SEANGIO VS REYES

ISSUE:

WON the document was a will and WON there was a preterition

RULING:

1. Yes, DOCUMENT WAS A WILL.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms
to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of
Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance
of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in
the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this
regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in
the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.1

In the case at bar, The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundo’s intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through
a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance
that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code (ART 919(6))

2. No, THERE WAS NO PRETERITION

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an
heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1âwphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated.
It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

FISCHER VS JOHNSON

ISSUE:

WON the handwritten letter of daniel peterson constitutes his will

HELD:

No, The letter in question shows that it was not regarded by Mr. Peterson as a will but was simply a
direction to his attorney, Mr. Burt, to write a will. It said, "Put these explanations in my will if you think
advisable," and then he set out six items and to whom he wanted them bequeathed. The next sentence in the
letter stated, "In the event this doesn't reach you before my death, try to make this as legal and binding as
possible."

Also, Mr. Peterson and his wife had previously executed a formal will drawn by their attorney and it
appears that he had considerable knowledge of the requirements of drafting and executing a will, which is
verified by the letter to his attorney.

This letter was written three months and twenty days before Mr. Peterson's death. A will was prepared
according to its instructions and given Mr. Peterson for execution and he visited the office of his lawyer
who prepared it on four or five different occasions and made no effort to execute it or legalize it.

In the case of Nelson v. Nelson, 235 Ky. 189, 30 S.W.2d 893 (1930), it is stated:

"We take it there will be no disputing the fact that the determination of whether an instrument is
testamentary in character depends wholly upon the intention of the maker, and that, in the absence of a
testamentary intent, there can never be a will."

We are of the opinion that the letter in question was not testamentary in character at the time of the death of
Mr. Peterson.

The judgment is affirmed.

DIZON VS DIZON

ISSUE:

WON the testamentary disposition in the will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of
the estate and therefore subject to reduction

HELD:

The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix
which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included
the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are
to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy."

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his
executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the
courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by
these fundamental premises, the Court finds for the appellee.

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was
in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will,
after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her
last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided
that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with
the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real
property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same.
This was a valid partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the
first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person
make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This
right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory
heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of
such compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than
the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the
compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition,

wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina
and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned to
them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the
executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who
admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by will more
than their respective legitimes.
PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH VS BELINA RIGOR

ISSUE:

What was the intention of the testator regarding the bequest of riceland to his nearest
male relative who will take the priesthood and how can this intention be ascertained

HELD:

The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the
plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his
intention was different from that literally expressed.

The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life
and soul of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving
effect to a will".

One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations as
to his intention

From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended
to devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was
forbidden to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies
for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who
would be obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls
of the testator and his parents.

On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the
ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male
relative of the testator was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's
nephew became a priest and he was excommunicated.

What is not clear is the duration or how long after the testator's death would it be
determined that he had a nephew who would pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that
patent ambiguity that has brought about the controversy between the parish priest of
Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.

We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the
time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens,
except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe

them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would
render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his
estate. That could not have been his intention.

Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie
la camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives
born after his death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that such
a broad provision would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of
his bequest.

What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his
nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in
grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish
priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary.
But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to
enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the
trusteeship would be terminated.

Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father
Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had
manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically
answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January
31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father)
Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative.
Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as
envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.

ESTATE OF RUSSEL (BOOK)

BELLIS VS BELLIS

ISSUE:

WHICH LAW SHOULD APPLY TEXAS OR PHILIPPINE LAW

HELD

In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer
to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated,
renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine
of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather,
they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.

This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the
old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It
must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in
our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession
of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard
to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.