Cases:
(Tomada, Michael)
• Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 171 (1979).
• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 phil. 113 (1945).
• Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951).
(Jadap, Carelle Mae)
• Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974).
• Tanada vs. Angara, 272 SCRA 18.
• Arthur Lim et.al., vs. Executive Secretary, GR #151445, April 11, 2002.
------------------------------------
Kuroda vs Jalandoni 83 Phil 171
Facts:
Shigenori Kuroda was a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines on 1943 and 1944. He
was charged before a Military Commission of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for unlawfully disregarding and failure to discharge his duties as commander, to control
the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners in violation of the laws and customs of
war.
Kuroda opposed the charges against him by assailing the illegality of EO No. 68, prohibiting
Melville Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution before the Military
Commission and permanently prohibits the respondents from proceeding with the case. He
assailed that EO 68 is illegal because it violates the provisions of the Constitution and the local
laws since the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent of the Hague Convention on Rules
and Regulations covering Land Warfare with regards to the high crimes charged against them.
The participation in the prosecution of the case by United States of America through Hussey and
Port, not being authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines are in violation
of the Constitution. Apart from this, they do not have personality as prosecutors since the United
States are not party in interest in the case.
Issue:
Whether or not EO No. 68 and participation of two US attorneys are both in violation of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
EO 68 and the participation of United States Attorneys are both valid. EO No. 68, establishing a
National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused
war criminals is valid and constitutional pursuant to Article 2 Sec. 3 of the Constitution that
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. Therefore, the generally accepted
principles adopted in the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents
of international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or
civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
The promulgation and enforcement of EO No. 68 by the President of the Philippines, as an
exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of all armed forces, was in conformity with the
generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of the Constitution.
President is fully empowered to consummate unfinished aspect of war like trial and punishment of
war criminals through EO No. 68. Philippines was then under the sovereignty of the United States
when the crimes charged were committed, therefore, the Philippines is equally bound together
with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties
between the belligerent countries. The change of Government of the Philippines from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with treason because
it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people. The appointment
of the Attorneys by United States, for vindication of crimes against her government and her people
to a tribunal in the Philippines, is not in violation of national sovereignty by virtue of spirit of comity
among the nations in representation in trial.
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 phil. 113 (1945
FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by
General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas
of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying
all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence
of an enabling law granting such authority.
During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and
jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and
in the laws they administered and enforced.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts during a de facto government are good and valid.
2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and void thereby all judgments and
judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation.
3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to,
and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those
proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by
the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were
reestablished in the Islands.
HELD:
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The doctrine
upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444):
“The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to
establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.
Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage
of the of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine,
from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate
private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended
or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”
According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been
occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty,
“does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for
one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control,
when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they
take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time
by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political
complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent
occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23,
1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been
necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. NO. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the
judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of
the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during
the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according
to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which
are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come
again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not
have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any
other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles
of international law.
3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended
as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or
tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented,
to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in
practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force
and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.
This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And
Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror
is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government,
legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is
restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local
laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been
adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily
deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government
established by the occupant of transient character.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the
same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity
of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the
removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables
elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to
the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.
Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951)
FACTS:
 Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai
as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands.
(The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed
and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law furing the
occupation.)
 He was arrested on March 18, 1948 as a Japanese spy, by U. S. Army
Counter Intelligence Corps. and later there was an order for his release.
 But on April 5, 1948, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had
entered the Philippines illegally in 1944 and ordered that he be deported on the first
available transportation to Russia.
 He was transferred to Cebu Provincial Jail and then Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa on
October, 1948.
 He then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis that too long a detention may
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus - denied
 Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the
Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country,
and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it
was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
 This is his 2nd petition for writ of habeas corpus
ISSUE: W/N the writ of habeas corpus should be granted since he was detained longer than a
reasonable time
HELD: YES. writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody
upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration
authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that
he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance
shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the
Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also put up a bond for
the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No.
613.
 Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum therein even if they are
"stateless," which the petitioner claims to be.
 The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for
crimes committed against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but
extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.
 Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December
10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all
human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free
and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth,
or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the
Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile" (Art. 9); etc.
 petitioner's unduly prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution,
if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no means actual,
present, or uncontrollable
 Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I
am loath to resort it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to supplement conviction of
such offenses as those of which defendants stand convicted.
 If that case is not comparable with ours on the issues presented, its underlying principle is
of universal application.
 As already noted, not only are there no charges pending against the petitioner, but the
prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
BAER vs. TIZON
57 SCRA 1 (1974)
FACTS:
This is a petition seeking to nullify seeking to nullify the orders of respondent Judge denying his
motion to dismiss a complaint filed against him by the private respondent, Edgardo Gener, on the
ground of sovereign immunity of a foreign power, his contention being that it was in effect a suit
against the United States, which had not given its consent.
Private respondent Edgardo Gener is engaged in logging operations and his operations were
stopped by the American Naval Base authorities. Hence, he filed a petition for preliminary
injunction restraining petitioner, Baer, from interfering with his logging operations. The restraining
order was granted by the lower court.
Counsel for petitioner, contested the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, on the ground that the suit
was against a foreign sovereign without its consent. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
reiterating such ground. It was pointed out that he is the chief or head of an agency or
instrumentality of the United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official
acts done by him for and in behalf of the United States of America. It was added that in directing
the cessation of logging operations by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was
entirely within the scope of his authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the
Naval Base and of the installations therein being the first concern and most important duty of the
Commander of the Base.
Gener opposed on motion to dismiss, relying on the principle that "a private citizen claiming title
and right of possession of certain property may, to recover possession of said property, sue as
individuals, officers and agents of the Government, who are said to be illegally withholding the
same from him, though in doing so, said officers and agents claim that they are acting for the
Government." That was his basis for sustaining the jurisdiction of respondent Judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not Baer, acting in its official function is immune from suit.
RULING:
The invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state without its consent is
appropriate. The U.S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a
suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action
against a foreign government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the
lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule are so
elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in
support thereof.
The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. He cannot be prevented from performing
his official function which is to protect and maintain the security of the base. Continued logging
operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with
the security and operation of the Base.
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and
various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against
to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated
with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected
in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that
Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare
if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections
10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the
exercise of legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power
by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied
rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.
Discussions:
 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of
foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic
seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has
some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which
comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states
have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote
equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their
common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can
form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside
the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a
negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to
“share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity,
 with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally
accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically
part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations
is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the
General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.
With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within
their own internal systems and processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial
powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution
to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the
WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
Rulings:
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As
explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter
on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty.
By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in
exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all,
states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted
objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale
that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable
burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute
settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final
Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown
by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what
the Senate was concurring in.
Arthur Lim et.al., vs. Executive Secretary, GR #151445, April 11, 2002
Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation
Clause, Treaties
Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-
1” on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military
maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into
by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial
aircrafts hijacking that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and
the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin
Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality
of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of
Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of
future violation of the Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a
question of fact specifically interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no
question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus standi since it does not
involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.
ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.
HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to
the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court -
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts
Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the
Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine
of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming
respect for each other's act, this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant
petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities,"
the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide
scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole
encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel
must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular,
from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article
32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the
foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be
used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an
well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to offensive war on Philippine territory.
Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of
interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that
the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation
divorced from the general rule.

The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a
certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of
the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US
exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect
violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally
conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only
as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter
thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign
troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription
stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and
international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the
1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State
Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief
Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even
more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed
entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.

International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws

Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international
agreements.

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national
law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries,
rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to
"invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: “The Supreme
Court shall have the following powers: xxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.”

Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by

a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.”