G.R. No.
L-81147 June 20, 1989 (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA
NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent
dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint
the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of
the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main
questions which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines,
passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was
survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner
Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-
83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining
to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified
petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria
Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the
deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the
deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the
Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the
PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the
Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay
Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased
and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss
the petition of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of
the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the
alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration
relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court,
appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the
intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her
in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of
all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an
inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought
the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the
appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision
dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the
following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2)
Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where
there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right
to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita
Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of
the deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons:
firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong
exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim
she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is
the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings
deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the
PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by
several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has
been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private
respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner
to decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to
appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested
in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not
belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations
as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not
a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or
non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before
which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in
the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of
the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations
thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if
any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate
court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action which may be instituted by the parties.7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the
administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be
unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6,
Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one,
should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is
established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the
heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they
may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if
the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course
of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which
is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial
administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal
age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each
case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do
not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary
estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case
the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the
hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument
is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has
indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the
 deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where
such property is in the hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as
administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir
seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain
transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action
for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a
reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is
necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the
intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just
adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the
latter.15
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue
of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the
sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as
administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the
administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of
private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the
property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are
only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age.
The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid.
What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms.
The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment
as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties
of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are
presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason
which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the
deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does
not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left
has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no
useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the
claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors,
should there be any, are protected in any event.

We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of
administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of
the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of
an administration proceeding.
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES
MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA
ALARAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009·, respectively, of
the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, Which affirmed the
Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several
heirs, including his_ children with his first wife, respondents Ma. Gracia
R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a
resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No.
51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the
land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both
located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of
Title and Recovery of Possession 5 dated September 15, 1993,
respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that
their co-heirs, Pedro’s second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children,
had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria
and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son,
Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When
confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing
respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in
the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a
previous loan obtoiined by Pedro and Benita from a bank. 6 The
document actually evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan of the amount
of ₱87, 352.62 releasing her and her late husband’s indebtedness
therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed
respondents that he has no record of any transaction involving the
subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the
same. When respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered
that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were
not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an
extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was published in a
tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused the annotation of their
adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of Deeds
of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for the
annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the
petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto. 8
In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on
the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring
the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial,
petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was
only the resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which
provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home
to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a
Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for ₱650,
000.00. 11
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the subject
Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the
Documents of conveyance offered by petitioner’s .as well as the
circumstances Surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not
duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed. 12 The Deed of
Sale was Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left
blank, and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left
side of the document Was not signed. 13 The trial court also observed
that both documents were Never presented to the Office of the Register
of Deeds for registration and That the titles to the subject properties
were still in the names of Pedro and His second wife Benita. In addition,
the supposed notaries and buyers of the Subject properties were not
even presented as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing
and execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On The basis thereof,
the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its Judgment, the
pertinent portions of its fallo provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is Hereby
rendered as follows:
xxxx
4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l ",
Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public Antonio G.
Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of
1991. .
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex. "2",
Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T. Rifioza in favor of
spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, purportedly
notarized by one Alfredo de Guzman marked Doc. No. 1136, Page
No. 141, and Book. No. XXX, Series of 1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements
introduced By defendants Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong
in the properties Covered by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and
51355 of the Register of Deeds for Nasugbu, Batangas. .
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose
Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4) parcels of land described
in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest of defendant
Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the
estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the Amended
Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza, each in
the capacity and degree established, as well as their direct successors-in
interest, and ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to issue the
co1Tesponding titles in their names in the proportion established by
law, pro in division, in TCT Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353
(after restoration) within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision,
4pon payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be
exempt from all expenses for its restoration.
With no costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial ‘court’s Judgment in its
Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged, Alfredo de
Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public from 1989 to July 3,
1991, the date the certification was issued. Such being the case, the
resort deed is not a public document and the presumption of regularity
accorded to public documents will not apply to the same. As laid down in
Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.:
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the
authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public docs net have the
capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway, then the document
should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh,
and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith relying
on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person pretending
to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the
elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may
receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule,
The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public will
have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged
in pretense. The notarization of a document carries considerable legal
effect. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a
public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary,
it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of
that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and
the courts and administrative offices generally.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be considered
a public document. This is because the following cast doubt on the
document's authenticity, to wit: J.
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas
for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or the
purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were
presented as witnesses. · Concededly, the absence of notarization in the
resort deed and/or the lacking details in the settlement/family home
deed did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by the
said documents. However, since the said deeds are private documents,
perforce, their due execution and authenticity becomes subject to the
requirement of proof under the Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132
of which provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any
private. Document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution a"Q.d. authenticity must be proved either:
(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home and the
resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are forgeries as
opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds' enforceability. After the
Complaining Heirs presented proofs in support of their claim that their
signatures were forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to
disprove the ~ame2 or conversely, to prove the authenticity and due
execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the notary
public who purportedly notarized the questioned instrument, (b) the
witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments as eyewitnesses to the
signing, or (c) an expert to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all
the signatures appearing on the said instruments. Verily, the rule that,
proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary
evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be
reasonably established as a pre requisite to its admission, was prudently
observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the
settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity are
doubtful. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006 raising the trial
court’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession
was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as
to the nature thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of the
intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action
filed was for Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant action is
really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting merely
in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon
the issues of forgery and ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said
ruling is void and has no effect for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by
the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for
Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of the petition, a
certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed
to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent
evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated September
26, 2007, this Court also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
in the absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification of the
previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became final and
executors on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry of Judgment
issued by the Court. 20 On January 16, 2008, the Court further denied
petitioner' s motion for leave to admit a second motion for
reconsideration of its September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that
the same is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Furthennore, petitioner's letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading the
Court to take a second. Look at his petition for review on certiorari and
that a decision thereon be rendered based purely on its merits was
noted without action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to
then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a decision on the case be
rendered based on the. Merits and not on formal requirements "as he
stands to lose everything his parents had left him just because the
verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective." However,
in view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007,
the Court likewise noted said letter without action. 22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part Writ of
Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to the portions
disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 200 a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and· Order before the CA assailing
October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the
RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In
Decision dated March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition a
affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the following wise: Although the
assailed Decision of the Court a quo has already become final and
executory and in fact entry of judgment was issued on 31 October 2007,
supra, nevertheless, to put the issues to rest,·We deem it apropos to
tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the Court a
quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the annulment of a
judgment may "be based only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal
stressed that: There is extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had
been ·prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, ...
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ... "
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud, which
prevents the aggrieved party ·from having a trial or presenting his case
to the court, or is used to procure the judgment without fair submission
of the controversy. This refers to acts intended to keep the unsuccessful
party away from the courts as when there is a false promise of
compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit. The pivotal
issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time during the
proceedings below that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting
fully their case, by fraud or deception, practiced on them by
Respondents, and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept away from the
court or kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We carefully
delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the instant case as well as
the proceedings below as shown in the 36-page Decision of the Court a
quo, is that the Petitioners were given ample time to rebut the
allegations of the Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of.
Respondent's cause of action against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation
of the Court a quo ‘s lack of jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit ruling of
the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao, thus: It is
elementary that' the active participation of a party in a case pending
against him before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's
jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which
will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. ' In
fine, under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are
stopped from assailing the Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We do
not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra. As mentioned
earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on the assailed
Decision and Order as early as 31 October 2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain
equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the I. Rules are
clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts is
resorted to only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the appropriate
remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is their own look out.
The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et al. v.
Security Bank Corporation, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of
judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of·appeal." A
party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for new trial or a
petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its
obvious rationale is to prevent the party from benefiting from his
inaction or negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment must
be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process. Having failed to avail of the remedies and there being 'a
Clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must
be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal
disposition unacceptable. 23 When the appellate court denied
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated April 23,
2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari on
June 10, 2009, invoking the following ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU,
BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE
SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO
RINOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE
HEIRS AND THIRD PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was
captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is
actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that
settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court
of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of
general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate
jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the
joiner of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus,
petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no
effect for having been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the appellate
court that since the finding of forgery relates only to the signature of
respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented to the conveyance,
the transaction should be considered valid as to them. Petitioner also
denies the indings of the courts below that his parents are builders in
bad faith for they only took possession of the subject properties after the
execution of the transfer documents and after they paid the
consideration on the sale.
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since.
Respondents’ complaint alleged the following causes of action, the same
is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of Nasugbu,
Batangas at the time of his death, died intestate on November 16,
1989. Copy of his death certificate is hereto attached as Annex
"A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants enumerated from
paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only known heirs of the above-
mentioned decedent. The plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando,
Rafael, Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna
R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma. Theresa R.
Demafelix are the decedent’s legitimate children with his first
wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedent’s widow and
Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's daughter with said widow. As
such, said parties are co-owners by virtue of an intestate
inheritance from the decedent, of the properties enumerated in
the succeeding paragraph; ‘
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all located
in Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no known
legal indebtedness;
 17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date and it will
be to the best interest of all heirs that it be partitioned
judicially. 26.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his
known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon may
fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete
reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of
the suit, the llegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is
clearly one for udicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age5 or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of
deeds. The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public
instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole
heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit
shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing
of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of
the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned
and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed
under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left
no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within
two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. 27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person
having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as
provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons
interested in the property. 28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of
respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact, mandatory, to
a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint
alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate; (2) that respondents, together
with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose;
(3) that the heirs enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that
there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro;
(5) that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that
respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent’s estate, pray for the
partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear,
therefore, that based on the allegations of the complaint, the case is one
for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action
identifying the heirs of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their
rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of
estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies
intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. Fails to furnish
the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall
be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court. 29 An exception to this rule, however, is found in the
aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left
no will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without submitting
the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of
an administrator by the court. 30The reasons that where the deceased
dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and
to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled. 31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
isputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without any
ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of
intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if
the estate has no· debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for
good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course
of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs
have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,
are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which
is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for judicial
partition instead of a special proceeding for the settlement of estate as
law expressly permits the same.1avvphi1 That the complaint contained
allegations inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not. Mean
that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to
the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their
status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the estate, may
also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a
complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done during the
partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.~5
Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy 9f partition is available to
the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to administration
proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being
dissipated. 36
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip the trial
court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the
annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved
in an action for partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts
determine the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for
the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles and recovery
of ownership and possession of property. 38 In fact, in Bagayas v.
Bagayas, 39·wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and partition was
dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety of an action for
annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title
of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be
improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For partition
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between
the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the
issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the
disputed realties 'to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that
what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the
title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself. The' certificate referred to is that -document issued by the
Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by
law means ownership, which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Petitioner c.pparently confuses title with the certificate of
title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for annulment
of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral attack since she was
actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title to the subject lands and not
any Torrens certificate oftitle over the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the
issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the existence of the
same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in
Municipality of Bifzan·v. Garcia: 40
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist,
or partition is_ legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an
adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper
in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event
[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c] ourt with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage
may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the [c] ourt after the. Parties have been accorded
opportunity to be heard Thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question. xx x. 41 ·
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-
existence of co-ownership between the parties. 42 Unless and until the
issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to
effect a partition of an estate. 43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial court acted
without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of settlement of estate and
annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the
instant complaint is precisely one for judicial partition with annulment
of title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of applicable
law and jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action
herein was not merely for partition and recovery of ownership but also
for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence,
considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its
decision, the instant petition for annulment of judgment must
necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone,
without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement of instituting a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status and
rights of the respondents as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in
light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of
heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule
74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to
the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject
it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which
could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the evil case - subject of
the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject · Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial, x x x. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the causes of
action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial court, in arriving
at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample opportunity to advance
his claims, petitioner cannot now be permitted to allege lack of
jurisdiction just because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To
repeat, the action filed herein is one for judicial partition and not for
settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that respondents also
prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same
proceeding does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for
'the annulment of certain transfers of property could very well be
achieved in an action for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered valid as to
the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as their allegation of
good faith, this Court does not find any compelling reason to deviate
from the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by both
courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the documents on
which petitioner’s claims are based were inadequately proven. They
were undated, forged, and acknowledged before a notary public who
was not commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They
were never presented to the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither
were the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties
presented as witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the estate,
actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the circumstances
surrounding the same militate against the fact of its occurrence. Not only
was the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by Benita undated and
unsigned by Pedro, but the document she presented purportedly
evidencing her receipt of her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of
sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate court’s observations
as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the transactions alleged herein
are concerned. First, they were seemingly uncertain as to the number
and/or identity of the properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer,
they gave the impression 'that· they bought both the resort and the
family home and yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they only
bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they presented the
subject Extra Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale. 50 Second, they never
presented any other document which w0uld evidence their actual
payment of consideration to the selling heirs. 51 Third, in spite of the.
Blatant legal infirmities of the subject documents of conveyance,
petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished several
cottages, and introduced permanent improvements thereon.
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners failed to
adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the subject
properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported transfers cast
doubt on whether they actually took place. In substantiating their claim,
petitioners relied solely on the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Sale, who utterly failed to prove their authenticity and due execution.
They cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership of the
subject lands based on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value and
builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of title builder that
the land the latter is building on is one's own without knowledge of any
defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in view of .the manifest defects
in the instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have been
placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several cottages and
constructed improvement on the properties. Thus, their claim of. Good
faith cannot be given credence.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except to
correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties
being deemed resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a fundamental principle in
our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
of the verdict. 54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment is
allowed only under the most extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet,
when petitioner is given more than • ample opportunity to be heard,
unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased judgments
rendered after a consideration of evidence presented by the parties, as
in the case at hand, the Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of
the courts below in the absence of any showing that the same were
rendered with fraud or lack of jurisdiction. ·

WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is DENIED. The

Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and April 23, 2009,
respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which
affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it
conce1ns the resort covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 513 54
and No. 51355, and family home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14921 December 31, 1960
DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
P.M. Beltran, M.B. Bautista and R.E. Gonzales for appellants.
M.H. de Joya, Primicias and Del Castillo for appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an action for liquidation and partition of the estate left by the
spouses Mariano Bautista and Gertrudes Garcia, filed on October 20,
1956 by plaintiffs Dolores B. Guico, et al., against defendants Pablo G.
Bautista, et al., legitimate grandchildren and children, respectively, of
said deceased spouses.
The complaint alleged inter alia that Mariano G. Bautista died intestate
on December 5, 1947 and that his properties had already been
extrajudicially partitioned among his heirs; that Gertrudes Garcia
likewise died intestate on August 31, 1956 leaving as her legitimate heirs
plaintiffs and defendants; that said Gertrudes Garcia, during her lifetime,
made several deeds of donation of some of her properties in favor of all
the defendants, but did not provide that the properties donated would
not be subject to collation, so that the donees are legally bound to bring
into the mass of the estate by way of collation the value of the properties
received by them in order that the net hereditary estate may be divided
equally among the heirs; and that the deceased Gertrudes Garcia left
outstanding obligations to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and
the G.A. Machineries, Inc.
On a motion to dismiss filed by defendants alleging, among other things,
that the action was premature because it is admitted in the complaint
that the deceased left certain debts, the lower court dismissed the
complaint on that ground without prejudice and without costs. From the
order of dismissal, plaintiffs appealed to this Court, urging that their
action for partition and liquidation may be maintained, notwithstanding
that there are pending obligations of the estate, subject to the taking of
adequate measures either for the payment or security of its creditors.
We are inclined to hold at the lower court that until all the debts of the
estate in question are paid, appellants' action for partition and
liquidation is premature.
There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a
deceased person by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary
action for petition, without the filing of a special proceeding and the
appointment of an administrator for the purpose of the settlement of
said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by
their judicial guardians" (sec. 1, Rule 74). The reason is that were the
deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for them and
to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Fule vs. Fule, 46
Phil., 317; Macalinao vs. Valdez, et al., 95 Phil., 318; 50 Off. Gaz., 3041;
Intestate Estate of Rufina Mercado vs. Magtibay, et al., 96 Phil., 383).
The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending
obligations. In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or
compounded with the creditors before the estate can be divided among
the heirs; and unless they reach an amicable settlement as to how such
obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably be submitted
to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to
ordinary partition, the regular estate proceeding offer the advantage of
requiring all creditors of the deceased to disclose themselves and submit
their respective claims within a comparatively short period (12 months
under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent), otherwise, they are forever
barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions the creditors 1claims are
only extinguished by the expiration of the period extinctive prescription.
An heir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share
allocated to him will be freed from invisible claims, so that creditors may
not later appear and initiate the very estate proceeding sought to be
avoided, and he may properly object to an action for partition this
ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming
personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well
as those undisclosed, regular estate proceedings can not be avoided.
It is no argument that under regular administration, the estate will incur
greater expenses. As a matter of fact, plaintiffs-appellants include in
their complaint a prayer for the appointment of an administrator during
the pendency of this case, in view of the existence of debts of the estate
and the lack of agreement among the heirs as to how debts would be
paid.lawphil.net

Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court
from directing and ordering that the pending obligations of the estate be
paid first, or that they should constitute as liens on the respective shares
to be received by the heirs. In other words, appellants propose that the
administration of the estate for the purpose of paying off its debts be
accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court
performing the duties of the administrator, or an administrator
appointed to take care of such debts, as prayed for in their complaint.
Obviously, an ordinary action for partition can not be converted into a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, without
compliance with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the rules of
Court, especially the provisions on publication and notice to creditors.

As we see it, appellants' major objective in filing this action for partition
is to have an early determination of the question whether or not the
donation inter vivos received by the defendants from the deceased are
subject to collation. But there is no reason why this question can not be
determined just as expeditiously in special proceeding, because even
before the known debts of the estate are settled and paid and pending
the expiration for the filing of other claims, the issue can, upon motion of
the heirs, be set for hearing, tried, and definitely settled.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against

appellants.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115181. March 31, 2000]
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR.,
TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents. Sdaa miso
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as
well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-
10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of
the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent
Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and
Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of
Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The
other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No.
Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She
asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by
filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for
judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order
which reads:
"Acting on the Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action
for Judicial Partition, considering that the petitioner is
the only heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all
the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an
expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
"WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial
partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr.
The parties are directed to submit a complete inventory
of all the real and personal properties left by the
deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on
APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all
the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
"SO ORDERED."[1]
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the
judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an
action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
31574. Sdaad
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the
assailed decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and
accordingly dismissed."[2]
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was
denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER
UNDER THE PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY
PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER
AND EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.[3]
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole
issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of
law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's
finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the
instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and
extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles
v. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence
of other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with,
administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the
same.[4] In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of
being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for
conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an
action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus,
procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal
basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in
his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or
fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78.[5]The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 74[6] which provide:
"SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented
by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized
for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as
they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.. Scs
daad
"SEC. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value.-
Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased
person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not
exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to
appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of
the estate by the petition of an interested person and
upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months from the date of
the last publication of a notice which shall be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, and
after such other notice to interested persons as the court
may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without
the appointment of an executor or administrator, and
without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if
any there be, to determine who are the persons legally
entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and
divide it among them after the payment of such debts of
the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and
legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally
appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be
entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the
portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively.
The court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders
and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof
shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order
of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
recorded in the proper register's office."
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the
deceased at the moment of the latter's death.[7] Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves
without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to
submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.[8]

We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent
left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age."[9] With this
finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should
apply.

