PEOPLE v.

PRIMITIVO OSI
Feb 27, 1950
Facts:
CFI of Quezon found Osi guilty of treason in all the five charges. Osi was an employee of the
Manila Electric Company as lighting inspector.

 Osi was the secretary of the Sakdalista Party in the municipality of Sariaya under Benigno
Ramos
 he voluntarily joined the "Mataichi Kabushiki Kaisha," otherwise known as Nacoco, as its
foreman No. 3
 he acted as interpreter of the Japanese manager of the Nacoco
 the first and second foreman respectively of the Nacoco. having been killed by the
guerrillas, his Japanese employers promoted this accused to the position of foreman No.
1, with the rank and title of "Captain."
 Since then, he had under his command between 300 and 400 Makapilisoldiers of
the Nacoco Military Police
 he and his soldiers were seen conducting punitive campaigns against guerrillas and their
sympathizers he and his men, without compensation, commandeered foodstuffs from the
residents of the neighboring barrios, which were turned over to the Japanese garrison and
the Nacoco Military Police.
 Finally, upon the return of the Americans, Primitivo Osi and his Makapili soldiers, with
the Japanese civilian officials of the Nacoco, retreated to the Sierra Madre mountains in
the province of Laguna and with his Japanese masters surrendered to the American forces.
Osi admitted that he was the secretary of the Sakdalista party, he voluntarily accepted
employment as foreman No. 3 of the Japanese Nacoco and acted as interpreter of the Japanese
manager of the company until the arrival of the Americans.
The rest of the testimony of appellant is a denial of all the charges made against him.
Issue:
Whether or not Osi is guilty of treason
Held:
YES
The main defense of this appellant consists at mere denials of appellant's participation in the
treasonous acts imputed to him in the five charges; and appellant, believing that he had succeeded
in side-stepping the imputations made against him by the prosecution, rested his case. As aptly
remarked by the Solicitor General, it is well established in the law of evidence that affirmative
testimony is stronger than negative.
In the ease at bar, our detailed examination of the testimonies given by the witnesses for the
prosecution convince Us that they were telling the truth and the facts established by their
respective testimonies clinch the case against this appellant.
appellant has failed to substantiate his claim and evidence strongly show not only the adherence
of this appellant to the enemy, but also his having given him aid and comfort in the municipality
of Candelaria in the manner and form described by more than two witnesses who testified against
him in each of the five counts

ALEJANDRO SAMSON VS. A NDREA B. ANDAL DE AGUILA, ET

AL.

Facts:
Petitioner filed against Agapito B. Andal and Valentina de Andal a complaint
for declaratory relief, praying that
1. judgment be rendered fixing the amount which petitioner should pay
to the Andal’s under a deed of mortgage executed by the former in favor
of the latter; and
2. defendants be ordered to cancel the mortgage upon payment of said
amount.
court rendered a decision, declaring amount due from the plaintiff is P150
and ordering the defendants to execute the proper deed of cancellation upon
payment of said amount.
The court applied the Ballantyne scale of values.
Andal’s appealed to the CA rendered a decision holding that the plaintiff
should pay to the defendants P6,000 (the full amount of the loan obtained
by the plaintiff from the defendants on October 25, 1944), in actual
Philippine currency, plus the stipulated interest, but subject to the
moratorium law.
Petitioner appealed. Andal’s died and were substituted as parties
respondents by their heirs, Andrea B. Andal de Aguila and others.
Issue:
Whether or not the amount that should be paid is P6,000 or P150

Held:
P150
when an obligation is payable within a certain period of time, and the whole
or part thereof coincides with the Japanese occupation, payment after the
liberation must be adjusted in accordance with the Ballantyne
schedule, because the debtor could have paid said obligation in Japanese
war notes during the occupation.
the debtor's mere failure to accomplish payment during the Japanese
occupation did not make him liable to pay, as damage or penalty, the
difference between the value of the Japanese war notes at the time the
obligation became payable and of the Philippine currency at the time of
payment. It is true that the creditors herein could not demand payment prior
to October 25, 1945, but this did not preclude the debtor, herein petitioner,
from paying his obligation at any time within one year from October 25,
1944, if he had wanted to do so.
Decision of Ca reversed. the amount which the petitioner should pay to
cancel his mortgage is only the sum of P150

