Republic of the Philippines success fee of US$100,000.

the Philippines success fee of US$100,000.00 should the said law office be able to expedite his release from
SUPREME COURT detention as well as his departure from the Philippines.6 Finding Strong to be believable and
Manila trustworthy, Atty. Manuel agreed to handle his case.7

FIRST DIVISION During the course of their meeting, Strong casually mentioned that he has a property in Boracay
and that he suspected his neighbors as the persons who caused his arrest. According to Strong,
his live-in partner Rodica filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo,
A.C. No. 9259 August 23, 2012
Aklan, for recovery of possession and damages8(against Hillview Marketing
Corporation9 (Hillview), Stephanie Dornau (Dornau) as President of Hillview, the Alargo Park
JASPER JUNNO F. RODICA, Complainant, Neighborhood Association, Inc. and spouses Robert and Judy Gregoire) in connection with the
vs. 353-square meter property they bought in Boracay. He disclosed that he and Rodica had been
ATTY. MANUEL "LOLONG" M. LAZARO, ATTY. EDWIN M. ESPEJO, ATTY. ABEL M. trying to sell the Boracay property to rid themselves of the problems but could not find buyers
ALMARIO, ATTY. MICHELLE B. LAZARO, ATTY. JOSEPH C. TAN, and JOHN because of the said case. They even offered the property to Apostol but the latter was hesitant
DOES, Respondents. because of the said pending case. Atty. Manuel averred that towards the end of the interview
with Strong, Rodica arrived. Strong described Rodica as his "handyman" who will act as his
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* liaison in the case.

PERLAS-BERNABE,**
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons."1
This is a Complaint for disbarment filed by Jasper Junno F. Rodica (Rodica) against Atty. Manuel
2
"Lolong" M. Lazaro (Atty. Manuel), Atty. Edwin M. Espejo (Atty. Espejo), Atty. Abel M. Almario,
(Atty. Almario), Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro (Atty. Michelle), and Atty. Joseph C. Tan (Atty. Tan) for
gross and serious misconduct, deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct, and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Factual Antecedents
On May 5, 2011, William Strong (Strong), an American, was arrested and detained by the
operatives of the Bureau of Immigration. Strong sought the assistance of Philip3 G. Apostol
(Apostol), a friend and neighbor, to secure the services of a lawyer. Apostol referred him to
Atty. Manuel, who is a partner at the M.M. Lazaro and Associates Law Office (Lazaro Law
Office).
Atty. Manuel initially declined because his law office only handles cases of its retained clients
and those known to him or any of the associate lawyers.4 However, he was eventually prevailed
upon by Apostol who would consider it as a special favor if Atty. Manuel would handle Strong’s
case. Hence, Atty. Manuel, together with Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo, senior and junior
associates, respectively, at the Lazaro Law Office, agreed to meet Strong at the Taguig
Detention Center of the Bureau of Immigration.5
Upon inquiry with the Bureau of Immigration, it was discovered that Strong’s arrest was made
pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; and that Strong is wanted in Brazil for Conspiracy to
Commit Fraud, Setting Up a Gang and Other Related Crimes. Specifically, Strong is being
indicted for his alleged involvement in "an international gang involved in shares fraud which led
to the creation of hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal securities."10 Strong denied any
participation in the alleged crime. Strong then pleaded with Atty. Manuel to expedite his
deportation to any country except Brazil and reiterated his willingness to pay the success fee of
US$100,000.00.
In her Complaint, Rodica alleged that in one of her meetings with the lawyers of the Lazaro Law
Office, she hinted that Atty. Tan, a senior partner at the Marcos Ochoa Serapio Tan and
Associates (MOST Law) and who is also the lawyer of Hillview and Dornau, was instrumental in
the immigration case of Strong. According to Rodica, Atty. Manuel called up Atty. Tan.
Thereafter, Atty. Manuel allegedly informed Rodica that Atty. Tan admitted having initiated the
immigration case resulting in the detention of Strong; that Atty. Tan threatened to do something
bad against Rodica and her family; and that Atty. Tan demanded for Rodica to withdraw the
RTC case as part of a settlement package.
On May 25, 2011, the Bureau of Immigration, rendered its Judgment11 granting the motion of
Strong to voluntarily leave the country. On May 31, 2011, Strong left the Philippines.
Subsequently, or on June 6, 2011, Rodica filed with the RTC a motion effectively withdrawing
her complaint.
Rodica alleged that after the deportation of Strong and the withdrawal of the RTC case, she
heard nothing from the Lazaro Law Office. She also claimed that contrary to her expectations,
there was no "simultaneous over-all settlement of her grievances x x x [with] the defendants [in
the RTC] case.12 Thinking that she was deceived, Rodica filed the instant administrative case. In
sum, she claimed that:
21. RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS (MANUEL, MICHELLE, EDWIN and ABEL) of M.M. LAZARO &
ASSOCIATES, furthermore, committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT & DECEIT to complainant and the

1
courts when (among other things):
During the meeting, Atty. Manuel explained to Strong the terms of the Lazaro Law Office’s

Page
engagement as well as the fees. Strong assured him of his capacity to pay and offered to pay a
 (a.) they mis-represented to complainant that the withdrawal of her case at the
Regional Trial Court at Kalibo (Branch VI-Civil Case No. 8987) was only the first step
in an over-all settlement package of all her differences with her legal adversaries (i.e.
Hillview Marketing Corporation and the latter’s officials / Stephanie Dornau / Atty.
Joseph Tan etc.), which respondent Manuel M. Lazaro had allegedly already taken
care of ;
(b.) they extorted from her more than ₱ 7 MILLION for alleged professional / legal
fees and PENALTIES involved in William Strong’s immigration case, when what
actually happened was -
(c.) as complainant came to know later, almost all of said amount was allegedly used
as "pay-off" to immigration, police and Malaca[ñ]ang officials as well as Atty. Joseph
Tan, and as ‘graft money’/ ‘kotong’ / ‘lagay’ / "tong-pats", for the expeditious approval
of Mr. William Strong’s voluntary deportation plea with the Bureau of Immigration ;
(d.) they even shamelessly denied the status of the complainant as their client, just so
that they can evade their responsibility to her ;
(e.) they even submitted concocted stories (re Mr. Apostol’s purchase bid for the
Boracay villa of complainant; Atty. Espejo’s attempt to cover-up for Lolong Lazaro and
accept sole responsibility for signing the questioned manifestation and withdrawal
documents last May 24, 2011, and many others) with the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo (Branch VI) just so that they can hide the truth, hide their crimes and go scot
free ;
22. RESPONDENT Atty. JOSEPH C. TAN on the other hand performed as a willing partner of
ATTY. MANUEL M. LAZARO by acting as ‘conduit’ to his Malacañang patron ("JOHN DOE") in
causing the arrest of William Strong last May 5, 2011, and in packaging with Lolong Lazaro of
the ‘magic formula’ regarding William Strong’s voluntary deportation bid and the conditions
attached thereto as sufficiently explained ;
xxxx
23. RESPONDENTS also violated THEIR OATH AS x x x ATTORNEYS, especially with the phrases
". . . I will obey the laws . . . I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court ; . .
. I will delay no man for money or malice . . . with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients . . . " ;13
Otherwise stated, Rodica claimed that she is a client of the Lazaro Law Office and that she was
deceived into causing the withdrawal of the RTC case. Further, she claimed that the Lazaro Law
Office collected exorbitant fees from her.
In their Comment, Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo admitted being present in the May 13, 2011
meeting with Rodica. They denied, however, that Atty. Manuel talked with Atty. Tan during the
said meeting, or conveyed the information that Atty. Tan and the group of Dornau were the
ones behind Strong’s arrest and detention.
Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo disputed Rodica’s assertion that the withdrawal of the RTC case
was a condition sine qua non to Strong’s departure from the country. They pointed out that the
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed only on June 3,
2011,15 or nine days after the May 25, 2011 Judgment of the Bureau of Immigration was issued,
and three days after Strong left the country on May 31, 2011. They insisted that Rodica
withdrew the RTC case because it was one of the conditions set by Apostol before buying the
Boracay property.
As to the preparation of Rodica’s Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration relative to the
RTC case, Atty. Espejo claimed that the former begged him to prepare the said motion. Since
the two already became close friends, Atty. Espejo accommodated Rodica’s request. He
admitted to acceding to Rodica’s requests to put the name of the Lazaro Law Office, the names
of its partners, as well as his name, in the motion and into signing the same, without the prior
knowledge and consent of the other senior lawyers of the firm. Atty. Espejo claimed that he did
all of these out of his good intention to help and assist Rodica in making the Boracay property
more saleable by freeing it from any pending claims.
In his Comment,16 Atty. Manuel contended that none of the lawyers of the Lazaro Law Office
communicated with Atty. Tan relative to the deportation proceedings or the RTC case. He
claimed that it was highly improbable for the Lazaro Law Office to impress upon Rodica that it
will coordinate with Atty. Tan for the withdrawal of the RTC case to expedite the deportation
proceedings as the RTC case was already dismissed as early as March 29, 2011 for failure to
state a cause of action. Atty. Manuel averred that the two cases are incongruous with each
other and one cannot be used to compromise the other.
Atty. Joseph Tan’s Arguments
For his part, Atty. Tan asserted that the allegations against him are "double hearsay" because
the same were based on information allegedly relayed to Rodica by Atty. Manuel, who, in turn,
allegedly heard it from Atty. Tan.17 He denied any participation in the withdrawal of the RTC
case and the arrest and deportation of Strong.
Atty. Tan stressed that Strong was deported on May 31, 2011. Three days thereafter, or on
June 3, 2011, Rodica, with the assistance of her counsel of record, Atty. Joan I. Tabanar-
Ibutnande (Atty. Ibutnande), filed the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Reconsideration. He averred that if it is indeed true, as Rodica alleged, that the filing of the said
motion was a pre-condition to Strong’s voluntary deportation, then the filing of the same should
have preceded Strong’s deportation. However, it was the reverse in this case.
Atty. Tan also pointed out that it would be inconceivable for him to participate in Strong’s arrest
as he had already obtained a favorable ruling "on the merits" for his clients in the RTC case
even before Strong was arrested and incarcerated. Besides, Strong is not a party and had
nothing to do with the RTC case. Atty. Tan likewise denied having any dealings with the rest of
the respondents insofar as the arrest and voluntary deportation of Strong are concerned.
Neither did he receive any phone call or message from his co-respondents nor did he
communicate with them in any manner regarding Strong’s case.
Issue
2
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the allegations in Rodica’s Complaint merit the
disbarment or suspension of respondents.
Page
Our Ruling
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr.,18 this Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in suspension
or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence.
Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court declared thus:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence,
the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number. (Citations omitted.)
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer continues
and the complaint against him must be dismissed.19
In the present case, the totality of evidence presented by Rodica failed to overcome the said
presumption of innocence.
Rodica’s claim of "settlement package"
is devoid of merit.
Rodica’s assertions that Atty. Tan orchestrated Strong’s arrest and that Atty. Manuel proposed
the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the deportation of Strong, are mere allegations
without proof and belied by the records of the case. "The basic rule is that mere allegation is not
evidence, and is not equivalent to proof."20 Aside from her bare assertions, Rodica failed to
present even an iota of evidence to prove her allegations. In fact, the records belie her claims.
The documents issued by the Bureau of Immigration showed that Strong was the subject of the
Interpol Red Notice for being a fugitive from justice wanted for crimes allegedly committed in
Brazil.21 His warrant of arrest was issued sometime in February 2008. Significantly, even before
Strong was arrested and eventually deported, Atty. Tan had already obtained a favorable
judgment for his clients.
We also agree that it is highly inconceivable for Atty. Tan and the Lazaro Law Office to concoct
the scheme of "pressuring" Rodica to withdraw the RTC case for the purpose of expediting the
deportation proceedings of Strong. The following facts are undisputed: (1) Rodica’s counsel of
record in the RTC is Atty. Ibutnande; (2) the RTC case was already dismissed in the Order 22 of
March 29, 2011 for failure to state a cause of action; (3) on April 18, 2011, Rodica through her
counsel of record filed a Motion for Reconsideration; (4) on May 5, 2011, Strong was arrested
and detained pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice; (5) Strong hired the Lazaro Law Office to
handle his deportation case; (6) on May 19, 2011 Strong filed a Manifestation with Omnibus
Motion to voluntarily leave the country; (7) the Bureau of Immigration rendered a
Judgment23 dated May 25, 2011 granting Strong’s motion to voluntarily leave the country; (8)
Strong left the country on May 31, 2011; (9) Rodica’s Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the
Motion for Reconsideration was filed on June 6, 2011; and, (8) acting on the said Manifestation
with Motion, the RTC on June 14, 2011 issued an Order24 granting the same.
Given the chronology of events, there appears no relation between the deportation case and the
withdrawal of the RTC case. Thus, it would be specious if not far-fetched to conclude that the
withdrawal of the RTC case was a pre-condition to Strong’s deportation.
As regards the alleged participation of Atty. Manuel in the "settlement package" theory of
Rodica, suffice it to say that Atty. Manuel has in his favor "the presumption that, as an officer of
the court, he regularly performs the duties imposed upon him by his oath as a lawyer and by
the Code of Professional Responsibility."25 Hence, absent any competent evidence to the
contrary, Atty. Manuel, as Strong’s counsel, is presumed to have worked out the release and
subsequent deportation of his client in accordance with the proper procedures.
Preponderance of evidence shows that
Rodica caused the withdrawal of the
RTC case to facilitate the sale of the
Boracay property to Apostol.
We cannot lend credence to Rodica’s allegation that she was deceived by Atty. Manuel, Atty.
Espejo, Atty. Almario and Atty. Michelle, another senior associate at the Lazaro Law Office, into
believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was part of a settlement package to settle her
differences with her legal adversaries. We accord more credence to the explanation of the
respondents, particularly Atty. Espejo, that in the course of rendering legal services to Strong,
he had become close to Rodica so much so that he accommodated Rodica’s request to cause
the withdrawal of the RTC case to facilitate the sale of the Boracay property to Apostol.
In their Joint Comment,26 respondents Attys. Almario, Espejo and Michelle debunked the opinion
of Rodica’s "well-meaning lawyer friends" that the withdrawal of the RTC case "absolve[d] all
defendants from any wrong-doing" and made "the contents of her original complaint practically
meaningless." Atty. Almario and Atty. Espejo opined that since the dismissal of Rodica’s
complaint was based on her failure to state a cause of action and without prejudice, the same
may simply be re-filed by revising her complaint and ensuring that it states a cause of action.
As argued by Atty. Manuel, he and his lawyers only acted in the best interest of their client
Strong and rendered services in accordance with the latter’s objective of leaving the country and
not being deported to Brazil. The Lazaro Law Office cannot be faulted for the dismissal of the
RTC case because it had already been dismissed even before the Lazaro Law Office was
