TORTS AND DAMAGES

G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and MS. LYDIA

GERONIMO, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.

Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to close down
as a consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the
discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages sold by it. The interesting
issue posed is whether the subsequent action for damages by the proprietress
against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of
implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability, as claimed by the
manufacturer, the petitioner herein which must therefore be filed within six months
from the delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or
one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can be filed within
four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.

On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a

complaint for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City. 1 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in
her complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen
docketed as located in Dagupan City, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft
drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the students of
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12 August 1989, some
parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks
sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles;
he then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of some
fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic
matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles
to the Regional Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La
Union, for examination; subsequently, she received a letter from the Department

1
of Health informing her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a
consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her
sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as low
as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day,
and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989; she became
jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages
but was rebuffed by it. She prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
P5,000.00 as actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount
equal to 30% of the damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs. 2

The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter ground, the
petitioner argued that since the complaint is for breach of warranty under Article
1561 of the said Code. In her Comment 4 thereto, private respondent alleged that
the complaint is one for damages which does not involve an administrative action
and that her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiff's right which can be
brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the
complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter
filed by the parties. 5

In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. It
ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply as
the existing administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the
complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict, as there exists
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties; thus, on the basis of Article
1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed within six
months from the delivery of the thing sold.

Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial
court in its Order of 17 April 1991, 7the private respondent came to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari which we referred to the public respondent "for
proper determination and disposition. 8 The public respondent docketed the case
as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.

In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent annulled

the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further proceedings in
Civil Case No. D-9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:

2
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for breach of warranty as
respondent contends, the applicable prescriptive period is four years.

It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an
action or damages arising from respondent's act of "recklessly and negligently
manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold or public consumption"
(p. 25, rollo). It is truism in legal procedure that what determines the nature of an
action are the facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as a defense in the
defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger Electric, Inc.
v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).

Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil code, the
existence of contractual relations between the parties does not absolutely
preclude an action by one against the other for quasi-delict arising from
negligence in the performance of a contract.

In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:

It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract between the parties
does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that) although the relation
between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and in nature the
act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales was taken,
the authorities are one in saying that he availability of an action or breach of
warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective goods. 10

Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the public
respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL
PROVISION ON QUASI-DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASEDON BREACH OF A SELLER'S
IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.

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 II.

CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A

GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S
ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD
PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12

The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal that the
primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not Article 2176 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or
wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a
seller's implied warranties under the law on sales. It contends the existence of a
contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the
application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private respondent's cause
of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have
been filed within six months room delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article
171 of the Civil Code.

In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of the
seller's implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the Civil Code,
elect between withdrawing from the contract or demanding a proportionate
reduction of the price, with damages in either case. She asserts that Civil Case
No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor for proportionate reduction of
the price, but for damages arising from a quasi-delict and that the public
respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a contract did not preclude
the action for quasi-delict. As to the issue of prescription, the private respondent
insists that since her cause of action is based on quasi-delict, the prescriptive
period therefore is four (4) years in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code
and thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said period.

We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that the cause
of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore,
pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is
supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12
thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of
"adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."

The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties against
hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those
prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which provides:

4
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the vendee
may elect between withdrawing from the contract and demanding a proportionate
reduction of the price, with damages either
case. 13

The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of error or
fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under
the law on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Responsibility
arising from negligence is also demandable in any obligation, but such liability
may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those who
in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages. 16

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may
be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule,
bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to
arise fromquasi-delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be
a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court
stated:

We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France
vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-class
ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for,
although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature . . . the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations. 20

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing

products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other
grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24Quasi-delict, as defined in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties as culpa

5
aquiliana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not
identical to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but
also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. 27

It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the public respondent
should by no means be understood as suggesting that the private respondent's
claims for moral damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.

W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.

W. L. Wright, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted
by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative.

The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway

and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the
eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as
the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries
complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature
than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.

6
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols,
about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised
to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy
was not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and
perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery,
spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The visit was made
on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone
after leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.

After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the
defendant's coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the
place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the
ground. These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol
cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it
may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable
explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their
right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of
which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they
met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to
the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the
caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no
result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for
a hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife,
and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who
when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had
his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent
as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for
his wounds.

The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be
on the defendant's premises, nor how long they had been there when the boys
found them. It appears, however, that some months before the accident, during
the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and

7
kind as those found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant
near the place where the caps were found; and it also appears that at or about the
time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the construction of
an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps
when found appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a
considerable time, and from the place where they were found would seem to have
been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon the
rubbish heap.

No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit

or prevent visitors from entering and walking about its premises unattended, when
they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant counsel's brief, "it is
undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to
the islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of
the defendant, in the neighborhood of the place where the caps were found.
There is evidence that any effort ever was made to forbid these children from
visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the
company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.

Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy
on one of the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office,
learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after
his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued
in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that
he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both
mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.

The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively
established by the evidence of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel.
The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed are plaintiff's allegations
that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises
were the property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and
control, and that the company or some of its employees left them exposed on its
premises at the point where they were found.

The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant

company, apparently relying on the rule of law which places the burden of proof of
such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in rebuttal, and insists that
plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient
to sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.

8
It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less
extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that
some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few
months before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found
the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it
in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the
place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the
company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or
detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not
articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances,
and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of
twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on
defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was
either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and
control. We think also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or
detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees
at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried
out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that
neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be,
we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the
company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them
exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at
play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or
ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in
play.

Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the
facts on which these conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming
that the blasting work on the company's well and on its McKinley extension was
done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman
employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a
firm of contractors, he did the work on the well directly and immediately under the
supervision and control of one of defendant company's foremen, and there is no
proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done
by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point, and while
he stated that he understood that a part of this work was done by contract, he
could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of the terms and
conditions of the alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to
the defendant company. The fact having been proven that detonating caps were
more or less extensively employed on work done by the defendant company's

9
directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should have introduced the
necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not
unreasonable inference that it was the owner of the material used in these
operations and that it was responsible for tortious or negligent acts of the agents
employed therein, on the ground that this work had been intrusted to independent
contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not be
applied. If the company did not in fact own or make use of caps such as those
found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple matter for it to
prove that fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence
in the record sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing
the reasonable inference that the caps found on its premises were its property,
and were left where they were found by the company or some of its employees.

Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in
plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together
with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.

ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and

illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence
occurs.

ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.

ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.

The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or on account of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

10
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage.

ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —

1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place.

Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his
contention that the facts proven at the trial do not established the liability of the
defendant company under the provisions of these articles, and since we agree
with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the various
questions as to form and the right of action (analogous to those raised in the case
of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359), which would,
perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.

We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the
generally accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as
that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must
establish by competent evidence:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person

for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the
real difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts
developed in the case under consideration.

It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps
been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked
up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises,

11
and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.

But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and
inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention
of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to
have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the
direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place
where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause of the
accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in
many of the courts of last resort in the United States in the cases known as the
"Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.

In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is
liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle
curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's
premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to
suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found explosive signal
torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which
when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant
found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such
condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed
to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in
playing with such machine.

In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds
the owner of the premises liable.

As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the
principal question was whether a railroad company was liable for in injury
received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes
of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable to the
negligence of the company), the principles on which these cases turn are that
"while a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to
mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries
arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an

12
infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of
adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must
himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of
tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity
and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances
of the case."

The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously
controverted and sharply criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court
of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463) formally repudiated
and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down
in Railroad Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the
language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner of the land is not liable to trespassers
thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful acts; (2)
that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by
dangerous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that
an invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not be predicated on
the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4)
that there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances
that will warrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter upon another's
premises.

Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were
indulged in by the courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad
Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has been questioned in
Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.

On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United
States, citing and approving the doctrine laid down in England in the leading case
of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule in these cases in
accord with that announced in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the
Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice
Harlan in the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered
the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an exhaustive and
critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English and
American, formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the
case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."

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In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as
follows: The plaintiff, a boy 12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own
pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises, without defendant's
express permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident injured by
falling into a burning slack pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but
which had been left by defendant on its premises without any fence around it or
anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although defendant knew or
had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court held
that the plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and
protection while on the premises in question, against the unseen danger referred
to, the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.

We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the
principles involved to the facts in that case, because what is said there is strikingly
applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of defendant's
contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant
company owed him no duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which
would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff on defendant's premises.

We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied
to the case now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of
negligence in leaving unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its
depot building. It could have forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for
purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it
permitted all, without regard to age, to visit its mine, and witness its operation. It
knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a narrow path skirting its slack
pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the village, old and young,
would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of frequenting that
locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slack
pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that
they were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was
concealed (except when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals
into which a child might accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the
circumstances, the railroad company ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff,
a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was
a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for whose protection it was under no
obligation to make provisions.

In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous
traps, baited with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the

14
premises of another, that dogs passing along the highway, or kept in his
neighbors premises, would probably be attracted by their instinct into the traps,
and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so attracted and thereby
injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap
by means of his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual
force?" What difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is there between
an express license to the children of this village to visit the defendant's coal mine,
in the vicinity of its slack pile, and an implied license, resulting from the habit of
the defendant to permit them, without objection or warning, to do so at will, for
purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the case of Townsend vs. Wathen,
Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence, volume 1, page 305,
note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make the owner of
land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his
neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be killed, and
which would exempt him from liability for the consequence of leaving exposed
and unguarded on his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child
attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might
thereby be killed or maimed for life."

Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the
case of Powers vs. Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):

Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and
impulses; and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward
them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave
exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them,
and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at
liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.

And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of
implied invitation to visit the premises of another, says:

In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied
license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving
a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to
gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of
it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common
way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p.
303.)

15
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion
in the cases of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs.
McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in this jurisdiction than in that
wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish
instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of
youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is
permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which
arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the
neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within
the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon
things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly
or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know
children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon
this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises
can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises
without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no
duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought
to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish
instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied
license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the
owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury
from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is
clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his
express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the
children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim
of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and
reasonably be expected to enter.

This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is

contention that a man has a right to do what will with his own property or that
children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to
prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in
doubt. In this jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure
the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs. Toribio,1 No. 5060,
decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would
be absurd and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we
lived to hold that parents or guardian are guilty of negligence or imprudence in

16
every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the parental roof
unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence of the
parent could in any event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to
recover in such cases — a point which we neither discuss nor decide.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant
from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his
part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly
speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand,
we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action between the negligent act
of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the explosion
which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to
the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although
we accept the doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought
proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in this decision. As was
said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in
regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting
from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault,
such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be
determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have
shown, under the reasoning on which rests the doctrine of the Turntable and
Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for injuries
resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of
15 years of age, because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises
without express permission or invitation' but it is wholly different question whether
such youth can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and
deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents,
knowing, as he undoubtedly did, that his action would result in an explosion. On
this point, which must be determined by "the particular circumstances of this

17
case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no
direct aid, although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and
analogous cases which our attention has been directed, the record discloses that
the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of such tender
years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or
character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15,
more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had
been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the
witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no
other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity,
followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the
contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there
be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might
be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within
him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and ran away.

True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap,
and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he
well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act,
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such
and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant
or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under
such circumstances.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own
acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and
precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable
and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of

18
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the
character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor
can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability
will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of
acts which may be done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of
infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an
examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are
conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and incurring
certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are
of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they
illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own
acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the provisions of
the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of
committing a crime and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the
fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will be taken into consideration as
an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a
child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a
guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765).
And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage
(Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he
put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury
which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him
must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non
intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book 50, tit. 17 rule 203.)

The Patidas contain the following provisions:

19
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through
his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law
25, tit. 5, Partida 3.)

And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit.
7, Partida 2.)

According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts
the grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit.
7 Partida 2.)

And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly
lays down the law touching contributory negligence in this jurisdiction,
nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the supreme court of
Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7
Phil. Rep., 359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover
damages from the defendant, in whole or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902
(93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in point. In that case the court said:

According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury
there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not
be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to
repair the same, although such acts or omission were imprudent or unlawful, and
much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the
negligence of the injured party himself.

The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the
alleged fault or negligence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other
cause, gave rise to the damage."

See also judgment of October 21, 1903.

To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the
decision of March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an
obligation when between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and
effect; but if the damage caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a

20
third person, there is no obligation to make good upon the latter, even though
such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and much less so when it is shown
that the immediate cause of the damage has been the recklessness of the injured
party himself.

And again —

In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is
upon the plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to
establish their existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and
September 27, 1898, have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth
in detail the necessary points of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on
the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability, and the production of
the damage by said act or omission.

This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect

between the act or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result
of one of the first two. As the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that
the damages result immediately and directly from an act performed culpably and
wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a legal ground for imputability." (Decision of
October 29, 1887.)

Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)

(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)

Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was
definitely settled in this court in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while "There are many cases
(personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of
the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of
January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's
Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court of Spain
"define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal
one, and we are left to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other
countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in this jurisdiction to require
the application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and
definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were the
immediate causes of the accident.

21
The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party

shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.
For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event giving occasion for
damages—that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the
crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty,
that would have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for
which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause
of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act
in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."

We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in

picking up upon defendant's premises the detonating caps, the property of
defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect between the negligent act
or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the
doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender
years would have no effect in relieving defendant of responsibility, but whether in
view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are
snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff
should be deemed without fault in picking up the caps in question under all the
circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.

Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the
judgment of the court below, without costs to either party in this instance, and ten
days thereafter let the record be returned to the court wherein it originated, where

22
the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first instance
and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

(digest case)

16 Phil. 18 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Element – Quasi Delicts

David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was
also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical
drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was
mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric
power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an
effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in
opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the
explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor
losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps
exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the company’s
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off
the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages
to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the company’s negligence
and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor
which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in
multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the
explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days

23
after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room
for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications
of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate
that the explosion might be dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from
another.”

G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987

VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and AMADEO AZARCON, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil Code) was
filed by private respondent against petitioner. The action arose from a vehicular
accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin
Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on"
the store-residence of the private respondent, causing damages thereto which
were inventoried and assessed at P53,024.22.

In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that his driver
Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent (and) careful manner;
that the steering wheel refused to respond to his effort and as a result of a
blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes, the said cargo truck hit the

24
store-residence of plaintiff (private respondent) and that the said accident was an
act of God for which he cannot be held liable." 1

Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance and
Surety Corporation, alleging that said cargo truck involved in the vehicular
accident, belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the third party defendant
insurance company. Petitioner asked that the latter be ordered to pay him
whatever amount he may be ordered by the court to pay to the private
respondent.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the latter court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court,
which ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Travellers Insurance
and Surety Corporation, to the private, respondent the following: (a) P53,024.22
as actual damages; (b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the
costs. On the third party complaint, the insurance company was sentenced to pay
to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third party liability under its
comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's
fees.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him guilty of fault
or negligence is not tenable. It was established by competent evidence that the
requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or
some person for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection
of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.

It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or

omission of petitioner. The issue of whether or not this act or omission can be
considered as a "negligent" act or omission was passed upon by the trial court.
The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, which we are not
prepared to now disturb, show that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular
accident" was sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of
Patrolman Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the cargo
truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it
crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it then bumped

25
a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed the store
warehouse of the plaintiff."2

According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did
not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a
mishap caused by defective brakes can not be consideration as fortuitous in
character. Certainly, the defects were curable and the accident preventable.

Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the

disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection and supervision
of his driver.

Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was negligence
on the part of the petitioner, the petitioner's contention that the respondent court
erred in awarding private respondent actual, moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney's fees and costs, is untenable.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants

of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian
of said minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January
29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al.

26
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for
recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living
and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107,
which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or

in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because
he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by
marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of
the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following
order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby

reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are

presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:

27
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF

SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR

RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE

CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST

DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page
4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,

defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No.
5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us
with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not
dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so,
when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:

28
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from
his father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence
as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the
basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of
recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act
can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil
Code. Thus, the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the
agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject
of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action
with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted
and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could
have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been

29
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines
that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury
to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the
slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability
arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising

30
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the
stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that
its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code.
This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because
it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the

foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence
and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of
the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to
fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of
the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case
of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations
"which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this
book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification,
"not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code."
And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that
drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,
which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal
law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to said

31
Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations
derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new
provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)

through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider
the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal
from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p.
162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the
intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering
that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising
from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the
Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and
more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant
language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the

32
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free
from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of

33
the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is
that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is
that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or
do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp.
766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to
see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot
be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill

notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch
as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of
Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered
to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees

(case digest)

77 SCRA 100 – May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages – Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from
Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a
criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent
coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his
dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued
that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if
ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is
already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

34
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing
of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the
marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
“Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvin’s liability
should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.

G.R. No. 48541 August 21, 1989

BERNABE CASTILLO (In his own behalf, and in behalf of SERAPION

CASTILLO, who has since then become deceased, and EULOGIO CASTILLO,
his minor child) and GENEROSA GALANG CASTILLO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITO ROSARIO and
CRESENCIA ROSARIO, respondents-appellees.

Lino R. Eugenio for petitioners.

