Colloquium 5

W h y Plato Never H a d a Theory of Forms

K e n n e t h Sayre

I.
Perhaps I should begin with assurances that my title is meant
to be taken seriously I really do believe that Plato never had a
theory of Forms, and I consider it the main task of this occasion
to explain why I believe this. The title, nonetheless, requires a
certain amount of clarification. For one thing, there is a matter
of emphasis. What I believe, and want to argue, is that Plato
never had a theory of Forms, not that he never had a theory of
Forms. The latter emphasis would suggest that, although he
never had a theory of Forms, Plato might have had a theory of
something else that is c o m p a r a b l y i m p o r t a n t - a t h e o r y of
virtue, for example, or a theory of learning as recollection. In
point of fact, I believe that Plato never had a theory of these
other things either, for reasons very similar to those I shall offer
for believing he never had a theory of Forms. But my present
concern on this occasion is with the latter specifically.
Caution may be due also with regard to the claim that it is
Plato who never had a theory of Forms, as distinct from Plato's
Socrates, or from the actual Socrates himself. As far as the his-
torical Socrates is concerned, we have the direct testimony of
Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b30) that he did not invest his univer-
sals with independent existence, as well as the indirect evidence
of Xenophon's Memorabilia, to show that Socrates' philosophic
interests were far more practical than theoretical. To be sure,
there are certain views attributed to a youthful Socrates at the
beginning of Plato's Parmenides that are easily read as a rudi-
mentary theory of Forms; but this is just one of several indica-
tions that the portrayal of Socrates in this particular dialogue
was not intended to be historical. Be this as it may, it is not part
of my present task to engage in the hazardous enterprise of
extracting a Socratic philosophy from the words spoken by
Socrates in the dialogues.
A more likely source of confusion regarding persons is the ten-
dency of many readers to equate Plato's views with the views
expressed by Socrates in one or another dialogue. This tendency
should be resisted, not only because the character Socrates
expresses widely differing views in different dialogues, and
because the views he expresses are often laced with irony, but
also because Plato turns his conversations over to other protago-
nists in the very dialogues where his own views seem to reach
their most mature formulation. Prominent examples are the
Sophist and the Statesman, which feature a mysterious Stranger
from Elea, as well as the Parmenides and the Timaeus which share
their names with their main protagonists. If Plato ever sought
o c c a s i o n to w o r k h i s o w n v i e w s into t h e d i a l o g u e s he
authored—which seems not unlikely—he had plenty of charac-
ters available to serve as spokespersons. The claim I want to
advance in this discussion, however, is not merely that none of
the views expressed by Plato's major characters adds u p to a
proper theory of Forms. What I want to argue is that Plato him-
self—the author of the d i a l o g u e s - d i d not have a theory that
meets this description. One component of my argument to this
effect will be that no such theory is to be found in the dialogues.
But my primary goal is to support a claim in this regard about
Plato himself.
The auxiliary claim that there is no theory of Forms in the dia-
logues, however, may strike one as sufficiently problematic to be
worth discussion in itself. There are many readers of Plato,
undoubtedly—students and professional scholars alike—who
would be inclined to say that it is obvious that the dialogues con-
tain a theory of Forms. Indeed, not a few readers have gone into
print purporting actually to have found a theory there them-
selves. So let us begin with the more restricted thesis that there
is no theory of Forms in the dialogues proper, and set aside the
question of what Plato himself believed for a later stage in the
argument.
One preliminary indication that there is no theory of Forms in
the dialogues is that there is no single dialogue to which a read-
er might turn to find such a theory expressly stated. The closest
one could come, I venture to suggest, would be Parmenides'
brief description of a certain conception of the Forms in the
opening pages of his namesake dialogue, followed by a series of
arguments aimed at showing what is wrong with this concep-
tion. But if this description counts as presentation of a theory, it
does so only in the manner of Socrates' criticism of Protagoras'
views in the Theaetetus, or of the S t r a n g e r ' s c r i t i c i s m of
Parmenides' views in the Sophist. In claiming that no theory of
Forms is to be found in the dialogues, my point is not to deny
that this view of the Forms is one of several philosophic views
discussed on their pages—discussed in these cases for purposes
of refutation. My point is that there is no single place in the dia-
logues where one could turn to find such a theory actually being
advocated.
There are many passages in the middle and later dialogues, of
course, to which one could turn to find isolated discussions of
the Forms from which a general theory of some sort might be
pieced together. Notable instances are the comparison between
Forms and sensible things in the Phaedo (78Bff.) undertaken by
Socrates as part of an argument for the immortality of the soul,
the account of participation in the Forms as a type of causation
given later in the same dialogue, and the discussion of the
Forms as objects of knowledge centered around the great images
of the Sun, the Line and the Cave in the Republic. In claiming
that there is no theory of Forms in Plato's writings, I certainly
am not denying the existence of these passages, or of many oth-
ers like them, that tell us a great deal about how Plato thought
of the Forms. These passages have been sufficiently informa-
tive, indeed, to have encouraged any number of commentators
and historians of philosophy actually to formulate one or anoth-
er theory of Forms in Plato's behalf. My present point is that
Plato himself never formulated a comprehensive account of the
sort that writers of textbooks and of histories of philosophy
seem to require in order to get on with their appointed business.
If Plato had seen fit to formulate a theory of Forms in his own
behalf, then these latter-day authors might have been spared the
trouble. As matters stand, the comprehensive theories found in
the textbooks and histories remain theories composed by these
authors and attributed to Plato, as distinct from any single theory
appearing in Plato's own writings.
Someone sympathetic with the art of philosophic synopsis,
however, might object that I am being unfair here to the writers
of textbooks and histories, perhaps even to the point of accusing
them of being unfaithful to the dialogues. Is there that much
difference after all, the objector might ask, between Plato dis-
cussing the Forms in many isolated comments, and a later writer
collecting these comments together and boiling them down into
a comprehensive theory? Provided that this later distillation
does not represent a misunderstanding of what Plato wrote in
the dialogues, moreover, what harm is there in thinking of the
resulting theory as one incipiently present in the dialogues
themselves? Lest it appear that I am making too much of this
distinction between a general theory of Forms, which I claim
cannot be found in Plato's writings, and what the objector might
describe as "raw material" for a general theory, which can be
found in abundance, let us look at a well known example of a
general theory of Forms constructed not long ago in Plato's
behalf.
In his paper, "The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of
Ideas" (Cherniss 1965), Harold Cherniss draws attention to the
second-hand report by Simplicius of a mathematical problem
s u p p o s e d l y assigned by Plato to e n t e r i n g m e m b e r s of the
Academy. The problem was that of working out an hypothesis
that would explain the seemingly diverse motions of the planets
in t e r m s of c o m b i n a t i o n s of r e g u l a r m o t i o n s . The s a m e
approach adopted to philosophical problems, Cherniss says, is
expressed in the Phaedo, where Plato has Socrates explain the
method of hypothesis which he applied in studying earthly phe-
nomena, and which according to Cherniss (1965, 1) was said by
Socrates to result in the "Theory of Ideas." Primary among phe-
nomena to be accounted for, Cherniss goes on to say, were mat-
ters of ethics, epistemology and ontology. With regard to the
former, Plato is supposed to have argued that the possibility of
ethical distinctions "implies objective differences which can be
accounted for only by the hypothesis of substantive Ideas"
(1965, 3). The Theaetetus is understood by Cherniss to be Plato's
attempt "to prove that the theory of Ideas is a necessary hypoth-
esis for the solution of the problems of epistemology" (1965, 7).
As far as ontology is concerned, "it is necessary that the objects
of knowledge be real entities existing apart from the phenome-
nal world" (1965, 8) in order to provide objects for the direct
mental awareness of which knowledge consists. Phenomena in
all three domains, Cherniss concludes in Plato's behalf, "can be
explained only by assuming a world of Ideas as the source of
phenomenal characteristics" (1965,11); and the account that pro-
