CONTE VS COA

FACTS
Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees
of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government service.
They availed of compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660.
In addition, petitioners also claimed benefits granted under SSS Resolution No.
56, series of 1971 that provides financial incentive and inducement to SSS
employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement benefits under RA 660 as
amended, rather than the retirement benefits under RA 1616 as amended, by
giving them “financial assistance” equivalent in amount to the difference
between what a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less what he was
entitled to under RA 660. Thereafter, COA issued a ruling disallowing in audit
“all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56” for the
reason that it results in the increase of benefits beyond what is allowed
under existing retirement laws.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not public respondent abused its discretion when it disallowed in
audit petitioners’ claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56.

2. Whether or not SSS Resolution No. 56 is valid.

HELD
1. No. The Commission bears stress that the financial assistance contemplated
under SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS employees who opt to retire
under R.A. No. 660. It is clear that petitioners applied for benefits under RA
660 only because of the incentives offered by Res. 56, and that absent such
incentives, they would have without fail availed of RA 1616 instead. The
petition is dismissed for lack of merit, there having been no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Commission.

2. No. The said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement

benefit that has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws particularly
R.A. No. 660. It is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to
maintain and implement such retirement plan and in the guise of rule-making,
legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory. Hence, SSS
Resolution No. 56 is hereby illegal, void and no effect.
PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954 (Constitutional Law – Publication of Bank Circulars and Regulations)

FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and
U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following
the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on
the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official
Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular
issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect.

HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes
a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
PERALTA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 212 SCRA 425, G.R. No. 95832, August
10, 1992

Facts:

Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September 1989 in the

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His appointment was classified
as "Reinstatement/Permanent". 120889 petitioner received his initial
salary, covering the period from September to October 1989. Since he had
no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his salary the amount
corresponding to his absences during the covered period, inclusive of
Saturdays and Sundays.

Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief, General

Administrative Service) inquiring as to the law on salary deductions, if
the employee has no leave credits. Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's
query in a memorandumciting Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of Information
on the Philippine Civil Service which states that "when an employee is
on leave without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding
a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall
also be without pay.

Petitioner sent a letter addressed to CSC Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas

raising the question: 'Is an employee who was on leave of absence without
pay on a day before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday,
Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of absence without pay on such
Saturday, Sunday or Holiday? Petitioner: he cannot be deprived of his pay
or salary corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays
(in the factual situation posed), and that the withholding (or deduction)
of the same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process
of law.

Respondent Commission promulgated Resolution No. 90- 497, ruling that the
action of the DTI in deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part
thereof corresponding to six (6) days is in order.

Issue: Whether or not the CSC resolution is valid.

Held: No. The court ruled that the construction by the respondent
Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative intent.
R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled
to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of absence with full pay and fifteen
(15) days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays in both cases. Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right
and the law does not provide for a distinction between those who have
accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits
in order to enjoy such right. The fact remains that government employees,
whether or not they have accumulated leave credits, are not required by
law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays and thus they can not be
declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot be or are not
considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be
deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just
because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or
after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.

CIR vs. CA 261 SCRA 262, G.R. No. 119761, August 29, 1996

Facts:

RA 7654 was enacted by Congress on June 10, 1993 and took effect July 3,
1993. It amended partly Sec. 142 (c) of the NIRC1. Fortune Tobacco
manufactured the following cigaretter brands: Hope, More and Champion.
Prior to RA 7654, these 3 brands were considered local brands subjected
to an ad valorem tax of 20 to 45%. Applying the amendment and nothing else,
the 3 brands should fall under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC and be taxed at 20
to 45%. However, on July 1, 1993, petitioner Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular37-93 which reclassified the
3 brands as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. The reclassification was before RA 7654
took effect. In effect, the memo circular subjected the 3 brands to the
provisions of Sec 142 (c) (1) NIRC imposing upon these brands a rate of
55% instead of just 20 to 45% under Sec 142 (c) (2) NIRC. There was no
notice and hearing. CIR argued that the memo circular was merely an
interpretative ruling of the BIR which did not require notice and hearing.
Issue: Whether or not RMC 37-93 was valid and enforceable.