35
Eduardo G. Rosario for private respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek the reversal of the
February 13, 1978 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52567-R,
entitled "Bernabe Castillo, et al. v. Juanita Rosario, et al," affirming the dismissal
by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the complaint for damages filed by
petitioners against private respondents. Said dismissal was decreed on the basis
of the evidence before the trial court as well as the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, entitled "People v. Juanito Rosario."

Petitioners and private respondents figured in a vehicular accident on May 2,

1965 at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons and
damage to their respective vehicles.

The parties have conflicting versions as to what actually transpired on that fateful
day; each party pointing to the negligence of the other as the proximate cause of
the accident. Thus, as expected in cases like this, the main issue is: Who was at
fault? According to the petitioners, the accident happened as follows: 1

On May 2, 1985, at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner Bernabe Castillo
was driving his jeep with Plate No. J-4649 '64 Manila on the right lane of the
McArthur Highway with Generosa Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo,
seated in front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor child, as passengers, bound and
northward for Binmaley, Pangasinan at the rate of 25 kilometers per hour. Just
past San Nicolas bridge, Villasis, he noticed, from a distance of 120 meters more
or less, a speeding oncoming car with Plate No. L-27045 '64 Cavite, along the
same lane (facing north) he was driving, overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it. He
switched on his headlights to signal the car to return to its own right lane as the
way was not clear for it to overtake the truck.

The car turned out to be driven by the private respondent, Juanito Rosario, with
his wife, Cresencia Rosario. The signal was disregarded, as the car proceeded on
its direction southward on the right lane (facing north).lâwphî1.ñèt In order to
evade the impending collision, petitioner Bernabe Castillo swerved his jeep to the
right towards the shoulder and applied on the brakes, and leaving his feet on it,
even, immediately after the impact. The car rested on the shoulder of the right
lane. The jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tiremarks behind it;
36
while the car left long tire-marks, specially its left rear wheel. The jeep suffered a
shattered windshield, pushed-in radiator. The left mid-portion of its bumper badly
dented. The car had a flat tire on its right front wheel; its right fender badly dented
as the headlamp on top of it. The bumber stooped downward, because it went
thru under the bumper of the jeep.

The driver of the jeep, including his passengers suffered physical injuries.
Bernabe Castillo, with the patella of his right knee, fractured, suffered serious
physical injuries, in other parts of his body. Serapion Castillo whose head crushed
through the windshield, was nearly beheaded, while the other two passengers
suffered multiple slight and less serious injuries.

Private respondents, on the other hand, have their own version of the accident
and thus asseverate as follows: 2

Sometime in the early afternoon of May 2, 1965, the private respondents, together
with their small daughter, were on their way from San Carlos City (Pangasinan) to
Olongapo City where they resided at the time and where Juanito Rosario, a
member of the US Navy, had been temporarily stationed. They rode in the family
car. (TSN, C. Rosario, p. 35; J. Rosario, pp. 2, 12 Annex "D", "Request for
Admission")

At or about 2:30 p.m. of the same date, as Juanito Rosario who was driving the
car, and his two passengers, were along MacArthur Highway in Barrio Bacag,
Villasis, Pangasinan, going towards the south, they saw ahead of them a big
heavily loaded cargo truck. (TSN, B. Castillo, p. 532, Annex "B", "Request for
Admission") The truck was moving very slowly because of its heavy load so that
Juanito Rosario decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that
the road was clear and as additional precautionary measure, he blew his horn
several times at the time he was overtaking the truck. (TSN, Juanito Rosario, pp.
4, 11; C. Rosario, pp. 31-41, Annex "B", "Request for Admission")

Then as the car was about to overtake the slow moving cargo truck, the car's front
left tire suddenly burst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and
naturally making steering and control difficult. Because of the tendency of the car
to veer towards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver steered the car
towards the direction where he could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He
finally brought the car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road (facing south). (TSN,
C. Rosario, p. 31; J. Rosario, pp. 4, 17, Annex "D", "Request for Admission")

37
But barely had the said defendant parked his car on the left shoulder of the road
and just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped
by the jeep driven by Bernabe Castillo which came from the opposite direction.
(TSN, C. Rosario, p. 32; J. Rosario, p. 6, "Request for Admission") Both vehicles
were damaged, the car suffering the heavier damage. (Please see Annex "C",
"Request for Admission") Passengers of the jeep sustained injuries while those of
the car were badly shaken.

On June 30, 1965, a civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries
sustained by petitioners and for the damage to their vehicle as a result of the
collision, was instituted by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
While this case was pending, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed an
information dated September 29, 1965 against Juanito Rosario, private
respondent herein, for double physical injuries; double less serious physical
injuries; and damage to property thru reckless imprudence, in the Court of First
Instance of Urdaneta. Respondent Juanito Rosario was prosecuted and convicted
by the trial court in the criminal case. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
rendered a decision 3 acquitting him from the crime charged on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In the meantime, private respondents thru counsel, filed a "Request for

Admission" 4 on April 3, 1972 in the civil case, requesting petitioners to admit the
truthfulness of the facts set forth therein as well as the correctness and
genuineness of the documents attached thereto. On May 5,1972, petitioners filled
a "Manifestation", 5 admitting the allegations in the "Request for Admission" with
some qualifications. Later, both parties submitted their respective memoranda.

On the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by the petitioners, as well
as the records of the criminal case attached in the "Request for Admission" of the
private respondents, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision 6 on
December 28, 1972, dismissing the complaint of the petitioners against private
respondents as well as the counterclaim of private respondents against the
petitioners. On January 24, 1973, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On February 13, 1978, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 7 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. 8 The petitioners-appellants

raise in issue before Us the following questions, to wit:

38
1) Is the decision of the Court of Appeals, where its dispositive part, or "fallo",
states that the guilt of the (appellant) accused was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt final and conclusive, on an action for damages based on quasi-delict?;

2) Are the testimonies given in a criminal case, without strict compliance with
Section 41 Rule 130 and without opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who
made these testimonies, admissible evidence in a subsequent case and can be
the basis of a valid decision?;

3) Is an action for damages based on quasi-delict barred by a decision of the

appellate court acquitting the accused, the body of which lays the blame on the
plaintiff but in its dispositive part, declares the guilt of the accused not proved
beyond reasonable doubt ? 9

The main thrust of this petition for review which stems from a cause of action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana (being a recovery for damages arising
from the vehicular accident), is that petitioners were deprived of due process
because their civil action was decided on the basis of private respondent Juanita
Rosario's acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence.

There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is
separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a
preponderance of evidence. According to a number of cases, 10 a quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a
substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case. 11

In the case of Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 468,
470-471, this Court held:

... in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries ..., the judgment of acquittal does not operate to extinguish the civil liability
of the defendant based on the same incident. The civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution —
39
whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.

But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court provides:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil action might arise did not exist.

In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v. Rosario, the Court of

Appeals after a painstaking analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the
relative positions of the two vehicles as depicted in the sketches; (c) the distance
of each of the two vehicles from the cemented edge of the road; (d) the point of
impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of the damage caused upon
each of the two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep and not the
accused driver of the car who was negligent and accordingly acquitted the
latter. 12

Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the

basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found
that no negligence was committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of
damages to the petitioners.

Respondent Appellate Court states:

In acquitting defendant-appellee Juanito Rosario in CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR on

October 28, 1968, this Court held that the collision was not due to the negligence
of Juanito Rosario but it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder
[of the road] where the car was that was actually the proximate cause of the
collision.' (Ibid., p. 183) With this finding, this Court actually exonerated appellee
Juanito Rosario from civil liability. Since plaintiffs-appellants' civil action is
predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged negligence which does not exist, it
follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already final, carried with it
the extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom. (Corpus vs. Paje, 28 SCRA
1062, 1064, 1067; Faraon vs. Priela, 24 SCRA 582, 583; De Soriano vs. Albornoz,
98 Phil. 785, 787788; Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672, 675). 13

40
It was the Court of Appeals findings that the collision was not due to the
negligence of Juanita Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the
jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the
proximate cause of the collision. With this findings, the Court of Appeals
exonerated Juanito Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged
negligence did not exist.

As earlier stated, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was an

affirmation of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the trial
of the case before the Court of First Instance, the private respondents were not
present, in view of the fact that they were out of the country at that time. Their
counsel introduced as part of their evidence, the records in the criminal case, in
accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14 These records
were attached to their "Request for Admission" and were substantially admitted by
petitioners. The said records were mostly composed of transcripts of the hearing
in the criminal case. Petitioners raised, as one of their objections, the propriety
and correctness of admitting and adopting these transcripts as part of the record
in the civil case. According to them, this is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, on the ground that petitioners were not given the opportunity
to cross-examine. We have to disagree. A careful reading of the transcripts would
reveal that then counsel for petitioners, Atty. Nicodemo Ferrer, actively
participated during the proceedings of the criminal case. He raised various
objections, 15 in the course of the trial. Petitioners, therefore, thru counsel had the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.