ENGRACIO DE ASIS VS. JOSE V. AGDAMAD

Facts:

On 1949, plaintiff filed an action to recover from the defendants a loan of

P10,000.00, secured by a mortgage, and evidenced by a promissory note
executed by the defendants on August 15, 1944, providing that the loan was
payable on or before August 15, 1947. and that, in case of non-payment on
the date of maturity, the sum of P1,000.00 would be paid by the defendants
for costs, attorney's fees and other collection expenses.

defendants invoked the Debt Moratorium and expressed their willingness to

pay the debt in an amount adjusted under the Ballantyne scale of values.
judgment was rendered against the defendants for the sum of P400.00. The
court applied the Ballantyne scale which fixes twenty five pesos in Japanese
war notes as the equivalent of one Philippine peso in August,1944.
plaintiff has appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court correctly applied the Ballantyne scale.

Held:

Yes
The stipulation of the parties being that the loan was payable on or before
August 15, 1947, the same could be paid at any time during the Japanese
military occupation. Appellees' failure to do so is not a justification for
requiring them to pay the full amount of the loan in the currency on the date
of payment.
The stipulation of the parties being that the loan was payable on or before
August 15, 1947, the same could be paid at any time during the Japanese
military occupation. Appellees' failure to do so is not a justification for
requiring them to pay the full amount of the loan in the currency on the date
of payment.
Petitioner is not liable to pay now in Philippine Currency the same value of
pesos in Japanese war notes. He is liable only to pay the equivalent which
may be determined by means of the Ballantyne scale of values.
if the parties had stipulated that the obligation shall be payable within a
certain period of time, that is, at any time within that period, and the whole
or a part of the period coincides with the Japanese occupation and, therefore,
the debtor might have paid his obligation in Japanese war notes during the
occupation payment according to the Ballanty.ne scale of values shall be
applied; because the debtor had the right to pay his obligation in Japanese
war notes at the time it became payable, and his mere failure to pay it would
not, make him liable to pay, as damages or penalty, the difference between
the value of the Japanese war notes at the time the obligation became payable
and of the Philippine Currency at the date of the payment
We note that the trial court adopted the value of the Japanese war notes in
Philippine pesos in August, 1944, and not in the month Immediately
preceding the I liberation when the war notes were almost worthless, and
this action of the trial court was decidedly in favor of the appellant.
The claim for stipulated attorney's fees cannot also be allowed because the
latter are willing to pay the amount of the judgment at any time, they cannot
be said uo have failed to pay their indebtedness on time, in view of said
moratorium.

TERESA VDA. DE FERNANDEZ, ET AL VS. NATIONAL LIFE

INSURANCE CO. OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Respondent insured the life of Juan D Fernandez for the sum of

P10,000 upon payment by the latter of the amount of P444 for the period
from July 15, 1944, to July 14, 1945, the beneficiaries thereof being his
mother Teresa Duat Vda. de Fernandez and his sisters Maria Teresa
Fernandez and Manuela Fernandez. The insured died on November 2, 1944
while the policy was in force.

After a lapse of more than seven years, Atty. de la Torre, in representation

of the beneficiaries, wrote the company advising it that the insured had died
in 1944, and claimed the proceeds of the policy.
company answered whether the beneficiaries represented by him were
willing to compute the value of their claim under the Ballantyne scale of
values. There was no reply to this inquiry, but beneficiaries presented
instead proofs of death of the insured and filed a claim for the amount of
P10,000
Company. advised the beneficiaries that the policy matured upon the death
of the insured on 1944, the proceeds should be computed in accordance with
the Ballantyne scale, which amount only to P500.
beneficiaries commenced suit but court sustained the stand of the company
and dismissed the complaint
appellants claim that they should be paid P10,000 in Philippine currency and
not under the Ballantyne scale of values.
Issue:
Whether the Ballantyne scale should be applied

