Shorter Notes
Ancient Egyptian Imperialism: Ideological
Vision or Economic Exploitation?
Reply to Critics of Askut in Nubia
Stuart Tyson Smith
With the exception of Trigger, the reviewers (CAl
7:1, 123-37) argued that I focused too strongly on the
economic dynamics of Egyptian imperial policy as
an explanatory force. Postgate and Sinopoli argue
for more complex models incorporating economic,
ideological and other factors, while Kemp rejects
economics as a motivating factor, instead relying
entirely on what he feels is an ideological desire
expressed in the textual sources to expand Egypt's
political boundaries and cultural sphere. I agree that
ideological, social and geo-political factors can cer­
tainly influence imperial decision-making, particu­
larly in the case of individual military campaigns
and initial expansion into new territories. Nor would
I argue that imperial policy is dominated by eco­
nomic concerns in every case, although I agree with
Postgate that there are strong economic motivations
built into most imperial episodes.
I emphasized the economic factors involved in
ancient Egyptian imperialism because of the clear
discontinuities between imperial ideology and prac­
tice. Kemp argues at the end of his essay that we
should look first to ideology to understand Egyptian
imperialism. If we did so, however, we would have
a rather strange view of Egypt's New Kingdom em­
pire. The state ideology portrayed Nubia as a sepa­
rate, foreign place. Nubians appear in 'barbaric'
costumes in the classic topos of rebellious foreigner,
ultimately overthrown or pacified by the superiority
of Pharaoh (Loprieno 1988; Liverani 1990). At the
same time, archaeological and more mundane tex­
tual sources show that Lower Nubia was incorpo­
.'(
rated both administratively and culturally into the
Egyptian sphere.
At issue is the nature of Egyptian state ideol­
ogy. Kemp argues, in effect, that it represents a se­
ries of policy statements, bombastic perhaps, surely
exaggerated, but setting forth the motivations which
accompanied decision-making like imperial expan­
sion and colonial policy. The king's boast that he has
expanded the boundaries of Egypt farther than any
king before him reflects an expansionist imperial
policy. The king points to the pacification and accul­
turation of foreign captives with pride, so imperial
policy is also driven by a desire to acculturate the
301
'barbaric' peoples surrounding Egypt. Yet, if the
Egyptians placed such an ideological premium on
the acculturation of foreigners, why did the state
ideology demand that loyal officials like Hekanefer,
Nubian Prince of Miam, appear in the topos of 'paci­
fied Nubian' (Davies 1926; cf. Loprieno 1988), when
his tomb and other monuments all portray him as
completely Egyptian (Simpson 1963)?
Let us take a closer look at Kemp's 'theology of
conquest'. These texts speak explicitly of an ideo­
logical goal to extend the borders of Egypt (Hornung
1980). Far from a statement of imperial policy, how­
ever, their formulaic expressions belong to an ideal­
ized realm that often extended the sphere of Egyptian
control to abstract, mythical boundaries (Liverani
1990,44-65; cf. Kemp 1978, 8-15; Hornung 1980,404­
5, 413-15). Thus Hatsheptsut ruled 'as far as the
primeval darkness', and Arnenhotep III controlled
everything 'to the supports of heaven'. For Arnen­
hotep II, 'there are no boundaries set for him to­
wards all countries ... they fall instantly because of
his Flaming Serpent' (the royal cobra on his fore­
head), and he rules 'that which the sun encircles, all
the lands and the countries which he knew ...'
(Breasted 1906,311). Not only do 'heaven and all the
foreign lands which god has created serve' Hat­
shepsut, but 'commands are sent to an unknown
land, and they do everything that she commanded'
(Kemp 1978, 13). This ideology hardly represents a
statement of foreign policy, and I doubt that Kemp
would seriously argue that Hatshepsut or any of her
officials really expected her commands to be obeyed
in, say, Babylon or Crete. These declarations refer
instead to the limits of royal authority in general, an
assertion of the political and cosmological power of .
the king, rather than an actual policy of expansion.
So how can we reconcile these contradictions?