Held:

No; lack of notice and hearing violated due process required for
promulgated rules. Moreover, it infringed on uniformity of taxation /
equal protection since other local cigarettes bearing foreign brands had
not been included within the scope of the memo circular. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, the memo was not a mere interpretative rule but
a legislative rule in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.
Promulgated legislative rules must be published. On the other hand,
interpretative rules only provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs. SOCIAL SECURITY

COMMISSION
Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22
requiring all Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's
remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other
media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias
Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission
in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular
No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in
the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly
premium contributions. Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular
for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of
publication in the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social
Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation
that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official
Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the
statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law
should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in

Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security
Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule
or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement
is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency
promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and
compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided therein.
The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been
said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create
new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. Therefore,
Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System
of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in
determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the
social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not
require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its
effectivity. The Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Azucena Reyes

In 1993, Maria Tancino died leaving behind an estate worth P32 million.
In 1997, a tax audit was conducted on the estate. Meanwhile, the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 was passed. Eventually in 1998, the
estate was issued a final assessment notice (FAN) demanding the estate to
pay P14.9 million in taxes inclusive of surcharge and interest; the estate’s
liability was based on Section 229 of the [old] Tax Code. Azucena Reyes,
one of the heirs, protested the FAN. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR) nevertheless issued a warrant of distraint and/or levy. Reyes again
protested the warrant but in March 1999, she offered a compromise and
was willing to pay P1 million in taxes. Her offer was denied. She continued
to work on another compromise but was eventually denied. The case
reached the Court of Tax Appeals where Reyes was also denied. In the
Court of Appeals, Reyes received a favorable judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the formal assessment notice is valid.

HELD: No. The NIRC of 1997 was already in effect when the FAN was
issued. Under Section 228 of the NIRC, taxpayers shall be informed in
writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made: otherwise,
the assessment shall be void. In the case at bar, the FAN merely stated the
amount of liability to be shouldered by the estate and the law upon which
such liability is based. However, the estate was not informed in writing of
the facts on which the assessment of estate taxes had been made. The
estate was merely informed of the findings of the CIR. Section 228 of the
NIRC being remedial in nature can be applied retroactively even though the
tax investigation was conducted prior to the law’s passage. Consequently,
the invalid FAN cannot be a basis of a compromise, any proceeding
emanating from the invalid FAN is void including the issuance of the
warrant of distraint and/or levy.

Republic vs Extelcom, [373 SCRA 316;

GR 147096, January 15, 2002]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

(Administrative Law, quasi-legislative power, proper procedure, filing and publication)

Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the provisional authority to
operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) on its own initiative applying Rule 15,
Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and Procedures.

Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed
with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the phrase “on its own initiative” were deleted
and since the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center.
Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law in force and effect in
granting provisional authority.

Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with
the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative
Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effect.

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF

CUSTOMS and CTA September 30, 1969CASTRO, J.

Facts:

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so
produced being placed in containers known as jute bags. In 1957, It made two importations of jute bags,
free from customs duties and special import tax upon the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special
import tax bond, conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year from the date of
importation.

However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 were exported and only 25,000 were
exported out of the 75,200 jute bags imported on the second shipment. In other words, of the total
number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported within one year after their importation. The
remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three years
from their importation.

Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special
Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure to export the
remaining jute bags within the period of one year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner.

Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within
one year from their importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the amount of p28,629.42 representing
the customs duties and special import tax due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later
on demanded the refund of the amount it had paid.

Issues:
a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with discretion to extend the period of one year
provided for in section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.

b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive
Department or other Administrative Agencies be given consideration? In the case at bar, the Bureau of
Customs.

Held:

a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs
Code, while fixing at one year the period within which the containers therein mentioned must be exported,
are silent as to whether the said period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of Customs
Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply
the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the one-year period
mentioned in the law as non-extendible.

b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and
Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code)have not been the subject of previous judicial interpretation,
then the application of the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar
the Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate confusion and provide a guide
as to how it shall apply the law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the
one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible., " would, initially, be in order.

Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable
that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state.

The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or uncertain

statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged with its administration or
enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded
appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or
interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute,
or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency.
 Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing
the provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given
controlling weight.

In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the
courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as factors leading the
courts to give the principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves.
These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with administration, their
competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to advise it
as to the practical working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency
with unique opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.

Isidro Cariño vs The Commission on Human Rights

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did
not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As
a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The
issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary
Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the
suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on
Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for
certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the
case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary
Cariño.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and
determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation
involving civil and political rights.

HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial
power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving
civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the
merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from
proceeding with the trial.
Lupangco vs CA Case Digest
Lupangco vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness,"
to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed
with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from
attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date
of the examination?

Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose
which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good
aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen
that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school,
college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor,
official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions.

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited
acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by
the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to
have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the
examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations
must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to
be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees'
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on
the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They
cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their
ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors