A. Schutz and F. Kaufmann Sociology Between Science and Interpretation - Helling

A. Schutz and F.
Kaufmann: Sociology between Science and Interpretation

Author(s): Ingeborg Katharina Helling
Source: Human Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, Schutz Special Issue (1984), pp. 141-161
Published by: Springer
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Human Studies 7:141-161 (1984).
? Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.
A. SCHUTZ AND F. KAUFMANN: SOCIOLOGY BETWEEN

SCIENCE AND INTERPRETATION*
INGEBORG KATHARINA HELLING

Universit?t Bielefeld
Introduction
1. Relevance
Why present a paper on the intellectual relationship between Felix

Kaufmann and Alfred Schutz?
The different variants of 'phenomenological sociology' all base their
writings on the authority of Alfred Schutz. They rely on his description
of the formal structures of the life world and on his methodological
conception of social science. Depending on the relationship seen
between these core areas of Schutz' work, different conceptions of the
object and the methods of sociology emerge:1
(a) Concept and theory formation in the social sciences are restricted
by the pre-established 'first order' constructs of everyday thought.
(b) Concept and theory formation in the social sciences are not
restricted by 'first order' constructs, given that a phenomenological
analysis of the foundation of the basic concepts of social science
in the formal structure of everyday conceptions of the social
world has been provided.
Whereas in the early days of 'phenomenological sociology', a close

link between 'structures of the life world' and 'new sociological
methods' was assumed by ethnomethodologists and argued in the
methodological critique of 'conventional sociology', much has been
written recently about a more complex relationship between these areas
*A paper first presented at the meetings of the Ad Hoc Group 'Phenomenological Sociology,'
10th World Congress of Sociology, Mexico City, August, 16-21, 1982.
[35]
142 [36]
of Schutz's work
'phenomenologic
(Gorman, 1977), th
and genuine huma
The question of
science is thus no
but at the same
future developm
its empirical meth
In what follow
prescriptions are
a higher-order un
and context (Ber
recent discussion
1981). Neither sha
Instead, I start fr
dological concepts
Weber or Felix K
use Kaufmann in
This exercise, as
methodological po
that the more ra
Another reason fo
work which has
menologically orie
2. Data
The relationship
the basis of two s
(a) references to e
1929, 1936a, 193
(b) unpublished pa
other's works.
II. History
Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) and Felix Kaufmann (1895-1949) both

studied law, ecomonics and sociology in Vienna after World War I
[37] 143
and received the
a doctorate in ph
post of Privatdo
positions while
academic after h
regarded, accord
career only three
of Kaufmann's a
Austrian univers
und Staatswisse
careers as we kn
autobiography,
The legal philos
men's intellect
Schutz writes in
'made Kaufmann
intensive think
(1978, p. 389) be
Whereas Schutz
the social scienc
interest covered
philosophy, logic
a narrow concept
of social science
(cf. Schutz, 1932
According to S
6416) and his re
6836), Kaufman
Viennese days; he
In those days I
the same time w
schaft [Logic
attempted 'to r
for its neo-Kan
ology.'5 He enco
first volume of
greatly admiring
my own problem
eigenen Problem
Internal Time C
of Bergson's ph
144 [38]
and Transcendental Logic, which was published in 1929: I
immediately caught on to Husserl's thinking and language because
he now focused upon the problem of intersubjectivity, and I
recognized the importance of his thinking for all the questions
occupying me.
Schutz and Kaufmann spent long and regular hours reading Husserl
together, yet they had a somewhat different interest: according to
Schutz (SP 6379-6414), Kaufmann's interest in Husserl was not like
Schutz's in 'the problems of noema and noesis and transcendental
logic but rather in formal logic as an analytical a priori, the idea of
a mathesis universalis, signification and meaning.'
On Kaufmann's engagement with the Vienna Circle, Schutz writes:
'Kaufmann was never a member and refused to be considered as such,
yet attended their meetings regularly' (SP 6379-6414). In the
Kaufmann papers, which contain lengthy scholarly exchanges with
almost all members of the Vienna Circle, we find a document con?
cerning Kaufmann's refusal: Prior to the publication of the program?
matic essay 'Scientific Conception of the World ? the Vienna Circle'
(1929), which marked the beginning of the Vienna Circle as a philo?
sophical school, Kaufmann received a letter from Carnap (26 February
1929; KP 08078-08063), then secretary of the Ernst Mach Society,
asking him to submit a list of his publications in preparation of the
pamphlet launching the Vienna Circle. Kaufmann refuses. Carnap (2
July 1929) answers: '. . . we do understand and honor the reasons you
gave and therefore shall not, according to your wish, list you in the
planned pamphlet. Of course neither your scientific nor your personal
relations to our circle will be disturbed in the least by your decision.'
(The letter includes a receipt documenting Kaufmann's membership in
the Ernst Mach Society founded in 1928, the forerunner of the Vienna
Circle.) And indeed, Kaufmann had a working relationship with the
members of the Vienna Circle in America throughout his life.6
Despite serious personal difficulties in their friendship Schutz and
Kaufmann kept their relationship on the intellectual level and went on
to quote each others' works.
III. Systematics
1. Matters of agreements
What emerges from the published texts of Schutz and Kaufmann is a

