The Postmodern Experiment: Science and Ontology in Experimental Social Psychology

Author(s): Augustine Brannigan

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 594-610
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Augustine Brannigan

The postmodern experiment: science and

ontology in experimental social psychologyt

ABSTRACT

Traditionaldebatesoverthe validityof operationalizationin psychologicalexperi-

ments overlookthe fact that they often simplydramatize,as opposed to discover,
telling social phenomena. Manylandmarkexperimentssurviveotherwisefatal
questioningof their validitybecause of their moral, ontologicalor pedagogical
relevance.Thispropositionis examinedin the context of the leadingsocialinflu-
ence studies. Postmodernismsuggeststhat the disiinctionbetween researchas
seculardramaand researchas rationalinsightis moot. As a result,the historyof
the disciplinetends to comprisestudies that are morallypertinentbut scientifi-
cally ephemeral. The postmodern experiment is a crisis in operationalism
broughtabout, not by abstraction,but by the pertinenceof psychologyto social
life and by the confusionof the ontologicaland empiricalaspirationsof inquiry.

KEYWORDS:
operationalization;
ontology;disciplinarycrisis;influencestudies

BIASANDPROGRESS
IN PSYCHOLOGY

In The Masmeasureof Man, Gould (1994) traced the racistpresuppositions

which underlaythe early scientificstudies of intelligence. S.G. Morton, a
noted nineteenth-centuryanatomist, ranked the capacities of several
collections of skulls and discoveredthe largestcraniawere found among
Caucasians,the smallestamong Africanswith erindian skullsoccupying
a middle position. In his re-analysisof the same samples,Gould concluded
thatMorton'sobservationsweremistaken.Ratherthansuspectingconscious
deception, Gould attributedMorton'sanalysesto a convenientomissionof
counterfactuals- in short to an 'unconsciousfinagling'of the data to meet
priortheoreticalexpectations.The historyof subsequentIQ testingto 1930
reiteratedthis same pattern.Goddardidentified epidemic levels of feeble-
mindednessamongEuropeanimmigrants.Yerkesidentifiedepidemiclevels
of moronityamong the millions of poor males recruitedfor the US Army
during WorldWar I. Both conclusionswere artifactsof eugenical presuR
positions.However,theyabettedexclusionaryimmigrationand sterilization
policiesbased on the theorythat intelligencewasentirelyhereditary.

Brit.Jnl. of SociologyVolume no. 48 Issue no. 4 December 1997 ISSN 0007-1315 O London School of Economics 1997
Thepostmodernexperiment 595

Gould'slesson is that the most interestingcases of scientificbias are not

individualmisperceptionsbut social prejudiceswhich are widely shared
among scientistsbecauseof a common background.Collectivebiasis more
insidiousthan individualhoax or deceit since it operatesunconsciously.If
that were entirelyunchecked, there could be little prospect of real scien-
tificadvancement.Indeed, one of the majorquestionsposed by Gould'shis-
toriographyis how such cases ultimatelyget rectified. Gould's studyis an
object lesson in the dangers,but not the inevitability,of bias. Contraryto
his reference to bias as a 'norm' (1978: 503), his later work suggeststhat
scientificprogressis possibleonly because of de-bunkingof 'older ideas in
the light of a differentviewabout the nature of things' (1994:322).
One of the hallmarksof scientificpsychologyin the aftermathof the first
intelligence studieswas the adoption of a methodologydesigned to mini-
mize extrascientificbiases - experimentation.Indeed, in North America,
psychologicalexperimentationappearsto have predatedthe development
of a theoreticalconsensusdemarcatingthe boundariesof the field, giving
it a methodologicalcredibilityin advanceof a coherent conceptual basis.
Ironically,the experimentalfoundations of scientific social psychologyis
nowfrequentlyviewedas the reasonfor its failure.On the eve of retirement,
Ferguson (1983) writes of 'forty years of useless research'. Silverman
(1977), reviewinga litanyof previousfrustrationswith the field, arguesthat
social psychologyis doomed to failurebecause of its preoccupationwith a
low impact,short-termmethod which in principleappearslittle capableof
making much headwayin understandingcomplex social phenomena. A
similarfrustrationwith experimentationhas led manywritersto speakof a
'disciplinarycrisis' (Adair 1991; Gergen 1985; Kiesler and Lucke 1976;
Harreand Secord 1972;Shaver1974;Stricklandet al. 1976).
How is it that a methodology designed to minimize extrascientificbias
can be said to enjoy so little empiricalsuccess?In our view, the idea that
the experimentalapproachin social psychologycan be grounded on the
supposition that extrascientificinfluences are successfullyneutralizedby
operationalizationis dubious. Our reviewof the leading studies of inter-
personalinfluence suggeststhat the unique conditions that arisefrom the
use of human subjectspermitthe experimenterto simultaneouslydrawon
the presuppositionswhich are being tested while at the same time uncon-
sciouslycensoring their relevancefrom the conclusions.This perspective
maybe importantfor understandinghow the lack of theoreticalgrowthin
scientific social psychologymight exist side by side with its phenomenal
popularity,and indeed whyits ubiquitousrelevancemaybe responsiblefor
its theoreticalpoverty.This in turn may shed light on why the disciplinary
crisisenjoysso few advocates.
The foundations for our position derive from the competing formu-
lationsof the problemof experimentaloperationalizationsfound originally
in Sorokin (1954) and more recentlyin Rosenwald(1986) since it is here
that objectivityappears most beset with the kinds of extrascientificbias
which Gould encountered.
596 AugustineBrannigan

