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TORTS AND DAMAGES COMPILED DIGESTS – ATTY.

PAMARAN the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was
in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
I. TORTS driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
II. QUASI – DELICTS the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers
A. ELEMENTS should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
B. NEGLIGENCE them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a
C. CAUSATION natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the
a. PROXIMATE CAUSE; IMMEDIATE CAUSE call for outside help.

1. SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA, OSCAR The driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
BATACLAN vs. MARIANO MEDINA around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area,
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957 can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor
would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted
torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the
FACTS: codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner, defendant Mariano Medina,
under a certificate of public convenience left town of Amadeo, Cavite on its way to Pasay City
and drove by Conrado Saylon. There were 18 passengers including the driver and the 2. PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
conductor. One of the 18 passengers is Juan Batacan. At about about 2 in the morning while COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO
driving in Imus Cavite the front tire burst and the vehicle began to stumbled and fell into a canal. No. L-65295. March 10,1987
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus while Batacan, Lara and Visayan and the
women behind them named Natalia Villanueva could not get out of the overturned bus. After FACTS:
an hour of helping them to escape, a group of men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where
of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fuelled by petroleum. Upon approaching the bus, he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his car when his car headlights (in his
the gasoline began to leak and the fire broke out. allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a
dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
The petitioner in this case and in behalf of her minor children, brought the present suit to recover registered in the name of Phoenix Construction Inc. and driven by Armando U. Carbonel, was
from Mariano Medina damages in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the CFI of Cavite parked on the right hand side of the street facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew in
awarded P1,000 to the plaintiff plus P600 as attorney’s fee, plus P100, the value of the such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncomphiing traffic.
merchandise being carried by Batacan to Pasay City. The plaintiffs and the defendants There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the
appealed to the CA, but the latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in dump truck, front or rear. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to
the claim in the complaint. the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
Dionisio suffered some physical injuries.
Hence, this petition.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his
Issue: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina which was the proximate cause of the injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to
death of Bataclan. him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the
Held: YES accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew
pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and
The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the supervision of the dump truck driver. Moreover, Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was
overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co- negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he "passive and static condition" and that Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient
must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. While the petitioner truck
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the
accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance"
But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to must bear his own injuries alone.
hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from ISSUE: Whether or not Dionisio is negligent?

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immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the
HELD: YES, but Dionisio’s negligence was only contributory. plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private FACTS: Aquilino Larin, driver of a Toyota altis own by C.O.L. Realty was driving along Katipunan
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night ave. corner Rajah Matanda Ave. in Quezon City. He was driving at a speed of 5 to 10 kilometers
and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights and thus did per hour and had just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when suddenly a Ford
not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane. Expedition owned by Lamberto Ramos and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo violently rammed against
the cars right rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court towards the direction where it came from.
that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful —
or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to
petitioner Carbonel. That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
negligence on the one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is Property. Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the
quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck repair of its car and the cost of hospitalization in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on
quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump Ramos denied liability insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver,
truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained that the sedan car
truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down the thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.
street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and Ramos also claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that
therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent driver, Rodel.
manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck
driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose The MeTC exculpated Ramos from liability. The Regional trial Court (RTC) upheld the decision of
upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an the lower court.
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan
vinculum of liability. Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) dated November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and Matanda Street in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless,
that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions of the barricade which were
subject to mitigation by the courts. broken, thus violating the MMDA rule.

Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos vehicle
employer Phoenix in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was not able to was moving at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction
overcome this presumption of negligence. The failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix (the Katipunan Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass). It therefore found the driver Rodel
to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, guilty of contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy
is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix. intersection.

The appellate court modified the RTC decision. The CA found Ramos to be solidarily liable Rodel
Ilustrisimo.
3. LAMBERTO RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
GR No. 184905, August 28, 2009
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rodel’s negligence is the proximate cause of the accident.
DOCTRINE: Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate 2. Whether or not Ramos is solidarily liable.
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the

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HELD: Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause 4. MANUEL BELARMINO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990
plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
FACTS:
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor Manuel Belarmino is the husband of Oania Belarmino. Oania was a classroom teacher of DECS
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. assigned at the Buracan Elementary School. One unfortunate day, Oania, who was then in her
8th month of pregnancy, while performing her duties, accidentally slipped and fell on the
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory classroom floor. Immediately thereafter, and subsisting for several days, she experienced
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will abdominal pains and a heavy feeling in her stomach. 11 days after her accident, she went into
defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl. Her abdominal pains persisted, accompanied by
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made. high fever and headache. She was brought to the hospital where she was diagnosed with
septicaemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan the hospital after 5 days, apparently recovered, but died 3 days later.
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover,
it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages Manuel filed a claim for death benefits which was denied by GSIS on the ground that she did
suffered by respondent from the accident. not suffer from an occupational disease and neither was there any showing that the ailment was
contracted by reason of her employment. Manuel appealed to ECC but to no avail. Hence, this
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken petition for review.
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and ISSUE: W/N ECC and GSIS are liable to pay death benefits to Manuel – YES
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its RATIO:
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher.
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its
might probably result therefrom. development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and
suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her
Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the
the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the
the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her
accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such demise.
crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor the final event in the chain
that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
cannot recover damages. under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels contributory negligence, since it default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause
of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a
seeks to recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent
result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death,
assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not are compensable.
eliminate respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the proximate result of the
accident.

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5. FERNANDO v. CA
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code
FACTS: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. While the construction of
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the
the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won. On November 26, 1975, Bascon signed the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements. Accident such as toxic gas leakage
purchase order. However, on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers.
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found
dead inside the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been
cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
The bodies were removed by a fireman. The body of Joselito Garcia was taken out by his uncle, risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service,
Danilo Garcia, and taken to the Regional Hospital, but he expired there. The City Engineer's who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to
office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance from it take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public
Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who respondent.
did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died
from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas.
6. TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H. SAYNES
The trial court dismissed the case. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled that the G.R. No. L-40570, 30 January 1976.
law is intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and the indigent.
Facts:
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. CA issued an amended decision, On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the
granting that of Davao City and dismissing the case. storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP)
were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which
ISSUE: Whether or not Davao City is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause; thus, was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning,
can be liable for damages barrio captain saw Cipriano Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter
told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix
HELD: NO. The Court affirmed the CA’s amended decision. it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P.
Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case is: Did the broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an died. It was only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. Issues:
(1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event- storm;
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the Ruling:
suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Decision affirmed.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have (1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution.
conduct or guarding against its consequences. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case
of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down.
While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic
tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the (2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case)
market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants'
Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Bascon. The public respondent, the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt
therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employee’s negligence is well
undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but
have remained unscathed.

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b. CONCURRENCE OF EFFICIENT CAUSES Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation which cannot be presumed to exist
c. TEST OF CAUSATION without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation
a. CAUSATION IN FACT (contractual or culpa contractual).
b. SUBSTANTIAN FACTOR
c. “BUT FOR” or “SINE QUA NON”
d. FORSEEABILITY 2. TEAGUE vs FERNANDEZ
e. CAUSE AND CONDITION
f. NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES FACTS:
d. INTERVENING CAUSE A fire broke down in a building where Realistic Institute, a vocational school for hair and beauty
culture owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes Teague, was located which
caused the death of four students including Lourdes Fernandez, the sister of the appellant. The
1. M.H. RAKES vs THE ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY brothers and sisters of Lourdes filed an action for damages against Mercedes. The RTC ruled in
7 Phil. 359 favor of Mercedes causing the appellant to appeal to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of
the RTC holding that there had been a negligence on the part of Mercedes. Thus, this petition.
FACTS:
M.H. Rakes was a black man working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a negligence on the part of Teague considering the fact
they were working in the company’s yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars that she was just a lessee in the building.
(karitons?); each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from
the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards HELD: The Court held yes. The CA was correct in holding that Teague was negligent and from
installed on the sides of the cars, but the rails were secured by ropes. The track where the cars which caused the death of Lourdes Fernandez based primarily on the fact that the section 491
move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila had not been complied within the connection
It was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same with the construction and use of Gil-Armi bldg.. where Realistic Institute was located.
were left unrepaired. While the cars were being moved and when it reached the depressed
portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails Furthermore, It is true that the non-compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and
slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy
he won; he was awarded 5,000 pesos for damages ($2,500). of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of
safety designed to prevent specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of
Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their the building.
workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the Thus, the doctrine of proximate cause applies to such violation.
cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that
Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired;
that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track, yet he
continued to work. 3. MCKEE vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

ISSUE: Whether the Atlantic is civilly liable. FACTS: It was the 8th of January in 1977, around 9:00 or 10:00 in the morning, somewhere
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was driving his daughter,
HELD: Yes, the Atlantic is civilly liable. Araceli Koh McKee, and her minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well as Kim’s
babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles City
Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another (northward) in a Ford Escort.
employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in
continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben
hand, though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the Galang, was headed in the opposite direction, from Angeles City to San Fernando (southward),
side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing going to Manila. The cargo truck was considerable in size as it was carrying 200 hundred cavans
near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages of rice, which weighed 10 metric tons.
though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages from 5,000 pesos to 2,500
pesos. As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly
In this case, the Supreme Court also elucidated the two kinds of culpa which are: ran from the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the boys were going back and forth,
Culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation unsure of whether to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. He was then forced to
between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; may be also considered as a swerve left and into the lane Galang was driving in.
real source of an independent obligation (extra-contractual or culpa aquiliana).

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Jose switched his headlights on, applied his brakes, and attempted to return to his lane. situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
However, he failed to get back into the right lane, and collided with the cargo truck. The reasonably require.
collision occurred on the bridge, which resulted in the deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-
old, Kim, and her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. Loida was seated in the and the TEST OF NEGLIGENCE,
passenger seat. Araceli, Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the back of the Escort,
received physical injuries from the collision. Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that (reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
An information was filed against Ruben Galang, charging him for reckless imprudence resulting situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
in multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to property. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges in the information. The conviction was affirmed by the CA and no negligence can be imputed to Koh.
achieved finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the denial by the SC of his Petition for
Review. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys
by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite
Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife and children of Jose Koh, and the second lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
one by Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and injuries to Araceli and her other vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down,
children. move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.

The respondents were impleaded against as the employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not THE EMERGENCY RULE: “one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. These cases were eventually consolidated. act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection
The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded the respondents damages and attorney’s may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
fees. brought about by his own negligence.”
Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation. This means he cannot be
On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dismissal was reversed. This was based on its considered negligent. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT JOSE WAS NEGLIGENT, THE COLLISION STILL
finding that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless imprudence that caused the accident. WOULD NOT BE IMPUTED TO HIM BECAUSE:

However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR, the IAC set aside its original decision and 1. PROXIMATE CAUSE: that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
upheld that of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car invaded the lane of the truck and efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
the collision occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the presumption that Koh was occurred.
negligent.
• Galang’s negligent act of not slowing down or stopping (instead, he continued at full speed
ISSUE: Was the IAC correct in reversing their original decision? towards the car) and allowing the Escort to return to the right lane was the SUFFICIENT
INTERVENING CAUSE and the ACTUAL CAUSE of the tragedy (failure to take the necessary
HELD: NO. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately measures and the degree of care necessary to avoid the collision)
concluded that it was Jose Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk, which could have partially accommodated the
shows. Jose’s entry into Galang’s lane was necessary to avoid what was, in his mind at the time, truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the
a greater peril – death or injury to the two idiots. This is hardly negligent behavior. car instead of meeting it head-on.”

Another witness said that the truck only stopped upon collision. Also, when the police o Negligence of Galang apparent in the records: “He himself said that his truck was running at
investigated the scene of the collision, they found skidmarks under the truck instead of behind it. 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on
This indicated that Galang only applied the brakes moments before the collision. a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.

On the basis of the DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE Under ARTICLE 2185 of the Civil Code, “a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.”
Layugan v. IAC: The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the 2. LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: A doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE of the party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is
shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
Corliss v. Manila Railroad: Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the

6
consequences thereof, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third The trial court and the Court of Appeals found petitioner solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual
person. damages suffered by respondents because of the injuries they sustained. It was established that
Payunan, Jr. was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as shown in the sketch of the police
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent investigator.
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior In a joint obligation, each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability; in a solidary or joint
negligence of the plaintiff. and several obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close
that each of them must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole obligation. Joint tort
• Basically, the last clear chance was with Galang, as can be gleaned from the evidence feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.
presented. Therefore, respondents are found, under ARTICLE 2180, directly and primarily
responsible for the acts of their employee. Their negligence flows from the negligence of their
employee. E. VICARIOUS LIABILITY, ART. 2180
a. PARENTS/GUARDIANS
Such presumption is juris tantum (REBUTTABLE) and NOT juris et de jure (CONCLUSIVE). They did
not present evidence that showed that the diligence of a good father of a family in the 1. SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO
selection and supervision of their employee, Galang. G.R. No. L-10134, June 29, 1957

FACTS:
D. PERSONS LIABLE Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless
a. TORTFEASOR / JOINT TORTFEASOR imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 where he
was found guilty of the crime charged. He was only (15) years old when he committed the
1. CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. ESTRELLA crime. Sabina Exconde, filed a separate civil action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante
Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son
FACTS: Isidoro Caperiña.
Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San
Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached their destination Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro
because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident,
Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in the former was not under the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was
front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus and sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay
extricated their legs from under the seats. the damages claimed in the complaint. From decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the case was certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, of law.
Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo. They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr. and Datinguinoo, who were the
drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2) It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of
that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31,
and supervision of their employees; 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the
ISSUE: whether the petitioner and BLTB and/or its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.
the damages sustained by respondents. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Held: YES. Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher.
imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one is
responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the ISSUE: Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his
employer for an employees act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent
subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection act of minor Dante Capuno?
and supervision of the employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to
prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision HELD:Yes. It is true that under the law, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
of Payunan, Jr. damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational

7
institution. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city b. EMPLOYERS
school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then
a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law. 1. GUTIERREZ V. CA
FACTS: Benigno C. Gutierrez and Domingo N. Balisalisa (petitioners) as contractor and project
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, engineer, respectively, of the contract executed by the former with the Bureau of Public Works,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is undertaking the construction of the N. Reyes-Severino Drainage Main, Manila Flood Control and
obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which Drainage Project, Manila.
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, The workers of petitioner startrd digging up Severino Street, at first by manual labor and later by
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, means of a crane to speed up the excavation. The earth and mud dug up were scooped by the
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish crane and dumped against the exterior side of the adobe stone fence of the A. Mabini
Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that Elementary School along the street. When the pile of earth and mud reached the height of the
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage(Article 1903, fence, the crane's steel scooper was used to press them down. Because of heavy stress thus
last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove. placed on the fence, where Edna, daughter of respondent spouses Beloyo, was playing, a
portion of it gave way and collapsed resulting to Emma’s death.
Respondents-spouses Eliseo G. Baloyo and Soledad Ramos de Baloyo filed a suit for actual,
2. MARIA TERESA CUADRA vs ALFONSO MONFORT moral and exemplary damages arising from the death.
G.R. No. L-24101, September 30, 1970 Issue: Whether the amount and character of the damages awarded by the trial court is proper
Ruling: The negligence of the defendants has been clearly established by the evidence. Indeed,
FACTS: no evidence is necessary to show that the defendants were negligent in the performance of
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade 6. Their their obligation. They ought to have known that it was not the right thing to do — to pile up the
teacher assigned them, together with 3 other classmates, to weed the grass in the school big volume of earth excavated against the wall, which was fragile, being made only of adobe
premises. While thus engaged, Monfort found a plastic headband and jokingly said aloud that stones held together by weak mortar and without reinforcements. The collapse, therefore, of the
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At the said wall could reasonably be expected by any person of ordinary prudence, if not intelligence.
precise moment, Cuadra turned around to face her friend and the object hit her eye. Smarting The danger not only to the wall but also to anybody on the other side of the wall, being a school
from the pain, she rubbed rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next ground, could have been anticipated by the defendants herein and yet they failed to take the
day, the eye became swollen and Cuadra was taken to a doctor for treatment. Despite the necessary precautions to avoid the same, For this omission on their part, they should be held
medical efforts, Cuadra completely lost her right eye sight. responsible for moral and exemplary damages. This is more so with respect to the contractor,
Benigno C. Gutierrez, in order that other contractors similarly situated should be more careful in
Cuadra’s parents subsequently instituted a civil suit against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa the performance of their contracts. It is a matter of public knowledge that there are important
Monfort’s father. public works projects of the government that have been awarded to contractors, who are not
reliable, if not irresponsible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Alfonso Monfort is liable for the act of his minor child.

RULING: NO. Art. 2180 provides, “The father… or mother… are responsible for the damages 2. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES AND FELIX PANGALANGAN vs. PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN
caused by the minor children who live in their company” FORWARDERS, INC. (PAFI), ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT AND FERNANDO PINEDA
“The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove GR No. L-25142, 25 March 1975
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Facts: Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit alleged that on 24 November 1962, Fernando Pineda
The presumption of vicarious liability is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted, as drove recklessly the freight truck owned by his employer Philippine-American Forwarders along
can be clearly drawn from the last paragraph of Art. 2180. The burden of proof necessarily rests the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. It bumped the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by
on the defendant. Felix Pangalangan.

In the present case, there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could As a result of the accident, Pangalangan was injured and the damaged bus cannot be used for
have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss seventy-nine (79) days, causing loss of income amounting to PhP8,665.81 to Philippine Rabbit.
in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which
caused it. Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan as plaintiffs, filed a case for damages against the
His child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right defendants Philippine-American Forwarders, its manager Archimedes Balingit and the driver
to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as for the injury, it was Fernando Pineda for damages and lost income sustained by Philippine Rabbit and the injuries
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, sustained by Pangalangan.
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against.

8
Balingit stated in defense that he is not Pineda’s employer and he asked for the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ case as they had no cause of action against him. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The CFI Tarlac held only PAFI and Pineda liable for damages and injuries sustained and dismissed
Balingit’s liability. As a result, Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan appealed the trial court’s
decision to the Supreme Court. 3. PLEYTO VS. LOMBOY

ISSUE: Whether Balingit as manager and employee of Philippine-American Forwarders Inc. is not FACTS: A head-on collision between a bus and a car along McArthur Highway in Gerona, Tarlac
liable for damages awarded to Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit happened on May 16, 1995 at around 11:30am.

Ruling: Yes, the trial court’s decision on appeal is affirmed. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc (PRBL), bound for Vigan, Ilocos Sur at the time of the
Balingit, as manager and employee of Philippine-American Forwarders, is not liable for damages accident, is engaged in carrying passengers and goods for a fare servicing various routes in
awarded to Pangalangan and Philippine Rabbit. Central and Northern Luzon. Its driver was Ernesto Pleyto.

The Supreme Court held that based on the allegations of the complaint of appellants Philippine Ricardo Lomboy was a passenger to a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Arnulfo Asuncion,
Rabbit and Pangalangan, Balingit has no liability based on tort or quasi-delict as manager of Ricardo’s brother-in-law. Carmela, the daughter of Ricardo, also a passenger to said car,
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. in connection with the vehicular accident because he may be suffered injuries requiring hospitalization. But her father Ricardo Lomboy died.
regarded as an employee of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. The Supreme Court interpreted the
term “manager” is used in the sense of employer, as it may be gathered from the article’s Ricardo’s heirs filed an action for damages against Pleyto and PRBL. A witness and one of the
context. bus passengers, Rolly Orpilla, testified that Pleyto tried to overtake a tricycle but hit it instead.
Pleyto then swerved in to the left opposite lane and smashed the Manila-bound car killing
The New Civil Code states that, Arnulfo and Ricardo Lomboy while the other passengers, Carmela and friend Rhino Daba
suffered injuries.
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- According to Pleyto, the tricycle suddenly stopped without warning to which Pleyto stepped on
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the the brakes and bus lost speed but swerved to the other lane to avoid hitting the tricycle.
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Unfortunately, it collided with the Manila-bound Mitsubishi car.