lifelong 'division of labor' between the two scholars: Schutz, writing
[39] 145
about methodolog
about concrete pr
structure of socia
world.7 For inst
the Social World
references (after
(1936a) Methoden
(1932) hold the fo
Collected Papers
Social Sciences (19
when dealing with
There is no space
ology of the soc
areas of Schutz's
this paper, spend
A phenomenologi
work. Kaufmann
logical atomism a
him, experience h
it is a simple giv
structural simplic
fully active ('spo
which cannot b
knowledge, which
levels ('strata of
existence of an ob
activation of for
pations') which ar
subjective confirm
with the logical p
cutting short an
view. Conceiving
of verification as
the relationship b
verification, they
Kaufmann's mo
following concep
Social and natura
objects are const
through both spo
146 [40]
because the syntheses involved are of a different kind ? in the social
sciences they involve the interpretation of objects as symptoms of acts
of consciousness of other persons.
It is erroneous to conceive of human actions as observable physical

facts, and this applies to artifacts and institutions. In all these
instances there is indeed reference to the observation of physical
facts (social facts are not intramental), but we do not observe
actions qua actions, artifacts qua artifacts, institutions qua
institutions [. . .] every interpretation of social facts presupposes
a fundamental interpretation, namely that of the underlying
physical fact as a social fact (Kaufmann, 1944, p. 166).
However,
phenomena of meaning do not constitute an autonomous domain

of knowledge independent of facts. The thought of another person
as analogous to one's own thinking can be assumed as a hypothesis
about not directly observable objects, e.g. atoms in physics
(1936b, p. 64 ff.).
The chief difference between rules of procedure concerning pro?
positions about the pyscho-physical world and those concerning
propositions about the physical world is that the protocol pro?
positions are of a different kind. In the psycho-physical domain
they imply interpretations by which psycho-pysical facts are
correlated with physical facts. But the two kinds of protocol
propositions have an essentially similar status in scientific pro?
cedure. Both can be sufficient conditions for the acceptance or
elimination of singular propositions ( 1944, p. 126).
On this basis, Kaufmann sees surprisingly little difference between

explanation and understanding. Just as there is not one and only one
explanation of a fact, there is not one and only one understanding of
social facts. In both cases, the following questions have to be asked:
What data (physical data/psycho-physical data) are to form the basis of
the explanation/understanding? What general laws of experience are to
form the basis of the explanation/understanding? Under which con?
ditions will the explanation/understanding of an object be considered
successful (1936a, pp. 71, 163-165)? The definition of both, under?
standing and explanation (1936a, p. 71), is the 'incorporation of facts
into general contexts of experience,' and in both cases laws and singular
facts (initial conditions) are required.
A conventionalist conception of laws enables Kaufmann to conceive
of ideal types as theoretical laws:
[41] 147
Just as, in general, laws are nothing but general assumptions, i.e.
rational reconstructions set up on the basis of pre-established
experience, which have to be continuously confirmed by facts,
the idealtypical interpretative schemes are rational reconstructions
of meaningfully comprehensible action. The lawfulness crucial for
sociological rules is lawfulness of understanding (1936a, p. 228).
As a consequence, Kaufmann defines the concept of society as 'a field

