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1nr vs kissmyafff

K
Quick underview
They conceded our baudrillard evidence which functions as both a link and an impact
—their description of distant third would suffering and subsequent demand for the
ballot creates a marketplace for suffering images, which leads to the reproduction of
the same suffering they claim to solve for. All of the above was conceded, which
means you grant us 100% risk of our impacts. It’s now only a question of framework,
which was answered in the 2NC
Xi Disad
Thicc o/v
This was severely mishandled in the 2AC and it’s gonna be hard for them to come back
from it. The CCP party congress is coming up, with several PSC seats up for grabs, so Xi
needs to enter the congress in a position of strength in order to keep those seats. He
has consolidated power in the squo, but the plan undermines him because it gets spun
as Xi succumbing to the US’s agenda. Campbell indicates that Xi will respond by
rebuilding his strongman image with a foreign crisis. That escalates and goes nuclear.
Almost all of this went conceded
Prefer our impact:
Extinction first. Putting material condition before survival is infinitely regressive and
the aff will never be able to solve
Robin Attfield, Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University, “The Ethics of the Global Environment”,
Perdue University Press, 1999, pg 68

Nevertheless, as John Leslie has remarked, many philosophers write as if there were no reason for preserving the
human species beyond obligations either to the dead or to the living, and some as if there would be nothing wrong with allowing the
species to extinguish itself, or even with actively extinguishing it ourselves, well before this would happen in the ordinary course of events.
Now the argument concerning the value of ongoing current activities already shows that the verdicts that there would be nothing
wrong with allowing (let alone causing) premature extinction are unsupportable ; for the prospect of premature human
extinction deprives many (but not all) widespread current activities of their meaning and value. But, as has just been argued, there must be
something else to explain the strength of the imperative not to allow or to make premature extinction come about, and to explain what it is
that makes most people who contemplate the possibility of premature human extinction regard it as appalling. Cicero makes a parallel
point: 'As we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare that they care not if when they themselves are dead the universal conflagration
ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake.'23 Likewise the consequentialist
ethic introduced and defended in Chapter 2 maintains that future people have moral standing (and future living creatures of other species
too). Future
generations have this standing even though their existence is contingent on current
generations and the identity of future individuals is unknown at present; the good or ill of
individuals who could be brought into existence count as reasons for or against actions or policies
which would bring them into being. This in turn implies that where the existence beyond a certain date of individuals likely to
lead happy, worthwhile or flourishing lives can be facilitated or prevented, there is an obligation not to prevent it, other things being equal.
This does not mean that everyone should be continually having children ; other things are seldom equal, and
problems of human numbers mean that acting on this basis could easily produce overextended families, countries or regions, or an
overpopulated planet, where extra people would spell misery for themselves and for the others (see Chapter 7). But it does mean that each
life likely to be of positive quality comprises a reason for its own existence, and that countervailing reasons of matching strength
(concerning the disvalue of adding this life) are required to neutralise such a reason. There are many other implications, including the
importance of planning for the needs of future generations (considered in later chapters). A further implication, more
relevant here, is that humanity should not be allowed to become extinct, insofar as this is within
human control, even if, foreseeably, a small minority of any given generation will lead lives of negative
quality (lives which are either not positively worth living or actually worth not living), as long as, overall, the lives of that
generation are of positive quality, and the positive intrinsic value of worthwhile lives outweighs the intrinsic disvalue of the
lives of misery. Since each generation is highly likely to include some lives which are not worth living, however hard its members and their
predecessors may try to raise the quality of these lives, this implication makes all the difference to the issue of whether causing or even
People who think that preventing misery is always of the
allowing the extinction of humanity is a moral crime.
greatest importance have to take the view that human extinction should be tolerated or even
advocated; but the consequentialist ethic defended here says otherwise. So, of course, say the widespread
intuitions reviewed earlier. A modified version of one of John Leslie's thought-experiments could be used to test much the same issue. On
each of numerous inhabitable planets, capable of supporting a large human population, whose members would predictably lead lives of
positive quality, there will also be a person whose life will predictably and inevitably be of negative quality. For the purposes of the thought-
experiment, these large human populations can be brought into existence by waving a magic wand. Should this be done? For
consequentialists who believe in optimising the balance of intrinsic value over intrinsic disvalue, and in counting every actual and possible
life as having moral standing, the answer is affirmative, even though the resulting population of each planet includes a life of negative
quality. But theorists who prioritise the prevention of misery would have to hold that the answer depends
entirely on whether the life of negative quality on each planet can be prevented; if it cannot, then none of
these lives should be engendered. (Others too, including consequentialists, might also take this view if the addition of human
lives were liable to harm the living creatures of these same planets; to make this thought-experiment a test case, we need to adopt the
further assumption that no such harm would be done.) This thought-experiment also has a bearing on human extinction. For the future of
the Earth beyond a certain date (just after the death of the youngest person now alive) is in some ways similar to the situation of the
planets just mentioned. The current generation could produce a population living then, most of them people with lives worth living, but
only at the risk of producing a minority whose lives will foreseeably be miserable. If the happiness or the worthwhile lives of the majority
do not count as reasons for generating those same lives, and hence nothing counts but the misery of the minority, or if the prevention of
misery should be prioritised over all else, then allowing extinction is clearly mandatory, and so may be even genocide. However, as
Leslie claims, the
coexistence of hundreds of thousands of lives of positive quality with one life of
misery is not morally disastrous, if the misery of the miserable life really cannot be alleviated . 25 (If of
course this misery could be alleviated, whether by contemporaries or by the previous generation, then this might well be a morally
disastrous situation, and alleviation would almost certainly be obligatory.) Consequentialism, then, does not mandate extinction, unlike
several of the theories which stand opposed to it.