Held:

Yes
The policy matured upon the death of the insured on November 2, 1944, and
the obligation of the insurer to pay arose as of that date. The sixty-day period
fixed by law within which to pay the proceeds after presentation of proof of
death is merely procedural in nature, evidently to determine the exact
amount to be paid and the interest thereon to which the beneficiaries may be
entitled to collect in case of unwarranted refusal of the company to pay, and
also to enable the insurer to verify or check on the fact of death which it may
even validly waive. It is the happening of the suspensive condition of death
that renders a life policy matured and not the filing of proof of death which,
as above stated, is merely procedural, for even if such proof were presented
but it turns out later that the insured is alive, such filing does not give
maturity to the policy. The insured having died on November 2, 1944, during
the Japanese occupation, the proceeds of his policy should be adjusted
accordingly, for
"The rule is already settled that where a debtor could have paid his
obligation at any time during the Japanese occupation, payment after
liberation must be adjusted in accordance with the Ballantyne schedule
Appellants argue that they could not have presented their claim and proof
of death during the Japanese occupation even if they wanted to because they
knew that the deceased was insured only after liberation when the policy was
handed to them by a business partner of the deceased.
The delay in the presentation of proof of death does not make any difference,
for it does not alter the date of maturity of the policy nor the ability of the
company to pay the proceeds of the insurance during the Japanese
occupation. Moreover, it is through no fault of the company that such delay
was incurred. At any rate, irrespective of whether there was delay or not in
the filing of proof of death, the hard fact remains that the policy matured
and was payable during the Japanese occupation, and under the doctrine in
the Valero vs. Sycip case, supra, payment should be adjusted in accordance
with the Ballantyne scale of values.

XERXES C. GARCIA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLEE.

Facts
This is an action on 22 May 1958 for the recovery of P20,000, the amount
typewritten in words and figure on a cashier's check dated 5 January 1945
drawn in the name of the plaintiff as payee, by the agency of the defendant,
PNB, for negotiation in Pampanga only
On 26 May 1958 the defendant answered denying the material averments of
the plaintiff's complaint and setting up the special defense the genuineness
and due execution of PNB Check, because it had been purchased from its
agency in Pampanga with Japanese military or war notes, the currency then
prevailing, which had been declared illegal and invalid pursuant to section 2
of Executive Order No. 49, issued on 6 June 1945 by the President of the
Philippines, the defendant is no longer under obligation to honor the said
check.
the plaintiff answered the defendant's counterclaim. According to him his
action is based upon the defendant's written undertaking which it had
refused to honor; that he has the right to seek the aid of the courts to compel
the defendant to pay its obligation; and the damage it will suffer, if any, is of
its own making for refusing to pay its obligation.
Court rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for the reason
that the defendant was no longer under obligation to honor the cashier's
check drawn by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff for P20,000 in
Japanese military or war notes long after Japanese military or war notes had
ceased to be legal tender.
plaintiff has appealed

Issue:
Whether PNB must pay in accordance with its terms
Held:

NO, the obligation should be paid or discharged according to the Ballantyne

schedule of values
The appellee's obligation to pay it matured as of 5 January 1945, the date
appearing on the check, when Japanese military or war notes were still valid.
The appellant, however, did not present the check for payment until 15
November 1954 when Japanese military or war notes were no longer lawful
and valid. Since the check or the obligation had matured during the Japanese
occupation when Japanese military or war notes were still valid, but
presented for payment or fulfillment of the obligation after liberation, when
the said Japanese military or war notes were no longer lawful and valid, the
obligation should be paid or discharged according to the Ballantyne schedule
of values. The appellant had purchased the draft, Exhibits 1 & A, in Japanese
military or war notes, or for a valuable consideration. Even if the then
prevailing currency was of very little value as compared to the present,
nevertheless it had a value. It is fair and just that the appellee should not
escape total liability, but the appellant cannot exact payment of the
obligation in the present currency in full.
According to the Ballantyne schedule of values, in January 1945, P120 in
Japanese military or war notes was the equivalent of P1 in Philippine
currency. Hence P20,000 in Japanese military or war notes was equivalent
to P166.67 in Philippine currency.
appellee ordered to pay the appellant the sum of P166.67, Philippine
currency