of application of certain interpretive schemes ("laws of understanding")
for social relations' (1936a, p. 208).
His concrete treatment of idealtypes is based on Schutz's analysis of
the modes of perception of alter ego and of the time structure of action.
In a formulation close to the spirit of the Vienna Circle and quite
foreign to many contemporary followers of Schutz, Kaufmann
introduces Schutz's analyses of the social world as an answer to the
question: what are the truth-criteria of propositions about the meaning
of actions of other persons? 'The manner of verification and therewith
the meaning of such judgments depends on the relative spatio-temporal
position of the person making the judgment and of the actor' (1936a,
p. 157). Truth criteria of statements vary with respect to the directness/
indirectness of the symptoms used to establish the validity of a
judgment (Schutz, 1932: 'Mitwelt, Umwelt, Vorwelt'). The concept
'objective meaning' provides no procedural significance without the
specification of a scheme of interpretation. (This variation of the
meaning of judgments relative to interpretive schemes is, in principle,
also true for the natural sciences.)
In turn, in The Phenomenology of the Social World, Shutz often
quotes Kaufmann's paper 'Sociale Kollektiva' (1929) and his writings
in legal philosophy, mathematics and logic; especially, important is
the reference to Kaufmann's application of the concept of invariance
to key concepts of legal philosophy, sociology and economics.
Kaufmann's interpretation of ideal types as 'theoretical social laws'
has already been quoted. I regard the concept of invariance of meaning,
motives, etc., as essential to Schutz's methodology, that is to that
element of his methodology that I have called the 'scientific rigor'
element, as opposed to the 'adquacy' element (Helling, 1979). Schutz
writes:
We have shown how the two most advanced 'theoretical' social

sciences ? pure economics and jurisprudence ? make use of ideal
typical constructs (in our sense) in order to delimit their subject
area and establish an objective context of meaning. What is true
148 [42]
for the theoretical social sciences is generally true for all social
sciences. Subjective meaning contexts are comprehended [scien?
tifically] by means of a process in which that which is scien?
tifically relevant in them is separated from that which is irrelevant.
This process is made possible by an antecedently given highest
interpretive scheme which defines once and for all the nature of
the constructs which may be used (1932, p. 283; 1967, p. 248).
The problem of the adequacy of methods to their objects of inquiry

in Schutz's methodology can be approached from this angle. In this
view, Schutz's call for the adequacy of methods in the social sciences
is counteracted by his view that the objects of the life-world become
objects of social science in a process governed by scientific perspectives,
and described by Kaufmann as 'the process of the transformation of an
object of experience into an object of inquiry.' There is, then, for
Schutz and Kaufmann, no simple dominance of the objects of
experience over methods, but an interaction between them.
Empirical social sciences, in Schutz's and Kaufmann's view, work on
the level of objects of inquiry. For the rules governing this level, Schutz
(in his American period) uses Kaufmann's (1944) concepts. The process
of selection of observations for an ideal type is governed by the
'scientific problem,' which in turn is determined by the 'scientific
situation,' i.e., the stage of development of a discipline. Work in the
social sciences has to follow the 'rules of procedure' of a discipline,
which are the established methods, concepts and lines of argument of
that discipline. In this interpretation of Schutz's methodology, the
description of The Structures of the Life World (Schutz and Luckmann
1973) therefore belongs not to sociology in the narrow sense, but to a
'protosociology' (Luckmann, 1976).
The propositions of the social sciences can be verified empirically,
but to this end one must use the phenomenological concept of
experience, in which neither physical nor social objects are given in
perception 'immediately.' Kaufmann's descriptions of 'spontaneous'
and 'receptive' elements of experience, and the incorporation of
individual perceptions into a context of experience for both kinds of
objects and of protocol sentences in the social sciences are relevant here.
Schutz and Kaufmann do not propose a total difference of the
natural and social sciences. Rather, on the level of the logic of expla?
nation, both take a moderate unity-of-science view. On the level of the
establishment and control of propositions, they do show considerable
differences.
[43] 149
2. Matters of dispute
Whereas no methodological disagreements between Schutz and

Kaufmann can be inferred from the published writings, differences of
opinion are emerging from their correspondence (KP 11539-11634).
For the sake of brevity I shall here skip the accounts of common aims
and opinions in the correspondence (see Appendix) and documents and
sum up the areas of disagreement.
On understanding. In a letter of August 27, 1930, Schutz refers to
some principal reservations concerning your concept 'of under?

standing' (causal reduction to psychic objects) [kausale Reduktion
auf Psychisches] which are, I think, closely intertwined with the
problems of Husserl's position that have become questionable to
me [. . .] the 'theory of neutralisation,' the opposition of'hyletic
data' and 'noema,' the principal possibility of 'regional ontologies'
(Otaca's problem) and more.
On the natural attitude. In a letter to Kaufmann (17 July 1945)

