Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Peter E. Hodgson
Introduction
The life and achievements of Galileo form a subject of enduring
interest. He is certainly one of the greatest scientists of all time and
indeed has been called the founder of modern science. He showed
that natural phenomena obey mathematical laws and thus, Galileo
laid the foundations of quantitative dynamics and used it to give the
first accurate account of the motions of falling bodies and projectiles.
He improved the telescope and used it to discover the moons of
Jupiter, the mountains on the moon, the phases of Venus, and the
spots on the sun. All this combined to throw doubt on Aristotelian
cosmology and to support the heliocentric theory of Copernicus.
More than any scientist, Galileo was responsible for initiating the
transition from the Aristotelian science of the Middle Ages to the
mathematical science of the following centuries.
Galileo lived at a critical moment in the development of science.
According to the popular account, the ancient Greeks made the first
steps toward a scientific understanding of the world. The Greek
writings were inherited by the Muslim civilization and then
logos 6:3 summer 2003
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 14
logos
transmitted to the new universities in the Middle Ages through
translations done mainly in Spain. Thereafter, an authoritarian
Church controlled the intellectual development of Western Europe
and prevented any independent thought or scientific development.
It was only during the Renaissance that the authority of the Church
was challenged by men like Galileo who insisted on the greater
value for science of experimentation and observation than reliance
on ancient texts. This is dramatized by the story that Galileo dropped
two balls of different masses from the Leaning Tower of Pisa and
showed that, contrary to Aristotle’s theory, they reached the ground
simultaneously. Thereafter, science developed as a free and inde-
pendent search for truth.
The reality is, of course, different and highly instructive. The
familiar story, still heard today, that there was no science worth
speaking about in the long period from the time of the ancient
Greeks to the flowering of genius in the Renaissance has long been
disproved by modern scholarship. Galileo himself was not only a
highly original scientist but remained a devout Catholic throughout
his life.1 He had a sound grasp of theology and saw clearly that the
new knowledge of the world gained by the scientific method was in
no way inconsistent with the teaching of the Church, since both
come from God. He also saw that some of the new knowledge raised
important problems of scriptural interpretation that could be
resolved within the context of traditional Catholic theology. It is now
recognized that Galileo’s views on the interpretation of Scripture are
basically correct, and he was particularly anxious to prevent the
tragedy that actually happened—the condemnation by the Church
of a genuine scientific breakthrough. He was, however, overconfident
concerning his scientific arguments, which were still at that time
inconclusive, at least to nonscientists. In view of the delicate theo-
logical questions raised by the heliocentric theory, it was not unrea-
sonable for Church authorities to ask Galileo to moderate his claims
until a definite proof was forthcoming. The main protagonists were
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 15
logos
and cosmology), Galileo retained a basic adherence to Aristotelian
natural philosophy throughout his life.
Aristotle thought of nature as a process, an organism, and held
that the main object of science is to see how it is related to man. For
him, the aim of science was to obtain certain knowledge by under-
standing the causes of natural phenomena. His cosmology was based
on direct commonsense experience, and this is why it has such a
strong appeal, even today. Aristotle emphasized the primacy of the
senses, which takes precedence over any theory. Who can doubt
that the earth is solid and immoveable, with the sun, the stars, and
planets moving around it?
Astronomers studied the motions of the stars and the planets, and
Ptolemy was able to describe them quite accurately by compound-
ing circular motions in the form of cycles and epicycles. This was a
purely mathematical description, and it was not maintained that the
cycles and epicycles corresponded to anything real. In contrast,
Aristotle sought a more physical cosmology in terms of real entities.
Johannes Kepler finally unified these two approaches in the early
1600s.3
At the center of Aristotle’s cosmology is the immovable earth.
Surrounding it are a number of concentric crystalline spheres bear-
ing the moon and the inner planets Mercury and Venus, then the
sun, and finally the outer planets Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Enclos-
ing all is the sphere of the fixed stars, and outside this is nothing at
all. There were differing views about the reality of the crystalline
spheres: Aristotle believed there are fifty-five in all, made of a pure,
unalterable, transparent, weightless, crystalline solid. The whole set
of spheres rotates once a day, thus accounting for the diurnal motion
of the sun and the stars. Seen against the background of the stars, the
paths of the planets sometimes show a retrograde or looped motion,
and this was accounted for by fixing the planets to secondary spheres
linked to the main ones. In this way, the Aristotelian cosmology was
able to give an account of all observable celestial motions, including
the prediction of eclipses.