JOSE PONCE DE LEON v. SANTIAGO SYJUCO

Facts:
Philippine National Bank was the owner of two (2) parcels of land known as
Lots 871 and 872 of the Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental. On March 9,
1936, the Bank executed a contract to sell the said properties to the plaintiff,
Jose Ponce de Leon for the total price of P26,300, payable as follows: fa)
P2,630 upon the execution of the said deed; and (b) the balance of P23,670
in ten (10) annual amortizations, the first amortization to fall due one year
after the execution of the said contract
On May 5, 1944, Ponce de Leon obtained a loan from Santiago Syjuco, Inc.,
in the amount of P200.00 in Japanese Military Notes, payable within one (1)
year from May 5, 1948. It was also provided in said promissory note that the
promisor (Ponce de Leon) could not pay, and the payee (Syjuco) could not
demand, the payment of said note except within the aforementioned period.
To secure the payment of said obligation, Ponce de Leon mortgaged in favor
of Syjuco the parcels of land which he agreed to purchase from the Bank
On May 6, 1944, Ponce de Leon paid the Bank the Balance of the purchase
price amounting to P23,670 in Japanese Military notes and, on the same
date, the Bank executed in favor of Ponce de Leon a deed of absolute sale of
the aforementioned parcels of land
deed of sale executed by the Bank in favor of Ponce de Leon and the deed of
mortgage executed by Ponce de Leon in favor of Syjuco were registered in the
Office of the Register of Deeds
On July 31, 1944, Ponce de Leon obtained an additional loan from Syjuco in
the amount of P16,000 in Japanese Military notes and executed in the latter's
favor a promissory note of the same tenor as the one he had previously
executed
On several occasions Ponce de Leon tendered to Syjuco the amount of
P254,880 in Japanese military notes in full payment of his Indebtedness to
Syjuco. Syjuco, however, refused to accept such repeated tenders. During the
trial, Ponce de Leon explained that he wanted to settle his obligations
because as a member of the guerrilla forces he was being hunted by the
Japanese and he was afraid of getting caught and killed
"In view of Syjuco's refusal to accept the payment tendered by Ponce de Leon,
the latter deposited with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila
the amount of P254,880 and he filed a complaint consigning the amount so
deposited to Syjuco. To this complaint Syjuco filed his answer. The records
of this case were destroyed as a result of the war and after the liberation the
same were reconstituted
Ponce de Leon filed a petition for the reconstitution of transfer Certificates.
TCT’s were issued.
Ponce de Leon obtained an overdraft account from the Bank in an.amount
not exceeding P135,000 and, on the same date, he executed a mortgage of
the two parcels of land covered by the reconstituted Transfer Certificates in
favor of the said Bank to secure the payment of any amount which he may
obtain from the Bank under the overdraft account.
overdraft account was granted by the Bank to Ponce de Leon in good faith,
said Bank not being aware of the mortgage which Ponce de Leon had
executed in favor of Syjuco during the Japanese occupation
Syjuco filed an answer claiming that Ponce de Leon, by.reconstituting the
titles in the name of the Bank, by causing the Register of Deeds to nave the
said titles transferred in his (Ponce de Leon's name, and by subsequently
mortgaging the said properties to the Bank as a guaranty for his overdraft
account, had violated the conditions of the mortgage which Ponce de Leon
has executed in its favor during the Japanese occupation. Syjuco then prayed
that the mortgage in his favor be foreclosed and the mortgage executed by
Ponce de Leon in favor of the Bank be declared null and void
Issue
(1)did the lower court err in reducing the principal and interest of said
promissory notes to their just proportions using as a pattern the Ballantyne