vides these explanations is just the "Theory of Ideas" that
Socrates is said to have announced in the Phaedo.
One minor objection I have to Cherniss' story is that Socrates in
fact does not identify the result of his method of hypothesis in
the Phaedo as a "Theory of Ideas." What Socrates says is that he
starts by hypothesizing the existence of the Beautiful itself, the
Good itself, and all such entities, and on this basis undertakes
"to display the sort of causation" (ejti5e{^ao0ai 't'Í1ç aiiias To
ei8o홢;: 100B3) he has worked out to replace the causation of
Anaxagoras. There is no m e n t i o n by Socrates, as Cherniss
alleges, of anything called a "Theory of Ideas." Indeed, it is not
even clear what term Plato would have had Socrates use if he
had intended to include mention of such a notion. There are
several occurrences of the omnibus term 홢.oyo5 in the immediate
context of this passage, which are sometimes loosely translated
by our term 'theory7.1 But there is nothing in this passage about
a "logos of Forms," a n d no other combination of terms that
invites "Theory of Forms" as even a loose translation. As far as I
have been able to tell, moreover, there is no explicit mention of
such a theory in the other dialogues either. If Plato ever did
have a theory of this sort, it seems reasonable to conclude, he
never got around to labeling it in terms equivalent to the expres-
sion "Theory of Forms" that Cherniss used so confidently in his
article.
My main misgivings about Cherniss' account, however, has to
do with the w a y he characterizes the theory he attributes to
Plato. It is a theory, he claims, that "explains" phenomena in
various areas of philosophic concern. The nature of the explana-
tion, moreover, is such that it shows that the theory in question
is a "necessary hypothesis" for the solution of philosophic prob-
lems in these areas—such that the Theaetetus, for example, can
"prove" that the theory is the only one available that is capable
of solving the problems of epistemology. The appearance of
terms like 'necessary' and 'prove' at key points in Cherniss'
account, along with the analogy he draws between the method
of hypothesis and methods by which members of the Academy
were directed to "explain the phenomena" of planetary motion,
suggest that Cherniss was thinking of the deductive conception
of scientific explanation that was current in philosophy of sci-
ence at the time his article was written? How did that concep-
tion of explanation go?
One essential component of a deductive explanation is a gener-
al law or set of laws pertaining to the domain of phenomena
under consideration. These might be general laws of physical
motion, general principles of thermodynamics, or even general-
izations covering the behavior of social organizations. In the
case of Plato's assignment in the Academy, there would have
1. One example is in the translation by Tredennick that is reprinted in the
widely circulated The Collected Dialogues of Plato edited by E. Hamilton and H.
Cairns.
2. A standard account of the deductive conception of explanation may be
found in Hempel and Oppenheim 1953.
been statements describing the circular or perhaps the elliptical
motion of bodies. Given an appropriate set of general princi-
ples, the explanation then proceeds in a fashion akin to a tradi-
tional syllogistic argument. The first step is to posit the set of
principles in question as the major premises, as it were, of a
deductive argument. Next comes the equivalent of a minor
premise specifying conditions u n d e r which the thing to be
explained might be expected to occur. The final step, in effect, is
to infer the occurrence of the thing to be explained from the
premises provided. This, in the standard case, is the deductive
phase of the explanation, inasmuch as the form of inference
employed is typically deductive. With an explanation of this
general structure at hand, the investigator may then undertake
to test the general h y p o t h e s i s by seeing w h e t h e r the thing
deduced in fact occurs under the conditions specified. If not,
then the principle might be rejected, and other principles sought
for an alternative explanation. In this manner, the deductive
method of explanation might merge with the hypothetical-
deductive method of theory-development that was prominent in
philosophy of science around the turn of the Century.
Anyone familiar with Socrates' description of the method of
hypothesis at Phaedo 100A-101E will see immediately w h y
Cherniss was d r a w n to this passage in developing his thesis
about the alleged general applicability of the "Theory of Forms."
For this passage contains what surely must be the first statement
ever of the hypothetical-deductive method; and Plato's Socrates
does indeed apply the method in propounding the account of
causation he has supposedly adopted in place of the account of
Anaxagoras. This particular application begins, as noted previ-
ously, with Socrates hypothesizing the existence of Forms like
the Good itself and the Beautiful itself (something like a major
premise), followed by an introduction of the notion of participa-
tion ((iETEXEt at 100C6, something like a minor premise). Given
that basis, an explanation of causation is said to follow: a given
thing is b e a u t i f u l - o r large, or dual, etc.—just in case it partici-
pates in the relevant Form. Participation in the Form Beauty is
both necessary and sufficient for the presence of beauty in an
individual thing, and in that sense is the cause of the thing's
being beautiful. Having arrived at this account of causation,
Socrates then combines this account with a number of state-
ments about relations among Forms to produce what can credi-
bly be read as a d e d u c t i o n of the soul's immortality. The
sequence ends with Socrates' exhortation to his friends that they
should continue to examine the credentials of the hypotheses
upon which the argument proceeds, with the recommendation
of this as the surest way to pursue the argument 0,6,yT: 107B6)
and finally to arrive at the truth of the matter.
The question to be raised by an ally of Cherniss, at this point, is
why this set of passages just by itself should not count as an
exhibition of the very "Theory of Ideas" that Cherniss is advo-
cating. The sequence begins with a statement of the hypotheti-
cal-deductive method, proceeds to what appears to be an appli-
cation of that method by w a y of explaining a conception of
causation based on the notion of participation, and ends with
what appears to be a demonstration of the soul's immortality on
the basis of a number of premises concerning the Forms and
their interrelations. If this by itself does not count as a manifes-
tation of a theory of Forms in the dialogues, then what addition-
al factors do we think might be needed?
By way of response, I want to say first that if any set of pas-
sages in Plato's writings is to count as a manifestation of a theo-
ry of Forms, then Phaedo 100A-107B is that set of passages. This
acknowledgment, in point of fact, provides occasion for explain-
ing another twist of my title—why Plato never had a theory of
Forms. If Plato ever had such a theory, he would have had it at
the time he was working on these passages of the Phaedo. So, if I
am to make out a convincing case for his never having had such
a theory at all, I will have to show why even this set of passages
does not contain a "Theory of Forms" of the sort Cherniss has
advocated.
What is missing is the use of deductive argument that figured
so prominently in Cherniss' account. Among the key tenets of
that account, we may recall, is that Plato h a d attempted "to
prove t h a t the t h e o r y of Ideas is a n e c e s s a r y h y p o t h e s i s "
(Chermiss 1936, 7) for the solution of epistemological problems,
and that he thought that "it is necessary for the objects of knowl-
edge to be real entities" (Cherniss 1936, 8) existing apart from
the phenomenal world. Matters of necessity of the sort these
claims seem to involve could be established only by tightly con-
structed deductive arguments, if indeed they could be estab-
lished at all. But there are no clear examples of deductive argu-
ments for the Forms in the Platonic corpus at large, and certainly
none in the Phaedo specifically.3 Moreover, the very notion of
proving such things as the existence of the Forms seems foreign
to the method of hypothesis described in that dialogue. What
the method calls for is beginning with a hypothesis that one
judges to be soundest (eppwweve6Ta2ov: 100A4) and then, when
the time comes to render an account of the hypothesis itself, pro-
ceeding in the same way by positing a more ultimate (ä.Vc.o8EV:
101D8) hypothesis, and so on until one arrives at something sat-
isfactory (it licccv6v: 101E1). This certainly does not sound like a
method of argument by which the necessity of anything could
be established.
Another major tenet of Cherniss' account is that the philosoph-
ic p r o b l e m s w i t h w h i c h P l a t o w a s c o n c e r n e d c o u l d "be
explained only by assuming a world of Ideas" (1965, 11). In
accord w i t h the d e d u c t i v e conception of explanation, this
amounts to a requirement that philosophic explanations take the
form of deductions based on a theory of Forms. But the only
thing explained in the section of the Phaedo we are now consid-
ering is a sense of causation depending upon participation. And
while causation is a topic of obvious importance to Plato, there
is nothing deductive about this explanation. What the explana-
tion amounts to is little more than pointing out the superiority