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 17
logos
scrutinizing ancient texts, particularly those of Aristotle. The duty
of a scholar was simply to understand, defend, and teach Aristotle’s
ideas. Within this mindset, the Aristotelians simply could not under-
stand what Galileo was trying to do. To them, the world is a living
organism that can be understood by experience and reason. For
this, direct perception is all that was needed. They interpreted the
world in terms of a close-knit system of purposeful behavior, using
organic categories and concepts like matter and form, act and poten-
cy, essence and existence. Thus, the qualitative properties of things
suffice to reveal their essences.
In sharp contrast, Galileo said that it is an illusion to think we can
understand the essences of things; what we can and should do is
describe their behavior as accurately as we can using mathematics
and then make experiments to test the validity of our ideas. Quan-
titative relations are the real clues to the unique, orderly, immutable
reality. By establishing them we can find out how things behave, but
not what they are. This seemed useless to the Aristotelians, who had
a low view of mathematics; indeed, Aristotle “left to mechanics and
other low artisans the investigation of the ratios and other secondary
features of acceleration.”4 To the Aristotelians, number, weight, and
measure have no philosophical significance; motion is interpreted in
terms of purpose, and for this, mathematics is irrelevant. They had
no interest in accurate descriptions of the motions of projectiles or
in the mathematical description of levers and pulleys. Mathematics,
they allowed, is an interesting game, but it tells us nothing about the
real world. Galileo, on the other hand, thought that the Aristotelians’
elaborate structure of abstractions in fact led nowhere.
Because Galileo occupied a chair of mathematics, his duty was to
expound the works of Euclid and Archimedes. He could be much
freer in his criticisms of Aristotle than if he had been a member of
the philosophical establishment, whose main duty was to master
and teach the works of Aristotle.
It is important to distinguish between Aristotle’s general ideas
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 19
logos
required to “save the appearances,” that is, to give predictions in
numerical agreement with the experimental measurements. Last, it
had to be in accord with Scripture.
logos
Galileo’s views on motion went through several stages. At first,
as described in De Motu, he believed that natural motion has a nat-
ural uniform speed proportional to the difference between the den-
sity of the moving object and that of the medium. As the effective
density is diminished by the medium, so is the natural uniform
speed. Nonnatural motions are due to an impressed force, and this
is responsible for the initial acceleration. These views constituted a
coherent philosophy of motion, but Galileo could not find a single
example of this uniform motion and so concluded that acceleration
is a feature of all motion. He considered the possibility that veloci-
ty is directly proportional to the distance but soon rejected this pos-
sibility. Then, from the mean speed theorem, which implies that the
acquired velocity is proportional to the time taken, he deduced that
the distance covered is proportional to the square of the time taken.
We can obtain this result more easily using Newton’s notation:
.
ẍ = g, x = gt, x = ½gt2.
Galileo soon found that it was difficult, if not impossible, for him to
measure with sufficient accuracy the time taken for bodies to fall. He
therefore hit on the ingenious idea of timing them as they rolled
down planes inclined at different angles. The times measured were
much longer, and so could be measured more accurately. He could
make measurements for a series of increasing angles and then
extrapolate to find the rate for free fall. The experiment is indeed
quite practicable, as shown by Settle.9
Galileo also made further studies of motion that do not require
time measurements. He let balls roll down an inclined plane, and at
the end of the plane they were deflected horizontally and then
allowed to fall freely until they hit a horizontal plane. The time-
squared law implies that the path of free fall is a semiparabola, so that
by seeing how the length and angle of the inclined plane was relat-
ed to the point of contact on the horizontal plane Galileo could ver-
ify the correctness of the law.
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 23
logos
satellites of Jupiter. These were found to occur rather later than
expected when Jupiter was far from the earth, compared with the
times when Jupiter was near. This is due to the time taken by the
light to travel from Jupiter to the earth, and from this the velocity
of light was determined.
Galileo also tried to develop a method of determining longitude
at sea by observing the satellites of Jupiter. Although this is possible
in principle, it was found to be impracticable because at that time it
was not possible to measure the time at sea with sufficient accuracy.
Harrison achieved this feat later. The method has, however, proved
useful in surveying on land.
logos
specified by a set of rules; it may therefore be wrong in a funda-
mental way or, more frequently, it may be inadequate in one respect
or another. Its consequences are likely to be extensive, and it is not
easy to choose the ones that make the sharpest test and yet are rel-
atively easy to carry out. If there is a disagreement, is it due to a
defect in the experiment or does it show a real defect in the theory?
If the latter, then how should the theory be modified and so on?
Many similar questions must be addressed.
As the theories become more sophisticated and agree with a
wide range of experience, they may be said to give genuine, though
still limited, knowledge about the world. As confidence grows it
become less necessary to make experimental tests, and this is cer-
tainly true of the laws of motion. However, it always remains possi-
ble that new experiences show inadequacies in the theory that
require it to be modified. There are many examples of this in the his-
tory of science.
