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r/Stoicism
For all things related to Stoicism
This FAQ contains some elements
borrowed from New Stoa.
Introduction
Why have a philosophy
of life?
Without a cohesive philosophy of life,
we risk living a less fulfilling life than
what is possible. Everyone can be a
philosopher. Human beings are
rational, thinking, reasoning creatures.
But people are distracted through
fulfilling basic needs, media overload,
and increased social connectivity, on
top of the usual temptations that daily
confront us. Applying the medicinal
cure of stoic philosophy to your mind
can lead to a better life.
What is the purpose of
r/Stoicism?
We're an independent-thinking
community committed to learning
about, practicing, and applying Stoic
principles and techniques. As Stoicism
is a philosophy of life, we often see our
other interests in a Stoic perspective,
leading to interesting analysis. We
welcome you to join us!
Is Stoicism something I
have to believe in, or
commit my life to?
Although the historical sources
sometimes emphasize the importance
rising controversial
r/Stoicism
Introduction
Why have a philosophy of life?
What is the purpose of r/Stoicism?
Is Stoicism something I have to believe
in, or commit my life to?
What is Stoicism, considered as a
philosophy of life in modern times?
What was Stoicism, historically?
What are some Stoic practices and
exercises?
What are the practices of the r/Stoicism
community?
Do Stoics believe in God, or gods?
If modern Stoics do not adopt the
classical Stoic theology, what do they
believe?
What are the Stoic views on physics?
Is it virtuous to do thus-and-such?
What did the Stoics mean by "virtue?"
What does it mean to live in accordance
with nature?
What is meant by a "preferred" or
"unpreferred" indifferent?
How do I explain Stoicism to a child
(EILI5)?
Determinism and free will
Were the classical Stoics determinists?
If Stoics believed in determinism, what is
"in our control?"
How did the Stoics reconcile
determinism with moral responsibility?
If everything is determined, what is the
point of trying to do anything?
How did the Stoics reconcile
determinism with the asserted "freedom"
of the sage?
What resources are there for further
exploration of Stoic determinism and
free will?
Stoicism and other philosophies
What are similarities between Stoicism
and Buddhism, in terms of mindfulness?
What are the differences between
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Recommendations for introductory reading
Recommended translations of Marcus Aurelius
Stoicism and repression of emotions
A summary of central themes in Stoicism
Free will and determinism in Stoicism
Stoicism, God, gods, and atheism
Stoicism and passivity
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practice many find benefit in doing no mindfulness? r/Philosophy

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inspirational material, particularly differences between Stoicism and r/SimpleLiving

Marcus Aurelius's Meditations and Cynicism? r/ZenHabits

Epictetus's Enchirideon. (In both r/Epicureanism

Misconceptions
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approach to life.) wiki page list
Does Stoicism encourage passively
No modern person "believes" in accepting your fate?
orthodox classical Stoicism as a Is enjoyment of life's pleasures a goal
whole, in the way one might believe in advocated in Stoicism?
a religion. Even at its height, different History
individual Stoics appear to have felt What is the brief history of Stoicism?
free to diverge from their predecessors How do we know about classical Stoic
and contemporaries when their own philosophy? Why do we know so little?
judgement differed. Modern Who or what did Stoicism influence?
circumstances result in even more How did historical Stoics treat women?
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Resources
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Stoicism is a philosophy of life, a practical guide to applying wisdom to your daily choices, focused clear
on living life as a thriving rational being, characterized by excellence in judgement and the fulfilled
happiness that is to the mind what robust healthy fitness is to the body. Stoics believe that, just as account activity
physical pain is caused by illness and injury to the body, human distress is caused (at least in part,
and according to orthodox Stoicism, entirely) by mistaken judgments and incorrect beliefs,
particularly about good and bad. To completely correct these judgements and correct these beliefs
is a difficult task, perhaps effectively impossible, but Stoic study, practice, and exercises aim at
least to improve those of the Stoics who practice them.

The details of Stoic beliefs and practices have varied significantly over time and by individual, but
there are some common, fundamental elements. In classical (ancient Greek and Roman) times,
there were Early, Middle, and Late periods, each of which had distinctive features. From the
enlightenment onwards, there have been philosophers sufficiently influenced by the classical
Stoics either to describe themselves as Stoic (Lawrence Becker) or be described by
knowledgeable scholars as Stoic (Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury).

Common central themes of philosophy labeled "Stoic" include:

Arete (in the context of Stoicism, excellence of character, or virtue) is the only good;
departures from arete the only evils.
Some things are up to us, a consequence only of our character; everything else is not
up to us, and independent of our character. Things which we appear only to influence
can and should be separated into factors that are entirely up to us, and entirely
independent of us.
The impossible is never compulsory; the unavoidable, never forbidden.
External events are not features of our character, and so can be neither good nor
bad.
There are four basic virtues (properties of an excellent character): wisdom, justice,
courage, and self-control. (These virtues were interpreted broadly, and many other
virtues were considered sub-categories of these four. For a list, see the Stoic Ethics
by Arius Didymus, collected in Stobaeus 5b2, for example in The Stoics Reader p.
125)

It is not things that disturb us, but our judgements about those things.
Arete is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (human flourishing, or happiness in
life).
Passions are emotions caused or reinforced by a belief that something not up to us is
either good or bad; they are symptoms of mistaken beliefs about good and bad.
Feelings, emotions not accompanied by such a belief, may be pleasant or
unpleasant, but not strong enough to affect ones quality of life, or interfere with ones
ability to make rational decisions.
An impeccable character (Sage) has feelings, but no passions.

Arete consists of acting consistently according to nature.

As social beings (such as humans) mature, their natural impulses expand from
helping themselves alone to their families, cities, nations, the community of all
rational beings, and the universe itself.
The natural impulse of a rational being (such as a human) is to believe what is true,
and avoid believing what is false.

There were a number of Stoic exercises aimed at developing arete by training the Stoic not to
judge externals either good or bad. These instructions are referred to but not well described by
classical literature, and so we must rely on educated guesswork and reconstructions. What has
survived has been influential in the development of modern psychotherapy techniques, particularly
cognitive behavioural therapy.

What was Stoicism, historically?

Stoicism was a "school" of philosophy in ancient Greece and Rome. Lessons in a school of
philosophy covered a wide curriculum, including both intellectual and practical elements. The
ultimate goal of such a school was improvement (or transformation) of ones character. We have
records of the names and authors of many of the books studied by Stoics, but the books
themselves did not survive the middle ages, and the person-to-person tradition ended in 529 CE
at the latest. What we do have is second hand accounts from rivals and compilers of
encyclopedias, and notes and writings of several late lay Stoics. (Attributions to Epictetus are
notes from his student Arrian, and were not written by Epictetus himself, and accounts of
Musonius Rufus's teachings are similarly second hand. Seneca and Marcus Aurelius were
politicians rather than professional philosophers.)

Stoic education had three parts: Logic, Ethics, and Physics. From Diogenes Laertius's Lives of
Eminent Philosophers:

[40] Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones and sinews,
Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile they use is that of an egg : the
shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics, and the yolk in the centre is Physics. Or, again,
 they liken Philosophy to a fertile field : Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop,
Physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to a city strongly walled and governed by reason. No
single part, some Stoics declare, is independent of any other part, but all blend together.

Because Stoic were teleological pantheist materialists, physics included theology. This education
included not just knowledge, but also character building. (That is, not just learning about wisdom,
but also how to train oneself to act wisely.)

The surviving texts (Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, Seneca, and Musonius Rufus) are mostly on
ethics. While it is clear that the other two branches were still taught (the existing Epictetus lecture
notes refer to lessons in physics and logic for which no notes exist), the explanation isn't
completely obvious; it may be that the late Roman Stoics placed less emphasis on physics and
logic than the Greeks, or it may just be that the Christian monks simply chose not to copy books
on logic or physics. There are parts in the surviving texts that indicate later Stoics viewed the
physics and logic as being important to study only in so far as they support the development of
ethics, but it is unclear if that was unique to the late Roman Stoics or if it was a feature of the
school from the beginning.

What are some Stoic practices and exercises?

While there are references to Stoic exercises, good descriptions of them in the classical literature
are rare to non-existent, and attempts to describe them (as below) are necessarily speculative.
Some known (or at least suspected) exercises are:

Whenever you remember to do it, refrain from giving automatic assent to mistaken
impressions, and refrain from automatically acting on impulses. Instead, observe them as
mere impressions and impulses. This is the "discipline of assent." This implies some level of
detachment, and somewhat resembles Buddhist mindfulness meditation, although it is
meant to be practiced continuously during all activities, not as a separate activity. (Some
modern Stoics find Buddhist style mindfulness meditation useful training, but there is no
evidence that it was part of the historical tradition.)
When an impression that something is good or bad is received but before assent is given,
consider whether it is under your control or not. If it is, and it is according to nature, assent
to it. If not, and it is of something that has actually happened or is actually happening,
accept it with reverence. If it is of a possible thing in the future, regard it with indifference.
This is the "discipline of desire," also called the "dichotomy of control." Note that it is only
possible as a follow-on to the discipline of assent.
Before you choose to do anything, consider whether it is according to nature, or an impulse
of the moment, and act accordingly. This is the "discipline of action," and makes use of the
discipline of assent as a foundation.
Regular consideration of ones situation and surroundings from a purely physical
perspective, breaking things down into their physical parts, or looking at the from a "Cosmic
perspective" (in relation to eternity and all that exists in the universe).
Reading Stoic literature. Reading is needed to understand what you are trying to do, but
reading in itself is only the foundation for future exercise, just as reading books about
physiology and exercise will not help you get in shape, but can improve the effectiveness of
the other exercises you do.
Regular (daily or more often) re-reading brief reminders of central Stoic principles.
Epictetus's Enchiridion contains examples of such reminders.
Regular rewording and writing of such reminders, to trigger active engagement and prevent
them from becoming "just words." Marcus Aurelius's Meditations contains many examples
of his.
Mental rehearsal (visualization) of upcoming events, particularly those that might trigger
mistaken judgements about good and bad. For example, say to yourself: "I shall meet today
ungrateful, violent, treacherous, envious, uncharitable men. All of these things have come
upon them through ignorance of real good and ill. I can neither be harmed by any of them,
for no man will involve me in wrong, nor can I be angry with my fellow human or hate him,
without my decision to choose that opinion. The harm is done in my response to their
actions, not in their actions." This exercise is frequently practiced at the beginning of the
day, and is sometimes referred to as a morning devotional
Mental review of recent events in the light of Stoic principals, possibly followed by mental
rehearsal of doing them as if you had followed those principals. (The point here is not to feel
 guilty about the recent events: they are now out of your control, and so it is now a mistake
to even look at them as good or bad. The goal rather is to train yourself not to make the
same mistake in the future.) This exercise has been referred to as Stoic meditation.
Negative visualization - Imagine something that you fear will happen has actually happened
(a loved one dies for instance). This will help you be grateful for what you have and also
take some of the sting out of bad things because you have prepared yourself for bad things
to happen.
Actual practice experiencing some of the consequences of difficult events, and reacting to
them as a Sage would, where doing such is not dangerous or destructive. The idea is to
start in a situation that is as easy as possible (it is expected, you know you can stop it, etc.)
and get practice so you can handle it if and when you have no choice. One variety of this is
self-denial, in which you consciously decide not to enjoy something for a time. Go camping,
shower using cold water, don't use the dishwasher, etc. This will help you be grateful for
what you have but also keep you from attaching your happiness to having things that are
ultimately not entirely in your control.
Another element of Stoic practice was building social bonds that will reinforce one's
progress as an influence separate from the influences of popular society. Ancient Stoics
discussed philosophy both in person and through letters. Such discussion was not
necessarily meant to be informative; part of the goal was to help each other pay attention to
beliefs already understood and acknowledged, but easy to get distracted from.
Contemplation of death, and the impermanence of everything around you.
Socratic dialog and self-dialog were used as teaching tools.