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or The trial court rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs awarding P1,642,521.00 for lost earnings
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. of Ricardo Lomboy. It found that Pleyto is negligent and lacked precaution when he overtook
the tricycle disregarding completely the approaching car in the other lane. Pleyto should have
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages been more prudent in overtaking considering the slippery road. The court held that Pleyto
caused by the minor children who live in their company. violated traffic rules and regulations and was negligent under Article 2185 of the Civil Code and
PRBL liable as owner of the bus and as employer of Pleyto under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are its failure to observe the required diligence in its supervision of its employees and the safe
under their authority and live in their company. maintenance of its buses.

The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification in the award of damages reducing the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are award for loss of earning capacity to P1,152,000.00 and took note of the amounts that were duly
employed or on the occasion of their functions. supported by receipts only.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it. Hence, this petition.
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in pegging the monthly living expenses at 50% of gross earnings
considering that no substantial proof was presented to prove Lomboy’s gross income
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which HELD: No reversible error may be attributed to the court in fixing the loss of earning capacity at
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. the amount P1,152,000.00.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the net earnings,
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. which is computed by deducting necessary expenses from the gross earnings, and not the gross

9
earnings, is to be utilized in the computation. The amount of net earnings was arrived at after McLoughlin by showing him around, introducing him to important people, accompanying him in
deducting the necessary expenses (pegged at 50% of gross income) from the gross annual visiting impoverished street children and assisting him in buying gifts for the children and in
income. This computation is in accord with settled jurisprudence. (Villa Rey case) distributing the same to charitable institutions for poor children. Tan convinced McLoughlin to
transfer from Sheraton Hotel to Tropicana where Lainez, Payam and Danilo Lopez were
The testimony of the wife, Maria Lomboy, that her husband was earning a monthly income of employed. Lopez served as manager of the hotel while Lainez and Payam had custody of the
P8,000.00 is sufficient to establish a basis for an estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity. keys for the safety deposit boxes of Tropicana. Tan took care of McLoughlin's booking at the
Tropicana where he started staying during his trips to the Philippines from December 1984 to
Jurisprudence provides that the factors that should be taken into account in determining the September 1987.
compensable amount of lost earnings are:
On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented
the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and, a safety deposit box as it was his practice to rent a safety deposit box every time he registered
the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. at Tropicana in previous trips. As a tourist, McLoughlin was aware of the procedure observed by
Tropicana relative to its safety deposit boxes. The safety deposit box could only be opened
Factor No. 1 through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other
Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-age at death]) adopted from remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. When a registered guest wished to
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of open his safety deposit box, he alone could personally request the management who then
Mortality. would assign one of its employees to accompany the guest and assist him in opening the safety
Factor No. 2 deposit box with the two keys. Private respondent placed envelopes inside the safety deposit
Multiply the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e, the total earnings less box containing certain amounts of money. Before his trip to Hongkong he took two envelopes,
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other his passports and credit cards from the safety deposit box and left. Upon arriving in Hongkong,
incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent of the gross he found that certain amounts of money were missing. He did not think much of it and returned
earnings. to Manila afterwards. Upon arriving in Manila and checking out of Tropicana, he left for Australia.
There he found that the envelope he kept inside the safety deposit box containing 10,000 USD
Thus, in the given case, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: was missing 5,000 and the jewelry he bought from Hongkong, save for a diamond bracelet, was
also missing. Upon returning to Manila he checked in again at Tropicana and asked Lainez of
Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at the time of death) x (gross annual income – someone returned his missing jewelry and money, and surrendered the same with the
reasonable and necessary living expenses)] management. Lainez replied in the negative. McLoughlin again rented a safety deposit box
= [2/3 x (80 – 44)] x [(P96,000 – 50%of P96,000)] and stored several envelopes inside containing certain amounts of money of different
= [2/3 x (36)] x [(P96,000 – P48,000)] currencies.
= 24 x P48,000
= P1,152,000.00 On 16 April 1988, McLoughlin requested Lainez and Payam to open his safety deposit box. He
noticed that in the envelope containing Fifteen Thousand US Dollars (US$15,000.00), Two
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or Thousand US Dollars (US$2,000.00) were missing and in the envelope previously containing Ten
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), Four Thousand Five Hundred Australian Dollars
the defendant’s culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration of the spiritual proportionate (AUS$4,500.00) were missing. He confronted Lainez and Payam and they later admitted that
to the suffering inflicted. they assisted Tan in opening his safety deposit box. Apparently, Tan stole the key from
McLoughlin while the latter was sleeping. Respondent asked management to conduct an
Thus, moral damages of P500,000 is reduced to P100,000 in keeping with the purpose of the law investigation. Upon confrontation, Tan admitted to the deed and wrote a promissory note to
and jurisprudence in allowing moral damages. answer for the stolen money. Despite the promissory note, McLoughlin insisted that the hotel must
assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 61300 is AFFIRMED, conditions of the rental of safety deposit boxes. McLoughlin returned to Australia and consulted
with the sole MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages to the heirs of Ricardo Lomboy is his lawyers as to the validity of the conditions and was advised that the same was null and void
reduced from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs. for being violative of universal hotel practice. Mcloughlin returned to Manila and asked the
Office of the President for assistance, he was referred to the DOJ and WPD which conducted
and later a case was filed. YHT was impleaded along with Lainez and Payam. However Tan and
4. YHT REALTY CORPORATION, ERLINDA LAINEZ and ANICIA PAYAM vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS Lopez were not because they were not served summons. RTC decided in favor of respondent
and MAURICE McLOUGHLIN hence an appeal was filed with the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, hence this
G.R. No. 126780, February 17, 2005 petition for certiorari.

FACTS: Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used to stay at ISSUE: W/N YHT can be held liable for the negligence of its employees?
Sheraton Hotel during his trips to the Philippines prior to 1984 when he met Tan. Tan befriended

10
RULING: Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
obligations, are guilty of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done . . . .
paying damages, Article 2180, paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of ...
their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an employee is found negligent, it is presumed Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and household helpers
that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for it is hard for the victim to acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
prove the negligence of such employer.35 Thus, given the fact that the loss of McLoughlin's business or industry.
money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan to ...
open the safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting employees and YHT The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
Realty Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
pursuant to Article 2193. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.[45] To avoid
5. MARCELO MACALINAO vs EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good
FACTS: father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the Genetron
International Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian.
On 25 April 1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy 6. MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO J. DEL ROSARIO vs.SPOUSES HUANG
piece of machinerya reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastians manufacturing plant in
Angat, Bulacan. While in the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, FACTS: Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990 Mitsubishi
Genetrons Isuzu Elf truck with plate no. PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of a private Truck. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen
jeepney with plate no. DAF-922 along Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.
morning.
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. in C5, Taguig (from Alabang
Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers sustained physical injuries as a going to Pasig City). The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the
consequence of the collision.nMacalinao incurred the most serious injuries among the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the
island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the
passengers of the truck. He was initially brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid
car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of a Church.
treatment but in view of the severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine
Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian. He was again moved to the Capitol Medical
Center by his parents, petitioners herein, for medical reasons and later to the Philippine General At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt (TVR). His driver’s license had
been confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving.
Hospital for financial considerations. Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the
neck down as a result of the accident and per doctors’ advice, his foot was amputated. He also
suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition, coupled with the doctor’s The car, valued at ₱300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal
cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his
recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died on 7 November 1992. chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment.

Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both Ong and
Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence while driving,
Sebastian.
and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.
RTC Held that Ong and Sebastian are jointly and solidarily liable. On appeal the CA reversed the
decision
The trial court found petitioners Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
ISSUE: WETHER OR NOT SEBASTIAN AS AN EMPLOYER IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE WITH THE ACTION OF
ONG (EMPLOYEE)?
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages to ₱1,000,000.00. The appellate
court also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
HELD: YES.
Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code which provide: ISSUES:
1. WON Del Rosario was negligent.
2. WON Mercury Drug Corp. failed to exercise the diligence required in supervising its employees despite overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner company.

11
HELD: c. STATE
1. YES. We affirm the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that petitioner Del Rosario was negligent.
Noteworthy on this issue is the testimony of Dr. Marlon Rosendo H. Daza, an expert in the field of physics. He conducted
a study based on the following assumptions provided by respondents, among others: 7. MERITT V. GOVERNMENT OF P.I
1. One vehicle is ten times heavier, more massive than the other; G.R. No. 11154, March 21, 1916
2. Both vehicles were moving in the same direction and at the same speed of about 85 to 90 kilometers per hour;
3. The heavier vehicle was driving at the innermost left lane, while the lighter vehicle was at its right. FACTS:
1. The plaintiff (E. Merritt), while riding on a motorcycle, collided with the General Hospital
Dr. Daza testified that given the foregoing assumptions, if the lighter vehicle hits the right front portion of the heavier
vehicle, the general direction of the light vehicle after the impact would be to the right side of the heavy vehicle, not the ambulance which resulted to Plaintiff E. Merrit’s severe injuries.
other way around. The truck, he opined, is more difficult to move as it is heavier. Thus, there is very little chance that the
car will move towards the left of the truck. As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was
The evidence proves petitioner Del Rosario’s negligence as the direct and proximate cause of the injuries suffered by incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg
respondent Stephen Huang. Petitioner Del Rosario failed to do what a reasonable and prudent man would have done and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the
under the circumstances. Uy Chaco building.

2. YES. ARTICLES 2176 AND 2180 of the Civil Code provide: 2. The plaintiff E. Merritt ruled that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur; CFI in
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741.
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 3. Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages
which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in
xxx his complaint."
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding
The LIABILITY OF THE EMPLOYER under Art. 2180 IS DIRECT OR IMMEDIATE. It is NOT CONDITIONED ON A that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital
PRIOR RECOURSE AGAINST THE NEGLIGENT EMPLOYEE, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine
ALSO JOINT AND SOLIDARY WITH THE EMPLOYEE. Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be
To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family,
true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.12 With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating ISSUE: As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance
employee of the Government, whether or not the Government is legally-liable for the damages
with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
resulting therefrom (NO)

In the instant case, Del Rosario took the driving tests and psychological examination when he applied for the position of HELD:
Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. The recruitment officer also admitted that petitioner
Del Rosario used a Galant which is a light vehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests. No NBI and police By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars – on June 30, 2001, concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the accident which occurred in 1996 any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
was held twelve years ago in 1984. and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.
It also appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the
accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any alternate. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and discipline over its the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
not suspended or reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against petitioner Del Rosario. We
therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal and
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario. that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore,

12
no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the 9. NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA
state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. FONTANILLA

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a Facts:
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who A pickup owned and operated by respondent NIA and driven by Hugo Garcia bumped a
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his tricycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioners, and Restituto Deligo at San Jose City
office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as along Maharlika Highway, resulting to Francisco and Restituto having injuries and sent to San
an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. Jose City Emergency for treatment. Francisco was later transferred to Cabanatuan Provincial
Hospital where he died. The parents of Francisco filed for damages. The trial court rendered
The Government of the Philippine Islands is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, judgment against NIA to pay for damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners.
and employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of NIA filed an appeal to CA but the Petitioners, instead of filing the required brief, filed the petition
article 1903 of the Civil code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special to SC.
agent. Petitioners allege the following:

Disposition: For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without Award of moral damages allowable under Art. 2206 par. 3 of the New Civil Code and such be
costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the awarded to each of the petitioner-successors individually which should not be less than Php
amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent 50,000.00 each;
acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and NIA acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the
not with the courts. NIEA personnel including the driver to stop in order to give assistance to the victims, thus liable
for exemplary damages under Art. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.

8. REPUBLIC VS PALACIOS They are entitled to attorney’s fees.

Facts: NIA, through the Solicitor General, contends the following:


In April 1960, a certain Ildefenso Ortiz sued the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU) which was under the The negligence of the driver, Hugo Garcia, must be determined first before the claims of
Department of Public Works because ISU, without the consent of Ortiz, encroached upon his petitioner against NIA be entertained;
land by allegedly inducing the Handong Irrigation Assoc. to do so. The basis of the suit was that Petition is not proper;
ISU, though created by the government, is engaged in private business (selling of irrigation The petition shall be dismissed since the party failed to agree on whether or not the negligence
pumps/construction materials in installment) and being such has opened itself to suit thereby caused the vehicular accident involves a question of fact which should have been brought to
waiving immunity from suit. Judge Palacio of CFI Camarines Sur ruled in favor of Ortiz so did the CA within the reglementary period;
Court of Appeals. The CA also ordered the issuance of the order of garnishment against the
deposit/trust funds in ISU’s account in the PNB (such fund were generated from the installment Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason of the
payments ISU received) shock and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their son and NIA shall not
be held liable for damages because it is an agency of the State performing governmental
Issue: Whether or not such deposits may be garnished function and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent hence
the driver shall solely shoulder the liabilities.
Held: No. ISU’s activity of selling irrigation pumps is not intended to earn profit or financial gain. It
is actually just to replenish the funds used in purchasing said irrigation pumps (the original funds The matter of due diligence of NIA in selection and supervision is not an issue since Garcia is not
were from FTA from US). The CA ruled that ISU, by selling irrigation pumps is engaged in private a special agent but a regular driver of the vehicle.
business, hence it waived its immunity from suit and had also ordered the garnishment of ISU’s
deposits in PNB. But then again, as based in Merritt vs Insular Government, the waiver of said Issue:
immunity does not make the government liable. This would only lead to a disbursement of fund 1. Whether or not NIA, as a government agency, may be held liable for damages caused
without any proper appropriation as required by law. There is also no showing that the ISU’s by its employees.
alleged inducement of Handong is authorized by the State hence the government cannot be 2. Whether or not NIA is a government agency exercising governmental functions.
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
1. YES. NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of
the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it
now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act
of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an

13
ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. Under Arts. 2176 and Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the
2180 of the New Civil Code: National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be
organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of
Art. 2176 thus provides: business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper
Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is conduct of its business.
obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-
provisions of this Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows: Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:
xxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers (c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain
in any business or industry. period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
(d) To do all such other things and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or
case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable. less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from
tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a
1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of
agents only. their employment.

2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, 10. QUEZON CITY GOV’T vs. FULGENCIO DACARA SR.
Paras; 1986 Ed. ). G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts FACTS:
or conduct of its special agent. On the midnight of February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., a father and son were driving an 87
Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan at Matahimik St., Quezon City. The driver and passenger were
Under the aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for Fulgencio Dacara, Sr., Fulgencio Dacara Jr... While driving, their vehicle suddenly slammed into a
acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be pile of street diggings situated exactly within the areas being repaired by Quezon City.
specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's
usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to The son Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered considerable
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer damage for it over turned when it hit the street pile that was left open without any warning signs.
and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private Consequently, the father Fulgencio Dacarra Sr filed his claims for damages against the LGU of
individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the Quezon City. The later then denied liability stating that they were not negligent further insisting
meaning of the provision. that they placed precautionary signs at the construction site. A case was filed by Dacara Sr. for
the recovery of moral and exemplary damages sustained by his son from the accident and the
The assumption of liability is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of NIA; in trial court decided in his favor.
this case was its negligence on supervision. It should be emphasized that the accident
happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban ISSUE: Whether the LGU of Quezon City is liable to pay for the moral and exemplary damages
area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, sought by Mr.Dacara Sr.
there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by
the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the THE COURT’S RULING:
fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown The court sustained the grant of Exemplary damages but the award for Moral
by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial damages was rejected.
reaction.
For Exemplary damages the court invoked Article 2231 of the Civil Code which states
2. NO. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising that in quasi delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act negligence. Such gross negligence must amount to reckless disregard of safety of persons or
provides: property and that the person at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences
of their carelessness.

14
HELD: Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
Likewise, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be ownership of the roads,streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. LGU’s and their agents are controlling factor, it being sufficient that a province,city or municipality has control or supervision
expected to exercise utmost responsibility not only for the maintenance of roads and streets but thereof.At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
also for public safety. established to attach thatthe defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. Whatsaid article requires is that the province,
Gross negligence is evident in this case because according to the court, the LGU of city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or roadWe must
Quezon City through its agents have failed to show even a hint of responsibility by simply leaving emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, of the Local Government Code, the
an open street digging without any warnings signs more so it happened in a first class LGU like phrases“regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer,
Quezon City. and other pipes”, and “adoptmeasures to ensure public safety against open canals, manholes,
live wires and other similar hazards to life andproperty”, are not modified by the term “municipal
As for the recovery of Moral damages, the court ruled that one who claim must prove road”. And neither can it be fairly inferred from the same provisionof Section 149 that petitioner’s
these; 1. There is injury sustained by the claimant; 2. A culpable act or omission factually power of regulation vis-à-vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in caseswhere such
established; 3. Proximate Cause of the injury sustained by the claimant and 4. The award must activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the municipality’s liability for
fall in the cases in Art.2219. injuriescaused by its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of
gas, water, sewer, and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is
In the case, the Fulgencio Jr testified that he sustained a deep cut wound on his left made on a national or municipal road, for as long asthe same is within its territorial
arm however they did not presented any medical certificate or proof of medical expenses. jurisdiction.Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of knowledge
Further, the witnesses also did not mentioned anything like mental anguish, wounded feelings, of the excavation and thecondition of the road during the period from May 20, 1988 up to May
besmirched reputation or social humiliation which were all indications of moral sufferings. 30, 1988 when the accident occurred. It mustbe borne in mind that the obligation of the
Emotional and mental sufferings must be proven to support claims for moral damages. Absence petitioner to maintain the safe condition of the road within its territory is acontinuing one which is
of these actual proofs, the Dacaras was not sustained by the court in their claim for moral not suspended while a street is being repaired
damages.

1. D. TEACHERS/HEAD OF ESTABLISHMENTS
11. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 121920 August 9, 2005 12. CIRIACO MERCADO vs. CA, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14342, May 30, 1960
FACTS:
MWSS entered into a contract for water service connections with KC Waterworks Service PARTIES:
Construction (KC).On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of Ciriaco L. Mercado – petitioner; father of Augusto Mercado
MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan Road, San Manuel Quisimbing, Jr. – private respondent, classmate of Augusto Mercado
Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of water pipesand tapping of water to the Ana Pineda, Manuel L. Quisimbing – private respondents; parents of Manuel Quisimbing, Jr.
respective houses of water concessionaires.Only ¾ of the job was finished in view of the fact that
the workers were still required to re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for FACTS:
the water connections to the concessionaires. Between 10 o’clock and 11 o’clock in the Augusto lent his "pitogo", an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank, to Benedicto P.
evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not aware that the "pitogo"
at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of Santolan Road towards belonged to Augusto. Manuel, Jr. was likewise unaware of such fact. He thought it was the
thedirection of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. She was with prosecutor Laura Biglang- "pitogo" of Benedicto, so that when Augusto attempted to get the "pitogo" from Renato,
awa. The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes
fell on a manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the of the "pitogo". Augusto resented Manuel, Jr.'s remark and he aggressively pushed the latter.
humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured.Consequent to the foregoing After Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel, Jr., and seeing that Manuel, Jr. was in a helpless
incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila acomplaint for position, Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal
officials.After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglang-awa Counsel for petitioner argues that since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent
adjudging MWSS and theMunicipality of San Juan jointly and severally liable to her. CA affirmed occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner
RTC with modification. herein, the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the latter.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Juan can be held liable ISSUE: Whether the teacher or head of the school should be liable for damages resulting from
the tort of their pupil/student

15
HELD: NO. This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly
Capuno, but we held: and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight
between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted, "teachers or directors of duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At
under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance
any academic educational institution. with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows: The Supreme Court reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student
ART. 2180. . . . must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

It would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation 14. FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO vs. EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and
where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence COURT OF APPEALS
on the pupil supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher;
and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the FACTS:
case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes 1963, Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational
with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan. Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time,
2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of petitioner that that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit. schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one
as early as 1962. In fact, he was able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.