Galileo was neither a pure Aristotelian nor a pure Platonist.11 He
could claim with justice that he was a better Aristotelian than many
of the professed Aristotelians that criticized him. He, like Aristotle,
observed nature and did not seek the answers to questions only in
books. If Aristotle had been able to look through a telescope he
would have certainly modified his views. Likewise, Galileo was a
good Platonist by his stress on the importance of mathematics, which
Aristotle undervalued. However, Plato considered the material
world to be an imperfect copy of the ideal world, whereas Galileo
believed in the possibility of an exact mathematical description.
Galileo never formulated a fully articulated theory of the scien-
tific method; indeed, this is still the subject of controversy. He was
a pioneer with a vision of the future and had to develop his tools as
he tackled new problems. He was primarily interested in solving
problems, not in explaining the methods he used to solve them,
which he made up as he went along. Yet in so doing, he was inevitably
throwing doubt on the traditional Aristotelian natural philosophy,
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 27
logos
him a large bonus. Subsequently he made many more telescopes
and presented them to many eminent friends and powerful princes.
This story illustrates well Galileo’s ruthless opportunism and tech-
nical genius. Certainly his best telescopes were far superior to any
others, and he made sure that their merits were widely recognized
and that his career benefited.
logos
In 1611, Galileo observed the sunspots that provide another
example of imperfections in the celestial realm. He correctly sur-
mised that they are clouds of vapor on the sun’s surface, and by
observing their motion deduced that the sun rotates with a period of
about a month. Galileo did not discover the sunspots; the Chinese had
known of them for centuries, and other European scientists had also
noticed them. To maintain the incorruptibility of the heavens, the
Jesuit astronomer Scheiner suggested that sunspots are little planets
orbiting the sun. Galileo had little difficulty in demolishing Scheiner’s
theory, but did so in a courteous way. Nevertheless, Scheiner was
offended, and this was to cause Galileo much trouble later on.
To disprove Scheiner’s theory, Galileo observed that the sunspots
are approximately circular when they are near the center of the
sun’s disk and progressively become more elliptical as they approach
the edge. This is just what would be expected if they are situated on
the surface of the sun; if they were spherical planets they would keep
the same circular shape as they moved around the sun. Although this
does not amount to a strict proof, Galileo was justified in using the
motion of the sunspots as an argument in favor of the heliocentric
theory.
logos
that it was just a convenient mathematical scheme with no preten-
sions to reality. The Lutheran theologian Osiander, who saw the
manuscript of Copernicus through the press, inserted an anony-
mous preface to this effect without Copernicus knowing.
Professional astronomers were well aware of the large number
of minor improvements that had been made in the Ptolemaic sys-
tem over the previous centuries without significantly improving
the fit to the unsatisfactory ancient data, and that proved quite
unable to fit the greatly improved data of Tycho Brahe, and they
increasingly turned to the Copernican theory as the basis of their
calculations. Many of them still rejected the heliocentric theory as
a real account of celestial motions and used the Copernican theory
simply as a method of calculation. The astronomers gradually
improved the Copernican theory and found that it was much more
tightly constrained than the Ptolemaic theory, so that it was not pos-
sible to adjust the parameters of the planetary orbits independently
of each other. And so, impelled by their practical concerns, the belief
of the professional astronomers gradually changed. By around 1616,
the time of the Church’s first action against Galileo, the case for
Copernicanism was respectable but still weak. By the time of his
recantation in 1633, the tide had turned and geocentrism was almost
a lost cause. According to Kuhn, “By the middle of the seventeenth
century it is difficult to find an important astronomer who is not
Copernican; by the end of the century it is impossible.” It took much
longer for heliocentrism to be generally accepted; Milton, for exam-
ple, in his great work treated the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems
on equal footing.
It is important to recall that not one of the arguments for Coper-
nicanism was conclusive. Galileo’s favorite argument from the tides
is fallacious. Bellarmine said that if the heliocentric theory was
proved correct (and by proof he meant certain knowledge through
causes, following Aristotle), then it would be necessary to study
carefully how it could be reconciled with Scripture. However, the
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 33
logos
and reason, and Galileo believed that if Aristotle had had the
opportunity to look through a telescope, he would have been con-
vinced by what he saw and would have revised his cosmology accord-
ingly. Galileo had nothing but contempt for those who looked for the
truth about the physical world only by searching through musty old
texts instead of opening their eyes to the world around them.
The commonsense belief in an immovable earth can be support-
ed by rational arguments. If the earth is moving with the speed nec-
essary to carry it around the sun, then surely the high winds would
demolish all buildings and blow everything away. It is well known, it
was said, that an object dropped from the high mast of a ship falls
nearer to the stern because the ship moves while the object falls, and
therefore the effects due to any motion of the earth should be even
more marked. Galileo responded by showing that this statement is
false: the object lands at the foot of the mast because the object shares
the forward motion of the ship all the time. He then pointed out that
if we are in a closed cabin in a steadily moving ship, we can play ball
and jump around just as we could if the ship were stationary. We
could experience the up and down motion of the waves and any
changes in the ship’s forward speed, but these are all accelerations.
This absence of effects due to a uniform velocity is known as the prin-
ciple of Galilean relativity. The absence of such effects is no argument
against the translational motion of the earth.
It may be remarked that these arguments are strictly true only
for rectilinear motion. On the earth, however, the situation is dif-
ferent because the objects on the earth’s surface have circular tra-
jectories, although the difference is small for short distances. So, the
top of the mast is moving slightly more rapidly than its foot due to
the earth’s rotation, and this implies that an object dropped from
the top of the mast will hit the deck a small distance to the east of
the base. The effect is small but not negligible and was first detect-
ed by G. A. Guglielmini in Bologna in 1789 and confirmed by J. F.
Benzenberg in 1802 and 1804, and by F. Reich in 1831. The most
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 35
logos
meet the overrigorous conditions he had accepted to show that helio-
centrism is not inconsistent with Scripture.
logos
several conclusions of Aristotelian physics, he retained a general
commitment to the principles of Aristotle’s approach to science, par-
ticularly the need to attain a physical understanding of nature and to
use the laws of logic. Galileo was a strong believer in the simplicity
of nature and so continued to believe that the orbits of the planets
are circular. As a result, although he greatly admired the work of
Kepler, he never showed much interest in Kepler’s three laws of
planetary motion, which indeed provide strong support for the
heliocentric theory. This belief in universal circular motion led
Galileo into great difficulties when he considered the explanation of
comets. Neither did he spend time on the optical theories underly-
ing the operation of the telescope, but constructed them by a process
of trial and error.
Galileo’s second great achievement was the construction of
significantly improved telescopes and the astronomical discoveries he
made with their aid. These made him famous throughout Europe
and changed his life. He soon became convinced that the helio-
centric theory of Copernicus was correct and used his astronomical
discoveries to develop arguments in its favor. Individually, none of
these arguments was conclusive, and at least one was incorrect, but
together they were sufficient to convince the scientifically trained
mind.
If he had been content, like most scientists, to publish his results
in weighty Latin tomes, Galileo might not have become embroiled
in controversy. Instead, he vigorously publicized his work and wrote
in the vernacular in a way that could be understood by the general
reader. This was necessary partly to obtain employment, but also
because he felt he had a duty to publish his new view of the world.
When his jealous enemies, unable, so he claimed, to defeat him on
scientific grounds, invoked the aid of theology, he countered with a
treatise on the interpretation of Scripture. The theologians of the
Inquisition, angered by his incursion into their domain and con-
cerned by the threat to the Church’s authority to be the sole, authen-
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 39
Notes
1. Olaf Pedersen, “Galileo’s Religion,” in G. V. Coyne, M. Heller, and J. Zycinski, ed.
The Galileo Affair: A Meeting of Faith and Science, Proceedings of the Cracow Confer-
ence, May 1984; Specola Vaticana, 1985, 75.
2. William A. Wallace, “Galileo’s Trial and the Proof of the Earth’s Motion,” Catholic
Dossier, 1, no. 2 (July-August 1995): 7.
3. J. L. Russell, “What Was the Crime of Galileo?” Annals of Science 52 (1995): 403.
4. William R. Shea, Galileo’s Intellectual Revolution: Middle Period, 1610–1632 (Sagamore
Beach, Mass.: Watson Publishing, 1977).
5. William A. Wallace, Galileo and His Sources (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984).
6. I. E. Drabkin, trans., “De Motu,” in Galileo Galilei on Motion and Mechanics, I. E.
Drabkin, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), 58.
7. Ibid., 70.
8. Ibid., 76.
9. Thomas B. Settle, Science (6 January 1961): 19.
10. Wallace, Galileo and His Sources, 198.
11. Thomas P. McTighe, “Galileo’s Platonism,” in Galileo:Man of Science, Ernan McMullin,
ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 365.
12. Maurice Finocchiaro, ed., The Galileo Affair (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989), 60.
01-logos-hodgson-pp13-40 6/12/03 9:31 AM Page 40
logos
13. William A. Wallace, “Galileo’s Trial and the Proof of the Earth’s Motion,” Catholic
Dossier 1, no. 2 (July-August 1995): 7.
14. Stillman Drake, trans., Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (Chicago: Chicago Univer-
sity Press, ), –.
15. William A. Wallace, Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources
of Galileo’s Thought (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing, 1981), 129 et seq.