Cases To Digest Batch 3

Stages of Commission; Specific Felonies; Robbery
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two years and
four months of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of prision
mayor for being an habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs
of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. At
that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The accused
had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the
trial judge and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which
has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the
case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing
through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense which,
due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its
execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively
performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable
connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon
its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following
its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of
the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery,
in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may
be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended
to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In the
instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused may reasonably
be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the accused on the day in
question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only
be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to enter by means of force said
store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store,
was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing
in the record to justify a concrete finding.1avvphil.ñet
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the
material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion
medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to
which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the
consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation , that is, in favor as well
as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act, must not and
can not furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. The relation
existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which said facts are
supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and
therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be
able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury.
This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to
exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is
to say, that the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense,
they would be meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the
commission of the offense, are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution,
and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense."
Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892 — that in
order to declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it is necessary
that their objective be known and established, or that said acts be of such nature that they
themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said
objective and finality to serve as ground for the designation of the offense: . . . .
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration does
not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and Morales,
59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the
Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the dwelling of
another against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to
commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation contained in the
information: "... the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board
and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store ... and that the accused did not
succeed in entering the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who
upon hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused ... ."
Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. (U.S. vs.
Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs. Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21
Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused
must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions,
— inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been
rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The
breaking of the wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance
inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to
dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to
dwelling, if committed with force, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted
trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating
circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the same
Code, the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183563

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant.
December 14, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2]dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-
appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7)
counts of rape against the private complainant AAA.[3]
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged[4] with eight (8) counts of rape in separate
informations, the accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the
uncle of [AAA], the offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], who was then
only eight (8) years old, without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.[5]
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who
is the uncle of [AAA], the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force and violence succeed in having
carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], without her consent and against her will.
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province of
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province
of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of [XXX], Province
of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, who
(18) years of age and the offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree.[12](Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28, 2000, he entered a plea of not
guilty.[13]
On March 13, 2001, the pre-trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated on
the identity of the accused-appellant in all the cases, the minority of the victim and the fact that the accused
appellant is the uncle of the victim.[14]
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by the accused and his counsel. The
cases were then heard on consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the charges against the accused-
appellant. AAA testified that she was born on November 1, 1987.[15] In one afternoon when she was only eight
years old, she stated that the accused-appellant raped her inside their house. She could not remember, though,
the exact month and date of the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and shirt and
went on top of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it
in her vagina and did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his organ penetrated her
vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.[16]
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July 1999 for five times on different
nights. The accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs
neighbor. He came to AAAs house, took off her panty and went on top of her. She could not see what he was
wearing as it was nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again how the accused-
appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on
top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she
felt pain. AAA said that she recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a moonlit night and
their window was only covered by cloth. He entered through the kitchen as the door therein was detached.[17]
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He
kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her
chest because he was heavy. She did not know if his penis penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-
appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the
rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he
proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.[18]
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence, consisting of:
(1) Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal Report,[19] which contained the results of the medical examination conducted
on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the
Social Case Study Report[20] pertaining to AAAs case, which was issued by the Municipal Social Welfare and
Development Office of the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:

- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so many
times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 oclock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE[21]
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the witness stand to deny the
informations filed against him and to refute the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first incident of
rape allegedly happened in 1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he
worked in Sagkahan, Tacloban City as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to 1996. He
stated that he was working in Tacloban City when the alleged rapes happened in
the municipality of XXX. When he would go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred
Antoni. He did not go to the house of AAA as the latters parents were his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel
with AAAs parents because he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that in July 1999,
he was also living in Tacloban City and worked there as a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked there from 1998
up to September 1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August 1999, he was still working at the
same restaurant in Tacloban City. While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with
work. He denied that he would have drinking sprees with AAAs stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.[22]
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother of AAA was his sister and they
were close to each other. He said that his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter then
resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his parents house was about two kilometers away from
the house of AAA.While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban City, he would visit his parents once
every month, mainly on Sundays.[23]
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered a Decision convicting the
accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of the

Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended by R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and
R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) the Court found accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF
RAPE charged under the informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty
of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos for each count of Rape and pay moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos and pay the cost.[24] (Emphases in the original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact that AAA was in tears when she
testified convinced the trial court of the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If there
were inconsistencies in AAAs testimony, the trial court deemed the same understandable considering that AAA
was pitted against a learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape incidents was not also an
indication that the charges were fabricated. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal
officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-appellants defense of alibi was likewise disregarded
by the trial court, declaring that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at any time of the
day after working hours while he was working in Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant
was positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her and she held no grudge against him. The
trial court imposed the penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within
the third civil degree. The trial court also appreciated against the accused-appellant the aggravating
circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25] of the RTC Decision, asserting that the
trial court failed to consider his minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct
examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was born on February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13
and 17 years old when the incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In a
Resolution[26] dated November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the accused-appellants motion, holding that the
latter failed to substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-
08.[27] The parties then filed their respective briefs.[28] On February 7, 2006, we resolved[29] to transfer the cases
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.[30] The cases were docketed in the appellate
court as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53
is AFFIRMED with modification awarding exemplary damages to [AAA] in the amount of
Twenty[-]Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape and clarification that the
separate award of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to
each count of rape. The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in accord with
Rep. Act No. 9346.[31]
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the
testimony of AAA were not sufficient to discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when
the incidents of rape occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a minor at the time. More significant was her
straightforward, categorical and candid testimony that she was raped eight times by the accused-appellant. The
Court of Appeals also agreed with the ruling of the RTC that AAAs charges of rape conformed with the physical
evidence and the accused-appellants uncorroborated defense of alibi could not stand against the positive
identification made by AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled that the relationship of the accused-
appellant to AAA was both alleged in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant. The appellate
court, however, differed in appreciating against the accused-appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAAs
minority. The lone testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an insufficient proof therefor. The
aggravating circumstance of nighttime was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was
purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the commission of the crimes of rape. In view of
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages
in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal[32] of the above decision and the same was given due
course by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[33] dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.[34] Thereafter, in a Manifestation
and Motion[35] filed on December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
prayed that it be excused from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-appellant submitted
a Supplemental Brief.[36]
The Issues
In the accused-appellants brief, the following issues were invoked:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF

DEATH.[37]
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give weight to the incredible
testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was first
supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-appellant also avers that AAA could not remember
the dates of the other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described in a uniform
manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above
inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances
of AAAs minority and her relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The
accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to deny the appeal, but with a
modification of the penalties and the amount of indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant guilty of one (1) count of
statutory rape and seven (7) counts of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first incident of rape was alleged to have
occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points out that the
prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as AAAs testimony thereon was too inconsistent and incredible
to be worthy of any belief. He explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first time when she
was eight years old. Nonetheless, during her testimony regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999,
she said that the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only seven years old. On her redirect
examination, AAA then stated that she was first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape by sexual intercourse as
follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of
which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented.[38]
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353,[39] or the Anti-Rape Law
of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997.[40] Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,[41] which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In People v. Macafe,[42] we explained the concept of statutory rape under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it departs from the
usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are
immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of
her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.[43] (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned provisions of law are essentially the
same. Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the amendment
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the
prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at the time of the
commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman.[44] Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not
grounds for acquittal.[45]
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs
testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our ruling in People v. Condes[46] that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of
witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions
deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of
observing the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty
and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth,
being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance
and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its
assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court of Appeals].[47]
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found no cogent
reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape
charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears
in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were still 8 years old?
[AAA]
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and date.
Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.
Q: How did he rape you?

A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.
Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?

A: Yes, sir in our house.
Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?

A: My younger brother and I.
Q: About your mother and step father where were they?

A: In the ricefield.
PROS. SABARRE:
May we make it of record that the witness is crying.
COURT:
Have it on record.
PROS. SABARRE:
Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?

A: In the afternoon.
xxxx
Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did he do to you next if any?
A: He went on top of me.
Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?

A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled down the zipper.
Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what did he do next if any?
A: He was pumping on me.
Q: Did he pull out his organ?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where did he place his organ?

A: In my vagina.
Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

A: Pain.[48]
The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and
Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. [W]hen the
testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there
has been carnal knowledge.[49]
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court
disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The testimony
of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July 1999?
A: Five times.
Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?

A: Night time.
Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?

A: Different nights.
Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?
A: My Kuya and other siblings.
Q: You have companions why were you raped?

A: Because they were sleeping.
Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you please narrate to the court?
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out my panty and went on
top of me.
Q: With whom was he drinking?

A: With my step father.
Q: Where did they drink?

A: In our neighbor.
Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused wearing at that time?
A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.
Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

A: No, sir.
Q: What did he do with his penis?

