Ebarle v.

Sucaldito, While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here
material in construing the intent of the measure.
Topic: Aids to Construction/ Terms Used
FACTS:

The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a

candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive
relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings of his
criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of
the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of
prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and various provisions of the Revised Penal
Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the failure of the respondents
City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of
Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH
COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE
GUIDED," preliminary to their criminal recourses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive
application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title
speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not
even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to say, "crimes." While
"crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very
well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself
applicable thereto. Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these
existing rules and streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter
of complaints against public officials. It is moreover significant that the
Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or
employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to
apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical
terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted."
People v. Purisima
Topic: Aids to Construction: Intent and Spirit of the Law
FACTS:
Note: This is a review for compiled petitions involving Illegal possession
of deadly weapon against 4 accused. (the accused carried different
bladed tools not related to their occupation).
Twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the
Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of
deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to
quash filed by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element
of the crime.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 9 October 2, 1972:
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 AND NO. 7 DATED
SEPTEMBER 22, 1972 AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE
UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in
form and substance to constitute the offense of “illegal possession of
deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9.
HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two
elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the
Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts
alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the
elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has
to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice
and contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall
within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent
and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, “whereas" clauses.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
To constitute a violation of P.D. 9, the two elements of carrying bladed or
pointed weapons outside one’s residence and of carrying such a weapon
in furtherance of, or to abet, or in-connection with subversion, lawless
violence, chaos and the like must be present. (PD 9 was created in the time of
Martial Law and Subversion)
the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events
are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state
of martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2)
the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are
particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder
a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the
presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the
act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation
behind it.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales
Topic: Aids of Construction- viewed as a whole, avoidance of absurdity
FACTS:
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. filed its quarterly income tax return for
the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31, and
consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15,
1981. During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered
losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return
for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of
P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of
P6,156,525.00. On July 9, 1982, TMX Sales filed with the Appellate
Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the
amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. This claim was
not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground
that "granting, without admitting, the amount in question is refundable,
the petitioner is already barred from claiming the same considering that
more than two years had already elapsed between the payment and the
filing of the claim in Court.
SECTION 292 NIRC: Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.
[Paragraph 2: In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after
the expiration of two years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty
regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: ]
ISSUE:
Does the two-year period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax
provided for in Section 292 or the National Internal Revenue Code
commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from
the date the filing of the Final Adjustment Return?
HELD:
Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the
Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of
income tax. The Court states that statutes should receive a sensible
construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as
to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity,
such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to
be adopted. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the
whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into
view. Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions
of the Tax Code in order to give effect to legislative intent and to avoid an
application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by private respondent TMX
Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to
the tax paid during the first quarter. A literal application of Section 292 would thus
pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the time the
quarterly income tax was paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter
in which the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal
application of Section 292 would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
in order to discover intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular
provision thereof, should be considered.
INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR
INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to
compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of filing the Final
Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return, when it can be finally
ascertained if the taxpayer has still to pay additional income tax or if he is
entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax.
the petition is hereby DENIED.
 by a comma from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced to three
months ofarresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a
People v. Subido fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended party,
Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
Aids of Construction: Punctuations and Wordings
pesos." The use of a comma in the part of the sentence is to make "the
FACTS: subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer not only to non-
payment of the indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.

If the lower court intended to make the phrase "with subsidiary

On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying
that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-
appellant argued that although he could not pay the fine and the
indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could
not be required to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in the form of
subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment did not expressly and
specifically provide that he should serve the fine and indemnity in form of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
TRIAL COURT DECISSION:
[From the facts above stated the Court finds the accused guilty of libel and
he is hereby sentenced to three (3) months of arresto mayor with the
accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00)
pesos, to indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson in the sum
of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.]
imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer to non-payment of indemnity
only and not to the non-payment of the fine, it would have omitted the
comma (,), after the phrase "to indemnify the offended party.
As thus worded and punctuated there would be no doubt that the lower
court would want to make accused-appellant serve the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of non-payment of the indemnity only.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the
retroactive force of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an accused person from subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil liability.
It is a well known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal statutes are
to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor of the
accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court intended to make the phrase “with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" refer to non-payment of
indemnity only and not to the non-payment of the fine

HELD:
No

A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that the
clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is separated

Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
Aids in Construction: Intention
Facts:
Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution
of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and March 2, 1964 the owner
of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of
land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.
In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel
of land, together with two other parcels of land for P4,000.00.
Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants
thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth
P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities,
accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of
redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of
P1,500.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of
land for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo
as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of
sale for the same price of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as
share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the
exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August
8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants.
(S)ec 12 of Republic Act No. 3844
Lessee's Right of Redemption. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person without
the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same
at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided: further, That where there are two or
more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the
extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section
may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority
over any other right of legal redemption.'
The systems of agricultural tenancy recognized in this jurisdiction are share tenancy
and leasehold tenancy. (Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 1199; Sec. 4, Republic Act No. 3844).
A share tenant is altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their respective rights
and obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal. (See Secs. 22 to 41, inclusive, and Secs.
42 to 48, inclusive, of Republic Act No. 1199; see also Secs. 4 to 38, inclusive, of Republic
Act No. 3844).
Agrarian court decided based on the section that "a share tenant is
altogether different from a leasehold tenant and their respective rights
and obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal"; and that the right of
redemption granted by section 12 of the Land Reform Code" is applicable
to leasehold tenants only, but not to share tenants.
Issue:
Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to
share tenants even if they are not mentioned in the Code?
Held:
YES, The agrarian court's dictum that "their respective rights and
obligations are not co-extensive or co-equal "refer to
their contractual relations with the landowner, with respect to the
contributions given, management, division or payment of the produce.
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to
be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be
agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy,
the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who
upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted
by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands
under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or
of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority.
It then becomes the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code,
for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter
thereof. A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention,
disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.'
By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out
and give due course to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to
redeem the subject landholdings are granted.