3. There is a loosely structured argument at Phaedo 72E-75B by which Socrates

recommends acceptance of the existence of the Forms. There are arguments in
other dialogues as well for the existence of one or another relevant Form, such as
the argument for a unique Form of Bed at Republic 597C. My point is that none
of these arguments is deductive in a manner even approximating that required
by Cherniss' account.
of this over other conceptions of causation, which fail by tracing
a thing's occurrence to conditions that are either not necessary
or not sufficient. The only inference in this section that might
plausibly be considered deductive, on the other hand, is the
final argument for the immortality of the soul, and this inference
does not appear to be an explanation of anything at all.
There is no shortage of deductive inference in the dialogues. If
this final argument for immortality in the Phaedo is not a con-
vincing example, there are powerful deductive arguments in the
Theaetetus a n d the Sophist, w i t h n o t a b l e i n s t a n c e s in the
Protagoras as well. These other arguments, however, almost
always take the form of refutations; and none, as far as I can
tell, includes any proposition explicitly about the Forms among
its premises. My point in response to Cherniss is not that Plato
never employed deduction, or that he never offered arguments
for the existence of the Forms. My point is that there are no
deductive explanations in the dialogues that engage any set of
propositions that might plausibly be identified as a theory of
Forms. There are no deductive arguments purporting to estab-
lish the n e e d for s u c h a theory, as w o u l d be r e q u i r e d (as
Cherniss puts it) "to prove that the theory of Ideas is a necessary
hypothesis" (1965, 7) for the solution of philosophic problems.
And there are no deductive arguments purporting to explain
things by deriving consequences from such a theory, as would
be required to vindicate Cherniss' claim that philosophically
important features of things "can be explained only by assum-
ing a world of Ideas" (1965, 11). Not even in the Phaedo passage
do we find such deductions. For the only argument in that pas-
sage that has the putative form of a deduction does not appear
to be an explanation; and the only explanation the passage
offers (that of causation by participation) comes nowhere near
the form of a deductive inference.
N o w it goes without saying that Cherniss' conception of philo-
sophic theory is only one among many that commentators have
attributed to Plato. And even if I were to succeed in tracking
these all down, it would be wholly impractical to attempt to
deal with them individually Among the several features of
philosophic theories as conceived by Cherniss, however, there is
one that might be expected to hold of these other conceptions
generally. The more interesting among these other conceptions,
at any rate, would all view a theory as a set of general princi-
ples, stated in propositional form, from which explanations can
be d r a w n by some explicit sort of inference. And it is in this
more general sense of the term that I want to claim that no theo-
ry of Forms appears in Plato's writings. There are explanations
in abundance that appeal to the Forms, such as the explanation of
beauty at Phaedo 100D. But these explanations are couched in
terms of participation, having nothing to do with inference from
a specific set of general propositions. And there are many argu-
ments by Plato's characters involving inference from general
propositions, such as the argument for immortality that Socrates
offers just before taking hemlock. But these arguments never
seem to take the form of explanations.4 The very considerations
that show a lack of a theory of Forms in the dialogues of the sort
Cherniss was proposing, in short, also serve to show the absence
of such a theory in this more general sense as well.
Having said all this, I should acknowledge that there is one
remote sense of the term 'theory' in which Plato clearly has
incorporated a theory of Forms in the dialogues. This is a sense
retaining the root meaning of the term geropía, which indicates
either a visual or a mental discernment. Plato clearly did have a
mental vision of those entities we call Forms or Ideas, and this
mental vision certainly finds expression within his writings. So
in this sense the dialogues do contain a "theory" of Forms. But
this is far from the sense of the term in which Cherniss claims
that Plato had a "Theory of Ideas," and far from the sense in
which scholars today speak of philosophic theories. What the
dialogues do not contain, I have been arguing, is a theory of the
sort that could be supported by propositional inference, or that
could s u p p o r t deductively structured explanations in turn.
4. Many of Plato's deductive arguments have the force of refutations, and
there is a sense in which a refutation is an "explanation" of error. But this, fairly
obviously, is not the sense of explanation at issue in the discussion above.
What Plato did not write into the dialogues, in brief, is a theory
of Forms which in any way could participate in deductive infer-
ences.
II.
The fact that no deductive theory of Forms appears in the dia-
logues is not adequate by itself to show that Plato himself never
held such a theory. On the other hand, if we had reason to think
that Plato himself never had a theory of this sort, it would go a
long way toward explaining why such a theory never shows up
in the dialogues. And we do in fact have a weighty reason for
thinking that Plato never had such a theory. The reason appears
in the Seventh Letter, where Plato denies ever having written a
work of philosophy
The Seventh Letter is one of a set of thirteen letters purportedly
written by Plato to various statesmen and rulers with whom he
had dealings. Some of these letters appear to be forgeries, and
at one time or another all have come u n d e r suspicion. But
scholarship in the 20th Century has generally favored accepting
the Seventh Letter as Plato's own.5 As the longest of the Letters
by far, the Seventh consists largely of a detailed account and
defense of Plato's involvement in the political affairs of Sicily
over a period beginning with his first visit in 388 B.C. It was
addressed to the friends and political associates of Dion, whose
differences with his kinsman Dionysius the Younger, tyrant of
5. Morrow 1962 reviews the evidence from Cicero up to mid-20th century, and
attests that a "great majority of modem students" (p. 16) accept the 7th and 8th
letters as genuine, and expresses his own view that the 7th constitutes a stan-
dard by which the status of the remainder might be tested (p. 15). The results of
a recent stylometric study in Ledger 1989 based on computerized techniques,
reinforces Morrow'sconfidence. As Ledger puts it, "Epistle 7 is nowadays
accepted by the majority of scholars and its thought and content has been widely
discussed. It hardly seems necessary to rehearse once more the arguments pro
and contra. The importance of having its authenticity confirmed is that it will
now be possible to rely on the long excursus on the nature of reality (342A-344C)
with confidence as a guide to Plato's later thought" (p. 150). Scholars who per-
sist in rejecting the authenticity of this letter (e.g., Vlastos 1973, 202-203) tend to
do so on the basis of conflict with their interpretation of various passages in the
dialogues. At this point, it seems fair to say, the priorities ought to work in the
opposite direction, ruling out interpretations that are at odds with the Seventh
Letter.
Syracuse, had led to his assassination sometime around 354 B.C.
The letter was written within months after Dion had died, some
6 or 7 years before Plato's own death.
What makes the Seventh Letter relevant to our present con-
cerns, however, is its account of Plato's failed efforts to intro-
duce Dionysius to the ways of philosophy, and the reflections on
the nature of the philosophic quest that Plato's memory of this
failure e n g e n d e r e d . The p a t h of p h i l o s o p h y , says Plato,
demands not only a god-given affinity (oixeio5: 340C2) for the
subject, and a sense of wonder (9(X'U¡.L(x홢J't1Ív: 340C3) that spurs
one onwards when the path becomes difficult, but also a "suit-
ably ordered way of living" (8iau:a . . . 1tpÉ1to'U홢J(x . . . KOO¡.Lía:
340E2) that makes one capable of pursuing philosophy So far
did Dionysius fall short of these requirements, Plato goes on to
say, that he is reputed actually to have written a treatise on the
subject. While Plato is careful to a d d that he is not sure
Dionysius ever did such an ill-advised thing, he does claim to
know other people who had ventured to write on philosophy
And this, Plato says, is a sure sign that they have come to know
nothing about the subject itself. At any rate, Plato avers, with a
sense of righteous indignation, there is no written work of his on
the subject, a n d there never will be; for there is no w a y of
putting philosophy into words (홢ilr6v: 341C6) like other studies.
Now if you have never encountered the Seventh Letter before,
and are hearing this for the first time, your reaction is likely to
be one of utter amazement. How could Plato, the undoubted
author of two dozen or more dialogues that have been recog-
nized through the centuries as philosophic masterpieces, state
unequivocally in an open letter that he never had written a work
of philosophy? Indeed, the tension between what Plato did and
what he denied doing seems even worse than that. The very
passage of the Seventh Letter where he is explaining how phi-
losophy eluded D i o n y s i u s - r o u g h l y five pages in all (340B-
345C)-clearly was written on philosophic topics, and hence
should count as a written work on philosophy. Before jumping
to conclusions charging Plato with contradicting himself, how-
ever, we should look further into the reasons he offers for why
philosophy cannot be committed to writing. Hand-in-hand with
these reasons, I hope to show, is an explanation of why Plato
never had a theory of Forms.
There is one celebrated account of the discrepancy between the
Seventh Letter and the existence of the written corpus, however,
that should be set aside before we go any further. Central to this
account is the notion of an "esoteric doctrine" that was funda-
mentally different from the views expressed in the dialogues,
a n d that was transmitted orally to Plato's associates in the
A c a d e m y O u r primary access to Plato's mature philosophic
thought, according to this approach, comes with Aristotle's
remarks in the Metaphysics (987b and passim), which attribute
doctrines to Plato that are hard to find in the dialogues and that
supposedly derive from this exclusively oral teaching.6 If this
line of interpretation were correct, then we would have to read
Aristotle rather than Plato to find out what Plato really thought.
Inasmuch as Aristotle was more concerned with criticizing
Plato's teachings than with expounding them in detail, however,
there is a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y for latter-day scholars to read
between the lines, and to attempt reconstruction of Platonic doc-
trines of which we have no surviving record. A bibliography
listing tens of thousands of pages of learned conjecture on this
topic may be found at the end of Hans Joachim Kramer's recent-
ly translated Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics.7
The fundamental flaw of this approach, as far as the Seventh
Letter is concerned, lies with its suppression of several passages
in the latter that rule out oral discourse as well as written as a
suitable vehicle for philosophy In Plato's key remark that phi-
losophy "is not something that can be put into words like other
subjects" (Pl1'tOV yap oi)8ag홢)q e6mv wc, akfax p.a8홢jpa2a: 341C6),
the term Pl1'tÓV means "communicable by words" quite general-

6. The widely accepted claim that these doctrines do not appear in the dia-
logues is countered in Sayre 1983.
7. See Kramer 1990. This book is reviewed at length by the present author in
Sayre 1993.
ly, not just "communicable by written language."8 Again at
343A, after a detailed explanation of why words are inadequate,
Plato summarizes by citing "the inadequacies of language" (To
Twv X6yo)v do9eve홢;: 343A1) which are such that no intelligent
person would rely upon it for an expression of what reason had
grasped. So inadequate is language for this purpose, he goes on
to say, that if a philosopher were to try responding to questions
about the Forms "in speaking or writing" (rev X6-yoiq홢 YP홢XJlJlacr\.V:
343D5), then these w o r d s could be confuted by any skilled
sophist. Should this happen, however, the fault would lie not
with "the mind of the writer or speaker" (i1 yrvxit Tov yp홢yravTOs
fi 홢E홢avTOS: 343D8), b u t rather with language itself which is
"naturally defective" (m:qm1Ct>îa cpav홢w5: 343D9). While the
symbolism of written language is especially defective in this
regard, d u e to its unalterable character once made public (cf.
343A3-4), the Seventh Letter is unambiguous in rejecting lan-
g u a g e g e n e r a l l y as a vehicle for the c o m m u n i c a t i o n of
philosophy There is no viable way out of the predicament this
poses by postulating an "unwritten teaching" by which Plato's
true thoughts might be transmitted orally (but still in language)
to members of the Academy.
Plato's explanation of what it is about the symbolism of lan-
guage generally that makes it unfit for communicating philoso-
phy is based on a distinction between the Forms themselves as
objects of knowledge and various means upon which the mind
relies in its attempts to reach the Forms. In order of mention,
these means include (i) the name of the Form in question, (ii) its
verbal characterization (),6,yoq: 342B2), (iii) a physical image or
likeness, and finally (iv) the particular state of mind by which
the Form itself is grasped. Each of the first three, Plato says, is
needed for the fourth, within which latter three states are further
distinguished-(a) true opinion (åÀ119T¡ç . . . 8o홢a: 342C5), (b)
k n o w l e d g e (E7CLQ27홢홢1.7홢: 342C4), a n d (c) intelligence (vouS:
342C5). Of these three, intelligence is most akin (cruyyF-veia:
342D1) to the Form, which Plato adds as the fifth entity on his
8. The term 홢lnr6v can also mean 'capable of being spoken of' specifically.
Read with this sense, 341C6 runs directly counter to the notion of Plato's having
passed on "esoteric doctrines" by oral communication.
list. Specific Forms m e n t i o n e d in this connection are the
Beautiful, the Good, and the Just, which should leave no doubt
in our minds about the relevance of this account to the Forms of
the middle dialogues.
One defect shared by the first three factors (names, verbal char-
acterizations and images) in comparison with the Forms, Plato
says, is that they all are bound up with "vocal sounds and bodi-
ly shapes" ((pcovalq |··2549
... 0 0 |||··1381
ax홢j홢a.wv:
0 0 |j|··1382
342C6).
0 0 |.|··1502
Sensible0 0fac-
|홢|··874 0 0 |T
tors like these, we should note, are the very stuff of public lan-
guage, w h e t h e r vocal or written or in pictorial form. One
respect in which language is inadequate as a means for commu-
nicating a philosophic grasp of the Forms, accordingly, is that
the very characteristics that make language communicable-i.e.,
its being audible or visible—make it essentially different from
the Forms it might purport to represent. Another fault of more
immediate relevance is that language in each case is made up of
particular symbols, in contrast with the Forms which are entire-
ly general. A consequence is that any given linguistic symbol in
some sense signifies (Öl1ÂOÛV: 342E4) some particular quality (to
1to'ióv n: 342E4) in addition to the thing it is intended to symbol-
ize. As I understand it, the point is that a drawing of a circle in
red ink, for example, might be said to signify something red at
the same time that it indicates a circular f i g u r e - a w e a k n e s s
(å.cr8evÉç: 343A1) Plato attributes to language generally
A third defect stems from the first and second together-i.e.,
from the status of linguistic symbols as sensible particulars with
ambiguous significance. Plato illustrates this fault by contrast-
ing the Form Circularity itself, which totally excludes any oppo-
site feature (343A7-9),9 with a drawing of a circle each point on
which is also part of a tangential straight line. Generalizing
from this example, we may surmise that Plato intends to draw
attention to the fact that the presence in particular symbols of
o p p o s i n g characteristics makes them available for naming
opposing objects, from which it follows that linguistic symbols