EXPERIMENTS,OPERATIONALIZATIONAND PRETHEORETICAL
KNOWtLEDGE

Much of contemporarysocial science has assumed a prophetic role in

secularsociety.In interpretingthe human condition, socialpsychologyhas
overtaken some of the earlier functions of philosophy and religion. It
tackles the pressing issues of the day, reproduces the matters of public
concern in its labs and unpacks the dynamicswhich trouble society.The
problemsare often high ethicaldrama,but the idiom is empiricistand, par-
ticularlyin North America, the approach is experimental- conveyinga
leverage over common knowledge that derives from laboratorycontrol.
Many of the key issues are moral as opposed to simply empirical. In
addition,since human subjectswouldbe expected frequentlyto havesome
insightrespectingthe mattersunder investigation,particularlymoralques-
tions, social psychologistsare requiredto re-scriptthe setting to mask the
topic under investigationand to deceive the subjectsabout the nature of
the research.Thishas attractedconsiderablecriticismbecauseof the poten-
tial harm to subjects,and because deception may render consent unin-
formed (Baumrind1985). As a result, the operationalizationof concepts
mustbe done in a waythatsimultaneouslyallowsa directinspectionof their
theoreticalrelevance to colleagues without being self-evidentto the sub-
jects. In this respect,the operationalizationof psychologicalconcepts goes
beyond the issuesof correspondencecommon to naturalscientistsand has
led to controversy.
The practiceof operationalizationwascriticizedby Sorokinin his classic
discussionof 'the illusion' of operationalism(1954). Sorokindecriedwhat
he called the 'conversion'of social scientiststo an 'orgyof operationalism'
in an attemptto mimic the successof the hard sciences. 'The operational-
ists firmlybelieve in the infallibilityof operationalincantations[yet their]
operationalmanipulationsoften resemble the ''scientificmethods"of"the
scientists"in Gulliver'sTravels'(1954:33) . Sorokinbecame a voice cryingin
the wildernessas experimentationbecame increasinglythe singleleading
methodology of scientific social psychology.If Sorokin'sgeneral view was
that the laboratoryexperimentswere frequentlydubious in terms of eco-
logical validity,a ratherdifferent perspectivewas suggestedby Rosenwald
(1986).
RosenwaldexaminedFestinger'sstudyof cognitivedissonance(hereafter
CD). He observedthat CD generated 'more empiricalresearchand theor-
etical controversythan any other finding in social psychology'(1986:306).
But, theoreticalprogressdid not furtherour understandingof the mechan-
isms underlyingit. 'An unfortunateconsequence of this point is that we
have learned practicallynothing about how to escape CD other than self-
deception or confusion' (p. 307). Cognitivedissonance received serious
attemptsat replicationand extension.These generatedconflictingfindings
and a streamof ad hoc theoriesas to whyfailuresto replicatewere the rule
Thepostmodernexperiment 597

as opposed to the exception. Chapanisand Chapanis(1962) ended their

review of the empirical assessment of the theory with their famous
conclusion - 'not proven' - but the concept continues to attractserious
attention.
Sorokin'sposition was that while operationalizationwas typicallyinvalid
and often opportunistic,the possibilityof progresswas none the less real.
In contrast,Rosenwald'stitle- 'whyoperationismdoesn't go away'- implies
that the problem of operationalismis in principleone from which we can
never extricateourselves.Like Gould's 'finagling,'the processof meaning
attributionoccursbelowthe thresholdof consciousness.Rosenwald'soyec-
tive was 'to explore the incentivesof a scientific strategywhich deliversa
scanty theoretical yield and which lacks firm philosophical supports'.
Accordingto Rosenwald,the key to understandingsuch a paradoxlies in
'the extrascientificincentivesguiding the discipline' (1986:304).
Rosenwaldpaintsa pictureof a pretheoreticbias from which there is no
escape. Contrastingthe quote fromArchimedes- 'Giveme where to stand
and I shallmove the earth'- allusionsto the archimedianleverwhich cannot
raisea worldare legion. 'Wejudge laboratoryinvestigations. . . by the lever-
age they give us on "reallife"'. [Yet]'the searchfor the magic leverdooms
our prospects for determinacy' (1985: 320, 325-6). In his movement
beyond cognitivedissonanceto a constructionistperspective,one discerns
a haunting apprehensionof contemporaryexperimentationin which the
escape from the existentialdeterminationof science is illusory.
Rosenwald'spsychologistsdeal schizophrenicallywith the perplexitiesof
existence. On the formallevel, they are conducting testsand searchingfor
new lawsand relationships.Despite the fact that they never make compar-
able headwayin identifyingthe mathests for the human sciences,
universalis
the explorationis none the less therapeutic.It permits them to confront
whattroublespeople in everydaylife. Festinger'sforced compliancedesign
'derives its persistent interest from the fact that it exhibits the formal
characteristicsof a perplexity- it illustrateshow social cohesion can be
obtainedat the expense of the individual'srationalityand self-transparence
. . . it dealswith the irrationalmannerin whichwe often resolvecontradic-
tions in our social experience' (Rosenwald1986: 309). As a result, the
experiment is more a philosophical self-reflectionthan an experimental
test of a specific hypothesis.His critiqueof operationalismpoints beyond
the usual questions of ecological validity(Campbelland Stanley1963) or
ethics (Zimbardo1973). The scientificprogressof the experimentmaybe
illusory as science but at a deeper level, it contains an unacknowledged
subtextwithoutwhich the ostensiveworkof inquirywould hold no attrac-
tion. It is a medium for the scientistto confront the pretheoreticperplex-
ity. This is done obliquely through operationalization,and if the moral
subtextdrivesthe design, the experimentportraysor poses basic ontologi-
cal questions about human existence. In such an idiom, the scientific
experimentsare actuallya disguisedform of drama.
598 AugustineBrannigan