13. SPOUSES PALISOC VS ANTONIO BRILLANTES Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal
41 SCRA 548 on October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton
concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left
FACTS: unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of the
In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco
Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty
school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This centimeters deep. At this point, Edgardo Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils
caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.
delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Edgardo and his four
president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio pupils got out of the hole. Then, Edgardo left the children to level the loose soil around the open
Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted
Civil Code. to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. Before
leaving. , Edgardo allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."
The lower court, as well as the Court of Appeals, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and
that Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only The three of the four pupils playfully jumped in the pit. The 4th pupil jumped on a concrete block
liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as but the block slid in the opening, the two pupils were able to escape but Ylarde was caught and
per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for got pinned on the wall. Ylarde sustained some injuries and after 3 days he died.
the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with the teacher or other
officials of the school – which Daffon was not. The parents filed for damages against Edgardo and Mariano. The lower court dismissed the case
on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called
ISSUE: Whether the ruling of the court in the Mercado Case still applies. Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and
(3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. The CA affirmed the
HELD: decision.
No. The Supreme Court abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in
the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. The parents based their action on Art. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

16
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is both an academic institution and an institution of arts and
Issue: W/ON the cited provisions, both private respondents can be held liable for damages? trade. Within its premises is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Held: No and Yes. (AFP). Said ROTC Unit has an office and an armory located at the basement of BCF’s main
No. As regards the principal (Mariano), We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the building.
death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts
and trades (Art. 2180). We rule that private respondent Soriano, as principal, cannot be held Jimmy B. Abon (Abon), a commerce student of the BCF, is the duly appointed armorer of the
liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts BCF ROTC Unit. Not being an employee of BCF, Abon received his appointment from the AFP.
and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Accordingly, he received his salary from the AFP as well as orders from Captain Roberto C.
Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging. Ungos (Ungos), the Commandant of the BCF ROTC Unit.

Yes. Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the On 03 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro
teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure (Castro), a student of the University of Baguio, with an unlicensed firearm which Abon took from
to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. However, as earlier the armory of the BCF ROTC Unit. As a result, Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and
pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30 of AFP.
which is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.
The heirs of Castro sued for damages, impleading Abon, Ungos, Benjamin Salvosa (President and
With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there acts and omissions on the Chairman of the Board of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal Executive Trustee of BCF), and the BCF as party defendants.
relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? Our answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for
damages. The trial court thereafter rendered a decision sentencing Abon, Salvosa, and BCF jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of Castro, and absolving the other defendants. The Intermediate
From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted Appellate Court (IAC) affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one- Issue: Whether or not Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under
ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying
nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the Held: No. Salvosa and BCF cannot be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under Article
perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180, par. 7 of the Civil Code provides that, “…teachers or heads
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.” This means that so long as the
attractive nuisance. student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the student.
The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of their Work The “custody” referred to means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
Education. A single glance at the picture showing the excavation and the huge concrete heads and teachers exercise over the pupils for as long as they are at attendance in school,
block 7 would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and including recess time.
not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise
when private respondent Aquino himself admitted that there were no instructions from the In the case of Palisoc vs. Brillantes, it was held that a student not “at attendance in the school”
principal requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing that it was cannot be in “recess” thereat. A “recess” contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
included in the lesson plan for their Work Education. Even the Court of Appeals made mention of school activities where the student still remains within the call of his mentor and is not permitted
the fact that respondent Aquino decided all by himself to help his co-teacher Banez bury the to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. The mere
concrete remnants of the old school shop. 8 Furthermore, the excavation should not be placed fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute
in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not “attending school” or being in the “protective and supervisory custody” of the school, as
expose the children to any risk that could result in death or physical injuries. contemplated in the law.

The record showed that when Abon shot Castro, he was supposed to be working in the armory
15. BENJAMIN SALVOSA AND BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE with definite instructions from Ungos, his superior, to not leave the office and to keep the armory
COURT (G.R. No. 70458, 05 October 1988) well-guarded. This negated the allegation that Abon was “at attendance in the school” or in the
custody of BCF when he shot Castro. Hence, the Supreme Court held that Salvosa and BCF
FACTS: cannot he held solidarily liable with Abon under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
16. AMADORA VS. CA

17
gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the
FACTS: physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose- At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was
Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old. Daffon was convicted regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to
parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the
complaint against the students was later dropped. student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
His parents contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents
In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for liable especially in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him without taking
the semester had already ended. disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly negligence
on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not necessarily link him to the
RTC- Liable shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the
CA- Absolved. Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a gun that killed the petitioners' son.
school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students
were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury. caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by
any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged
ISSUE: with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
1. WON the respondents are liable based on Art 2108. connection with such custody.
2. WON Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts
and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody." 2. It applies to academic and non-academic.
HELD:
1. NO. In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic
directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle o frespondeat superior, but nature of the school where he is teaching. The Court cannot see why different degrees of
then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their
bonus paterfamilias. respective schools. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by
the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is
trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that
defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180. liable if the school were non-academic. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its
present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and
a. NO, there was no teacher in charge. Evidence does not support who teacher in original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject
charge was aside from the fact that he just submitted his Physics report. to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.

The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally
ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or
Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the
and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the
the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had custody of the school

18
The Trial Court absolved Vivencio Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents and school liable.

1. e. SCHOOLS The Court of Appeals, held the school liable under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code,
finding that the school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher
17. REYNALDO PASCO V. CFI BULACAN accompanying them.

FACTS: On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with two companions, while ISSUE: WON St. Mary’s Academy should be held liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos and
walking inside the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said university, was liable for damages.
accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were
also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was
hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life. HELD:
No. The negligence of St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident, between
the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the
On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim
Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta University. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. For the school to be liable, it must be
based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code. shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be legitimate consequence of the wrong
done, the connection between the negligence and the injury must be direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient cause.
Respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:

a. Article 2180 under which it was sued applies only to vocational schools and not to academic institutions; The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim. The cause of the accident was not recklessness of James Daniel II but the
b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable under Article 100 of the RPC. Hence, the civil mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva.
liability in this case arises from a criminal action which the defendant university has not committed;

c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident
an action for damages against defendant University. was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance
on Article 219 is unfounded. There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed minor James
On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order * granting said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider
Daniel II to drive the jeep, it was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep,
the Order of Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the ground that there is no sufficient justification to disturb
its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari under R.A No. 5440, praying that judgment be rendered setting aside and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.
the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against respondent school and the order of July 17,
1980 denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal, with costs against respondent school. Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents
ISSUE: Whether or not ART. 2180 is applicable to academic institutions (the school or the university itself, as primarily. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

HELD: NO. The provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads," and not the academic institution itself.
19. CHILD LEARNING CENTER vs TAGARIO

Facts:
Timothy was a Grade IV student at Marymount School, an academic institution operated and
18. ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. WILLIAM CARPITANOS maintained by Child Learning Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1
G.R. NO. 143363 FEBRUARY 6, 2002 and 2 p.m., Timothy entered the boys comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building
to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out.
FACTS: Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995- help. When no help arrived, he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of
1996. A facet enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where the prospective opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was
enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos, part of the campaigning group, together with hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries.
James Daniel II (15 years old, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (in possession and was
driving the jeep, grandson of Vivencio Villanueva-owner of the jeep) and other companions An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by Timothy’s parents against the CLC. In
were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when James Daniel II allegedly its defense, CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of
drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle that caused the death the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further
of Sherwin Carpitanos. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached. maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of a family to
ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.
Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II, his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.

19
Trial court ruled in favor of the parents. Court of Appeals affirmed ruling. HELD:

Issue: Whether or not CLC can be held liable 1. The source of FEU’s liability is the contract between students and learning institutions.

Held: Yes, CLC is liable. In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. x x
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. x...
CLC failed to fix a defective doorknob despite having notice it was faulty, and also failed to
install security grills on the window where Timothy fell. An architect witness also testified that he Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students
was not sure if the doorknobs that were installed in the building were in accordance with his with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting
specifications. knowledge. x x x . . . Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Even if there was no direct evidence that the door knob was defective during the day in
question, the fact that Timothy fell from the window proves a defective doorknob, under the Saludaga was enrolled as a sophomore law student in FEU. As such, a contractual obligation
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. was created between the two parties. On Saludaga's part, he was obliged to comply with the
rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand, FEU, as a learning institution is mandated
CLC argued that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and to impart knowledge and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education
supervision of its employees. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is only or a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to maintain
applicable where the employer is being held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under peace and order within the campus.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLC’s liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring that all its doors are properly It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
maintained. failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Here, Saludaga was
shot inside the campus by Rosete who was hired to maintain peace and secure the premises,
hence, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to
20. JOSEPH SALUDAGA, vs. FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as provide a safe and secure environment to its students.
President of FEU
G.R. No. 179337, April 30, 2008 FEU claimed that the incident was a fortuitous event because such could not have been
reasonably foreseen nor avoided since Rosete was not their employee; and that they complied
FACTS: with their obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by having exercised
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga, a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy. The Court ruled that FEU failed to show
was shot by Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the school that it undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
premises. actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. A learning
institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its
Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU and Edilberto C. De Jesus (De Jesus), in his premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
capacity as President of the University, on the ground of breach of obligation to provide students obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. Rosete was
released since no formal complaint was filed against him. Article 1170 of the New Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of
their obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Saludaga. FEU and De Jesus appealed to the in providing a safe learning environment, FEU is liable to Saludaga for damages.
Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s decision. Saludaga filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was later denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 2. No, De Jesus is not liable.
45.
In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, the Supreme Court held that:
ISSUE:
x x x . . . Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not
1. What is the source of FEU’s liability to Saludaga? necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when - (1) he assents to a
2. Whether De Jesus is liable? patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in
3. Whether FEU is vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation,
its stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who,

20
having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written
objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the HELD:
corporation; or (4) he is made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his The court ruled in the NEGATIVE.
corporate action.
The Court stated that, If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own
Here, none of the foregoing exceptions was established; hence, De Jesus should not be held negligence or the negligence of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be
solidarily liable with FEU. shown hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the
negligence of those under them.
3. No, FEU is not vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot
The Court of Appeals is correct in finding that respondents cannot be held liable for damages be held liable for damages of any kind. At the outset, it should be noted that respondent
under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code because FEU is not the employer of Rosete. The latter spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.
was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by FEU's Security Consultant to Galaxy and its Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the Civil Code in
security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son. Article 2180, par. 4 states
services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the that: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. .xxx… Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
21. ST. FRANCIS HIGHSCHOOL VS. COURT OF APPEALS industry.
GR No. 82465 February 25, 1991
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence
FACTS: of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of St. Francis High School wanted to join a while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks.
school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Because of short notice, his Parents, As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the
respondents spouses Castillo did not allow him to join the picnic. However, he was only allowed planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner
to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article
after doing so. But because of the persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the
the beach. findings of respondent Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and
danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees even
During the picnic, one female teacher was drowning wherein some of the students, if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue. But in the process, it was Ferdinand who drowned and
eventually died. Respondent spouses Castillo then filed a Civil Case in the RTC of Lucena City While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this
against St. Francis Highschool represented by the Principal and Teachers for damages due to does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the required
failure of Petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of the good father of the family in diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at
preventing their son’s drowning. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary bar, petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the
damages, attorney’s fees and expenses for litigation. The trial court found in favor of the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
respondent spouses Castillo and against the teachers but dismissed the case against St. Francis
High School. PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of
Ferdinand Castillo and awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as the
Both Petitioners and Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court ruled petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing their
that, under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the
plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the rule that the negligence of the employees in
causing the injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner 22. PHIL. SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (PSBA) vs CA
and/or manager of the establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its G.R. No. 84698, Jan. 4, 1992
principal); and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and
convincing proof that the owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good School's responsibility in loco parentis over its own students: the harm or negligent act must be
father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the committed by its students against another student, not by an outsider
injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers). Hence, this petition.
General rule on the application of quasi-delict: no pre-existing contract between the parties.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is liable on the death of respondent spouses’ son.

21
FACTS: FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista, a third-year commerce student of PSBA, was stabbed to death while on the Maximo Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages against the Republic Central colleges
second-floor premises of the school. The assailants were not members of the schools’ academic alleging the R.L. Security Agency, Inc. And Jimmy Solomon, a Security Guard, as defendant. He
community but were elements from outside the school. The parents of Carlitos filed a civil action alleged that while he was in the campus of RCC, as a student, Jimmy Solomon, duly appointed
against the school authorities, alleging them negligent, reckless and with failure to take security Security Guard under R.L. Security Agency, Inc. headed by Benjamin Serrano, without any
precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. The provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, malevolent manner, with intent to kill,
appellate court found in their favor, primarily anchoring its decision on the law of quasi-delicts. attack, assault, strike and shoot Maximo Soliman on his abdomen with a .38 calibre Revolver.
Soliman was treated and may not be able to attend regular class and be incapacitated in usual
Hence, the petition. work for 3-4 months. RCC filed a motion to dismiss contending that the complaint has no cause
of action against it. The trial Judge granted the motion.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the appellate court was correct in deciding the case based on Article 2180 ISSUE: Whether the Republic Central Colleges is vicariously liable for damages.
(in loco parentis)
2. Whether or not the application of the law on quasi-delict is proper when there is a pre- RULING:
existing contract As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who
among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to
HELD: it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards
The SC did not agree with the premises of the CA’s ruling. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or
2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule in in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may give
(Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly
for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of PSBA, for whose acts the envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being no
school could have been made liable. employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student
cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.
IS PSBA EXCULPATED FROM LIABILITY?
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against
It does not necessarily follow. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at
there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the
are bound to comply with. Moreover, there is that “built-in” obligation to provide students with assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly
knowledge. The school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal,
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could
have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest
and Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, the mere fact that a person of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted
the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties. Art. f. OWNER OF VEHICLE
21 of the Civil Code comes to mind, so that should the act which breaches a contract be done g. PROPRIETOR OF BUILDING OR STRUCTURE
in bad faith and violative of Art. 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi- h. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
delict.
F. DEFENSES; TOTAL and PARTIAL
In the present case, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Carlitos had
been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. i. PLAINTIFF’s OWN NEGLIGENCE
a. EXCEPTIONS:
i. THEORY OF IMPLIED INVITATION
23. SOLIMAN VS. TUAZON ii. DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992 ii. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

22
1. FIDEL CABARDO vs CA and JUANITO C. RODIL case is the simple negligence of driver Jose C. Peralta for failure to install an early warning
device. The judgment rendered in the Santa Cruz case would not be res judicata in the instant
case.
Jose Peralta was a driver of the Consolidated Industrial Gases Incorporated (CIGI). On October 26,
1987, while driving the company's truck-tanker on the southbound lane of the South Luzon Expressway,
he met an accident. Peralta claimed that a Volkswagen car suddenly took the inner lane occupied by his WHEREFORE, motion to dismiss (affirmative defenses pleaded) is hereby denied for lack of
truck, as a result of which he was forced to swerve to the left. This caused the truck-tanker to veer and roll merit.
over the center island of the expressway until it fell on its right side, lying perpendicular to the expressway
with its undesirable facing the north. With him at the time of the accident was petitioner Fidel Cabardo
On January 3, 1991, after hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment against private
who was his helper and pump operator.
respondent Juanito Rodil. It found private respondent guilty of recklessness in driving his car which, it
held, was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by petitioner Fidel Cabardo. 19
Moments later, private respondent Juanito Rodil came along in a Toyota Corolla car, also southbound,
on the inner lane of the highway. There was a heavy rain which affected visibility along the highway. Rodil
Private respondent Rodil filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied in an order of the
claimed that upon seeing the disabled vehicle on the center island, he immediately stepped on his brakes,
court dated March 15, 1991. 21
causing his car to swerve to the left and slide sideways towards the truck-tanker, stopping only after it had
crashed into the underside of the truck-tanker. With private respondent was his wife Leveminda.
Private respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its now questioned decision
reversing the RTC's decision on August 9, 1994. The Court of Appeals held that the testimonies of
Private respondent and his wife were injured. The truck-tanker driver, Jose Peralta, was unhurt but his
petitioner Cabardo and Peralta could not be believed because of inconsistencies. 22
helper, petitioner Cabardo, suffered a fractured left leg. He and the Rodil spouses were taken to the
hospital by passing motorists.
Petitioner Cabardo filed a motion for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution dated December 8, 1994. 23 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Fidel Cabardo and the truck driver Jose Peralta gave their respective statements, on the basis
of which a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed by
the Biñan INP police against private respondent Juanito Rodil. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred: 24

The Rodils filed a complaint for damages against CIGI and truck driver Jose Peralta. I. IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONER AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
On the other hand, petitioner Cabardo filed a complaint for damages against private respondent Juanito
Rodil. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he and Peralta "were able to get out of the vehicle unhurt" II. IN STATING THAT THERE WERE APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES IN THE STATEMENT
after the "truck tanker fell on its right side in the middle portion of the center island of the [South Luzon] OF PETITIONER AND PERALTA.
Expressway"; 12 that, as he was about to put up the early warning device, however, private respondent,
driving a Toyota Corolla in a "reckless and negligent manner
III. IN STATING THAT NEITHER THE PETITIONER NOR PERALTA WAS CATEGORICAL IN
. . . , bumped the truck-tanker and hit [him] on his left leg, causing him to be thrown off balance and lose
THEIR TESTIMONIES REGARDING THE INCIDENT.
consciousness" and that as a result, he "suffered a fractured left leg and other injuries." 13

IV. IN STATING THAT PETITIONER SUFFERED INJURIES WHEN THE TRUCK-TANKER


In his answer, private respondent denied having caused petitioner's injury. He alleged that the same was
SWERVED TO THE CENTER ISLAND OF THE EXPRESSWAY.
sustained when the truck-tanker, driven by Jose Peralta, fell on its side.

Private respondents, on the other hand, argue 25 that —


RTC of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment finding CIGI and Peralta guilty of negligence, even as it
held private respondent Juanito Rodil guilty of contributory negligence.
I. The petition suffers from numerous procedural deficiencies
Meanwhile, the Malolos court considered private respondent's motion as a motion to dismiss and denied it
on the ground that 18 II. The petition raises only questions of fact not cognizable by this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 and neither does this case constitute an exception.
In the defense of litis pendencia, it is necessary that there be another action pending involving
the same parties, subject matter and cause of action (Santa Ana vs. Narvades, 30 SCRA 454). We find the petition to be meritorious. To begin with, both the Santa Cruz court and the court below found
private respondent Juanito Rodil guilty of negligence in running his Toyota Corolla at a high speed in
driving rain with the result that he did not see the disabled truck-tanker until it was late and thus failed to
The plaintiff in the case at bar is not a party in the Santa Cruz, Laguna case. The cause of
stop his car on time. The Santa Cruz court found:
action in the instant case is the reckless imprudence of defendant Juanito C. Rodil which
caused the injuries sustained by Fidel C. Cabardo while the cause of action in the Santa Cruz

23
. . . . Letter of Instructions No. 229, which requires the installation of an early warning devi[c]e Indeed, there is no question that private respondent drove his car negligently. The question in this case is
infront [sic] and rear of a stalled vehicle, is precisely intended to prevent fatal or serious accidents. whether petitioner's injuries were caused by private respondent's car or whether he was injured as a
Here, there was that omission. While the defendant driver, attempted to show, that he gave result of the fact that the truck-tanker in which he was riding turned turtle and fell on its side.
instructions to his helper to install the early warning devi[c]e. there is absolutely no corroboration on
this alleged fact. As a matter of fact, not one of the several defense witnesses testified as to the
After reviewing the evidence in this case, we are inclined to agree with the trial court's finding that
existence of that early warning device. If it existed, than it would have been presented as a piece of
petitioner's injuries were caused by private respondent's car. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
evidence. Consequently, it is here clear, that the defendant driver, was negligent when he failed to
court's decision on the ground that petitioner, as plaintiff below, failed to prove that he sustained injuries
cause the installation of the early warning device, the same of which could have warned the
as a result of having been hit by private respondent's car and not as a result of the truck-tanker having
plaintiffs of the stalled truck tanker on the middle of expressway island, which ordinarily should not
veered and rolled over its side. The appellate court's decision is based mainly on alleged inconsistencies
be staying there. In fact, there is even now a doubt as to whether or not said truck had any early
in the testimonies of petitioner and his witness Jose Peralta. The Court of Appeals stated: 28
warning device.

On direct examination, appellee testified that after the truck landed on its side, Peralta and he
xxx xxx xxx
(Cabardo) got out of the truck. He found that the truck did not sustain any damage. He was then
told by Peralta to put up the early warning device (EWD) behind the truck. He was then hit on
Be all that as it may, however, the plaintiff driver [herein private respondent Juanito Rodil], in this the left leg by the rear tire of the car after which he lost consciousness. (TSN, May 7, 1990, pp.
case, does not appear without a fault. He testified that it was raining heavily and that while driving 8-9).
for home, he noticed the truck tanker from about 5 to 10 meters, more or less, from his car. When
he applied his brakes, his car skidded to the left and slipped to the right and smashed into the truck
On cross-examination, appellee stated that after coming out of the truck he was asked by
tanker. From the way his car reacted to his application of its brakes, the plaintiff driver [Rodil], was
Peralta who stood nearby to inspect the truck. In the course of his inspection at the truck, he
driving at a fast pace, because it skidded for a very long space, that of about 5 to 10 meters, and
depressurized its valve and it was while he was looking for the pressure gauge when the car
the impact it caused on the truck tanker, was strong. Clearly, therefore, the plaintiff driver, was
bumped him. (Ibid. pp. 23-24).
driving fast, while it was raining heavily. 26

When confronted with a portion of his answer to question No. 7 in his statement. Exhibit A,
If the court allowed recovery to private respondent, it was only because the defendants in that case (CIGI
which reads, thus:
and Peralta) were negligent in failing to install an EWD.

27 . . . Tumaob ang sasakyan namin sa mismong sakop ng center island ng


On the other hand, the Malolos court likewise found private respondent negligent:
expressway. Ako naman ay matiwasay na nakalabas mula sa loob ng tumaob
naming sasakyan at hindi ako nagkaroon ng anumang pinsala sa katawan. Kinuha ko
The defendant was reckless in driving his car. This conclusion is based on defendant's own ang early warning device na dala-dala ng trak para ilagay sa bandang likuran ng
admission, he was travelling on the left lane of the expressway at the rate of 60 to 70 kilometers aming tumaob na trak sa pinanggalingan ng mga sasakyan. Hindi pa ako gaanong
per hour despite the heavy rain and he could hardly see an object at the distance of ten (10) nakakalayo sa aming trak ay bigla na lamang na may kotseng bumundol sa aking
meters. The heavy rain fell between San Pedro and Biñan, Laguna, according to the defendant kaliwang paa ako ay tumilapon at nawalan ng ulirat. . . .
which is a few kilometers away from the scene of the accident. A careful and prudent driver
would slow down, put his head lights on and transfer to the lane for slow moving vehicles. This
and asked which version was correct: his statement on cross-examination that after getting out
precaution the defendant failed to take. Instead he recklessly and imprudently continued to
of the truck, he looked around the truck and at the gauge at which time he was hit by the car, or
drive on the left lane without regard to the surrounding circumstances at that time.
his written statement that after coming out of the truck, he got the EWD and he was on his way
to putting it up when he was hit by the car, appellee initially answered that he was confused
Not a portion of the truck-tanker was protruding the asphalted portion of the expressway, (Ibid., p. 25), then later explained that at the time, he was also carrying the EWD but he did not
according to the police investigator. The police investigator testified that when he arrived at the follow Peralta's instructions to set it up (Ibid., p. 27). Farther down his testimony on cross-
scene of the accident he saw the truck-tanker and the car in contact inside the center island. examination, appellee changed his statement again by saying that at the time when he was
looking at the gauge and he was hit by the car, he was not holding anything, not even the EWD,
because he did not follow Peralta's instructions right away (TSN, May 14, 1990, p. 4).
The defendant is liable for the injury sustained by the plaintiff even assuming that a portion of
the truck-tanker was protruding the pavement of the expressway. The accident could have been
prevented had defendant exercised reasonable care in driving his car. He was driving Peralta, on the other hand, testified that after he and appellee got out of the truck, it was he
unreasonably fast even if he could hardly see an object at a distance of ten meters. The truck- (Peralta), who checked the pressure on the gauge and that the he also instructed appellee to put up
tanker was already stationary inside the center island of the expressway. Had defendant the EWD, but he was not sure if appellee followed his instruction, although appellee was able to get
exercised reasonable care and prudence the accident would have been avoided and the the EWD (TSN, May 21, 1990, pp. 4, 16). Concerning the exact moment when appellee was hit by
plaintiff would not have been injured as a consequence. The law provides that whoever by act the car, Peralta's testimony is far from being clear-cut and straightforward. In one breath, he stated
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the that he saw appellee hit by the car (supra). In another, he said he did not see appellee bumped by
damage done. . . . (Art. 2176, Civil Code). the car but that he saw appellant fall down (Ibid., pp. 18, 19 and 20).

24
Peralta's answer to question No. 5 in his written statement, Exhibit C, taken by the police reads, with the Rodils. Had he been injured earlier when the truck-tanker turned turtle, he would, in all
thus: probability, have been taken for treatment much earlier.

31
. . . Kapwa kami hindi nasugatan ng aking kasamang si Fidel Cabardo at kami ay lumabas Second, as the trial court observed:
mula sa trak at inutusan ko si Fidel na kunin iyong aming dala-dalang early warning device
para ilagay sa lugar na di-kalayuan sa aming sasakyan na pinagmulan ng mga sasakyang
The Plaintiff, as passenger of the truck-tanker was seated at the right side of the driver. The driver did
dumadaan. Ng bitbit na ni Fidel iyong early warning device ay nakita ko na lamang (sic) na
not sustain any injury. On the other hand, the plaintiff sustained and was treated of the following
mayroong isang kotse na nag-slide doon sa tinatakbuhan niyang lane ng expressway at
injuries.
tinumbok nitong kotse si Fidel. Nabunggo si Fidel nung kotse at si Fidel ay tumilapon at
tinamaan din ng kotse iyong aming bumaligtad na trak. . . .
If the plaintiff sustained his injuries when the truck-tanker he was riding turned turtle and landed on its
right side in the center island of the expressway, it would not have been on his left knee but in some
In view of the apparent inconsistencies in the statements of appellee and Peralta which cannot be
parts of the body, more especially on the right side that must have came in contact with the door. This
considered as insignificant, their version of the incident can not inspire credence and should not
is the law of gravity, and testimony to the contrary should not be given credence. The plaintiff was
have been given much weight by the court a quo. Where the narration's concern essential facts and
categorical in his testimony that after the car fell on its right side the driver and he came out of the
the very event sought to be established, such inconsistencies cannot inspire belief in the integrity of
truck and he was already looking at the gauge [sic] carrying the EWD when the car hit him. The
the witnesses' testimonies.
defendant, in contrast, did not state categorically that his car did not hit the plaintiff. What defendant
testified was that he did not see a person hit by the car. Moreover, defendant admitted that
There are indeed inconsistencies but these are minor and inconsequential. What is important is that the immediately before the accident he was driving on the left lane at the rate of 60 to 70 kilometers per
statements dovetail in essential details with the testimonies given in court: Petitioner claimed that he was hour and he could hardly see an object at a distance of ten (10) meters because of the heavy rain.
unhurt after their vehicle turned turtle and fell on its side; that he and Jose Peralta, who was driving the
vehicle, got out of the truck-tanker; that he was asked by Peralta to put up the EWD; and that petitioner
Private respondent argues that the petition in this case should be dismissed on procedural grounds. It is
was hurt because he was hit by private respondent's car. Petitioner said in court that he was hit while
not true that the petition does not contain an assignment of errors. There is an assignment of
checking the pressure gauge. It is possible that this happened before he could put up the EWD.
errors, 32 and it is quoted in this opinion.

The statement (Exh. A) that he was hit while in the act of putting the EWD could be a mistake of the police
It is further contended that the motion for extension to file petition was made on behalf of the Consolidated
investigator who took down petitioner's statement. We have noted in a number of cases inaccuracies and
Industrial Gases Inc. This is obviously a mere typographical error made in the title of the motion. A
their causes, but as long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, we have not allowed the
reading of the allegations of the motion for extension shows plainly that it was actually filed on behalf of
resulting inconsistencies to affect our judgment of the credibility of witnesses. Indeed, as we have also
Petitioner Cabardo. 33 Anyway the defect should have been pointed out earlier, instead of only now.
said, "a witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection down to insignificant
and minute details." 29 Nor is the contradiction between petitioner's statement (Exh. A) that he was holding
the EWD when hit by the car and Peralta's testimony in court that he (Peralta) was not sure whether Lastly, petitioner's failure to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping that he undertakes to inform the
petitioner followed his (Peralta's) instruction to put the EWD fatal to his credibility. What is important is that Court of any petition which might be filed, as required under Revised Circular No. 28-91, may be
Peralta said he had instructed petitioner to put the EWD and that petitioner was hurt because he was hit overlooked since it does not appear that any petition related to this case has ever been filed in any other
by private respondent's speeding car. court. On the other hand, to dismiss the petition on this ground would be to uphold technicality over
substantial justice.
It is noteworthy that at the scene of the accident, Peralta told police investigators of the Biñan Police
Station that petitioner had been hit by a car which crashed against their truck-tanker. That was shortly WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and that of the Regional Trial
after the accident and before he had time to invent a story. His statement to the police is reflected in the Court is REINSTATED.
entry made in the police blotter on the day of the accident, which reads: 30
SO ORDERED.
On this date and time indicated above Pfc Jenario Zavalla and Pat Antonio Enriquez of this station
reported a vehicular accident that occurred on or about 12:20 P.M., this dated at the Luzon South
Expressway, Brgy. San Francisco, this locality wherein a Cargo Truck with Plate No. NBG-925 T Pil
'86 owned by CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIAL GASES INCORPORATED with office address at Brgy. 2. NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna and driven by one: JOSE PERALTA y CARUNGAN, 37 yrs old,
resident of same address, holder of Prof-DLR-8972935 was accidentally swerved to the left to avoid FACTS:
hitting the volkswagen running ahead while travelling towards South direction, simultaneously lost Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his
control of its wheel and turned side-down which plunged at the center island of the highway. wife, daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The
tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila on April 22, 1980. The
Indeed, it is more probable that petitioner's injuries were caused by private respondent's car hitting him. ship sailed on the said date. However, in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off
First, as the Court of Appeals itself found, petitioner was taken to a hospital in Biñan, Laguna together the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
25
(PNOC/STC). Tthe M/V Don Juan sank and several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy, action and in allowing the two (2) vessels to come to such close quarters as to render the
some of whose bodies were never found including the respondents’ families. collision inevitable. In addition, the trial court did not merely base its decision on the
Mecenas case and made its own independent findings on the basis of the testimonies of
Ramon Miranda and Spouses Ricardo and Virginia De La Victoria filed a complaint with the RTC witnesses. The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the then Minister of National Defense
against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC finding both vessels to be negligent.
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la
Victoria Miranda, Rosario V. Miranda, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., and Elfreda de la Victoria. Negros 3. No, the total loss of the M/V Don Juan did not extinguish the petitioner’s liability.
Navigation admitted that Miranda purchased tickets, the victims were listed in the passenger In well-settled jurisprudence, it provides that a shipowner may be held liable for injuries to
manifest but denied that the four relatives actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that passengers notwithstanding the exclusively real and hypothecary nature of maritime law if fault
their bodies were never recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy can be attributed to the shipowner. In Mecenas, this Court found petitioner guilty of negligence
and manned by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault in allowing or tolerating the ship captain and crew members in playing mahjong during the
of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City. voyage; in failing to maintain the vessel seaworthy; and in allowing the ship to carry more
passengers than it was allowed to carry. The petitioner was clearly liable for damages to the full
PNOC and Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a compromise agreement whereby extent.
petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of
or in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any liability
to it. EXCEPTIONS: CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents. When raised to the Court iii. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Appeals, the decision was affirmed with modification on the amount of damages. Thus, the
petition with the Supreme Court.
3. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN AND RUBY LIM VS. ROBERTO REYES A.K.A AMAY BISAYA
ISSUE: G.R. No. 154259, Feb. 28, 2005
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals,[2] finding the crew members of petitioner
to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case Facts:
2. Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioners liability Year 1994, Mr. Roberto Reyes, more popularly known as AMAY BISAYA, was having a coffee at
the lobby of Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, where he spotted his friend Dr. Violeta Filart, who was
RULING: going to attend a birthday party at the same place. According to Reyes it was Filart who
1. Yes, the ruling is binding in the case. approached him and invited him to the birthday party of a certain Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka at
the penthouse of the same hotel. When Reyes was lined-up to the buffet table herein petitioner
Following the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere, the Court adhered to the Mecenas Ms. Ruby Lim, the executive secretary of the said hotel, approached him and told him to leave
v. Intermediate Appellate Court case, where it was found that although the proximate cause of the party as he was not invited. Not long after the said conversation between Reyes and Lim, a
the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Makati Policeman approached Reyes and escorted him out of the Hotel. Being put to shame
Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latters master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was and embarrassment Mr. Roberto Reyes, now claims for damages.
playing mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De After trial, the lower court dismissed the case and held that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being
Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing thrown out for attending a party for which he was never invited. On appeal, the Court of
them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court, contending that Mr. Reyes was put in a very
steps to prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the embarrassing situation, that telling him to not finish his food and leave within the hearing distant
abandoning of the ship. Petitioner Negros Navigation was found equally negligent in tolerating of other guests is act which is contrary to morals, good customs for which Mr. Reyes should be
the playing of mahjong by the ship captain and other crew members while on board the ship compensated for the damage that he has suffered as a consequence thereof.
and failing to keep the M/V Don Juan seaworthy so much so that the ship sank within 10 to 15
minutes of its impact. M/V Don Juan, as the faster and better-equipped vessel, could have Issue: Whether or not Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out the party
avoided a collision with the PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if the Tacloban City had
been at fault for failing to observe an internationally-recognized rule of navigation, the Don Held: Yes. According to the Supreme Court, as far as Ms. Lim and Nikko Hotel are concerned,
Juan was guilty of contributory negligence. The Don Juan was more than twice as fast as the any damages which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate
Tacloban City, it carried the full complement of officers and crew members specified for a right done within the bound of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. Furthermore,
passenger vessel of her class and it was equipped with radar which was functioning that the Supreme Court said when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
night. Furthermore, the Don Juans officer on-watch had sighted the Tacloban City on his radar norms enshrined in article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Had it taken seriously its duty of committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is
extraordinary diligence, the collision could have easily been avoided. Don Juan having sighted to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's right but also in
the Tacloban City when it was still a long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive the performance of one's duties. When article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper

26
under articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that disapproval of the application
a law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to is characterized by bad faith.
leave.
As to Cebu Country’s reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria, suffice it to state that
the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, we held that this principle does not apply when
4. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB V. RICARDO ELIZAGAQUE there is an abuse of a person’s right.
G.R. No. 16273 January 18, 2008’
(2) Lastly, in the argument that Cebu Country could not be held jointly and severally liable for
Facts: damages because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondent’s application lacks
Ricardo Elizagaque, Senior Vice-President of Operations of San Miguel Corp. (SMC), was merit.
designated as a special non-proprietary member by SMC, a special company member, of the
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (Cebu Country). The designation was then approved by the board. Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
After this, Elizagaque filed an application for proprietary membership, it was indorsed by Cebu SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully and
Country's two proprietary members one of which is Edmundo Misa. The price for a propriatary knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
share for was around the Php 5 million range, but the president of Cebu Country offered gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal
Elizagaque a share amounting to Php 3.5 million. However, Elizagaque was able to purchase a or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly
share amounting to Php 3 million for a member. Therafter, Elizagaque's application for and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
proprietary membership was deferred, and in the following meeting it was outright denied. members and other persons.
Elizagaque received a letter informing of his application being denied. Misa, then wrote a letter
of reconsideration to the board of Cebu Country, for the reconsidaration of Elizagaque's iv. DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
application and nother letter, this time inquiring for the members of the board who voted
against the application. Both letters received no reply. Elizagaque then goes to the RTC with a 5. PICART vs SMITH (No. 12219. March 15, 1918)
complaint of damages against Cebu Country, which ruled in his favor. Cebu Country then filed
appealed to the CA then a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Facts:
Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge at San Fernando, La Union. Before he had
Issue: gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going
(1) WON Cebu Country is liable for damages; at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. As Smith neared the bridge, he saw a horseman
(2) WON damages is joint and severally. (Picart) on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and
gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback was not
Held: observing the rule of the road.
(1) The Supreme Court found that Cebu Country is liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the same Code. The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, he became anxious
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s applications. due to the unusual apparition or rapidity of the automibile’s approach so he pulled the pony to
This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left.

It bears stressing that the amendment of Cebu Country’s Amended By-Laws requiring the Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side, so he guided his automobile
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the toward his left, which is his proper lane. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, instead of
application form. Cebu Country explained that the amendment was not printed on the veering to the right, Smith continued to approach directly toward the horse without slowing
application form due to economic reasons. Which the SC founnd as a flimsy and unconvincing down. When he had gotten quite near, giving the horse no chance to get to the other side,
excuse. Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced almost twenty Smith quickly turned his car to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
(20) years ago. automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned
its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse was hit by the car and its
It is thus clear that Elizagaque was left in the dark wondering why his application was limb was broken. Hence, it fell and its rider was forcefully thrown off. As a result, the horse died
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was and Picart suffered contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
required. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary attention for several days.
member of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the
very least, they should have informed him why his application was disapproved. Picart sought to recover damages. The Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union
absolved Smith from liability. Hence, Picart appealed.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to Issue: Whether or not the Smith was guilty of negligence.
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. It bears

27
Held: Yes. 6. LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (LADECO) VS. MICHAEL
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider RAYMOND ANGALA
would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was G.R. No. 153076, June 21, 2007
demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In Parties:
the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some Apolonio Deocampo – employee of LADECO and assigned as driver and bodyguard of Manuel
distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to Mendez.
escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had LADECO – Employer of Apolonio Deocampo and owner of the crewcab.
then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate Henry Beneguel – LADECO’s Administrative Officer.
stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass Michael Raymond Angala – Owner of Chevy pick-up which was bumped by the crewcab driver
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the by Apolonio
defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into Bernulfo Borres – Driver of the chevy pick-up owned by Michael Raymond Angala
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature
of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with FACTS:
automobiles, he might get excited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. On May 1993, a chevy pick-up owned by Raymond Angala was bumped by a Datsun crewcab
When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, driver by Apolonio Deocampo. Both vehicles were running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao,
negligent in the eye of the law. Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated Michael Angala sent a demand letter to LADECO for the payment of the damages he incurred
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and but he did not receive any reply. Michael Angala the case against LADECO, Berenguel, and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then Deocampo.
he is guilty of negligence.
Michael Raymond Angala filed a quasi-delict, damages, and attorney’s fees against LADECO,
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must Berenguel, and Deocampo. He alleged that his pick-up was slowing down and was making a
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the f facts left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab.
involved in the particular case… They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to Apolonio Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were both
suggest or warn of danger. running at about 40 kph. The pick-up was running along the outer lane. The pick-up was about
10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the left. Apolonio testified that he tried to avoid
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence the pick-up but was unable to avoid the collision. He further stated that he did not apply the
is clearly established. brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable. Apolonio admitted that he stepped on
the brakes only after the collision. |
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would, in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen
harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable consequence of that course. Under these ISSUES:
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened 1. Whether or not Sec 45 of RA 4136 and Art. 2185 of the New Civil Code apply to this case; and
harm. 2. Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of RULING:
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have 1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that both negligent in this case. Bernulfo Borres was at the outer
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to lane when he executed the u-turn, he should have stayed at the inner lane which is the
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent nearest to the center of the highway. However, Apolonio was equally negligent because he
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant should have slowed down when the pick-up slowed down. The pick-up and the crewcab
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these were the only vehicles on the road, Apolonio could have avoided the crewcab if he was not
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending driving very fast before the collision.
harm and f ails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party. 2. Yes. Since both parties are at fault, the doctrine of last clear chance applies.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to

28
avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. n this case, Deocampo had the The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the
last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Apolonio was driving the rear vehicle, he had very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and there by
full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By
Apolonio had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on
straight ahead. He could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while the part of PLDT.
following the pick-up and he was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step
on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
collision. excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost
everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence,
7. PLDT v. CA and Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban the presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore,
Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
FACTS imputes to PLDT.
Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at
25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts
the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case,
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the presented was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a
lack of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of
Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her a medical report from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even
cheek, while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also shattered. been explain

PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own
negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. [Barte] who 8. ACHEVERA VS. RAMOS (G.R. No. 175172)
should be held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the
terms of their agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from PARTIES: Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo Achevara, and Benigno Valdez
the negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified Elvira Ramos, John Arnel Ramos, and Khristine Camille Ramos
of the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate signs. FACTS: Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep on a national highway in a reckless,
careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’ complaint, saying to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos.
that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto RTC’s The injuries sustained by Arnulfo caused his death, notwithstanding prompt medical assistance.
decision. Cresencia was the operator of a passenger jeep which was driven by Benigno during the
incident wherein Arnulfo, the husband of Elvira, died.
ISSUE WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban.
Elvira her two minor children, namely, John Arnel and Khristine Camille, then filed with the RTC of
HELD: NO Ilocos Sur a complaint for damages under Article 21763 of the Civil Code against Cresencia and
her husband Alfredo along with the driver Benigno for the death of Arnulfo.
The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not
imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen Elvira and her children alleged that Crescencia failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep and sought to recover
to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had damages. Cresencia, Alfredo, and Benigno claim that Benigno was driving southward at a
not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, moderate speed when he saw an owner type jeep coming from the south and heading north,
he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision,
made him see the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft Benigno drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the
high and 1-1/2 ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the
many previous times. passenger jeep. They claim that it was Arnulfo who was careless and negligent in driving a motor
vehicle which clearly had a mechanical defect.

29
Testimonies of various witnesses from each side were taken. One of which was that taken from v. FORTUITOUS EVENT
SPO3 De Peralta who said that he saw Arnulfo driving in a zigzag manner. Alfredo claimed that
they exercised due diligence in the selection of Benigno as their employee, requiring the latter to 9. ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN
show his professional license and they likewise investigated on his personal background, training ELECTRONICS, INC.
and experience as a driver. They also had an apprenticeship which required Benigno to drive G.R. No. 107968. October 30, 1996
from Metro Manila to Tagaytay
City, and then back to Metro Manila for a day. Benigno also never had a traffic violation. Facts:
Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is engaged in the
The trial court ruled in favor of Elvira holding that the doctrine of last clear chance was rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Motobilkote. Private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc.,
applicable to this case. Applying the said doctrine, where both parties are guilty of negligence, through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to petitioners shop for
but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the rustproofing. On April 30, 1991, the car was brought to his shop at 10 am and was ready for
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is release later that afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing. On
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other the next day, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his
party. The doctrine of last clear chance, as applied to this case, implied a contributory Motobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including
negligence on the part of the late Arnulfo Ramos, who knew of the mechanical defect of his private respondent’s car. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from
vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed the same decision with modification, reducing the theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was simply not enough
amount of damages awarded. time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which had been saved because they
ISSUE: Whether or not the Acheveras and Benigno Valdez are liable to the Ramoses for damages were parked near the entrance of the garage. On May 8 1991, Private respondent sent a letter
incurred as a result of the vehicular accident. to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. Petitioner, in its reply,
denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event.
RULING: No, the Acheveras and Benigno Valdez are not liable. Private respondent filed a suit against the petitioner for the value of its vehicle and for damages.
Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have the petitioner, citing petitioner’s failure to register his business with the Department of Trade and
acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.
certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class
of risks. Petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss which he alleged
was due to a fortuitous event. He testified that he employed an electrician who regularly
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing shop. He claimed that he had installed
Arnulfo continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its fire-fighting devices and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid
mechanical defect, while Benigno did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road of any negligence on his part. He further averred that private respondent’s car was ready for
upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Arnulfo—perhaps because it still kept to its lane and Valdez release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it was respondent delay in claiming it
did not know the extent of its mechanical defect. However, when the owner-type jeep that was the cause of the loss. He explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered materials underneath motor vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and that the materials
the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was at this and chemicals used for this purpose are not inflammable. Therefore, he could not be made to
point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was assume the risk of loss due to fire. He claimed that he was not required to register his business
Valdez who had the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep with the Department of Trade and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.
towards the right shoulder of the road. Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents which contended that the failure of defendant
to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply where the party charged is required to act [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire, even as it
instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after ruled that the business of rustproofing is definitely covered by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did
the peril is or should have been discovered. Even if it can be said that it was Benigno who had not register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his customers. As already
the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondentP252, 155.00 with interest at 6% per
lane of the passenger jeep, he no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision. annum from the filing of the case and attorney’s fees in the amount of P10, 000.00.

Both Arnulfo and Benigno failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of trial court and ruled that the provisions of the Civil
prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the gross negligence Code relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable to this case, and that the law applicable
of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause to the case is P.D. No. 1572, the purpose of which is to protect customers who entrust their
of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the properties to service and repair enterprises. CA held that by virtue of the provisions of P.D. No.
Civil Code. 1572 and it’s implementing rules and regulations which require fire insurance coverage prior to
accreditation, owners of service and repair enterprises assume the risk of loss of their customer’s
property.

30
While it is true that a common carrier has such obligation under Article 1736, it should be pointed
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was required to insure his business and the vehicles received out that the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that
by him in the course of his business and, if so, whether his failure to do so constituted negligence, may be caused to the shipment under clause 14 of their agreement stating:
rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured against.
"Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk'
Held: Yes. Petitioner is liable for loss due to his failure to comply with statutory duty. Supreme unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss
Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals. It was held that violation of a statutory duty is or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war;
negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, SC held the owner of a furniture public enemies; x x x fire x x x."
shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which started in his establishment in
view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In The same stipulation is valid and binding between the parties. There is nothing therein that is
Teague v. Fernandez, SC stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented contrary to law, morals or public policy. The stipulation is a mere iteration of the basic principle of
by the ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act law written in Article 1174 of the Civil Code:
negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death. "Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared
by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person
Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. Petitioner's negligence is the source of were inevitable."
his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to
negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is Where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the
therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. There is nothing in the record to show that
event, since it was petitioner’s negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the the carrier incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had
proximate cause of the loss. Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises for not only notified Clara and Amparo of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the
motor vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and Industry. same be withdrawn.

Phil. Steam or its employees cannot be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in
10. SERVANDO VS. PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO. the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made
G.R. Nos. L- 36481-2 with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by
the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no
PARTIES: Amparo C. Servando, Clara Uy Bico, control whatsoever over the same.
Philippine Steam Navigation Co.

FACTS:
Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel, FS-176, for 11. SCHMITZ TRANSPORT & BROKERAGE CORPORATION vs. TRANSPORT VENTURE, INC., INDUSTRIAL
carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental certain cargoes such as rice, paper, INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and BLACK SEA SHIPPING AND DODWELL now INCHCAPE SHIPPING
toys, and general merchandise. Bills of lading for the cargoes were issued by Philippine Steam SERVICES
Navigation (Phil. Steam). Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, the cargoes were G.R. No. 150255. April 22, 2005.*
discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At
about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown
origin, destroying the cargoes. Before the fire, Clara was able to take some of the cavans of rice FACTS:
because of that, her claims for the value of the goods was rejected by Phil. Steam. They then SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V "Alexander
filed a case against Phil. Steam for damages due to their lost goods. Saveliev" (a vessel of Russian registry and owned by Black Sea) 545 hot rolled steel sheets in coil.
The cargoes, which were to be discharged at the port of Manila in favor of the consignee, Little
The trial court ruled in favor of Clara and Amparo ordering Phil. Steam to pay them. Article 1736 Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant), were insured against all risks with Industrial Insurance
of the Civil Code was applied in leading to such decision noting that common carriers the duty Company Ltd. (Industrial Insurance). Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation (Little Giant) hired
to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in Schmitz Transport, to secure the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes—hot rolled steel
their possession until it is delivered to the consignee or whoever shall receive the same. sheets in coil, from the shipside, and to deliver them to its warehouse. Little Giant also engaged
the services of Transport Venture Inc., (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside. During
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Steam Navigation Co. is liable for the loss of the goods. which the weather condition had become inclement due to an approaching storm, the
unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. No tugboat pulled the barge back
RULING: No, Philippine Steam is not liable. to the pier, however. Due to strong waves, the crew of the barge abandoned it and transferred
to the vessel. The barge pitched and rolled with the waves and eventually capsized, washing
the 37 coils into the sea. After a while, a tugboat finally arrived to pull the already empty and

31
damaged barge back to the pier. Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and received for transportation until they
and Industrial Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile. Little Giant thus filed a formal were delivered actually or constructively to consignee Little Giant. The delivery of the goods to
claim against Industrial Insurance. Little Giant thereupon executed a subrogation receipt in favor the consignee was not from "pier to pier" but from the shipside of "M/V Alexander Saveliev" and
of Industrial Insurance. Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI, into barges, for which reason the consignee contracted the services of petitioner. Since Black
and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape before the RTC of Manila, for the recovery of Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little Giant, through petitioner, it had
the amount it paid to Little Giant plus adjustment fees, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses. discharged its duty.
Industrial Insurance faulted the defendants for undertaking the unloading of the cargoes while
typhoon signal No. 1 was raised in Metro Manila.
EXCEPTIONS: McKee vs IAC
ISSUES: vi. PRESCRIPTION, Art. 1146
(1) Whether the loss of the cargoes was due to a fortuitous event, independent of any act of vii. DILIGENCE OF GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY
negligence on the part of petitioner Black Sea and TVI, and viii. RES JUDICATA
(2) If there was negligence, whether liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea, petitioner and ix. WAIVER
TVI.

HELD:

(1) NO, the loss of the cargoes was not due to a fortuitous event. In order, to be considered a
fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must
be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito,or if it can be foreseen it
must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. [T]he principle embodied in
the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence
of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether
due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. The appellate court, in
affirming the finding of the trial court that human intervention in the form of contributory
negligence by all the defendants resulted to the loss of the cargoes, held that unloading outside
the breakwater, instead of inside the breakwater, while a storm signal was up constitutes
negligence. It thus concluded that the proximate cause of the loss was Black Sea’s negligence
in deciding to unload the cargoes at an unsafe place and while a typhoon was approaching.

(2) Petitioner and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the cargoes but no liability may attach to
Black Sea. TVI’s failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might
have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but was the proximate
cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating
for a considerable number of hours, at such a precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing
that the barge does not have any power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of
the sea. That it was nighttime and, therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be
charging overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat. As for petitioner, for
it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article 1739 of the Civil Code, prove that it
exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before, during and after the occurrence
of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods. While
petitioner sent checkers and a supervisor on board the vessel to counter-check the operations
of TVI, it failed to take all available and reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting
that TVI failed to arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea
conditions, it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend help, but it did not.
As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time the goods were

32
CECILIO PE, ET AL, vs. ALFONSO PE the car’s trunk. While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962 was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated, and she
was thrown against the windshield of Li’s car and then fell to the ground.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe. Lolita was 24 years old and She was confined in the UERM Medical Memorial Center for 20 days, and her leg was
unmarried. Alfonso Pe, was a Chinese national, and a married man. He was an adopted son of amputated and was replaced with an artificial one. The expenses for the confinement
a Chinaman who was a collateral relative of Lolita’s father. The plaintiffs averred that Alfonso (P120,000) and the artificial leg (P27,000) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. They became close and eventually fell in love, to which Lolita’s parents adamantly The trial court found Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of
objected to. the Civil Code. It also held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable
for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters and one day she disappeared. Her brothers and
sisters discovered that her clothes were gone, as well as a note from Alfonso regarding a date The CA held that there was ample evidence that Valenzuela’s car was properly parked beside
that they would have on that day. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police and the sidewalk when it was bumped by Li’s car, but absolved Li's employer from any liability
the NBI. towards Valenzuela. It found that Li’s testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 kph is
self-serving and was in fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that Li was driving
Plaintiffs brought an action before the CFI to recover damages from Alfonso based on Article 21 on a very fast speed, was noticeably intoxicated and Li’s car was zigzagging.
of the NCC. CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to prove that
Alfonso, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s ISSUES:
affection. Hence, this appeal. 1. Whether or not Li was guilty of negligent
2. Whether or not Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence
ISSUE: W/N Alfonso is liable for damages – YES 3. Whether or not Alexander Commercial as Li's employer should be held liable

RATIO: The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to HELD:
any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the 1. YES. As between Li’s self-serving asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not
latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant even know the victim personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the similar to his testimony to the investigator, the latter’s testimony deserves greater weight.
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two Valenzuela’s version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested witness,
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan Rodriguez, owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the
but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit accident. He testified that he observed a car being driven at a very fast speed and that he
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their was standing in front of his establishment when he saw the car hit Valenzuela. He then
house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against crossed the street and noted that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted from
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with the offending car. Also, he declared that Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation.
from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit 2. NO. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family required to conform for his own protection. However, under the "emergency rule,” an
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
of the new Civil Code. much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his
own negligence.

VALENZUELA v. CA A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be
faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a
FACTS: hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a
At 2am of June 24, 1990, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving along Aurora Blvd. with a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her.
companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards Manila. Having noticed that she had a flat tire,
she parked along the sidewalk about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights and opened

33
Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials
not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park
her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Blvd. was not of her own making, and it was evident that The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing private respondent
she had taken all reasonable precautions. of participation in the anomalies.

3. YES. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator submitted a report
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, Alexander Commercial, based on finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be
the principle of bonus pater familias, is jointly and severally liable with Li. conducted.

Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it Nevertheless Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company filing of criminal charges against him.
car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents
gave full and unlimited use of a company car. pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime
report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in
The relationship in question is not based on the principle of resppndeat superior, which holds the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of
the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that
the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial
its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed
relieve him of the liability imposed by Art. 2180. However, the case at bench presents a against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while
situation of a character involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their the fifth was for of Article 290 of’ the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
employees of managerial rank or their representatives. Also, Li’s claim that he was on the Correspondence). All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.
road on the night of the accident because he was coming from a social visit with an
officemate was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below and In the meantime Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been
was obviously self-serving. terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor
arbiter’s decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners’ appeal from the NLRC
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs. CA and Tobias ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter’s decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor’s order with
G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989 the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and
private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter’s
Facts: complaint for illegal dismissal.
Respondent. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the RETELCO. However, petitioner Hendry, without
engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. MACKAY due to dishonesty.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
them his immediate superior Ferraren and to petitioner Hendry who was then the Executive Vice- malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment in
President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY. favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the
One day after Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was CA. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages.
the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
When private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went
up to him and called him a “crook” and a “swindler.” Tobias was then ordered to take a lie Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

34
Ruling: The petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias
YES who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry “showed
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of belligerence..” This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private
their right to dismiss private respondent. respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter’s reaction towards the
former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners’ abusive manner in that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered. the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-
handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of “some basic reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the on after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry
stability of the social order.” Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 who said. “Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company.”
which provides:
Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted some time
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, later, the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. If the dismissal is done abusively, then
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias,
the performance of one’s duties. giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter’s termination from work. after the filing of
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias’ protestations by telling him to just
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail.
for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not Hendry added that, “You Filipinos cannot be trusted.” The threat unmasked petitioner’s bad faith
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about
Article 21 would be proper. Filipinos as well as Hendry’s earlier statements about Tobias being a “crook” and “swindler” are
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that: clear violations of ‘Tobias’ personal dignity
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same. The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO .Because of
the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias,
they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides Petitioners, however, contend that they have a “moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
that: employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was.” Petitioners
further claim that “it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter’s life, honor or property. And this
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. includes warning one’s brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting
into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect” These arguments, rather than
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid justify petitioners’ act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even
test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
legal and factual circumstances called for its application, the question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant cannot be “penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries
damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

35
and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the
money” Civil Code provides that “[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence,” the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways,
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to Inc., ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason
the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad
prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by
petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by
a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that the charges were false and groundless.

In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS ROMEO JADER
filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by 327 SCRA 804
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the FACTS:
eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners In 1987, Romeo Jader was a graduating law student at the University of the East. He failed to
were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias. take the regular examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade
(INC). He enrolled for the second semester as a fourth-year student and filed an application for
XX (on damages) the removal of the incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive.
It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable In the meantime, the faculty members and the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth-
tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the year students should be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name appeared on the tentative list, he
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory also attended the investiture ceremonies and later he gave blowout celebrations. He thereafter
language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to
RETELCO which resulted in Tobias’ loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the take the 1988 bar examinations because his academic requirements were not complete
criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds because it appears that his INC rating was not removed.
that, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was
reasonable under the circumstances. Then, he sued the University of East for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights, when he was not able to take
NOTES: the 1988 bar examinations arising from the University of East ’s negligence. He prayed for an
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
damnum absque injuria. It is argued that “[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff
(private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed ISSUE: Whether University of East should be held liable for damages for misleading a student into
from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the
herein). case.

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute HELD: Yes.
a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no The Supreme Court held that University of East is liable for damages. It is the contractual
application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each
the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate.
damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be
was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of
petitioners. right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in
a case that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages MANILA GAS VS CA
are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.” Hence, the CA committed
no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias FACTS:
. Ongsip applied for gas service connection with Manila Gas Corporation and subsequently, a
year after, he requested that Manila Gas shall install additional appliances as well as additional

36
gas service connections in his apartment within the same compound. An employee of Manila The municipal councilor’s act of hitting the priest on the face caused mental anguish, moral
Gas went to the premises and changed the gas meter and installed new tube connections shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. It is of no moment that he had done so without
without the consent of Ongsip. Thereafter, the said employees returned with a photographer bad faith, or that he claimed that it was only accidental. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
who took pictures of the premises. The employees said that there had been a by-pass valve and court’s findings that there was an existing feud between the families of the parties, and that
they are asking money from Ongsip. Bienvenido slapped Fr. Rafael’s face, without provocation and in the presence of several
persons.
Then, Manila Gas filed a criminal case against Ongsip. Pending investigation of the criminal
complaint, petitioner disconnected the respondent’s gas service for alleged failure or refusal to
pay his gas consumptions. But were dismissed eventually, prompting Ongsip to file a civil action AMERICAN EXPRESS VS. CORDERO
against Manila Gas.
Facts:
ISSUE: Whether or not Ongsip is entitled to a moral and exemplary damages Respondent, together with his wife, Nilda, daughter, sisters-in-law and uncle-in-law, went on a
three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop. Noel picked
HELD: The Court held Yes. But in the awarding of damages, we must give due consideration to up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express extension
respondent Ongsip’s social and financial status as a businessman and the mental anguish he charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card by making a telephone
suffered as a result of the false imputation. However, We also consider petitioner’s financial call to the American Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later, the store manager, emerged
capability. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose primary concern is service to the from behind the counter and informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card.
people, the profit motive being merely secondary. Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This,
according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that it was
Furthermore, in the second contention in the act of disconnecting respondent’s gas service done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter.
without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The
prematurity if the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering When they returned to the Excelsior Hotel, Nilda called up petitioners Office in Hong Kong. She
to private respondent. And is a ground for awarding of moral damages. was able to talk to Senior Authorizer, who informed her that, a person in Hong Kong attempted
to use a charge card with the same number as respondents card. The Hong Kong American
Express Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in Manila and not in
PATRICIO VS. HON. OSCAR LEVISTE. Hong Kong, placed his card in the Inspect Airwarn Support System. This is the system utilized by
FACTS: petitioner as a protection both for the company and the cardholders against the fraudulent use
Rafael Patricio was an ordained Catholic priest and was appointed Director General of the 1976 of their charge cards.
Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. On the evening of the benefit-dance, Fr. Rafael was accompanied by
two policemen, to check on the watchers of the gate. When the Watsons sales clerk called up petitioners Hong Kong Office, its representative said he
wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the latters identity, pursuant to the procedure
Bienvenido Bacalocos, was also present near the gate. He was the president of the barangay observed under the Inspect Airwarn Support System. However, respondent refused.
captains in Pilar, and thus occupied a seat as a municipal councilor. He was in a state of Consequently, petitioners representative was unable to establish the identity of the
drunkenness. He struck a bottle of beer on the table, injuring his hand. Bienvenido then cardholder. This led to the confiscation of respondents card.
approached the priest in a hostile manner, and asked the priest if he had seen his wounded
hand. Respondent filed, a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed for the award of moral
damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the humiliation he
Before the priest could respond, Bienvenido hit the priest’s face with his bloodied hand. A suffered.
commotion ensued thereafter, and Bienvenido was brought to the municipal building.
Issue: WON the Petitioner is liable for damages against the Respondent.
The criminal complaint against Bienvenido, for slander by deed was dismissed by the Municipal
Trial Court. A second case for damages was later brought by the priest, where the court ruled in Held: NO.
his favor. Bievenido was liable to the priest for moral damages, as a result of physical suffering, Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following provision of the Civil Code:
moral shock and social humiliation as a result of the incident.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the priest. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
for the damage.” provisions of this Chapter.

37
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for
quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping
tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, HELD: No. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
the damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales
clerk of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are
determine that respondent is indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of
breaches the contract can be attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners representative. recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute
an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
To be sure, pursuant to the above stipulation, petitioner can revoke respondents card without
notice, as was done here. It bears reiterating that the subject card would not have been Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified himself does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part "communication" to a point of absurdity.
of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.

PASTOR TENCHAVEZ vs VICENTA ESCAÑO


SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
FACTS:
Pastor Tenchavez married Vicenta Escaño on February 24, 1948 in Cebu City.
FACTS: As of June, 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged.
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of On June 24, 1950, Escaño left for the US. On August 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada. On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escaño married an American Russel
manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and Leo Moran in Nevada.
public policy."1 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against
P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's Vicente Escaño and her parents, Mamerto and Mina Escaño. The parents were charged with for
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of allegedly dissuading Vicenta from joining Tenchavez to be her husband, and alienating her
the confrontation made by petitioner. affections.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta’s Escaño are liable against Tenchavez for allegedly alienating the
Court of Pasay City for violation of RA 4200. affections and influencing the conduct of their daughter against Tenchavez.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial court granted. The private RULING: NO. That the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court which referred the original suit for annulment or her subsequent divorce are not supported by credible evidence.
case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals declared the trial court’s order null and void That no re-celebration of the marriage ceremony was had was not due to defendants Mamerto
and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration. Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it.

38
that there can be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents unquestionably caused them a legal duty. In that instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. since the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to
legal injury or wrong. Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery
While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless of damages.
in the face of the proven facts and circumstances.

LAGON V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. 119107, March 18, 2005

Facts: DELFIN G. VILLARAMA vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC.
Jose Lagon (petitioner) purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court, G.R. No. 106341 September 2, 1994
two parcels of land. Menandro Lapuz (private respondent) claims that he previously entered
into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi in which one of the provisions agreed upon “Sexual harassment abounds in all sick societies. It is reprehensible enough but more so when
was for Lapus to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. inflicted by those with moral ascendancy over their victims. We rule that it is a valid cause for
The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent Lapus was obligated to pay separation from service.”
Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the
construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was Facts:
allegedly renewed Petitioner Delfin Villarama was employed by private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., as its
Materials Manager. Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-
Lapus filed a complaint for torts and damages, accusing Lagon of inducing the heirs of Bai typist assigned in his department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from work.
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. This prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc., to call Villarama to a
meeting, where Villarama agreed to tender his resignation. Golden Donuts moved swiftly to
Issue: Whether the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of separate petitioner - it approved petitioner's application for leave of absence with pay and
Lapus’ lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which issued an inter-office memorandum advising all concerned that Villarama was no longer
he should be held liable for damages. connected with the company.

Ruling: Later on, however Villarama defaulted on the agreement. Still, Golden Donuts terminated
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his Villarama prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in that Labor Arbiter held that due process was not observed in the dismissal of petitioner and there was
provision is known as interference with contractual relations. The interference is penalized no valid cause for dismissal.
because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should
result therefrom. Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 16, 1992,
public respondent reversed the decision of the labor arbiter.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid down the elements of tortuous Hence this petition.
interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the
part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person Issue: Whether there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.
without legal justification or excuse.
Ruling: Yes, The court held that petitioner committed immoral acts hence he should be dismissed
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court found the contention of Lagon meritorious. He from service due to the sexual harassment charges against him.
conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious
circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any The records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him. Initially, he
conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire property’s title bore no voluntarily agreed to be separated from the company. He took a leave of absence preparatory
indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no to this separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr. Prieto which
record of the same. In sum, the Court ruled that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated claiming the seriousness of
Lagon liable for tortuous interference are present, the latter cannot be made to answer for his offense would not warrant his separation from service. Needless to stress, he cannot complain
Lapus’ losses. there was no valid cause for his separation.

This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the legal invasion of Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It
a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. The Court held can be proved by substantial evidence which is present in the case at bench. The Solicitor

39
General is correct when it ruled that petitioner not only failed to act accordingly as a good
father of the family because he was not able to maintain his moral ascendancy and authority Issues:
over the group in the matter of morality and discipline of his subordinates, but he actively 1. Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
facilitated the commission of immoral conduct of his subordinates by driving his car into the done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
motel. As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed 2. Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
to live up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. Administrative Code
And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides justifiable Ruling:
ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every 1. On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a
employer to protect its employees from over sexed superiors. person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of
his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
As to the monetary awards which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it
The public respondent erred in awarding separation pay of P17,000.00 as indemnity for his would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
dismissal without due process of law. The award of separation pay is proper in the cases monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, and in cases where there is illegal damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope
dismissal (for lack of valid cause) and reinstatement is no longer feasible. But this is not to state of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
that an employer cannot be penalized for failure to give formal notice and conduct the
necessary investigation before dismissing an employee. Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad
Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. There was no bad faith or faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of
malice on the part of private respondent in terminating the services of petitioner. Petitioner is the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized
entitled, however, to his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay, as held by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly
by the labor arbiter. These are monies already earned by petitioner and should be unaffected violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
by his separation from the service. the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO, CORP. capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where
said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public
Facts: officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway
as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally 2. On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law,
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per
pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are
brands were already covered. cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not
by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
the right to equal protection of the laws. whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and
within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. vs.
ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA,
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.
ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or G.R. No. 163087, February 20, 2006
bad faith.

Hence this appeal. FACTS:

40
On January 10, 1988, Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at (9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn of January 11, 1988, she heard searches and seizures;
pounding sounds outside, prompting her to open the door of the locker room upon which she xxxx
saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. She even saw one of the (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
men hid something behind his back. She then closed the door and went back to bed. Soon As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects
after she heard the door of the union office opened. against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and
democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether
In the morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against. As the Code Commission
the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. noted,
xxxx
Soluta thus immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a (3) Direct and open violations of the Penal Code trampling upon the freedoms named are
locksmith, Efren Guevarra, who tried to assist him, Edna, Arnold Ilustrisimo and Ed Bautista open not so frequent as those subtle, clever and indirect ways which do not come within the pale
the door. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting of the penal law. It is in these cunning devices of suppressing or curtailing freedom, which are
Soluta and his companions, drawing them to run to the female locker room, and to thereafter not criminally punishable, where the greatest danger to democracy lies. The injured citizen
proceed to the Engineering Office where they called for police assistance. will always have, under the new Civil Code, adequate civil remedies before the courts
because of the independent civil action, even in those instances where the act or omission
While awaiting the arrival of the police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latter’s request, met. At the complained of does not constitute a criminal offense.
meeting, Panlilio told Babay that they proceed to the union office where they would settle the
mauling incident, to which Babay replied that the door of the office could not be opened. The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private
Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is
Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice
asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of
flowering tops. individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police
conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers, namely:
Babay, Isaac Asuncion, Jr., Soluta, Teodoro Gimpayan, Vicenta, Edna, Arnulfo Ilustrisimo, Irene MVRS PUBLICATIONS VS. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES
Velarde, Joselito Santos, Renato Lina, Avelino Meneses, Matilla, and Norman Agtani 9 was filed G.R. No. 135306, Jan. 28, 2003
before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179 (The Dangerous Drugs Act). FACTS:
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than 70 Muslim
Hence a Complaint was filed with the RTC of Manila for violation of RA 6425. RTC acquitted the religious organizations, filed a complaint for damages against MVRS Publications, Inc., arising
accused. Soluta and his fellow union officers, together with the union, thereafter filed before the from an article, which reads:
Manila RTC a Complaint against petitioners et al. including prosecuting Fiscal Jose Bautista and
Atty. Eduardo Tutaan who assisted in the prosecution of the case against them, for malicious "ALAM BA NINYO?
prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. RTC found the
petitioners liable for damages. On appeal with the CA, the CA upheld the RTC decision with Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
modification that the accused were civilly liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code and not for
Malicious Prosecution. Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na
sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it rendered petitioner civilly liable under Art. 32 of the NCC in sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na
citing People vs. Aruta? tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

RULING: ISSUE: W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action
Article 32 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly HELD: The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for defamation.
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: DEFAMATION DEFINED:
xxxx

41
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure "Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and
derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some jurisdictions, refers
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show,
among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable
GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION: person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of
action, not simply a matter of damages.
…where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that
the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats,
the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage
separately, if need be…. had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a
certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are
The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard
any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.
Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting
in damages.
VESTIL VS IAC
The action likewise is not for emotional distress.
FACTS:
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS v. DEFAMATION: Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of Purita and Agustin Vestil in the
house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was rushed to the Cebu
Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted
character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, the child died. The cause of death
the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming was certified as broncho-pneumonia. The Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were
there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which includes harm to social liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente
reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the
standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in TRIAL COURT: Dismissed the complaint
Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the
present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for IAC: The Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under
defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had
properly belongs. died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof.

WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER: VESTIL: insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate
has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property.
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct ISSUE: whether or not Purita Vestil is liable for damages under Article 2183 of the Civil Code
was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme RULING: What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the
and severe. house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Article 2183 reads as
follows:
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

42
only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who On August 28, 1995, the Court En Banc promulgated judgment in the case of Metal Forming
has suffered damage. Corporation v. Office of the President, etc., et al., dismissing the petitioner's appeal and affirming
the decision of the Office of the President dated April 30, 1993. The latter decision in turn
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is hardly credible. She affirmed that of the Department of Trade and Industry rendered on May 29, 1991 in an
said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him and maintained administrative case initiated against Metal Forming Corporation (hereafter MFC) by complaint of
themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement. There is contrary evidence the spouses Virgilio M. del Rosario and Corazon Paredes-del Rosario.
that the occupants of the house were boarders who paid the Vestils for providing them with
meals and accommodations. Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of Purita herself, Facts:
categorically declared that the Vestils were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness 1. Private respondent MFC, in selling the public roofing materials (Banawe Shingles) advertised
was bitten by a dog. Another witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and the same to be “structurally safe and strong” and that the "Banawe Metal Tile structure acts as a
that the Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps" The
advertisement prompted the Del Rosario’s to buy Banawe Shingles and have them installed at
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente their residence. However, two months after its complete installation, portions of the Del Rosario’s
Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of roof were blown away by the strong wings of typhoon “Ruping.”
the incident in question. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente
Miranda and until the incident in question occurred. 2. The Del Rosarios' filed a complaint charging private respondent Metal Forming Corporation
(MFC) with violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising,
The Vestils also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc."
Theness, there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof. The death certificate
declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia. The Court need not involve itself in an extended After due proceedings, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) declared that MCF had
scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of indeed misrepresented its product because "as the records showed," strong winds actually blew
death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a off part of the structure/roof of the Del Rosario Spouses and the same acted in parts (instead of
result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused as a single unit) when strong winds blew, a part remaining while another part was blown off.
her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was
bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo. The link between the dog bites MFC was ordered to pay an "administrative fine of P10,000 " (within 10 days from finally of the
and the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. Death certificate is not decision), otherwise its "business name and registration ** would be deemed suspended and its
conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of establishment closed until the fine was fully paid."
the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince the SC that she died because she was bitten by
the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. 3. The decision of the DTI (of May 29, 1991) was, on appeal, affirmed in toto by the Office of the
President on April 30, 1993; and the latter judgment was in turn affirmed by this Court on August
Vestils’ contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not 28, 1995 with a modification solely as to the fine, which was reduced to P5,000. In said judgment
acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal of August 28, 1995, this Court, stressing that the factual findings of such administrative bodies as
should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either the Office of the President are generally to be accorded respect, if not indeed invested with
that, as the Vestils also contend, the dog was tame or was merely provoked by the child into finality, pronounced as correct that Office's ruling, among others, that “although the occurrence
biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as of a typhoon is a fortuitous event, . . . it cannot efface the fundamental fact that (petitioner)
they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, Theness was only three years old at the time acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence in failing to deliver the necessary accessories for
she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal. the proper installation of the structure. . . and actually installed inferior roofing materials at
(private respondents') residence, in violation of the proper installation procedure expressly
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on specified in the former's brochures and advertisements for installation..”
the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is
based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for It appears that MFC replaced and repaired the roof free of charge, evidently acknowledging
his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. that the damage was covered by its one-year warranty on the materials and the installation. The
repair work was observed and analyzed by the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., which was
engaged by the Del Rosarios to determine the cause of the destruction. The repair; work was
Virgilio M. Del Rosario v. CA begun on October 23, 1989, with the delivery of replacement tiles, and completed on
G.R. No. 118325, January 29, 1997 November 7, 1989. Thereafter the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc. submitted its report to the
Del Rosarios, dated November 8, 1989, in which it made the following conclusion:
Petitioners: Virgilio M. Del Rosario and Corazon Paredes-Del Rosario
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Metal Forming Corporation The "Banawe" metal tiles which were detached from the roof trusses were not fastened with two
(2) wood screws on each metal cleat as required but only with a single wood screw or a
Case: combination of a single wood screw and a 1-inch nail which is contrary to the design and

43
specification. We have observed during the course of repai(r) works that some "Banawe" metal
tiles installed were no longer than the roof span, hence there is overlapping on the ridge roll/hip. Issue:
It is very evident that the original subcontractor (which we were not able to identify) were in 1. Whether or not there is privity of contract between the parties (YES)
haste to complete the project. . . . 2. Whether or not upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to the
Del Rosarios for the damage caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of
4. MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario shingles purchased from and installed by the former, was blown away by a typhoon
Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted the latter to (YES, PARTIAL)
commence a civil action against MFC on April 16, 1990 in the RTC of Manila. In this suit, the
spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages resulting from the events just narrated, Held:
contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its 1. Whether or not there is privity of contract between the parties (YES)
electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. The
plaintiff spouses reckoned their actual damages at P1,008,003 — "representing the estimated The facts on record — including those set forth in the final judgment of the Court En Banc
cost of the repair, restoration and/or replacement of the damaged areas and items in plaintiffs' involving the same parties, adverted to in the opening paragraph of this opinion, supra. of which
house and the .cost of the inspection conducted by the independent adjuster (engaged by judgment official cognizance may properly be, as it is hereby, taken — constitute adequate
them), with legal interests thereon from 21 February 1990 when defendant (MFL) received the basis for a verdict against MFC.
formal demand from plaintiffs until fully paid." They also prayed for an award to them of moral
damages in the sum of P3,000,000, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000, and All the quibbling about whether Engineer Puno acted as agent of MFC or of the spouses, is
attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000. pointless. The matter is not a factor in determining MFC's liability for its workers' use of inferior
materials and their defective installation of the "Banawe" metal tiles in the roof of the latter's
5. MFC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. It stated that it had no residence. Prescinding from the persuasive proof on record that at all times material and with
contractual relationship with the Del Rosarios since the contract for the purchase and installation regard to the acquisition and installation of the metal tiles or shingles, Puno was in truth acting as
of the roofing, upon which the latter's claims were based, was actually entered into between it contractor of the Del Rosarios and on their instructions, ascertainment of the definite identity of
and another person, Jesus M. Puno (an engineer identified as the Del Rosarios' contractor). The the person who actually ordered the shingles from MFC is utterly inconsequential — it might just
Trial Court denied the motion. MFC assailed that denial in the Court of Appeals, but was as well have been a construction foreman, a trusted domestic, or any friend or acquaintance of
rebuffed; and its recourse to this Court (G.R. No. 95514) was also unsuccessful. the Del Rosarios — in view of the indisputable fact not only (1) that the tiles were delivered to the
Del Rosarios and used in fabricating the roof of their home, but also (2) that it was the employees
Trial then ensued after which RTC ruled in favor of the Del Rosarios in a judgment (November 18, and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the
1991) ordering the defendant MFC to pay: Del Rosarios' home, and (b) undertook and completed the installation thereof. These they did in
bad faith, using inferior materials and assembling them in a manner contrary to MFC's express
Actual Damages - P1,008,003 with legal interest thereon, from June 31, 1990 until fully paid; representations in its brochures and advertisements circulated and broadcast to the general
Moral Damages - P500,000; public — which representations had, in the first place, induced the Del Rosarios to choose the
Exemplary Damages P300,000; and metal tiles in question for their roofing. In fine, since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence,
Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation - P150,000 infringed the express warranty made by it to the general public in connection with the "Banawe"
tiles brought to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty, and
Counter claims filed by the defendant are dismissed. thereby caused them considerable injury, the identity of the individual who actually dealt with
MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery and installation is of little moment.
The Trial Court held the corporation liable for breach of its contract for the supply and installation
of the roofing materials in the Del Rosarios' residence. The Trial Court ruled that there was privity 2. Whether or not upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is answerable to the
of contract between the Del Rosarios and MFC; Engineer Puno acted as MFC's agent in the Del Rosarios for the damage caused to the latter's residence when its roof, made of
signing of the contracts for the supply and installation of the "Banawe'' shingles; hence, the shingles purchased from and installed by the former, was blown away by a typhoon
contract was really between the Del Rosarios and that company. (YES, PARTIAL)

6. MFC appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision promulgated on June 29, 1994. said Turning now to the matter of damages, it is the Del Rosarios' contention that the pecuniary
Court reversed the Trial Court's judgment, It ruled that there was no privity of contract between detriment to their home amounted to P1,008,003, covering not only the destruction of the roof,
the Del Rosarios and MFC and thus the Del Rosarios had no cause of action against MFC for but also substantial harm to the electrical wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wallpaper, wood parquet
breach of warranties, there being no law allowing them to proceed directly against those whom flooring and furniture. They rely on the Report of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc, to which
their contractor had subcontracted to furnish materials and do part of the work that the latter the Regional Trial Court accorded full credit. But that report contains no statement whatever of
was engaged to perform. the amount of the damage. Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the representative of the
Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc., is that his firm had been retained only to determine the
The Del Rosarios appealed, and in this Court expectedly present for resolution, the issue of cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it. A similar aridity as to the amount of the
"'WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A PRIVITY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES,'" damage, unfortunately characterizes the testimony of Atty. Virgilio Del Rosario and the rest of

44
the spouses' proofs. There is therefore no evidentiary foundation upon which to lay an award of Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to
actual damages. The Trial Court's grant thereof must be struck down. Lufthansa German Airlines speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the
vs. CA, et al. promulgated on April 21, 1995, inter alia ruled that: "Actual or Compensatory decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree attorney's fees."
of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have (been) suffered
and on evidence of the actual amount thereof."
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS VS CA
That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the
general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those Facts:
warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in Dagupan City.
award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft
bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances. She brought the said
trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is warranted. bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a
Over a period of about a month, they experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear, result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12
embarrassment and anger. "As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of Appeals, among December 1989 for losses. She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which
other precedents: It is essential . . . in the award of damages that the claimant must have dismissed the same on motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the
satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its CA annulled the orders of the RTC.
causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of
pecuniary estimation are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for Issue:
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer and are allowable only WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be
when specifically prayed for in the complaint. As reflected in the records of the case, the Court treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of the CC which prescribes
of Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial court that petitioners suffered anguish, after six months from delivery of the thing sold.
embarrassment and mental sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its
obligation to petitioners. According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent acted in Held:
wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These pronouncements lay the basis and The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found on
justification for this Court to award petitioners moral and exemplary damages." quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on breach of
warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations in the
This Court also agrees with the Trial Court that exemplary damages are properly exigible of MFC, complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated
"Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
or correction for the public good. While exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter
of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether PEDRO J. VELASCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAM SNYDER, its President;
or not exemplary damages should be awarded." "Exemplary damages are imposed not to JOHN COTTON and HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, its Vice-Presidents; and ANASTACIO A. AGAN, City
enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative Engineer of Quezon City, defendants-appellees.
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." However, the same statutory and jurisprudential G.R. No. L-18390, August 6, 1971
standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts of moral and exemplary damages
fixed by the Trial Court. There is, to be sure, no hard and fast rule for determining what would be
a fair amount of moral (or exemplary) damages, each case having to be governed by its Facts:
attendant particulars. Generally, the amount of moral damages should be commensurate with Appellant Velasco bought 3 adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets,
the actual loss or injury suffered. The Court sees no reason to adopt a different treatment in the DIliman, Quezon City which were zoned out as “first residence” district by Quezon City Council.
case at bar, and accordingly reduces the moral damages from P500,000 to P100,000, and the Appellant sold 2 lots to Meralco and retained the lot farthest form the street where he built his
exemplary damages from P300,000 to P50,000. house. Meralco started construction on the said lots without prior building permit or authority
from Public Service Commission. The facility was built at a distance of 10-20 meters from
Like the adjudication of actual or compensatory damages, the award of attorney's fees must be appellant’s house. The company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but
deleted. The matter was dealt with only in the dispositive portion of the Trial Court's decision. along the side adjoining the appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to
Since the judgment does not say why attorney's fees are awarded, there is no basis for such an interlink wire fence. Plaintiff filed for actionable nuisance against Meralco by the sound
award which should consequently be removed. So did this Court rule, for instance, in Scott emanating from the facility which was actionable under Art. 694 of the Civil Code. Subjection to
Consultants and Resource Development Corp., Inc. vs. CA, et al.: "It is settled that the award of the sound since 1954 had disturbed the concentration and sleep of said appellant, impaired his
attorney's fees is the exception rather than the rule and counsel's fees are not to be awarded health and lowered the value of his property. Wherefore, he sought a judicial decree for the
every time a party wins. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the

45
abatement of the nuisance and asked that he be declared entitled to recover compensatory, unreasonable. Usually it was shown to be of that character. The determining factor when noise
moral and other damages under Article 2202 of the Civil Code. alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary
Trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the sound of substation was unavoidable and did not sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it
constitute nuisance; that it could not have caused the diseases of anxiety neurosis, can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a
pyelonephritis, ureteritis, lumbago and anemia; and that the items of damage claimed by question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions.
plaintiff were not adequate proved. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
However, character and loudness of sound being of subjective appreciation in
Issue: Whether or not the sound emanating from the Meralco facility be considered nuisance. ordinary witnesses, not much help can be obtained from the testimonial evidence. The
statement of Velasco is to plainly biased and too emotional to be of much value, and the
Ruling: Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. estimate of the other witnesses on the point of inquiry are vague and imprecise, and fail to give
In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and a definite idea of the intensity of the sound complained of. To help establish the fact, sampling
appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such was conducted under the instructions of DOH and form Meralco’s electrical laboratory, making
character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary the court rely on quantitative measurements.
sensibilities. However, appellant’s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses’ As to the caused by the noise, Velasco, being a physician, presented medical
testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters evidence, supported by a host of expert witnesses and voluminous literature, laboratory findings
were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the and statistics of income preponderates over the expert evidence of Meralco, not merely
testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were more reliable since they actually treated him, because of its positive character but also because the physicians presented by plaintiff had
unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and actually treated him, while the defense experts had not done so. Thus the evidence of the latter
tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the was to a large extent conjectural. That appellant's physical ailments should be due to infectious
nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the organisms does not alter the fact that the loss of sleep, irritation and tension due to excessive
readings include 52, 54, and 55. noise weakened his constitution and made him easy prey to the infection. However, the
amounts given as damages are considered exaggerated.
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business condition of property or anything else
which: SC reversed in part and affirmed in part the appealed decision. Meralco is hereby
(1)Injuries or endangers the health or safety of others; or ordered to either transfer its substation at South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City, or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; take appropriate measures to reduce its noise at the property line between the defendant
xxx xxx xxx company's compound and that of the plaintiff-appellant to an average of forty (40) to fifty (50)
decibels within 90 days from finality of this decision; and to pay the said plaintiff-appellant P20,
Consequently, when a person suffered from a nuisance made by another and as a 000.00 in damages and P5, 000.00 for attorney's fees. In all other respects, the appealed decision
consequence, the former suffered damages, the latter is made liable to the injuries made by the is affirmed.
said nuisance, following Article 2202 of the Civil Code:

ART. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which CITY OF MANILA VS. GERARDO GARCIA, CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA ET.AL
are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen
by the defendant. FACTS:
Right after the Liberation of Manila, Geraldo Garcia, Carmencita Villanueva and their
The test is whether rights of property of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the companions built houses of second class into parcels of lands in Malate which were owned by
noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit the City of Manila. Such physical occupation was done without the knowledge and consent of
imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact the city officials. Likewise, the construction of houses was done without the required building
devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it permits to be issued by the city government.
within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who though creating a
noise is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it. In 1947, the occupation and possession of the lands was discovered by the City. The defendants
were given permits to occupy but with the label “Lease of Contract” and that they are to be
There can be no doubt but that commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in charged nominal rentals.
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the
enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. It is no defense that skill and care have been When it was time for the expansion of Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School which is the
exercised and the most improved methods and appliances employed to prevent such result. closest government own school to the disputed lands, the Mayor ordered to clear the houses of
The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the Gerardo Garcia and his companions. They were given (30) days to vacate and remove their
opinions that to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and

46
constructions but they refused to leave alleging that they already acquired the legal status of RULING: Judgment Affirmed.
tenancy. (1) The SC held that the shack was a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the
temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its
A civil action was filed against Garcia, Villanueva, et.al and the Court ordered them to vacate location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it
the premises and pay the overdue rentals. An appeal was raised questioning the Court’s constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.
decision on the validity of City Ordinance 4566 appropriating 100 thousand for the construction (2) According to Article 707 of the CC, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall
of new building of the public school. be liable for damages in only two cases: (a) if he causes unnecessary injury; or (b) if an alleged
nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
ISSUE: Whether the Trial Court is correct in its decision that Manila City needs the disputed In the case at bar, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there
government lands for the utilization of a public school. no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it
was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but
THE COURT’S RULING: through a judicial proceeding. The denial of petitioner’s petition for injunction was in effect an
YES, the Trial Court is correct. Although at first there was contradicting decision, the Judge authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.
explained that the reversal of his decision is due to his duty as a court officer to take notice of
the noble purpose of the City Ordinance 4566 in conformity with the Law and justice in
connection with the settled rule that the city’s dominical right is a paramount consideration.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF
The defendants in this case are considered squatters because from the beginning they entered APPEALS
the lands without the consent of the owners and their construction of houses were illegal without G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952
permits. Their claims of valid tenancy are tainted with misrepresentation and fraud because the PARTIES:
previous erroneous “contract of lease” was null and void because Manila Mayors did not have Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. - petitioner
authority to give permits. Guillermo Balandan, Anselma Anila – private respondents, parents of Mario Balandan

The forcible entry to public lands makes one a public nuisance. These squatters hindered and FACTS:
impaired the use of such lands which were necessary to build the extension of the already Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice plant, in whose premises were installed two tanks full
crowded public school. They created obstruction to the city’s exercise of its duty to establish and of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. The factory was fenced but anyone
maintain an adequate educational system for the youth of Manila. The City Ordinance 4566 is could easily enter the premises because the entrance gate was continually open and there was
just a valid exercise of the police power of the city and as such, the city authorities may no guard assigned in the said gate. Also, the tanks didn’t have any fence or top covers.
implement even without the aid of courts.
Private respondents’ son, Mario, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing with and in company of
other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of
FARRALES V. MAYOR OF BAGUIO said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out
G.R. No. L-24245. 11 April 1972. later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning

FACTS: The lower court decided in the favor of the parents stating that that the petitioner is liable for
Farrales was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the damages due to the fact that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and
temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its
a permanent building. She was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the premises, applying the doctrine of attractive nuissance. The CA affirmed it.
permanent building was completed. Instead, not liking the location the city officials gave her,
Farrales built a temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market without ISSUE: Whether the subject water tanks are attractive nuisance
seeking prior permit from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish the shack,
she sought an injunction before the CFI which asked her that she present proper permit. Upon HELD: NO.
failure to comply with the order, the CFI denied the petition for injunction, and the police then The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises dangerous
demolished the shack. instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to
Farrales argues that her stall was not a nuisance and that even if it was a nuisance its not a exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to
nuisance per se, only per accidens a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question
ISSUES: although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender
(1) WON the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance; years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied
(2) WON the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance. invitation to such children

47
American jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not peso account, which had a balance of only P1,362.10 as of October 29, 1979. A letter of RCBC
applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual dated August 9, 1985 stated Chiang’s Current Account No. 12-2009 was opened on February 8,
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the 1979, with an initial deposit of P729,752.20; a total of P728,390.00 was withdrawn by way of five
water tanks themselves do not fall under such doctrine thus, the petitioners cannot be held liable checks respectively dated February 13, 19 and 23, 1979 and October 5 and 29, 1979, apparently
for Mario’s death. issued by petitioner in favor of Papercon (Phils.), Inc., (hereafter, Papercon) one of the herein
private respondents and a business venture of Tom Pek.Thus, the balance of the account was
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive reduced to P1,362.10 as of October 29, 1979 and no transactions were made on the account
nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows: since. In the same letter, the bank stated that it was no longer able to locate the microfilm
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is copies of the issued checks, specimen signature cards, and other records related to the
always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are questioned account, since the account had been inactive for more than five years.
sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any Chiang insisted that he did not cause the transfer of his money to the Shaw Boulevard branch of
new danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance." RCBC.

The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No RCBC alleged that there is no indication from its records of the transfer of US$100,000.00 for
costs. petitioners account from Hang Lung Bank Ltd. through the Pacific Banking
Corporation. However, after Chiang had adduced his evidence, it filed a third-party complaint
HEIRS OF BORLADO V. VDA. DE BULAN against Papercon and Tom Pek, admitting that plaintiff conclusively appeared to have
G.R. 114118 (2001) deposited the sum of US$100,000.00 with the bank and said foreign currency deposit was
converted.
FACTS: April 15, 1942: Serapio Borlado sold the lot to Francisco Bacero. Then on February 1948 his
widow Amparo Dionisio Vda. de Bacero, as legal guardian of her minor children, sold the lot to Tom Pek and Papercon did not deny receiving the checks worth P712,700.00 but argued that
the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon and they declared the lot in the name of unless proven otherwise, the said checks should be presumed to have been issued in their favor
Bulan for Tax Declaration purposes and obtained the continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, for a sufficient and valuable consideration.
adverse and exclusive possession of the lot until November 4, 1972 when heirs of Simeon
Borlado forcibly entered and wrested physical possession from them. On November 23, 1972, the TRIAL COURT: Based on the evidence and arguments before it, the trial court determined that
spouses filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment. The MTC ruled in favor of the spouses. the withdrawals were not made by petitioner nor authorized by him, and held respondent bank
liable for the US$100,000.00 (and the interest thereon from date of filing of the complaint),
The heirs were ordered to vacate the lot and pay 100 cavans of palay annually from 1972 until damages, attorneys fees, and costs. The trial court further concluded that the withdrawals from
they vacate the premises and P5K for attorney’s fees and cost of suit. The Regional Trial petitioners account could not have been made possible without the collusion of the officers and
court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action in a decision. employees of respondent bank.
CA: The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, found that the opening of the current account
ISSUE: Whether the 100 cavans of palay is an acceptable form of damages. and the withdrawals therefrom were authorized by petitioner; accordingly, it reversed the
decision of the RTC and absolved private respondents of liability.
HELD: No, the Supreme Court held that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding
petitioners liable to pay respondents one hundred (100) cavans of palay every year from 1972 Issue: W/ON Chiang had proven the negligence of RCBC
until they vacate the premises of the land in question. Palay is not legal tender currency in the
Philippines. Held: No. RCBC have presented evidence that petitioner did sign and issue these checks. The
testimony of Catalino Reyes that petitioner told him to prepare the checks, and that he saw
Chiang Yia Min vs CA and RCBC petitioner sign these checks and give them to Tom Pek, stands unrebutted.
[G.R. No. 137932. March 28, 2001]
There is thus no evidence to demonstrate that respondent bank and respondents Papercon and
Facts: Tom Pek colluded to defraud petitioner of his money. What the evidence in fact establishes is
Chiang Yia Min alleges that a $100,000 was sent by Hang Lung Bank Ltd. of Hong Kong on that the opening of the account and the withdrawals were authorized by petitioner, and that
February 7, 1979 through the Pacific Banking Corporation to RCBC head office. The remittance the signatures appearing on the questioned checks were petitioners.
was for petitioners own account and was intended to qualify him as a foreign investor under
Philippine laws. As found by the trial court, it was sent by petitioner himself prior to his arrival in the Petitioner, however, insists that respondent bank acted with negligence in opening Current
Philippines. Account No. 12-2009 without properly verifying the identity of the depositor and in contravention
of sound and well-recognized banking procedures. The petition capitalizes on the following
When Chiang checked on his money sometime in mid-1985, he found out that that the dollar purported irregularities surrounding the opening of the account: (1) the alleged depositor never
deposit was transferred to the Shaw Boulevard branch of respondent bank and converted to a appeared at the bank; (2) the person who transacted for the alleged depositor was not shown

48
to have been authorized for that purpose; (3) the application form and other documents
required to open the account were brought out of the bank premises; and (4) the application Issue: Whether or not respondent spouses are entitled to payment of damages.
form, when submitted, was not properly accomplished, but was left blank on most of the
required details. Held:
Yes. Respondent spouses are entitled to payment of damages. The contention of petitioner Bank
The arguments are unmeritorious for failure to show that such irregularities attending the opening that it has a right to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by respondent spouses in its
of the account resulted in the unauthorized withdrawal of petitioners money. The evidence favor as the loan under the real estate mortgage contract had become due and demandable
stands unrebutted that petitioner instructed the opening of the said account and signed the is untenable. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage
pertinent application forms. Quite contrary to petitioners insinuations of fraud or negligence, the indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be foreclosed only when the debt remains unpaid at
evidence indicates that the reason why respondent bank relaxed its rules in handling petitioners the time it is due.
application was because, in addition to having been referred by a well-known client, petitioner
was in a hurry to have the remittance credited to his account. In the case at bar, respondent spouses were constantly paying their loan obligations with
petitioner Bank. It is, therefore, not the fault of respondent spouses that their payment amounting
The person who alleges fraud or negligence must prove it, because the general presumption is to P960,000.00 was not credited to their account. Thus, the loan which was secured by a real
that men act with care and prudence. Good faith is always presumed and it is the burden of the estate mortgage cannot be considered as unpaid so as to warrant foreclosure on the
party claiming otherwise to adduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. No mortgage.
judgment for damages could arise where the source of injury, be it fraud, fault, or negligence,
was not affirmatively established by competent evidence.
Moreover, respondent spouses have not yet defaulted on the payment of their loans. The term
of the loan was from 1982 to 1985. Petitioner Bank filed its application for extrajudicial foreclosure
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES CHUA on 15 October 1984. Indisputably, such application was premature because the respondent
G.R. No. 111584, 17 September 2001 spouses’ loan was not yet due and demandable.

Facts: The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the
Sometime in April 1982, respondent Salvador Chua was offered by Jimmy Rojas (Rojas), manager respondent spouses’ are entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary
of petitioner Producers Bank of the Philippines (Bank), to transfer his account from Pacific damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages, the
Banking Corporation to petitioner Bank. In view of Rojas’ assurances of longer loan terms and court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages
lower rates of interest, respondent spouses opened and maintained substantial savings and according to its discretion. The dishonor of respondent spouses’ checks and the foreclosure
current deposits with the Bacolod branch of petitioner Bank. Respondent spouses also obtained initiated by petitioner Bank adversely affected the credit standing as well as the business
various loans from petitioner Bank, one of which was a loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured dealings of respondent spouses as their suppliers discontinued credit lines resulting in the
by a real estate mortgage and payable within a period of three (3) years from 1982 to 1985. collapse of their businesses.

On 20 January 1984, respondent spouses deposited with petitioner Bank the total sum of The damage to respondent spouses’ reputation and social standing entitles them to moral
P960,000.00, which was duly entered in respondent spouses’ savings account passbook. damages, in accordance with Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
However, petitioner Bank failed to credit this deposit in respondent spouses’ savings account Additionally, the award of exemplary damages is in order in view of the malicious and
due to the fact that its Branch Manager, Sixto Castillo, absconded with the money of the Bank’s unwarranted application for extrajudicial foreclosure by petitioner Bank which was obviously
depositors. Subsequently, petitioner Bank dishonored the checks drawn out by respondent done to harass, embarrass, annoy, or ridicule respondent spouses.
spouses in favor of their various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds despite the fact that
at that time, the balance of respondent spouses’ deposit was in the amount of P1,051,051.19.
Because of this, respondent spouses requested for copies of their ledgers covering their savings DE VERA V. SAN DIEGO CONSTRUCTION
and current accounts, but petitioner Bank refused.
Facts:
Respondent spouses thereafter instituted an action for damages against petitioner Bank. On the Respondent Q.P. San Diego Construction, Inc. (QPSDCI), entered into a Syndicate Loan
other hand, petitioner Bank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate Agreement with respondent banks (hereafter collectively known as Funders) to finance the
mortgage during the pendency of the respondent spouses’ civil case. As a result, respondent construction and development of Lourdes I Condominium. QPSDCI mortgaged to the creditor
spouses filed a complaint for injunction and damages alleging that the petition for extrajudicial banks as security its Panay Avenue Property and the condominium constructed thereon.
foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously in order to harass respondent Petitioner and QPSDCI entered into a Condominium Reservation Agreement where petitioner
spouses. undertook to buy Unit 211-2C of the condominium. Petitioner's remaining balance of the
purchase price was to be secured through his housing loan. As petitioner failed to obtain said
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent spouses. The Court of Appeals loan, he was not able to pay the balance of the purchase price.
affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification.

49
Petitioner, upon discovering that the Funders had already published a notice of extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage, filed a complaint against respondents for damages. Meanwhile, On September 28, 1987, a team of petitioner's inspectors conducted a surpriseinspection of the
QPSDCI failed to pay its obligations to the Funders. Asiatrust extra-judicially foreclosed the electric meters installed at the DCIM building which were foundto be allegedly tampered with
mortgage on the condominium units, including that of petitioner. The trial court decided in favor and did not register the actual power consumptionin the building.
of petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and ordered
respondents to pay nominal damages, but deleted the award for actual and exemplary MERALCO informed TEC of the results of the inspection and demanded from the atter the
damages. payment representing its unregistered consumption from February 10,1986 until September 28,
1987, as a result of the alleged tampering of the meters.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages to petitioner is proper.
Since Ultra was in possession of the subject building during the covered period,TEC's Managing
Held: In the present case, petitioner did not present any proof that he suffered any damage as a Director, Mr. Bobby Tan, referred the demand letter to Ultra.
result of the breach of seller's warranty. He did not lose possession of his condominium unit,
although the same had not yet been registered in his name. Article 2199 of the Civil Code For failure of TEC to pay the differential billing, petitioner disconnected theelectricity supply to
provides that one is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by the DCIM building.
him as duly proved. This provision denies the grant of speculative damages, or such damage not
actually proved to have existed and to have been caused to the party claiming the same. TEC demanded from petitioner the reconnection of electrical service, claimingthat it had
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be nothing to do with the alleged tampering but the latter refused to heedthe demand.
proved with reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. Hence, TEC filed a complaint before the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) whichimmediately
ordered the reconnection of the service.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. T.E.A.M. ELECTRONICS CORPORATION, TECHNOLOGY However, prior to the reconnection, petitioner conducted a scheduled inspectionof the
ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY and MANAGEMENT PACIFIC CORPORATION; and ULTRA ELECTRONICS questioned meters and found them to have been tampered anew.
INSTRUMENTS, INC
Meanwhile, on April 25, 1988, petitioner conducted another inspection, this time,in TEC's NS
FACTS: Building. The inspection allegedly revealed that the electric meterswere not registering the
T.E.A.M. Electronics Corporation (TEC) was formerly known as NS Electronics(Philippines), Inc. correct power consumption
before 1982 and National Semi-Conductors (Phils.)
MERALCO sent a letter demanding payment of representing the differentialbilling.
TEC is wholly owned by respondent Technology Electronics Assemblyand Management Pacific
Corporation (TPC). TEC denied petitioner's allegations and claim.

On the other hand, petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) is a utility company supplying Petitioner, thus, sent TEC another letter demanding payment of the aforesaidamount, with a
electricity in the Metro Manila area. warning that the electric service would be disconnected in case of continued refusal to pay the
differential billing.
MERALCO and NS Electronics (Philippines), Inc., the predecessor-in-interest of respondent TEC,
entered into two separate contracts denominated as Agreements for the Sale of Electric Energy To avert the impending disconnection of electrical service, TEC paid the aboveamount, under
wherein: protest.

petitioner undertook to supply TEC's building known as Dyna CraftInternational Manila (DCIM) TEC and TPC filed a complaint for damages against petitioner and Ultra beforethe RTC which
with electric power. rendered a decision in their favor and affirmed by CA.

Another contract was entered into for the supply of electric power toTEC's NS Building under Petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari.
Account No. 19389-0900-10.
ISSUES:
TEC, under its former name National Semi-Conductors (Phils.) entered into aContract of Lease 1) whether or not TEC tampered with the electric meters installed at its DCIM and NSbuildings;
with respondent Ultra Electronics Industries, Inc. for the use of the former's DCIM building for a 2) If so, whether or not it is liable for the differential billing as computed by petitioner; and
period of five years or until September 1991. 3) whether or not petitioner was justified in disconnecting the electric power supply in TEC's DCIM
building.
Ultra was, however, ejected from the premises on February 12, 1988 byvirtue of a court order, for
repeated violation of the terms and conditionsof the lease contract. HELD: The petition must fail.

50
As to the alleged tampering of the electric meter in TEC's NS building, suffice it to state that the avail of its peso and dollar credit facilities by offering low interest rates so they accepted
allegation was not proven, considering that the meters therein were enclosed in a metal cabinet Equitable's proposal and signed the bank's pre-printed promissory notes on various dates
the metal seal of which was unbroken, with petitioner having sole access to the said meters. beginning 1996. They were allegedly unaware that the documents contained escalation clauses
granting Equitable authority to increase interest rates without their consent. Equitable argued
that the respondents knowingly signed the agreement.

NELEN LAMBERT VS HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON RTC upheld the validity of the promissory notes. However, due to alleged damage of
G.R. NO. 160709, FEBRUARY 23, 2005 respondent’s business reputation when Equitable froze their account, the trial court awarded
moral and exemplary damages to them.
FACTS:
Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper
motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around the city. Ray drove the
motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. After eating supper at Honas Restaurant and imbibing Held: No basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages.
a bottle of beer they traversed the highway towards Tambo at high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a tamarraw jeepney, owned by Nelen Lambert actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer. To be entitled to moral
and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden damages, a claimant must prove:
left turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio. 1. That he or she suffered besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological
suffering sustained by the claimant;
The heirs of Ray filed an action for damages against Nita the jeepney owner for the death of Ray 2. That the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission;
and damages to the motorcycle. 3. That the wrongful act or omission was the proximate cause of the damages the
claimant sustained;
After trial the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Ray finding that Nita’s driver 4. The case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219
was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the damages for which and 2220.
Nita is liable. But the court reduced the liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of 5.
Ray. In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton disregard of his contractual
ISSUE: Nita claimed that the accident was entirely due to the fault of Ray since his motorcycle obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or
bumped the rear of the jeepney and was therefore presumed to be the cause of the accident. abusive.
Was Nita correct?
When respondents defaulted on their obligation, Equitable applied respondents' deposits to their
HELD: No. The abrupt and sudden left turn of Gardo without first establishing his right of way, was loans upon maturity. Equitable had the right to exercise its legal right of set-off or compensation.
the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Whatever damage was sustained by the respondents was due to their failure to pay their loan.

Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, Neither was there reason to award exemplary damages. Since respondents were not entitled to
intervening cause, produces injury and without which the damage would not have occure. moral damages, neither should they be awarded exemplary damages. And if respondents were
not entitled to moral and exemplary damages, neither could they be awarded attorney's fees
The cause of collision is traceable to the negligent act of Gardo for without that sudden left turn and litigation expenses.
executed without precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. Drivers of
vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident
unless contradicted by other evidence. The trial court likewise correct in finding Ray guilty of JOSE V. LAGON vs.HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC.
contributory negligence, but the ratio of apportionment of damages must be increased. It was G.R. No. 135657, January 17, 2001
established that at the time of the mishap Ray was 1) driving the motorcycle at high speed; 2)
was tailgating the jeepney; 3) had imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and 4) was not wearing a FACTS:
protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximat Petitioner Jose V. Lagon (Lagon) is a businessman and owner of a commercial building in
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, who contracted Respondent Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc.
(Hooven), a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and installing of aluminum
EQUITABLE PCI BANK vs NG SHEUNG NGOR materials, for the installation of said materials on the aforesaid building.

Facts: Ng Sheung Ngor, Ken Appliance Division, Inc. and Benjamin E. Go filed an action for Two (2) contracts, both denominated Proposal, were entered into between the parties for a
annulment and/or reformation of documents and contracts against petitioner Equitable PCI total consideration of P104,870.00, where Hooven agreed to sell and install various aluminum
Bank (Equitable) and its employees. Respondents claim that Equitable induced respondents to

51
materials in Lagon's commercial building. Upon execution of the contracts, Lagon paid Hooven reason for the award of attorneys fees must be stated in the text of the courts decision. Petitioner
P48,00.00 in advance. submits that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding the same, the award of
attorneys fees should have been disallowed by the appellate court. The Court find for petitioner
Hooven commenced an action for sum of money with damages and attorney's fees against in this regard.
Lagon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Hooven alleged that on different
occasions, it delivered and installed several construction materials in the commercial building of It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule, hence it is
Lagon pursuant to their contracts necessary for the trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring the case within
. the exception and justify the grant of the award.[13] Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial
The RTC ruled that P39,140.00 remained unpaid and Lagon incurred delay. The RTC also court to explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys fees, the same shall be
awarded Hooven P3,255.00 as attorney's fees, but sustained Lagon's counterclaims and disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of the records shows that the trial court failed to
awarded him P26,120.00 as actual damages representing the value of the undelivered and explain the award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should thereby be deleted.
uninstalled materials, and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees in addition to litigation expenses of
P45,534.50. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals which set aside the judgment of the
RTC and resolved the case in favor of Hooven. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari. IRINGAN V. CA (2001)

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner Lagon or Respondent Hooven is entitled for the award of attorney’s Petitioners: ALFONSO L. IRINGAN
fees. Respondents: CA, ANTONIO PALAO, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FELISA P.DELOS
SANTOS
HELD: Only Lagon is entitled to attorney’s fees of P30,000.00.
Considering the fact that Lagon was drawn into this litigation by Hooven and was compelled to
hire an attorney to protect and defend his interest, and taking into account the work done by FACTS:
said attorney throughout the proceedings, as reflected in the record, we deem it just and March 22, 1985: Antonio Palao sold to Alfonso Iringan an undivided portion of a lot in
equitable to award attorney's fees for Lagon in the amount of P30,000.00. Tuguegarao. The parties executed a Deed of Sale with the purchase price of P295, 000, payable
as follows:
a. P10, 000 – upon the execution of this instrument, and for this purpose, the vendor
SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. State Investment House acknowledges having received the said amount from the vendee;
GR No. 128538 February 28, 2001 b. P140, 000 – on or before Apr. 30, 1985;
c. P145, 000 – on or before Dec. 31, 1985
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc. amounting to When the second payment was due, Iringan only paid P40,000. Thus, on July, 18, 1985, Palao sent
Php 129,824.48. To secure the payment of loan, private respondent executed a Comprehensive a letter to Iringan stating that he considered the contract as rescinded for Iringan’s failure to
Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity comply with his obligation, and that Palao would no longer accept any future payments.
date. SCC then failed to pay the loan when it matured. State Investment then sent demand
letters to SCC but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made. Iringan agreed to the rescission but asked for the reimbursement of the P50,000 he paid as well
as geodetic engineer’s fee, attorney’s fee, and current interest. Palao refused.
State Investment filed a Civil Case against SCC at the RTC of Manila. SCC contended Iringan then proposed that the P50,000 he paid be reimbursed or Palao could sell to him an
that the promissory note upon which State Investment anchored its cause of action was null, equivalent portion of the land. Still, Palao refused. Needless to say, they failed to reach an
void, and of no binding effect for lack or failure of consideration. The RTC then promulgated its agreement.
decision in favor of State Investment. SCC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
contended that State Investment had failed to show, by preponderance of evidence, that that On July 1, 1991, Palao filed a Complaint for Judicial Confirmation of Rescission of Contract and
the latter had a case against it. But, the appellate court affirmed in toto the judgment appealed Damages against Iringan and his wife.
from. SCC filed its motion for reconsideration but the CA denied. Hence, this petition.
Iringans argued that the contract of sale was a consummated contract, hence, the remedy of
ISSUE: WON the Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in awarding Attorney’s Fees to the Palao was for collection of the balance of the purchase price and not rescission. Moreover, they
Private Respondent. had always been ready and willing to comply w/ their obligations in accordance w/ said
contract.
HELD: The Court ruled on the AFFIRMATIVE.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Palao.
Petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with reversible error for having sustained the trial courts Iringan contended that no rescission was effected simply by virtue of the letter sent by Palao
award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies on Radio Communications of the Philippines v. stating that he considered the contract of sale rescinded. He also asserted that a judicial or
Rodriguez, 182 SCRA 899,909 (1990), where we held that when attorneys fees are awarded, the notarial act is necessary before one party can unilaterally effect a rescission.

52
Palao contended that the right to rescind is vested by law on the obligee and since Iringan did G.R. No. 141011. July 19, 2001
not oppose the intent to rescind the contract, he in effect agreed to it and had the legal effect
of a mutually agreed rescission. FACTS:
Isagani Villanueva opened a savings account and a current account with Citytrust Banking
ISSUES: WON the contract of sale was validly rescinded Corporation. He deposited some money in his savings account with the Banks Makati Branch. He
requested new checkbook and filled up the requisition slip except his current account number
HELD: YES. A1592. “In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated which he could not remember. The CSR of the Bank assured him that she could apply the
that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of information from Banks account records. Another CSR, Pia Rempillo, filled the requisition slip with
right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no its account number. Upon receiving the checkbook, he signed a check payable to Kingly
demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a notarial Commodities and delivered it to Helen Chu, the investment Consultant of Kingly Commodities.
act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.” The check was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and disparity in the signature. Villanueva
called the Bank’s Makati Branch and was advised to re-deposit the check, which was again
A1592 requires the rescinding party to serve judicial or notarial notice of his intent to resolve the dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and a stop-payment order he allegedly issued.
contract. Villanueva together with his investment consultant and trading partner personally inquire about
the matter. Marilou Guenino, the Bank’s branch Manager, found out that the account number
Both RTC and CA affirmed the validity of the alleged mutual agreement to rescind based on assigned to his new checkbook was the account number of another depositor with same name
A1191, par. 1 and 2. but with different middle initial. Villanueva sent a demand letter for indemnification for actual
damages, moral and other damages suffered by him. Gregorio Anonas III, the Bank’s Senior
Even if Article 1191 were applicable, Palao would still not be entitled to automatic rescission. In Vice-President, apologized but claimed that the dishonor was due to Villanueva’s failure, and
Escueta v. Pando, SC ruled that under A1124, OCC (now A1191), the right to resolve reciprocal further stated that as soon as the mistake was discovered, the Bank promptly sent a check to
obligations, is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply with what is Kingly Commodities to avoid any further damage. Villanueva then filed a complaint for
incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked judicially. The same article also provides: damages based on breach of contract and/or quasi-delict before the RTC branch of Makati.
"the court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of Bank claimed that it acted in good faith and asserted that Villanueva’s negligence was the
a period." proximate cause of his self-proclaimed injury and the alleged losses and damages could not
likewise be deemed natural and probable consequence of the Banks breach of obligation, had
However, when Palao filed an action for Judicial Confirmation of Rescission and Damages there been any,. Bank claimed that Villanueva acted with malice in filing the case.
before the RTC, he complied with the requirement of the law for judicial decree of rescission. The
complaint categorically stated that the purpose was 1) to compel appellants to formalize in a ISSUE: Whether Villanueva is entitled to moral damages.
public document, their mutual agreement of revocation and rescission; and/or 2) to have a
judicial confirmation of the said revocation/rescission under terms and conditions fair, proper RULING:
and just for both parties. No. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
Iringan contends that even if the filing of the case were considered the judicial act required, the besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
action should be deemed prescribed based on the provisions of A1389. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
A1389 applies to rescissible contracts, as enumerated and defined in A1380 and 1381. However, the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission. Thus, case law establishes the
that the "rescission" in A1381 is not akin to the term "rescission" in A1191 and 1592. requisites for the award of moral damages, viz: (1) there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a culpable act or
In A1191 and 1592, the rescission is a principal action which seeks the resolution or cancellation omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate
of the contract while in A1381, the action is a subsidiary one limited to cases of rescission for cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on
lesion as enumerated in said article. any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

The prescriptive period applicable to rescission under A1191 and 1592, is found in A1144, which It is beyond cavil that VILLANUEVA had sufficient funds for the check. Had his account
provides that the action upon a written contract should be brought within ten years from the number been correct, the check would not have been dishonored. Hence, we can say that
time the right of action accrues. VILLANUEVAs injury arose from the dishonor of his well-funded check. We have already ruled that
the dishonor of the check does not entitle him to compensatory damages. But, could the
The suit was brought on July 1, 1991, or six years after the default. It was filed within the period for dishonor result in his alleged intolerable physical inconvenience and discomfort, extreme
rescission. Thus, the contract of sale between the parties as far as the prescriptive period applies, humiliation, indignities, etc, which he had borne before his peers, trading partners and officers of
can still be validly rescinded. Kingly Commodities? True, we find that under the circumstances of this case, VILLANUEVA might
have suffered some form of inconvenience and discomfort as a result of the dishonor of his
check. However, the same could not have been so grave or intolerable as he attempts to
CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) vs. ISAGANI C. portray or impress upon us.
VILLANUEVA

53
Further, it is clear from the records that the BANK was able to remedy the caveat of Kingly themselves or through guardians. The petitioner did not participate in the said partition, the
Commodities to VILLANUEVA that his trading account would be closed at 5:30 p.m. on 26 June settlement is not binding on her. Furthermore, the provision is not applicable when the deed of
1986.The BANK was able to issue a managers check in favor of Kingly Commodities before the extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. The deed of extrajudicial
deadline. It was able to likewise explain to Kingly Commodities the circumstances surrounding partition executed without including some of the heirs (specifically Maria Elena, Miguel’s legally
the unfortunate situation. Verily, the alleged embarrassment or inconvenience caused to adopted daughter), who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and
VILLANUEVA as a result of the incident was timely and adequately contained, corrected, vicious. Rosalina also cannot represent the petitioner in the partitioning since when Miguel died,
mitigated, if not entirely eradicated. VILLANUEVA, thus, failed to support his claim for moral the petitioner was no longer a minor. Thus, the applicable prescriptive period here is four (4)
damages. In short, none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code exists years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, which held that: The action to annul] a deed of
to sanction the award for moral damages "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. The complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three
years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was
MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & executed, her action had not yet prescribed.
RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ
2. Yes, the petitioner can recover an award for damages.
FACTS: No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence were presented to justify or
In 1946, Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings for the legal substantiate her claims for actual and moral damages. However, nominal damages are
adoption of petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. The petition was granted and Pedrosa awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be
was declared the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina. In 1972, Miguel died intestate and his vindicated and recognized. Technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was
heirs, Elena and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel’s estate, not adequately and properly proved; petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal
adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Jose, Carmen, participation in the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father; the respondents had
Mercedes & Ramon, all surnamed Rodriguez, filed an action to annul Elena’s adoption which transferred portions of the properties involved to third parties, and the case had dragged on for
was denied by the Court of First Instance. The decision was raised to the Court of Appeals. While more than a decade, we find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in
the appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with recognition of the existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such damages
respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. These should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept
properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, and purpose of said damages.
represented solely by Rosalina. The Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to third parties. The parties in the appeal filed
a joint Motion to Dismiss, wherein the appellate court dismissed the appeal but upheld the BPI Investment Corporation vs. D.G. Carreon Commercial Corporation, Daniel G. Carreon, Aurora
validity of the adoption. J. Carreon, and Josefa M. Jeciel
G.R. No. 126524. November 29, 2001
The petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were Facts:
not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The BPI Investment Corporation formerly known as Ayala Investment and Development Corporation,
petitioner filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition on January 29, 1987 and later amende on was engaged in money market operations. The respondents D.G. Commercial Corporation was
March 25, 1987. The RTC dismissed the complaint and when the said decision was raised to the a client of herein petitioner BPI investment together with spouses Daniel G. Carreon and Aurora
Court of Appeals, it was affirmed. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the J. Carreon and Josefa M. Jeciel who also placed the personal moneys in the money market
Court of Appeals. Thus, the petition was filed with the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the placement. Sometime in the end of year 1979, BPI Investment paid D.G. Carreon twice,
Court of Appeals affirming the RTC’s decision. representing a single money market placement due to bookkeeping error.

ISSUE: In 1982, BPI Investment wrote to respondents Daniel and Aurora Carreon demanding the return
1. Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and of the over payments, the spouses however proposed a memorandum agreement in which the
Partition" had already prescribed BPI Investment ignored and instead filed a complaint for the recovery of sum of money against
2. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been D.G. Carreon with preliminary attachment. Respondent filed an answer with counterclaim,
transferred to the respondent buyers. wherein D.G Carreon asked for compensatory damages; spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon
asked for moral damages for the humiliation, great mental anguish, sleepless nights and
RULING: deterioration of health due to the filing of the complaint and indiscriminate and wrongful
1. No, the complaint had not yet prescribed. attachment of their property, especially their residential house and payment of their money
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have market placement; Josefa Jeceil asked for moral damages; all respondents claimed for
participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or
heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by

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The lower court finds the case unmeritorious and dismissed the case. On Appeal to the
Appellate Court, the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing the complaint was affirmed, while the
counterclaim of defendants was granted and was awarded damages including exemplary
damages amounting to One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) to all defendants.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals awarded excessive moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney's fees to respondents.

Held:
Yes. According to the Supreme Court, the law on exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts if the
defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.

Here, BPI Investments did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner, when it asked for preliminary attachment. It was just exercising a legal option. The sheriff
of the issuing court did the execution and the attachment. Hence, BPI Investments is not to be
blamed for the excessive and wrongful attachment. There is no doubt, however, that the
damages sustained by respondents were due to petitioners fault or negligence, short of gross
negligence. Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. The Court deems it prudent to award reasonable temperate damages to
respondents under the circumstances.

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