9. At Symposium 211A2-4, the Beautiful itself is said not to admit ugliness in

any respect. At Phaedo 103B4, C6, opposite Forms generally are said never to
admit each other.
by nature lack fixed reference. Names, as he puts it, are "in no
way stable" (ou8evi (3E(iavov: 343B1); and nothing prevents
things now called round from being called straight at other
times, and vice verso.10 Using words in altered senses like these,
moreover, we might find them every bit as stable as we find
them in their current use—which is to say that we should never
think of them as stable in the first place. Given this inherent
instability, however, language remains an inadequate instru-
ment for conveying awareness of the immutable Forms.
Once knowledge of the Forms has been attained, accordingly, it
cannot be conveyed to other persons by means of theories and
philosophic arguments. The only way philosophic knowledge
can be gained is by hard work, disciplined living, and repeated
conversations-conversations with a master who submits the
learner to a "well-disposed refutation by cross-examination"
(euneveaiv ÈÀÉYXptç iXF-'yX6홢tF-v(x: 344B6) that conditions the mind
of the learner for eventual understanding. But when philosoph-
ic knowledge finally arrives in the course of this long and ardu-
ous discipline, "it is suddenly generated in the soul like a torch-
light kindled by a leaping flame, and straightway becomes
self-sustaining" (Èçaícpv11ç, otov å.1tO 1t'Upoç 홢T)8T)oavTo홢; Èçacp8èv
cpcix;, iv top \|/t>%fi yevopevov ocuto i a j r 6 ti8t| TpE(pEl: 341D1-2). The
imagery of the onset of true understanding as a flash of insight
is repeated at 344B, where Plato speaks of a flash of wisdom and
intelligence which extends h u m a n capacities to their limit.
Whatever one might make of these vivid descriptions of the
onset of philosophic knowledge, it clearly is Plato's view that
this knowledge comes to fruition as a state of the soul, and that
the object of this knowledge cannot be adequately represented
in propositional language.
Given that the fruits of philosophy cannot be represented sym-
bolically, it follows that philosophic understanding cannot be
conveyed by argument. For a student merely to be presented
with a proposition that the Forms exist, and to be convinced by
argument that this proposition is true, does not a m o u n t to

10. With regard to the instability of names (as at 343A9), see Cratylus, 384D2-8.
awareness of the Forms themselves. Seeing connections among
propositions-even deductive connections—falls short of seeing
connections among actual Forms that the propositions might
purport to be about. A philosophic grasp of the Forms, accord-
ingly, cannot be "repackaged" in the form of propositions, and
cannot be augmented by propositional inference. Hence it can-
not be communicated to other persons by propositional dis-
course.
According to the account of the Seventh Letter, there is no
manner of discursive interchange by which philosophic knowl-
edge might be transmitted from one person to another. The only
w a y s o m e o n e w h o has m a s t e r e d p h i l o s o p h y can pass this
knowledge on to an aspiring student is to admit this student
into ongoing conversations (avvovaias: 341C7) that provide
occasion for the "well-disposed cross-examination" mentioned
at 344B6, and that encourage the student to persevere in the dis-
ciplines that philosophy requires. If the student succeeds in
gaining knowledge in the course of this interaction, that knowl-
edge will arrive as a state of soul or mind that shines forth with-
in, rather than having been imparted from without by the teach-
er through propositional discourse. While Plato seems to allow
that discursive means are available for passing on what we learn
in other studies—such as the study of planetary motion which
Cherniss took as a model for the kind of theory he attributed to
P l a t o - t h e Seventh Letter is quite explicit (341C6) in saying that
philosophy differs from other forms of knowledge in not per-
mitting expression in language.
What Plato was objecting to at 341C, we should now be pre-
pared to see, was not people conversing on philosophic topics,
or taking notes on such conversations for future reference. His
blanket repudiation in this passage, rather, was of people who "claim
to know" (cpaaiv ei8evau 341C2) about philosophy—whether from
a n o t h e r ' s instruction or by "their o w n discovery" (Fi)p6vrF;
auTou 3 4 1 C 3 ) - a n d who then attempt to express what they
think they know in writing. It is directly following this blanket
repudiation, of course, that Plato denies ever having written
about such things himself.ll What he is denying here, accord-
ingly, is not something palpably untrue like not having written
on philosophic topics. Of course he wrote on philosophic topics,
the Seventh Letter itself providing an obvious example. What
Plato is d e n y i n g in these remarks, instead, is ever h a v i n g
attempted to express his knowledge of philosophy in discursive
form.
What appears at first to be an unbelievable claim on Plato's
part never to have written on philosophic topics at all, in brief,
turns out to be a n entirely intelligible claim never to have
attempted to put what he knows about philosophy into the form
either of written or of spoken discourse. And the reasons Plato
gives for never having attempted this—which boil down to the
point that this knowledge cannot be put into words like other
things we learn (6ckka 1la.8"IlU"ta: 341C6)-are reasons as well
why he should have seen fit not to marshall his most carefully
considered philosophic views into the form of explicit theories.
Given that Plato considered himself to be someone in whose
mind genuine philosophic knowledge had, in the florid lan-
guage of 341D, "blazed forth and become self-sustaining"-one
point at least on which the Seventh Letter seems clear—then any
attempt to cast this knowledge into the form of a theory would
have been tantamount to an attempt to express it in the symbol-
ism of a public language. And this is exactly what the author of
the Seventh Letter says no one who really understands philoso-
phy would ever attempt to do.
The first part of this paper was occupied primarily with con-
siderations d r a w i n g attention to the fact that no theory of
Forms, properly so-called, appears within the Platonic corpus.
In the second part I have examined certain remarks by Plato in
the Seventh Letter which, if read carefully, explain why no such
theory is to be found in the dialogues. These remarks centered
around the key claim that philosophic knowledge cannot be
11. The expression nepi avuav at 341C5 echoes the nepi 'toû 1tPåylID'tOÇ at 341C4,
which I take to cover philosophic knowledge gained by either means noted at
341C2-3-namely, either from his (Plato's) instruction or from personal discov-
ery.
expressed in X6yot like what we learn in other studies. But this
key claim itself appears to be at odds with some striking pas-
sages in the Republic, and elsewhere, to the effect that being able
to give X6-tot is an essential requirement for philosophic under-
standing. The concluding part of the paper attempts to defuse
this apparent discrepancy.
III.
The difficulty remaining to be faced is that there are several
prominent passages in the middle and later dialogues that say
things about the powers of X6,yo; which appear to be in direct
conflict with the distrust of language expressed in the Seventh
Letter. For example, there is the passage in the Republic where
Socrates identifies the dialectician or philosopher as one who
can "grasp an account of the being of each thing" (xov 홢.oyov
ex홢6TOV 홢a홢(3ocvovTa 'tílç ovoiaq: 534B3-4), and then goes on to
suggest that someone unable "to give an account to oneself or
others" (Xoyov cc6n홢),ce Kat. a홢,홢w 8t86vat: 534B4-5) lacks intelli-
gence regarding the matter in question. This requirement holds,
Socrates says, even in the case of the Good, inasmuch as anyone
who is unable "to define the Idea of the Good in discourse"
(8vopiaa6Aav Tm Xoyq) . . . iov aya6ov i8eav: 534B9-C1) cannot be
said to know (Fi8ivat: 534C4) the Good itself or any other good
thing. This claim, at first encounter, certainly seems to be in con-
flict with the insistence of the Seventh Letter that philosophic
knowledge cannot be expressed in discourse.
Even more explicit, as far as the powers of language are con-
cerned, is the passage a few pages earlier in the Republic where
Socrates says that true numbers and true figures—by which pre-
sumably he means the Forms of these t h i n g s - " i n truth are
a p p r e h e n d e d by discourse a n d t h o u g h t " (8홢 zoom giv Kai
Suxvota À.Tl1t'tá.: 529D4-5), as distinct from being visible to the
physical eye. There is also the passage in the Parmenides where
Socrates is commended for extending his concern to the Forms,
which Parmenides says "can be grasped preeminently by dis-
course" ()ia홢oTa ... 홢v Xoym 7홢a홢ioi: 135E3).
 Perhaps the most striking statement in this regard, however, is
the remark by the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman that the
dialectic there u n d e r w a y should be thought of as a training
exercise by which Young Socrates could develop his ability "to
give and to apprehend an account of each thing" (X6yov iic6aroi)
. . . 8o"vvat Koa 8e^ao9ai: 286A4-5). For things that are not bodi-
ly, b u t are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t a n d the most beautiful, the
Stranger continues, can be "clearly exhibited by discourse
alone" (K6y(p g6vov . . . ocKpSq 8F-iicvi),cect: 286A6-7). This state-
ment appears to be in direct contradiction with what Plato says
in the Seventh Letter about knowledge of the Forms eluding
expression by written and spoken discourse.
Now one tack we could take in response to the apparent dis-
parity between these passages and the Seventh Letter is to reju-
venate the notion that what Plato has his characters say in the
dialogues is simply at odds with his own views on these mat-
ters. Apart from other problems inherent in this notion of an
"esoteric teaching," however, such a response would have to
include a better explanation than any yet offered of why Plato
would deliberately mislead his readers on philosophic issues of
such magnitude. It seems to me that this tactic has very little to
recommend it.
Another tactic, of course, would be to resurrect the old doubts
from 19th Century German scholarship about the authenticity of
the Seventh Letter. But this would be unpromising for numer-
ous reasons. Not only has relevant evidence been read as
strongly in favor of authenticity by a sizeable majority of schol-
ars during recent decades,12 but moreover it is not clear that con-
flict between texts should even be allowed to count in deciding
questions of authenticity. There are a number of obvious dis-
crepancies of this general sort among key dialogues in the cor-
pus, after all, which seem never to have led to serious questions
about authorship.l3 By far the more promising course, it seems
12. See footnote 6.
13. Examples are the opposition between the doctrine of the incomposite soul
in the Phaedo (e.g. at 80B) and that of the tripartite soul in the Republic, and
Socrates' conclusion that virtue is not teachable in the Meno (99E) in opposition
to hisconclusion that it is teachable in the Protagoras (361B).
to me, is simply to accept the fact of apparent conflict between
the Lettersl4 and the dialogues, and to look for a way of reconcil-
iation that might actually throw light upon some of the texts
concerned.
One thing to note about the set of texts just cited is that they
contain different claims about language and knowledge, some of
which are actually consistent with the message of the Seventh
Letter. The claim of Republic 534B, for instance, is that persons
rightly said to know the Good and other Forms will be able to
give an account of these Forms, both to themselves and to other
people. Nothing is said here to the effect that the account such a
person is able to give by itself constitutes knowledge of the
Form in question. The point seems to be rather that an ability to
define or to distinguish a given Form in discourse goes along
with knowledge of that Form specifically. There is a passage
from the Timaeus, in fact, that makes this point explicitly In his
c o m p a r i s o n at 51D-E of t r u e o p i n i o n w i t h intelligence,15
Timaeus observes that intelligence is imparted by instruction, is
not moved by suasion, and "always is accompanied by dis-
course that is true" (act weT' å.Â.T\90ûç ),6you: 51E4). The thesis of
the Seventh Letter is that philosophic knowledge or intelligence
cannot be expressed in discourse. But this is entirely consonant
with the thesis that knowledge of a Form should be accompanied
by an ability to articulate something about the nature of this
Form in discourse, which is all that is claimed explicitly at
Republic 534B.
The claim at Statesman 286A that the most important things can
be clearly exhibited by discourse alone, however, cannot be
accommodated in such an easy manner. If philosophic knowl-
edge amounts to a grasp of the Forms, and if the Forms can be
clearly exhibited by discourse as this passage says, then why

14. A claim on the author's part never to have written philosophy also
appears in the Second Letter (314C), which however is generally considered to
be one of the more dubious of the thirteen.
15. The term vo"v5 (for intelligence) at Timaeus 51D3 is the very term used both
at Republic 534B5 and at 342C5 of the Seventh Letter, which supports the rele-
vance of the Timaeus passage to the present issue.
should we not be able to gain knowledge by grasping Forms
through the clear representation that discourse is said here to
provide? Indeed, this seems to be what Parmenides is propos-
ing at 135E of his namesake dialogue, where he says that the
Forms are graspable preeminently by discourse. These passages
bring our problem back into focus with new immediacy If the
position r e p r e s e n t e d here is that the Forms i n d e e d can be
grasped through language, what is to be made of the claim in
the Seventh Letter that language is not a suitable medium for
philosophic knowledge?
The Seventh Letter states that philosophic knowledge cannot
be expressed in written or spoken discourse-i.e., in the form of
symbols that are accessible to sight or hearing. The position of
the Statesman, on the other hand, is that the Forms can be clearly
exhibited in discourse alone, a position supported by the claim
of the Parmenides that the Forms can be grasped through dis-
course especially. Although these views appear at first to be in
direct opposition, as we have duly noted, a way of reconciling
them is suggested by Republic 532A. This passage occurs as part
of Socrates' extended characterization of dialectic between 531C
and 534E; and what Socrates says here specifically is that the
nature of each Form can be a p p r o a c h e d t h r o u g h discourse
"entirely without sense experience" (avev 1ta.crrov a.icr9T¡crerov:
532A6-7), whereby it can be "grasped by thought alone" ((x홢)홢
varjaet x홢(3rt: 532B1). Socrates here joins forces with Parmenides
and the Eleatic Stranger in claiming that the Forms are accessible
through discourse. But the discourse involved is described as
being removed from sense experience, and hence as being dis-
tinct from the written and spoken language castigated in the
Seventh Letter. The discourse that leads the dialectician to an
intellectual grasp of the Forms, rather, is a 7v,oyo5 not dependent
upon perceptible symbols. Socrates' remarks in this passage are
entirely compatible with the Seventh Letter as well, inasmuch as
this latter document makes no mention of imperceptible dis-
course.
This allusion in the Republic to an imperceptible form of 홢,oyo5
should bring to mind a well-known text from the final pages of
the Phaedrus, where Socrates and Phaedrus are talking about a
"living and animated discourse" (7홢.oyov . . . 홢6)vr(x xai Ë¡.Ul'VXov:
276A8) which, so to speak, is "written within the soul of the
learner" (yp홢(perat ev 't'Í1 'toû )iav8avovTo홢; 홢D홢: 276A5-6). The
fact that this text from the Phaedrus is often cited in connection
with the discussion of language in the Seventh Letter makes it
particularly relevant to our understanding of the latter pas-
sage.16
The text in question begins with a story about the invention of
writing in which King Ammon admonishes Theuth, the inven-
tor, that his creation would not improve memory, as Theuth had
promised, but rather would make memory lazy and cause it to
atrophy. To this Socrates adds his own misgiving, that written
words are like portrait paintings that seem to be alive but that
remain mute when someone puts questions to them. The trou-
ble with words (oi %6-lot: 275D7) generally, says Socrates, is that
they seem to be intelligent, but that when one wants to converse
with them they just go on "signifying the same thing forever"
(O'1lllaíve홢 (xovov tccutov 홢ei: 275D9). Once committed to chan-
nels of public discourse, that is to say, words tend to become dis-
sociated from the specific circumstances in which they were
issued, and hence become incapable of "defending themselves"
()3oT)9f)oai ... aú'tC¡>: 275E5-6) against unintended interpreta-
tions. This is a problem, Socrates notes, that attaches to "spoken
and written" (Xeyeiv TE ical ypacpetv: 277D2) discourse alike.
And it is a problem for discourse especially that purports to
"secure great certitudes within itself" (IlEyliÀ.1lv . . . ev aLr6)
pepa).6TT)'Hx .. , aacp홢jvevav: 277D8-9) about good and bad, justice
and injustice, and like matters.
But there is another form of discourse, says Socrates, that is a
"legitimate brother" (a8eX홢?6v yvA(Ytov: 276A1) of speech and
writing, and that can take care of itself by knowing when to
speak and when to remain silent. This is the discourse that is
written within the soul of the learner—the "speech, living and
16. My understanding of the Phaedrus has benefited considerably from
Griswold 1986.
animate" (Xoyov . . . £fi>vxa xai Ë홢'V'I.>Xov: 276A8) that goes "with
knowledge" (RET' E7[).oTr))iT)홢;: 276A5). It is this discourse "about
justice a n d beauty and goodness that is written in the soul"
(ypacpopevovs ev \\ro%f[ REP! 8tKa(mv TE xai lCaX6)V Kat aya8wv:
278A3-4), Socrates goes on to say, that is worth pursuing "in
c o n v e r s a t i o n a i m e d at l e a r n i n g a n d t e a c h i n g " (ev 5e Toiq
8v8aaxopevotc, xai 홢a8f¡cr£coç xapw a,EY ' OEIEVOLC홢: 278A2-3). The
person who "has knowledge about what is just and beautiful
and good" (5tK(xt'o)v is Ken ica;홢6)v xai åya8홢v È1ttcr't1Í홢aç E%ovxa:
276C3-4), indeed, will not choose merely to write or to tell sto-
ries about these topics. Such a person, if a dialectician, will
instead "take a soul of the appropriate sort" (Àapcõv yojcriv |··2277 0 0 |T|··2195
276E6), and therein "will plant and sow words
a c c o m p a n i e d w i t h k n o w l e d g e " (홢p'l.>'tE'Ú11T e Kai cr1tEÍP1l IlE't'
È1ttcr't1Í홢1lÇ 7v.o홢yous: 276E6-7), hoping that the seeds thereby plant-
ed will grow and prosper in this other setting. With this transac-
tion, Socrates assures Phaedrus, would come an immortality
(å8áva'tov: 277A3) and well-being |··1658 0 0 |8|··2195 0 0 |a|··1378 277A3)
0 0 |i|··3599
of the 0 0 |||··1382
highest sort achievable by humankind.17
To gain this result, however, the seeds of knowledge not only
must be sown in suitable soil (1tPOcr'Í1KOV: 276B7; see also 276E6),
but they must be allowed to germinate for as long as necessary
to reach their term. All of this, of course, sounds very much like
the Seventh Letter, except that here the story of the growth of
knowledge is being told from the standpoint of the teacher
rather than that of the learner. In either case, philosophic
knowledge is engendered in the mind of the learner, but only in
minds that are naturally suited for the topic. The seed is sown
in either case through conversation with the teacher, and in
either case requires long periods for germination. When the
seed comes to term, however, it finally bursts forth in a bloom of
k n o w l e d g e - k n o w l e d g e of the Just a n d the Good a n d the
Beautiful (Seventh Letter 342D4, Phaedrus 278A4)-that is capa-
ble of nourishing and sustaining itself. In the Seventh Letter,
this state of fruition is likened to a flame which tests the limits of

17. There are obvious parallels here with Diotima'smessage in the Symposium,
esp.- 212A.
human mental capacity. In the Phaedrus, it is described as bring-
ing its possessor the highest degree of well-being to which
humankind has access.
The main difference between the two accounts for our present
purposes, however, lies in what they have to say about the role
of discourse in the process leading to this state of fruition.
While the Seventh Letter dwells upon the disparities between
philosophic knowledge and the sensible symbols of public lan-
guage, the Phaedrus describes this state of knowledge as a kind
of d i s c o u r s e of w h i c h public l a n g u a g e is a static likeness
(ei8w홢,ov: 276A9). The discourse in question is a "living and
animate speech," inscribed "in the soul" of the person who has
gained a mental grasp of the Forms. Thus augmented by the
Phaedrus, the message of the Seventh Letter is not that philo-
sophic knowledge eludes expression by X6yoq categorically. The
message, rather, is that philosophic knowledge is a grasp of the
Forms that comes into being within the mind of the knower.
And while this state of mind cannot be communicated in a lan-
g u a g e e m p l o y i n g sensible symbols, it can be e n g e n d e r e d
t h r o u g h conversation with a knowledgeable teacher. Once
achieved, moreover, this state of knowledge can be described as
a form of X6-yoq "inscribed within the soul" of the person pos-
sessing it.
So the philosopher's knowledge of the Forms, in a sense, can
be articulated in discourse after all. As the Seventh Letter clear-
ly states, it cannot be articulated in the public language of writ-
ten and spoken symbols. The discourse in which it can be artic-
ulated, rather, is an internal X6yo,; structured by an awareness of
the Forms themselves. When Parmenides says at 135E of his
namesake dialogue that the Forms can be grasped preeminently
by discourse, we may plausibly understand this as saying that
the "living 홢,oyo5 of the soul" described in the Phaedrus is
u n i q u e l y well suited for a g r a s p of the Forms. W h e n the
Stranger says at Statesman 286A that the most important things
are clearly exhibited in X6yo홢; alone, we may reasonably take it
that the X6yoq in question is that "written within the mind of the
knower."I8 And when Plato has Socrates say at Republic 534C
that anyone who knows the Good itself should be able to define
that Form in discourse, we may conclude that the sense intend-
ed is that the knowing mind can discern the Good itself as dis-
tinct from all the other Forms.
This reconciliation between the Seventh Letter and the several
dialogues on the topic of knowledge and language completes
my account of why Plato never presented his knowledge of phi-
losophy in the style of an explicit theory of Forms. To have
attempted to do so would have constituted an attempt to convey
philosophic knowledge through the medium of written or spo-
ken discourse. And when someone attempts to do this, he says
expressly at 341C of the Seventh Letter, it is a sure sign that this
person "understands nothing about the subject" (rcepi 1:01> 1tpáy-
p.aTOS E7t홢xieiv ol홢8iv: 341C4). The reason Plato did not have a
theory of Forms, in brief, is that he understood enough of the
nature of philosophy to realize that philosophic knowledge can-
not be expressed in the form of theories.
University of Notre Dame

Reply to Charles Griswold

Charles Griswold's rousing commentary raises three objections
to which I wish to respond.19 The first is that my arguments
against Cherniss, even if successful, do not show that Plato did
not have a "theory" of Forms in some other sense of the term.