THEEXPERIMENT
ASDRAMA

Some of the most enduring contributionsretain a place of pride in the

historyof the disciplinebecausetheyconstituteengagingcommentarieson
the perplexitiesof existence. In the humanities,dramaticlicense imposes
only loose standardsof verisimilitudebetween the author and the world,
and the dramatistand the audience are awareof the fictionalqualityof the
writing.Bycontrast,the experimentalistsand their publicviewthe labwork
with an eye to basic scientific detachment and theoreticalpedigree, and
employ disciplinarymethods as a source of empiricalleverage.But if the
experimentationis characterizedby even a little 'unconsciousfinagling',
the self-conceptionsof the scientistsaboutwhattheywere doing would not
constitute grounds by which to distinguish their projects from those of
dramatistssince, following Gould, we are not dealing with hoax, but
illusionsbased on pretheoreticknowledge.
If the suppositionsadvancedhere are correct,the problemsaboutwhich
I am concerned are not relegated to the peripheryof the discipline,but
may affect the core. This argumentcan be advancedthrough a reviewof
the classicillustrationsof operationalizationin the interpersonalinfluence
studies of Sherif,Asch and Milgram.These examplesare chosen because
they are part of nearly every undergraduateliberal education. They are
offered to explore how positivemoralpresuppositionsmight encourageus
to lend a charitablereading to researchwhose relevancewould otherwise
foster serious methodologicalmisgivings.This perspectivewill permitsus
subsequentlyto explore some implicationsin the context of the widerpost-
modern critiqueof reason,and to explore the role of college psychologyas
a massmedium of secularhumanism.

THEAUTOKINETIC
EFFECT
ANDTHELIABILITIES
OFAN ILLUSION

In 1936 MuzaferSherif published his classicstudy, ThePsychology of Social

Norms,in which he reportedhis elegant researchon the autokineticeffect.
The key experimentsappearedinitiallyin a 1935 articlebut the book was
an attemptto spell out the implicationsin a much broaderframework.In
the experiments,Sherifreported the verbalresponsesof subjectsexposed
to a stationar,vpinpoint of light projectedon a panel in a darkenedroom.
When asked to estimatehow much the point of light had moved, subjects
reiterated estimates similar to those reported verballyby others before
them. These estimatesconverged.In contrast,estimatesgiven privatelyby
individualswithout overhearingone anotherwere disparateand indepen-
dent. Sherifarguedthat the resultswere indicativeof the processby which
norms emerge naturallyin society.
Sherifpoints out that the experience of movementis an opticalillusion.
The light appearsto wanderforwantof a frameof reference.Consequently,
the 'group' effectivelyframesego's perception. So how do norms evolve?
Thepostmodurnexperiment 599

Sherif suggeststhat ego is influenced by others when the naturalworld is

an ambiguoussourceof information.If we agree thatnatureis alwaysmedi-
ated by history,then ego is conditioned by others all the time. While no
one would dispute this, it is doubtfulthat this is actuallydiscoveredempir-
ically in the experiment. It is improbablethat one could believe that the
behaviourof severalstrangerswatchinga point of light, an opticalillusion,
could be indicativeof the formation of norms in the sense of shared or
group norms. There is no evidence that any group in an anthropological
sense existedin these experiments,no leader,no common history,no regu-
lation of deviants,nor any of the usual things we ascribe to groups. This
does not disputethat therewascbordinated action. Certainly,subjectswho
spoke in one another's presence took turns at speaking and reported
similarestimates.However,the subjects'responsesto Sherif'srequestsfor
estimatesof movementwould appear to be demand characteristics- ego
says 'five inches' since he or she has been instructedto expectmovement
(1936: 95), and since it appears as though the strangersgot awaywith
similarutterancesbeforehand, and this, in a situationwhere it was really
impossiblefor anyoneto sayfor sure if there reallywasanymovement,and,
if there was movement,how much of it occurred.
This interpretation- demand characteristicsand externalcompliance-
is an obvious consideration for anyone trying to replicate Sherif today
(Orne 1962). It would also be relevantto askwhether anyone thought the
stimuluswas an optical illusion and was not reallymoving at all. But the
reports of displacement were treated as objective distortions exacted by
group influence, while the subjective reportsof ambiguitywere simplydis
counted. 'Darknessleft no guide for distance. . . It wasdifficultto estimate
the distance. . . Therewasno fixed point fromwhich tojudge the distance'
(1936: 97). Significantly,Sherif acknowledgesthat 'the effect takes place
evenwhen the personlookingat the light knowsperfectlywell thatthe light
is not moving' (1936: 92). If that were the case, in what sense would this
action be 'normative'since a verbalestimatemeasuredwith the precision
of optometrywould correspondratherimperfectlyto the subjectiveuncer-
tainty recorded afterwards,and such exacting utterancescould be given
even though the subject knet differentlyfrom what she saw.Judgment is
forced out of the analysisand complianceis equated solelywith the 'objec-
tive' shift in perception.
Another considerationis whether a series of strangerssaying the same
thing- one hundred times each repeated over four consecutivetrials- in
an environment in which there were no consequences in terms of indi-
vidual survivalor error constitutesa norm in any importantsense of the
term. Is an inconsequentialascent to a mathematicalvalue something that
norms are made oR Does failure to comply lead to discredit?The major
relevantnorm seems to be thatstrangersaccommodatethe sometimesper-
plexing requestsof psychologistsout of their sense of obligationto a scien-
tific authority and that they rely on one another's utterances where a
failure to do so might make them stand out in a crowd.Certainly,Sherif
600 AugustineBrannigan