In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner

insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character
of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a
complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition
proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower
court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of
administration into an action for judicial partition. Sup rema

Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court
converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial
partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm.
The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the
partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an
ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have
held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to
the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings.[10] The trial court appropriately
converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for
judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible
error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial
court's action procedurally in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals is CA-G.R. SP No. 31574
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 45904 September 30, 1938
Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G.
UTULO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano B. Gardiner for appellant.
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as
judicial administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his
property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia,
the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial
administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan
Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the
presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G.
Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the
said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate
descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband.
The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration of
the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating
in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law,
the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted
in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez,
and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said
deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial
administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of
the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said
deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial
administration; but she stated that should the court grant the
administration of the property, she should be appointed the
administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the
applicant. After the required publications, trial was had and the court, on
August 28, 1936, finally issued the appealed order to which the
oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was
certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the
trial court, but these assigned errors raise only two questions for
resolution, namely: whether upon the admitted facts the judicial
administration of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with
the consequent appointment of an administrator, and whether the
appellant has a better right to the said office than the appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if
a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This
provision enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living
property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an
executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions
established by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally
amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator. According to the
second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs
may apply to the competent court, after the required publications, to
proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all the known
obligations, to partition all the property constituting the inheritance
among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that
when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his
heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa,
17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34
Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil.,
317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions
of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs
succeed to all the property left by the deceased from the time of his
death. In the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the
rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the
absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter
upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they
desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual
agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure
in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a
petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the
division. When there are no debts existing against the estate,
there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an
administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among
the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no
debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with
the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property
belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts
against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in
any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs.
They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers
them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves.
There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs
requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they
intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there
are any heirs of the estate who have not received their
participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of
the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra,
and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated.
And in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified
the same doctrine in the following language:
Upon the second question — Did the court a quo commit an
error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of
Saturnino Fule? — it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of
the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no
debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of
Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657,
659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and
personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted
immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil.,
546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321;
Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19
Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34
Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes
immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what
reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial
administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive
the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil.,
232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question,
said: Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661),
the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the
moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the
ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the
absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter
upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they
desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual
agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure
in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a
petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the
division. (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there
is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost
 and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right
to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate
among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no
debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their
relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that
of any other coowners or owners in common, and they may
recover their individual rights, the same as any other coowners
of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502;
Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss.,
57.)
xxx xxx xxx
Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the
right of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of
his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife
who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary
party if she were living . In order to intervene in said intestate and to
take part in the distribution of the property it is not necessary that the
administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted — an
administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and
unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the
parties has preferential right to the office of administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to
the applicant-appellee. So ordered.

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also
exist in the divisions of personal as well as the real property. If
they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of
such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is
maintenable where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of
age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no
necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)

It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property

susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided
by the coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real
estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-
contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the
lands of the coowners as well as of the whole.
(Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698;
Pipes vs. Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal.,
20.)

We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of

a doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had
followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would not
have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they
are now. There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to
the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so
that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000]
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES
PHILLIPS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the
alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, respondents. Scmis
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the
Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals
which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of
the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated
considering that they involve the same parties and some of the issues
raised are the same.
The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati
City, filed a petition for probate of his will[1] in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In his petition, Dr.
De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in
his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of
not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the
custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips. A copy of the will[2] was annexed to the petition for probate.
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati,
Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.
The order reads:
On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the
hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30
oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to
Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 September 1995
attached to the records). When the case was called for
hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any
written opposition was ever filed and on motion of
petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in
support of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was
placed on the witness stand and was directly examined
by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and
answers to give this Court a basis to determine the state
of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject
will. After the examination, the Court is convinced that
petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and not acting
on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that
petitioner signed his Last Will and Testament on his own
free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced
nor influenced by any other person in signing it. Mis sc
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the
evidence adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed
his Last Will and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-
4", "A-5") at his residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner
Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City; said Last Will and
Testament was signed in the presence of his three (3)
witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr. Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-
6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16", "A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J.
Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3", "A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"),
and Atty. Victoria C. delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13",
"A-14", "A-17", & "A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of
the testator and in the presence of each and all of the
witnesses signed the said Last Will and Testament and
duly notarized before Notary Public Anna Melissa L.
Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual execution of the Last
Will and Testament, pictures were taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-
3").
 Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner
Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named
as sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real
and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2
million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated
as executor and to serve as such without a bond.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the
petitioner has substantially established the material
allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and
Testament having been executed and attested as
required by law; that testator at the time of the execution
of the will was of sane mind and/or not mentally
incapable to make a Will; nor was it executed under
duress or under the influence of fear or threats; that it
was in writing and executed in the language known and
understood by the testator duly subscribed thereof and
attested and subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of another; that the
testator and all the attesting witnesses signed the Last
Will and Testament freely and voluntarily and that the
testator has intended that the instrument should be his
Will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator
himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will
and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby APPROVED
and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26,
1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for
intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew
and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a
creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of
the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration
in his name. Mis spped
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent
moved to withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was
required to file a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that
said court (Branch 61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.[3]
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the
other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the
same purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch
65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special
administrator of Dr. De Santoss estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special
administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the
existence of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court
was still pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of
the testators estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special
administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of
administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case
before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had
denied on August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention.
Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a
decision[4] promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of
petitioners motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996,
returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the
ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent
Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads: Spped
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch 65,
this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on the
ground that this case is related with a case before this
Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the
information that there is no related case involving the
ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS pending
before this Branch.
There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS, as
petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the
Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP.
PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16
February 1996 and has become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it
became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn
after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the
motion could not be admitted as the subject matter
involves a separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court, and movant withdrew her motion and filed this
case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion
was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26
August 1996 likewise for the same grounds that the
matter is for a separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court and cannot be included in this case
filed under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that
consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding
Judges of the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,[5] Judge Abad Santos
appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch
65) to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering
that the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus
ordered the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However,
he later recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to
expedite the proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he
stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe,
Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case
notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the
probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and
must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the
testator had been partitioned and distributed as per
Order dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional
Trial Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the
petition if only to expedite the proceedings, and under
the concept that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is
but one court. Jo spped
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief
justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the
Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.; Pacita
De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de Santos
Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for
intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her
motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997,
rendered a decision[6] setting aside the trial courts order on the ground
that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court -
Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with
the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos
 2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court -
Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by
(private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the
late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and
oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary
filed by the respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum
shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters
testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati,
Branch 65 knowing fully well that the probate
proceedings involving the same testate estate of the
decedent is still pending with the Regional Trial Court -
Makati, Branch 61. Spped jo
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of
RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing
the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban[7] and Tagle v. Manalo,[8] he argues that the proceedings
must continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs,
devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules
of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not
lawfully act upon private respondents petition for issuance of letters
testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the
court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[9]
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the
testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of
a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.[10]
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for
probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the
court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In
such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall
govern. Miso
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules
of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills
on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will,
either during the lifetime of the testator or after his
death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any
executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same
be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in
the court for the allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of
testator has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the
testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities
adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few
cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine
 the mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than
after his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence
are minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply
with the requirements prescribed by law, the same may
be corrected at once. The probate during the testators
life, therefore, will lessen the number of contest upon
wills. Once a will is probated during the lifetime of the
testator, the only questions that may remain for the
courts to decide after the testators death will refer to the
intrinsic validity of the testamentary dispositions. It is
possible, of course, that even when the testator himself
asks for the allowance of the will, he may be acting under
duress or undue influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the
testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter
or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a
new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and if
he should die before he has had a chance to present such
petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the
testators death would be in order.[11]
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16,
1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a
certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of
Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of
Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -Nex old
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having
begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the
deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be
noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the
allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to
such time that the entire estate of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed.
The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of
the testator meant merely that the partition and
distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the
latters death. In other words, the petitioner, instead of
filing a new petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary, should have simply filed a manifestation
for the same purpose in the probate court.[12]
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to
intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit
or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court
of Appeals, it was held:[13]
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75,
Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption
of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law
of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court
over the subject matter "existed was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began." That power or
 authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which
simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not
amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose
jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something
essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in
the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption
that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter
of method, of convenience to the parties. Mani kx
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of
estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro
Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial
courts under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches
comprising each court in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions
independent of and incompatible with each other.[14]
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of
the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does
not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the
leading case of Bacalso v. Ramolote:[15]
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a
coordinate and co-equal courts, and the totality of which
is only one Court of First Instance. The jurisdiction is
vested in the court, not in the judges. And when a case is
filed in one branch, jurisdiction over the case does not
attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of
the other branches. Trial may be held or proceedings
continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for
this reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly
grants to the Secretary of Justice, the administrative right
or power to apportion the cases among the different
branches, both for the convenience of the parties and for
the coordination of the work by the different branches of
the same court. The apportionment and distribution of
cases does not involve a grant or limitation of
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be
vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and
the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the
court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has
jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent.
He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his
interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has
no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati
City, the Court of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee
under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither
is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and
nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit
from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the
decedent has left a will which has already been probated
and disposes of all his properties the private respondent
can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in
the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or
immediate. Maniks
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one,
having been raised for the first time only in his reply to
the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as
the records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct
interest in the estate or the will, and the private
respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the
private respondents opposition, that the petitioner has
deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the
 estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency
to act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
requires only an allegation of the probable value and
character of the property of the estate. The true value can
be determined later on in the course of the settlement of
the estate.[16]
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary.
Simultaneous petition for administration. - Any person
interested in a will may state in writing the grounds why
letters testamentary should not issue to the persons
named therein as executors, or any of them, and the
court, after hearing upon notice, shall pass upon the
sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at the same
time, be filed for letters of administration with the will
annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is
material and direct, not merely incidental or contingent.[17]
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of
testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs
may dispose of his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code
provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of
all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person
having capacity to succeed. Manikan
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this
Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287
of the Civil Code.[18]
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may
have been preterited in the testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the
testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon
the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v.
Pecson:[19]
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a
testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose
of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that
the testator should desire to appoint one of his
confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his
wishes in the disposal of his estate. The curtailment of
this right may be considered a curtailment of the right to
dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails
to give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the
estate.[20] None of these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum
shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary
(Sp. Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-
4223) were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of
parties, rights asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which
are founded on the same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res
judicata in the other.

This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate
was filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of
authenticating his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings
were terminated. Oldmis o

On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was
filed by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for
the purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the
estate and put into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement
proceedings commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the
distribution and delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons
named in the will. Clearly, there is no identity between the two petitions,
nor was the latter filed during the pendency of the former. There was,
consequently, no forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court of

Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the
estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no
Vl, petitioners, notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
vs. upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents. regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia,
she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976 administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of
Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G.
vs. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before
GARCIA, respondents. the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to
remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides
Francisco Carreon for petitioners. the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration
of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents. erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that
Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she
has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the
court.
MARTIN, J.:
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31,
word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court,
1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation
referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased
in Southern Luzon.
persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a
special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental
Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First
Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A.
petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of
Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp.
the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of
Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the
regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition
was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others,
that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning
because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the
original and supplemental petitions for letters of administration,
raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia
G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20,
1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties of the
decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure
cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion,
calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the
power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of
the personal and real properties making up the state of the
deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an
order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying
the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2,
1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and
admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the
petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the
parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue
was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in
interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G.
Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental
motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado
G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14,
1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking
possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have
not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to
remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority
and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in
behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending
omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed
by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge
Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those
provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1subject
only to the previous qualification made by the court that the
administration of the properties subject of the marketing
agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the
special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous
order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all
papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to
Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any
qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue
of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2,
1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental
petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the
decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further
held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be
appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December
27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge
Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the
special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B.
Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the
petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of
Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders,
the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the
power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of
the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19,
1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised
by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b)
venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal
of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special
administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January
7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three
questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to
her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing
Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles
presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon
Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified
with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc.
27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the
time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973
showing that three months before his death his residence was in
Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he
was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first
district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that
court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the
criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing
the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix,
Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp.
Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack
of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975,
Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by
certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of
the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on
February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G.
Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge
Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B.
Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia
informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before
Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the
annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on
January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to
withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of
Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it
being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the
court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of
Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on
December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance
to Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated
in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling
attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this
Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and
that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded
Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the
payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a
cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-
C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining
order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record." With particular regard to letters of administration,
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the
petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all
the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of
the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy,
where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks
administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be
appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence
within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,
and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the
court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject
matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began."
That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which
simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully
and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not
exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction
over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective
for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that
it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to
the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts
of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly
fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori,
the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of
will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive
of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"
mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at
the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of
his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely
stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate
and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the
petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and
improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no
domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as
"property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba,
Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B.
Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by
Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the
last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition,
Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is,
the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in
evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows
that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence
certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971
turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the
Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest
in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in
bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue
for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is
deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason
to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her
objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while
insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia
claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of
Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased
until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special
administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a
will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for
appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g.,
parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion
to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial,
or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to
rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason,
equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular
administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a
special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the
order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the
appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow
would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership.
For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The
good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits
than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the
widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia
maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado
G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable
of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B.
Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is
entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient
reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated
therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein
the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these
documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the
surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the
interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix
over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of
First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case
and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17,

1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject
matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to
deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for
payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia

Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with
costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005]
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL
JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr.,
assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of
title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought to prove
by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz
Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom
she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as
Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their
father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.[9] In
the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and
participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his
favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan
parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to
herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in Portugals
name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No.
159813[14] was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on
March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran,
married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of
the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in
her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23,
1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in
her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made
false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondents name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a
Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still
be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the
complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after
giving an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses
and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined
during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the
ground that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over
the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court
held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case
at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate
of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their
right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a
status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be
determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or
a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c),
Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the
former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their
status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been
established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to
rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status and right herein.
Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in
relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning
the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically
opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog,
GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001)
subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the
appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in
this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was
the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4
Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention
between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and
Susan Yee Cario) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case
that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women
during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two
marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the
deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of
the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of
a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this
case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292.
However, here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants
and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the
decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein have not,
therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and
naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly
ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil
action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The
institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is
thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or
forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow,
a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in
an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to
impinge upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus
affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the
appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it
failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]
Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in Cario,
and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render
judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court
that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on
the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the
court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that
the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be entered remanding to
the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two
marriages is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of
Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment
of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise
prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged
multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading
of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of
heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is
necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the
appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory
heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners
have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit
of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They
later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two
lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay
Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof
to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus
filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved
to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia,
state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of
itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs
of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs
of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings
in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This
must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in
the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the
petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et
al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a
special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he
is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is
survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are
children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China
in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another
marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will
nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent.
The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on
Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the
estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R.
Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam
and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations
made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list
of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and
Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some
unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard
by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil
case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al.
are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is
Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised
for determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael
Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam
and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the
father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial
courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the
birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the
deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it
does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in
any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof; and that
[t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely
immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage
between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged
status . . . as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court
should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is
the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the
[civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the]
[s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special
proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia
Solivio, the decedents maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father,
moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole
heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court
denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the
denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before
the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which
rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who
posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had
jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the
[estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same
court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents
estate, a court should not interfere with [estate]
proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of
Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private
respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself
declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the
merits of her claim in the interest of justice, and declared her an heir of
the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an
adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita),
and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother,
following which the probate court directed that the records of the case
be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father
to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and
fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the
two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed
a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father
to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the
parties agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanitas motion in
the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots
alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided,
set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order
setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in
the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of
the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the
delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set
aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there
was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two
lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this
Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive
that the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this
Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally
terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been
delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is
not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has
not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge
which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties
long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730,
741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24,
1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29,
1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial
court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to
continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to
Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or
parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been 1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a Q. Portugal, is valid;
putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the 3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and
deceased. can still be contested by plaintiffs;
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she
was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the
1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second complaint.[40]
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said rule
is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. ASIDE.
6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch
name an executor therein.[37] 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
the heirs of a deceased. No costs.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of SO ORDERED.
the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of
the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence
before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,[39] the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL
ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO –
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES,
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an
action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate
matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the
decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 is the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal
portion of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside and another one entered
annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the
Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT
No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del
Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children,
namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share
while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six
children.1âwphi1.nêt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver
of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his
children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided
into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square
meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a
land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No.
107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but
retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No.
107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was
issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving
his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as
heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in
favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443
and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred
that she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus,
under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano
already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein
private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or
against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a
decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in
favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a
complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of
property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that
there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between
them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract
of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid
donation as it was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of
the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of
advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir
of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's
decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a
just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an
ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in
a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as advance inheritance. What the court should have
done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave
the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate
proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle
through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the
appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the
case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant
petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding"
may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no
formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides.
In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to
the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or
 suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those
proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is
instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in
the case of proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics
of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must therefore be
in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for
particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a
pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate
of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is
nevertheless clear that the same provision11contemplates a probate
court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its
general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein
petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper
vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly
constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the
estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the
court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-
appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the
estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing
the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court.
From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying
an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a
special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed
rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial
Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue
but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed
the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule
on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to
petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently
enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate
court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but

merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of
estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share
due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain
steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained,
by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all
donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can
be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not
a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in