What are the practices of the r/Stoicism community?

In the past, we have had selections from popular ancient stoic texts posted weekly, which allows
us to contemplate his words in context of our human natures, as well as our current point in life.
On a semi-regular basis we have an Ask Us Anything thread where many various questions are
discussed; these have been our longest threads. Sometimes there are guest Ask Me Anythings,
and quote threads.

Additionally, the community welcomes respectful debate, disagreements, and differing opinions.
However, in the interest of fostering a welcoming community, posts that are deemed to grossly
violate reddiquette may be removed by the moderators.

Do Stoics believe in God, or gods?

The answer about Stoic theism is usually rather different for modern people who self-identify as
Stoics and the classical Greek and Roman view. There are few modern people who share the
ancient view. Modern people of a variety of different views about theology have been strongly
influenced by Stoicism, but atheists and agnostics are more likely to self-identify as Stoics;
comparably influenced theists usually still self-identify with the religion that holds the theological
views closest to their own (although there are modern deists and pantheists who self-identify as
Stoics).

There is a substantial amount of material in Stoicism which can be adopted to a wide variety of
religious beliefs (or non-belief).

As far as the ancient Stoic view goes, this classical account from Diogenes Laertius's Lives of
Eminent Philosophers, book 7, may have the best compact explanation:

[142] ...The doctrine that the world is a living being, rational, animate and intelligent, is laid
down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Providence, by Apollodorus in his
Physics, and by Posidonius. [143] It is a living thing in the sense of an animate substance
endowed with sensation...

[147] The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness,
admitting nothing evil [into him], taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but
he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the
father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which
is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia because all
things are due to him; Zeus in so far as he is the cause of life or pervades all life; the name
Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera
marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire;
 Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men
have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his
peculiar attributes.

[148] The substance of God is declared by Zeno to be the whole world and the heaven, as well
as by Chrysippus in his first book Of the Gods, and by Posidonius in his first book with the
same title. Again, Antipater in the seventh book of his work On the Cosmos says that the
substance of God is akin to air, while Boëthus in his work On Nature speaks of the sphere of
the fixed stars as the substance of God. Now the term Nature is used by them to mean
sometimes that which holds the world together, sometimes that which causes terrestrial things
to spring up. Nature is defined as a force moving of itself, producing and preserving in being its
offspring in accordance with seminal principles within definite periods, and effecting results
homogeneous with their sources. [149] Nature, they hold, aims both at utility and at pleasure,
as is clear from the analogy of human craftsmanship. That all things happen by fate or destiny
is maintained by Chrysippus in his treatise De fato, by Posidonius in his De fato, book ii., by
Zeno and by Boëthus in his De fato, book i. Fate is defined as an endless chain of causation,
whereby things are, or as the reason or formula by which the world goes on.

If modern Stoics do not adopt the classical Stoic theology, what

do they believe?
Although the classical Stoics regarded their physics and theology as important parts of Stoicism,
at least some of them explicitly recognized that the ethical aspects of the philosophy would still be
justified even if their physics and theology were incorrect. More recent people who either consider
themselves Stoic, or are deeply influenced by Stoic views, come in many varieties.

Christian, Jewish, and other dualist theologies can be compatible with Stoicism. Indeed, some
aspects of modern Christianity were strongly influenced by Stoicism, as the early Roman
Christians were often familiar with Stoicism. Greek and particularly Latin were important elements
of higher education in Europe for a significant period of time, and Stoic and Stoic-influenced
writings (particularly Seneca and Cicero) were popular and influential. The Serenity Prayer has a
particularly Stoic character.

Most elements of Stoic ethics are compatible with traditional atheism, and many atheists agree
with the deterministic and materialist aspects of historical Stoicism.

Modern variations of pantheism can also be compatible with Stoicism. Naturalistic pantheism,
which differs from atheism only in its beliefs about the best attitude to take toward the world, is a
natural fit, incorporating the religious flavor of the acceptance of past and present events present
in much Stoic writing.

What are the Stoic views on physics?

Modern people do not generally adopt the classical Stoic views on physics, although
understanding it is sometimes helpful in interpreting ancient Stoic writing. The Stoics were
materialists, in that they believed that the universe consisted only of corporeal bodies. They
thought the universe was a solid sphere of substance surrounded by infinite void. Every point in
the sphere has some combination of four elemental substances: earth, water, air, and fire. These
substances are not necessarily exclusive: a single point can have a superposition of elements, in
a variety of states. Points in the middle of a red-hot piece of iron have a superposition of fire and
earth, while a cold piece has less fire but just as much earth, for example.

They also thought the universe could be divided into passive and inert parts, stationary unless
being acted upon, and an active part, pneuma. Pneuma extends, at some level, though every
point in the cosmos, and is what pushes the other stuff around. It comes in several varieties, which
cause different kinds of actions (plant-like, animal-like, rational, etc.). The rational variety is most
concentrated in the hearts of living humans, the sun, stars and other heavenly bodies. Because
pneuma fills everything, God moves everything by the same physical mechanism humans use to
move their limbs, etc.

The relationship between pneuma and the four elements is uncertain, but some classical sources
assert that it is a combination of air and fire, and others a particular kind of fire.

Is it virtuous to do thus-and-such?
Virtue is excellence of ones character or rationality, rather than body, anything that happens to
one, or anything one achieves. When "virtuous" or "vicious" are used to describe what one does,
the virtuousness or viciousness of the act depends on the virtue or vice of the character traits
leading to the act. Where the central question of much modern ethics revolves around what
specific acts are moral or immoral, this doesn't seem to have been how the classical Greeks even
thought about the question. The focus of their attention was on character; if one develops a
virtuous character, moral acts follow naturally.

From Stobaeus (translated by M. Lawrence):

Zeno described the moral character as the fountain of life and conduct, whence all our
particular actions flow.

What did the Stoics mean by "virtue?"

When applied to humans by the Stoics, arete (usually translated as "virtue") meant something like
"excellence of character." There are two basic approaches to describing in more detail what the
Stoics meant by "virtuous:" practical, and theoretical.

When offering practical advice, Stoic writers seem to assume that what is virtuous and what isn't is
pretty obvious. From Seneca's Letter 71:

To infer the nature of this Supreme Good, one does not need many words or any round-about
discussion; it should be pointed out with the forefinger, so to speak, and not be dissipated into
many parts.

From Seneca's On Benefits book IV:

Just as there is no law which bids parents love and indulge their children, seeing that it is
superfluous to force us into the path which we naturally take, just as no one needs to be urged
to love himself, since self-love begins to act upon him as soon as he is born, so there is no law
bidding us to seek that which is honourable in itself; for such things please us by their very
nature, and so attractive is virtue that the disposition even of bad men leads them to approve
of good rather than of evil... Nature bestows upon us all this immense advantage, that the light
of virtue shines into the minds of all alike; even those who do not follow her, behold her.

Ones ability to know what is virtuous is perhaps analogous to ones ability to recognize certain
sounds as being music. Although they did offer theoretical explanations, they did not rely on these
to motivate being virtuous. You are not going to persuade anyone to take guitar lessons using a
neurological account of why people like music, or definitions of music in terms of harmonics,
beats, etc. The only real way to do it is to play them examples of music and say "see, that!"

The classical Stoics did something very similar in arguments for why virtue is the only good, or
that the way to live a good life was to be virtuous. See, for example, paradox I of Cicero's Stoic
Paradoxes, or Seneca's Letter 120, or Of a Happy Life. When trying to persuade their audience to
be virtuous, they describe virtuous acts. There are also categorizations of virtues and vices. From
Yonge's 1853 translation of Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers by Diogenes Laërtius:

Among the virtues some are primitive and some are derived. The primitive ones are prudence,
manly courage, justice, and temperance. And subordinate to these, as a kind of species
contained in them, are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, wisdom in
council...

... And analogously, of vices too there are some which are primary, and some which are
subordinate; as, for instance, folly, and cowardice, and injustice, and intemperance, are among
the primary vices; incontinence, slowness, and folly in counsel among the subordinate ones.
And the vices are ignorance of those things of which the virtues are the knowledge.

Such virtuous and vicious character traits do seem to be widely (although perhaps not universally)
admired and condemned even across cultures, and similar traits show up in modern psychology
as well (see Peterson and Seligman's character strengths and virtues, for example). The Stoics
used this to get across what they were talking about when describing virtue much as someone
trying to get across what they mean by "music" might use examples of performances or recordings
of music.

The classical Stoics took a theoretical approach as well, perhaps analogous to a description of
music in terms of patterns of sound and human psychology.
Diogenes Laërtius (VII.LII) lists a number of variations on the Stoic definition of "the chief good",
attributing them to a variety of different specific Stoics.

From Zeno, Cleanthes, Posidonius, and Hecaton:

The chief good was confessedly to live according to nature; which is to live according to virtue,
for nature leads us to this point.

From Cleanthes:

Virtue is a disposition of the mind always consistent and always harmonious; that one ought to
seek it out for its own sake, without being influenced by fear or hope by any external influence.
Moreover, that it is in it that happiness consists, as producing in the soul the harmony of a life
always consistent with itself; and that if a rational animal goes the wrong way, it is because it
allows itself to be misled by the deceitful appearances of exterior things, or perhaps by the
instigation of those who surround it; for nature herself never gives us any but good inclinations.