schedule in effecting the reduction?
(2)did the lower court err in disregarding the defense of moratorium set up
by the plaintiff against the counterclaim of defendant Syjuco?
Held:
(1)On two previous occasions this Court had been called upon to rule on a
similar question and has decided that when the creditor and the debtor have
agreed on a term within which the payment of the obligation should be paid
and on the currency in which payment should be made, that stipulation
should be given force and effect unless it appears to be contrary to law, moral
or public order. Thus, in one case this Court said: "One who borrowed
P4,000 in Japanese military notes on October 5, 1944, to be paid one year
after, in currency then prevailing, was ordered by the Supreme Court to pay
said sum after October 5, 1945, that is, after liberation, in Philippine currency
(Roño vs. Gomez et al., G.R. No. L-19^7, May 31, 1949). In Another case,
wherein the parties executed a deed of sale with pacto de retro of a parcel of
land for the sum of P5,000 in Japanese military notes agreeing that within
30 days after the expiration of one year from June 24, 1944, the
aforementioned land may be redeemed sa ganito ding halaga (at the same
price), the Court held that the "phrase sa ganito ding halaga meant the
same price of P5,000 in the currency prevailing at the time of redemption
and not the equivalent in Philippine currency of P5,000 in Japanese war
notes". The Court further said, "The parties herein gambled and speculated
on the date of the termination of the war and the liberation of the Philippines
by America. This can be gleaned from the stipulation about redemption,
particularly that portion to the effect that redemption could be effected not
before the expiration of one year from June 24, 1944. This kind of agreement
is permitted by law. We find nothing immoral or unlawful in
it"(Gomez vs. Tabia, G.R. No. L-1826, Aug. 5, 1949).
In this particular case, the terms agreed upon are clearer and more
conclusive than the ones cited because the plaintiff agreed not only not to
pay the obligation within one year from May 5, 1948, but also to pay peso;
for peso in the coin or currency of the Government that at the time of
payment it is the legal tender for public and private debts. This stipulation is
permitted by law because there is nothing immoral or improper In it. And It
is not oppressive because it appears that plaintiff used a great portion of that
money to pay his obligations during the Japanese occupation as shown by
the fact that he settled his account with the Philippine National Bank and
other accounts to the tune of P100,000. It would seem therefore clear that
plaintiff has no other alternative than to pay the defendant his obligation
peso; for peso in the present currency as expressly agreed upon in the two
promissory notes in question. The decision of the lower court on this point
should, therefore, be modified.
As regards the penal clause contained in the two deeds of mortgage herein
involved, we agree to the following finding of the court a quo: "The attempt
made by the plaintiff to pay the obligation before the arrival of the term fixed
for the purpose may be wrong; but it may be attributed to an honest belief
that .the term was not binding and not to a desire to modify the .contract".
This penal clause should be strictly construed.
(2) lower court erred in disregarding the defense of . moratorium set up by
the plaintiff against the counterclaim of the defendant on the sole ground
that this defense was not raised by the plaintiff in his pleadings. An
examination of the record shows that the plaintiff raised this question in his
pleadings. This must have been overlooked by the court.
The lower court, therefore, should have passed upon this defense in the light
of Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32, which
suspended payment of all obligations contracted before March 10, 1945. We