the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established
rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del
Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-
observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under
the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its
limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the
issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the
settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE
PASTOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I,
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO
QUEMADA, respondents.
Pelaez, Pelaez, & Pelaez Law Office for petitioners.
Ceniza, Rama & Associates for private respondents.
PLANA, J.:
I. FACTS:
This is a case of hereditary succession.
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on
June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on
October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr.
(PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate
child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA
PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936.
SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's
citizenship.
On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT), docketed as SP No.
3128-R. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy
in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in
the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.
On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of
QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special
administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not
covered or affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as such on
December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P 5,000.00.
On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted
against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged
properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the
legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his
wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners
thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The action, docketed
as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch IX.
On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their
opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing
QUEMADA as special administrator.
On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing
the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
52961- R, the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On
petition for review, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the
petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded
the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on
January 11, 1978.
For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT,
QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for payment of his legacy
and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and
SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the
reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First
Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.
On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic
validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR.
and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no
hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required
the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much
inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant
thereto, PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA submitted their Memorandum of
authorities dated April 10, which in effect showed that determination of
how much QUEMADA should receive was still premature. QUEMADA
submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. ATLAS, upon order of
the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor
Group of tsn from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980.
The statement revealed that of the mining claims being operated by
ATLAS, 60% pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows:
1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%
2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%
3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%
On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated
in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT
issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving
the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling
in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious. [There was
absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972 had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the
mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the
holographic will.]
The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and
a written acknowledgment of PASTOR, JR. dated June 17, 1962, of the
above 60% interest in the mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group,
42% belonged to PASTOR, SR. and only 33% belonged to PASTOR, JR.
The remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor Group. The
PROBATE COURT thus directed ATLAS to remit directly to QUEMADA
the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which QUEMADA was
authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with
a reputable banking institution for payment of the estate taxes and other
obligations of the estate. The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his
assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy
of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.'s death, which amounted to
over two million pesos.
The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in
obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment on September 4, 1980,
and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. Notified of the Order
on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on
the same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT
gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership
of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after
prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the
meantime, the PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all
royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees until after resolution of
oppositors' motion for reconsideration.
Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however,
PASTOR, JR., this time joined by his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE
PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No.
SP- 11373-R). They assailed the Order dated August 20, 1980 and the
writ of execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The petition
was denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds (1) that its filing was
premature because the Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned
Order was still pending determination by the PROBATE COURT; and (2)
that although "the rule that a motion for reconsideration is prerequisite
for an action for certiorari is never an absolute rule," the Order assailed
is "legally valid. "
On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision of November 18, 1980,
calling the attention of the appellate court to another order of the
Probate Court dated November 11, 1980 (i.e., while their petition for
certiorari was pending decision in the appellate court), by which the
oppositors' motion for reconsideration of the Probate Court's Order of
August 20, 1980 was denied. [The November 11 Order declared that the
questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the
mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally adjudicated by
the final and executory Order of December 5, 1972, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and
academic the suit for reconveyance then pending in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch IX. It clarified that only the 33% share of
PASTOR, JR. in the royalties (less than 7.5% share which he had assigned
to QUEMADA before PASTOR, SR. died) was to be garnished and that as
regards PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share, what was ordered was just the
transfer of its possession to the custody of the PROBATE COURT through
the special administrator. Further, the Order granted QUEMADA 6%
interest on his unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.]
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of pre
y injunction, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 18, 1980 as well as the orders of the Probate Court dated
August 20, 1980, November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, Med by
petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed by a Supplemental Petition with
Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, the lifting of which was denied in the Resolution of the same
Division dated October 18, 1982, although the bond of petitioners was
increased from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00.
Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private respondent
filed seven successive motions for early resolution. Five of these motions
expressly prayed for the resolution of the question as to whether or not
the petition should be given due course.
On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution
stating that "the petition in fact and in effect was given due course when
this case was heard on the merits on September 7, (should be October
21, 1981) and concise memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments on the merits of the case were filed by the parties pursuant to
the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . . " and denied in a resolution dated
December 13, 1982, private respondent's "Omnibus motion to set aside
resolution dated October 18, 1982 and to submit the matter of due
course to the present membership of the Division; and to reassign the
case to another ponente."
Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and December
13, 1982 Resolutions, the Court en banc resolved to CONFIRM the
questioned resolutions insofar as hey resolved that the petition in fact
and in effect had been given due course.
II. ISSUES:
Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the
Order of execution and garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as
the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to implement the Probate
Order of December 5, 1972, to wit: the Order of November 11, 1980
declaring that the Probate Order of 1972 indeed resolved the issues of
ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, and reiterating the Order of
Execution dated August 20, 1980; and the Order of December 17, 1980
reducing to P2,251,516.74 the amount payable to QUEMADA
representing the royalties he should have received from the death of
PASTOR, SR. in 1966 up to February 1980.
The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic
will in probate, is not questioned. But petitioners denounce the Probate
Court for having acted beyond its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the assailed Orders. Their argument runs this
way: Before the provisions of the holographic win can be implemented,
the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic
validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with finality. Now,
contrary to the position taken by the Probate Court in 1980 — i.e.,
almost eight years after the probate of the will in 1972 — the Probate
Order did not resolve the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate Order
could not have resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's
entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of
the legacy in alleged implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are
unwarranted for lack of basis.
Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA The
Probate Order of 1972 having become final and executory, how can its
implementation (payment of legacy) be restrained? Of course, the
question assumes that QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy was finally
adjudged in the Probate Order.
On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of
December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the questions of ownership and
intrinsic validity. A negative finding will necessarily render moot and
academic the other issues raised by the parties, such as the jurisdiction
of the Probate Court to conclusively resolve title to property, and the
constitutionality and repercussions of a ruling that the mining
properties in dispute, although in the name of PASTOR, JR. and his wife,
really belonged to the decedent despite the latter's constitutional
disqualification as an alien.
On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as
a means to assail the validity of the order of execution and the
implementing writ.
III. DISCUSSION:
1. Issue of Ownership —
(a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and
large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section
1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should
or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court (1980 ed.), p. 458; Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,
91 SCRA 540.]
(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that
decreed in the dispositive part of the decision. (Philippine-American
Insurance Co. vs. Honorable Flores, 97 SCRA 811.) However, in case of
ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be scanned for
guidance in construing the judgment. (Heirs of Presto vs. Galang, 78
SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles vs.
Timario. 107 Phil. 809.)
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is
the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 which allegedly resolved the
question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. The said
Probate Order enumerated the issues before the Probate Court, thus:
Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these
proceedings: (1) the probate of the holographic will (2)
the intestate estate aspect; and (3) the administration
proceedings for the purported estate of the decedent in
the Philippines.
In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings
are being impugned by the oppositors on jurisdictional
grounds, i.e., that the fact of the decedent's residence and
existence of properties in the Philippines have not been
established.
Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate
proceedings are: (a) whether or not the holographic will
(Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as the last will and
testament upon the death of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June 5,
1966, in Cebu City, Philippines; (b) Whether or not the
said will has been executed with all the formalities
required by law; and (c) Did the late presentation of the
holographic will affect the validity of the same?
Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows:
(1) Was the ex- parte appointment of the petitioner as
special administrator valid and proper? (2) Is there any
indispensable necessity for the estate of the decedent to
be placed under administration? (3) Whether or not
petition is qualified to be a special administrator of the
estate; and (4) Whether or not the properties listed in the
inventory (submitted by the special administrator but
not approved by the Probate Court) are to be excluded.
Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:
Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and
resolves some of the problems and issues presented in
these proceedings, as follows:
(a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings as it hereby allows and approves the so-called
holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed
on July 31, 1961 with respect to its extrinsic validity, the
same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Let,
therefore, a certificate of its allowance be prepared by
the Branch Clerk of this Court to be signed by this
Presiding Judge, and attested by the seal of the Court, and
thereafter attached to the will, and the will and certificate
filed and recorded by the clerk. Let attested copies of the
will and of the certificate of allowance thereof be sent to
Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation,
Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of
Cebu or of Toledo City, as the case may be, for recording.
(b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters
testamentary or of administration for as a matter of fact,
no regular executor and/or administrator has been
appointed up to this time and - the appointment of a
special administrator was, and still is, justified under the
circumstances to take possession and charge of the
estate of the deceased in the Philippines (particularly in
Cebu) until the problems causing the delay are decided
and the regular executor and/or administrator
appointed.
(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special
administrator and later on an executor and/or
administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this Court's
declaration that the oppositors are the forced heirs and
the petitioner is merely vested with the character of a
voluntary heir to the extent of the bounty given to him
(under) the will insofar as the same will not prejudice the
legitimes of the oppositorfor the following reasons:
1. To submit a complete
inventory of the estate of
the decedent-testator
Alvaro Pastor, Sr.
2. To administer and to
continue to put to prolific
utilization of the
properties of the
decedent;
3. To keep and maintain
the houses and other
structures and belonging
to the estate, since the
forced heirs are residing
in Spain, and prepare
them for delivery to the
heirs in good order after
partition and when
directed by the Court, but
only after the payment of
estate and inheritance
taxes;
(d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of
ownership and possession of real and personal
properties in Civil Case No. 274-T before Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed, unless, however, it
is duly proven by the oppositors that debts of the
decedent have already been paid, that there had been an
extrajudicial partition or summary one between the
forced heirs, that the legacy to be given and delivered to
the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate
of the testator, that the respective shares of the forced
heirs have been fairly apportioned, distributed and
delivered to the two forced heirs of Alvaro Pastor, Sr.,
after deducting the property willed to the petitioner, and
the estate and inheritance taxes have already been paid
to the Government thru the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to
remain as special administrator or administrator of the
other properties of the estate of the decedent, which
properties are not directly or indirectly affected by the
provisions of the holographic will (such as bank deposits,
land in Mactan etc.), will be resolved in another order as
separate incident, considering that this order should have
been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of
whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of
specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership
was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic
validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special
administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with
respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated
pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared
that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to
the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of
real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the
CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the
"intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate
of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes
of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the
estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate
purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not
direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the
intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . .
that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not
exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly
implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic
validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule
on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special
administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will,
"considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued
solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and
approve the aforestated will. "
(c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of
the properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate,
considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme
Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable Order were
only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order.
(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution dated
August 20, 1980, the Probate Court in its Order of November 11, 1980
explained that the basis for its conclusion that the question of ownership
had been formally resolved by the Probate Order of 1972 are the
findings in the latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent,
he was receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2) he had resided in the
Philippines since pre-war days and was engaged in the mine prospecting
business since 1937 particularly in the City of Toledo; and (3) PASTOR,
JR. was only acting as dummy for his father because the latter was a
Spaniard.
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously far-fetched.
(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to
conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of
ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on
this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order
directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will -
(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside
from his two legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is
therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the
share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to
the administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR. which
will include, among others, the determination of the extent of the
statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death. * When the
disputed Probate order was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been
no liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive
determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an
inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special
administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a
hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or recovery
of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was
still being litigated in another court.
(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the
debts of the decedent and his estate. Indeed, it was only in the Probate
Order of December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court ordered that-
... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring all
persons having money claims against the decedent to file
them in the office of the Branch Clerk of this Court."
(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided
for, as of December 5, 1972.
(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime
of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained.
(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to
determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific
property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the
deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.
(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity
of the will in other respects. It was obviously for this reason that as late
as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 years after the Probate Order was issued
the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on
the intrinsic validity of the will.
3. Propriety of certiorari —
Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to
assail the validity of the disputed Order of execution. He contends that
the error, if any, is one of judgment, not jurisdiction, and properly
correctible only by appeal, not certiorari.
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be
rejected. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is
much too evident in the actuations of the probate court to be overlooked
or condoned.
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what
properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting
claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR)
involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence
of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there
was no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972,
which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the
questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980
and the subsequent implementing orders for the payment of
QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged implementation of the dispositive part of
the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.
(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule
requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the
determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and
expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue among
the heirs and legatees. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.)
(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Payment therefore of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the
provision of the National Internal Revenue Code requiring payment of
estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive share of
the estate (Section 107 [c])
(d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been
issued purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees,
legatees, or heirs have been in possession. —
Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into
possession of portions of the estate before the debts and
expenses have been settled and paid and have become
liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and
expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may,
by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the
amount of their several liabilities, and order how much
and in what manner each person shall contribute, and
may issue execution as circumstances require.
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment
of debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are
among those against whom execution is authorized to be issued.
... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the
probate court generally cannot issue a writ of execution.
It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its
orders usually refer to the adjudication of claims against
the estate which the executor or administrator may
satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a writ of
execution. The probate court, as such, does not render
any judgment enforceable by execution.
 The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly
specifies that the probate court may issue execution (a)
to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive
shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce
payment of the expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90),
and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for
examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142)
may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion
alterius, that those are the only instances when it can
issue a writ of execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59
SCRA 96, 108.)
(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final
judgment; but to order the execution of a final order (which is not even
meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in
utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that
certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to
the execution of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an
order of execution is issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at
variance with the judgment sought to be enforced (PVTA vs. Honorable
Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the order of
execution.
(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order
of execution which varies the terms of the judgment sought to be
executed or does not find support in the dispositive part of the latter,
there are circumstances in the instant case which justify the remedy
applied for.
Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the
holder in her own right of three mining claims which are one of the
objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR,
SR. and was not a party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she could
not appeal from the Order of execution issued by the Probate Court. On
the other hand, after the issuance of the execution order, the urgency of
the relief she and her co-petitioner husband seek in the petition for
certiorari states against requiring her to go through the cumbersome
procedure of asking for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings to
enable her, if leave is granted, to appeal from the challenged order of
execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or
garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of which
she is the duly registered owner and/or grantee together with her
husband. She could not have intervened before the issuance of the
assailed orders because she had no valid ground to intervene. The
matter of ownership over the properties subject of the execution was
then still being litigated in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by
the special administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, appeal was not available to him
since his motion for reconsideration of the execution order was still
pending resolution by the Probate Court. But in the face of actual
garnishment of their major source of income, petitioners could no longer
wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration. They needed
prompt relief from the injurious effects of the execution order. Under the
circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-
11373-R is reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate Court
dated August 20, 1980, as well as all the Orders issued subsequent
thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order dated December
5, 1972, particularly the Orders dated November 11, 1980 and
December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to
the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings, subject to
the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 203770, November 23, 2016
MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, Petitioner, v. EDWIN TIU AND DAMIANA
CHARITO MARTY, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the October 5, 20111 and September 24, 20122
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 06256, which
dismissed the petition filed by Remedios Tiu (Remedios) and Manuela
Azucena Mayor (Manuela) for procedural infirmities. The said CA
petition challenged the January 20, 20113 and June 10, 20114 Orders of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 6), in Sp. Proc.
No. 2008-05-30, a case for Probate of Last Will and Testament and
Issuance of Letters of Testamentary.
The Antecedents:
On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the widow
of the late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a holographic
Last Will and Testament,5 wherein she named her sister, Remedios Tiu
(Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela), as
executors. Immediately thereafter, Remedios and Manuela filed a
petition for the probate of Rosario's holographic will6 with prayer for
the issuance of letters testamentary (probate proceedings). The petition
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City (RTC-Br.
9) and docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that Rosario
left properties valued at approximately P2.5 million.
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty (Marty) claiming
to be the adopted daughter of Rosario, filed a petition for letters of
administration before the RTC, Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 34),
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given due course
because of the probate proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject
of a separate proceeding filed by Marty with the CA Cebu City, docketed
as CA- G.R. SP No. 04003.7
On June 12, 2008, in its Order,8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition for
probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in form and
substance and set the case for hearing.
Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and
Motion,9 dated June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the decedent
Rosario a virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and her family was
financially dependent on her which led to the wastage and disposal of
the properties owned by her and her husband, Primo. Marty averred
that until the alleged will of the decedent could be probated and
admitted, Remedios
and her ten (10) children had no standing to either possess or control
the properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed for the
probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the properties
subject of the proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the estate, namely,
Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose Hotel, to deposit their
rentals with the court; 3) direct Metrobank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze
the accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose Development Corporation
(Primrose) or Remedios; and 4) lock up the Primrose Hotel in order to
preserve the property until final disposition by the court.
On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their
Comment/Opposition10 to the urgent manifestation averring that Marty
was not an adopted child of the Villasins based on a certification issued
by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban City, attesting that no
record of any adoption proceedings involving Marty existed in their
records. They also argued that the probate court had no jurisdiction over
the properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario's estate
because these properties were actually owned by, and titled in the name
of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the rentals
to the probate court, Remedios and Manuela countered that the probate
court had no jurisdiction over properties owned by third persons,
particularly by Primrose, the latter having a separate and distinct
personality from the decedent's estate.
In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte (CFI Leyte) in SP No. 1239,12 claiming that as
early as March 3, 1981, the veil of corporate entity of Primrose was
pierced on the ground that it was a closed family corporation controlled
by Rosario after Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that "piercing" was
proper in the case of Rosario's estate because the incorporation of
Primrose was founded on a fraudulent consideration, having been done
in contemplation of Primo's death.
Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the
Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan,13
Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic will.
Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios, also filed his
Opposition,14 dated June 13, 2008.
After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted their
respective memoranda.
The January 14, 2009 Order
In its January 14, 2009 Order,15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion of
Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special administrator of
the Estate. The Probate Court also ordered Mercury Drug and Chowking
to deposit the rental income to the court and Metrobank to freeze the
bank accounts mentioned in the motion of Marty. The doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil was applied in the case considering that
Rosario had no other properties that comprised her estate other than
Primrose. According to the probate court, for the best interest of
whoever would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it was best to
preserve the properties from dissipation.
On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion for
Inhibition16 on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence in RTC-
Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) to dispense
justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for Reconsideration Ad
Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing that Rosario's estate
consisted only of shares of stock in Primrose and not the corporation
itself. Thus, the probate court could not order the lessees of the
corporation to remit the rentals to the Estate's administrator. With
regard to the appointment of a special administrator, Remedios and
Manuela insisted that it be recalled. They claimed that if ever there was a
need to appoint one, it should be the two of them because it was the
desire of the decedent in the will subject of the probation proceedings.
In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its January 14, 2009
Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also granted the motion for
inhibition and ordered that the records of the case be referred to the
RTC Executive Judge for reraffling. The case was later re-raffled to RTC-
Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, presiding judge.
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, Remedios
and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA in Cebu City,
docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the January 14, 2009 and
March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.19
Ruling of the CA
In its October 16, 2009 Decision,20 the CA reversed the assailed orders
of the RTC Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special administrator
insofar as this relates to properties specifically belonging to the "Estate."
It held that Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from the
estate of the decedent and that the probate court had no jurisdiction to
apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the probate court
was it stated that its determination of the title of the questioned
properties was only for the purpose of determining whether such
properties ought to be included in the inventory. When the probate
court applied the doctrine of "piercing," in effect, it adjudicated with
finality the ownership of the properties in favor of the Estate. The CA
stated that RTC-Br. 9 had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a
property claimed by another based on adverse title; and that questions
like this must be submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and not to a
probate court.
The CA added that assuming that the probate court's determination on
the issue of ownership was merely intended to be provisional, Marty's
contentions still had no merit. The properties, which she claimed to be
part of the estate of Rosario and over which she claimed co-ownership,
comprised of real properties registered under the Torrens system. As
such, Primrose was considered the owner until the titles to those
properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The CA
further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the order issued by the
CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate proceedings involving the estate of
Primo. Whatever determination the CFI made at the time regarding the
title of the properties was merely provisional, hence, not conclusive as to
the ownership.
By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and Manuela
filed their Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of Execution Enforcing the
January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable Court and Manifestation in
Compliance with the October 21, 2009 Order (Ad Cautelam),21 dated
October 27, 2009.
In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially granted
the motion as it revoked the power of the special administrator to
oversee the day-to-day operations of Primrose. It also revoked the order
with respect to Mercury Drug and Chowking, reasoning out that the said
establishments dealt with Primrose, which had a personality distinct and
separate from the estate of the decedent. In the said order, Atty. Blanche
A. Sa1ino nominated by oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed
special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of the estate.
The same order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as to the
conduct and inventory of all the properties comprising the estate.
This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.
Omnibus Motion
On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the November
17, 2009 Order of the probate court was issued, Marty, together with her
new counsel, filed her Omnibus Motion,23 praying for the probate court
to: 1) order Remedios and Manuela to render an accounting of all the
properties and assets comprising the estate of the decedent; 2) deposit
or consign all rental payments or other passive income derived from the
properties comprising the estate; and 3) prohibit the disbursement of
funds comprising the estate of the decedent without formal motion and
approval by the probate court.
Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6
In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty's Omnibus
Motion. Although it agreed with the October 16, 2009 CA Decision
reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of the RTC-Br. 9, nonetheless, it
acknowledged the urgency and necessity of appointing a special
administrator. According to the probate court, considering that there
was clear evidence of a significant decrease of Rosario's shares in the
outstanding capital stock of Primrose,24 prudence dictated that an
inquiry into the validity of the transfers should be made. A final
determination of this matter would be outside the limited jurisdiction of
the probate court, but it was likewise settled that the power to institute
an action for the recovery of a property claimed to be part of the estate
was normally lodged with the executor or administrator. Thus, the
probate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to render moot
any action that the special administrator, or the regular administrator
upon the latter's qualification and appointment, may deem appropriate
to take on the matter (i.e. Whether or not to institute in the name of the
estate the appropriate action for the recovery of the shares of stock), this
Court hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's Omnibus Motion, dated
September 24, 2010, and thus hereby:
1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a) RENDER AN
ACCOUNTING of all the properties and assets comprising the estate of
the decedent that may have come into their possession; and, (b)
DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the rentals payments or such other passive
incomes from the properties and assets registered in the name of
Primrose Development Corporation, including all income derived from
the Primrose Hotel and the lease contracts with Mercury Drug and
Chowking Restaurant, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Order;
2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and charge of
the properties comprising the decedent's estate, specially those
pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent in Primrose
Development Corporation, to determine whether or not action for the
recovery of the shares of stock supposedly transferred from the
decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu, Manuela Azucena Mayor should
be instituted in the name of the estate against the said transferees and to
submit a Report on the foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this Order; and,