engaged to handle Strong’s immigration case. Besides, Rodica admittedly agreed to withdraw
her RTC case to meet Apostol’s condition and to make the property marketable.
Apostol corroborated Atty. Manuel’s statement in his Affidavit27 of July 21, 2011. He affirmed
that he told Rodica that he would only consider purchasing the Boracay property if it is cleared
of any pending case so that he can protect himself, as a buyer, from any possible issues that
may crop up involving the said property. According to him, Rodica assured him that she would
work for the termination of the RTC case and consult her lawyers in Boracay on the matter so
she could already sell the property.
3
It is difficult to imagine that Rodica was deceived by some of the respondent lawyers into
Page
believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only the initial step in the settlement of her
differences with her adversaries.28 We went over the said Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw
the Motion for Reconsideration29 and we note that paragraph 6 thereof specifically states:
6. However, the Plaintiff respectfully manifests that after much serious thought and deliberation,
and considering the anxieties caused by the pendency of the instant case, Plaintiff is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff respectfully moves for the withdrawal of
the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 14, 2011 of the Order dated March 29, 2011
dismissing the instant Complaint filed on April 18, 2011.30
As already noted by the RTC, Branch 6, Kalibo, Aklan in its Order31 dated April 4, 2011, in the
case for recovery of possession with damages:32
This Manifestation was signed by plaintiff, her Manila lawyers and Atty. Joan Ibutnande,
plaintiff’s counsel on record. From the statements made by plaintiff in her Manifestation to
Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration that she had made serious thoughts and deliberation she
cannot now say that she was manipulated and forced in signing the same. The Court perceives
plaintiff to be an intelligent woman not to be swayed of her principles and beliefs and
manipulated by others, she may have a fickle mind when it comes to other things but definitely
it can not be applied to the Court.
The Court does not see the connection between the instant case and that of William Strong as
alleged by the plaintiff. Mr. Strong is not a party in this case, even plaintiff’s counsel thought so
too. From the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Joan Ibutnande, it was stated in
paragraph 5: "That the undersigned counsel was baffled as she did not see any connection
[between] the incident surrounding the arrest of Mr. William Strong and the above-entitled case
filed by the [plaintiff], and told the plaintiff about it x x x." As Mr. Strong is not a party in the
instance case, his affairs whatever they are can not dictate the outcome of this case.33
Moreover, it would appear from her own narration that Rodica is not someone who is naïve or
ignorant. In her complaint, she claimed to be an astute businesswoman who even has some
business in Barcelona, Spain.34 Thus, the more reason we cannot lend credence to her claim that
she was tricked into believing that the withdrawal of the RTC case was only preliminary to the
complete settlement of all her differences with her perceived adversaries. If such had been the
agreement, then a Compromise Agreement enumerating all the terms and conditions should
have been filed instead of the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw the Motion for
Reconsideration. In addition, the withdrawal should not have been limited to the RTC case as it
appears that there are other cases pending with other tribunals and agencies35 involving the
same parties. If Rodica is to be believed, then these cases should likewise have been dismissed
in order to achieve the full and complete settlement of her concerns with her adversaries.
From the above and by preponderance of evidence, it is clear that Rodica’s purpose in
withdrawing the RTC case is to pave the way for Apostol to purchase the Boracay property. In
fact, Rodica eventually executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Apostol over the Boracay
property.36
Rodica’s claim of paying more than ₱ 7
million to the Lazaro Law Office is
substantiated.
There is likewise no merit in Rodica’s allegation that the Lazaro Law Office extorted from her
more than ₱ 7 million for alleged professional and legal fees and penalties relative to Strong’s
immigration case. To support her claim, Rodica attached four statements of account issued by
the Lazaro Law Office for US$2,650.00 under Statement of Account No. 13837,37 US$2,400.00
under Statement of Account No. 13838,38 US$1,550.00 under Statement of Account No.
1383939 and US$8,650.00 under Statement of Account No. 13835,40 or for a total amount of
US$15,250.00. She likewise presented photocopies of portions of her dollar savings account
passbook to show where the aforesaid funds came from.
Considering the prevailing exchange rate at that time, the Court notes that the sum total of the
abovementioned figures in its peso equivalent is far less than ₱ 7 million. In fact, the statements
of account even support the contention of Atty. Manuel that Strong failed to fully pay the
amount of US$100,000.00 as success fee. Anent the alleged withdrawals from Rodica’s dollar
savings account, the same merely established that she made those withdrawals. They do not
constitute as competent proof that the amounts so withdrawn were indeed paid to Lazaro Law
Office.
Rodica was not the client of the Lazaro
Law Office.
Rodica also faulted the Lazaro Law Office lawyers for disclaiming that she is their client.
However, Rodica admitted in paragraph 5 of her unnotarized Sworn Affidavit41 that Atty. Manuel
and his lawyer-assistants were "engaged by William Strong to handle his case with the
Philippine immigration authorities." Thus, this Court is more inclined to believe that the Lazaro
Law Office agreed to handle only the deportation case of Strong and such acceptance cannot be
construed as to include the RTC case. In fact, all the billings of Lazaro Law Office pertained to
the immigration case, and not to the RTC case. To reiterate, the RTC case has nothing to do
with Strong’s deportation case. Records also show that the RTC case was filed long before
Strong was arrested and detained. In fact, it had already been dismissed by the trial court long
before Strong engaged the legal services of the Lazaro Law Office. More importantly, Strong is
not a party to the RTC case. Also, the counsel of record of Rodica in the RTC case is Atty.
Ibutnande, and not the Lazaro Law Office. There is nothing on record that would show that
respondent Attys. Manuel, Michelle, and Almario had any participation therein.
Atty. Espejo’s participation in the RTC
case.
However, we cannot say the same as regards Atty. Espejo. He admitted drafting Rodica’s
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration indicating therein the firm
name of the Lazaro Law Office as well as his name and the names of Atty. Manuel and Atty.
Michelle without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, and in likewise affixing his
signature thereon.
Atty. Espejo acknowledged committing the abovementioned acts as a way of assisting Rodica
who had already become his close friend. Atty. Espejo’s admissions are as follows:
not 11. Atty. Espejo further recounts that after being advised to simply withdraw her Motion for
Reconsideration ("MR"), Rodica pleaded with Atty. Espejo to prepare the documents required to
4
be filed with the RTC x x x to spare her Boracay lawyers from preparing the same. Atty. Espejo
Page
accommodated Jasper and drafted the Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for
Reconsideration ("Motion to Withdraw MR") to be given to Rodica’s Boracay counsel, Atty. Joan
I. Tabanar-Ibutnande, who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the withdrawal of the Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted upon in
MR. accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the lawyer
filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually
assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said
11.1. Upon seeing Atty. Espejo’s initial draft, Rodica requested Atty. Espejo to include x x x the
law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not.
name of the Lazaro Law Office as signatory allegedly to give more credence and weight to the
pleading and to show the defendants in the RTC case her sincere intention to terminate the
case. It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an
officer of the court.43Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair
dealings and must conduct himself beyond reproach at all times.44 He must likewise ensure that
Due to Rodica’s pleas and insistence, Atty. Espejo, who among all lawyers of the Lazaro Law
he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument
Office, became the most familiar and "chummy" with Rodica, agreed to include the Lazaro Law
of truth and justice.45 As shown by his actuations. Atty. Espejo fell short of what is expected of
Office and put his name as the signatory for the Office. Still not satisfied, Rodica pleaded with
him. Under the circumstances, Atty. Espejo should have exercised prudence by first diligently
Atty. Espejo to further revise the Motion to Withdraw MR to include the names of Atty. Manuel
studying the soundness of Rodica’s pleas and the repercussions of his acts.
and Atty. Michelle as signatories and represented that she herself will cause them to sign it.
Relying on Rodica’s representations that she would speak to Atty. Manuel about the matter,
Atty. Espejo obliged to include the name of Atty. Michelle and Atty. Manuel. Rodica repeatedly We note that on August 5, 2011, or even before the filing of the disbarment complaint, Atty.
reminded Atty. Espejo not to bother Atty. Manuel on the matter and that she herself will take it Espejo already caused the filing of his Motion to Withdraw Appearance46 before the RTC.
up with Atty. Manuel at the proper time. Therein, Atty. Espejo already expressed remorse and sincere apologies to the RTC for wrongly
employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office. Considering that Atty. Espejo is newly admitted
to the Bar (2010), we deem it proper to warm him to be more circumspect and prudent in his
11.2 Atty. Espejo has a soft heart. He signed the pleading only with good intentions of helping
actuations.
and assisting Rodica, the common law wife of a client, whom he had learned to fancy because
of being constantly together and attending to her. He never thought ill of Rodica and believed
her when she said she would speak to Atty. Lazaro about the matter as represented. Atty. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against respondents
Espejo only agreed to sign the pleading for purposes of withdrawing Rodica’s MR to attain Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M. Almario, Atty. Michelle B.
Rodica’s purpose or desired result and objective – to convince or facilitate the sale to Apostol Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan isDISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M. Espejo is WARNED to be more
and/or to make the property more marketable to interested buyers and to attain peace with the circumspect and prudent in his actuations.
defendants in the RTC case. Evidently, Rodica took advantage of Atty. Espejo’s youth and
naivete and manipulated him to do things on her behalf, and deliberately excluded Atty. Almario
SO ORDERED.
the senior lawyer. Rodica preferred to discuss matters with Atty. Espejo than with Atty. Almario
as the latter often contradicts her views. Atty. Espejo apologized to Atty. Manuel for allowing
himself to be manipulated by Rodica.42