Thus, the admission of the said testimonies cannot be set aside.

Finally, in a long line of decisions, this Court has held time and again that the
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the
Supreme Court. 16

In Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 and Tolentino v. De Jesus,

56 SCRA 167, it was held that:

Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the
Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee;

41
(6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9)
when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of
evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.

Finding that the questioned decision does not fall under any of the exceptions
cited above, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of
the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby denied. No

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989

EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.

Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.

Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a
vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" 1 The respondent
Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle
which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was then driven by
petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial
capitol, and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a
consequence. 2

42
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207
thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve
his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of
said criminal case through a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said
criminal case "on reasonable doubt".5

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in
the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and act
complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer filed therein, the
petitioner alleged as special and affirmative detenses that the private respondent
had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action, if any, is
barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said
criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since
therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the
criminal case. 8

Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court

issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that "(t)o enrich our
jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the
Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the ruling of
the court". 9

On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the
aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in
the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof
was denied for the same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. 11

After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the
herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the
sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other
actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees,
and costs. 12

On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of the
lower court except as to the award for moral damages which it reduced from
P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14

43
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private
respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without
reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a
separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the
herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no
civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the

respondent court for refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal
therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had been passed upon
by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is petitioner's
position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case, the first
dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion for reconsideration, do
not constitute the "law of the case' which would control the subsequent proceed
ings in this controversy.

1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.

The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid posture of
the proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down. While it may be
true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the issues which were
thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two lower courts, the
proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its order denying
therein defendants motion to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific
opinion or explanation as to the legal and factual bases on which its two
resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action on that
incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution was premised on
the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts then presented,
did not consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for such resolutions having been
expounded on the merits of that action, no law of the case may be said to have
been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court's refusal to
consider petitioner's claim that his former acquittal barred the separate action.

'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established, as
the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,

44
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330). (Emphasis supplied). 16

It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the
final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in
any given case constitutes the law of that particular case . . . (Emphasis
supplied). 17

It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is

the law of the case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent
proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no question
necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second
appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are
substantially the same as those on which the first question rested and, according
to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits . . . 18

2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal
plaint of petitioner.

Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this
case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of
liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil
liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict
or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability. 19

We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., 20 it was
held that where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the
offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private
prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the
subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not to
lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral
defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal omen and cannot
otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed
reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena vs. Potenciano, et
al., 21 this time involving damage to property through negligence as to make out a

45
case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, such
secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not
intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano. The citation
of Roa in the later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords no
comfort to petitioner.

These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even
statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions arising from criminal offenses
and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the statutory aspects for
another case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the doctrinal
developments on this issue.

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in

the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present
jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable
doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the
accused 23 and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the
trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24

Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after such
acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the
relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. 25that:

In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the
ground that 'his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt' the
plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to recover
damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA
113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still
be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist'. (Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558
cited in People vs. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987;
Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,
1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence ... 26

46
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure
of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil
liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil
liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide
that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable. 27

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through
the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal
offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the
acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or
requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by
such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict,
hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter,
which action can be proved by mere preponderance of
evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the
rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.

The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is
constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner, thus:

3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at about 7:00 o'clock, the plaintiff crossed
Iznart Street from his restaurant situated at 220 lznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines,
on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and
while he was standing on the middle of the street as there were vehicles coming
from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was bumped
and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-2508 W which was on its way
from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was being
driven by the defendant in a reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive rate
of speed and in violation of the provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as
amended, in relation to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code as well as in
violation of existing city ordinances, and by reason of his inexcusable lack of
precaution and failure to act with due negligence and by failing to take into
consideration (sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the
place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other conditions of lznart Street; 29

Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to

reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal

47
case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. 30 The
Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that —

... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover
damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused . . .

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved
virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion
hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to
reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the
criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages,
especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt
was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on
two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365
of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was
based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of
civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may
proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court

aside, We hold that on the issues decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining
the decision a quo.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.

SO ORDERED

(case digest)
EDGAR JARANTILLA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING G.R. No. 80194
March 21, 1989

48
FACTS:
Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar
Jarantilla in the evening of July7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City.Jarantilla was
accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thrur
eckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207. Sing, as the complaining witness, did not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the
prosecution of the criminal case through a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted
on reasonable doubt.On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a civil case against Jarantilla
in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo,Branch IV, in which civil action involved the
same subject matter and act complained of in the dismissed criminal case. RTC denies
motion to dismiss, granted damages to Sing, and proposed that the case be elevated to the
SC by certiorari. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action without
reserving the civil action can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the
same act or omission?
HELD:
YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT.

Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the
part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto .
Since the same negligence cang ive rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort,
either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended partycannot recover damages under both
types of liability.Where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the
offense charged in the criminal case through intervention as a private prosecutor, the final
judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon
the same cause.The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may
still be civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist' Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the
court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability
of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and
determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to
determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the
application of Article29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There

49
is persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused
foreclosed the civil liability based on Article100 of the Revised Penal Code which
presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense
charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or
omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon
may be instituted or or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere
preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29
enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or
omission.

[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000]

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf of the
minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all
surnamed Dy), respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] affirming the decision and supplemental decision of the trial court,[3] as
follows:

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered

dismissing the appeals interposed by both accused and Reyes
Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and Supplemental
Decision dated June 6, 1992 and October 26, 1992 respectively.

"SO ORDERED."[4]

The facts are as follows:

On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an amended information
charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double
homicide and damage to property, reading as follows:

50
 "That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of
Cauayan, Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused being the driver and
person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor bearing Plate No. N2A-867
registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a
load of 2,000 cases of empty bottles of beer grande, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the same while along
the National Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and ordinances and without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property,
causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said
trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No.
BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @
Pacquing, due to irreversible shock, internal and external hemorrhage
and multiple injuries, open wounds, abrasions, and further causing
damages to the heirs of Feliciano Balcita in the amount of
P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and
damages to his Nissan Pick-Up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the
total amount of P2,000,000.00.

"CONTRARY TO LAW.

"Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.

"(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC

"Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor"

Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
On the same occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy and minor children
and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a
separate civil action against the accused arising from the offense charged.[5] On
November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based
on quasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita
(the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private respondents
opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex
delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, private respondents
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and

51
manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal
action.[6] However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the
accused driver.[7]

Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil
cases and conducted a joint trial of the same.

The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be undisputed, are as
follows:

"The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic

corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products for
the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short) from the latters San
Fernando, Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets in Luzon.
Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described
above driven by Romeo Dunca y Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside
from the Corporations memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to
physically inspect their vehicles before each trip (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5),
the SMCs Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of
this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to
a professional drivers license, it also conducts a rigid examination of
all driver applicants before they are hired.

"In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by
Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga
loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at
the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck
helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00 oclock that same
morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along
the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a
damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the trucks right
lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the
surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to
six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the
potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming
from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by
taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the
incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to

52
bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved
to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle
rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the
road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally stopped.
(see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs.
A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-14, pp. 9-11, record), and its two passengers,
namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh.
A-19) from external and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures
(pp. 15 and 16, record).

"For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent
P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the time of his death he was 45 years old.
He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic
Wood Products and Development Corporation (DWPC), a wood
processing establishment, from which he was receiving an income of
P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the Articles of Incorporation of the
DWPC, the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy appear
to be stockholders of 10,000 shares each with par value of P100.00
per share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60,000
shares valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1 & 10-B). Under its 1988
Income Tax Returns (Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net income of
P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University
graduate in Business Administration, past president of the Pasay
Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the Philippine Jaycees
in 1971 and 1976, respectively, and World Vice-President of Jaycees
International in 1979. He was also the recipient of numerous awards
as a civic leader (Exh. C). His children were all studying in prestigious
schools and spent about P180,000.00 for their education in 1988
alone (Exh. H-4).

"As stated earlier, the plaintiffs procurement of a writ of attachment of

the properties of the Corporation was declared illegal by the Court of
Appeals. It was shown that on December 26, 1989, Deputy Sheriff
Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at San Fernando, Pampanga, attached six
units of Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its garage at
San Fernando, Pampanga. These vehicles were kept under PC guard
by the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the Corporation to
operate them. However, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dissolved the writ (p. 30, record) and on December 29, 1989, said
Sheriff reported to this Court that the attached vehicles were taken by

53
 the defendants representative, Melita Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record).
The defendants general Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per
day for the non-operation of the six units during their attachment (p. 31,
t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, proceedings on December 10, 1990)."[8]

On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is

hereby rendered:

"1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No.
4136), and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset
the same, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer two (2)
indeterminate penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor
as minimum to three years, six months and twenty days as maximum;
to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 as compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;

"2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the
defendant therein actual damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and

"3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br.
19-424.

"No pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED.

"Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.

"(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA

"Regional Trial Judge"[9]

On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from
the joint decision.[10]

54
On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive
portion of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the
damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the
accused.[11]

On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending
the dispositive portion by inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows:

"2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily

liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in
the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the
damages of P84,000.00 awarded to said defendant in the next
preceding paragraph; and x x x"[12]

On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice
of appeal from the supplemental decision.[13]

During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign
country. By resolution dated December 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.[14]

On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision

affirming that of the trial court, as set out in the opening paragraph of this
decision.[15]

On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended
decision.[16]

On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[17]

Hence, this petition for review.[18]

On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition
within ten (10) days from notice.[19]

On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment.[20] On April 13,
1998, the Court granted leave to petitioner to file a reply and noted the reply it filed
on March 11, 1998.[21]

We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case.

55
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition, which, however,
boil down to two (2) basic issues, namely:

1.....May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be

held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended
parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing
of a separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer
of the truck driver?

2.....May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the

criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of
the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the
information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage
to property?[22]

We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand
the cases to the trial court for determination of the civil liability of petitioner as
employer of the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delicto re-opened for
the purpose.

In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to
enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail
himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission of the accused.[23] This is the rule against double
recovery.

In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the
part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto"
either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages
under both types of liability."[24]

In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for
damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict,
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued
petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to
be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this
vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of
law.
56
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to be instituted by the
injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and
would necessitate only a preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability
of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary,
subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action
based on Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the
nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two being
statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.[25] The second, predicated on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer may be held
subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of
his duty. This liability attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in
the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable
to properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.[26]

As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because
of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of
the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of
civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate
civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.[27]

Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal
action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission of the
accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.[28]

The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against

petitioner as employer of accused truck driver became clearer when they did not
ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the
accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily liable for
damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended

57
parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer based on quasi
delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.

It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case

withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against the driver (accused) and
manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal
action. However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the
reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil
action against petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, the provision of
Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is
clear that the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a
waiver of other available civil actions arising from the same act or omission of the
accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil actions
deemed waived upon such reservation or filing, and one of which is the civil
indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure specifically provides:

"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others."

The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same
litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. The restrictive
phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil
actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for its basis
the same act or omission of the offender.[29]

However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed
against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon. Thus, the trial court
grievously erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the trial courts decision. Unfortunately private respondents did
not appeal from such dismissal and could not be granted affirmative relief.[30]

The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to
promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding"[31] or exempted "a
particular case from the operation of the rules."[32]

Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages
in the criminal case and in dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with
such award, private respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case.
58
However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial
court so that it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be
warranted by the evidence.[33]

With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was
improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the
criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As
enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,[34] "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for
the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal
action is whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery
of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action
filed against the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.

In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction.
Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became final and executory, but only
insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded
in the criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver. The
pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil liability
arising from the crime has been waived in said criminal action.

With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action
exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the amended information, the issue
is de minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal
case because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a separate civil
action or the filing thereof, "there would be no possibility that the employer would
be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the
civil liability of the accused.[35]

As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that
only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is
brought against the employee or against his employer.[36] The injured party must
choose which of the available causes of action for damages he will bring.[37]

Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence with violation
of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There is no such nomenclature of
an offense under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to
sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months

59
and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum." This is erroneous
because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence
bears no relation to the individual willful crime or crimes committed, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.[38]

Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if erroneous, as it is,

because it has become final and executory.

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is
punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the
common use of such descriptive phrase as homicide through reckless
imprudence, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately,
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; or simple imprudence causing
damages to property."[39]

There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without

disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in strict
adherence to precedent.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CR No. 14448,
promulgated on January 6, 1997, and the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No.
Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.

IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares the accused Romeo
Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined and penalized under Article
365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, with violation of the automobile law
(R. A. No. 4136, as amended), and sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate
penalties of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
maximum,[40] without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and

60
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the case re-opened to
determine the liability of the defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation to
plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendants counterclaim.

No costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO

LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution[1] dated
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the
Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for
brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity)
and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an
accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.

61
 When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss
the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and
dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil
case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7,
1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and
therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further
held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC
erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an
abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas
RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think
and believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first
party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for
reckless imprudence against the second party.On the other hand, the second
party, together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved

62
parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is
the very private complainant in the criminal case.[4]

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case.

The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal
case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an
action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved
party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one
who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the
owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does
not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and
Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to
avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of
law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the
legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action
- the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of
forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The
MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without
prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it

63
is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the
same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on
the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without
prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special
civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the
judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
to secure a favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or
more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed
the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although
these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under
the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.These articles on culpa
aquiliana read:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant.

64
 Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that
state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused

in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for
brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right
to file such civil action.Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before
the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from
the same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the
recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for violation of
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the
1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to
bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in
the criminal action.Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right
to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

65
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the
others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000
and now provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with
the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions
shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)

66
 Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file
a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil
Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the
civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended
party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before
filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed
separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not
apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action,
if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered
in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to
recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions
based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues
this procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

67
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final
judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on
the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the
criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented
by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional
evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided
jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the
separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the
filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the
offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the
offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
provides as follows:

SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985
Rules, expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the
68
present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an
action but the offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to
the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with
Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence
of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions
and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court
ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and
disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the
accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party after the criminal
case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be
promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party
complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings
and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000
Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states that
any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil
action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
69
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil
Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil
action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict -
without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action
for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim
of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for
two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in
the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article
2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from
filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on
the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court
in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent
civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code
70
introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly
provides that the independent civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs.
Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:

x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate
the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that
this action 'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the
concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action
although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to
encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one
hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any
event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such
remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on
December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28,
1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -

x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable

to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO,
BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and
LEONARDO FERRER, petitioners, vs. HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO,
as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M
SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,

71
 represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] dated March 1, 2002, petitioners

assail the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and
January 9, 2002, respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and denying
their motion for reconsideration, arising from the dismissal of their complaint to
recover civil indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound
Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which
claimed the lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its passengers, including a
two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a reservation to file a
separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated on December 17, 1998.[2]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against
Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their reservation to file a
separate civil action.[3] They cited therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper
service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of
non-forum shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as
defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron Transit from its officers.[4]
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the
right to file a separate action in this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned
from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there was no appeal of
the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2)
years thence was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.

72
 The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause
of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based
on quasi delict, as it construed petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four (4)
years from the accrual of the cause of action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that
petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint ought to
be dismissed on the ground of prescription.[5]
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a ground for dismissal of
the complaint as summons was served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the
legal department without mentioning her designation or position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the
complaint is not based on quasi delict but on the final judgment of conviction in
the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.[6] The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
reiterating that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and had
prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the complaint was filed
more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident.[7] As regards the improper
service of summons, the trial court reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought
to be dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal.[8] The appellate
court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reasoning that even if the
respondent trial court judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible remedy as appeal was
available to petitioners and they failed to allege that the petition was brought
within the recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal.[9]
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application of the rule that
certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an
existing obligation arising from the criminal liability of private respondents.
Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex
delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave
abuse of discretion when it insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners
is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action had prescribed. Since the
action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action
accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court was procedurally flawed,
petitioners implore the Court to exempt this case from the rigid operation of the
rules as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to vindicate, i.e., damages for
the deaths and physical injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil
73
liability had been adjudged by reason of their reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action.
In their Comment[10] dated June 13, 2002, private respondents insist that the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They point
out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi
delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive
period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since
Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits
contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer contemplated in Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the
case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil
case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to the Court of
Appeals via certiorari was improper as petitioners should have appealed the
adverse order of the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other procedural
lapses allegedly committed by petitioners, such as lack of certification against
forum-shopping; lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed
order of the trial court; and non-indication of the full names and addresses of
petitioners in the petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply[11] dated September 14, 2002, while private
respondents filed a Rejoinder[12] dated October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of
their arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.[13] Such civil liability may consist of restitution,
reparation of the damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages.[14] When a criminal action is instituted, the civil liability arising from the
offense is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly waives the right to recover
damages from the accused; second, when the offended party reserves his right to
have the civil damages determined in a separate action in order to take full control
and direction of the prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured party
actually exercises the right to maintain a private suit against the offender by
instituting a civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case.

74
 Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,
which governed the institution of the criminal action, as well as the reservation of
the right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111 thereof states:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the
others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way
of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such
action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon filing thereof in court for trial.

Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil

action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this
reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting Sibayan, did
not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction and their reservation to
file a separate civil action made in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint

75
for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman.
Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover
private respondents civil liability arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its
misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed the same,
declaring that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and should
have been brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of action
accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent
with petitioners claim that the action was brought to recover civil liability arising
from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan
and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing
a cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.
Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an
action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176
of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.[15] Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar
proscription against double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can
pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil
liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company[16] was decided upon a
similar set of facts. Therein, the driver of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged
with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The plaintiff made an

76
express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was
convicted which conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a
separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict which was ordered
dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more than
six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed.
Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another action, this time based on the subsidiary
liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed the action holding that the
dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to
enforce the bus companys subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar
to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer becomes subsidiarily liable
if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with
controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of
indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on
the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners allegations in their
complaint, opposition to the motion to dismiss[17] and motion for
reconsideration[18] of the order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
recover civil liability arising from crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate
civil action waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the
avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act
or omission of the offender.[19] However, since the stale action for damages based
on quasi delict should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for
petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as the only recourse
available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This interpretation is also
consistent with the bar against double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners should have appealed the
order of dismissal of the trial court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however, should be exempted from
the strict application of the rules in order to promote their fundamental objective of
securing substantial justice.[20] We are loathe to deprive petitioners of the
indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction
based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent such an injustice.[21]

77
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002,
respectively dismissing the present action and denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, as well as the orders of the lower court dated February 26, 2001
and July 16, 2001. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and G.R. No. 150157
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS
LINES, INC., Present:
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
MODESTO CALAUNAN,
Respondent. January 25, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 55909 which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, finding petitioners
Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to
pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

78
 The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353
with plate number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner
Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned
by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.

At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent

Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way
to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit
Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway
in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right
side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter
to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters
from point of collision.

Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first
brought for treatment to
the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to
the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.

By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case
No. 684-M-89.Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint
for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC
of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was
tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testified in the criminal case were
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos.

In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:

1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and

be sued as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles
involved;
79
 2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly
licensed;

3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;

4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto

Calaunan and the existence of the medical certificate;

5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private
jeep being ahead of the bus;

6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and
straight, although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep
fell into.[3]

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)[4] of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be
received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.

Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left

for abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio
Ramos took the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left
for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her husband, Marcelo
Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her
husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after
one month. She went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was
informed that he did not go there.

The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8,

RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried,
to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan,[5] Marcelo

80
Mendoza[6] and Fernando Ramos[7] in said case, together with other documentary
evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique
Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified
the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he
had brought.[8] Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and
documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since
the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised
that said TSNs and documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as
rebuttal evidence.

For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor

Oscar Buan testified. The TSN[9] of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator
of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be
adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.

Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence,

the TSNs[10] of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and
petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.

The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the
collision?

Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the
latter is resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up.

The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

The parties differed only on the manner the collision between

the two (2) vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver,
the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on
the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the
time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake
the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back

81
 of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the
testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was
on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of
plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep of the plaintiff
overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the
Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also
overtook the jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud
sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy
portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they
overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic),
meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He
testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was
bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that
the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they
explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the
left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left
because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Such was their
testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case and before
this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the
manner how the collision took place was correct, would be
determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the
operation of their respective vehicles.][11]

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of

a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee,
specifically petitioner Manliclic.

On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent
Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of
its decision reads:

82
 WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff
jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for
the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of
the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition,
the defendants are also to pay costs.[12]

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.[13]

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no

reversible error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.[14]

Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN
EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION
OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY
OCCURRED.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF
83
 HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF DUE
DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
EMPLOYEES.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this
appeal with this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent
filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio
Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and
Liwayway Calaunan.[15]

In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a

Decision[16] of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the
charge[17] of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.

On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan,[18] Marcelo Mendoza[19] and Fernando
Ramos[20] should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply
with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

For Section 47, Rule 130[21] to apply, the following requisites must be
satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or
deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative,
between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the
same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case.[22]

84
 Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites
set forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a
party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the
three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are
not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.[23]

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said
criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the
ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.

It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged

inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party
may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform
to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being
hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted
and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted.[24] Hearsay
evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and
given the importance it deserves.[25]

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing
the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
in the criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In
fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by
both petitioners.[26] Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN
containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner
PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the
criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the
TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears
that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that
85
the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal
case should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the
testimony of the witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow
admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo
Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied

due process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is
too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of
the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that
the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.

In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court, through Associate

Justice Reynato S. Puno,[28] admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a
witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertion that he would be
denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of
denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as
a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so
doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said ground.

Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have
been admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only
to testimony or deposition. We find such contention to be untenable. Though said
section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents
from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be
admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
admitted.Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the
testimony may be entitled.[29]

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of

petitioner Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than
respondents version. They anchor their contention on the fact that

86
petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.

To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in

the civil case.

From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was
one arising from, or based on, quasi-delict.[30] Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI
was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection
and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations
read:

4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff

was on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a
moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway heading South
towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then
driving the same;

5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon

Express Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly
bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353
and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one
Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was
then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost
control of his vehicle;

6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the

above-described motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon
Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers side on a
ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle
which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was
rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during
the pre-trial and trial of this case;

87
 7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily
injuries which compounded plaintiffs frail physical condition and
required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22,
1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex A
and made an integral part hereof;

8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of

the above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by
plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant
driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353
at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic
rules and regulations;

9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed

to exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection
and supervision of its drivers; x x x[31]

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence
of negligence on his part?

In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals

said:

To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that

accused-appellant was negligent when the bus he was driving
bumped the jeep from behind; that the proximate cause of the
accident was his having driven the bus at a great speed while closely
following the jeep; x x x

We do not agree.

The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle

in front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.

88
 xxxx

Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant

cannot be held liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.[32]

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that

petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that
he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the
mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime
or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising from
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.[33]

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the

Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for
quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractualunder the Civil Code.[34] It is now settled

89
that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.[35]

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his

guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not
the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this
second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based
thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be
instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.

As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same

will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable
doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or
that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code.[36] An acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case[37] based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision

occurred and to disregard that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the
PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking respondents jeep, the latter, without
warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep
ahead of it, thus causing the collision.

As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for

review. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.[38] Not being
a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
90
 (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.[39]

After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the
exceptions that would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree
in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was
petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the
cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial
court has this say:

x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision
took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the
two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.

In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of

Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator
CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the
driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took
place. The allegation that another jeep was being overtaken by the
jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case No.
684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and
before this Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the
part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not
be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the
truth was also apparent when it would be considered that in his
91
statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator
CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus
bumped the jeep of Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was
behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the Regional Trial Court
in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the
collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement and
testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision
between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with
caution. It might be true that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to
the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was mentioned by
the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another
jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine
Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was
given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his
statement should not escape attention. The one-day difference
between the giving of the two statements would be significant enough
to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise
before giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement
and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of the latter
should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14),
the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan(Exh. 13) given to
CV Cabading rear its ugly head when he did not mention in said
affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake another jeep
when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine
Rabbit bus took place.

xxxx

If one would believe the testimony of the defendant,

Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the
collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been
somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear. Furthermore,
the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been
92
 forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine
Rabbit was running very fast as testified to by Ramos which was
not controverted by the defendants.[40]

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a
family.[41] Under Article 2180[42] of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused
by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or
both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is
not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.[43]
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised
the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening
process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As
to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues that
presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to

examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the
supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for
the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that
was incumbent on them.[44]

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[45] it was explained

that:

93
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand,
includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his or its employees and the
imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in
case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of
acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring
of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who
should regularly report on their supervisory functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and

supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it
is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part
of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of
hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers,

that the formulation of various company policies on safety without
showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt
petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the
erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on
efficiency and safety were followed. x x x.

94
 The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its
employees. It expounded as follows:

From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine

Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well
as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is
as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of
evidence introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus
company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver
should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There is no
showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee
how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles without courting
incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to supervision, it is not difficult
to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been negligent as
an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees,
particularly the driver involved in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the

accident is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the
negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set
forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the
accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is,
prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner
failed to do. The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is
only one set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers of
PRBLI. [46] How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI know and be
continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being
lent to all the drivers?

For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is
held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by
petitioner Manliclics negligence.

95
 We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the
amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by
respondent for the towing and repair of his jeep.[47] As regards the awards for
moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances, must be
modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be
reduced to P50,000.00.[48] Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good.[49] The amount awarded by the trial court must,
likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.[50] The award of P15,000.00 for attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.[51]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review

is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages
shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall
be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989

SPOUSES FEDERICO FRANCO and FELICISIMA R. FRANCO, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANTONIO REYES, MRS. SUSAN
CHUAY and LOLITA LUGUE respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The instant petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals deals mainly
with the nature of an employer's liability for his employee's negligent act.

At about 7:30 in the evening of October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the
northbound Franco Bus with Plate No. XY320-PUB he was driving to the left to
avoid hitting a truck with a trailer parked facing north along the cemented
pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby
taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus bearing Plate No. YL-735 being

96
driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two (2)
vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.

Dragged fifteen (15) meters from the point of impact (midway the length of the
parked truck with trailer), the mini bus landed right side down facing south in the
canal of the highway, a total wreck. The Franco Bus was also damaged but not as
severely. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two (2) drivers, Macario Yuro
and Magdaleno Lugue, and two (2) passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and
Fernando Chuay.

Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs.
Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife
of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages through reckless
imprudence before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Angeles City,
Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case No. 2154 against Mr. & Mrs. Federico Franco,
the owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company. The complaint
alleged that: (a) the recklessness and imprudence of the Franco Bus driver
caused the collision which resulted in his own death and that of the mini bus driver
and two (2) other passengers thereof; (b) that as a consequence of the vehicular
mishap, the Isuzu Mini Bus became a total wreck resulting in actual damages
amounting to P50,000.00 and the loss of an average net income of P120.00 daily
or P3,600.00 monthly multiplied by a minimum of one more year of serviceability
of said mini bus or P40,200.00; and, (c) that in view of the death of the three (3)
passengers aforementioned, the heirs of each should be awarded a minimum of
P12,000.00 and the expected average income of P6,000.00 each of the driver
and one of the passengers and P12,000.00 of the Chinese businessman
passenger.

In answer to the complaint, defendants set up, among others, the affirmative
defense that as owners and operators of the Franco Transportation Company,
they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of all their
employees, including the deceased driver Macario Yuro.

Said defense was, however, rejected by the trial court in its decision 1 dated May
17, 1978, for the reason that the act of the Franco Bus driver was a negligent act
punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation arising from Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It said: "This is a
case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises, and not a case of civil
negligence and the defense of having acted like a good father of a family or

97
having trained or selected the drivers of his truck is no defense to avoid civil
liability." 2 On this premise, the trial court ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs, Antonio Reyes, Lolita Lugue, and Susan Chuay, and against the
defendants Mr. and Mrs. Federico Franco, ordering the latter:

(1) To pay Antonio Reyes, actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P90,000.00 for the Isuzu Mini Bus;

(2) To pay Lolita Lugue, the widow of Magdaleno Lugue, actual and
compensatory damages in the total sum of P18,000.00;

(3) To pay Susan Chuay, the widow of Fernando Chuay, actual and
compensatory damages in the total sum of P24,000.00; and

(4) To pay attorney's fee in the amount of P5.000.00;

All with legal interests from the filing of this suit on November 11, 1974 until paid;
and the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED. 3

On appeal by herein petitioners as defendants-appellants, respondent appellate

court, agreeing with the lower court, held that defendants-appellants' driver who
died instantly in the vehicular collision, was guilty of reckless or criminal
imprudence punishable by law in driving appellants' bus; that the civil obligation of
the appellants arises from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code resulting in the
subsidiary liability of the appellants under the said provisions, 4 that the case
subject of appeal is one involving culpable negligence out of which civil liability
arises and is not one of civil negligence; 5 and that there is nothing in Articles 102
and 103 of the Revised Penal Code which requires a prior judgment of conviction
of the erring vehicle driver and his obligation to pay his civil liability before the said
provisions can be applied. 6 Respondent appellate court increased the award of
damages granted by the lower court as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified as follows:

1. To pay Susan Chuay, widow of Fernando Chuay, the sum of P30,000.00 for the
latter's death and P112,000.00 for loss of earning capacity;

98
2. To pay Lolita Lugue, widow of Magdaleno Lugue, the sum of P30,000.00 for the
latter's death and P62,000.00 for loss of earning capacity. The rest of the
judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED. 7

On April 1, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid

respondent appellate court's decision dated January 2, 1985 but the same was
denied on May 13, 1985.

Hence, the instant petition raising two (2) legal questions: first, whether the action
for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was predicated
upon crime or quasi-delict; and second, whether respondent appellate court in an
appeal filed by the defeated parties, herein petitioners, may properly increase the
award of damages in favor of the private respondents Chuay and Lugue,
prevailing parties in the lower court, who did not appeal said court's decision.

Petitioners contend that the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended

Complaint 8 of herein private respondents as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2154
unequivocally claim that the former as the employers of Macario Yuro, the driver
of the Franco Bus who caused the vehicular mishap, are jointly and severally
liable to the latter for the damages suffered by them which thus makes Civil Case
No. 2154 an action predicated upon a quasi-delict under the Civil Code subject to
the defense that the employer exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made between the

subsidiary liability of the employer under the Revised Penal Code and the
employer's primary liability under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious
in character. The first type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:

Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of

establishments. — In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavern-keepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have
been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery
or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the
99
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the
innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposits of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by the servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties;

while the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the defendant.

Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry,

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

100
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict
committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose
primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Before the
employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that
there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or
delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was
instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103. 9

In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted because the person who
should stand as the accused and the party supposed to be primarily liable for the
damages suffered by private respondents as a consequence of the vehicular
mishap died. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on
considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary
liability. Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible.

On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is
based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious
acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.

Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambulo, supra, where it was
held that the defense of observance of due diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of employees is not applicable to the subsidiary
liability provided in Article 20 of the Penal Code (now Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code). By such reliance, it would seem that respondent appellate court
seeks to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of the employer without a criminal
conviction of the party primarily liable therefor. This is not only erroneous and
absurd but is also fraught with dangerous consequences. It is erroneous because
the conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability 10 and, at the same time, absurd because we will be
faced with a situation where the employer is held subsidiarily liable even without a
primary liability being previously established. It is likewise dangerous because, in
effect, the employer's subsidiary liability would partake of a solidary obligation
resulting in the law's amendment without legislative sanction.

The Court in the aforecited M.D. Transit case went further to say that there can be
no automatic subsidiary liability of defendant employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code where his employee has not been previously criminally
convicted.

101
Having thus established that Civil Case No. 2154 is a civil action to impose the
primary liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its alleged
reckless driver, we confront ourselves with the plausibility of
defendants-petitioners' defense that they observed due diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

On this point, the appellate court has unequivocally spoken in affirmation of the
lower court's findings, to wit:

Anyway, a perusal of the record shows that the appellants were not able to
establish the defense of a good father of a family in the supervision of their bus
driver. The evidence presented by the appellants in this regard is purely
self-serving. No independent evidence was presented as to the alleged
supervision of appellants' bus drivers, especially with regard to driving habits and
reaction to actual traffic conditions. The appellants in fact admitted that the only
kind of supervision given the drivers referred to the running time between the
terminal points of the line (t.s.n., September 16, 1976, p. 21). Moreover, the
appellants who ran a fleet of 12 buses plying the Manila-Laoag line, have only two
inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspection. There is no evidence that
they are really safety inspectors. 11

Basically, the Court finds that these determinations are factual in nature. As a
painstaking review of the evidence presented in the case at bar fails to disclose
any evidence or circumstance of note sufficient to overrule said factual findings
and conclusions, the Court is inclined to likewise reject petitioners' affirmative
defense of due diligence. The wisdom of this stance is made more apparent by
the fact that the appellate court's conclusions are based on the findings of the
lower court which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonies of the
witnesses during trial. As a rule, this Court respects the factual findings of the
appellate and trial courts and accord them a certain measure of
finality. 12 Consequently, therefore, we find petitioners liable for the damages
claimed pursuant to their primary liability under the Civil Code.

On the second legal issue raised in the instant petition, we agree with petitioners'
contention that the Intermediate Appellate Court (later Court of Appeals) is without
jurisdiction to increase the amount of damages awarded to private respondents
Chuay and Lugue, neither of whom appealed the decision of the lower court.
While an appellee who is not also an appellant may assign error in his brief if his
purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, he cannot ask for
modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also

102
appealed. 13 For failure of plaintiffs-appellees, herein private respondents, to
appeal the lower court's judgment, the amount of actual damages cannot exceed
that awarded by it. 14

Furthermore, the records 15 show that plaintiffs-private respondents limited their

claim for actual and compensatory damages to the supposed average income for
a period of one (1) year of P6,000.00 for the driver Magdaleno Lugue and
P12,000.00 for the Chinese businessman Fernando Chuay. We feel that our
award should not exceed the said amounts .16

However, the increase in awards for indemnity arising from death to P30,000.00
each remains, the same having been made in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence decreeing such increase in view of the depreciated Philippine
currency. 17

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified

decreasing the award to private respondents of actual and compensatory
damages for loss of average income for the period of one year to P6,000.00 for
the deceased Magdaleno Lugue and P12,000.00 for the deceased Fernando
Chuay. The rest of the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against
the private respondents. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
***********

Cerego vs Tuazon ( hindi ko mahanap)

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM,

BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO
and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R.
BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.

Balgos and Perez for petitioners.

Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.

Pre-existing contract generally bars quasi-delict,

103
PADILLA, J.:

A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos

Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of
Appeals justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA
and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the
third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants
were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from
outside the school.

Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities:
Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M.
Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M.
Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private
respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due
to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means
and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the
proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other
petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.

Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging
that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject
is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit
of the rule in the afore-stated article.

The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an
order dated 8 December 1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January
1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition before the respondent
appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the
trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to
deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily

anchored its decision on the law of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now
assailed ruling state:

104
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old
Spanish Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its
meaning should give way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible
(sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a
rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its
capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.

Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be
construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde
vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3hence, the ruling in
the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions,
academic or vocational.

At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless
they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article
2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This
can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5

While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the
complaint was correctly denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits,
we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule
of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases
of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of
Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180)
plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or
students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not
exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were
not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.

However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean
the exculpation of the petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide
the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the

105
other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of

providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining
its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb
the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts
and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain
peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation

between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from
quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for
his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is
noted, however, that the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one
arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is
authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for
the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs.
Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was
already of a similar mind. In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr.
Justice Fisher elucidated thus:

The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual

obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from
extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists
the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

106
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage. (emphasis supplied).

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the
petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the
comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat."
In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger
was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award
damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act
which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then
there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru
the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for
the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same
could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a
contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual
relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs
under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of
schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier,
cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the
populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where
there have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms
of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the
security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the
breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence,
here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is

107
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
persons, time and place. 9

As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents' complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at
this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence
still to unfold.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings
consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, plaintiffs,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his
capacity as President of the said Bank, defendants.

Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.

Aviado and Aranda for defendants.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a
decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against
defendants herein, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas.

It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the
Court of First Instance, Manila, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing
him and his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co.,
to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co.
Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not
Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and
executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon
the Bank of the Philippine Islands — in which the Singsons had a current account
— insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned. What

108
happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from, from which we
quote:

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all
matters of execution and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff
herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further
reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co.,
Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter
for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C.
Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case. Another
letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank for the
Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the
amount of P383 in favor of B. M. Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing
No. C-424852, and check No. C-394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the
Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited by the said
drawers with the said bank. Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the
check, had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank, the
checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. After the
first check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass Service, the latter wrote
plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April 19, 1963, advising him that his
check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for the
reason that his account therein had already been garnished. The said B. M. Glass
Service further stated in the said letter that they were constrained to close his
credit account with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the
defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that his name was not included
in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the
bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps to
verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the
plaintiff Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting
him to disregard their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment
from his account had already been removed. A similar letter was written by the
said official of the bank on April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him that
his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special Sheriff was considered cancelled
and that they had already removed the Notice of Garnishment from plaintiff
Singson's account. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that
had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the
account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.

109
 xxx xxx xxx

On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank
and its president, Santiago Freixas, for damages1 in consequence of said illegal
freezing of plaintiffs' account.1äwphï1.ñët

After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered

judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover
from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation
between the parties is contractual in nature; because this case does not fall under
Article 2219 of our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs
have not established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them.

The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort
or quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We
have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor.2 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs.
Carrascoso,3 involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to
take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from
the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation
between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the
act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".

In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied
as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages —
the amount of which need not be proven4 — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.5

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one
shall be entered sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to
the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000, as nominal damages, and P500, as attorney's
fees, apart from the costs. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

110
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.

Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent

Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first
class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various
amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.

On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on

Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the
appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner.

The case is now before us for review on certiorari.

The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of
record", are:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class",
but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a
"better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff,
as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said
Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist

111
class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with
the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr.
Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May
26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of
respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to
make complete findings of fact on all the issues properly laid before it. We are
asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate
court's decision.

Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be
rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory
demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all
issues properly raised before it". 7

A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct

attack. 8 The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is
not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented
by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered
as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws
the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such
that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of
Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error for
said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law
that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the
contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not
sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law
and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the
mere fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the
prosecution without taking into consideration or even mentioning the appellant's
side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the
judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each
witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not

112
mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At
any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly
performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the
court and passed upon by it. 15

Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined
as "the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and
essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist
of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A
question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not
call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from

a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts.
It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter the facts or to review the
questions of fact. 20

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals support its judgment.

3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from
petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not
represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said
respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any
specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class
ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.

These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its
brief before the Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads:
"The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a
right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly that
from Saigon to Beirut". 21

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:

Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class

ticket was no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued,

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would be accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of
plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the
necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could
have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received
the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the
passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the
tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of
petitioner's contention, thus:

On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be
no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1,"
"B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed
plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:

Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this
OK mean?

A. That the space is confirmed.

Q. Confirmed for first class?

A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and
Rafael Altonaga that although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class"
airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court
cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail
over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1"
belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was
issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.

Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga

testified that the reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was
confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such confirmation defendant had a

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verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few
pesos in the amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of
First Instance was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold
the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of the lower
court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that
the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and
"all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have
been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So
also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We
reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision of the Court of
Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war
with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon
a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the
conclusions of the trial court. 26

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class

seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline.
What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an
airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and
say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had
a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document
speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If
only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower
courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the
ticket.

The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are
facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent
Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok,
which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no
"welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's
accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to
provoke an issue". 29And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to
see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from

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Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take
a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a
better right to the seat?

4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's

trenchant claim is that Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that
to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or
bad faith;31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a finding of
bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:

3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air
Lines for a valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in
behalf of the defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as
defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's plane
during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting
point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .

4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from
Saigon to Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class
accommodation but only after protestations, arguments and/or insistence were
made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.

5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead
furnished plaintiff only Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran
and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees
to leave the First Class accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already
seated.

6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and

embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a
Pan American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32

xxx xxx xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class

accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments,
and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33

xxx xxx xxx

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The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract
to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached when petitioner
failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the
tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and
humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is
no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of
bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties.
But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's
counsel placed petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That
while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso was ousted by petitioner's
manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the
petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages.
Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment
thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad
faith, the Court of Appeals declared:

That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the
plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was
transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has
been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his
notebook which notation reads as follows:

"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene",

and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a

co-passenger. The captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of
defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused to do so. It is
noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this
evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its

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manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37

The Court of appeals further stated —

Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the
white man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class
ticket to him when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should
not have been picked out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be
subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in the
presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence
committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step
of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are
strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the
meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the
space is confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for
defendant, who was the chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as
follows:

"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?

A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)

In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this
point:

Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white
man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.

If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in
Bangkok, the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony
of the said Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption
is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par
(e), Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find,
as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
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asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up
his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".38

It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first
transcribed did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital
of facts therein points to bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso
from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he
forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go
to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose
right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad
faith in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:

The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager
in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that
he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy
the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which
the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.40

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not
be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held

that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable. 42

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6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from
any other contractual relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an
air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public.
It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of
air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be

treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any
rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44

Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was

a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence
of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand
payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and
she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger
and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a
passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare
tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop,
and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash
fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the
passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by
calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the
carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphîl.nèt

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress
of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus —

Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?

A When we left already — that was already in the trip — I could not help it. So one
of the flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I
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said, What for? and she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist
class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to accepting my transfer."
And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am protesting
to this transfer".

Q Was she able to note it?

A No, because I did not give my ticket.

Q About that purser?

A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't
have enough leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me
and the purser was there. He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my
notebook." He read it and translated it to me — because it was recorded in French
— "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene."

Mr. VALTE —

I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best
evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.

COURT —

I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an
entry in his notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon
evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not think
so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on
the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. 49a

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened,
the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous
excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance
of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to

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the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of
the res gestae.

At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of
petitioner. It would have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted
Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no such entry was made, the
deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in

evidence.

8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample
power to grant exemplary damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only
condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition
to moral damages.54

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary

damages justifies a similar judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said
is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys' fees be
given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well
exercised — as it was here — should not be disturbed.

10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of
exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these
amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere
with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur
thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness
thereof.57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer
from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
petitioner. So ordered.

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