note, however, that said moratorium orders have already been modified by
Republic Act No. 342 in the sense of limiting the ban on obligations
contracted before the outbreak of war to creditors who have filed claims for
reparations with the Philippine War Damage Commission, leaving them
open to obligations contracted during the Japanese occupation
(Uy vs. Kalaw Katigbak, G.R.No. L-1830, Dec. 1, 1949). As the obligation in
question has been contracted during enemy occupation the same is still
covered by the moratorium orders. The claim of counsel for the defendant
that the moratorium orders cannot be invoked because they are
unconstitutional cannot now be determined it appearing that it has been
raised for the first,,time in this instance. This defense of moratorium was
raised by plaintiff in his reply to the amended answer of the defendant dated
August 1, 1946, and in his motion to dismiss the counterclaim dated October
29, 1946, but the defendant did not traverse that allegation nor raise the
constitutionality of the moratorium orders in any of Its pleadings filed In the
lower court. It Is a well known rule that this Court can only consider a
question of constitutionality when it has been raised by any of the parties in
the lower court (Laperal vs.City of Manila, 62 Phil. 352; Macondray &
Co. vs. Benito and Ocampo, 62 Phil. 137).
Thus, plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant Syjuco the sum of P2l6,000,
Philippine currency, value of two promissory notes. It is further ordered that
should said amount, together with the corresponding interests, be not paid
within 90 days from the date this Judgment becomes final, the properties
mortgaged should be sold at public auction, and the proceeds applied to the
payment of this judgment in accordance with law
DISSENTING
PARAS, C. J.,
The plaintiff obtained from, defendant Syjuco on May 5, 1944, a loan of
P200,000 and on July 31, 1944, another loan of P16,000, payable "within
one year from May 5, 1948." On November 15, 1944, the plaintiff offered to
pay the entire indebtedness plus all the interest up to the date of maturity.
Upon Syjuco's refusal to accept the tendered payment, the plaintiff deposited
the amount with the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
instituted the present action .to compel Syjuco to accept payment. The
records of the case were destroyed during the war, but they were duly
reconstituted after the liberation. The trial court sentenced the plaintiff to
pay to Syjuco the total sum of P23,130, representing the whole indebtedness
plus interest from August 6, 1944, to May 5, 1949, computed according to the
Ballantyne scale of values. From this judgment Syjuco has appealed,
claiming the right to be paid the sum of P216,000, actual Philippine
currency, plus P200,000 as penalty agreed upon in the contract. The
majority of this Court sustains Syjuco1s claim for P216,000
whether a debtor can pay an indebtedness before the date of maturity
provided corresponding interest is paid
I hold that the mortgagor has the right to pay the indebtedness at any time
within three years provided that, as in this case, he pays the interest for the
whole term of the mortgage. In the ordinary course of things, a loan is
granted in consideration of interest, and if by the early payment of the
obligation, the creditor would not lose any part of the stipulated interest,
both paragraphs 3 and 4 would practically be enforced. It cannot be alleged
that the creditor herein, in addition to interest, wanted to have his money in
the safekeeping of the debtor, because the contract is one 6f loan and not of
deposit. It is to be remembered, moreover, that the debt was being paid in
the same currency loaned (Japanese money). The effect of inflation is one.of
the risks naturally incident to the money-lending business, and the lender
should protect himself against it by plain covenants.