From Chrysippus:

To live according to virtue is the same thing as living according to one’s experience of those
things which happen by nature... For our individual natures are all parts of universal nature; on
which account the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to nature, and that means
corresponding to one’s own nature and to universal nature; doing none of those things which
the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding, and that common law is identical with
that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator
and chief manager of all existing things.

From Diogenes of Babylon:

The chief good is to act according to sound reason in our selection of things according to our
nature.

From Archidemus:

[The chief good is] to be living in the discharge of all becoming duties.

Stobaeus gives a similar catalogue, but asserts that Zeno's original formulation was simply to "live
consistently," and that "with nature" was added by Cleanthes, his immediate successor.

By "nature" they mean something rather different from what a modern English speaker thinks of,
such that these definitions just transform the question of what they meant by virtue to that of what
they meant by "nature." See this question, below.

They also have a theoretical discussion of how humans develop a concept of virtue, which is in
itself informative (on a theoretical level) concerning what they thought "virtue" is. See this page on
oikoiosis.

What does it mean to live in accordance with nature?

It is important to realize that the ancient Greek conception of nature was rather different than the
modern one. Murray's lecture provides a useful account:

What is Goodness? What is this thing which is the only object worth living for?

Zeno seems to have been a little impatient of the question. We know quite well; everybody
knows who is not blinded by passion or desire. Still, the school consented to analyze it. And
the profound common sense and reasonableness of average Greek thought expressed the
answer in its own characteristic way. Let us see in practice what we mean by “good.” Take a
good bootmaker, a good father, a good musician, a good horse, a good chisel ; you will find
that each one of them has some function to perform, some special work to do ; and a good
one does the work well. Goodness is performing your function well. But when we say “well” we
are still using the idea of goodness. What do we mean by doing it “well”? Here the Greek falls
back on a scientific conception which had great influence in the fifth century b.c., and,
somewhat transformed and differently named, has regained it in our own days. We call it
“Evolution.” The Greeks called it Phusis, a word which we translate by “Nature,” but which
seems to mean more exactly “growth, ”or “the process of growth.” (See a paper by Professor
J. L. Myres, “The Background of Greek Science,” University of California Chronicle, xvi, 4.) It is
Phusis which gradually shapes or tries to shape every living thing into a more perfect form. It
 shapes the seed, by infinite and exact gradations, into the oak; the blind puppy into the good
hunting dog; the savage tribe into the civilized city. If you analyze this process, you find that
Phusis is shaping each thing towards the fulfilment of its own function—that is, towards the
good. Of course Phusis some-times fails; some of the blind puppies die; some of the seeds
never take root. Again, when the proper development has been reached, it is generally
followed by decay; that, too, seems like a failure in the work of Phusis. I will not consider these
objections now; they would take us too far afield, and we shall need a word about them later.
Let us in the meantime accept this conception of a force very like that which most of us
assume when we speak of evolution; especially, perhaps, it is like what Bergson calls La Vie or
L'Elan Vital at the back of L'Evolution Creatrice, though to the Greeks it seemed still more
personal and vivid; a force which is present in all the live world, and is always making things
grow towards the fulfilment of their utmost capacity. We see now what goodness is; it is living
or acting according to Phusis, working with Phusis in her eternal effort towards perfection. You
will notice, of course, that the phrase means a good deal more than we usually mean by living
“according to nature.” It does not mean “living simply,” or “living like the natural man.” It means
living according to the spirit which makes the world grow and progress.

This Phusis becomes in Stoicism the centre of much speculation and much effort at
imaginative understanding. It is at work everywhere. It is like a soul, or a life-force, running
through all matter as the “soul” or life of a man runs through all his limbs. It is the soul of the
world. Now, it so happened that in Zeno’s time the natural sciences had made a great
advance, especially Astronomy, Botany, and Natural History. This fact had made people
familiar with the notion of natural law. Law was a principle which ran through all the
movements of what they called the Kosmos, or “ordered world.” Thus Phusis, the life of the
world, is, from another point of view, the Law of Nature ; it is the great chain of causation by
which all events occur; for the Phusis which shapes things towards their end acts always by
the laws of causation. Phusis is not a sort of arbitrary personal goddess, upsetting the natural
order; Phusis is the natural order, and nothing happens without a cause.

A natural law, yet a natural law which is alive, which is itself life. It becomes indistinguishable
from a purpose, the purpose of the great world-process. It is like a fore-seeing, fore-thinking
power—Pronoia; our common word “Providence” is the Latin translation of this Pronoia,
though of course its meaning has been rubbed down and cheapened in the process of the
ages. As a principle of providence or forethought it comes to be regarded as God, the nearest
approach to a definite personal God which is admitted by the austere logic of Stoicism. And,
since it must be in some sense material, it is made of the finest material there is; it is made of
fire, not ordinary fire, but what they called intellectual fire. A fire which is present in a warm, live
man, and not in a cold, dead man; a fire which has consciousness and life, and is not subject
to decay. This fire, Phusis, God, is in all creation.

We are led to a very definite and complete Pantheism. The Sceptic begins to make his usual
objections. “God in worms?” he asks. “God in fleas and dung beetles?” And, as usual, the
objector is made to feel sorry that he spoke. “Why not?” the Stoic answers; “cannot an
earthworm serve God? Do you suppose that it is only a general who is a good soldier? Cannot
the lowest private or camp attendant fight his best and give his life for his cause? Happy are
you if you are serving God, and carrying out the great purpose as truly as such-and-such an
earthworm?” That is the conception. All the world is working together. It is all one living whole,
with one soul through it. And, as a matter of fact, no single part of it can either rejoice or suffer
without all the rest being affected. The man who does not see that the good of every living
creature is his good, the hurt of every living creature his hurt, is one who wilfully makes himself
a kind of outlaw or exile: he is blind, or a fool. So we are led up to the great doctrine of the later
Stoics, the Συμπαθεία τών όλων, or Sympathy of the Whole; a grand conception, the truth of
which is illustrated in the ethical world by the feelings of good men, and in the world of natural
science... We moderns may be excused for feeling a little surprise... by the fact that the stars
twinkle. It is because they are so sorry for us: as well they may be!

St. George William Joseph Stock's A Little Book of Stoicism also provides some insight:

It was assumed by the Greeks that the ways of nature were 'the ways of pleasantness,' and
that 'all her paths' were 'peace.' This may seem to us a startling assumption, but that is
because we do not mean by 'nature' the same thing as they did. We connect the term with the
origin of a thing, they connected it rather with the end; by the 'natural state' we mean a state of
savagery, they meant the highest civilization; we mean by a thing's nature what it is or has
 been, they meant what it ought to become under the most favorable conditions: not the sour
crab, but the mellow glory of the Herperides, worthy to be guarded by a sleepless dragon, was
to the Greeks the natural apple. Hence we find Aristotle maintaining that the State is a natural
product, because it is evolved out of social relations which exist by nature. Nature indeed was
a highly ambiguous term to the Greeks no less than ourselves, but in the sense with which we
are now concerned the nature of anything as defined by the Peripatetics as 'the end of its
becoming.' Another definition of theirs puts the matter still more clearly: What each thing is
when its growth has been completed, that we declare to be the nature of each thing.

What is meant by a "preferred" or "unpreferred" indifferent?

Preferred and unpreferred indifferents are things it is our nature to select or avoid selecting. They
are not truly good or bad, and we should not take their attainment or avoidance as goals; virtue
and vice play that role. However, they provide the context in which we exercise virtue and vice.

A preferred indifferent is analogous to "winning the game" for an athlete who takes the attitude of
"It's not whether you win or lose, but how you play the game." The attitude of a Stoic might be
considered analogous to that of an unbiased spectator at a sporting event, one who wants all
players to do everything they can to win (while following the rules, and within the bounds of good
sportsmanship). Such a spectator would want player A to strive to win, but would be indifferent to
whether or not player A actually wins. The Stoic tries to apply this attitude to everything in life,
striving to attain preferred indifferents rather than unpreferred ones, but ultimately indifferent to
whether or not they are actually attained.

They considered the proper use of preferred and unpreferred indifferents to be analogous to the
way a marathon runner uses the course or finish line, or a baseball player the ball, bases, and bat.
The marathon runner in, say, the New York marathon "seeks" the finish line in one sense, but the
real goal of the marathon runner isn't to get to the finish line. Getting to Central Park is not why
people run the New York marathon. Similarly, events in the external world -- the preferred and
unpreferred indifferents -- are not things the Stoic sage ever seeks, although they do work toward
certain goals in the external world, just as the marathon runner runs toward the finish line.

Expressed in more technical terminology, a Stoic will endeavour to perform καθήκοντα

(kathēkonta), "fitting" or "appropriate" acts, or (when translated by way of Latin) "duties." Whether
an act is appropriate depends on whether it is reasonable for achieving more over less preferred
indifferents. A reasonable course of action does not guarantee any given result, however. People
being unreasonable sometimes "get lucky," while reasonable strategies often fail. To the Stoic,
however, what is important is the act itself, not its consequences. An appropriate act which
actually ends up with an unpreferred indifferent is no worse than one which results in a preferred
one, and does not imply that the actor should have done otherwise, even if an inappropriate act
would have turned out better. Hence, the actual outcome is truly indifferent. (Note that kathēkonta
are not necessarily virtuous; they might not be performed with perfect reason and intention, even if
the action itself is the same.)

The Stoics thought that the initial "preferred indifferent," for humans and animals alike, was self-
preservation. As humans mature, though, they undergo a process called oikeiosis in which the
general wellbeing of humanity as a whole becomes the primary preferred indifferent, ahead even
of self-preservation. While these indifferents were seen as preferred for their own sake, others
were seen as preferred because they tended to be useful. Examples of secondary preferred
indifferents are wealth and status. Some indifferents, like strength and abilities, were seen as both
preferred for their own sake and also because of their utility.

Pleasure and pain were sometimes explicitly listed among indifferents that are neither preferred
nor dispreferred, and other indifferents were not considered preferred or dispreferred because of
their utility relative to pleasure or pain. (See, for example, the account collected by Stobaeus in
Anthology 2.7b, found on page 134 of Inwood and Gerson's The Stoics Reader.)

One of the more practical accounts of the role of externals in Stoicism can be found in Epictetus's
Discourses II.5. Additional discussion can be found in Diogenes Laertius's Lives of Eminent
Philosophers VII.1.105 and Stobaeus's Anthology, quoted in Long and Sedley's The Hellenistic
Philosophers Volume 1, p. 354, or Inwood and Gerson's The Stoics Reader, p. 134.

How do I explain Stoicism to a child (EILI5)?

Remember when your gold fish died, and you felt sad? Well, think about these three things:

Sadness is a bad feeling, right? And you have some control over how you feel about things.
Remember that time you did a dance for show and tell, and at first you kept thinking about how the
other kids might laugh at you, and it wasn't fun, but then you stopped worrying about that, and it
was fun? Well, I know that while you were doing your dance today, you were feeling sad, because
you were thinking sad things about your gold fish. But, if you had just been thinking about Mr.
Happyfin in a different way, or not at all, you could have been happy. And happy is a good feeling.

There are these forces of nature, and they led to your fish dying. But they also led to your birthday,
and your mom loving you, and that pretty butterfly outside the window. Everything in the whole
world is connected by these forces. The whole universe is one big thing, and just like how you love
your sister even though she can be annoying sometimes, you should love the universe, and all its
parts, even if some of those parts might make you feel sad at first.

Happiness is a part of you. What feels happiness and sadness? You do. You're the one who's
responsible for all the emotions you ever feel, and while at first you may be tempted to feel bad
about Mr. Happyfin's death, why should you? Mr. Happyfin died, but that has nothing to do with the
real you. And neither did the time your friends made fun of you at school because you wore a pink
shirt, nor the time you scraped your knee, nor the time you lost your lunch money. None of those
things made the real, inner you better or worse, so why should you feel bad because of them?

Determinism and free will

Were the classical Stoics determinists?
Yes. They asserted that there are no effects (changes or differences in state of a body) that are
not determined by causes, and that a "chain" or "web" of causes results in all that happens.
Because their cosmology was eternal and cyclic, they didn't even have a need for a initial
uncaused cause to get things going.

From Gellius's Attic Nights:

Chrysippus, the leader of the Stoic philosophy, defined fate, which the Greeks call εἱμαρμένη,
in about the following terms: "Fate," he says, "is an eternal and unalterable series of
circumstances, and a chain rolling and entangling itself through an unbroken series of
consequences, from which it is fashioned and made up." But I have copied Chrysippus' very
words, as exactly as I could recall them, in order that, if my interpretation should seem too
obscure to anyone, he may turn his attention to the philosopher's own language. For in the
fourth book of his work On Providence, he says that εἱμαρμένη is "an orderly series,
established by nature, of all events, following one another and joined together from eternity,
and their unalterable interdependence."

They regarded human beings as part of this chain or web, not something separated from it, but
embedded within it.

The Stoics (and their contemporaries) did not have a concept of "free will" that exactly
corresponds to ours. However, there were a number of objections to their determinism that are
closely related to modern conceptions of free will, and they answered these objections not by
denying what a modern person would consider "free will", but rather by arguing that there is no
contradiction between determinism and the objection. They are therefore considered some of the
earliest proponents of compatibilism, the belief that determinism and free will do not conflict, and
are both true.

These free-will related objections to determinism are addressed in separate questions below.

If Stoics believed in determinism, what is "in our control?"

The term usually translated as "up to us" or "in our power" is ἐφ' ἡμῖν (eph' hêmin). Long argues
(in his essay Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action, in the collection
Problems in Stoicism) that the term is really better translated as "attributable to us."

Epictetus seems to have been unusual in his extensive use of the concept in ethical contexts.
(Ethical discussion from other Stoics centered on virtue and vice.) Uses of the term by other Stoics
seem to have been in the context of discussions of fate and determinism, for example in the
account of the Stoic theory of fate given by Alexander of Aphrodisias in On Fate. Alexander's
discussion makes it clear at least his account of what the Stoics meant by the term is closer to
"due to our nature" or "as a consequence of our character." (It's worth noting that Alexander was
arguing against the Stoic position he was describing,)

If something is eph' hêmin, we form the last link in the causal chain that leads to the event. We are
instrumental to fate. Both Cicero and Gellius report the example of Chryssipus's cylinder.

From Gellius's Attic Nights:

But the authors of other views and of other schools of philosophy openly criticize this definition
as follows: "If Chrysippus," they say, "believes that all things are set in motion and directed by
fate, and that the course of fate and its coils cannot be turned aside or evaded, then the sins
and faults of men too ought not to cause anger or be attributed to themselves and their
inclinations, but to a certain unavoidable impulse which arises from fate," which is the mistress
and arbiter of all things, and through which everything that will happen must happen; and that
therefore the establishing of penalties for the guilty by law is unjust, if men do not voluntarily
commit crimes, but are led into them by fate.

Against these criticisms Chrysippus argues at length, subtlety and cleverly, but the purport of
all that he has written on that subject is about this: "Although it is a fact," he says, "that all
things are subject to an inevitable and fundamental law and are closely linked to fate, yet the
peculiar properties of our minds are subject to fate only according to their individuality and
quality. For if in the beginning they are fashioned by nature for health and usefulness, they will
avoid with little opposition and little difficulty all that force with which fate threatens them from
without. But if they are rough, ignorant, crude, and without any support from education,
through their own perversity and voluntary impulse they plunge into continual faults and sin,
even though the assault of some inconvenience due to fate be slight or non-existent. And that
this very thing should happen in this way is due to that natural and inevitable connection of
events which is called 'fate.' For it is in the nature of things, so to speak, fated and inevitable
that evil characters should not be free from sins and faults."

A little later he uses an illustration of this statement of his, which is in truth quite neat and
appropriate: "For instance," he says, "if you roll a cylindrical stone over a sloping, steep piece
of ground, you do indeed furnish the beginning and cause of its rapid descent, yet soon its
speeds onward, not because you make it do so, but because of its peculiar form and natural
tendency to roll; just so the order, the law, and the inevitable quality of fate set in motion the
various classes of things and the beginnings of causes, but the carrying out of our designs and
thoughts, and even our actions, are regulated by each individual's own will and the
characteristics of his mind."

Stoic physics distinguished "principle" from "antecedant" causes. If there is a chain of causation, A
causes B causes C causes D, then each thing is principle cause of the next in the chain, while
everything prior to it is an antecedant cause. So, A is an antecedant cause of C, but only B is the
principle cause. Likewise, B is only an antecedant cause of D, and only C is a the principle cause.
(see Cicero's On Fate book 3, starting at ch. XVIII.)

For A to be the principle cause of B, then A must come into direct physical contact with B. The
Stoics believed that only "bodies" exist, and regarded things like mind, etc. as physical bodies,
much like a modern materialist views the brain. The most obvious way to update Stoic science in
this regard would be to say that the mind is a body covering those parts of the brain responsible
for conscious thought. Eph' hêmin refers specifically to those things of which our mind is the
principle cause. Stoics thought that the only thing important for fate or destiny is that everything is
connected through antecedant causes, while the only thing important for free will is that the mind
is the principle cause of some things. Thus, they claimed, there is no contradiction.

This conception of Eph' hêmin also works well within the context of Epictetus's writing. Consider
the opening paragraph of the Enchiridion

Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our
own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one
word, whatever are not our own actions.

In English, the most natural interpretation of "in our control", our desires, aversions, etc. seem
much less in our control than our own bodies. When the Stoic jargon is translated as "attributable
to us", as indicated above, the examples in the categories are more natural.
This interpretation also makes Epictetus's Stoicism agree better with previous Stoics, in that what
is "eph' hêmin", "attributable to us", matches what may be virtuous of vicious: our character.
Rather than being a significant philosophical departure from Zeno, Chrysippus, and others, the
emphasis on eph' hêmin becomes an idiosyncratic, alternate description of the same basic
approach.

How did the Stoics reconcile determinism with moral

responsibility?
Many critics of determinism, modern and ancient, allege that if I am fated to do something, it is
unjust to reward or punish me for it, praise me or criticize me for it; and if everything is fated, all
praise or punishment is unjust. This is another criticism the cylinder analogy (described above)
was designed to address. The classical Stoics argued that it simply doesn't follow. Lets consider
an analogy with a car. Say I have a car whose transmission breaks regularly, and it is clearly the
result of a problem with the design of the car. Is it a mistake for me to take it in to get fixed? If I
recommend that a friend not get the same model, am I being unfair? Is it a good idea to use it as a
guiding example when making my own design? Of course not. Given its design, the car couldn't
be any other way, but that's completely irrelevant. Note that this conception of free will is not the
same as eph' hêmin, but it is tightly related. If something is not in someone else's "free will" in the
"eph' hêmin" sense, praise and punishment are not likely to be effective at altering their behavior,
and locking them up will do no more to prevent future similar behavior than locking up someone
else entirely. There are, however, many properties of a personality without moral content, and
others where praise and punishment aren't effective, so just because something is "free will" in the
eph' hêmin sense does not mean that necessarily has moral implications.

If everything is determined, what is the point of trying to do

anything?
A classical attack on Stoic determinism went something like this. Lets say I want pizza for dinner.
The pizza delivery person is either fated to deliver my pizza, or not. If it is fated, then it will arrive
no matter what I do; I don't need to place an order, because fate will arrange for some other way
for me to get it (perhaps the delivery person gets the address wrong on another order). If I am
fated not to get it, placing the order is useless, because something will prevent it from showing up,
for example the pizza place might burn down. So, whether I place the order makes no difference
to whether I get the pizza, and I might as well be lazy and not order it. The classical Stoic
response would be that your order and the pizza delivery are co-fated. In other words, if I am fated
to get a pizza, I am also fated to place the order. Whole chains of causation are fated, not isolated
events, and your own choices are part of that chain.

This example may seem silly, but it is closely related to the misconception that because the Stoics
advocated accepting ones fate, that they also advocated an attitude of passivity (for example on
politics and social issues).

How did the Stoics reconcile determinism with the asserted

"freedom" of the sage?
The Stoics asserted that the Sage (perfect Stoic) was free, able to "act as they will." How is this
possible if they are determinists? They seem to have regarded as "free" or "at liberty" anyone who
gets whatever they want to get, and avoids whatever they want to avoid, and the proposed
solution was only to want things that were in your free will in the eph' hêmin sense.

Long's essay in Problems in Stoicism points out that the classical Stoic term translated as "to will"
does not imply an action by some entity referred to as ones "will," as it generally does in English,
but rather simply designated "adopting a pro-attitude toward an object."

What resources are there for further exploration of Stoic

determinism and free will?
Several older discussions on this subreddit function as useful philosophical dialogues, including
this one.

Keith Seddon also has a good essay on Stoic compatibilism.

Another good free, online account is on pages 200 and 212-214 of Arnold's Roman Stoicism.

Another online source in this page, basically an outline based on Brennan's book on Stoicism.

Much longer and more detailed accounts can be found in:

Long's essay Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Action, in the
collection Problems in Stoicism.
Frede's "Stoic Determinism" in the collection The Cambridge Companion to Stoics
Bobziens's book Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy
Jedan's Stoic Virtues also has an interesting (less sympathetic) analysis.

The most accessible classical source to start with is probably Cicero's On Fate. Other sources
include Alexander of Aphrodisias's On Fate and the collections of fragments in the Resources
section of this FAQ.

Stoicism and other philosophies

What are similarities between Stoicism and Buddhism, in terms
of mindfulness?
Both advocate stripping down of the sense of self. Marcus Aurelius relates an exercise where the
self is stripped of connection to body, past deeds, future plans, and present sensory impressions,
so that only the core ability to evaluate and decide in the present moment, the hegemonikon, is
considered to be the self. In Buddhism, the absence of a true self, i.e. an essential, underlying
substance to things that stands apart from the causal flux of the universe, is understood to apply
to all phenomena without exception, including the core faculties of the Stoic hegemonikon.

Both locate salvation from suffering in a careful analysis of the moment-to-moment perceptual-
psychological processes that begin with sensation and end with the causes of suffering, desire
and aversion (and in Buddhism, add ignorance to the list). For the Stoics, we cut the chain of
suffering by cutting the link between automatic value judgments and the subsequent 'assent' to, or
belief in, those value judgments. Rather, we assent only to proper value judgments, i.e. that the
only locus of value is in what is under the control of the hegemonikon. For the Buddhists, we cut
the chain of suffering by cutting the link between the experience of valenced feeling tone
(pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral sensations) and the ensuing quality of attention to those feeling
tones (desirous attachment, aversive rejection, or disinterested ignoring/overlooking). Rather, we
apply an open, equanimous attention to all events in consciousness, regardless of feeling tone,
allowing them to come and go without internal struggle.

Both advocate a careful, analytic approach to ongoing experience in order to accomplish the
above two goals. For the Stoics, this amounts to exercises like Marcus Aurelius's physical
definition ("Always define or describe whatever presents itself to your mind, so as to see what sort
of thing it is when stripped to its essence, as a whole and in its separate parts; and tell yourself its
proper name, and the names of the elements from which it was compounded and into which it will
finally be resolved") and Epictetus's injunction to be constantly aware of value judgments ("Work,
therefore to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are but an appearance, and not
absolutely the thing you appear to be." And then examine it by those rules which you have, and
first, and chiefly, by this: whether it concerns the things which are in our own control, or those
which are not; and, if it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to
you). For the (Theravada) Buddhists, this careful ongoing analysis of experience is vipassana, in
which the practitioner maintains an alert but equanimous attention to any and all contents of
experience, making various discernments (e.g. identifying current mental states or discriminating
the myriad ephemeral sensations that comprise the experience of breathing) and recognizing in all
sensory arisings X the three marks of existence (X is not-self, not me/mine/I, but is merely a link in
the causal mesh of the universe without an independent, underlying substance; X is impermanent;
X is unsatisfactory, stressful, not a suitable and dependable source of complete and lasting
happiness).

What are the differences between Stoicism and Buddhism, in

terms of mindfulness?
Stoicism emphasizes the reasoning faculty as the seat of identity and the path to true virtue and
goodness. Buddhism emphasizes the faculties of meditative absorption and discerning awareness
as the vantage point from which identity is transcended and suffering is overcome. One is more
intellectual, the other more experiential / perceptual.

Stoicism is apparently intended for use and practice within the flow of normal everyday life, in
which one goes about one's worldly affairs and performs one's responsibilities to society.
Buddhism has more of a renunciate tradition in which practitioners spend long periods, if not all of
life, in monasteries in order to perform their practices. Even 'householders' who practice Buddhism
within the flow of worldly life commonly set aside periods of time to retreat into solitude in order to
exercise their practices.

What are some similarities and differences between Stoicism

and Cynicism?
They had very different ideas on what it meant to be virtuous, and what "Nature" referred to. For
the Cynics, it meant rejecting society entirely and living as homeless people, and trying to get
others to do the same. For the Stoics, it meant working as part of society, for the good of mankind.
For the Stoics, although virtue was the only good, some externals were to be preferred over
others, and virtue was tied up in dealing with these preferences, which in turn meant working
within society.

Other aspects that differed were that the Stoics (at least the early Stoics) had a strong interest in
physics (which for the Stoics included theology), natural science, logic, etc. while the Cynics
rejected the study of any of these.

Arnold's Roman Stoicism (1911) provides some good discussion of how the conceptions of virtue
differed between the two schools, and how the came about historically.

From section 319:

Up to this point we find a broad resemblance between ethical principles of the Stoics and the
Cynics. Both assert the sole supremacy of virtue, ridicule traditional prejudices, and bid
defiance to external circumstances. But there is at the same time divergence. To the Cynics
virtue stands out as alone, needing no theory, and by itself in the universe. To the Stoics virtue
is but one expression of that universal reason which is equally at work in the universe and in
the human mind. The Stoics are therefore under the obligation of bringing virtue into touch with
circumstances, the soul into harmony with the body. From this arises their doctrine that virtue
is bound up with the study both of universal and of individual nature, and that amongst things
indifferent there are some that the good man must seek, and others that he must avoid. The
critics of Stoicism, both ancient and modern, regard this doctrine as an afterthought suggested
by practical difficulties, and alien from the original teaching of Zeno, This seems to be a
misapprehension. Undoubtedly Zeno had said 'some things are good, some are evil, some
indifferent. Good are wisdom, temperance, justice, fortitude, everything that is virtue or an
aspect of virtue ; evil are folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice, everything that is vice or an
aspect of vice. Indifferent are life and death, glory and disgrace, pain and pleasure, riches and
wealth, disease, health, and so forth' But there is a difference between a principle and its
application; and this very list of things indifferent indicates by its contrasts an underlying
difference, though it is not the difference between good and evil. Zeno was therefore quite
consistent in proceeding to examine the nature of this difference.

Arnold's account of the philosophers with which Zeno studied, and who influenced what in Stoic
philosophy, is also enlightening. After describing Crates of Thebes, the Cynic philosopher under
which Zeno first studied, and Zeno's writing of his Republic (his vision of a utopian society) while
still a student of Crates, Arnold describes Zeno's education thereafter. Starting in section 76 of
Roman Stoicism:

Zeno, after writing his Republic, took up a position more independent of the Cynics. He could
not, perhaps, avoid noticing that the coming of his model Kingdom was hindered by the
narrowmindedness of the philosophers, their disagreement one with another, and their lack of
clear proofs for their dogmas. He began to realize that the study of dialectics and physics was
of more importance than his Cynic teachers would allow; and he seems to have conceived the
idea of uniting the Socratic schools. He became eager to learn from all sources, and turned
first to Stilpo, who then represented the Megarian school. Crates, we are told, tried to drag him
back from Stilpo by force; to which Zeno retorted that argument would be more to the point.
 From this time he no longer restricted his outlook to force of character, but sought also for
argumentative power and well ascertained knowledge. The foundations of his state must be
surely laid, not upon the changing tide of opinion, but on the rock of knowledge. That a wise
man should hesitate, change his views, withdraw his advice, he felt would be a bitter reproach.
If indeed virtue, the supreme good, is knowledge, must it not follow that know- ledge is within
the reach of man?

Arnold then goes on to discuss his studies of and with other philosophers, both directly with
contemporaries and indirectly of predecessors, for example Heraclitus, Stilpo, and Polemo.
Section 78 starts...

In becoming in turn a listener to Polemo, Zeno, we may imagine, entered a new world. He left
behind the rough manners, the stinging retorts, and the narrow culture the Cynics and Eristics
to sit with other intelligent students at the feet of a man of cultured manners and wide reading,
who to a love for Homer and Sophocles had, we must suppose, added an intimate knowledge
of the works of Plato and Aristotle, was himself a great writer and yet consistently taught that
not learning, but a natural and healthy life was the end to be attained. That Zeno profited much
from his studies under Polemo we may conjecture from Polemo's good-natured complaint, 'I
see well what you are after: you break down my garden wall and steal my teaching, which you
dress in Phoenician clothes' From this time it became a conventional complaint that Stoic
doctrine was stolen from that of the Academics...

Misconceptions
What is the difference between stoicism with a lower case and
Stoicism with an upper case?
The word 'stoic' has come to mean 'unemotional' or indifferent to pain, because Stoic ethics taught
freedom from 'passion' by following 'reason.' The Stoics did not seek to extinguish emotions;
rather, they taught living according to one's natural limits that enables a person to develop clear
judgment and inner calm instead of mentally and physically destructive passions. Emotional
instincts are natural, its how you respond to them that matter.

Is it true that Stoics repress their emotions and feelings?

The Greek word pathos (πάθος) is often translated as "emotion" in English, but the Greek word (at
least in the context of Stoic philosophy) does not refer to everything the English word "emotion"
denotes, and there are a variety of emotions that the Stoics either approved of or advocated
indifference to. Even in the case of pathos, they did not advocate repression, but rather treatment
and prevention. See this section of Seneca's On Anger for a long list of examples of emotions that
are not "pathos." Affection seems to have been particularly highly regarded. For example, Marcus
Aurelius admires one of his teachers as being "utterly impervious to all passions and full of natural
affection" (Meditations I.9), and there were even Stoic psychological exercises explicitly aimed at
cultivating affection (see the quote here).

Different translators handle the poor match between Stoic technical jargon and modern English in
different, contradictory ways. For example, some translators translate pathos as "emotion" and
propathos as "feeling", while others (very confusingly) translate pathos as "passion" and propathos
as "emotion" (or sometimes "pre-passion"). One way to avoid ambiguity is to think of them as
"feeling" and "passion," and use "emotion" to mean either.

Passions (πάθος) are emotions caused or reinforced by a belief something outside of one's
control is good or bad. Feelings, on the other hand, are closer to perceptions we have, and not
things either to be controlled or avoided; a Stoic "merely" should avoid being led by them to false
beliefs about good and bad. The distinction is analogous to seeing an optical illusion, where
"feeling" corresponds to "seeing" the illusion, while "passion" is corresponds to actually believing
it.

The practical dividing line between a passion and feeling has been the subject of some debate.
Some regard as "passions" only emotional problems of the sort one might see as requiring
counselling for depression, anger management, or similar issues, while others see the majority of
what a modern person thinks of as "emotions" as being passions, and that "feelings" are limited to
emotions of the variety caused by reactions to music or fiction.