Schutz defends his conception of the natural attitude and its role in the
systems of knowledge.
I fully agree with what you say about the relation between epoche
and skepsis, the difference between systematically uncovering the
various strata of the meaning of existence and the presupposed
doubt in existential positing. But this is a problem in the theoretical
sphere, a problem of science, of logic, [. . .] of phenomenology.
Indeed, the paragraph of Formal and Transcendental Logic you
quote refers, as is evident from its context, to the scientist's con?
cept of reality and truth. It refers to scientific apophantic judg?
ment [. . .] On this level of the problem everything you say is
correct. Granting you this, I cannot see why it should be incom?
patible with my conception of the natural attitude and of epoche.
The natural attitude refers to the life-world, which, being one and
unified, is also the substratum of apophantic, and, possibly,
critical scientific judgment. But in the natural attitude the con?
cept of reality is not gained through judgment. From the start the
life-world is taken for granted in the way in which it appears,
unless motives appear which run counter to this general supposition.
But just this general positing [Generalansetzung] ofthe life-world
as given, taken for granted [Fragloses], something beyond doubt
I have called the 'epoche of the natural attitude' which involves
refraining from doubt, not from belief. The point is the naive
attitude of man in the world, who poses its existence simply as
real. It may be that calling such an attitude 'epoche is incom?
patible with Husserl's terminology.
150 [44]
On the proper scope of methodology. Congratulating Kaufmann
on his book The Methodology of the Social Sciences Schutz writes
(21 October 1944):
I believe that arguments can be raised only against the principal

premises of the book. These accepted, the argument is stringent
and for the most part, cannot be challenged [. . . My arguments
relate] to problems not treated in the book, problems which I
regard as essential elements of a methodology of the social
sciences. I can't see how a specific methodology of social science
and its themes can be developed without intensively treating the
problems of action, communication, intersubjectivity, of sub?
jective and objective meaning, and the structure of the formation
of types in the social sciences; and in particular, without going
into the relationship of the interpretation of the social world by
those living and acting in it to the interpretation of this same
world by the social scientist.
Kaufmann (29 October 1944) answers:
You have surely understood that I was troubled by the question of

how deep to dig the foundations and how broad to build the
structure, and that compromises between different perspectives
are inevitable [. . .] I hope that I was able to make my main point
sufficiently clear, namely the difference between deductive logic
and methodology, so that it can serve as an orientation for future
research [. . .] In order to clarify the relation between your and
my analyses it is important to see that I deal exclusively with the
structure of scientific research, and therefore the problems of
social interaction [Umwelt] with their constitutive strata do not
became thematic on this level. The types of social science, on the
other hand, are theoretical laws in my framework. The question
of the formation of types in my book appears as the rational
reconstruction of rules of higher order: none of the problems you
raise, for the 'objective stratum' is lost this way. However, this
stratum [of meaning] cannot be transcended in methodological
analysis. The methodologist, too has his 'brackets' and must obey
this limitation.
In his memorial speech for Kaufmann, Schutz seems to accept

Kaufmann's position. (But what is the truth-value of memorial
speeches?)
On the natural and the scientific attitude. On the differences between
the natural attitude and the scientific attitude which Kaufmann seems
to have questioned, Schutz (25 September 1945) sums up his position
as follows:
[45] 151
[The question of] the degree of coherence [in both systems of

