PEIRCE'S SEMEIOTIC AND SCHOLASTIC LOGIC

Author(s): Alan R. Perreiah

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter, 1989), pp. 41-49
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27794961 .
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 Alan R. Perreiah

PEIRCE'S SEMEIOTIC
AND SCHOLASTIC LOGIC
Scholars have long noted the importance of medieval thought
for the development of Peirce's philosophy. Some influences such
as Scotistic have been documented in recent
metaphysics years.1
Less well known, and still for the most part undocumented, is the
influence of scholastic on Peirce's Semeiotic. In 1893 Peirce
logic
noted that medieval philosophy was
in need of thorough scholarly
study.2 Today after a century of
scholarship
on medieval
philoso
and a half century of scholarship on medieval it is pos
phy logic,
sible to more Peirce's sources as well as the theories
identify precisely
which most influenced him.3
Scholastic doctrines would seem to have for Peirce
scholarship
more than historical interest. are essential for a
They background
number of peculiarly Peircean notions, e.g. the modes of being, the
modes of the normative character of logic, the priority
propositions,
of dialectical reasoning, logic and probability, the nominalism-realism

controversy. The list multiplies beyond necessity. The ideal of a

terminology which is neither vernacular nor

precise philosophical
arbitrary in "The Ethics of Terminology" follows from Peirce's
admiration for Scholastic method. Emulation of his Scholastic
sources is explicit in Peirce's Third Rule: "To use scholastic terms

in their anglicized forms for philosophical conceptions, so far as they

are and never to use them in other than their proper
strictly applicable;
senses."4 But even if this rule had not been stated, Peirce was so

steeped in the Latin writings of the middle ages and especially the
13 th and 14th centuries that it would have been remarkable indeed

if the and concepts essential to those texts had not af

vocabulary
fected his thinking.
This paper examines several doctrines in medieval logic which
seem to have influenced Peirce. The paper is exploratory and offers
some lines of which might usefully be pursued. Fol
investigation
a review of the principal ways in which Peirce conceived
lowing
42 Alan R. Perreiah

Semeiotic, the introduction draws some parallels with the organiza

tion of medieval and rhetoric. Part 1 examines the

grammar, logic
medieval concept of signification (significatio) which was available
to Peirce. Part 2 outlines the function of supposition or "standing
for" which is relevant to Peirce's discussions of sign.
(suppostilo)
Part 3 discusses the medieval idea of inference (consequentia) in

relation to Peirce's to reasoning. The conclusion will

approaches
further of Scholastic for research on Semeio
suggest implications logic
tic.
Michael has drawn attention to the fact that Peirce's idea
Emily
of Semeiotic was after the medieval trivium of Grammar,
patterned
and Rhetoric.5 its initial attractiveness this suggestion
Logic Despite
is complicated the many in Peirce's own idea of semeiotic
by changes
as well as in the nature of the trivium itself. Just what did Peirce

understand by the medieval trivium? How did it influence his own

thinking? Max Fisch has distinguished no fewer than five different
conceptions of the divisions of Semeiotic: (1) Spring 1865, Symbol
istic (the science of representations) divides into Universal
general
Grammar, Logic and Universal Rhetoric. (2) May 1865, Symbolistic
is divided into General Grammar, General Logic and General Rheto

ric. (3) 1867, Formal Grammar, Logic, Formal Rhetoric. (4) 1897,
Pure Grammar, Logic Proper, Pure Rhetoric. (5) 1903, Speculative
Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic. From 1867 on, Peirce also rec

that each of the of semeiotic could be on

ognized parts developed
? Each of these in
three levels terms, propositions and arguments.
turn contains one or more three-part ?subdivisi?n: The original simple
schema thus grew into very complex models which preoccupied
Peirce from 1867 to the end of his life.6 Here is a simplified schema
from 1867:

I. Formal Grammar II. Logic III. Formal Rhetoric

A. Terms A. Terms A. Terms

1. icons 1. icons 1. icons
2. indices 2. indices 2. indices
3. symbols 3. symbols 3. symbols
B. Propositions B. Propositions B. Proposition
1. True 1. True 1. True
 Peirce s Semeio tic 43

2. False 2. False 2. False

3. Doubtful 3. Doubtful 3. Doubtful
C. Arguments C. Arguments C. Arguments
1. Deduction 1. Deduction 1. Deduction
2. 2. Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis
Hypothesis
3. Induction 3. Induction 3. Induction

Medieval Scholastic manuals divide logic into three domains of terms,

and arguments, and their subdivisions are
propositions comparable
in many ways to those of Peirce.7 Moreover, the grammar books of the
Middle Ages no less than the rhetoric manuals of the Renaissance
observe the basic three-fold division of rational discourse.8 What
ever we may find it is clear that Peirce intended to distinguish
parallels
three irreducible domains for the study of signs or
representations.
I. The nature of meanings or signs of their oc
general independent
currence in a context with other signs. II. The relations of signs
to III. The of signs. We will now examine
objects. interpretation
each of these in turn.