18. This conception of knowledge as mental discourse is extended to other late

dialogues in Sayre 1992.
19. The written version of my paper incorporates two substantial passages not
present in the version on which Professor Griswold's comments were prepared.
Both additions were intended to correct oversights which his commentary made
evident, and both are identified in the text of this Reply. Other passages I might
have wanted to change as a result of his perceptive observations were left in
original form, in order not to deprive certain aspects of his commentary of their
target. I want to thank Professor Griswold wholeheartedly for his thoughtful
criticisms of my arguments, and for his sympathy with the contents of my paper
overall. I am grateful to the Editors also for the present opportunity to address
these criticisms more fully.
The second is that I am too sanguine in accepting the Seventh
Letter as an expression of Plato's own true thoughts about phi-
losophy. Third is Griswold's express dissatisfaction with my
efforts to reconcile the Seventh Letter with certain passages in
the dialogues regarding the powers of X6yo홢;. Each of these
objections, it so happens, corresponds to a different section of
the original paper. I shall respond to the objections in the order
of the corresponding sections.
1.
The central thesis of the first section is that no theory of Forms
can be found in the Platonic dialogues. In order to provide an
explicit sense of the term "theory" in which that claim could be
argued, I drew upon Cherniss' discussion in "The Philosophical
Economy of the Theory of Ideas" for an example. There are
other examples upon which someone might draw for this pur-
pose instead. (A partial list may be found in Julia Annas' very
fine treatment of this topic in Chapter 9 of Annas 1981). The rea-
son I chose Cherniss should be obvious enough: his discussion
remains the most well-known available, and makes the case for
such a theory in the most forceful manner. Having presented
my arguments against Cherniss, however, I left myself vulnera-
ble to the charge that there might be a "theory" of Forms of
some other sort in the dialogues that escapes my objections.
And so there might. It counts as a genuine defect of the oral ver-
sion of my paper that I did not attempt to deal with this vulner-
ability in advance.
I attempt to remedy this defect in the written version with the
addition of the penultimate paragraph of the initial section,
which makes explicit the tactic I had in mind originally. What I
had intended to argue in this section, and in fact did argue in
connection with the particular example taken from Chemiss, is
that the Platonic dialogues contain no theory of Forms, in the
broad sense of "theory" as a set of general principles in proposi-
tional form from which explanations are drawn by explicit infer-
ence. If someone has a weaker sense of "theory" to put forward
that does not fall under this broad definition, then I would be
ready to admit that my arguments do not show that Plato had
no theory of Forms in that particular s e n s e - w h a t e v e r it might
be. My concern in the paper is with theories of the sort that
involve inference from general propositions. For that is the
sense of theory, I believe, that Plato rules out in the Seventh
Letter as being unsuited for the communication of philosophic
knowledge.
2.
I want to offer a minor correction to the summary remark by
which Griswold introduces his criticism of the second section of
my paper. The second section does indeed argue, as he says,
that Plato himself had no theory of Forms of the relevant sort.
But it does not argue that Plato thought no such theory could be
had. Of c o u r s e t h e o r i e s of t h a t sort can be p u t
together—philosophers do it on a regular basis on Plato's behalf,
including Cherniss as a notable example. What Plato thought, if
I am right, is that no such theory could be a d e q u a t e as an
expression of philosophic understanding. This is why he him-
self declined to produce such a theory, at least according to the
testimony of the Seventh Letter. But this correction is incidental
to Griswold's second objection.
Griswold's second major objection, to put it irenically, is that I
impose too much trust in the authenticity of the Seventh Letter.
For the record, I want to take exception to his remark that I
accept the Seventh Letter as authentic on the grounds that most
modern authors on Plato are of that opinion. It would be more
accurate to say that I take it to be authentic for much the same
reasons as do most other modern authors. What these reasons
boil down to, for my part, is that I am not aware at this point of
any good reasons why the Seventh Letter should not be taken at
face value. Particular factors underlying this attitude of accep-
tance are mentioned in footnote 6 of the printed paper, which
also was added after the oral delivery.
At one point in my discussion of the Seventh Letter I briefly
mention what I take to be a basic flaw in the reading of that doc-
ument by the Tubingen school. The flaw is that this reading
suppresses passages that reject oral as well as written discourse
as a means of communicating philosophic knowledge, which
undercuts the notion of an esoteric doctrine reserved for oral
communication. In his commentary, Griswold identifies a
branch of the Tubingen approach that bases its case for an eso-
teric oral doctrine upon the Phaedrus rather than the Seventh
Letter, and suggests that my argument against this approach
would have been stronger if I had taken on this latter branch
instead. By way of response, I can only say that the present
paper does not purport to argue against esotericism in general,
or against the Tubingen approach in particular. The present
paper is concerned only with the reading of the Seventh Letter
which Kramer's interpretation epitomizes. It is relevant to note
in this regard, however, that I do offer a general criticism of the
notion of an esoteric oral doctrine in Sayre 1993. A point
advanced as part of this criticism is that the passages in the
Phaedrus, upon which the esotericists rely (often along with the
Seventh Letter) also rules out oral as well as written language
for the communication of knowledge. Inasmuch as Griswold
himself acknowledges that Socrates' speech in this context does
not endorse the spoken word without qualification (Griswold
1986, 209), I will be very interested in his reaction to this part of
my criticism.
3.
Griswold has a rather short response to the rather lengthy
attempt in the final section of my paper to reconcile the Seventh
Letter with certain passages in the Republic and the Statesman
(among others). At Republic 534B4-6, Socrates says that someone
unable to give an account (Lyyoq) of the being of things cannot
be said to have intelligence (vob;) about the matter. My sugges-
tion is that this passage seems to mean that an ability to give an
account goes along with having intelligence as a natural conse-
quence, thus hoping to square the passage with the claim of the
Seventh Letter that intelligence cannot be rendered in %6yo;.
Without offering details, Griswold says he thinks the passage
means more t h a n that. The reading I propose of Statesman
286A5-7 is that the most important and beautiful of nonbodily
things can be exhibited by a discourse (7홢.o홢yoS) that is not percep-
tible. Griswold demurs. As he rightly points out, this concep-
tion of an imperceptible discourse is imported from Republic
532A6-7. And the explication of that passage upon which I rely
is one he rejects as being "strained." What the Eleatic Stranger is
talking about in the Statesman, he suggests, is not discourse that
itself is imperceptible, but just discourse about things that can-
not be perceived. A similar reading is claimed for the Republic
passage.
I propose a particular reading, and Griswold rejects it. My
position is that the Seventh Letter rules out public language as
an unsuitable m e d i u m for philosophic knowledge, and I am
faced with the task of bringing a few discordant passages from
the dialogues into line. His position is that my attempts in this
regard do not succeed, and that I shouldn't bother in the first
place because the Seventh Letter is suspect. Is this the point to
reach an agreement to disagree, with each of us leaving our
written words—in the language of Phaedrus 275E5-6-to fend for
themselves as best they may? In fact, I think not. It is the point
instead for me to acknowledge that my case for the harmony of
the Seventh Letter with the passages in question is incomplete.
One aspect of the problem that needs a more careful look has
to do with the ambiguity of the term 7홢,oyo5 of which all Plato
scholars are aware. In the context of 343A1 and associated pas-
sage of the Seventh Letter, the term seems clearly to carry the
meaning of written or spoken language. This also seems-albeit
less clearly—to be the sense at Republic 534B9, although the
reading "rational account" is plausible as well. This latter sense
comes to the fore in the Statesman 286A4, 6, as Griswold himself
indicates, and some translators render the term X6yo; here by
"reason" (Skemp) or "thought" (Jowett) alone. The same read-
ing is invited at Parmenides 135E5 (see Jowett, for example). If
the t e r m A.6yo홢; in these p a s s a g e s is r e n d e r e d by "rational
account" or "reason," however, the appearance of conflict with
the Seventh Letter disappears. The Seventh Letter says that
philosophic knowledge cannot be communicated in public lan-
guage, and Statesman 286A6-7 (e.g.) says that most important
a n d b e a u t i f u l t h i n g s can be clearly e x h i b i t e d in reason.
Rendering X6yo홢; by "reason" in the latter passage not only
removes the appearance of conflict between the two contexts,
but also exhibits a straightforward sense in which ?홢6yoS might
be imperceptible. For a seasoned reader of Plato, at any rate,
there is nothing "mysterious" (Griswold's term) about reason
being removed from sense perception.
At the same time, I want to defend the conception of an imper-
ceptible discourse as also relevant to Plato's views on such mat-
ters. The primary textual source of this conception is Phaedrus
276A, where Socrates refers to the discourse "written in the soul
of the learner" (ypdcpexai ev 2홢;jiov jlav8ávov'toç 'II'Uxf¡: 276A5-6).
The description of this logos as being "written" in the soul, of
course, is metaphorical; but Socrates' talk about its being present
there in some manner presumably is to be taken literally. And
whatever the manner of containment, a X6yo홢; in the 'II'Ux1Í of a
budding philosopher will not be accessible by the sensory facul-
ties. The existence of a philosophic X6yo; that is imperceptible in
this way dovetails nicely with the critique of public discourse in
the Seventh Letter, which is based entirely upon the perceptible
qualities of public language.
Having said this, I accept Griswold's criticism to the effect that
the conception of an imperceptible language does not fall neatly
out of Republic 532A6-7. W h a t that passage refers to is an
attempt, through \6yo홢;r and apart from sense experience, to
push on to the essence of things—not such an attempt through
discourse unaided by the senses as my phrasing in the paper
(following Cornford) suggests. But the sense of an impercepti-
ble discourse appears to lurk between the lines of this passage,
nonetheless, inasmuch as the discourse involved in an attempt
which is wholly apart from|·" typ="BWD"
ncco홢)v:
xbd="876"
532A6)
xhg="775"
perception
ybd="2085" yhg=
would seem itself to be imperceptible. That is why I referred to
this passage in my paper as suggesting a way of reconciling the
Seventh letter with the other texts in question, by way of the
conception of an imperceptible discourse found in the Phaedrus.
Although these lines of reconciliation require further attention,
I believe they show that there is no irresolvable conflict between
the Seventh Letter as I have interpreted it and the several pas-
sages in question from the middle and late dialogues.

University of Notre Dame