The classical Stoics did seem to disagree with the common modern "hydraulic" model of negative
emotions, according to which one releases the "hydraulic valve" of ones anger by shouting or
punching the wall, believing that this will reduce anger in the immediate future, and that the
alternative is to explode with more anger later. The Stoics, on the other hand, advised refraining
from making voluntary, conscious decisions to act according to ones emotions, arguing that such
actions caused the passions to grow stronger. "Repressing" ones passions without addressing the
underlying belief, though, is analogous to hiding the symptoms of a disease without addressing
the disease itself; eventually, the disease may progress to such an extent that the symptoms
cannot be hidden. Instead, they should be addressed using an assortment of psychological
exercises. (There is some modern evidence in support of the Stoic contentions, as opposed to the
hydraulic model.)

For a more extended discussion and related quotes and extracts from classical texts, see this
/r/Stoicism wiki page. For a much more in-depth analysis and discussion of historical evidence,
consult Margaret Graver's Stoicism and Emotion.

Does Stoicism encourage passively accepting your fate?

While the Stoics did advocate acceptance of all externals, "acceptance" seems to have been
meant in the context of ones emotional reaction, rather than in actions to be taken, or not. It does
not seem to imply passivity in action. Indeed, in Marcus Aurelius's Meditations, his exhortations of
acceptance are often accompanied by exhortations to virtuous action. For example, see
Meditations 9.6:

It is enough if your opinion in the present is based on understanding, your action in the present
directed to the common good, and your disposition in the present one of contentment with all
that befalls you from a cause outside yourself.

and 8.7:

Every nature is well content when its progress is good. And the progress of a rational creature
is good when that nature yields to nothing false or obscure in thought, when it directs its
impulses to social acts alone, and when its appetites and aversions are confined to what is
within our power, and when it has a welcome for every dispensation of the universal Nature.

(Jackson translation, modernized)

The same themes are paired many other places; for much more discussion and many similar
citations, see Hadot's The Inner Citadel.

The Meditations includes other exhortations to action and against passivity. Consider 9.16:

Not in passivity but activity lies the good of the rational and civic being, precisely as virtue and
vice to the same lie in action not in passion.

and also 9.5:

Injustice lies as often in omission as commission.

What is important is to be a good person, to be virtuous, to show excellence of character. These

are ἐφ' ἡμῖν (eph' hêmin), "in our control." What should be accepted are things not in your control,
"all that befalls you from a cause outside yourself."

Consider the example of Priscus Helvidius from Epictetus's Discourses, book 1:

Priscus Helvidius also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and
commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, "It is in your power not to allow me to be
a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in." "Well, go in then," says the
emperor, "but say nothing." "Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent." "But I must ask your
opinion." "And I must say what I think right." "But if you do, I shall put you to death." "When
then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to
kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow."

In this example, we see Priscus Helvidius persistently acting as he thinks a virtuous person should
act, without regard to the consequences for himself.

It should be remembered that Marcus Aurlius wrote his exhortations for himself alone, when he
was already emperor. Stoic advice to others was not generally to be so selfless, or lacking in
ambition; humility and selflessness were given much less emphasis in the Stoic conception of
virtue than in the Christian.

From Cicero's On Duties 3.10, quoting Chrysippus:

And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and surrender to others what we need
for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury
to his neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot- race," says Chrysippus with his usual
aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all his might to win; but he
ought never with his foot to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of
life, it is not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, but he
has no right to wrest it from his neighbour."

... although everyone did have social responsibilities: from Cicero's On Duties 3.5:

Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss
is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect
either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and
fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal
profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most
in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. Suppose, by way of comparison,
that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be
strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member,
the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize
upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his
own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without any conflict
with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for
his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to
increase our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others.

A failure of ambition can even be seen as being disgraceful, and a vice. From On Duties 1.71:

So perbaps those men of extraordinary genius who have devoted themselves to learning must
be excused for not taking part in public affairs; likewise, those who from ill-health or for some
still more valid reason have retired from the service of the state and left to others the
opportunity and the glory of its administration. But if those who have no such excuse profess a
scorn for civil and military offices, which most people admire, I think that this should be set
down not to their credit but to their discredit; for in so far as they care little, as they say, for
glory and count it as naught, it is difficult not to sympathize with their attitude; in reality
however, they seem to dread the toil and trouble and also, perhaps, the discredit and
humiliation of political failure and defeat. For there are people who in opposite circumstances
do not act consistently: they have the utmost contempt for pleasure but in pain they are too
sensitive; they are indifferent to glory, but they are crushed by disgrace and even in their
inconsistency they show no great consistency. But those whom Nature has endowed with the
capacity for administering public affairs should put aside all hesitation, enter the race for public
office and take a hand in directing the government; for in no other way can a government be
administered or greatness of spirit be made manifest.

Compare to Seneca's Of Peace of Mind ch 4:

This is what I think ought to be done by virtue and by one who practises virtue: if Fortune get
the upper hand and deprive him of the power of action, let him not straightway turn his back to
the enemy, throw away his arms, and run away seeking for a hiding-place, as if there were any
place whither Fortune could not pursue him, but let him be more sparing in his acceptance of
public office, and after due deliberation discover some means by which he can be of use to the
state. He is not able to serve in the army: then let him become a candidate for civic honours:
must he live in a private station? then let him be an advocate: is he condemned to keep
silence? then let him help his countrymen with silent counsel. Is it dangerous for him even to
enter the forum? then let him prove himself a good comrade, a faithful friend, a sober guest in
people's houses, at public shows, and at wine-parties. Suppose that he has lost the status of a
citizen; then let him exercise that of a man: our reason for magnanimously refusing to confine
ourselves within the walls of one city, for having gone forth to enjoy intercourse with all lands
and for professing ourselves to be citizens of the world is that we may thus obtain a wider
theatre on which to display our virtue. Is the bench of judges closed to you, are you forbidden
 to address the people from the hustings, or to be a candidate at elections? then turn your eyes
away from Rome, and see what a wide extent of territory, what a number of nations present
themselves before you. Thus, it is never possible for so many outlets to be closed against your
ambition that more will not remain open to it: but see whether the whole prohibition does not
arise from your own fault. You do not choose to direct the affairs of the state except as consul
or prytanis or meddix or sufes what should we say if you refused to serve in the army save as
general or military tribune? Even though others may form the first line, and your lot may have
placed yon among the veterans of the third, do your duty there with your voice,
encouragement, example, and spirit: even though a man's hands be cut off, he may find
means to help his side in a battle, if he stands his ground and cheers on his comrades. Do
something of that sort yourself: if Fortune removes you from the front rank, stand your ground
nevertheless and cheer on your comrades, and if somebody stops your mouth, stand
nevertheless and help your side in silence. The services of a good citizen are never thrown
away: he does good by being heard and seen, by his expression, his gestures, his silent
determination, and his very walk. As some remedies benefit us by their smell as well as by
their their taste and touch, so virtue even when concealed and at a distance sheds usefulness
around. Whether she moves at her ease and enjoys her just rights, or can only appear abroad
on sufferance and is forced to shorten sail to the tempest, whether it be unemployed, silent,
and pent up in a narrow lodging, or openly displayed, in whatever guise she may appear, she
always does good. What? do you think that the example of one who can rest nobly has no
value? It is by far the best plan, therefore, to mingle leisure with business, whenever chance
impediments or the state of public affairs forbid one's leading an active life: for one is never so
cut off from all pursuits as to find no room left for honourable action.

He applies similar advice even in the case where one cannot justly serve the state:

Could you anywhere find a miserable city than that of Athens when it was being torn to pieces
by the thirty tyrants? they slew thirteen hundred citizens, all the best men, and did not leave off
because they had done so, but their cruelty became stimulated by exercise. In the city which
possessed that most reverend tribunal, the Court of the Areopagus, which possessed a
Senate, and a popular assembly which was like a Senate, there met daily a wretched crew of
butchers, and the unhappy Senate House was crowded with tyrants. A state, in which there
were so many tyrants that they would have been enough to form a bodyguard for one, might
surely have rested from the struggle; it seemed impossible for men's minds even to conceive
hopes of recovering their liberty, nor could they see any room for a remedy for such a mass of
evil: for whence could the unhappy state obtain all the Harmodiuses it would need to slay so
many tyrants? Yet Socrates was in the midst of the city, and consoled its mourning Fathers,
encouraged those who despaired of the republic, by his reproaches brought rich men, who
feared that their wealth would be their ruin, to a tardy repentance of their avarice, and moved
about as a great example to those who wished to imitate him, because he walked a free man
in the midst of thirty masters. However, Athens herself put him to death in prison, and Freedom
herself could not endure the freedom of one who had treated a whole band of tyrants with
scorn: you may know, therefore, that even in an oppressed state a wise man can find an
opportunity for bringing himself to the front, and that in a prosperous and flourishing one
wanton insolence, jealousy, and a thousand other cowardly vices bear sway. We ought
therefore, to expand or contract ourselves according as the state presents itself to us, or as
Fortune offers us opportunities: but in any case we ought to move and not to become frozen
still by fear: nay, he is the best man who, though peril menaces him on every side and arms
and chains beset his path, nevertheless neither impairs nor conceals his virtue: for to keep
oneself safe does not mean to bury oneself.

In all cases, though, one needs to avoid confusing the goal with the object. It is excellence in the
pursuit that is what is valued, not the object of the pursuit. From Cicero On Ends 3.6:

But, first of all, we must remove a mistake, that no one may think that it follows that there are
two supreme goods. For as, if it were the purpose of any one to direct an arrow or a spear
straight at any object, just as we have said that there is a special point to be aimed at in
goods-- the archer aught to do all in his power to aim straight at the target, and the other man
aught also to do his endeavor to hit the mark, and gained the end which he has proposed for
himself-- let this what we call the chief good in life be, as it were, his mark; and his endeavor to
hit it must be furthered be careful selection, not by mere desire.

Continuing the classical analogy with athletics, this aspect of Stoicism can be cosidered a
generalization of sportsmanship to life in general, a universal application of "it isn't whether you
win or lose, but how you play the game." Good sportsmanship doesn't mean not playing hard, or
not playing to win. It does mean playing honorably, and handling whatever result with grace.

Is enjoyment of life's pleasures a goal advocated in Stoicism?

No, pleasure and pain were both regarded as indifferent. The Stoics did not advocate either
avoiding or enjoying pleasures as ultimate goals, but they did regard the pursuit of pleasure as a
dangerous distraction from virtue: pleasure was not regarded as being bad, but the pursuit of
pleasure was regarded as foolish, and avoiding some kinds of pleasure in some circumstances
was advocated as a means to other ends. They did believe a sage (a perfect Stoic) would be
happy and free from distress (though not necessarily pain), but this was seen more as a side-
effect than the goal; from Seneca's Of a Happy Life:

In the first place, even though virtue may afford us pleasure, still we do not seek after her on
that account: for she does not bestow this, but bestows this to boot, nor is this the end for
which she labours, but her labour wins this also, although it be directed to another end. As in a
tilled-field, when ploughed for corn, some flowers are found amongst it, and yet, though these
posies may charm the eye, all this labour was not spent in order to produce them — the man
who sowed the field had another object in view, he gained this over and above it — so
pleasure is not the reward or the cause of virtue, but comes in addition to it; nor do we choose
virtue because she gives us pleasure, but she gives us pleasure also if we choose her. The
highest good lies in the act of choosing her, and in the attitude of the noblest minds, which
when once it has fulfilled its function and established itself within its own limits has attained to
the highest good, and needs nothing more: for there is nothing outside of the whole, any more
than there is anything beyond the end. You are mistaken, therefore, when you ask me what it
is on account of which I seek after virtue: for you are seeking for something above the highest.
Do you ask what I seek from virtue? I answer, Herself: for she has nothing better; she is her
own reward. Does this not appear great enough, when I tell you that the highest good is an
unyielding strength of mind, wisdom, magnanimity, sound judgement, freedom, harmony,
beauty? Do you still ask me for something greater, of which these may be regarded as the
attributes? Why do you talk of pleasures to me? I am seeking to find what is good for man, not
for his belly; why, cattle and whales have larger ones than he.

You might think of the Stoic attitude toward pleasure and distress this way: they thought that virtue
was pleasurable (but not the only pleasure). A non-sage's lack of virtue would always cause that
non-sage distress (even though they might experience pleasures as well), and so the non-sage
cannot ever find true eudiamonia (a flourishing life). A sage, on the other hand, would experience
the joy of virtue, and, although he might experience other kinds of pain, never distress. See
Cicero's 2nd Stoic Paradox.

The misconception that Stoicism is concerned with the appreciation of the pleasures of life arises
primarily from Irvine's A Guide to the Good Life. In it, Irvine rejects the historical role of virtue in
Stoicism (p. 42), and this change reverberates throughout the book, resulting in significantly
altered interpretations of several key aspects of Stoicism. (See here for additional discussion.)

History
What is the brief history of Stoicism?
Stoicism was founded in Athens by Zeno of Citium around 300 BC. He was particularly influenced
by his teacher, Crates the Cynic, as well as Antisthenes, Socrates, Stilbo, Philo, Diodorus,
Heraclitus, and the sophist Prodicus of Ceos. He and his successors (including Chrysippus,
Posidonius, Panaetius, and others) were quite prolific, writing many books on a wide range of
topics. Stoicism was popular throughout both the Hellenic world and the later Roman Empire.
Many of Rome's elites considered themselves Stoics, from Nero's tutor, Seneca to the Emperor
Marcus Aurelius. The last surviving major classical Stoic writing seems to have been the personal
journal of Marcus Aurelius, who died 180AD. The living Stoic tradition ended sometime between
the death of Marcus Aurelius and when the Christian Emperor Justinian I closed all of the
philosophy schools in 529 AD because he perceived pagan associations from their origins.
How do we know about classical Stoic philosophy? Why do we
know so little?
With the media and usual storage conditions of the time, books quickly disintegrated; texts that
survived the middle ages either had to be preserved in usual conditions (such as in a cave in the
desert), or some literate person had to choose to recopy it. In the middle ages this was almost
always Christian monks. (The chapter from Stephen Greenblatt's The Swerve, in which he
describes the survival of Epicurian texts, applies just as well to Stoic texts.) So, the texts that
survived the middle ages are those that the Christian monks of the time found of inspirational
value.

The first-hand accounts of the Stoic's themselves are Marcus Aurelius's meditations, which were
written for his own use and not intended to be published, notes (and a "Handbook" extracted from
them) on lectures by the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, some essays and letters by the Roman
statesman Seneca the Younger, and some additional accounts of things said by Musonius Rufus.
All of these are examples from late in the history of Stoicism, and often assume the reader has a
background in studying Zeno, Chrysippus, etc., almost all of whose works are lost. Additional
writing by Cicero, who was influenced by Stoicism but did not consider himself a Stoic, partially
falls in this category.

Accounts of earlier Stoicism and what its major historical figures said are preserved in Diogenes
Laertius Lives of the Philosophers and Stobaeus's Anthology, both of which attempt to provide
brief summaries of the views of major historical philosophers, including the most important Stoics.
There are also accounts of Stoicism given by philosophers of rival schools as part of critiques on
Stoicism, particularly from Sextus Empiricus.

Who or what did Stoicism influence?

Stoicism's effects are felt throughout history, but a sampling of people would include Saint
Augustine, Montesquieu, Francis Bacon, and James Stockdale (POW in Vietnam for over 7 years,
subjected to torture, including isolation). Stoics have sometimes been credited with the invention
of the modern notion of "Natural Law," but this has been disputed. Stoicism has been particularly
influential in the field of psychology. The founders of cognitive therapy and REBT, Aaron Beck and
Albert Ellis, both refer to Stoicism in particular as the main precursor of the modern cognitive
approach.

How did historical Stoics treat women?

Musonius Rufus and his student Epictetus both took the view that women should learn philosophy.
Earlier Stoics Antipater of Tarsus and Chrysippus provided some of the first known instances of
the Greek word for misogyny, both viewed it negatively and associated it with hatred of humanity.

Resources
What are some recommended starting points for newcomers to
Stoicism?
There is no "one best" work for a modern person to study to learn about Stoicism. Instead, there
are a variety of resources, the suitability of which depends on exactly what the reader is looking
for. The following list includes common choices, and ones regular posters on /r/Stoicism have
found particularly useful.

The Enchiridion of Epictetus

One element of Stoic psychological training was the regular reading, rereading, and memorization
of short, powerful reminders and exhortations of the principles and practical advice of the
philosophy. The Enchiridion is a collection of such reminders compiled by Arrian from the lectures
of his teacher, the Stoic philosopher Epictetus.

The Enchiridion consists of very short and easy to read sections. The sections are in no particular
order, and thus the Enchiridion is suitable for browsing, and selected sections can be good
subjects for contemplation. For many modern Stoics, the Enchiridion is the primary (and
sometimes only) source of inspiration.
The Enchiridion was, however, intended as a set of reminders for those already familiar with
Stoicism, not an introduction to those unfamiliar with it. As a result, it is easy to misinterpret:
several modern misconceptions about Stoicism arise from reading the Enchiridion without the
assumed background.

In some cases, this may actually be an advantage: a Christian reader may, for example, find it
easier to supplement their own religion using the Enchiridion when more free to interpret it in their
own way.

Many good translations of the Enchiridion are available, and several are public domain and online.
The translations by W. A. Oldfather and P. E. Matheson include the full Discourses as well (the link
to the Matheson translation of the Enchiridion alone is here). Other translations of the Enchiridion
online include those by Elizabeth Carter, Thomas Higginson, and George Long. The Long
translation also includes selections from the Discourses. Discussion of alternate translations can
be found here.

The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius

In addition to reading and memorizing exhortations and reminders of the type compiled in the
Enchiridion, Stoic practice sometimes included writing exercises. The Meditations of Marcus
Aurelius are thought to the a compilation of such exercises.

The strengths and weaknesses in studying Stoicism through the Meditations are similar to those of
studying the Enchiridion: the entries are short, approachable, and easily browsed, and also (in
good translations) often beautiful and inspiring. At the same time, they were composed for the
author himself, not an external audience, so much is lost in context, and significant background
information is assumed.

In spite of these similarities, the Meditations and the Enchiridion can be very different works;
Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus each had their own personalities and idiosyncrasies, and these
show in their works.

Modern readers are encouraged to read the IEP entry on Marcus Aurelius to help interpret his
book.

There are many translations of the Meditations. See this question for more discussion of those
available, and links to free online versions.

The Letters and Essays of Seneca the Younger, and the Essays of Cicero

Seneca the Younger (Lucius Annaeus Seneca) and Marcus Tullius Cicero were both wealthy and
politically powerful Roman statesman and orators who wrote extensively on philosophy. Seneca
was educated in Stoicism and regarded himself as a Stoic, and although Cicero regarded himself
as a Sceptic (a rival school to the Stoics), he wrote essays that attempt to portray the Stoic point
of view, or contrast several philosophies (including Stoicism) with each other.

Unlike the Enchiridion and the Meditations, which were written in Greek, Seneca and Cicero wrote
in Latin, and appear to have had a wider, more "popular" audience in mind. Their essays and
letters present more systematic and exhaustive discussions of their topics, and are less cryptic
and open to misinterpretation.

Because they were in Latin rather than Greek, they were more influential for significant periods in
European history. Shakespeare, for example, is likely to have been familiar with Seneca and
Cicero.

Some essays particularly recommended for newcomers to Stoicism include:

De Tranquillitate (Of Peace of Mind) by Seneca the Younger

De Brevitate Vitae (On the Shortness of Life) by Seneca the Younger
De Vita Beata (Of a Happy Life) by Seneca the Younger
De Officiis (On Duties) by Marcus Tullius Cicero

In addition, a collection of the Seneca the Younger's Letters is also highly recommended.

Moses Hadas's The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca is a good place find the recommended essays by
Seneca, and a selection of his letters.

The Guided Tour: Stoic Serenity: A Practical Guide to Finding Inner Peace by Keith Seddon

Keith Seddon's book is not a "stand-alone" introduction to Stoicism. It is intended to be read in

conjunction with Robin Campbell's translation of Seneca in Seneca: Letters from a Stoic and
Robin Hard's translation of Marcus Aurelius's Meditations, and provides extensive discussion and
quotes from other Stoic authors such as Epictetus to help the reader interpret and understand the
philosophy as a cohesive system.

Modern accounts aimed at modern practice

Stoicism and the Art of Happiness by Donald Robertson

A practical, readable introduction to Stoicism intended for modern practice, readable independent
of historical sources, in the style of modern "self-help" books.

A Guide to the Good Life: The Ancient Art of Stoic Joy by William Irvine

Irvine's book is controversial among readers of /r/Stoicism. It is one of the most clear, easy to
read, and practical accounts of Stoicism available, but critics feel it waters down and distorts many
central elements of the philosophy.

Additional discussion of Irvine's book can be found here, here and here.

The Stoics: A Guide for the Perplexed by Andrew Holowchak

Holowchak's book is a short, stand-alone account of Stoic philosophy. It quotes classical authors
extensively, and provides many references for follow-up reading, but does not use the classical
sources as its primary vehicle, and works as a stand-alone source. A longer review can be found
here.

Historical Stoicism

The emphasis in the accounts listed in the previous section are strongly influenced by the intent to
provide a basis for modern practice. Several aspects of historical Stoicism are both challenging for
modern readers to understand and unlikely to be adopted even if understood, and so are
discussed only very briefly in the sources intended for modern practice. However, these elements,
including Stoic cosmology, theology, and physics, were fundamentally important to many of the
Stoics themselves, and understanding them is essential to understanding their place in the history
of science and philosophy. Those interested in Stoicism primarily as history will therefore be better
served by books with a different emphasis.

Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy by R. W. Sharples

Sharples's book is a short, easy to read account of Stoicism and its primary rivals, Epicureanism
and Skepticism. The three philosophies have much in common, and describing them jointly,
pointing out their similarities and differences, is a useful approach in understanding any of them
individually.

The Stoics by F. H. Sandbach

Sandbach's book is short, but very dense. It provides significantly deeper discussion of Stoic
physics and cosmology than the other sources listed here, and spends more time discussing the
subtleties in translating the various Greek technical terms than most.

Stoicism by John Sellars

Sellars' book is another good general introduction to Stoicism that includes more emphasis on
logic and physics than many others.

What other useful classical sources are available?

In addition to the classical sources listed as "starting points," there are a number of additional
classical sources that can provide a significantly deeper and more systematic understanding, and
provide material for further study.

Unfortunately, the original canon of books written by Chrysippus, Zeno of Citium, and other
leaders of the school are lost. A number of fragments and second-hand accounts remain, and
there are two collections that make these accounts available:

Long and Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers

Inwood and Gerson's The Stoics Reader

In addition to the Enchiridion, Arrian took more extensive notes on Epictetus's lectures. Many of
these survive, and Carter's translation is public domain and available on-line.

Notes on some lectures of Musonius Rufus, Epictetus's teacher, are also available in print and on-
line.

Seneca the Younger wrote a number of essays not listed in the "starting points" section, and most
collections of his letters are not comprehensive. Tracking down these remaining letters and essays
is recommended. Notable examples include On Benefits, On Anger, On Firmness, On Mercy, and
On Providence.

Cicero left a considerable body of work, and On Duties is not the only one of relevance to those
studying Stoicism. Other recommended works by Cicero include the Tusculan Disputations, Stoic
Paradoxes, On Ends, On Fate, and On the Nature of the Gods.

Diogenes Laërtius's Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, an encyclopedia of the views of
different philosophers written sometime between 200 CE and 500 CE, includes an account of
Stoicism in the entry on Zeno of Citium. The entry can be challenging to read, and Diogenes
Laërtius has been criticized for not completely understanding the views he is reporting, but this
second hand account is valuable in that it is an attempt to give a balanced overview of the views
of the school, rather than the the opinions of one specific author on the topics that interest that
author.

Finally, miyatarama's really long Stoic book list with reviews is a good resource for finding
additional material.

What are some recommended on-line resources about

Stoicism?
Wikipedia has several entries covering topics related to Stoicism. Helpful entries include the
ones on Stoicism, eudaimonia (particularly the section on eudaimonia in Stoicism), arete,
and natural law (particularly the section on Stoic natural law).
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has many good entries related to Stoicism. Of
particular interest are those on Stoic philosophy of mind and Stoic ethics, Epictetus, Marcus
Aurelius, Cicero, and Chrysippus.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a more technical entry on Stoicism, giving
more weight to Stoic physics, logic, and technical aspects of the Stoic psychology than most
modern accounts.
Donald Robertson's blog has several useful introductory posts, including The System of
Stoic Philosophy, A Simplified Modern Approach to Stoicism, and An Introduction to Stoic
Practice: The Three Disciplines of Stoicism.
The Stoic Philosophy is a transcript of a 1915 lecture by Gilbert Murray. While it certainly
reflects the attitudes and prejudices of the culture and times in which it was delivered as
well, it still provides a reasonable introduction to the philosophy.
Captains of the Soul by Michael Evans is a short overview specifically tailored for members
of the military.

Where can I find descriptions of Stoic exercises?

Good resources for exercises a modern person inspired by Stoicism might want to practice
include:

Pierre Hadot's Philosophy as a Way of Life and The Inner Citadel

24 Stoic Spiritual Exercises, quotes from Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius with commentary
by Massimo Pigliucci and Greg Lopez, free online.
The final chapter of Holowchak's The Stoics: A Guide for the Perplexed
Practical Stoicism, a free ebook by /u/GreyFreeman
Stoic Week's 2014 Handbook, 2013 Handbook and 2012 Living the Stoic Life booklet
Donald Robertson's Stoicism and the Art of Happiness
Elen Buzare's Stoic Spiritual Exercises
William Irvine's A Guide to the Good Life
Donald Robertson's The Philosophy of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy: Stoic Philosophy as
Rational and Cognitive Psychotherapy, particularly in combination with one of the many
CBT self-help books, such as Ellis's How To Control Your Anxiety Before It Controls You
Donald Robertson's Build Your Resilience
This lists presents the sources roughly in order of scholarly historical rigor to practical applicability;
the Hadot books are an historical analysis rather than instructions, while books later on the list
include more speculation, other influences, and original extrapolation, but are also easier to read
and have instructions that are more practical to follow. Placement on this list is not intended as a
criticism of any of them. The ancient sources are sufficiently thin that an author has to make a
compromise between the two, and the different authors had different goals, and so compromised
differently. The last books on the list do not even present themselves as being primarily about
Stoicism, but are rather modern psychological self-help books influenced by (and perhaps
discussing their relation to) Stoicism.

What is the best translation of Marcus Aurelius's Meditations?

The translation by Gregory Hays is the most popular here, but there are sometimes questions
about its accuracy. Other widely recommended translations include those of the Robin Hard,
Hammond, and Hicks and Hicks. The one by Farquharson is worth looking into as well; although
the translation itself is in modern English it is not the most eloquent or easiest to read, but the
extensive notes are very valuable for understanding references, finding related entries, and
otherwise providing context.

There were many translations published before 1923, (and which are therefore free and out-of-
copyright in the U. S.), but they generally try to mimic archaic (King James Bible style) English,
which isn't to everyone's taste. There are a few people who do like the (free) translation by Long,
and the Chrystal translation is slightly more modern sounding than the others, but most modern
readers find later translations such as those by Hays, or Hard, or Hicks and Hicks much more
readable.

This comment shows the same passage as translated in many of the different translations.

The last 5 pages of Haines' introduction to his 1916 translation (starting page xvi) discusses the
merits and flaws of a number of earlier translations.

Some additional helpful reviews:

William O. Stephen's review of the Hard translation, with some commentary on Farquharson
and other translations in comparison.
Gregory Wasson's review of the Hays translation

Pre-1923 translations (mostly with links to scanned books online):

Bouchier (1534) (from an unknown French translation)

Casaubon (1634)
Collier (1701)
Hutcheson & Moor (1742)
Thomson (1747) (selections only)
Graves (1792)
Swayne (1811) (selections only)
McCormac (1844)
Long (1862)
Tileston (1876) (selections only)
Crossley (1882) (book 4 only)
Zimmern (1887) (revision of Collier)
Upton (1888) (selections, revision of Long, reorganized)
Rendall (1892)
Smith (1899) (selections only)
Swasey (1900) (selections only)
Chrystal (1902) (revision of Hutcheson and Moor)
Wilson (1902) (selections only)
Jackson (1906)
Crump (1907) (selections, reorganized)
Haines (1916)
Jennings (1917) (selections only)
Blake (1920) "Sonnets from Marcus Aurelius" (selections only, in verse)

There are numerous more recent (copyrighted) translations:

 Farquharson (1946) Meditations ISBN: 0679412719
Komai (1952) The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius; a cycle of sonnets (selections only, in
verse)
Hadas (1961) The Essential Works of Stoicism (revision of Long)
Staniforth (1964) Meditations ISBN: 0140441409
Grube (1983) The Meditations ISBN: 0-915145-79-0
Kaufman (1997) Meditations ISBN: 0-486-29823-X (revision of Long)
Forstater (2000) The Spiritual Teachings of Marcus Aurelius ISBN: 0-06-019577-0
(selections, rewrite of Long translation into contemporary English, reorganized by topic)
Hays (2002) Meditations ISBN: 0-679-64260-9
Hicks and Hicks (2002) The Emperor's Handbook ISBN: 0-7432-3383-2
Hammond (2006) Meditations ISBN: 978-0-140-44933-4
Needleman and Piazza (2008) The Essential Marcus Aurelius ISBN: 1585426172
(selections only)
Hard (2011) Meditations with selected correspondence ISBN: 978-0-19-957320-2
McNeil (2011) The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius : selections annotated & explained ISBN:
1594732361 (selections, rewrite of Long translation into contemporary English, reorganized
by topic)
Tuffley (2012) The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: A Primer ISBN: 1468196790 (first 5
books only)
Gill (2013) Marcus Aurelius Meditations Books 1-6 ISBN: 978-0-19-969483-9 (first 6 books
only)

How should I read Marcus Aurelius's Meditations?

Some find that the disorganized and fragmentary nature of the Meditations makes it challenging to
read. There are several things it is useful to keep in mind.

The most important is that he did not intend for anyone to read it but himself.

He sometimes doesn't really explain his references to Stoic philosophy in a way that someone not
already immersed in it would easily understand. Some translators just leave the references cryptic,
while others try and come up with a rough approximation in English. The IEP entry on Marcus
Aurelius provides a good short summary of the parts of Stoic philosophy that seem most important
to interpreting the Meditations.

Another is more speculative, but which many find helpful. The Stoics are known to have practised
philosophical exercises, some of which were written. Our evidence for exactly what these
exercises were is really limited and indirect.

It has been conjectured (and most widely popularized by Pierre Hadot in The Inner Citadel) that
the Meditations were examples of such written exercises. The act of writing and composing forces
one to think about a concept or idea. Meditations VI.48 may be a description of what he was doing
when he wrote book I (Smith translation):

When you would cheer your heart, consider the good qualities of those about you—the energy
of one, the modesty of another, the liberality of a third, and other virtues in others. Nothing is
so cheering as abundant exemplifications of the virtues in the characters of those with whom
we live. Let us, therefore, have them always ready at hand.

Writing many variations on the same theme is an exercise in forcing ones-self to contemplate
certain ideas in certain ways, and writing down philosophical principles regularly is intended to
help one think of them regularly, or even habitually. So, to help yourself become a more grateful
person, you might make a habit of writing down to whom you're grateful, and why, etc. The result
is a book, this conjecture goes, that is rather repetitive, showing the direction in which Marcus
Aurelius was trying to change his thinking, the kind of perspective he wanted to encourage himself
to take, etc. It doesn't necessarily indicate what he did think, just how he was trying to get himself
to think.

revision by cleomedes — 1 month ago view source

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