knowledge] is variable in both cases. I should think that its limits
depend on the scope of the projects involved [problems posed]
and the systems of relevance emerging from them. This essentially
comes to th? same thing as your formulation: that they depend
on the practical aims and on the stage of development of science.
(I would prefer to simply speak of the stage of 'knowledge,'
respectively - in the theoretical sphere ? of the stage of develop?
ment of science.) So far we are in agreement, except that even
in the case of identical or typically identical selections the
different interpretations of meaning involved would still justify
distinguishing a particular theoretical province [of meaning]. But
the selections cannot be identical, since in the world of working
the selecting factor is the pragmatic motive with all its systems
of relevance emerging from the fundamental anxiety. The
theoretical thinker, on the other hand, is free ofthe fundamental
anxiety but, for this very reason, also set apart from the 'world
within reach,' the time dimension of the pure we-relationship,
etc. His system of relevance is exclusively determined by the
aporetic general situation as pregiven in a preconstituted science
by the procedural governing any possible solution of his problems.
You yourself have described and analyzed this situation with
incomparable clarity. This is the starting point of all the problems
you deal with in your book, and the manner in which you unfold
these problems and carry through their analysis is in my opinion
not invalidated by any of my approaches [durch keinen meiner
Ans?tze in ihrer Entfaltung und Durchf?hrung behindert wird].
Finally, even if the selections and interpretations of meaning were
identical (which as I have argued they are not, in my view), one
could hardly say that the different basic attitudes [. . .] involved
would not justify contrasting the world of working and the
theoretical world [world of science] since only these basic
attitudes constitute the different finite provinces of meaning [. . .]
In conclusion, I believe (1) what is crucial are not the selections
[involved] but the different interpretations of meaning; (2) the
selections, too, are of necessity different in both cases; (3) how?
ever, if they were not, the world of working as a finite province of
meaning would still have to be contrasted with the theoretical
province of meaning since both involve fundamentally different
'attitudes' (tensions of consciousness) and are incommensurable
with regard to their style and achievement. This is not contradicted
by the fact that the one and unitary life world underlies both
spheres and that the systems of coherence have or may have a
similar structure. The latter is all the less surprising since both
theoretical thinking and working are 'performances' and therefore
in project and intention refer to the context of prior experience
and the regulative principles implied.
152 [46]
IV. Concluding r
We have seen th
their publicati
correspondence
seems to be the
some places, th
the sciences can
analysis of the s
Kaufmann, how
methods of th
methodology is
note that these
and Kaufmann
as a result of ch
States.
On a less general level, Schutz and Kaufmann seem to disagree on
the concept of understanding. Schutz accuses Kaufmann's concept
of understanding of 'causal reduction.' But why, except for strategic
reasons, does Schutz use Kaufmann's definition of protocol sentences
in the social sciences which reflects Kaufmann's concept of under?
standing and refers to his own analysis of the modes of perception of
social objects, if he rejects that very concept?
Further why does Schutz invoke Kaufmann's 'rules of procedure'
and 'operational rules' and 'the jurisdiction of each discipline over its
methods' which are not based on the analyses asked for by Schutz?
Whereas Schutz and Kaufmann disagree on the scope of method?
ology they seem to agree on methodological rules in a narrower sense.
Though such agreement/disagreement is logically correct, it offers no
solution to the pressing requirement for an integrated philosophy/
methodology of 'phenomenlogical sociology.' In a next step, therefore
the materials of this paper must be analysed without regard to their
authors' intention of displaying agreement.
V. Appendix: the Schutz-Kaufmann correspondence (KP 11539?11634)
In order to enable the reader to judge for himself/herself, I here present

an annotated selection of letters from the Schutz-Kaufmann
correspondence (full letters, sections of letters and some summaries by
[47] 153
the present autho
intellectual frien
discussion betwee
personal and admi
Two periods can
between Schutz
and 1939, only t
between 1944 an
1939, the reason fo
10 July 1930: Sch
his work: T am co
working mainly t
in my attempts [.
27 August 1930:
he has 'intensive
book on mathem
congratulates Ka
his treatment of
understood as a th
of Husserl's Logik
[reading] this boo
are now becomin
"theory of neut
"noema," the poss
problem] and mor
of more or less
admiration I expe
you agree, I would
and also the chan
seems to me to ha
have a change to
concerning your
psychic objects),
problems of Huss
3 February 1932:
manuscript of Der
ology of the Socia
unable to make
exhaustion. T am
namely, for point
154 [48]
for justly requir
results are dep
Kaufmann's req
note (in paragra
Whereas in the
World he is full
discussion with
fact, not [. . .] c
[. . .] would be v
contrary) but is s
In his commen
above letter, Ka
places the book
the purpose of S
in social science
implicit presupp
the method of i
the meaning of
of an argument
has become [. .
mystery, as [a] t
by the second m
fit this interpre
fact that the con
logically, does no
ous meaning ofth
ment? At this s
for, but the tr
covariance, invar
the selection [o
subjective mom
relativity with r
of overcoming d
of perception [.
complications [ar
The external wor
means of self-ex
on to discuss the
19 April 1932: Sc
der socialen We
[49] 155
encouragement, y
belief in the still
By this you have d
20 June 1932: Sc
which had been p
with Kelsen he con
reception that yo
case also. So far, I
three more times.
of "Studies"12 alr
achievement the i
cannot be evaluate
correctly grasped
further independ
end of his appret
questions troublin
theory of types, pr
sleep and the unit
ological category
metaphysics, whic
this metaphysica
manner in which it
systems [...].'
Schutz thanks Ka
study and comme
(seven pages) to y
It deals with our o
and I shall let yo
Studying the Lo
beautiful evening
issues. I now kno
must disagree. W
. [Formal and Tran
joy: I now doubt
indubitable to me
Several letters fr
Kaufmann's Meth
the individual cha
of course, your re
In 1939, after som
156 [50]
friends to leave G
In 1944, we hav
them about their
21 October 1944
Methodology of
raised only with
these, the argum
challenged [. . .]
the book, proble
ology of the soc
of social science
treating the prob
subjective and ob
of types in the s
relationship of t
and acting in it t
scientist.' Kaufm
understood that
the foundations
promises between
I was able to ma
difference betw
serve as an orien
relation between
deal exclusively w
the problem of
strata do not bec
on the other han
of the formation
struction of rule
the "objective st
meaning] canno
methodologist, to
25 September 1
letter of 21 Sep
disagreement is
discussed many y
agreement [. . .]
one important po
your principal th
[51] 157
with you that phil
implications [of t
reflection the diff
addition, I merely
in the world of w
general: theoretic
pre-theoretical sp
earlier works you
they come about a
the formation of
description of th
regards these imp
stop where you st
of the analyses atte
or to the consequen
Perhaps another le
missing) will clarif
refers to quite oft
fully agree with w
skepsis, the differ
strata of the mean
existential positing
der verschiedenen
supposierten Zwei
the theoretical sph
ology. Indeed, the
quote refers, as is
reality and truth.
through constant
evident self-given
case of this "broa
factual. [Wirlichke
dieses "weitesten
Reale.] On this lev
Granting you this,
conception of the
refers to the life
einheitliche), is a
critical scientific
of reality is not
158 [52]
world is taken
motives appear w
this general posi
given, taken for
called the "epoch
from doubt, not
the world, who p
such an attitude
this attitude is t
start from here
various other sph
On the differen
attitude which
his position (in
degree of cohere
cases. I should th
involved [problem
them. This essen
that they depend
of science (I wou
respectively, in
science.) So far
identical or typic
meaning involv
theoretical pro
identical, since
pragmatic motiv
fundamental an
free of the fund
apart from the
we-relationship,
by the aporetic g
by the procedura
You yourself h
incomparable cla
you deal with in
problems and c
invalidated by an
ihrer Entfaltun
selections and in
[53] 159
have argued they
different basic at
world by mean o
the solution of th
in the second ? wo
the theoretical wo
constitute the dif
objects of the pre
are not the selecti
meaning; (2) the
cases; (3) however,
province of mea
theoretical provi
different "attitu
surable with regar
not contradicted b
lies both spheres a
similar structure
theoretical thinki
project and intent
regulative princip
Notes
1. For a detailed analysis

der Konstrukte erster u
und Anwendung' (Hell
2. For access to the (m
Sozialwissenschaftliches
and Mathias Michailow.
3. For more detailed ac
Wagner (1983).
4. H. Wagner (personal
5. I here use Nagel's ter
(1978, p. ix). Schutz, 'H
(1977).
6. Especially with Carnap and Hempel, for a discussion of substantial differences and
similarities between Kaufmann's views and the position of the Vienna Circle; see Helling
(forthcoming).
7. Though necessary for a discussion of Schut's conception of methodology, I am forced to
neglect the Schutz-Gurwitsch correspondence (Grathoff & Turpin, 1981) for lack of
space.
8. See my introduction (Helling, forthcoming) to Kaufmann's Methodological Writings in the
Social Sciences which will contain a translation Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften
160 [54]
(Kaufmann, 1936a). All quotations from 1936a are taken from this forthcoming edition.
9. In an early formulation by Waismann (1930, p. 229), this principle says: 'If there is no
way of indicating under what circumstances a proposition is true, then the proposition
has no meaning at all, for the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification
[...] a statement which cannot be verified definitively is not verifiable at all.' (Kann auf
kein Weise angegeben werden, wenn ein Satz wahr ist, so hat der Satz ?berhaupt keinen
Sinn; denn der Sinn eines Satzes ist die Methode seiner Verifikation .. . eine Aussage, die
nicht endg?ltig verifiziert werden kann, ist ?berhaupt nicht verifizierbar.'
10. I assume that Logik refers to Husserl (1929) Formale und Transzendentale Logik.
11. This passage nicely illustrates the argument of Srubar's paper in this issue.
12. I assume that 'Studies' refers to the texts published as Experience and Judgment (Husserl,
1938).
13. Husserl had asked Schutz to review these books.
14. Schutz defines the task he set himself similarly in his correspondence with Parsons
(Grathoff, 1978).
15. 'Wirken' has been translated as 'affecting the other' by Walsh and Lehnert in Schutz
(1967), but in the present context 'working' or 'acting' seems more appropriate.
References
Embree, L. Husserl and his influence on me. Annals of Phenomenological Sociology. 1977,
41-44.
Gorman, R.A. The Dual Vision. Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977.
Grathoff, R. Alfred Schutz. In D. K?sler (Ed.), Klassiker des soziologischen Denkens. M?nchen,
1978.
Grathoff, R. & Turpin, G. (Eds.). The Schutz-Gurwitch Correspondence. Ms, Sozialwissenschaft?
liches Archive Konstanz, 1981.
Grathoff, R. (Ed.). The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and
Talcott Parsons. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.
Helling, I.K. Zur Theorie der Konstrukte erster und zweiter Ordnung bei A. Schutz. Ph.D.
dissertation, Konstantz, 1979.
Helling, I.K. Introduction. In Kaufmann, F. Methodological Writings in the Social Sciences. I.K
Helling (Ed.), Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel (forthcoming).
Husserl, E. Logische Untersuchungen. Halle (Saale): Niemeyer, 1913-21.
Husserl, E. Logical Investigation. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities, 1970.
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Halle (Saale): Niemeyer, 1929.
Husserl, E. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortr?ge. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff,
1963.
Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
Husserl, E. Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Generalogie der Logik. Hamburg: Classen
undBovents, 1948.
Husserl, E. Experience and Judgment: Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
Husserl, E. Ideen zu einer reinen Ph?nomenologie und ph?nomenologischen Philosophie.
Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950.
Husserl, E. Ideas. London: Macmillan, 1962.
Kaufmann, F. Sociale Kollektiva. Zeitschrift f?r National?konomie I (1929-30), 294-308.
Kaufmann, F'. Methodenlehre der Sozialwissenschaften. Wien: Springer, 1936a.
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28: 64-84.
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Kaufmann, F. Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism. In M. F?rber (Ed.), Philosophical
Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl. Westport: Greenwood, 1968.
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(note a translation of 1936a).
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1978.
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Boston: Reidel (forthcoming).
Luckmann, Th. Phenomenology and Sociology. Ms 1977.
Popper, K.R. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. Long: Fontera/Collins, 1976.
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of Schutz, 1932).
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Schutz, A. & Luckmann, Th. The Structures ofthe Life-World. London: Heinemann, 1973.
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Thomason, B. Making Sense of Reification. London: Heinemann, 1982.
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229-248.

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A. Schutz and F.

Kaufmann: Sociology between Science and Interpretation

A. SCHUTZ AND F. KAUFMANN: SOCIOLOGY BETWEEN

INGEBORG KATHARINA HELLING

Why present a paper on the intellectual relationship between Felix

Whereas in the early days of 'phenomenological sociology', a close

Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) and Felix Kaufmann (1895-1949) both

What emerges from the published texts of Schutz and Kaufmann is a

It is erroneous to conceive of human actions as observable physical

phenomena of meaning do not constitute an autonomous domain

On this basis, Kaufmann sees surprisingly little difference between

As a consequence, Kaufmann defines the concept of society as 'a field

We have shown how the two most advanced 'theoretical' social

The problem of the adequacy of methods to their objects of inquiry

Whereas no methodological disagreements between Schutz and

some principal reservations concerning your concept 'of under?

On the natural attitude. In a letter to Kaufmann (17 July 1945)

I believe that arguments can be raised only against the principal

Kaufmann (29 October 1944) answers:

You have surely understood that I was troubled by the question of

In his memorial speech for Kaufmann, Schutz seems to accept

[The question of] the degree of coherence [in both systems of

V. Appendix: the Schutz-Kaufmann correspondence (KP 11539?11634)

In order to enable the reader to judge for himself/herself, I here present

1. For a detailed analysis

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