acknowledgesthat the autokineticeffect 'reduc[es] the process to a very

simpleform' (1936:99) in contrastto his own conception of 'norms'which
was most inclusive. When he 'venture[s] to generalize' from the basic
lesson obtained from the experiment to social reality,he contends that
'the psychologicalbasis of the established social norms, such as stereo-
types, fashions, conventions, customs and values, is the formation of
common frames of reference as a product of the contact of individuals'
(1936: 106).
How do we get from the optical illusion to social stereotypes,fashions,
and customs?The extrascientificpresuppositionsbeam through the oper-
ationalfloorboardsas Sherifexplicitlyadvocatesa post hoc form of reason-
ing. 'If the principlesestablishedon the basisof laboratoryexperimentscan
be profitablyextended to the explanation of the everydayoperation of
norms, then our principlesare valid' (op. cit. 68). And again
The test for such an approachlies in the applicabilityof the principle
reached to the descriptionand explanationof norms found in everyday
life . . . Whetheror not this isjust one more psychologicalabstractionor
laboratoryartifact. . . can be decided after it has met facts in the fresh
and wholesomeair of actualities.(1936:88)
It followsfrom this form of reasoningthat if a researchercan discoveran
extrapolationto everydaylife, that is what the experimentwas essentially
about. Whatmakes this implausibleis that Sherifsuggestsrepeatedlythat
the experimentwas simply'an extension' of well knownprior observations
in perception,specificallyAllport'searlierworkon groupmediationof indi-
vidualperception.One must conclude that its relevanceto the all embrac-
ing conception of norms was arrivedat in advance.This experimentwas a
perceptualdemonstrationadvanced allegoricallyto explain the general
processesof influence.
It is interestingthat edited collectionsand textbooksummariesomit the
socialcontext of Sherif'sinquiryand the expansiveviewof normswhich it
explored. In 1936, Sherif reports a concern for the dramaticchanges in
social life associatedwith the 1930s in America, the rise of totalitarian
governmentsin Europe,widespreadhunger and starvation,oppressionof
thepowerlessand the mobilizationof mobs throughpoliticalsloganeering.
He suggested'the studyof such unstablesituationsof oppression,hunger,
andinsecurityand their psychologicalconsequencesdemandcarefulatten-
tionfrom socialpsychologists. . . especiallyin our time of transition'(1936:
193).Again
when social life becomes difficult. . . the equilibriumof life ceases to be
stable and the air is pregnant with possibilities ... Such a delicate,
unstablesituationis the fertile soil for the rise of doubts concerningthe
existing norms, and a challenge to their authority.(1936:85)
Sherifwas preoccupied with the importanttensions in society that arose
duringthe Depression.
Thepostmodernexperiment 601

Whatsocial proxywas operationalizedin the lab to scrutinizethe social

processesthat gave rise to the fascismand 'nationalsocialism'which arose
and flourishedwhen the equilibriumof life 'ceasedto be stable'?The auto-
kineticeffect.To theorizethe originsof counter-culturalnorms,Sherifcon-
trivesa settingwhere subjectsare scriptedinto roles which dramatizewhat
the societyhas experiencedat large.He suggeststhatsubjectsin a darkened
room watchinga flickeringpoint of light actuallyperce*e the movement
which they report. And in the responsesof these subjectsto this illusion,
Sherif himself sees the complexityof the society compressedto its essen-
tials.He speculateson the evolutionof normativebehaviourfromwatching
people tryingto figure out if a stationarylight is perceivedas movinga dis-
cernible distanceas his subjectsshare their impressions.
From this perspective,Sherif has duped his subjectsby leading them to
treat an illusion as though it were real. Yet it is equallypossible that they
have duped him by telling him what he wants to hear, making him the
objectof his own illusion.Sittingin the darknesstogether,and havingbeen
instructed that the light will move and that they will have to figure out
exactlyhow much, the firstvoice hazardsa guess. 'Twoinches?'The next
voice followssuit. 'Twoand a half'. Then we get 'two', 'three', two' and so
on as subjectstake turnsaroundthe room. Consequently,we find reported
not only that a stationarypoint is moving,but that as far as the subjectsare
concerned,becauseno one wantsto standout in a crowdwheretherewould
be no point to it since the phenomenon is apparentlyambiguous, it's
movingthree inches for one group, althoughfour or five inches might do
aswell.The tablesare turnedon the experimenter.Subjectstacitlyconspire
to allowSherif'sillusion that they are being deluded in what they see, and
consequentlythat what he sees in them reflectsthe social order.
The entire experimentis a kind of optical illusion, both for the experi-
menterwho discoversin it what he finds so pressingin the society,and for
his audiencewhose attentionhe commandssince, like Pasteurand cow pox
(Latour1983), he has capturedthe phenomenon in his laboratory.The lab
gives the experimenterpower over the effect by showinghow to unlock it
from natureand reproduceit at will.But,in retrospectthe experimentdoes
not surviveoperationalscrutiny.In the context of Sherif'slargerinterests,
the autokineticexperimentappearsto be an allegoryused to illustratehow
individualperceptionsare mediatedby others and how this can be used as
a paradigmto understandthe whole nature of social behaviour.
ThePsychologyof SocialNormsis not abouta specializedaspectof socialpsy-
chology but is a brilliantand at times radicaltreatiseon the verynatureof
social interaction,values, identity and social change. Like other classical
statementsin the social sciences,it often blursthe line between ontology-
the limitationsand tragediesof human experience- and empiricalinquiry.
Among Sherif'ssuggestions,we find a call to end frictionarisingfrom class
conflict: 'the classes themselves must be eliminated' and a call for the
removalof 'the belief in the divineorigin of individualspecies' ( 1936:201)
- both of which are 'survivals'that create palpable harm to individuals.
602 AugustineBrannigan
Viewed in this way,the
autokineticeffect is what he calls a
normsin thismore expansive 'prototype'of
ing on the largerissuesof conception,and becomesa vehiclefor reflect-
human naturesuggestedby the
of all our experiences socialmediation
including sensory perception by
Murphysuggestsin the 1965 culture. Gardner
reprintthat 'the laboratory
sented to our facultyhere is investigationpre-
embedded in a matrixof social
siderations,nearlyto the point of science con-
the laboratorytest have now being completelylost . . . the
become incidental' (1965:x). details of
Fromthis perspective,the fact
shiftsin perception resulting that the subjectsexperiencedno genuine
from group influence would
sincethe processwas alreadya be
matterof common knowledge immaterial
scientificrecognition.Later and earlier
Sherif'sapproachwaspurelygenerationswould be educatedto believe that
empiricaland discoveredthrough
autokineticeffects - making them studyof the
process the latest victims of the
was not unique to Sherif's illusion. This
history research.It continued throughout
of the classicgroup influence the
studies.