PEOPLE v. JOSE LUIS GODINEZ

Facts

Prosecuted and tried for treason accused Godinez was found guilty
He was a shipmaster in the Philippine coastwise trade before the Pacific War.
After the Japanese invasion, from May, 1942 to June, 1943, he rendered
services to the Japanese Navy, as pilot in the Port of Cebu, bringing their
ships into harbor and otherwise performing work connected with navigation.
He was paid monthly salaries.
The prosecution's case rests on such acts of cooperation which, it is argued,
demonstrate treasonable adherence to the enemy, making defendant guilty
as charged.
In his defense the accused swore that he had to serve the Japanese because
he was required by them to do so, that he could not give any valid excuses,
that if he made any false statements he would be caught, and killed; and that
even if he could escape, the many members of his immediate family would
be left to their ruthless ill-will.
The majority of the trial judges discounted this explanation saying, hat the
danger to the accused was not imminent, because other merchant marine
officers succeeded in evading service to the Japanese and were not molested.

Issue:
Whether Godinez is guilty of treason

Held:

NO

To clinch its case the prosecution should have attested that appellant had a
valid excuse or that he could have eluded the wrath of the masters.
Furtheremore, the mere fact that some Filipinos were brave enough to refuse
and were lucky enough to be let alone is no conclusive reason to hold that in
truth there was no danger in denying the conqueror's demands. There were
persons put to death or maltreated for so refusing, and that was known at the
time, as admitted on the stand by the people's witness Francisco Garcia.
Again, it may be that such marine officers were not pressed by the Japanese
precisely because the herein accused and others (Eduardo Gonzales, Marcelo
Ayesa) had consented to render pilotage service. Those who refused to
cooperate, in the face of danger, were patriotic citizens; but it does not follow
that the faintheart, who gave in, were traitors.
It is now undisputed that mere governmental work under the Japanese
regime and pilotage service may be considered in the same light does not
constitute per se indictable disloyalty.
President Osmeña:
"* * * Not all public officials could take to the hills to carry on the heroic
struggle. Some had to remain in their posts to maintain a semblance of
government, to protect the population from the oppressor to the extent
possible by human ingenuity and to comfort the people in their misery.
Had their services not been available, the Japanese would either have
themselves governed directly and completely or utilized unscrupulous
Filipino followers capable of any treason to their people. The result
would have been calamitous and the injuries inflicted to our body
politic beyond cure.
"The problem under consideration must be solved with justice and
dignity. Every case should be examined impartially and decided on its
own merits. Persons holding public office during enemy occupation,
for the most part, fall within three categories; those prompted by a
desire to protect the people, those actuated by fear of enemy reprisals,
and those motivated by disloyalty to our government and cause. The
motives which caused the retention of the office and conduct while in
office, rather than the sole fact of its occupation, will be the criteria
upon which such persons will be judged."

the Court reaches the conclusion that defendant's disloyal heart or

treacherous mind has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. He is
absolved

XERXES C. GARCIA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, DEFENDANT AND

Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the
appellant, Agoncillo, guilty of treason
According to the information, the appellant
(1) "did consistently and continuously traffic in war materials and sold
them to the enemy," and
(2) "did join and serve the enemy as informer, agent, and spy." The People's
Court held that the second count was not proven, and the appealed
judgment of conviction is predicated solely on the first count.
Under the theory of prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is
inferable from the following alleged facts;
a) while the appellant was taking a bath in the house of his neighbor
Rufina Cepeda, the latter's cousin (Olimpio Do), who knew how to
read Chinese, examined appellant's clothes and found therein
appellant's identification card written in Japanese and Chinese
characters tending to show that the appellant was a Japanese
undercover
b) after a trip to Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told the appellant a that there
were guerrillas in Bohol and that Japanese notes were no longer
accepted in said place. In the evening of the next day, Rufina Cepeda
was arrested by the Japanese and their undercovers and asked about
things she saw in Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her
release, the appellant came to her house and got some chickens for
the consumption of the Japanese who arrested her. A Japanese also
used to sleep once in a while in appellant's house.
Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and
comfort to the enemy are summarized in the brief for the Government as
follows:
a) appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum crystals at three pesos a kilo,
to the Keribo, a construction company operated by the Japanese
Army. Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity some
100 pieces of water pipes, the price of which was not known.
b) the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping push a handcart full
of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the intermediate
on high school premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor
pool.

Issue:
Whether appellant is guilty of treason

Held:
NO
Court is of the opinion that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have not
been duly proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the
testimony of the presecution witness Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the
price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated by any other witness. With respect to
the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the appellee admits
that the price thereof was not known. in essential part of the overt act
charged in the information was therefore lacking. No pretense was made that
the appellant donated the articles in question. The alleged delivery of truck
and auto tires, batteries and spare parts can be disregarded. The only detail
that may at most be considered established by the prosecution refers to the
fact that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart loaded with such
articles, and the evidence is even uncertain in one respect, namely, that the
cart was brought either to the intermediate school premises or to the high
school building. Indeed, It Is acknowledged by the lower court that the
witnesses for the Government did not know how the appellant disposed of
the articles loaded in the cart.
Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really sold for a definite
price alum crystals and water pipes, the same did not per se constitute
treason. As said articles or materials were not exclusively for war purposes,
their sale did not necessarily carry an intention on the part of the vendor to
adhere to the enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was
treasonable in view of the other proven acts showing appellant's adherence
to the enemy. It appears, however, that the alleged acts of adherence
performed by the appellant took place after the overt act in question. It is not
unlikely that at the time the appellant made the sale, his motive was purely
personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where two
probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the
presumption of innocence will be adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G. R. No.
L-778, October 10, 1947.)
appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted