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Hazard Analysis Techniques Performed on the M109 Howitzers Fire Control System
Name
Institution
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 2
Table of Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Commander's Control and Display Unit & Tactical Computer (CDU&TC) .............................. 6
Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 7
References ..................................................................................................................................... 15
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 3
Executive Summary
This paper details the hazard analysis of the M109 Howitzer fire control system. The
hazard assessment has been accomplished using the Hazard Analysis Types and Techniques
(PHL, PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA).The system comprises of different
elements, including Vehicle Reference Unit, Gunner's Display Unit (GDU), Vehicle Motion
Sensor (VMS), Commander's Control and Display Unit & Tactical Computer (CDU&TC) and
the Muzzle Velocity Radar (MVR). The assessment has revealed the existence of various hazards
that exist at different levels (see the filled-in Excel sheet attached alongside this document).
Every element, including hardware, system functions, energy sources, software, hazardous
operation and hazardous material has some inherent hazard factors. It is recommended that the
most appropriate measure of assuring health and safety is managing the systems to minimize
risks focusing on two levels: system management and personnel management. It is also
important to develop a checklist tailored to these areas. Monitoring and evaluation using tools
such as Root-cause analysis (RCA) are also critical for the M109 Howitzer fire control system
Introduction
M109 is self-propelled howitzer with a155 mm turret (Department of the Army, 1994). It
continues to serve as one of the most common indirect fire support weapons owned by armored
and mechanized infantry maneuver brigade divisions. The artillery often comprises of six crew
members: the driver, the section chief, two ammunition handlers, the gunner and assistant
gunner. The role of the gunner is to focus the cannon through movement, while the assistant gun
focuses the cannon through vertical movement. Since its introduction, M109 howitzer has now
undergone various system upgrades to increase its capability (Military Today, 2017). One of the
critical components in the M109 howitzer is the fire control systems. In acknowledgement of the
severe restrictions of operation that are placed on the modern combat machines by the traditional
methods of deployment and survey systems, part of the focus of the military engineers have been
to develop modular artillery fire control systems that are aimed at providing the highly adaptive
and effective solutions to keep abreast with the modern deployment environment. M109
howitzer is now fitted with the modular artillery fire control systems. The aim of this paper is to
perform a hazard analysis of M109 howitzer, focusing on its fire control systems.
The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System is designed to provide a computer-supported fire
operation, starting from preparation, identification of firing direction and controlling the fire
(Astronautics, 2018). It also provides digital integration for various fire support systems. The
mission planning and firing in digital environment, gun heading measurements and continuous
gun location supported by the Inertial Navigation Systems, accurate and rapid ballistic
calculations, displays of combat area on a digital map, precise and automated gun laying,
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 5
and fire command displays derived from ballistic calculation. The system can also use
information derived from Muzzle Velocity Radar to support muzzle velocity management and it
is integrated with NATO Armaments Ballistic Kernel that computes and provides firing
The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System comprises of various components. The key
components include the Vehicle Reference Unit, Gunner's Display Unit (GDU), Vehicle Motion
Sensor (VMS), Commander's Control and Display Unit & Tactical Computer (CDU&TC) and
the Muzzle Velocity Radar (MVR). The figure 1 below illustrates the key components of the
M109 Howitzer Fire Control System. The functions of these components are described in
sections as follows.
Figure 1: the key components of the M109 Howitzer Fire Control System (Astronautics, 2018).
The Vehicle Reference Unit comprises of the inertial navigation unit with either
embedded or external GPS receivers. This component is installed on the gun’s elevating mass
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 6
and functions to provide a precise output of the attitude and position of the weapons. The
purpose of the VRU component is performing all the attitude, navigation, north finding and
pointing functions.
The Commander's Control and Display Unit & Tactical Computer components provide
the man-machine interface. This system is often used by the gun’s commander. The gunner is
also provided with the similar unit to support the aiming functions. The component comprises of
a powerful computer process that provides overall system control, fire control computation, and
management. CDU&TC have high brightness backlights, the programmable keys for
manipulating functions and color liquid crystal displays to support user-machine interface. The
display is designed to allow a wide-angle viewing area, yet it also provides a high-resolution
image supported by high brightness rays to support sunlight readability. The system has buttons
that are placed on the front bezel to support menu-driven operations. In essence, the CDU&TC
offers different types of system management, as well as M109 Howitzer Fire Control System’s
task processing. The system level functions that this component discharges can be listed as the
generation of graphic display, ballistic computation, the on-board technical fire control and the
overall system mode control. The system is incorporated with software that allows customization
The gunner is also provided with a unit similar to the Commander's Control and Display
Unit & Tactical Computer to support the aiming functions. Like the CDU&TC, the component
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 7
comprises of a powerful computer process that provides overall system control, fire control
The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System is designed in a way that allows it to accept and
read inputs from the Muzzle Velocity Radar, which provides continuous monitoring of the gun
wear effects in a manner that is predictive, and thereby support the improvement of the ballistic
computation. The processing units of the Muzzle Velocity Radar, including the antennae, are
implanted in front of the cradle to enhance efficiency. The measurements derived from the MVR
kit are featured in the ballistic computation process, aided by a predictive algorithm. This feature
enables the M109 Howitzer Fire Control System to improve the effectiveness of the weapon
The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System is fitted with Vehicle Motion Sensors. This
component can be installed in the engine or planted in the gear transmission compartment. The
functions of the component are to provide the measurements of the wheels or tracking the speeds
of the Vehicle Reference Unit on course of the gun and vehicle movement. This feature is aimed
Methodology
The hazard assessment of the M109 Howitzer Fire Control System was accomplished
using the Hazard Analysis Types and Techniques (PHL, PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and
SRCA), based on the pre-designated system design building upon the preliminary hazard list
analysis was conducted in accordance with the PHL methodology presented by Ericson, (2016),
which guides that hazard analysis should be systematic; it should start with identifying the
potential hazard by drawing a preliminary hazard list, and then proceed to analyze the nature and
form of vulnerabilities as dictated by different hazard analysis types and techniques through
PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA. The table below summarizes the definitions of
vulnerabilities inherent to
system components
hazards
factors
criteria requirements
The list components that informs the scope of the analyses are varied and include: cannon
tube, subsystem cannon tube, breech bore evacuator, muzzle brake, thrust collar, travel lock,
hydraulic subsystem, rammer variable recoil, cannon equilibrator, power pack, actuating valve,
tray handle, blocking valve, cylinder valve, sighting subsystem, elbow telescope, panoramic
telescope, panoramic telescope, ballistic cover, alignment device, collimator, and dial sight. The
assessment task was to identify the hazards inherent to these components by filing the excel
sheet.
The scope of subsequent PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA was further
limited to hardware, system functions, energy sources, software, hazardous operation and
hazardous material. Thus, the analysis work largely entailed identifying the hazards, analyzing
Findings and Analysis of PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA
The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System analysis based on PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA,
O&SHA, and SRCA presents different forms of multi-faceted hazards, which have different
magnitudes of effects to the system, as well as the operating personnel and the successfulness of
the mission (see the filled-in Excel sheet attached along this paper). These different forms of
hazard can be broadly divided into five areas: hazardous components, hazardous functions,
Energy sources, hazardous operation and hazardous material. These areas are discussed in the
corresponding section.
Hazardous Components
The PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA analysis reveals various hazardous
functions associated with the M109 Howitzer Fire Control System, which poses different health
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 10
and safety risks. The associated risks largely have to do with likelihood of mission failure,
system destruction and causing injury to the personnel. The examples of hazards and associated
risks include the variable recoil system hitting the personnel that results either injury or damage
to the system itself. Another example of the hazard is failure of the M82 primer or M4 Series
Propelling Charges that results in the minute delay in the mission or possible mission failure.
Other examples of hardware hazards that could result in similar problems are computer button
failure, radio failure and monitor failure, among others. The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System
also relies on the computer to integrate the functions of Vehicle Reference Unit, Gunner's
Display Unit (GDU), Vehicle Motion Sensor (VMS), Commander's Control and Display Unit &
Tactical Computer (CDU&TC) and the Muzzle Velocity Radar (MVR). The computer works
based on the programmable software. The failure of the software can result in a number of risks,
including harming the personnel and destruction of system translating to mission failure. The
software is vulnerable to problems such as the virus and errors in programming that slows the
system or causes total failure. Software error could result cause the computer to displays
incorrect data or unreadable data, resulting in round landing off target, causing loss of personnel
and equipment. The unreadable computer display can also result in mission failure due to digital
communications.
Hazardous Functions
The PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA analysis of system function presents
various hazards associated with the M109 Howitzer Fire Control System. The effects of these
system hazards are also varied, including the harming the personnel, destruction of system and
mission failure. All the M109 Howitzer Fire Control Systems, which include Vehicle Reference
Unit, Gunner's Display Unit (GDU), Vehicle Motion Sensor (VMS), Commander's Control and
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 11
Display Unit & Tactical Computer (CDU&TC) and the Muzzle Velocity Radar (MVR) are
subject to hazards inherent to system components, material, hardware and software that could
Energy Sources
Based on PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA analysis, the M109 Howitzer
Fire Control System is presented with various hazardous energy sources. One of the energy
sources of the system is diesel, which is burnt to generate the system power. The system is also
fitted with a battery to provide energy to ignition circuit systems and power some operations.
The combustion of oil can by accompanied by the production of harmful gases such as carbon
monoxide that can cause illness, permanent neurological damage, loss of life. The battery can
also malfunction and cause the failure of the entire system and failure. A similar problem can be
Hazardous Operation
The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System is subject to various hazardous operations that
are revealed in PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA. For example, the GDU can fail
to display correct data, denying the crew the needed information to perform the mission. The
premature or late functioning of fuze up to 1 sec could cause the Round to detonate as close as
300 meters from tube, resulting in the injury to personnel and equipment. The loss
communication during fire mission can cause failure to receive emergency voice commands
resulting in failed mission. The propellant may fail to ignite properly in a cook off, which could
cause a blowback. This problem could lead to the potential injury or loss of life to personnel and
damage to the equipment. The operation failures are also associated with different human
factors. For example, the failure to inspect ammunition could result in unnecessary ammunition
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 12
malfunctions, which could cause bodily injury. The improper lay for elevation will result in
round impacting left or right of the target causing possible loss of life, while the wrong fuze
settings will result in premature or late round exploding, which could cause injury or loss of life
to personnel.
Hazardous Material
The M109 Howitzer Fire Control System also entails interaction to various hazardous
materials that could either harm the personnel or destroy system and limit the mission success, as
revealed by PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA. For example, tritium gas escaping
from the broke valves could be inhaled by operating personnel. This contact could cause
different health problems depending on exposure. It could also cause the system to fail to
illuminate and result in mission failure. The propellant charge disposal requires burning of
charges, and can lead to damage to environment or cause injuries to personnel and destruction to
the equipment. Diesel fuel spill during refueling could cause injury to eyes, skin, lungs and it is
an environmental hazard, too. Hydraulic fluid spill may cause swelling and redness to the skin.
It can also cause intestinal problems which could ultimately lead to death and presents an
other animals. If ingested can lead to severe diarrhea, vomiting, kidney failure and death.
In conclusion, the aim of this paper was to perform a hazard analysis of the M109
Howitzer, focusing on its fire control system. This analysis has been motivated by the
acknowledgement of the severe restrictions of operation that are placed on the modern combat
machines by the traditional methods of deployment and survey systems, which necessitates
questioning and assessing whether the artillery fire control systems are well placed to provide the
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 13
highly adaptive and effective solutions that keep abreast with the modern deployment
environment.
M109 Howitzer Fire Control System comprises of different elements, including Vehicle
Reference Unit, Gunner's Display Unit (GDU), Vehicle Motion Sensor (VMS), Commander's
Control and Display Unit & Tactical Computer (CDU&TC) and the Muzzle Velocity Radar
(MVR). The hazard assessment has been accomplished using the Hazard Analysis Types and
Techniques (PHL, PHA, SSHA, SHA, HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA). The PHL was interested in
hazards inherent to components of the subsystems, while the subsequent PHA, SSHA, SHA,
HHA, O&SHA, and SRCA narrowed on issues pertaining to hardware, system functions, energy
The assessment has revealed the existence of various hazards that exist at different levels
(see the attached filled-in Excel sheet). As can be inferred, every element, including hardware,
system functions, energy sources, software, hazardous operation and hazardous material has
some underlying hazard factors. More importantly, all the identified hazards have the potential of
causing serious health and safety risks such as fire explosions, environmental pollution,
In light of these issues, several recommendations can be put forth. Firstly, the safety
management team will need to first recognize that most hazards cannot be completely eliminated
because they are inherent to system components. Therefore, the most appropriate ramification
measures should include managing the systems to minimize risks. This process should be done at
two levels: system management and personnel management. In this case, the system
management level concerns itself with all the measures facing M109 Howitzer Fire Control
System, which include maintaining and upgrading systems to foster efficiency and reduce faults.
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 14
In contrast, personnel management focuses on addressing the human factor risks, which include
training and development of the human resource to improve their skills and capacity to assure
It will also important for the safety team to develop healthy and safety checklist tailored
to these areas. Monitoring and evaluation of system health and safety should also be continuous
and objective. Incidents and accidents should also be objectively documented to inform
corrective and preventative actions. The safety management team is presented with techniques
such as Root-cause analysis (RCA) for managing and preventing mishaps. Root-cause analysis
(RCA) spans processes, approaches, techniques, and tools that seek to identify and address the
cause of a problem to prevent it from recurring (Sue, 2017). In other words, RCA can be
conceived as an integrated approach that breaks down processes and systems and studies to
establish nonconformities, guided by questions such as what happened, why the incidents happen
and the changes that ought to be taken to prevent the problem. The model rightly assumes that
problems that occur in systems may be varied but traces to certain main causes that, if addressed,
would prevent other problems from happening. It then also rightly recognizes that system
components are so holistically related that they should be approached using an integrated system
approach. Like RCA, other tools such Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) also present
comprehensive and systematic steps for identifying and addressing the causes of errors that
compromise the health and safety (Dubale, Suleman, & Gurmesa, 2017). Evidently, the process
of managing health and safety within the M109 Howitzer Fire Control System can be seen to be
relatively demanding to the extent that it can be inferred to particularly count on informed
management.
HOWITZERS FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 15
References
us/press-room/Brochures/Command-Control-Comm-Computer-
Systems/FIRE_CONTROL_SYSTEMS_ENG.pdf
http://www.astronautics.co.il/land/artillery-fire-control-system
Department of the Army (1994). Operator’s Manual For Howitzer, Medium, Self-
Rights
Dubale, S., Suleman, S., & Gurmesa, A. (2017). Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) of
IV-Medication Process in Mettu Karl Hospital, Mettu Town, Oromiya Regional State,
research/article-data/CLROA-3-118/CLROA-3-118.pdf
Ericson, C. A. (2016). Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety (2nd ed.). Hoboken: John
Military Today (2017). M109: 155 mm self-propelled artillery system. Retrieved from
http://www.military-today.com/artillery/m109.htm
Sue, A. (2017). Root Cause Analysis (RCA) Getting to the Reasons for the Problem. 2017
NCALA Symposium People, Purpose and Passion Winston-Salem, NC October 10, 2017