ASCH
ANDTHERESISTANCE
TO PROPAGANDA
Solomon Asch (1951, 1956)
onthe individual.His work contributeda classicstudyof group influence
appearedafter the Second World
Sherif
stressedhowsubjectswere War.Where
interested influencedbythe groupoutlook,Asch
in the groundsof resistance was
tion
to his work,Asch reviewed to group pressure.In the
the enormous costs of introduc-
hadbeen so influentialin propagandawhich
mobilizingthe Germanand Italian
duringthe war to supportthe war
effort, and which, in the populations
promoted racialhatredresultingin Germancase,
identify
the groundsfor resistingsuch genocide. ForAsch,it wasimportant
to
Howcould the individualstand evil.
up
devicefor exploringthisquestionagainstthis sort of false propaganda?
The
the in the labwasto asksubjects
length of a stimulusline which to match
one was presentedon a cardboardsheet with
of three other lines
represented on
match appearedself-evident,the another sheet. Although the
correct
or
herselfat odds with the majority unsuspectingsubjectfound him-
in
real subject, the confederates two thirdsof all trials.Unknownto
the
In twothirdsof the critical had been instructed to choose incor-
rectly.
estimates,
In
some cases, subjectslater reported to subjectsmimickedthe majority.
neous Asch that they believed the
majoritymatch to be the most errb
Under what conditions do people accurate.
that
errorsmade by real subjects resist propaganda?Asch
following discovered
when
one other subjectchose group pressureto err declined
ego
hasan ally.But the allymustcorrectly.Ergo,propagandais
or be constant,for if the ally resistedwhen
arrives
late, ego's vigilancefor truth desertsmidway
one
must ask whether they constitutedeclines.The resultsare elegantbut
ganda. an explanation of wartime
propa-
Thepostmodernexpenment 603

Realistically,this experiment sheds little light on the effects of propa-

ganda during the war.It saysnothing about genocide and the politicaluse
of scapegoats to misattributethe misery of German society during the
1930s. It says nothing about national animosities,virulent anti-Semitism,
or the use of violence to degrade opponents. Like the Sherif experiment,
it borrowsfrom the pretheoretic understanding of the phenomenon in
order to make the experimentintelligible.Our collectiveimmersionin the
moral issues of the day may lead us to overlook the impertinence of the
autokinetic effect and the line discrimination task to social instability
during the 1930s and the later wartimepropagandabecause our minds
have been misdirectedfrom the props of the experiment to the history
which is dramatizedthrough them. Again, the investigationwas attractive
for ontological reasons. It transformedthe empiricalquestions of propa-
gandainto personalquestionsof fidelityand betrayal,solidarityand deser-
tion.
Although the experiments arise from pressing issues in the life-world,
protocol dictates that this relevance be studiouslymisrepresentedin the
experimentsthemselvesthrougha deceptivecoverstoryto preventthe sub-
jects from learning the point of the study.As in a box camera,things are
turned upside down as our graspof the worldis used to make sense of the
experimentin the lab, and as the same life-worldrelevanceis hidden from
the subjectsto ensure theydo not invoketheir own common stockof know-
ledge to exhibit how propagandaought to be dealt with.
What about those subjectswho reported that they came to adopt the
erroneous matches made deliberatelyby the majority?It may be possible
that severalmillion years of genetic evolution go on holidayswhen ego is
confrontedwithseven stubbornpeople makingpatentlywrongfulmatches
before ego has his or her turn to speak. It is more plausible that the sub-
jects who reported that the majorityview was 'true' even though they
thought better, may have thought they had misunderstood the instruc-
tions. Perhaps they were intimidatedby the prospect of reporting differ-
ently from the majority,and were frightened to stand out in a crowd
withouteither wantingto or knowingwhy.The subsequentexplanationto
the experimenter during the debriefing that such choices were made
because they were thought to be 'true' reminds one of Sherif's subjects
who said they actuallyexperienced the movement of the light to be x or
y inches. The subjectsappearto be behavingbeneficently (Levy1974). Not
completely aware of what is going on, they 'pass' by mimicking the
majorityand tryingto figure out whatmayhave gone awry.In the debrief-
ing, they handle their embarrassmentby tactfullyreframingtheir duplic-
itous conduct as though it had been correct all along - by telling a lie to
repair a lie. But one point cannot be discounted: the experiment would
have no force at all if the taskwere inherently ambiguous.Logically,the
differencesin the lines had to be self-evidenteven to the subjectswho said
otherwisein order for any inference to be drawnabout the group's influ-
ence.
 604 AugustineBrannigan
THE HOLOCAUST AND OBEDIENCE TO
AUTHORIIY

The Milgramexperimentsare the single, best-known

contributionof social
psychologyto contemporaryculture (Miller1986;Milleret al.
are also amongst the most controversialfor both 1995). They
empirical and ethical
reasons (Orne and Holland 1968; Mixon 1971, 1989;
Baumrind 1964;
Patten 1977a,1977b) althoughthe textbookwritersact as
is such good copy that the scholarlydissent cannot be though the story
allowedto spoil the
story.Milgram'sstudyof obedience originatedin the
early 1960sand was
contemporaneouswith the trial and execution of Adolf Eichmann
allegedlyplodding Nazi bureaucraticwho brought the the
efficiencyof mass
murder to unprecedented levels in his management of
the Auschwitz
concentration camp in Poland during the Second World War.
million innocent people were slaughteredat Auschwitz, Several
and at the other
Polish and German death camps, by ordinary German
administrators,
policemen,soldiersand camp guards.In Milgram's
experiment,ordinary
subjectswere cast in the partsof torturers.Milgramtook
people from all
walksof life and turned them into the experimental
equivalentsof Eich-
mannsuggesting that the capacityfor evil was fostered
in virtuousindi-
vidualsby monstrousbureaucrats.
Contraryto thisview,Orne and Holland,Mixon,and other
criticsargued
that,in psychologyexperiments, subjects presume that
nothing can go
wrongand that thingsmaynot be whatthey appearto be.
Eventhough sub-
jectsare told that the shocking device delivered some
450 volts and are
demonstratedthrough a sample that the volts are, well,
electrifying,most
presupposethat 'this must be OK- no one can reallyget hurt'.
In the pretests of the study, Milgramreported that
'in the absence of
protestsfrom the learner, everysubjectin the pilot study
went blithelyto
theend of the board' (1974:22) . It wasonly at this point
thatMilgramintro-
ducedthe variousfeedbackconditions- initiallya knockon
the wallto indi-
catethat the subject receiving the shocks was
actually experiencing
discomfort. In the film Obedience,it is evident that when the fake
exhibit pain by actuallyshrieking- along prerecordedlines - the learners
jects real sub-
initiallylaugh out loud. They are startledthat anyoneis
hurt. actuallybeing
In the later designs,when the subjectshear similar
thelearnerstestifyingto the brutalityof the complaints from
experiment,they also have in
theirpresence the 'authorityfigure' - the actor-experimenterwho
their perceptionsthat somethingis going wrong,and who contra-
dicts
sivelyas people appear to be dying nearby.The subjectis reactspas-
drawnbetween
whatis heard - a sufferingvictim- and what is seen - a
ority non-plusedauth-
figure. This causesenormous conflict for the subjects.
tified They are mor-
by evidence that the learner is suffering.This is a
rather different
scenario from the Eichmann episode where the stench of death
camps in the
wasunmistakable.
Mixon suggests that every experimentalmanipulation
which Milgram
developed which introduced less ambiguousevidence that a
subjectwas
 experzment
Thepostmodern 605

being hurt reduced the aggressionof the teacher.When the learner'spain

wassignalledthroughpounding on the wall,compliancedroppedfromvir-
tually100 per cent to 65 per cent - the most significantvariationtested.All
the elaborateverbalfeedbackreduced the complianceby only a further2.5
per cent over the knock on the wall- meaning that only one less person in
forty resistedgoing to the highest shock level. Even though the authority
figure is centralto the receivedviewof the study,the inclusionof the auth-
orityfigurewasa late additionto the design.Milgramthoughtthatthe verbal
designation of the shock levels written across the electricaldevice would
impede aggression.That it did not suggests that people did not expect
sufferingto come to citizen volunteers.The 'classic'study only emerged
when he introduced feedback of harm and equated compliance with a
specific agent - the lab-coatedscientific'boss'.But surelythis was illogical
since the 'harm'occurredat the highestlevelswithoutthe expertauthority.
The introductionof the lattercontributednot 'power'over the subjectsas
much as ambiguityover the harm.Fromthis perspective,the studyappears
more like an inductiveexplorationthan a deductivetest of theory.When
the victim'ssufferingwasbroughtinto the room and portrayeddramatically
by an actor in the real subjects'presence, although the authorityfigure's
comportmentsuggestedno harm, the aggressiondeclined. And when the
authorityfigurewastotallyremovedfrom the lab, the painfeedbackreduced
the shocks to extremelylow levels. In other words, the more evident the
painfulnessof the procedureto the innocent teacherand the more the back-
ground expectationthat nothing-can-go-wrong was contradictedby experi-
ence, the lowerthe levelsof complianceto the authority'sdemands.On this
reading, the experiment should have been grounds for optimism about
humankind.However,in 1962this interpretationwasnot exploredas atten-
tion wasdevotedto Holocaustanalogies- analogiesthatappearill-founded.
Milgramdid not throwany more light on the subjectmatterthan what
was alreadyevident from history. The final frames of the film Obedzence
depicting the pulsating force field of the authorityfigure ends with a
warningmore appropriateto vintagescience fiction movies.
In comparisonto the effectstested in our New HavenLabs,one can only
wonder at the altogether more powerfulinfluences wielded by govern-
ments and bureaucracieson individuals.
This would alreadyhave been self-evidentto any student of the War.As for
its contributinganythingof theoreticalsignificance,the experimentwas a
theoreticalcul-de-sacdespitethe massivepublicattentiondevotedto it. The
'agentic'stateis as tautologicaltodayas it waswhen invented.It is alarming
to think that the studywhich attractedmore attentionthan any other in its
generation did not result in any subsequent insight. The experiment's
extrascientificattractionwassimplythis:it allowedthe psychologistto dra-
matizethe storyof humankind'scapacityfor ruthlessviolence in an experi-
mental idiom. By replayingEichmann in the lab, it did not substantially
advanceknowledge,nor did it discoveranythingessentialor new about the
606 AugustineBrannigan

death camps.Indeed, the recent revelationsof historianDaniel Goldhagen

(1996) suggeststhat the ordinaryGermanswere overwhelminglycomplicit
and willingparticipantsin the slaughterof theJews,thatthose enlistedmen
who asked to be relievedfrom the killing were re-postedwithout recrimi-
nations,and that the remainingexecutionersinflictedsufferingand humil-
iation on theirvictimsfar beyondwhatwasrequiredby orders.By contrast,
Milgram'sdepictionof the Holocausttransfersour focus awayfrom the real
victimsby dwelling sentimentallyon the murderersas the victimsof their
bureaucracies,reifyingtheir alibi of 'justfollowingorders'.

THEPOSTMODERN
EXPERIMENT

Postmodernismis an intellectualsensibilitythatariseswhen the major'nar-

ratives'of the Enlightenmentlose their credibility,resultingin the feeling
that historicalprogressis an illusion (Lyotard1984). One of the majornar-
rativesconcerns our ability to achieve knowledge of social life through
adherence to scientificprinciplesin order, thereby,to achieveboth social
and scientificprogress.To speakof the postmodernexperimentis to define
the scepticismwhich is associatedwith the use of a scientific approach-
experimentation- whose utility in the naturalworld does not appear to
have translatedsuccessfullyinto psychologicalinquiries.The case studies
which we have reviewed here are quintessentiallymodern in their con-
struction,and commonlyheld in high regard.But in our view,they are not
very penetrating.Not only do they tell us little about reality,but they may
have operationalizedthe problems so as to mischaracterizereality.This
scepticismought to contributeto the disciplinarycrisisto whichwe alluded
earlier. However,we cannot fail to notice that in spite of the perennial
recognitionof the crisisof method and the adventof new approaches,such
a crisisactuallyenjoysverylittle currencyamong professionalpsychologists.
Unlike The Crisisof EuropeanScience(Husserl1970) describedby Husserlin
the 1930s,the contemporarysituationdoes not arise out of the abstraction
of science and hence its inabilityto instructus directlywhen 'the equilib-
rium of social life is broken'. The crisisarisesfrom our preoccupationwith
the life-world- and our lack of distance from its problems.This is not a
crisis that appearscapable of engendering much anxietygiven the peda-
gogicalreturnsof the experimentsto our self understanding(Rogers1989).
The postmodern experiment may be vacuous as science but it has enor-
mous utilityin dramatizingcertainsocial truths,ironies and contradictions
in our experience. Its scientific credentialsmay be suspect, but ontologi-
cally,it is attractive,and this explainsboth its popularityand its capacityto
survivemethodologicalsoul-searching.
The approachwe have developed here does not justify the drawingof
conclusionsabout all social experimentation.It is not necessaryto deter-
mine on the basisof these caseshowwidelythisinsurgentreadingof experi-
mentationapplies,nor even to determinewhich experimentsare bona fide
Thepostmodurnexperiment 607

and which are postmodern.Nor is it necessaryto accept the illustrations

entirelyas they havebeen sketchedto appreciatethe point. Sufficeit to say
that many other landmark inquiries raise the same questions - the
Hawthornestudies (Jones 1992), the Pygmalionstudy (Wineburg1987),
the media effects studies (Fisher and Grenier 1994), etc. Admittedly,all
experimentsentail an element of contrivancewhich arisesfrom their use
of deceptivecoverstories,and from theiruse of laboratoryproxiesfor rape
and murder. But, it does not follow from this that all experiments are
optical illusions, or that experimental operationalizationsin principle
provide any less leverage than other approaches.It is enough to observe
that at least some of the key experimentsare given a charitablehearingfor
their social value despite their dubious ecologicalvalidity.
The postmodernexperimentshave certainthings in common. First,the
studies are sociallyrelevantwithout being practicalor instrumental.They
probablyare better classifiedas studiesin ontologycastin an experimental
idiom. Ontology, the study of being, highlights the contradictionsand
tribulationsof existence, but it is basicallya philosophical undertaking.
Second, the ontological emphasisof the postmodernexperimentexplains
why they do not appear to have a developmentalhistory.As Rosenwald
stressed,the returns to operationalismhave been spartangiven the apol-
lonian investmentin experimentalmethodology.Publicationsmaydouble
everysevenyears,but psychologicalknowledgedoes not. Socialpsychology
textbookstend to followfadsin the discipline.Knowledgedoes not accumu-
late. An area is explored experimentallyby severalpeople, and research
dies out as trendier topics overtakethe imagination.Social psychologyis
vulnerableto these arrestsof development preciselybecause research is
drivenby interestsin the life-worldand these interestsare frequentlymore
consequential than the data themselves.This explains why psychologists
can retain the imagery of a dubious effect long after its empiricalfoun-
dationshavevanished (Davis1971).
Third, the postmodern cast of research is only possible because of a
failureto thinkabouteverydaylife in termsof general,collectivelyaffirmed
theories. Textbooks are organizedaround substantivetopics but rarelyis
there an effort to ground the observationssystematicallyin tel-lllsof core
integrative theories. The research agenda is driven by current affairs
divorcedfrom an abidingsubscriptionto a specifictheoreticalperspective.
Finally,some of the issues raised in this discussionhave been raised by
previous writers. Their interests have been largely methodological or
ethical,to challenge the practiceof operationalismin scientificpsychology,
presumablyso that social inquirycould be more accuratein its resultsand
more humane in its treatmentof subjects.Our position is quite different.
If we considerthe relationshipbetweensocialpsychologicalknowledgeand
its consumers,we find that social psychologyis in a different relationship
than, say, physics. One cannot design an aircraftwithout reference to
mechanics but it is certainlypossible to conduct all one's social affairs
without the insights of psychology.In contrast to English Literature,the
608 AugustineBrannigan

majorityof 'end users' of our knowledgeare students- captiveconsumers

in massivelypopularundergraduatecourses.These are the audiencefor the
dramasof the counter-intuitive,the ironicand the perplexing.The primary
areaof informationtransferto the publicby the professionis the classroom.
This should lead us to think of these experimentsas a distinctivetype of
massmediumbased in the university- somethingsituatedbetweenpopular
dramaticentertainmentand explicit moral instruction.
From this perspective,the experiment is a form of pedagogy.Milgram
takesus throughthe elaboratecoverstory.Justas in Shakespeare,the decep-
tion of the actors is the foundationfor irony and insight.We witnessthe
sufferingof the ordinarysubjectsas they reluctantlyshock their helpless
victims,although,as with drama,we knowthatno one is reallyhurt.We ask
the studentsto predicthow manysubjectswill 'go to the end of the panel'-
and surprisethem when they underestimatethe common capacityfor vio-
lence. The whole experimentexposes everyoneto the sort of dark reality
which capturedMilgram'simaginationin the firstplace.Fromthis perspec-
tive, it does not matterthat as science it mayfail to meet the basicrequire-
ments of ecological validity.Milgram'swork is a secularhumanismwhich
bringshome the messagethat the EuropeanHolocaustcan be let out of a
bottle, as he has done on a smallerscale in his New Havenlaboratory.And
the studentsare heartened.Surely,this is a lesson they can use: they must
resistthe bureaucratswho caused the Holocaust,or in Asch's study,must
resistthe propagandaof the majority.Like Divinity,the subjectmaynot be
'practical',but it is certainlyrelevant.Andwhilenot scientific,it hasa lesson.
However,if social psychologywishesto sustainits scientificleverage,it is
essentialto differentiateits ontological concerns from its empiricalobser-
vations.The disciplineemerged under the institutionalwingof the general
Psychologydepartments in advance of any broadly accepted theory or
theorieswhichwould demarcateits distinctiveintellectualjurisdictionand
which would govern its empiricaldirections.Instead,its purchaseon the
scientificcommunitywaspaid for by adoptionof a methodologywhichmay
or maynot havebeen appropriatein termsof its basictheoreticalcore. And
in the absence of a consensuallydeveloped theoreticalcore, the experi-
ment has been vulnerableto operationalizationswhichshowcasea relation-
ship of pressing contemporaryrelevancewithout actuallytesting it. The
resulthas been ambiguoustheoreticalprogress,a recurringcrisisover the
scientific status of the discipline and a curriculumwhich frequentlycon-
fuses moral sentiments and common sense truisms with scientifically
grounded insight. The alternativeis to develop a general theory of social
life and a truly pluralisticmethodology to examine it ( e.g. Harre and
Gilbert1994). Until this occurs,the shadowof postmodernismwillstalkthe
prospectsof its advancement.

(Date accepted:October 1996) AugustineBrannigan

Department
ofSociology
TheUniversity
of Calgary
The postmodyn experiment
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
*Thisarticleenjoyedthe encouragementof manypeople whose assistance
is acknowledgedhere. These include RichardHadden, Ken Gergen,Hank
Stamm,PaulSecord,Don Mixon,DianaBaumrind,EmilyCaroteOrne, the
late Dick Henshel, George Rosenwald,Bob Stebbins,Shelly Goldenberg,
Mike Lynch, GrahamWatson, Ron Gillis, Ed Boyd and an anonymous
reviewerfor the journal.
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