In accepting the primacy of economic factors in de­
termining imperial policy, must we conclude that
ideology did not matter at all? Liverani (1990) pro­
vides a framework for understanding the contradic­
tions between imperial ideology and practice. He
argues that the ideological topos applied to external
interactions within ancient Near Eastern states was
aimed at legitimizing royal authority to an internal
audience, and was often divorced from the practical
functioning of empire and international relations. To
the inner audience, Egypt becomes the centre of the
world, and all the foreign lands bow down to Phar­
aoh. Whether or not these claims had any basis in
fact was irrelevant; the importance of imperial ide­
ologies lay not in actual control, but rather in the
ruler's prestige in the central kingdom. Loprieno's
 Shorter Notes

study of topos and mimesis in the construction of

afterlife' and 'personal piety'. These individual and
the concept of foreigners and foreignness in ancient
collective religious acts challenged royal prerogative
Egypt illustrates this principle. Literature and other
as divine intermediary, asserting individual respon­
texts show a more realistic, or mime tical portrayal of
sibility for the afterlife and relations with the gods.
foreigners, recognizing them as human and part of
Assmann (1989; 1990) argues that these movements
the Egyptian .c ultural sphere. In contrast, the state
represented a serious threat to royal legitimacy, ulti­
ideology presents foreigners in the top os of uncivi­
mately provoking Akhenaten's short-lived Amarna
lized enemy. They are not really people, and are
'revolution' in the New Kingdom.
often compared with animals, their speech unintelli­
The legitimizing ideology of imperialism was
gible like the jabbering of baboons. Thus for the
transmitted through verbal, visual, ceremonial and
imperial ideology, Hekanefer had to don his 'bar­
artefactual (including architectural) channels (for an
baric' Nubian costume and bow down before Phar­
extended discussion see Smith forthcoming a). Only
aoh as a topical Nubian. Even the great powers of
the literate elite could understand the most esoteric
the day which treated with Egypt were similarly
level of these ideological expressions, but the mate­
affected, much to their consternation. For example,
rialization of ideology through symbolism, monu­
Kadashman-Enlil, king of Babylon, complains that
mental architecture and large-scale state ceremonies
Pharaoh, 'put my chariots amid the chariots of the
would allow a less precise transmission reaching far
Khazanu (Egypt's Syro-Palestinian vassals): you did
down the social ladder (Liverani 1990, 28; Kolb 1993,
not see them separately. You caused them to be
with corrunents). The huge temple complexes of the
brought to the presence of the country (all) alike, in
New Kingdom, financed to some extent by Nubian
order that they be not seen separately' (Liverani 1990,
wealth, emphasized royal power in their decoration,
264-6). To the foreigner topos of Egyptian ideology,
including massive scenes on the exterior pylons of
Babylon was just another example of a 'pacified'
temples showing the king victorious in battle or ritu­
enemy bowing down to Pharaoh. Diplomatic corre­
ally slaying foreign enemies. The king himself was
spondence, however, reveals a different, mimetical
surrounded by such imagery. When he rewarded
point of view, here interactions with the Babylonian
officials at the 'window of appearances,' he rested
court are couched in terms of equality.
on a balustrade supported by topical images of the
Kemp dismisses legitimacy as irrelevant, since
heads of foreign enemies (e.g. Kemp 1989, fig. 73).
all Egyptian elites already accepted the state ideol­ This kind of symbolism was exploited at every op­
. ogy. This makes two assumptions about the socio­ portunity. For example, four of Tutankhamun's walk­
political dynamics of Egypt that are not necessarily ing staves had topical representations of a Nubian
warranted; that Egyptian elites never challenged and Asiatic on the base (Reeves 1990), so that he
Pharaoh, and that Egyptian ideology was meant only could drag his enemies in the dust. Processional ways
for elites. To what extent was the state ideology and footstools had similar images, so that the king
shared by elites and the general populace? Scott's trod upon his enemies as he walked and rested his
(1985, 273-317) study of class and ideology in feet upon their backs when he sat down (Ritner 1993).
Malaysia shows that we cannot take ideological com­ Whenever the king made a public appearance, his
pliance for granted, even when consensus appears own accoutrements and surroundings emphasized
on the surface. Behind the fa<;:ade of compliance, acts his role as the defender of order against the topical
of ideological resistance challenged the dignity of enemies of Egypt.
the ruling class. We can see this for New Kingdom The New Kingdom ceremony of 'viewing the
Egypt in satirical papyri and ostraca (e.g. Peck 1978, tribute' provides perhaps the most dramatic exam­
49-50, 147) from the later New Kingdom showing ple of the transmission of the foreigner topos. A
high officials as mice attended by cat servants (if student's model letter from Paser, the Ramesside
only the cats knew their real nature!). Similarly, graf­ Viceroy of Kush, to a Nubian administrator describes
fiti in a grotto above Hatshepsut's mortuary temple this event (Caminos 1954, 437-46; cf. a tomb scene of
at Deir el-Bahri shows her in a most unflattering the same event in Davies 1926, pl. XXVI):
position. Scott notes that subordinate classes did not Take care! Think about the day when the Tribute is
usually break openly with the dominant ideology, sent, and you are brought into the presence (of th~ I'
but created a rival interpretation that suited their king) under the window (of appearances), the i
own needs and goals. This may be represented in Nobles to either side in front of his Majesty, the
Egypt by large-scale movements among subordinate Princes and the Envoys of every foreign land stand­
elites towards the so-called 'democratization of the ing, looking at the Tribute ... Tall Terek-people in

302
 Shorter Notes
their leather(?) garments, with fans of gold, high,
feathered(?) hair-styles., and their jewellery of ivory,
and numerous Nubians of all kinds.
In the state ideology, Nubians symbolized the exter­
nal forces of chaos which threatened to destroy the
inner peace and prosperity. The royal Ma'at theol­
ogy linked the king's defeat of foreign enemies with
the sun god's defeat of the cosmological forces of
evil (Assmann 1989; 1990). Ma'at (order, rightness)
stood in opposition to Isfet (chaos, evil) . On a
cosmological level, the sun god Re upheld Ma'at
against the forces of Isfet, personified by the great
snake demon, Apophis. Re charged Pharaoh with
enforcing Ma'at against the earthly forces of Isfet,
the foreign, topical enemies of Egypt. Without the
king, Egypt's inner stability, and by extension the
entire cosmos, was threatened (Liverani 1990). Thus
in the state ideology, Nubia could never be a part of
Egypt, it must always remain the stereotypical en­
emy, pacified by a powerful and vigilant king, but
potentially rebellious and threatening. The dramatic
procession of contrite foreigners presenting their trib­
ute to Pharaoh must have made an impressive mani­
festation of royal power and authority, connecting
the king to the cosmological battle between order
and chaos. The external contacts and luxury goods
displa yed also provided ideological tools for
strengthening royal legitimization (e.g. Hodder 1982;
Liverani 1990; Earle 1990; 1991; Helms 1992; and
variously in Schortman & Urban 1992).
Wealth from Egypt's empire in Nubia and Syro­
Palestine helped finance these and other ideologicat
political and socio-economic activities. In particular,
the foreign preciosities distributed at the rewards
ceremony would have both reinforced the state's
ideological message and served to cement patronage
relationships between king and elites, and ultimately
the broader society (for Nubia's resources see
Zibelius-Chen 1988). I agree with Kemp that temple­
building campaigns were not necessarily linked to a
cold assessment of cost and benefit, although I would
argue that such impressive displays of monumental­
ity represent more than simple acts of royal piety.
For example, the building programme of Ramesses
II occurs in the context of recovery from the Amarna
'heresy', representing the completion of the restora­
tion to the old order. Although not near an obvious
population centre, Abu Simbel is hardly remote. Its
giant images of Pharaoh would have greeted anyone
penetrating farther south into Nubia. A literate trav­
eller or local official stopping to worship would be
exposed to its legitimizing ideology linking the king
to the sun god, Re. Assuring that the gods were
303
propitiated was an important royal responsibility.
Abu Simbel was constructed for a pious and ulti­
mately ideological purpose, the ideology of internal,
royal legitimization, not imperialism.
So if Egyptian imperialism was more about gain
than ideology, why did the Egyptians not simply
say so? The short answer is that they did! The annals
of Thutrnose III at Karnak include long lists of booty
and tribute from his campaigns dedicated to the tem­
ple of Amun-Re, and the annual 'Presentation of
Tribute' ceremony displayed the considerable wealth
derived from Egypt's empire and external connec­
tions (Redford 1967, 120-28; Bleiberg 1984; Liverani
1990,256-62). A hymn of praise to Middle Kingdom
Pharaoh Senwosret III has many expressions of the
foreigner top os, but also includes these lines
(Lichtheim 1973, 199):
How the people rejoice in your guidance,
your might has won increase for them!
... you have enlarged their holdings!
... you have made them prosper!
Chorus: Horus extender of his borders, may you re­
pea t eterni ty.
Nonetheless, Kemp is right in pointing out that tex­
tual references to foreign conquest tend to empha­
size an expansionist ideology. Egyptian economic
goals are concealed beneath layers of theology be­
cause the texts that survive are predominantly theo­
logical. They corne either from the walls of temple
complexes, or in idealized preambles to administra­
tive documents. Structures made of stone endure,
while the many letters, ledgers, day-books and other
mundane administrative documents that must once
have filled Egyptian state archives are mostly lost to
the ravages of time. A handful of documents do
reflect a maximizing tendency. For example, the
model letter from the Viceroy Paser cited above re­
flects both a minimum expectation of income and a
desire to increase revenues: 'When my letter reaches
you, prepare the Tribute in every respect [a long list
of products follows] . Exceed your obligations every
year ... Think about when the Tribute is sent, and
you are brought into the presence of the King . . .'
(Carninos 1954,437-46).
Even supposing that Nubian imperial strate­
gies were economically motivated, how did Egyp­
tian policy-makers assess the relative cost of different
strategies? Kemp puts forward a decentralized model
for New Kingdom administration, arguing that the
central government could never gain even a sense of
how the country's economy was performing, let
alone tally an imperial balance sheet. Given the

 Shorter Notes
fragmentary nature of the historical record, we can
never know all of the details, but ample evidence
exists of strong centralized supervision and control.
The 'Duties of the Vizier', an early New Kingdom
text outlining the responsibilities of Egypt's chief
civil administrator, show that this most senior of
Egyptian officials had direct control not only over
the major departments of the central government,
but also of local urban and agricultural centres
throughout the nation (van den Boom 1988,317-50).
Since deliveries to the royal treasury were often made
through his office, he would be well aware of the
economic performance of the nation. The biography
of Hormeni, Mayor of Nekhen (el-Kab) during the
early 18th Dynasty, shows that the central authority
held local administrators to minimum goals for rev­
enue (Save-Soderbergh 1941,178): 'I went north with
Tribute for the King each year. I came forth from
there justified, and never was an amount of mine
found in arrears.' Although rare, several documents
from the Middle and New Kingdom show the care­
ful accounting procedures practised at court and in
royal granaries and workshops (e.g. Quirke 1990;
Megally 1977). This attention to economic detail is
reflected even at the lowest levels with the archival
sealing system used to account for individual grain
withdrawals and other economic transactions attested
at the pyramid town of Kahun and fortresses like
Askut and especially Uronarti (Ferioli & Fiandra 1990;
Smith 1990; 1996).
Egyptian officials would also have been well
aware of the costs of military campaigns and resource
extraction. Records from the Middle Kingdom show
a careful accounting of food and supplies in quarry­
ing expeditions (Seyfried 1981). Celebratory texts on
temple walls contain digested information from
military daybooks detailing the amounts of tribute
and booty taken during military campaigns (Redford
1986), and detailed accounting of food and supply
were necessary to keep an army in fighting condi­
tion. Long-term military planning appears in Askut's
role as a rearward grain reserve for Middle King­
dom campaigns (Kemp 1986), and the dedication of
districts in Syro-Palestine to the maintenance of grain
reserves during the New Kingdom. Whatever an
individual king's or the central government's de­
sires, ideological or economic, the resources had to
be present in order to carry them out. An Egyptian
king need not sacrifice temple-building in order to
campaign, but he had to have enough grain and
supplies to feed and equip both army and artisans.
The only way that this could be ensured was through
careful accounting and some degree of economic
304
forecasting, including a consideration of cost and
benefit.
To what extent could historical difference in
the character of Middle and New Kingdom decision­
makers account for differences in imperial policy?
The official ideology hardly changed, as seen in an­
other stanza of the Middle Kingdom Hymn to
Senwosret III cited above (Lichtheim 1973, 198; for a
general discussion, Zibelius-Chen 1988):
Hail to you Khakaure, our Horus, Divine of Form!
Land's protector who widens its borders,
Who smites foreign countries with his crown ...
Who subdues foreign lands by a motion of his hands ...
As Kemp points out, the New Kingdom has a more
cosmopolitan feel than the Middle Kingdom, but
Nubians and Asiatics were integral parts of Middle
Kingdom society just as they were in the New King­
dom, and foreign loan words entered the vocabulary
(e.g. Kitchen 1991; David 1986, 189-94; Hayes 1955).
Nubian mercenaries, by now acculturated, had been
employed and settled in Egypt since the end of the
Old Kingdom (Loprieno 1988). The fictional Byblians
encountered by Wenamun at the end of the New
Kingdom were already speaking Egyptian in the Mid­
dle Kingdom adventures of Sinuhe (Lichtheim 1973,
222-35). Archaeology shows that the rulers of Byblos
had adopted Egyptian titulary and some Egyptian
iconography by this time (Redford 1992), probably
as much for internal reasons as to please their Egyp­
tian trading partners. To be sure, Egyptians were
convinced of the superiority of their own culture,
and encouraged others to acculturate (or at least
speak Egyptian) both in the Middle and New King­
dom. But if Egypt's New Kingdom foreign policy
was geared towards the acculturation of foreigners,
why was there never a serious attempt at an accul­
turation policy in Upper Nubia or Syro-Palestine?
Only Lower Nubia was fully incorporated into Egypt.
By neglecting the fundamental contradictions
between the Egyptian foreigner topos and the ad­
ministrative and social realities of Egypt's empire,
Kemp's ideologically driven model fails to explain
the differences between Middle and New Kingdom
policy, and the various imperial strategies used in
Syro-Palestine, Lower and Upper Nubia. I agree with
Trigger that economics were at the heart of Egyptian
imperialism, but that geo-political considerations like
the need for luxury goods to maintain relationships
with Near Eastern states, accommodation of the
Medjay, or an Egyptian tradition in Nubia, which
Postgate compares to Assyrian territorial claims,
helped shape imperial outcomes, especially in

 Shorter Notes
providing the initial impetus for imperial expansion.
Sinopoli also argues for a consideration of the
complexities of imperial dynamics, balancing poli­
tics, ideology, economics, and other factors like cul­
tural identity. I agree that the Horvath and Bartel
matrix makes a poor explanatory tool, but I state
explicitly that I am not using it as such. Although I
still feel that it is useful in characterizing Egyptian
imperial policy, I also agree that it may not be appli­
cable, or prove useful analytically, for all imperial
situations or inquiries. My explanatory model was
derived instead from a combination of the work of
Luttwak (1976), D'Altroy & Earle (1985), Doyle (1986),
Hassig (1988), Alcock (1989), and D'Altroy (1992),
and acknowledges some of the complexities Sinopoli
alludes to, including cultural identity, economic and
political dynamics and the participants, both native
Nubian and Egyptian. Part of Sinopoli's disappoint­
ment results from the narrow focus of my study.
Askut in Nubia was not an attempt at a comprehen­
sive consideration of the broad sweep of Egyptian
imperialism and culture contact. It focused tightly
on a specific historical problem, the changes in large­
scale Egyptian imperial policy, viewed through the
lens of a specific site, the Egyptian colonial fortress­
settlement at Askut, and the insights it could provide.
As a result, the study does retain an Egyptocentric
viewpoint. Askut in Nubia would have benefited from
an examination of the native point of view that data
from the many Nubian sites found in its vicinity
would have provided. Unfortunately, attempts to
gain access to the data from the surrounding sur­
veys, still unpublished and available today only in
brief preliminary reports, were unsuccessfuL Never­
theless, a key part of my model took native Nubians
into account, if not in as much detail as Sinopoli
would have liked. I agree that this is an important
dimension of all imperial and culture-contact situa­
tions, and have recently published a survey of the
broad sweep of Egyptian-Nubian relations from the
Nubian point of view (Smith forthcoming b).
My interpretation of the shift to an accultura­
tion policy in the New Kingdom is also more com­
plex than Sinopoli's characterization. I did not
implicitly assume that a policy of acculturation colo­
nialism would lessen the need for coercive controL If
this were the case, Egypt would have acculturated
all of its conquered territories. Coercion was not
really an issue. Rebellions were easily put down in
Lower Nubia, which may also have played a role in
determining imperial outcomes. Records show that
Egypt fielded armies 20,000 or more strong, as much
as the entire population of Lower Nubia! As Kemp
305
pointed out, the Nile makes a convenient highway.
Troops or grain could be transported with ease the
entire length of Egypt and Nubia up to the second
cataract. Instead of assuming the pliability of those
acculturated, I argue that the lack of C-Group com­
plexity noted by Trigger required a more significant
imperial intervention, whether with forts in the Mid­
dle Kingdom, or acculturation in the New Kingdom.
The expatriate population, if co-op table, would have
been useful to the new Egyptian administration be­
cause of their knowledge of the region and contacts
and personal relationships with both Egyptians and
Nubians (for the social dimension of exchange in
ancient Egypt and the Near East, see Janssen 1982;
Liverani 1990). Here is where the bureaucratic vision
or self-perpetuation that Kemp and Postgate speak
of would come into play. Egyptian officials would
have seen the opportunity to restructure Nubia fun­
damentally in a way that would meet imperial goals
in, from their point of view, the best way possible,
by replicating Egypt. This new infrastructure would
be, like any other part of Egypt, self-sustaining, un­
like the old fort system which must have been very
costly to maintain.
Another point Sinopoli raises is in my use of
the term 'expatriate' and the larger question of iden­
tity. The term 'expatriate' seems justified since these
communities were directly descended from Egyp­
tian colonists, retained an overwhelmingly Egyptian
material culture and continued to write (and by ex­
tension speak) Egyptian, maintaining ties to Upper
Egypt even when nominally under Kerma's controL
The extent to which they may have forged new kinds
of social and kinship relations, and established dis­
tinctive cultural identities is a compelling question,
although a hard one to address given the paucity of
historical sources. I did point to evidence at Askut,
and by extension elsewhere, that hints at possible
intermarriage between Egyptian colonial communi­
ties and native Nubians. Any attempt seriously to
address this question requires a carefully nuanced
study of the full assemblage from Askut. This ques­
tion is a central focus of the ongoing full analysis
and final publication of Alexander Badawy's Askut
excavations.
I chose to focus on the economic underpinnings
of Egyptian imperialism in Nubia not from an epis­
temological preference, but because of the dramatic
discontinuities between ancient Egyptian ideology
and imperial policy discussed above. A predominantly
economic model stressing the pre-existing nature of
the subjected polity provides the best explanation
for the dramatic shifts in Egyptian imperial policy

 Shorter Notes
over time and space. I do not argue that we should
impose strict, modern concepts of profitability on
ancient governments. Administration, economy, re­
ligion and ideology were intertwined in ancient
Egypt, like Mesopotamia and many other ancient
civilizations, as Postgate points out. Implementation
of new imperial systems did require both economic
and symbolic restructuring, especially in the case of
acculturation. This does not mean, however, that the
state did not take cost and benefit into account, or
even give it primacy, in the organization of the
economy or when choosing imperial strategies. In
the case of Egypt, the ideology of imperialism was
aimed at legitimizing the power and authority of
Pharaoh, and had little to do with the choice of im­
perial strategy. Acculturated Lower Nubia was use­
less to New Kingdom ideologues, and so, in a rather
Orwellian twist, acculturated Nubian Princes like
Hekanefer had to appear in the topos of 'barbaric'
foreigner bowing down to the power and authority
of Pharaoh during the ceremony of 'Presenting Trib­
ute'. The ideology of empire was not a policy state­
ment or moral guide, but reinforced the role of the
king in the maintenance of Ma'at (Assmann 1990,
51-4, 200-272). This concept provided a powerful
integrating ~orce in Egyptian society and govern­
ment, legitimizing the kings' authority over the en­
tire nation.
Stuart Tyson Smith
Institute of Archaeology
University of California at Los Angeles
405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90024
USA
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