At the outset, Atty. Espejo was well aware that Rodica was represented by another counsel in
the RTC case. As a practicing lawyer, he should know that it is the said counsel, Atty.
Ibutnande, who has the duty to prepare the said motion. In fact, he himself stated that it is
Atty. Ibutnande who is in a better position to evaluate the merit of the withdrawal of the Motion
for Reconsideration.

Atty. Espejo’s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend assistance to Rodica
deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01 and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not
refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to
safeguard the latter’s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered as defenseless
or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC case. Needless
to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been
represented by any lawyer, which, however, is not the case.

Moreover, the Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law

5
firm’s client and without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, gave in to Rodica’s request
for him to indicate in the said motion the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle

Page
for the purpose of "giving more weight and credit to the pleading." As a member of the bar,
Republic of the Philippines WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker &
SUPREME COURT McKenzie.
Manila
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985

ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant

vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.

Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.

Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought
to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker
& McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois.

In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of
Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the
release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to
Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie
"and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having
received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.

We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines
(Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker
& McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members
and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the
Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates
of Baker & Mckenzie.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie
constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services
of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade

6
and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not

Page
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa
City, ARNE STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the order dated March 18, 1994 of
respondent judge, the Hon. Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 47, granting the Motion to Quash filed by the accused, now herein
respondents Arne Strom and Grace A. Reyes in Criminal Case No. 11529 of said court.
On February 2, 1994, a complaint (Criminal Case No. 11529) for violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom
and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since
the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No.
1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The
prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been
abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however,
respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation
relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the "law" contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code
which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order
of March 18, 1994 held as follows:
WHEREFORE in the light of all the foregoing facts and consideration, as the
City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute this case for
reasons amply discussed above, the Court hereby orders this case quashed
in the interest of justice, without costs (Rollo, p, 27).
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent judge denied the same in an
order dated April 12,1994, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
. . . . It may be ignorance of the law to insist that the law, Republic Act
1130 was repealed or amended by Letter of Instruction (sic) No. 2, Series
of 1972 as what the City Prosecutor has harped all along. A Letter of
Instruction (sic) is not law by any standard and neither has it the force and
effect of law. A contrary contention would be violative of Article 7 of the
New Civil Code which provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones and of the Rules of Statutory Construction.
Besides, penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused. The rules in all criminal prosecutions is that all
counts are resolved in favor of the accused. In the case at bar, the court
seriously doubts that the City Prosecutor has the power or the authority to
investigate violations of the Anti-Dummy Law and to file and to prosecute
cases of this kind before our courts, as that is lodged with the Anti-Dummy
Board under R. A. 1130.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Motion for Reconsideration
mentioned above is, hereby denied for sheer lack of merit, and the Order
dated March 18, 1994 quashing this case is maintained (Rollo, p.5).
Hence, the present petition.
After the filing of the comments by respondents, this Court gave due course to the petition, in a
resolution dated October 24, 1994.
The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent judge in granting the
Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari
as prayed for by petitioners herein.
In resolving this issue, it must be recalled that immediately after the proclamation of martial
law, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1 to reorganize the
entire Executive Branch of the National Government. To carry out the intent of P.D. No. 1,
various Letters of Implementation were issued from time to time. It was in the course of this
reorganization that Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972 was issued for the purpose of
reorganizing certain agencies in the Department of Justice. One such agency was the Anti-
Dummy Board which was abolished by the aforesaid LOI, to wit:
Anti-Dummy Board
1. The investigation function of the Anti-Dummy Board shall be absorbed by
the National Bureau of Investigation, and its prosecution function by the
Prosecution Staff in the Department of Justice and the various provincial
and City Fiscals. Its corresponding appropriation, records, equipment,
property, and subordinate personnel are transferred to the National Bureau
of Investigation and the Prosecution Staff in the Department of Justice.
2. The services of the present members of the Anti-Dummy Board are
hereby terminated.
3. The Anti-Dummy Board shall cease to exist as of the date hereof.
7
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of September in the year of our
Page
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. (emphasis supplied)
Later, P.D. No. 1275 was issued which reorganized the entire prosecution system of the
government with the creation of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) under the Supervision
and control of the Secretary of Justice, tasked with the investigation and prosecution of all
violations of penal laws, including violation of C.A. No, 108, the Anti-Dummy Law.
In his Comment on the petition, respondent judge insists that the dismissal of the case is
supported by the law and existing jurisprudence . Inasmuch as the City Prosecutor relied mainly
on LOI No. 2 which according to respondent judge, is not even a law, the Anti-Dummy Board
cannot be considered as having been effectively abolished.
We reverse.
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of
P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy
Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming
that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to
Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent
judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI
No. 2 reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972,
Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National Government, the
following agencies of the Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or
activated in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of the cited LOI; otherwise, he
would have readily acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by
the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have the same force and effect as the
laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec, (62
SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued,
or done by the former President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal,
binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such legal order
issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D.
No. 1. Inasmuch as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised,
revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the force and effect of law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8).
Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked.
But even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check the citations
of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to inform the court on the applicable law
to a particular case devolves solely upon the Prosecution or whoever may be the advocate
before the court. Respondent judge should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take
judicial notice of all the laws of the 1 and (Sec. 1, Rule 129 Rules of Court). Being the trier of
facts, judges are presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and
jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the bar (and bench) to keep
abreast of legal developments. As provided in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate
in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating in formation regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
CANON 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks.
The Court is fully aware that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
duties is subject to censure. But where, as in the present case, the error could have been
entirely avoided were it not for public respondent's irresponsibility in the performance of his
duties, it is but proper that respondent judge be reprimanded and his order of dismissal set
aside for grave ignorance of the law. For, respondent judge's error is not a simple error in
judgment but one amounting to gross ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the
public's perception of the court's competence.
The responsibility to keep abreast with the changes in the law espoused in Canon 5 above is
applicable with equal force to counsel far private respondents, Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo who first
raised the issue at hand before the trial court. By insisting upon the authority of an already
abolished Anti-Dummy Board, counsel displayed blatant irresponsibility, not to mention
ignorance of the law, she should be reminded that "The law, (it is not to be forgotten), is a
progressive science. There is less than full compliance with the demands of professional
competence, if a member of a bar does not keep himself abreast of the trend of authoritative
pronouncements" (Bautista v. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535 [1978], emphasis supplied).
Equally deplorable is the terse half-paged pleading entitled Comment filed in behalf of private
respondents by the same counsel Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo, before this Court, wherein she alleges:
1. That private respondents ARNE STROM AND GRACE REYES was (sic)
properly represented by the undersigned attorney;
2. That private respondents ARNE STROM AND GRACE REYES has (sic)
nothing to do with the decision of HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR.
WHEREFORE upon premises considered it is most respectfully prayed of this
Court that said certiorari (sic) be dismissed." (Rollo, p. 33)
It need not be emphasized that the order of dismissal of the criminal case against private
respondents arose out of the resolution of the Motion to Quash/Dismiss filed by private
respondents themselves, through counsel Bermejo, on the ground of lack of authority of the City
8
Fiscal to prosecute. In other words, such dismissal was not ordered by respondent judge motu
Page
proprio but rather, as prayed for by, and on motion of, private respondents through said
counsel. It is quite disturbing, therefore, for counsel to brazenly deny before this Court that
private respondents had "nothing to do" with the assailed resolution, the issuance of which was
based on their very own pleading.

Moreover, counsel did not even bother to defend the position of private respondents before this
Court by restating in the Comment, their arguments before the trial court, being content instead
with the short allegations aforequoted. These acts are indicative of counsel's incompetence and
lack of respect which this Court cannot countenance.

Undoubtedly, counsel for private respondents failed to observe the responsibility imposed upon
members of the bar to keep abreast with the developments of the law under Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility as well as to exercise candor, fairness and good faith before
the court as prescribed by Canon 10 of the same Code, for which omissions, she should likewise
be reprimanded.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of respondent judge dated March 18, 1999
dismissing Criminal Case No. 11529 is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE and the aforesaid
criminal case is REINSTATED. Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED AND FINED in the
amount of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or a similar offense shall merit serious consequences. Atty. Elvira T. Bermejo is
likewise REPRIMANDED AND FINED P10,000.00 for ignorance of the law and for her failure to
observe candor, fairness and good faith before this Court, with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely by this Court. Let a copy of this
decision be spread on the personal records of Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. and Atty. Elvira T.
Bermejo.

SO ORDERED.

9
Page
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5119 April 17, 2013
ROSARIO BERENGUER-LANDERS and PABLO BERENGUER, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN, ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES and ATTY. PEDRO
VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Rosario Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer
(complainants) against herein respondents Isabel E. Florin (Florin), Marcelino Jomales (Jomales)
and Pedro Vega (Vega).
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Remedios Berenguer-Lintag, Carlo Berenguer and Belinda Berenguer-Aguirre, Rosario
Berenguer-Landers and Pablo Berenguer (Berenguers) are the registered owners of a 58.0649-
hectare land in Bibingcahan, Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Sometime in April 1998, a notice of coverage
was issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regarding the acquisition of their
landholding pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). The Berenguers protested and applied for the exclusion of their land with the DAR and
for a notice to lift coverage based on the ground that their landholdings have been used
exclusively for livestock pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 09.2
On October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the application for
exclusion, cancelled the Berenguers’ certificates of title on the land and issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award3 (CLOAs) in favor of the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (BARIBAG).
Eventually, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Dalugdug) denied their application for
exclusion from the CARP’s coverage in the Order4 dated February 15, 1999 based on the
Investigation Report dated February 9, 1999 submitted by the DAR Region V Investigation that
said area sought to be excluded is principally devoted to coconuts and not the raising of
livestock.5
Aggrieved, the Berenguers filed a notice of appeal6 with the Secretary of DAR.
While the case was pending appeal, BARIBAG filed a petition7 for the implementation of the
Order dated February 15, 1999 before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). This
was granted by Florin, as RARAD, in an Order8 dated March 15, 1999. Accordingly, Florin
directed the issuance and implementation of the Writ of Possession.9
On March 19, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion for reconsideration,10 claiming that they were
denied due process as they were not furnished with a copy of BARIBAG’s petition for
implementation. Florin denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in an
Order11 dated March 22, 1999.
On March 25, 1999, the Berenguers appealed12 to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
BARIBAG, on other hand, filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.13 The
Berenguers opposed14 the motion saying that the execution would be premature in view of their
pending appeal before the DARAB. Nevertheless, BARIBAG still filed a Motion for the
Appointment of a Special Sheriff.15
In his Order16 dated April 6, 1999, DAR Acting Secretary Conrado S. Navarro denied the
Berenguers’ appeal.
On April 8, 1999, Florin issued a Resolution,17 which granted BARIBAG’s Motion for the
Appointment of a Special Sheriff and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for.
On April 13, 1999, the Berenguers filed a motion to set aside18 the Resolution dated April 8,
1999, arguing that: the DARAB already acquired jurisdiction over case when they seasonably
filed an appeal before it; and that Florin should have waited until the DARAB has decided the
appeal. In an Order19 dated April 21, 1999, Florin denied the said motion prompting the
Berenguers to move for her inhibition20 on ground of partiality.
The Berenguers elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51858, which was denied outright on procedural grounds, to wit:
(1) copy of the assailed order bears the words "certified true copy" but the name and authority
of the person certifying is not indicated as required in SC Circular No. 3-96, and the signature
therein is illegible; (2) only one of the petitioners signed the certification on non-forum shopping
which is an insufficient compliance of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court; and (3)
there is non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as the assailed order of the Regional Director
is not directly reviewable by the CA.21
Undaunted, the Berenguers filed a second petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 53174, which questioned the Orders dated March 15, 1999 and March 22, 1999
issued by Florin. The petition was also denied on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and wrong mode
of appeal.22
Thus, Florin issued on April 21, 1999 a Writ of Possession23 in favor of BARIBAG.
Florin subsequently directed the full implementation of the writ of possession pursuant to Rule
71 of the Rules of Court in spite of the Berenguers’ protestations.24
On June 3, 1999, the Berenguers moved to quash25 the Writ of Possession, to no avail.
On August 4, 1999, the complainants filed the instant Complaint26 for the disbarment of
10
respondents Florin, Jornales, in his capacity as Assistant Regional Director for DAR, and Vega, in
his capacity as DAR Legal Officer V, for allegedly conspiring and confederating in the
commission of the following acts:
Page
 A. ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN AS REGIONAL ADJUDICATOR KNOWINGLY RENDERING
AN UNJUST JUDGEMENT, ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS ADVERSE AND PREJUDICIAL
TO THE INTEREST OF PETITIONERS;
B. ISSUING AN ORDER AND GRANTING A WRIT OF EXECUTION EX-PARTE AND
SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUING AND SIGNING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT
CERTIFICATION OF FINALITY ISSUED BY THE PROPER OFFICER FULLY KNOWING
THAT SHE HAS NO AUTHORITY AND TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE
RULES AND IN CONTRAVENTION WITH THE NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD; FURTHER, HIDING
THE WRIT OF POSSESSION FROM PETITIONERS INSPITE OF REQUEST FOR A COPY;
C. REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION ON PLEADINGS FILED BY PETITIONERS THRU
COUNSEL AND FAILING AND REFUSING TO CONDUCT A HEARING AS PRAYED FOR
BY COUNSEL; FAILING AND REFUSING TO FORWARD THE APPEAL TO THE PROPER
APPELLATE BOARD;
D. UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE IN LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE
PREJUDICE OF PETITIONERS AND LAWYER; ABUSE OF AUTHORITY TO CITE
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER IN CONTEMPT AND ISSUING AN ORDER OF ARREST
WITHOUT HEARING CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF COURT;
E. ATTY. MARCELINO JORNALES AND ATTY. PEDRO VEGA, INSPITE OF THEIR
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION, PERSISTED AND
ASSISTED IN THE ILLEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION TO
THE PREJUDICE OF LEGITIMATE FARMERS AND PETITIONERS.27
Florin filed her Comment28 stating, among others, that: (1) the writ of possession is anchored on
the CLOAs issued by the Register of Deeds, and not on a final and executory decision that would
require a certification of finality as prescribed by the DARAB rules; (2) Atty. Federico De Jesus
(De Jesus), as Berenguers’ counsel, was not furnished with a copy of the writ because it was not
yet issued at the time when it was requested; (3) there was no intent to hide the writ; (4) when
the writ of possession was finally signed, it was delivered to the sheriff for service and
enforcement; (4) it was unfair to impute illegal acts against Vega and Jornales as DAR lawyers
in view of the DAR’s denial of the motion for a cease and desist order and because of the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty; (5) the petitions for certiorari filed
with the CA were both dismissed; and (6) the findings of DAR and the issuance of the CLOAs
remain undisturbed. Florin also claimed that it is Atty. De Jesus who wants her disbarred and
not the Berenguers.
In a separate Comment,29 Vega denied the allegations against him arguing that: (1) the writ of
possession is not illegal in the absence of a court order stating its invalidity; (2) he did not
participate in the issuance of the writ of possession because he did not appear as the farmers’
counsel; (3) the Legal Division he heads has no control or influence over the DARAB; and (4) his
presence in the execution of the writ of possession was to ascertain that no violations against
any law are committed by the person/s executing the writ.30
Jornales’ Comment,31 for his part, stated that: (1) the writ has no prima facie infirmity; (2) he is
not privy to the issuance thereof; (3) he has no supervision and control over the DAR which
issued the writ; and (4) he has no authority to determine the writ’s validity or invalidity. Jornales
admitted, however, that he was in the meeting presided by the PNP Provincial Director of
Sorsogon prior to the writ’s implementation in his capacity as Regional Assistant Director for
Operations of DAR Region V and not as a lawyer. He added that the disbarment complaint
against him is not only malicious for lack of legal basis but is also meant to harass and
intimidate DAR employees in implementing the CARP.32
After the complainants filed their Consolidated Reply,33 the case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner Milagros San Juan (Commissioner San Juan) Recommended34 that Florin be
"suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, Orders and Resolutions adverse and prejudicial to the interests of the Complainants."
Commissioner San Juan, meanwhile, recommended that the charges against Jornales and Vega
be dismissed for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against them.35
Commissioner San Juan’s recommendation against Florin is based on the findings36 of the CA in
its Decision dated December 26, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 53174,37 which reads:
The Petition for Certiorari filed by the complainants before the Court of Appeals was treated as a
petition for review and the court found the following errors:
"1) Respondent DAR Secretary has no jurisdiction over the subject properties being devoted to
pasture and livestock and already classified as residential and industrial land, hence, outside the
coverage of Republic Act 6657. (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) The generation and
issuance of Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) was therefore void;"
2) Being outside the coverage of CARL (Republic Act 6657), respondent Hon. Isabel E. Florin
who is exercising delegated jurisdiction from the DARAB has no jurisdiction over Petitioners’
Properties as held in Krus na Ligas Farmer’s Coop vs. University of the Philippines; G.R. No.
107022, 8 December 1992, which is squarely in point with the case at bar."
Anent the issue regarding the qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, the Court ruled thus –
"Assuming that the lands are indeed agricultural, we cannot understand why the DAR awarded
them to members of respondent Baribag and not to the farmers in the area, in violation of Sec.
22 of the CARL x x x."
The court further stated – "We cannot xxx close this discussion without mentioning our
observation on the actuations of Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Isabel Florin. Just why
she issued a writ of execution and eventually a Writ of Possession in favor of respondent
Baribag puzzles us no end. She knew that Baribag is not a party in petitioners’ application for
exclusion filed with the Office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug. Obviously, she never
acquired jurisdiction over Baribag. She also knew that petitioners appealed to the DAR Secretary
from the Order of Regional Director Dalugdug dismissing petitioners’ application for exclusion.
Clearly, such order was not yet final and executory when she issued the assailed writs of
execution and possession. Thus, the writ are [sic] void and would be set aside."38
11
On May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVII-2006-282 modifying
the recommended penalty, viz:
Page
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with xxxx
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant
and for knowingly rendering an unjust Judgment, Orders and Resolutions, adverse and
to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
prejudicial to the interest of the complainants, Atty. Isabel F. Florin is hereby SUSPENDED from
government service. This is clear from Canon 644 of said Code. Lawyers in government are
the practice of law for one (1) year. The charges against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Peter
public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
Vega are DISMISSED for failure of the complainants to substantiate the charges against
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the
Respondents.39
ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

In her opposition,40 Florin averred that: (1) jurisdiction was acquired over BARIBAG at the time
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
it filed a petition for the implementation of the Order dated February 15, 1999; (2) the DARAB
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
has jurisdiction to issue the CLOAs; (3) as RARAD, she has concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB;
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty
(4) the Berenguers were not denied due process; and (5) the Berenguers never questioned the
and fair dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
regularity of the DAR’s acquisition of their landholding nor did they file a petition for the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
cancellation of the CLOAs issued to BARIBAG.
brethren in private practice.45 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

This Court agrees with the findings of the IBP Board of Governors but modifies the penalty to be
Thus, in Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,46 the Court ruled that an administrative case against a lawyer
imposed.
for acts committed in his capacity as provincial adjudicator of the DARAB may be likened to
administrative cases against judges considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides: our government.47

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.—A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party without authority so to do. x x x.
In Lahm III v. Mayor, Jr.,41 the Court ruled that:
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in
his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Gross misconduct is any inexcusable,
shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the administration
of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the
cause. The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.42 (Citations omitted)
Similarly in this case, Florin, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs
official functions of a RARAD that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present
controversy may be likened that of a judge whose decision, including the manner of rendition, is
made subject of an administrative complaint.
Going now to the acts complained of, Section 29 of DAR Administrative Order No. 06-00
provides:
SEC. 29. Effect of Appeal.—Appeal to the Secretary, the Office of the President, or the Court of
Appeals shall have the following effects:
(a) Appeal from the Regional Director or Undersecretary to the Secretary.—The appeal shall stay
the order appealed from unless the Secretary directs execution pending appeal, as he may
deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case (Executive Order No. 292
[1987], Book VII, Chapter 4, Sec. 21).

In the instant case, the Berenguers want this Court to impose disciplinary sanction against the
three (3) respondents as members of the bar. The grounds asserted by the complainants in
support of the charges against the respondents, however, are intrinsically connected with the
discharge of their quasi-judicial functions. Nevertheless, in Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,43 the
Court already ruled that if a misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer, then a lawyer may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar, viz:
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a
xxxx
Based on the foregoing provision, the appeal of the Berenguers to the DAR Secretary clearly
stayed the implementation of Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999.
Moreover, it is the DAR Secretary who has jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal.
Records reveal that there was no order by the DAR Secretary directing execution of the Order
dated February 15, 1999 during the pendency of the Berenguers’ appeal.

12
member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a Corollarily, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides for the instances when execution may
lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar. be had, namely: (1) after a decision or order has become final and executory;48 (2) pending

Page
appeal, only upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing;49 and (3)
execution of several, separate or partial judgments.50
Moreover, Rule XX of the 2009 Rules of the DARAB reads:
Sec. 1. Execution Upon Final Order or Decision.—Execution shall issue upon an order, resolution
or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding. Such execution shall issue as a
matter of course and upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been duly perfected.
judge after finding out that the ignorance of the law he committed was not tainted with bad
faith.
With respect to the complaint against Jornales and Vega, the Court agrees and adopts the
finding of the IBP that no sufficient evidence was adduced to substantiate the charges against
them. Hence, the complaint against them should be dismissed.

The Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper officer that a resolution, order WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of
or decision has been served to the counsel or representative on record and to the party himself, violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION
and has become final and executory, and, upon motion or motu proprio, issue a writ of from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint
execution ordering the DAR Sheriff or any DAR officer to enforce the same. In appropriate against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient
cases, the Board or any of its Members or its Adjudicator shall deputize and direct the Philippine evidence.
National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of their component units or other law
enforcement agencies in the enforcement of any final order, resolution or decision.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Sec. 2. Execution Pending Appeal. — Any motion for execution of the decision of the Adjudicator
pending appeal shall be filed before the Board which may grant the same upon meritorious
SO ORDERED.
grounds, upon the posting of a sufficient bond in the amount conditioned for the payment of
damages which the aggrieved party may suffer, in the event that the final order or decision is
reversed on appeal, provided that the bond requirement shall not apply if the movant is a
farmer-beneficiary/pauper litigant. (Emphasis ours)

In this case, the Order dated February 15, 1999 of DAR Regional Director Dalugdug denying the
Berenguers’ application for exclusion from CARP is yet to become final and executory as it was
seasonably appealed to the DAR Secretary. There is also nothing in the records that will show
whether BARIBAG posted a bond pursuant to the Rules.

While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent proof that such error was
made with a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injustice,51 the facts on hand prove
otherwise. Florin’s issuance of the writ of execution and writ of possession in order to fully
implement Regional Director Dalugdug’s Order dated February 15, 1999 clearly constitutes
ignorance of the law for as a rule, a writ of execution is issued only after the subject judgment
or order has already become final and executory.52 As aptly stated by IBP Commissioner San
Juan, Florin ordered the issuance of such writs despite the pendency of the appeal with the
DARAB.53 Consequently, the Court finds merit in the recommendation of suspension.

As to the penalty –

Judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to
do injustice will be administratively sanctioned.54 In this case, it appears, however, that this is
the first time that Florin has been made administratively liable. Although there is no showing
that malice or bad faith attended the commission of the acts complained of, the same does not
negate the fact that Florin executed an act that would cause an injustice to the Berenguers. To
our mind, the act of issuing the writ of execution and writ of possession is not simply an honest
error in judgment but an obstinate disregard of the applicable laws and jurisprudence.

13
With all these, the Court deems it reasonable to reconsider the penalty recommended and
instead impose the penalty of suspension for three (3) months55 without pay. As also held in
Rallos v. Judge Gako, Jr.,56 three (3) months suspension without pay was imposed against a

Page
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO
LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos.
and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three
years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in
various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case
A.......- No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc.
B.......- No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time toOnFile
C.......- and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. receipt
42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar
Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes,
he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of
an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the
R.
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing
some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas,
as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter
No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim.
Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order
dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP
Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for
violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted
any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
July 7, 1997,
Required respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
Comment
SP (notofCivil
notice,
Case)after
No.which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in
1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member
of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in
good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court
14
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of
Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief
Page
 As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of
the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B"
and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal
259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment
of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact,
in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he
is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan,
Laguna.
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In
fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he
alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited
practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in
him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact,
his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having
exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment,
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that
insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
citizen since 1992.
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc

Rule 139-A provides:

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this
was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering
respondents suspension for three months.
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of

15
deceased members thereof.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

Page
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
 months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of
the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does
not include payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO

THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we
believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision
be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

16
Page
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992
EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good
moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No.
78 instituted on 6 January 1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a
Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.
It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at
Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was
performed under Article 76 of the Civil
Code1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition).
The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his
law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a
stable future for them. Complainantadmits, though, that they had not lived together as husband
and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982).
Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his
application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant
blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming
that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to
take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after
Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5).
The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint.
Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June
1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted
that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not
as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after
he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having
indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest
belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was
not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had
reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the
Complaint be dismissed.
Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's
Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding
and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against
Respondent.
Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and
allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982.
On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for
Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds:
a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid
marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a
mockery of our marriage institution.
b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already
married in his application to take the bar exam.
c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he
submitted to the Supreme Court;
d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into
signing of the affidavit ofdesistance and the conformity to his explanation
and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in
fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage
and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad
motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with
the Supreme Court.
Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned
letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his
Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not
force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their
marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the
Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of
the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be
at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years
old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family
name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and
there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any
court."According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear
on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1").
17
Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant
Page
who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.
In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had
covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take
the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of
the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said
parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as
husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in
the eyes of the law, he was single.
On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with
the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since
Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be
reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had
filed before this Court.
On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the
indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled.
Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find
Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established.
Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he
was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which
he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outrightfrom
taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.
Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not
only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because
that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts
absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage to Complainant is
void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional
character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in
connection therewith has been regularly performed.
Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings
submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable.
The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in
paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet,
during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted
any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his
signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were
merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this
Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and
[g]; 4[b]).
Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant
(par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its
being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract.
In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made
public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he
contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the
beginning."
Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned
letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons
that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for
failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.
Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled
with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable
him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he
had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his
marriage to Complainant.
Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with
Complainant in order to serve his purpose. Inso doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith
to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196
SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him
not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court.
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law(People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990,
181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice GeorgeA. Malcolm: "As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers
ofan attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350
[1933]).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all
18
Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Page
SO ORDERED.
Page 19
Republic of the Philippines had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued
SUPREME COURT by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid
Manila by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake
in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together.
Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18 Stay
EN BANC
Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of ₱ 4,539,000
from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes
A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012 supporting the computation of the fees he believes are due him.

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos
(resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional
Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two
other women while respondent’s first marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent
to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They
submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment of fees to complainant
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of
Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial
consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used
them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his
allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and
Jane,10 letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment
made to the latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting.
He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent,
contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in
Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in
the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in
Ermita, Manila.13
Respondent’s Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was
not an employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that
complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant,
resulting in the latter’s dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding
the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered
documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.17

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his
on 01 August 2005.8
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that
his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would
handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to
the financial aspect of the case’ such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be
presented in court. To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint
Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law
Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena,
Vice-President for Operations of the said company.19

Complainant’s Accusations On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William

20
Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative
value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

Page
consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latter’s numerous
petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To
the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places
and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the
three marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a
marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15
July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon,
and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane
E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third
Marriage Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were
filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and
Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan,
Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently
discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and
allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for
their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory
hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he
would not attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for
the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited
two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage
Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of
two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Piñon while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for
contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his
provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC–Laguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit.
The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was
only empowered to determine respondent’s administrative liability. On this matter, complainant
failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission
found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his
legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the
violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary
evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the
latter’s first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154,
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On
01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the
recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission should have
suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had
filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those
contracts with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to
establish that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of
disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and
likewise moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions
he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondent’s disbarment.44
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur
with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the former’s share in
the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to
21
divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on
the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
Page
that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to
share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the
lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainant’s
allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against
respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that
Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts
by respondent to advertise the latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in
the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in
corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for
the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of
a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle
used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The
letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent
would render legal services related to the former’s loan obligation with a bank. This
circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by
respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a
law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the
attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice
by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03
and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative
case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We
are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification
and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities
in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1âwphi1 For the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was
still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he
resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages.
He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna – one
in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null
and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages to two other women aside from his
22
wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the
Page
NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and
death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in
accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
respondent has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents. Philippines.

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment Attorneys.
and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code
SO ORDERED.
provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage,
prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his
gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old
Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice
while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held
thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only
as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply
and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as
the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice,
in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high
degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may
rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name
be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

23
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral

Page
conduct.
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L.
TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous
circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April
11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six
months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI,
which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service
of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears
that complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of
their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato
(Now General Santos City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his
profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena
gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from
office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to
another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after
investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued
living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child
named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children by
her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with
Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of
Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents marriage to complainant subsists, as
nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts,
including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a
similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for
disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children from
the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest
daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name
be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the
Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for
having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated
in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena
Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part
of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro
L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and
24
adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that
Page
respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
 Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after that of
the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all
times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to
state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary,
a fact that aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in
the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the
law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations,
lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the
Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct,[15] an
attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration
of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of
the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is
expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard for
public decency in an orderly society.
taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of administering
justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the
clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their
son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent
was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that respondent
failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by
this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded
wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found
respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance;
in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he
still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the matter
against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could
not be explained away.Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still
subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross
misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his
moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established
norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.[16] Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as moral character. To
achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of
his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.

On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.[17]

25
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an

Page
officer of the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended to
afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is
SECOND DIVISION which directed your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in
connection with this case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis
G.R. No. 133090 January 19, 2001 Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.
ATTY. Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, CONCEPCION: subpoena.
vs. ATTY. May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial BUGARING: the Register of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor
Court Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent. please, and the record will bear it out. Until now they did not file any
answer, opposition or pleadings or pleadings with respect to this motion.
DE LEON, JR., J.: ATTY. Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only
CONCEPCION: the Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of our office regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I
of Appeals1 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, received this morning the subpoena, your Honor.
declaring petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.1âwphi1.nêt ATTY. Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
BUGARING: respondent that he was not informed.
The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here
Case NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel2 Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz is recorded.
Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala ATTY. Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we
of respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, BUGARING: will be [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him
Cavite. your Honor please, with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of
Deeds that is irregularity in the performance of the official duty of the clerk
not to inform the parties concerned.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court
issued an order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the
to annotate at the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register video recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court
of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran that such proceedings should be taken.
on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly ATTY. Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just
appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis BUGARING: accompanied me this morning.
pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the defendants. On COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the
November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed permission of this Court.
a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court.3 ATTY. Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
BUGARING:
During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that
incident transpired: shots should be done.
ATTY. This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from
ATTY. For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready. BUGARING: an occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I
BUGARING: could prove your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other
matters your Honor please. I was just surprised why he took video tape your
ATTY. CORDERO: Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.
Honor please, that we ask the apology of this Court if that offend this Court
ATTY. Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our your Honor please.
BUGARING: motion for contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary
Register of Deeds is properly notified for today's hearing.
authority or permission should be secured.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
ATTY. In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor. BUGARING:

26
ATTY. We are ready, your Honor. COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.
BUGARING:
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please,

Page
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court BUGARING: that is personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being
 ….
COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.
ATTY. At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary
BUGARING: evidence as part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
ATTY. Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this
CONCEPCION: contempt you are talking. I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This
BUGARING: is a criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
CONCEPCION:
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for
the Register of Deeds.
ATTY. Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your
CONCEPCION: Honor.
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply
represented.
ATTY. As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing….
CONCEPCION:
ATTY. BARZAGA4: Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
ATTY. Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just
BUGARING: mark our documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and
thereafter your Honor please….
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by
newly appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as
the privately hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of
this contempt proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the
record of this case so that we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Second call, your Honor.
---------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the
case your Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed
on November 6, 1966 and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated
that, 'the record of the case shows up to the filing of this motion, the
Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado Concepcion of the Office of
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not comply with the
Court Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996, respectively.'
However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a letter
coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed
to the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos.
T-519248, 519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the
annotation of the lis pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered
in the book of primary entry. We would like also to invite the attention of the
Hon. Court that the Motion for Contempt of Court was filed on November 6,
1996. The letter for the annotation of the lis pendens was made by the
counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996, your Honor. However,
your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already been issued
by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in view of the above, the
motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens
annotated at the back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic) and
51950 (sic).'
ATTY. Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our
BUGARING: documentary evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The
counsel has just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let
us wait until he is finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what
to do to have an orderly proceedings in this case.
ATTY. Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated
BUGARING: your Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis
pendens has already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just
request that we be given a period of ten days from today your Honor, within
which to submit our formal written opposition your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by
Atty. Tutaan in connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to
annotate the lis pendens because of certain reasons. According to the
manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is appearing in the earlier part of the
record of this case, the reason for that is because there was a pending
subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996. May 1
have the record please.
ATTY. BARZAGA: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.
ATTY. Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this,
BUGARING: your Honor.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can
be guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the
matter started from that. After the submission of the …. What are you
suppose to submit?
ATTY. Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in
BUGARING: contempt of Court.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment
to the counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the
plaintiff an equal time within which to submit his reply.
ATTY. Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor
BUGARING: please, that we will be marking first our documentary evidence because this
is set for hearing for today, your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment
yet what are we going to receive as evidence.
27
ATTY. If your Honor please …
BUGARING:
Page
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the
 submission of the comment. COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.
ATTY. I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion ATTY. Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
BUGARING: for contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado BUGARING:
Concepcion.
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to horse.
do. This should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a
ATTY. No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than
Court of record the comment has to be in first then in your reply you can
BUGARING: this Court. Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in
submit your evidence to rebut the argument that is going to be put up by
many certiorari cases, your Honor.
the respondent and so we will be able to hear the case smoothly.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court.
ATTY. My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time (Banging the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in
BUGARING: furnished of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they jail. (Turning to the Sheriff)
should have filed it in due time in accordance with the rules and because it is
ATTY. I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
scheduled for trial, we are ready to mark our evidence and present to this
BUGARING:
Court, your Honor
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
of this Court.
ATTY. I am listening, your Honor.
ATTY. I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is
BUGARING:
BUGARING: one way I am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of
ATTY. Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all this Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in
BUGARING: officers of the Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know jail." (pp. 29-42. Rollo)
also our procedure, your Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first
and then do whatever you want.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct contempt
BUGARING: the Court of this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and of court, thus:
I put on record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel) During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one
ATTY. Because we could not find any sort of justice in town. (1) operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case
BUGARING: while counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that
he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in
COURT: Do that right away. contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
ATTY. We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our
BUGARING: witness. The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came
presented. from a function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with
him and the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent
ATTY. I did not…. out the cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the
BUGARING: proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record, and since its
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of discretion of the Court.
his comment.
ATTY. Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he
BUGARING: anything but I reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying needed the services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio
this case. Barzaga to present him, the case was allowed to be called again. On the second call,

28
Atty. Burgaring started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his
COURT: You can do whatever you want. documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor. he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that the Motion

Page
BUGARING: has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
 At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:
evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact
that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
appears to disregard orderly procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for
ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS
the ruling of the Court for an orderly proceeding.
SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A
GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION.11
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so.
Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the
Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject
uttered words insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual
has won all his cases of certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the
and legal basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he
Rules of Court; that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
always addressed the court with the phrase "your honor please."
allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were hurled to the
discredit of the Court.
We disagree.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the
Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention. Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95
provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring
committed an open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence
and contumacious manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the
sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward
detention shall commence immediately at the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5 others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit
or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in
contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a superior court,
Jail, and paid the fine of P3,000.00.6
or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not
exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.
While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6,
We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the
1996, petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
trial court in consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout
Both motions were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996.7
the proceedings is belied by his behavior therein:

To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the
1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15,
Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in
tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
direct contempt of court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from
respondent Judge Dolores S. Español had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
contempt of court, and that said Order was null and void for being in violation of the
Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence.8
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of
the other party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule
The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes
11.04, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from
of the hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed
attributing to a judge "motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to
arrogant, at times impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying
the case".
and sarcastic towards the court.9 It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that
the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, 10 and
ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered 3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the
judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: proceedings (pp. 9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard
to Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to
"maintain towards the courts (1) respectful attitude" in order to maintain its

29
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
order dated December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the respect due to
modification that the excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the

Page
the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
petitioner.
 4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he
was making representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by
the petitioner and was not allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn,
December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite, through counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of
Article III, 1997 Constitution on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics which mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse
witness "with fairness and due consideration," and Canon 12 of Code of Professional
Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort and consider it his duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."16
Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she
erred in imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16,
1995. It was not established that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus
properly ordered the return of the excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days
imprisonment meted out to petitioner was justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible
error in its assailed decision.

The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
"your honor please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to
his subsequent utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should
return to the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
not be countenanced, if proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court
P3,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
proceedings.12

SO ORDERED.
Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the
extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and
the court, was defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administrative of
justice.13 Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the
case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing.14 Hence, petitioner cannot claim
that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the contempt order
inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make an
immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court
during he hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for
reconsideration of the contempt order on the same day.15

Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing
the case of his client – by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the
respondent judge's contrary order – he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect
the interest of his client to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.

The Court of Appeals aptly stated:

But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda
v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court,
bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA
432, 439). He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends

30
of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes,
in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).

Page
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000]
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant, vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN,
REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of
PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
D E C I S IO N
VITUG, J.: JVITUG
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically
Canon 9 thereof, viz:
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only
deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to
avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." barth
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores,
Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some
expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel
for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge,
compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had
taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission
Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing
to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of
effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were
expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The
students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F.
Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo
B. Villareiz,, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused
to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student
Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the
students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication
funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students. Jksm
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President,
gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14thMarch 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of
apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of
the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo,
assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President;
letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 September
1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC
President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his
parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a
Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for
defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution,
dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed
Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed
Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex 'A,' and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice
of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of
the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the
negotiation of the case." Chief
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the
civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to
their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This
failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of
the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.
Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation[1] which, among other
things, explicitly contained the following stipulation; viz:
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"1.......Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom
assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission
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Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging
 guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil,
criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against the
AMACC arising from their previous dismissal. Esm

"x x x......x x x......x x x

"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from

Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them."

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of
Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear
to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this
decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and
as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

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