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25 Mar 93 Dave Bozyk e mail
Qatargas C3 compressor disch and Power failure.
John,
We talked today about the possibility of a propane compressor
discharging to the dry gas flare during a power failure.
Presently
the design of the combined flare structure which sets the height
of all flares is a 3 Train Power failure with 1,141,000 kg/h
contributed from the dry gas flare. This number includes the
release of 380,000 kg/h due to the failure of the APCI relay
instrumentation in one train.
This number obviously does not include the C3 compressor discharge
flow of roughly 1,000,000 kg/h. Yet one could argue that with
power failure, we lose seawater cooling to the propane compressor
and therefore the relieve from the propane machines. Now we do
have a 2 or 3 voting high pressure trip system on the compressor
discharge that should prevent the machines from lifting the PRV's
but if we were to take this control as not working in I train
during the total plant upset we presently would send roughly
600,000 kg/h more (1,000,000 from Q compressor less a credit of
380,000 kg/h for APCI relays working) to the flares for the Power
failure case.
RESOLUTION:
One needs to consider further the above scenario of relieving in
order to convince ourselves that we've done the right thing. I
would saggest that we look at how long one could actually relieve
from the closeJ propane circuit. Additionally, I think we should
route some of our flows to the wet gas header so that we dont
exceed the allowable back pressure of the dry gas header. This
seems to be possible with no piping or flare stack changes. (the
present rough load for power failure into wet gas is about 40,000
kg/h I"m told. The design of the wet gas for depressuring was
recently increased to roughy 750,000 kg/h).
Lastly, we could argue that the flare height need not go up for
the extra 600,000 kg/h contribution to the power failure scenario.
We would say that this is such an extreme and remote situation
The above memo is basically a summary of the meetings that we've
had
with input from everyone on distribution above.
26 Mar 93 D Hill e mail
Subj: Qatargas LNG EPC: Status of flare Design
I'm sending you the above message which discusses the status of
the flare design. I would recommend that in our proposal that we
not include total "preendorcement" of the flare system on the
basis that it was the last unit to be done and there were many
changes toward the end of the basic design which need to be
verified. Additionally, some of the large relief loads are
dependent on the compressor selection, which has=ve yet to be
done. We should probably have a list of areas/items which we do
not provide total/unconditional "preendorsement". By this
recommendation I am not implying that there are any problems with
the design prepared during the FEED and interim period, only that,
if we are not forced to, we should not give away the opportunity
to give the flare design the detailed attention it deserves in the
EPC phase of the project.
29 Mar 93 J Dobler e mail
Your comment about "endorsement" of the flare system is too late.
That was given away with the rest of the endorsement in Princeton.
Even so, I do not understand why you are so concerned. With the
screwy scenarios Qatargas wanted for sizing of the flares, the
sizes are large enough. During detailed engineering we will
develope more realistic scenarios. I am also sure that we can
rationalize a means to not consider the propane machines
discharging during power failure, just as we did for NWS.
Remember, the Qatargas dry flare is based on both JT valves not
closing in one train during a power failure. That load is similar
to blocked outlet of one propane machine. We would not consider
the JT failure coincident with a propane machine trip failure.
As for impacts due to final selection of the compressors, we have
not given that away. We have qualified our endorsement for the
assigned items and their impacts.
30 Mar 93 Dave Bozyk e mail
Before I touch on the 2 items I want to say that the APCI (JT
valve) failure case load is given as 380,000 kg/h whereas the
Propane machine discharge relieving flow is 922,880 kg/h. This
would be the reason that one would be inclined to avoid adding
propane machine relief during another upset. And to add propane
failure in place of APCI relay failure would incur the additional
difference of 542,000 kg/h. FYI our dry gas flare where the
propane machines presently discharge is designed for approx 1.4 mm
kg/h. (Similar to YLNG). Obviously, 3 propane machines would be
3xl mm kg/h = 3 mm kg/h.
1) COST: I do not expect a significant impact in capital cost
if any to the flare systems as a result of the propane machine
relieving philosophy. As a worst case we might end up splitting
the flows to 2 different headers and proposing that flare heights
need not be increased.
A few months back J.Baguley, CSE and myself made sure that we had
a 2 out of 3 reliable pressure trip on the discharge of the
propaen compressors. However, one could read the chief engineers
memo #45 and conclude that the design must consider that one of
the compressors instrumentation fails to trip the machine and
release occurs. Since we did not do this it leaves some people
uncomfortable with the present design philosophy.
(FYI it is possible to lose power to 3 trains as stated in our MOM
and continue to have power to the Sea Cooling water pumps however
one might argue that this is highly unlikely).
This philosophy too leaves some people uncomfortable.
D Hill response
I agree with your comments, but I thought if there was still room
to maneuver we should take advantage of it. As you say, the
sizing we have provided in the basic design should be adequate,
Baguley also concurs.