3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent shall be
disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the conformity of the
Special Administrator, duly approved by this Court.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary25cralawred [Underscoring supplied]
The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by
Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of the
RTC--Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011.26
Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the CA.
Action by the CA
The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution,27 dismissed the
same based on the following infirmities: 1) there was no proper proof of
service of a copy of the petition on the respondents which was sent by
registered mail; 2) petitioners failed to indicate on the petition the
material date when the motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy
of the assailed order was not certified true and correct by the officer
having custody of the original copy; and 4) the serial number of the
commission of the notary public, the province-city where he was
commissioned, the office address of the notary public and the roll of
attorney's number were not properly indicated on the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed CA
resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court denied the motion in its
September 24, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as Remedios
had also passed away, and anchored on the following
GROUNDS
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF
THE RULES OF COURT AND DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER
PROOF OF SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED JURISPRUDENCE AND
RULE 65 AND IT HELD THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE MATERIAL DATE RULE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1,
RULE 65 FOR FAILING TO ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED THAT PETITIONER
MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION
AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND THE RULES
WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT ALLOWED TECHNICALITIES TO BE
USED TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE PARTIES.
VI.
PETITIONERS HAVE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS CASE AGAINST
HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH 1(B) OF THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION OF THE FIRST ASSAILED ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN
REVERSED BECAUSE IT OVERTURNS THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.28
Petitioner Manuela argued that:
1)
There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court. The CA petition was accompanied by a notarized affidavit of
service and filing of registered mail. At the time the petition was filed,
this was the best evidence of the service. The other registry receipts for
the other parties were also attached to the petition. Further, the
available registry return card was furnished the CA in the motion for
reconsideration.29
2)
The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a statement of
material dates could be excused because the dates were evident from the
records.30
3)
The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure certified true
copies of the assailed orders. Only the stamped name of the Clerk of
Court, however, appeared thereon, because the particular branch had no
stamp pad which had the phrase for certification. The branch did not
even have a typewriter in order to affix the phrase on the copies. These
inadequacies could not be attributed to the petitioners.31
4)
The lack of information pertaining to the notary public in the verification
and certification against forum-shopping should not invalidate the same
because, again, it was not attributable to the parties.32
5)
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of a
party.33
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution34 the Court ordered the respondents
to file their respective comments. Marty, in her Comment, insisted that
the petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements as
stated by the CA.35
In her Reply to Comment,36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the
affidavit of service was executed on August 31, 2011, which was after the
petition was signed by the lawyers and after it was verified by the
petitioner herself. After contesting Marty's arguments on the alleged
procedural infirmities of the petitions with the CA and this Court,
Manuela asserted that the final and executory October 16, 2009 Decision
of the CA already held that Primrose had a personality separate and
distinct from the estate of decedent Rosario.
Meanwhile, in his Manifestation,37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin affirmed
that he and Manuela decided to patch up their differences and agreed to
settle amicably. Accordingly, he manifested that he was withdrawing
from the case pursuant to their agreement.
On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction38 on the ground
that a flurry of orders had been issued by the RTC-Br. 6 in the
implementation of the assailed January 20, 2011 Order, such as the
Order,39 dated May 27, 2013, wherein the probate court vaguely
ordered "the inventory of the exact extent of the 'decedent's estate.'"
Then another order was issued appointing an auditing firm to conduct
an inventory/audit of the Estate including the rentals and earnings
derived from the lease of Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, as
tenants of Primrose.40 According to petitioner Manuela, although an
inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper, the probate court
ordered an inventory of the assets of Primrose, a separate and distinct
entity. Manuela asserts that it was clearly in error.
In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,41 dated June 17, 2013,
Manuela informed the Court that the inventory and accounting of
Primrose would already commence on June 19, 2013.
Marty filed her Opposition,42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the petition
of Manuela had been rendered moot and academic as the probate court
had declared her as the sole heir of Rosario and appointed her
administrator of the estate. She argued that an injunctive relief would
work injustice to the estate because of the total assimilation by
petitioner of the shareholdings of the decedent in Primrose and her
share in the corporation's income corresponding to her shareholdings.
Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were
present,43 the Court issued the TRO44 in favor of Manuela on October
14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the rights of
Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of injunctive relief were
material and substantial and the TRO was issued in order to prevent any
irreparable damage to a corporate entity that could arise from the
conduct of an accounting by the court-appointed inventory.
The Court's Ruling
The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a permanent
injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela. This position is
supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows:
First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of property to which
the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. This class of
artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.
Example is the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.45 From this
pronouncement, it can be gleaned that the estate of the deceased person
is a juridical person separate and distinct from the person of the
decedent and any other corporation. This status of an estate comes
about by operation of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet
under corporation law that a corporation has a separate personality
distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it
may be connected.46
Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no relevant
application in this case. Under this doctrine, the court looks at the
corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an aggregation of
persons undertaking business as a group, disregarding the separate
juridical personality of the corporation unifying the group. Another
formulation of this doctrine is that when two business enterprises are
owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and
equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties,
disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and
treat them as identical or as one and the same.47 The purpose behind
piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier between the
corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent and
illegal schemes of those who use the corporate personality as a shield for
undertaking certain proscribed activities.48
Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the corporation
separately as a stockholder, the situation was reversed. Instead, the
probate court ordered the lessees of the corporation to remit rentals to
the estate's administrator without taking note of the fact that the
decedent was not the absolute owner of Primrose but only an owner of
shares thereof. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not
of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical
personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be presumed, but
must be clearly and convincingly established.50
Third. A probate court is not without limits in the determination of the
scope of property covered in probate proceedings. In a litany of cases,
the Court had defined the parameters by which a probate court may
extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in
probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,51 the Court
explained that, as a rule, the question of ownership was an extraneous
matter which the probate court could not resolve with finality. Thus, for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should, or should
not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge
of proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate but which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only determine
whether they should, or should not, be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be overseen by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.52
In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties and the
parcel of land on which these were erected should be included in the
inventory of Rosario's estate. More so, the arrears from the rental of
these properties were later on ordered to be remitted to the
administrator of the estate grounded on the allegation that Rosario had
no other properties other than her interests in Primrose. To the Court's
mind, this holding of the probate court was in utter disregard of the
undisputed fact the subject land is registered under the Torrens system
in the name of Primrose, a third person who may be prejudiced by the
orders of the probate court. In Valera vs. Inserto:53 the Court stated:
x x x, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and
thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title
to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless
the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third
persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being
that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land registration,
etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one,
involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
xxxx
x x x These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the
Torrens title to the property is not in the decedent's names but in others,
a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.54
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the incontestability
accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over Marty's arguments of
possible dissipation of properties. In fact, in the given setting, even
evidence purporting to support a claim of ownership has to yield to the
incontestability of a Torrens title, until after the same has been set aside
in the manner indicated in the law itself. In other words, the existence of
a Torrens title may not be discounted as a mere incident in special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Put
clearly, if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, "the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight,
and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the
holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of
the property itself is in the persons named in the title."55
Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152956 proscribes a
collateral attack on a Torrens title:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
In Cuizon vs. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy was
duly registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court categorically
stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the
respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory
of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property.58 x x x
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
A perusal of the records of this case would show that that no compelling
evidence was ever presented to substantiate the position of Marty that
Rosario and Primrose were one and the same, justifying the inclusion of
the latter's properties in the inventory of the decedent's properties. This
has remained a vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario owned were
shares of stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly underscores the fact that
Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of the
decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of
the estate of Rosario are in the possession of, and are registered in the
name of, Primrose, Marty's claims are bereft of any logical reason and
conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.
Fourth. The probate court in this case has not acquired jurisdiction over
Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of corporate entity applies
to determination of liability not of jurisdiction; it is basically applied only
to determine established liability. It is not available to confer on the
court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not
impleaded in a case.59 This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case after
the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the corporation. Hence,
before this doctrine can be even applied, based on the evidence
presented, it is imperative that the court must first have jurisdiction
over the corporation.60
Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the
court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. Resultantly,
any proceedings taken against the corporation and its properties would
infringe on its right to due process.
In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no other properties that
comprise her estate other than her shares in Primrose. Although the
probate court's intention to protect the decedent's shares of stock in
Primrose from dissipation is laudable, it is still.an error to order the
corporation's tenants to remit their rental payments to the estate of
Rosario.

Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a permanent

and final injunction is in order in accordance with Section 9, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]f after the trial of the action it
appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained
of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction
perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the
commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction." Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to
suffer an irreparable injury from the subject order of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining

Order, dated June 14, 2013, is hereby made PERMANENT, effective
immediately. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, is
ENJOINED from enforcing and implementing its January 20, 2011 and
June 10, 2011 Orders, insofar as the corporate properties of Primrose
Development Corporation are concerned, to avert irreparable damage to
a corporate entity, separate and distinct from the Estate of Rosario Guy-
Juco Villasin Casilan.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150164. November 26, 2002]
GLORIOSA V. VALARAO, petitioner, vs. CONRADO C. PASCUAL and
MANUEL C. DIAZ,[1] respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at seventy-one (71) years, femme
sole, leaving a substantial inheritance for her querulous collateral
relatives who all appear disagreeable to any sensible partition of their
windfall.
To divide the disputed estate are five (5) groups of legal heirs which
include respondents Conrado C. Pascual, a brother of the deceased, and
Manuel C. Diaz, a nephew, son of her sister Carmen P. Diaz, and
petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao who is the decedent's niece. The
bloodlines marking the groups of heirs are: (a) the legitimate children of
her late sister Leoncia P. Villanueva, including petitioner Gloriosa V.
Valarao; (b) the legitimate children of her late sister Carmen P. Diaz
including respondent Manuel C. Diaz; (c) the legitimate children of her
late brother Macario Pascual; (d) the legitimate children of her late sister
Milagros P. de Leon; and, (e) the decedent's surviving sister Augustia C.
Pascual and brothers Leonardo C. Pascual and Conrado C. Pascual, the
latter being one of respondents herein.
On 27 May 1998 petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City special proceedings docketed as SP
No. 98-061 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor over
the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual. On 29 September 1998 respondent
Conrado C. Pascual and some of his co-heirs, including respondent Diaz,
filed with the same probate court a petition for probate, docketed as SP
No. 98-0124, of an alleged holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. The
two (2) special proceedings were consolidated.
On 26 January 1999, by agreement of the parties in the
proceedings a quo, petitioner Valarao and respondent Diaz were
appointed joint administrators of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual. On 8
February 2000, RTC-Br. 260 of Paraaque City rendered a Decision which
dismissed SP No. 98-0124, denying probate of the alleged holographic
will of the decedent and giving due course to the intestate settlement of
the estate.[2] On 22 March 2000 respondent Pascual appealed
the Decision to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal.
On 2 May 2000, in view of the appeal taken from the disallowance of
the holographic will, petitioner Valarao moved in the probate court for
her appointment as special administratrix of the estate. On 9 May 2000
respondent Diaz also asked for his designation as special co-
administrator of the estate alongside petitioner. On 10 May 2000 the
motions were heard wherein petitioner opposed the request of
respondent Diaz on the ground that he had allegedly neglected his
previous assignment as co-administrator of the estate.
On 7 June 2000 the probate court issued an Order appointing
petitioner Valarao as special administratrix based on this observation -
Weighing the pros and cons of the situation, considering the unanimity
of choice by the heirs, of Mrs. Valarao as special administratrix, and the
vigorous objection to Mr. Diaz as co-administrator, not to mention the
fact that the heirs on the side of Mrs. Valarao represent a numerical
majority of the legal heirs of the deceased, the Court believes that it will
be to the best interest of the estate and the heirs themselves if Mrs.
Gloriosa Valarao is appointed special administratrix.[3]
On 29 June 2000 the probate court approved petitioner's bond
of P500,000.00, and on 6 July 2000 she took her oath of office as special
administratrix.
On 19 July 2000 respondent Diaz moved for reconsideration of his
rejection as special co-administrator of the estate. He contested the
allegation of petitioner Valarao that he had been remiss in his duties as
co-administrator. He cited as examples of his services the collection of
rentals for properties included in the estate, the payment of estate taxes
and the deposit of about P4,000,000.00 in a joint bank account held in
trust for the estate by him and petitioner as co-
administrators. Respondent Diaz further alleged that justice and equity
demanded that his group of heirs be also represented in the
management of the estate.
 On the other hand, petitioner reiterated the alleged uncooperative
conduct of respondent Diaz in discharging his tasks as co-administrator,
and at the same time moved that he and his group of sympathetic heirs
be compelled to surrender to her as special administratrix the books and
records of a corporation where the estate owned substantial interests.
On 11 September 2000 the probate court denied the motion for
reconsideration and ordered respondent Diaz and all the heirs to respect
the authority of petitioner Valarao as special administratrix, especially
by furnishing her with copies of documents pertinent to the properties
comprising the estate. Anent the charges of nonfeasance in his tasks as
co-administrator, the probate court found -
x x x [respondent] Diaz has not disputed these charges beyond making a
mere general denial, stating that he had been diligent and regular in the
performance of his duties when he was still the estates co-
administrator. Considering the allegations of both Manuel Diaz and
Gloriosa Valarao and assessing the circumstances surrounding the case,
this Court is of the considered view that the best interest of the estate
will be best protected if only one administrator is appointed for, in that
way, conflicting interests which might work to the detriment of the
estate may be avoided.[4]
On 25 September 2000 respondents Pascual and Diaz along with
other heirs moved for reconsideration of the 11 September
2000 Order on the ground that petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix was not authorized to dispossess the heirs of their
rightful custody of properties in the absence of proof that the same
properties were being dissipated by them, and that the possessory right
of petitioner as special administratrix had already been exercised by her
"constructively" when the heirs on her side took possession of the estate
supposedly in her behalf. Respondents further alleged that the motion
was pending resolution by the probate court.
On 10 October 2000, while the motion for reconsideration was
pending resolution, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61193, to reverse and set aside
the Orders dated 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000 insofar as the
probate court appointed only petitioner Valarao as special
administratrix, and to order the appointment of respondent Diaz as
special co-administrator of the estate.
On 15 May 2001 the probate court upon motion cited respondents
for indirect contempt of court for refusing to turn over to petitioner
Valarao documents covering properties belonging to the estate and
ordered them arrested until compliance with the order to hand over the
documents. The warrant of arrest was subsequently lifted by the probate
court after respondents promised to deliver the documents.
On 13 June 2001 respondents filed their supplemental petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193 seeking permanent injunction against
the enforcement of the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000
also as they mandated the turn over of documents to petitioner Valarao.
On 28 September 2001 the Court of Appeals promulgated
its Decision reversing and setting aside the Order of 7 June 2000 of RTC-
Br. 260, Paraaque City, appointing petitioner Valarao as lone special
administratrix although the fallo of the CA Decision was silent on
whether the probate court should also appoint respondent Diaz as
special co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual.[5] The
appellate court explained that since the heirs were divided into two (2)
scrappy factions, justice and equity demanded that both factions be
represented in the management of the estate of the deceased,
citing Matias v. Gonzales,[6] Corona v. Court of Appeals,[7] and Vda. de
Dayrit v. Ramolete.[8] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Valarao claims that the probate court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion when it rejected the application of respondent
Diaz for appointment as special co-administrator of the estate because of
his indubitable uncooperative attitude towards effective administration
of the estate. She also argues that diverse interests among different
groups of heirs do not give each of them the absolute right to secure the
appointment of a co-administrator from within their ranks since it
remains the discretion of the probate court to designate the
administrators of an estate. She further asserts that as special
administratrix of the estate she possesses the authority to demand the
surrender of documents pertinent to the estate insofar as necessary to
fulfill her mandate.
On 26 February 2002 respondents filed their Comment on the
petition alleging the absence of special reasons to justify a review of the
assailed Decision and of the partiality of the trial judge in favor of
petitioner.
We grant the petition. To begin with, the probate court had ample
jurisdiction to appoint petitioner Valarao as special administratrix and
to assist her in the discharge of her functions, even after respondents
had filed a notice of appeal from the Decision disallowing probate of the
holographic will of Felicidad C. Pascual. This is because the appeal is one
where multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is
required.[9] In this mode of appeal, the probate court loses jurisdiction
only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains jurisdiction over
the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for purposes of
further remedies which the parties may avail of, including the
appointment of a special administrator.[10]
Moreover, there is nothing whimsical nor capricious in the action of
the probate court not to appoint respondent Diaz as special co-
administrator since the Orders of 7 June 2000 and 11 September 2000
clearly stipulate the grounds for the rejection. The records also manifest
that the probate court weighed the evidence of the applicants for special
administrator before concluding not to designate respondent Diaz
because the latter was found to have been remiss in his previous duty as
co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his
administration.Verily, the process of decision-making observed by the
probate court evinces reason, equity, justice and legal principle
unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion correctible by the
special civil action of certiorari under which the appellate court was
bound to act. Finally, the extraordinary writ does not operate to reverse
factual findings where evidence was assessed in the ordinary course of
the proceedings since perceived errors in the appreciation of evidence
do not embroil jurisdictional issues.[11]
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v.
Gonzales,[12] Corona v. Court of Appeals[13] and Vda. de Dayrit v.
Ramolete,[14] cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these
cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate
court to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the
respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute
precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just
one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single
estate.Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when
the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its
sound discretion.[15]
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge
upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the
heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this
Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of
the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in
the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving
protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since
the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more
than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the
act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the
selection of another special administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice
of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the
wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will,"[16] for
this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is
also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting
interests among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the
designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into
account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to"overshadow" the
objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of
kinship."[17]
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of
the decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered
opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal
properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to
deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the
probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."[18] The
special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals[19] where we held
that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in
the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not
only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of
the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the
good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but
more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals[20] we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse
applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when
we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to
justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator
in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent
proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that
were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being
repeatedly urged by respondents.
 We also rule that the probate court in issuing the Order of 11
September 2000 did not err in commanding respondents to turn over all
documents pertinent to the estate under special administration and in
enforcing such order by means of contempt of court. The powers of a
special administrator are plainly delineated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules
of Court, vesting upon him the authority to "take possession and charge
of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards
appointed x x x x"
Contrary to respondents' assertion, there is nothing in Sec. 2
requiring a special administrator to take possession of the estate only
upon a prior finding that the heirs have been wasting properties of the
estate which are in their possession. The law explicitly authorizes him to
take possession of the properties in whatever state they are, provided he
does so to preserve them for the regular administrator appointed
afterwards. Clearly, the special administrator enjoys not merely
subsidiary possession to be carried out when the heirs dissipate the
properties but the primary and independent discretion of keeping them
so they may be preserved for regular administration.
Moreover, respondents cannot deprive the special administratrix of
access to and custody of essential documents by arguing that their
possession thereof allegedly in behalf of petitioner is already the
equivalent of "constructive possession" which constitutes full compliance
with the possessory powers of petitioner as special administratrix under
Sec. 2 of Rule 80.Contrary to what respondents seem to understand by
"constructive possession," the right of possession whether characterized
as actual or constructive invariably empowers the special administrator
with the discretion at any time to exercise dominion or control over the
properties and documents comprising the estate.[21] Hence, even if we
are to give credence to the theory that petitioner also has "constructive
possession" of the documents alongside respondents' actual possession
thereof, respondents would nonetheless be under the obligation to turn
them over whenever the special administratrix requires their actual
delivery.
In any event, as we have held in De Guzman v. Guadiz,[22] the
partisan possession exercised by litigants over properties of the estate
differs greatly from the neutral possession of a special administrator
under the Rules of Court. Quite obviously, with this distinction, the
possession of portions of the estate by respondents as heirs necessarily
excludes the possessory right over the same properties inherent in the
mandate of a special administrator.
The language of Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, also
unmistakably gives a special administrator the discretion to take actual
custody of the properties of the estate for the purpose of preserving
them for regular administration. This appreciation of the powers of a
special administrator is fairly evident from the combination of the
words "possession" and "charge" in Sec. 2, so much so that even if we
have to concede that "possession" means only the fictitious custody of a
thing as respondents suggest, the word "charge," i.e., the commitment of
a thing to the care and custody of another,[23] would emphasize the
requirement of actual possession of the properties of the estate
whenever vital according to the discretion of the special
administrator. When taken together, the words "possession" and
"charge" serve to highlight the fact that a special administrator must be
able to subject the properties of the estate to his control and
management when in his good judgment such action is needed. Indeed,
this understanding of the possessory right of a special administrator is
indispensable in fulfilling his mandate to preserve the properties of the
estate until a regular administrator is designated, for fiction and illusion
cannot stand in place of the concrete and tangible exercise of possession
if he is to function effectively.
Finally, respondents cannot disobey the reasonable exercise of the
authority of a special administrator on the dubious ground that the
order appointing petitioner Valarao as special administratrix had not in
the meantime become final and executory because of a pending motion
for reconsideration filed by them. The fallacy of this reasoning is
apparent, for an interlocutory order is not instantly appealable and
therefore there is no period nor action to suspend or interrupt by a
motion for reconsideration;[24] it is even well settled that a special civil
action for certiorari does not suspend the immediate enforceability of an
interlocutory order absent a temporary restraining order or an
injunction.[25] In the same manner, the appointment of a special
administrator being an interlocutory order is not interrupted by a
motion for reconsideration and thus must be obeyed as the proceedings
in the probate court progress.[26] The ruling in PAFLU v.
Salvador[27] reiterated in Republic Commodities Corporation v. Oca[28] is
enlightening -
[The] refusal to accord due respect and yield obedience to what a court SO ORDERED.
or administrative tribunal ordains is fraught with such grave
consequences x x x x If such a conduct were not condemned, some other
group or groups emboldened by the absence of any reproof or
disapproval may conduct themselves similarly. The injury to the rule of
law may well-nigh be irreparable x x x x When judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed; what they ordain
must be followed. A party dissatisfied may ask for reconsideration and, if
denied, may go on to higher tribunal. As long as the orders stand
unmodified, however, they must, even if susceptible to well-founded
doubts on jurisdictional grounds be faithfully complied with.

Needless to state, the special administratrix appointed by the

probate court must be constantly aware that she is not a representative
nor the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment but the
administrator in charge of the estate and in fact an officer of the court. As
an officer of the court, she is subject to the supervision and control of the
probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire
estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest
settlement.[29] Whatever differences that may exist between the heirs
shall be ironed out fairly and objectively for the attainment of that
end. She ought to be sensitive to her position as special administratrix
and neutral possessor which under the Rules of Court is both fiduciary
and temporary in character upon which accountability attaches in favor
of the estate as well as the other heirs, especially respondents Pascual
and Diaz in light of her alleged rivalry with them.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for
Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
September 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61193, "Conrado C. Pascual and
Manuel P. Diaz v. The Hon. RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 260, and Gloriosa
V. Valarao," is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 7 June 2000
and 11 September 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, of
Paraaque City, rejecting the application of respondent Manuel C.
Diaz[30] as special co-administrator of the estate of Felicidad C. Pascual
and ordering respondents Conrado C. Pascual and Manuel C. Diaz and all
other heirs who may have in their possession or custody papers,
records, certificates of titles over parcels of land, etc., pertaining to
properties of the estate of the late Felicidad C. Pascual to turn over such
papers, records and titles to petitioner Gloriosa V. Valarao as special
administratrix thereof, are REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. No costs.