Cross apply Schell 82—there can be no value to life without life in the first place. That
means we turn case because even if some life is devalued in the squo, all life is
devalued in the world of the aff
Now prefer empirics-- escalation is uniquely likely in the case of the DA
Colby 2015 Elbridge, Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, The Foreign
Policy Essay: A Nuclear Asia?, 2/15/2015, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/02/the-foreign-policy-
essay-a-nuclear-asia/

For all the focus on maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, there is an even greater peril in
Asia that deserves attention: the rising salience of nuclear weapons. China’s military buildup—in particular its
growing capabilities to blunt America’s ability to project effective force in the western Pacific—is threatening to change the
military balance in the region. This will lead to a cascade of strategic shifts that will make nuclear
weapons more central in both American and Chinese national-security plans, while increasing the danger that
other regional states will seek nuclear arsenals of their own. Like it or not, nuclear weapons in Asia are back. This is true
for four reasons. First, the conventional military balance in the region is becoming more competitive in ways
that will make the possibility of nuclear escalation in the event of conflict more likely . After three quarters of a
century of unquestioned supremacy in maritime Asia, the U.S. military is now facing an increasingly severe challenge
from China’s military buildup. No longer can U.S. forces in maritime Asia operate decisively and with impunity; rather, key U.S.
facilities and assets, such as aircraft carriers and vital bases on Okinawa and Guam, are now increasingly vulnerable to China’s
strike forces even as the United States’ own strike assets face a more and more capable Chinese air defense network. Because of this, U.S.
forces attempting to operate in maritime Asia will now have to struggle for dominance rather than simply assume it. A war in the region
between the United States and China under such circumstances would be more susceptible to nuclear
escalation. In any contingency in the region, the growing sophistication of China’s large military would mean that the United States would
have a much more difficult time overcoming it, since Chinese systems that have longer range, are more accurate, are smarter, and are more
effectively netted together require more work, creativity, and skill to defeat. Put more directly, the
United States and its allies
would have to fight harder, quicker, nastier, deeper, for longer, with less deliberation, and over a wider
battlefield than was the case in the past in order to defeat Chinese forces in maritime Asia . Even without
anyone really wanting to introduce nuclear weapons into the equation, these trends raise classic
“inadvertent escalation” risks. This line of analysis points to the dangers of escalation that can arise due to the way even a
conventional war can unfold. In particular, if one needs to fight harder against an opponent in order to prevail, it also
becomes harder to limit the war—including in ways that might entangle nuclear weapons . Second, China’s
nuclear arsenal is becoming somewhat larger and considerably more sophisticated . While China continues to
exhibit restraint regarding the size of its nuclear arsenal and in how it appears to think about the role of nuclear weapons in its military strategy,
China is nevertheless substantially modernizing its nuclear forces. It is fielding more modern road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possibly capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)
while also making progress on the development of a serious ballistic missile submarine capability . At the
same time, its command and control systems and the professionalism of its nuclear warriors are also improving. Whether deliberately pursued
or not, these advances will by necessity give Beijing more and better options for employing its nuclear
weapons, especially in more limited and controlled ways. Instead of only, practically speaking, having the option of striking at a major
American or Japanese city, China will increasingly gain the ability to employ its nuclear forces in more tailored fashion—for example, against
military facilities or forces, including those in the region. This
ability to use nuclear weapons in more limited and tailored
ways will make China’s threats—explicit or implicit—to use nuclear forces more credible. The consequence of
this is that China’s nuclear force will cast a darker shadow over Sino-American competition in the Pacific. Third,
the conventional balance is not fixed and the United States might actually lose the conventional advantage in the western Pacific—or important
portions of it. A loss of U.S. conventional advantages in maritime Asia could come about because of a U.S. lack of resolve or inattention, because
of the scale and effectiveness of China’s substantial and ongoing military buildup, or because of some malign combination of both. In this case,
Washington might seek to rely more on its nuclear weapons to compensate for this conventional
weakness in extending deterrence to its allies in the region . In particular, Washington would likely seek to
exploit its superior ability to conduct a limited nuclear war to deter China from taking advantage of its
conventional lead. This course will seem unappealing to many, not least in the United States. But this disquiet points to the fourth and
final reason: the prospect of further nuclear proliferation in the region. If, as China grows stronger and more assertive , its
conventional military power begins to outweigh that of the United States in maritime Asia, and if that shift is not met by a greater U.S. reliance
on its nuclear forces or some other effective countervailing steps, then those countries
of Asia traditionally allied to
Washington—countries that cannot hope to match China’s strength at the conventional level—may ultimately see getting their
own nuclear weapons as essential to deterring China ’s exploitation of its growing strength.

And, factional in-fighting causes shutdown of the Chinese government – turns the case
Dr. Li 13 (Cheng, master's in Asian studies from the University of California, Berkeley and a doctorate in
political science from Princeton University. director of the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior
fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, From 1993 to 1995, he worked in China as a fellow
with the U.S.-based Institute of Current World Affairs pg online at “China’s Third Plenum: Reform And
Opening Up 2.0?,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/10/31-chinas-third-plenum-reform-
and-opening-up/103113_cpc_transcript_ia.pdf //um-ef)

the leadership and the factional in-fighting, it is true that we cannot understand
Finally, the third pessimistic view about the lack of consensus within

Chinese politics without a grasp of factional tensions. And after past months, no one understands the importance of factional tension better than we do in
Washington. Do you agree? Well, Chinese leaders in the past Deng era, are generally divided into two coalitions -- the Jiang Zemin camp currently led by President Xi Jinping, and the Hu Jintao camp, currently led by Premier Li
Keqiang. President Xi Jinping now holds a six to one majority on the Politburo Standing Committee. Premier Li seemed to have had the cooperative partnership thus far. For example, publicly, Premier Li has been seen as the leader,
pushing for the establishment of the Shanghai free trade zone, although the real driving force is, in fact, the Jiang Zemin camp, whose power base is in Shanghai. But the strong influence of President Xi and his protégé in China’s
economic and financial circles may make Premier Li uneasy. Also, a majority of senior officials, one or two levels below the Politburo Standing Committee actually belong to Hu Jintao’s camp, particularly 376 Central Committee
members. The majority of them belong to Hu Jintao’s camp. I just did a study about over 90 of them belong to the so-called tuanpai, the Communist Youth League. These are the protégés of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang. They are surely

interested in gaining more seats in the top leadership or having someone occupy the top driver seat in the years to come. Their policy agenda and the regional priority may
differ from President Xi’s. In four years, China will have another round of leadership in-fighting as five out of the seven Politburo Standing Committee members will retire. This means that a new run of
vicious fighting for seats on this superior leadership body now occurs on a fiveyear cycle rather than its general 10-year cycle. Now , it is possible that a vicious power struggle

may get out of control leading to a Chinese style government shutdown . Luckily, for the Chinese, if such a shutdown occurs, they can still
watch the American panda cam. No, we cannot see during the shutdown. But all of these observations will actually encourage Xi Jinping and his coalition to more forcefully carry out their market reform agenda. Failure
to deliver will significantly undermine Xi Jinping’s credibility, reduce middle class support, further alienate the liberal
intellectuals, marginalize China from important international economic integration, like the potential TPP .
And most importantly, make accountable China’s strategic condition to a consumption-driven economy.

If you buy any of the above, you vote neg without a second thought because the 2ac
did almost nothing on this flow. I’ll answer the arguments they did make below:
AT no link
They made this argument in cross x and we gave them answers. Going into the 2AC,
they knew the specific arguments we would make for why Corcoran doesn’t solve. This
would have been a good opportunity for them to preempt, yet somehow they decided
to make the exact same already-answered argument as if cross x never happened. You
should view this as a concession. Extend that times where China has financed debt
relief in the past are fundamentally different from the aff. Two warrants:
1) campbell indicates that Xi needs to project infallibility in order to maintain his
strength going into the party congress this fall. Their evidence was from 2015;
there was no party congress that year. They only happen every 5 years
2) deng indicates that what hurts Xi is not any specific policy but rather the
perception that he’s following a foreign agenda. So any time China has, on its
own, decided to forgive debt is fundamentally different from the aff, because
the aff sees the US directing China to do so, which gets spun against Xi,
triggering the DA
AT no impact
Did they even read the disad? We make no argument about regime change or CCP
collapse, which means we get a conceded impact. Don’t let them come back on this in
the 1AR. That creates late-breaking debates which skew the neg because we only have
1 speech to answer
Neocol
There was no 2AC answer to complexity. They’re gonna say their “we don’t claim to
solve all of colonialism” line was an answer, but don’t let them get away with that.
First, the argument was out of context and not given as a response to complexity so
you can’t make that cross application for them. Second, this is another moment from
cross x they seem to be forgetting—they asked why not do something? The answer
was given— their linear model is a harmful form of planning. It’s not real-world, it
doesn’t lead to solutions, and affirming that epistemology creates a reliance that leads
to more policy failure in the future. That means the first step to actually solving their
harms is to reject the overly simplistic framing of the 1ac. That means we get a
conceded solvency takeout and a conceded case turn. Now I’m gonna make them pay
for it:
The predictive logic of the 1AC in the face of continual uncertainty ensures their policy
changes will revert back to chaos
Sa, 04 – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE:
UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004,
scholar)RK

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If
future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been
an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major
policies revert back to the uncertainty and chaos. Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known,
it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers
to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors
and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein
1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency,
ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency
arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change . What results is uncertainty
from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between
policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause
and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical
explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns
emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of;
disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as
the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study
object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-
organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to
say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same
network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out
of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take
place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities
constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts
emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It
means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a
frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with
the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as;
faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with
each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception.
Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things
proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes
that predictions of the
future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one
(Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite
small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that
prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial
fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to
amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak
chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak
chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a
system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy
Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in
terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that
policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many
different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal
relationships.

Any policy resulting from linearity is unstable and chaotic – complexity theory
establishes adaptability
Sakowski et. al., IPEA, 15 - (Bernardo Alves Furtado, Researcher at the Directorate of Regional,
Urban and Environmental Studies and Policies, Patrícia Alessandra Morita Sakowski, Researcher at
Dirur/Ipea. Special Advisor at Dirur/Ipea, Marina Haddad Tóvolli, Research Assistant at Dirur/Ipea,
translated to English, IPEA is the “Research Institute of Applied Economics,” April 2015, "A COMPLEXITY
APPROACH FOR PUBLIC POLICIES",
http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/4945/1/DiscussionPaper_205.pdf, DOA: 9-21-2016)
//Snowball

The process of law-making entails heterogeneous individuals (legislators), usually under no centralized control, who
strategically interact with each other in order to produce collective decisions.27 When this interaction occurs under a
majority rule institution, collective choice problems may arise. One main problem faced by the legislators is instability.
According to the social choice theory (Arrow, 2012), majority-rule decisions tend to be unstable and chaotic. Another important
problem is related to information. From the game theory perspective (Riker, 1959), legislators have incomplete and asymmetric
information, which reduces their capacity to reach a collective decision. One way to overcome these collective action problems is
through legislatures’ organizational features. These features may induce stability and enhance information . However,
the reasons for the adoption of one organizational model over the other are not clear, as well as the effect of the historical process over this
choice. Two contrasting theories try to explain the emergence and change of legislative institutions. On one side, rational
choice theory
(Downs, 1957) states that rational individuals design the institutions according to their interests , and when
unforeseen consequences happen, these individuals may make changes that contribute to the institutional development. On the other side, the
evolutionary perspective (Smith and Price, 1973), embodied in complexity theory, emphasizes the adaptation
property of the system itself. According to this view, institutional development is the outcome of the interactions between
institutions and the environment . In this sense, complexity theory might help explain why outcomes vary within
the context in which they are embodied, and how legislative institutions emerge and change . Following this perspective, it is
of main interest in the Brazilian context to analyze the organizational evolution of the Brazilian Congress, especially, the institutional changes
that have occurred since 1987, as a way to highlight the potential contribution of the application of complex systems to legislative studies.
Complexity is a prerequisite to effective policy-making
Johnson 2010 (Liz, Ph.D. Candidate Public Policy Program The University of North Carolina at Charlotte
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1657193)

The challenges facing the design and implementation of science and technology
policy can be analyzed in various contextual frameworks, but need to account for
innovation as a complex adaptive system. Furthermore, in hard times, it is even more imperative to reevaluate how we conceptualize innovation to ensure we

The central purpose of this paper is to explicate science and


do not fall victim to the myth of isolated systems.

technology innovation as a complex adaptive system and explore the properties and
mechanisms that can be directly applied to the policy process. Since form follows
function, and function continually reforms form, how can these principles be best
applied to innovation as a complex adaptive system, and what form should policy
take? Ideally, policymaking strategies need
Also, what is the form and function of technology and invention as interrelating components of innovation?

to move dramatically beyond practices of fractionalizing systems of the innovation


whole, and reinforce the natural processes of complexity. Effective policy should
encourage co-evolution in which systems learn and adapt to a constantly changing
environment, in addition to increasing resilience to absorb shocks from random
events and unexpected consequences of action. An understanding of system
changes and new states of innovation will be evaluated in terms of proactive and
reactive policymaking strategies with the goal of strengthening and sustaining the
whole. Theoretical building blocks of system pace, action dynamics, and simplicity
will also be considered for further policy application. Though the discipline of
complexity is still in its early stages, it has enabled successful application and
breakthroughs in fields like biology, economics, and consciousness. Studying
innovation as a complex adaptive system can serve as a foundational tool in policy
studies to expand our epistemological and ontological perspectives to build theory
accounting for complexity, whether hard times or not.

Form comes before function—Complexity provides the frame necessary for effective
policy-making
Johnson 2010 (Liz, Ph.D. Candidate Public Policy Program The University of North
Carolina at Charlotte papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1657193)
it is critical to examine what would
As we face challenging times and move further into the rapid evolution of transformative, emergent, and convergent technologies,

be effective innovation policy and what form it could and should take. Does the
unique nature of innovation as a complex adaptive system operating in a global (CAS)

economic network thrive more under an incremental policy form or should we adapt
for an interrelating systems approach to policy? given the challenges in science Furthermore,

and technology policy, can the form of policy be expanded “in order to improve or
made more fit for a particular purpose,” like national innovation success? (TheFreeDictionary.com, 2009)

Times of global economic challenges do not preclude deviceful thinking and focused
attention on national innovation as a complex adaptive system, with unique
demands and application for policymaking. Also critical to consider is the generally
accepted principle that form follows function The function or use of the design (Brand, 1994).

of innovation policy is to spur and trigger economic growth. The form of the policy
should take into account how to most effectively organize and direct the
coordinating parts of an innovation system for successful outcomes measured in
patents, increased entrepreneurship, commercialization, and economic growth.
However, “Function reforms form, perpetually” Further to consider is what are (Brand, 3).

compelling strategies to design better policy in a globally competitive environment


where many complex factors are out of policymakers’ control? The Science of Strategy views all

competitive situations in terms of position, conditions, decisions, and action. In relation to innovation, position is how an entity, such as country, ranks in relation to other countries. The

condition to examine is United States innovation as a complex adaptive system nested2 in a globally, competitive economic system. Yet no matter what the competitive challenges and level of complexity, the goal is to

To improve national innovation positions requires making


improve position or outcomes of innovation (Science of Strategy, 2009).

the right decisions and actions in the form of appropriate policy design and ensuring
its implementation. Given that innovation functions as a complex adaptive system, it
is important to understand its mechanisms, potential to evolve, and unique systems
of technology innovation. I will assess the form and function of technology and
innovation in a policy context, as a complex adaptive system. Additional academic
attention should also be given to a viable policy form that can best actualize the
function of national innovation policy systems. Finally, I will assess policy forms and
explore how they can be customized and disposed to better fit the demands and
strategies necessary for successful innovation policy.

Even if they win solvency, linear planning makes their impacts inevitable
James, 96 – Glenn E., Major in the USAF (“IV How Can We Use the Results? Exploiting Chaos Theory,”
Chaos Theory, Naval War College, Newport Paper Number Ten, October 1996,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/np10.pdf)RK
At this point the reader should have some intuition for the common features of Chaos. An enormous number of systems exhibit
chaotic dynamics; many of these systems are relevant to military decision making. But how can we use Chaos to make better decisions or
design new strategies? Even if we accept the idea that Chaos can be applied to strategic thinking, shouldn’t we leave this high-tech
brainstorming to the analysts? Absolutely not! As Gottfried Mayer-Kress points out, if
we fail to learn the basic applications of
Chaos theory, our naiveté could lead to unfortunate consequences. We may, for example, fall into the trap of
thinking that successful short-term management allows total control of a system; we may have unnecessary
difficulty in making a diagnosis from available short-term data; or we may apply inappropriate control mechanisms that
can produce the opposite of the desired effect.45

Even if you don’t buy any of the above, extend their 2AC Andrews evidence. They say
the only way to solve neocol is to “look beyond the west/other-than-west binary”.
They go on to say they do this by “looking beyond current debt policy” Ummm what?
Changing debt policy doesn’t equate to breaking down the west/nonwest binary,
which means they can’t solve. If anything, Andrews is a case turn because the entire K
demonstrates the 1AC presents the nonwest as a site of distant suffering and poverty
and in need of our saving through the almighty USFG and of course the almighty
ballot. That means they double down on the west/nonwest binary.
Don’t grant them the Harvey evidence. Harvey only says imperialism caused wars in
the past, but there’s no warrant for why the aff prevents any war. Make them explain
why forgiving debt stops war. Even if you don’t buy that, the DA outweighs on
timeframe
Also, Holt and Mitchell don’t apply. We are not a body count argument. Schell and
Attfield simply say that life is a prereq to VTL. Obviously it would be wrong to say that
killing 5 people is okay to save 6, but the question of total extinction is entirely
different. It is a question of whether there can be any VTL, not who kills more people
Econ
Cross apply every complexity argument. They do not solve.
Extend Bloomberg—China’s economy is fine. “Stability now doesn’t mean stability is
permanent” is not an answer. The burden is on them to explain why their impact is
imminent and likely. They don’t do that, so you don’t grant them this impact.