A: He made me hold it.
Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?

A: He left.
xxxx
ATTY. SABARRE:
Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how did he rape you?
A: (witness did not answer)
PROS. SABARRE:
Make it of record that the witness is crying again.
Q: Why are you crying?

A: I am angry and hurt.
PROS. SABARRE:
Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding considering that the witness is
psychologically incapable of further proceeding.
xxxx
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please narrate the whole incident
to this honorable court?
A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.
Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?
A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he pump what did you feel?

A: Pain.
COURT:
Why did you feel pain?
A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.
ATTY. SABARRE;
How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night time?
A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by cloth as cover.[50]
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of rape. She made no reference
whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July
1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999. AAA narrated
only one incident of rape in this manner:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month of August 1999?
A: Two times.
Q: Was it during day time or night time?

A: Nighttime.
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?

A: He kissed me.
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?

A: He took off his shirts.
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?

A: He went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?

A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?

A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his name answered Henry
Arpon).[51]
It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law requires to be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of moral certainty that
the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's presumption of innocence.[52] Thus,
including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a
uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAAs narration of the sexual abuses committed by
the accused-appellant contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e.,
that he placed his organ in her private part.[53] Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that a victim of a savage
crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid detail of a
frightening experience a verity born[e] out of human nature and experience.[54]
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of alibi deserves scant
consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit
approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs
criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed.[55] [S]ince alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot
prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused
perpetrated the crime.[56]
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be negotiated
by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be
present in [XXX] at any time of the day after working hours while working in
Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to him he spent
in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually
molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years
up to August 1999. She can not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first
sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her
uncle, the brother of her mother.[57]
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant that AAA may have been prompted to
falsely testify against him (accused-appellant) in view of the latters quarrel with AAAs parents when he refused
to work with them in the rice fields.[58] Aside from being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and
implausible. Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a minor disagreement, even if
true, does not amount to a sufficient justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public scrutiny
that a rape trial brings in its wake.[59]
As to the accused-appellants objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the trial courts
finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of rape were
committed. The testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987,[60] the voluntary stipulation of the
accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during pre-trial and his testimony
regarding his recollection of the age of the victim,[61] his own niece, all militate against accused-appellants
theory. In People v. Pruna,[62] the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of
the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified
true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother
or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on
matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant
to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the

testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the
complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by
the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party.
The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken
against him. (Emphases ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand (when she
was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.[63]
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation need no longer be
belabored upon. [I]n rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-father, uncle, or the common-
law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.[64]
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, punishes the crime of rape with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law-spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship qualify the three (3) counts of rape committed
by the accused-appellant. As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the concurrence of the
victims minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[65] In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was less than eighteen (18) years of age when
the incidents of rape occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third
civil degree. The said circumstances were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial conference
of the case and again admitted by him during his testimony.[66]
In People v. Pepito,[67] the Court explained that [t]he purpose of entering into a stipulation or admission
of facts is to expedite trial and to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving facts which
will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions
during the pre-trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the admissions made by
appellant therein must be given weight. Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty is warranted. For the second and third
counts of rape, the imposable penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, we still take
cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule that [i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the
entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be
found in the appealed judgment.[68]
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict with the
law,[69] viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law
until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,[70] we clarified that, in the past, the Court deemed sufficient the testimonial
evidence regarding the minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions concur, namely: (1)
the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar
documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or
a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection
on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused's and/or his
relatives' testimonies are untrue.[71]
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on February 23, 1982 and that he was only
13 years old when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.[72] Other than his testimony, no other
evidence was presented to prove the date of his birth. However, the records of this case show neither any
objection to the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary evidence to dispute the
same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals should have appreciated the accused-appellants minority in
ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20,
2006, the said law is still applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this
Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if
they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.
People v. Sarcia[73] further stressed that [w]ith more reason, the Act should apply to [a] case wherein the
conviction by the lower court is still under review.
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in
providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section
20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise
be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,[74]i.e., from under nine years of age and above
nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) - to fifteen years old or under and above
fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability.[75]
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly
committed in 1995, the testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was only 13 years old
at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of
rape, i.e., whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed, any doubt therein should be
resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter.[76] The Court, thus, exempts the accused-
appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344. The accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was already
17 years old. We likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment. In Madali
v. People,[77] the Court had the occasion to reiterate that [d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. In this case, the
fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA,
which we had already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did not tell anybody about the
sexual assault she suffered at the hands of the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her
mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts
only proved that he knew full well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the consequences
thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity
with our ruling in Sarcia, when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of
determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of
death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-appellant the circumstance of his minority, the
latter would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of rape under Section
38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged,
the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court
shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of
his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court Rule on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case given that the accused-
appellant is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to the application
of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that
the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with
this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.(Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the
instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution,
in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections], in coordination with the [Department
of Social Welfare and Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second and third incidents of rape shall
not be affected by the above disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and the
pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.[78] that [c]ivil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to
have been committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim
as civil indemnity for each count. We also explained in Sarcia that [t]he litmus test x x x in the determination of
the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition
of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[79] The
trial courts award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore increased to P75,000.00
for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified without need of proof other than the fact of rape because
it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she underwent].[80] We also increase
the trial courts award of P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein established in
keeping with the recent case law.[81]
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals award of exemplary damages. As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,[82] [t]he
award of exemplary damages is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of the
aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship surrounding the commission of the offense, both of
which were alleged in the information and proved during the trial. The appellate courts award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is raised to P30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the current
jurisprudence on the matter.[83]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant Henry Arpon y Juntilla is
hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA for each of the three (3)
counts of rape P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from the date of
finality of this Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with
Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00
as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The information alleges:
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana
together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and
Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang
market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the
restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt.
Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant,
approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun
that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant
moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately
grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told
the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the
appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt.
Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two
were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled
out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and
after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead,
he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter
that they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana
was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed
Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp.
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a
separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and
Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who
happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near
the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the
dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused
to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the
V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds
inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal
Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana
and made the following findings, which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-
89, rec.), and which reads as follows:
Postmortem findings.
General:
Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity
over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe tips are
pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen, measuring 21 cm.
long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches applied. There are
surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the
anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches
applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each, respectively.
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline,
128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and slightly upwards,
passing superficially between muscles and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline,
121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards, downwards and to
the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline,
96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards and to the
left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric vessels, grazing
the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of the lower lobe of the
right lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by
0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index finger,
measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of
the stomach.
There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic

hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the stomach,
gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts:
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a
restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come
from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant,
the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later
learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting
for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil
and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt.
Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation so the two
moved over to the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to the accused who, however,
refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused
not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not
reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his
identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID
card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist
League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted
that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to
put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad
and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the
accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist
and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed from his
head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried
the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times and
then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to
surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang,
Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he
was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of
Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal building. Arriving there, one
Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just
across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971).
After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang policeman to the
municipal, building where he was detained for two days before he was picked up by the Philippine
Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91,
t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17;
People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80
Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover,
to prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30
SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People
vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil.
7 7 2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the
victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the
satisfaction of the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who
committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he
refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was his
and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot
perceive how this refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent
of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that
the accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him.
Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in
an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to
comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal
an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed when the incident happened, he
being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason to be
resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea that his
gun be returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms.
Accordingly, We are constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was the accused, not the
deceased, who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting
in his death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third blow.
This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the
scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID thus —
Court
Q Where is that scar?
(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony in his
medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It
also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were facing
each other. If that was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the accused,
holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head and and on
his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who first
hit him twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is
definitely belied not only by the location of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa
aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both
right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would
perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE,
therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural course of
human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the
victim parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his
head on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal
building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims
that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his (Masana's)
gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was detained in
the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC
Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or
other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the
lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed self-defense during the
preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec.
10, 1971). If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the
Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked
him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police
Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused
made before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an
exculpatory statement made so long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim
does not deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the
straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard
serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace
officers, in the absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth,
must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr.
Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the incident
between the appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the
knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.
II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with assault
upon an agent of authority?
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established by
the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a
chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal
wounds on the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack with a
deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the latter to
flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's
brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil.
475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following testimony
of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
COURT
Q What is the truth?
A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo
Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on
the edge of a table; that is why he sustained an injury and blood
oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis
supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
ATTY. MUÑOZ
Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a
table and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally

bumped his head on the table.
Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the

extent that he bumped his head on the table?
A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana
already stabbed?
A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed.
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the
prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face to
face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the victim was
able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off the
attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him
which necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the
moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery
(People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show that the accused
made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime, making it at the
same time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil.
546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the accused
employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to himself. On the
contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking distance of his three companions, two
of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation between the accused and the
victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the moment
when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed
the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his
victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence
does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be
presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil.
670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or
treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make [Art. 14, par.
16, Revised Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in
civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the
complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason
that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of
the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that
appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his
official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to
justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such
knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence
of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would
only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the
victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating,
being "in contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal
Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank,
..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to
offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority
(People vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et
al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly
alleged in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority does not render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from
which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority.
Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of
Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school bonding of Lian,
duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the performance of her official
duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, embraced
and kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester
Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of
having committed it inside the school building and during school classes.
Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:
Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority
or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code).
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors,
and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in applying
the provisions of article 148." This special classification is obviously intended to give
teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official
duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there
is no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of
her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by
specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not
expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law
and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non- compliance on his part
(Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil
or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or remedial
(Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the
information for Direct Assault reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of
Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and
Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with a piece of wood, except Paulo Coraide
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said
pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio Languyin of said
municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said councilman was engaged
in the actual performance of his duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the

information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that
such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in this
case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari but
the refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following considerations:
The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t is
patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is want of
factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been based.'
It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information was
deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct assault
that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held by the
person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in
authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11,
Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it
is sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of
authority, held by the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then
engaged in the performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to
allege further that the accused also knew that such position was that of a person in
authority, since 'this is a matter of law' thus:
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that

the accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and
engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that she
was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of law.
It matters not that such knowledge on `his part is not expressly
alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter
of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-
compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to
all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs.
Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs.
Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual findings
as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the fiscal's proper course is not
the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against respondents-
accused, as herein indicated.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a valid

information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated (emphasis
supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the
instant case; because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the latter
and does not allege facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the
person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that
the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member
of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social
position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or
station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy
in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George
Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order
to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and
sometimes of command or by which to determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army
staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing,
relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade, including its grade,
status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p.
100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89,
105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil
Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975),
the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez,
107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil.
298), the murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs.
Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a
justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by his
subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of an
army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally
considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be
respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender and
the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The
Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-
smuggling unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent
of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either
circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a
person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently,
either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged
with and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said
Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder for
the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army
Gen. Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with homicide
for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-
35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City
Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang
was present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from
behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang.
And appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims
that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not allegedly in the
restaurant during the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs.
Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public
authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public
authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling
since it is not justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of
Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of
the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid
three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The
lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of
Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 1452. The
lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public authority, which may however
include, but not limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is
a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person
in authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People,
90 Phil 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well
as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya,
CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for he
is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to
prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the
aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors
although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads
and supervises the entire police force in the municipality as well as exercises his authority over the
entire territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than and includes the school premises or
the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or
barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should therefore
be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty prescribed for
homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE

AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD
OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT
FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER
RESPECTS.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING,"
and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged
with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple
murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of the court a quo the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero
guilty as principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as
accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio,
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on the
minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances to mitigate
the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3)
LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to
6 Months ofarresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan
Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and
1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years
and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional
penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury
suffered by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all
surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in
the sum of P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of
P12,000.00; and the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and
to pay three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-
fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and
once thereat, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with extreme
cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and
strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately
thereafter, the same accused while already on the road, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting upon him multiple mortal wounds
which caused his death.2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its decision, the trial
court made the following findings and a summary of the evidence for the prosecution thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de
Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San
Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old
child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the
breast of his mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo
Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital but he died on the way. . . .
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio
and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And
immediately thereafter, with their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked
Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on
November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo
(sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came
from the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo.
Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or
reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun
with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession
of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico
Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so
she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning
palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused,
Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of
Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house
to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw
the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going
towards her. She told them: "Why can't you be patient and forget?" But she was asked not to
interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle
of the three accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the three
accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they can't be
patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you."
Then they struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father
Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo
Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the testimony of

Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she was in the house
of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and
Marcial Sagun, she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at
their house and called to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to their
house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio
going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there,
she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your
children." Then she saw the three accused coming down from the house, going towards the
road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several times until he fell.
When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all
left.3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the
crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was
with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio
Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p.
7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on their way
home. (p. 8, Ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed,
however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial
Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed
Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he
was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also
unsheathed his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita
de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter
ignored them, as his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio
Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico
tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and then run
(sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal,
together with his small children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in
the kitchen downstairs also eating his meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing
June 8, 1971-Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might
meet something bad that night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until the
door. Then he ran away. His father asked him what happened, but he did not answer
anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins,
Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house, he saw the house of Marcial
Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house
calling him to get down. When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial
Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial
Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the
back of his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19,
tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the
buri tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming from
the south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he did so, he noticed someone
approaching him coming from the yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not
recognize the man and thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however,
that the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard.
He asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered
him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process of evading
the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a
second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it away, causing
Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero
unsheathed Ms bolo. When the latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero
boloed him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to the child. A
doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures were then taken.5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below established that
––
. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side of the forehead.
There is fracture of the underlying skull.
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left eyebrow to the right
eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying skull.
(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the month towards the
lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a severance from the level
of the middle finger.
(8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm,
left.
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.
xxx xxx xxx
One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab wound around 3
cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the left border of the
sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal
bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right clavicular region.
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the second wound.
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying skull at the
right frontal portion of the head.
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the head.
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony
portion, left.
(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of the hand right.
There was fracture of some of the underlying bones.6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru,
about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was another
about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2
inch, temporal right." He further testified that the child was admitted to the hospital on November 8,
1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later.7
During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on May
17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal8
and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day.9
In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for accused-
appellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death
certificate attached thereto as Annex "A".10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability of
appellant Conrado Doctolero.
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the
commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated in the
commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place
where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any
evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-
conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source and must
be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion.11
This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical
testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the
prosecution Witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more
credence.12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against appellants. The only
imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had against appellants occurred years ago
and she was, at the time she testified, on good terms with appellants as shown by the following
testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:
Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic)
your relationship with her was harmonious and rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail
to see you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun (wife of Marcial
Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the
persons who went up her house that night of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a
grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that previous incident at the crossing
yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio
Doctolero in the commission of the crime."14
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the
witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit.15
And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution
was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit.16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain inconsistencies that
allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies,
however, are not so substantial as to destroy their credibility. As correctly explained by the People,
the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness
pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each
observer in relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of
witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute
evidence of good faith. Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same
manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details.17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer
to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.18 And where the
prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as the authors of the crime and
the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil material points, the contradictions become
insignificant.19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the
investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is
accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that
they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.
Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was motivated by an improper motive other
than that of accomplishing his mission.20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police department of San
Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros
were involved. He further testified that when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime
and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came with
bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun.21
In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his investigation and the weight to
be accorded to his findings was properly addressed to the trial court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as accomplices in
the slaying of the women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree with its findings and the
ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling
challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women
thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn.
Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up
the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and
Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally
killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the
child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number,
and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and
D-1), it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado
(assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either the screams of pain of
their brother's victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when
their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . . Under these
circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew
what was going on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did
nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to
death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio,
merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased
women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two
appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the
encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes
against two defenseless women and a child.22
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the
others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material
and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse,
thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one
can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided
he was aware that it was an illicit act.24
This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where the accomplices
therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for the
resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were liable but only with regard to the extent of
their participation. There being ample evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on
the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is
that of being mere accomplices,26
no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan
Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants
therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days
of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an
accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated only his
criminal liability but not his civil liability.27
Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same
should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the
judgment rendered by the trial court having long since become final and executory with respect to
him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years
of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each for the
death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty
(20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo.
Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the
sum of P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

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Stages of Commission; Specific Felonies; Robbery

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183563

HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Promulgated:

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51

Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47

The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:

P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:

Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE[21]

The Judgment of the RTC

WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and 266-B of the

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF

The Ruling of the Court

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

1. By using force or intimidation;

[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]

Q: How did he rape you?

Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?

Q: Who were the persons present then at that time?

Q: About your mother and step father where were they?

Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or evening?

Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?

Q: Did he pull out his organ?

Q: And where did he place his organ?

Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?

Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?

Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?

Q: You have companions why were you raped?

Q: With whom was he drinking?

Q: Where did they drink?

Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

Q: What did he do with his penis?

Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?

Make it of record that the witness is crying again.

Q: Why are you crying?

Q: When he pump what did you feel?

Why did you feel pain?

A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel pain.

Q: Was it during day time or night time?

Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?

Q: After kissing you what did he do next?

Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?

Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?

Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,