1.
It is natural to think of the grammar which comprised the medieval
trivium as the traditional grammar of Donatus and Priscian which
treated the of expressions in the language of Vergil,
congruity
Augustine and other Latin writers. This concept of medieval grammar,
however, is not the one which Peirce adopted for Semeiotic. Roger
Bacon, one of Peirce's favorite authors, had at
placed grammatica
the center of all liberal studies which would lead to new scientific

knowledge. But Bacon had already distinguished traditional grammar

which was language-specific from grammar which was general and
which the general features such as nomin?is, verbals, and
captured
adverbials which cut across of This notion of a
species languages.9
general grammar grew in the 13 th century into the study of the

general features of thought or the modes of signifying (modi signifi

candi) of thought. By the second quarter of the 13 th century uni
versal or grammar had come to rival traditional grammar;
speculative
and if Henry of Andaly's Battle of the Seven Liberal Arts is a true
war story, the battle was lost to gram
by mid-century speculative
mar. Two decades later when John Duns Scorns was a student,
 44 Alan R. Perreiah

speculative grammar had taken over the field. It remained influential

for almost a century until the fulminations of Petrarch and other
humanists against Scholasticism urged a return to classical grammar.
Peirce's mistaken attribution of Thomas of Erfurt's Grammatica

Speculativa to Scotus and his use of that title to name one of the

parts of Semeiotic suggest the great of the idea of

importance specu
lative grammar for Peirce's realism.10 In fact, his own views on the

pure meaning of of a resemble the central

signification sign closely
concept of signification in speculative grammar. The
(signification
modists (modistae) distinguished the various ways in which the mind

signifies (modi
significando) when it knows particular Dis
objects.
tinguishing between primitive and derivative modes of as
signifying
well as between the modes of signifying associated with the parts of

speech, they to maintain Bacon's ideal of capturing what is

sought
essential to language as distinct from what is accidental to particular

languages. For that reason

their descriptions were and,
very general
we Peirce's own of indexicals, of
might say, metalinguistic. study
relatives and of the term itself awareness of the method
"being" betrays
of pure description of linguistic phenomena which was practiced by
the speculative of the Middle Whatever the virtues
grammarians Ages.
of this approach to the clarification of and meaning
signification
Peirce did not think it was sufficient. If truth is discoverable,
signs
must be related to Peirce went on to the con
objects. investigate
nection between signs and objects.

2.
Peirce's discussions of theof signs to objects centers
relationships
on the function of "standing for." A is said "to or
sign represent"
"to stand for" an Peter of Spain's Summulae lists
object. Logicales
supposition as one of the basic of terms
(suppositio) properties
(proprietates terminorum), and the basic function of for"
"standing
occurs the medieval texts which Peirce read from Aquinas
throughout
through Scotus and Ockham to Paul of Venice. If we allow that
a term is nothing more than a species of it mean to
sign, what does
say inmedieval logic that a term "stands for"
something?
The medieval texts routinely define supposition (suppositio)
as "that property of a categorematic term which 'stands for' (supponit
pro) some thing or things in a proposition."11 Iste terminus(i)
 Peirce 's Semeiotic 45

supponit(unt) pro aliquo (vel aliquibus) in propositions The verb

'supponere pro9 (usually translated "to stand for") in its finite

singular or forms is normally a nominative (sin

plural preceded by
gular or plural) and followed by an ablative (appropriately singular
or The of this construction in Latin
plural). unequivocal meaning
grammar is substitution: the nominative expression is said "to stand
for" the thing or things indicated by the ablative expression. This
basic meaning of "to stand for" (supponere pro) is found in virtu

ally every assertion about the suppositio of a term in the Middle

Ages. This is true no matter what of suppositio, what
variety theory
of suppositio or what author is involved. It is uniform and ubiquitous

throughout the Scholastic texts which Peirce read so avidly. It is

difficult, if not impossible, to understand how Peirce's own concep

tion of the function of a sign's representing
an could be very
object
far fom this medieval conception.
A term has supposition in one of three ways: (1) When it stands
for itself or its equiform as a it is said to have material
language sign
supposition (suppositio materialis). When it stands for its significa
tion purely, it is said to have simple supposition (suppositio simplex).
When it stands for some individual or complex of individuals it is
said to have personal supposition In "Some
(suppositio personalis).
Consequences of Four Incapacities," Peirce uses the explicit language
of supposition. When he discusses the various ways in which "a
can stand his is similar to the
thought-sign" exposition strikingly
divisions of sketched above.12 our discussion
supposition Although
has been confined to the supposition of substantival terms, the
medieval theory included rules for the supposition of relative terms
as well. Emily Michael has already shown some links with Peirce's
own study of the logic of relations.13

3.
Peirce did not conceal his dissatisfaction with "the rank and file"
of writers on logic. He cites the psychiatrist Maudsley's declaration
that they suffer from "arrested brain In addition
development."14
to mathematical as "the most essential
for
training qualification"
the study of logic, Peirce insisted on the importance of actual prac
tice for the analysis and evaluation of reasoning. "[T]he methods
of men consciously admire are different from, and often
thinking
46 Alan R. Perreiah

in some respects, inferior to those they actually employ."15

If the theory of signification gives meaning to the basic signs of
human discourse, and if supposition theory is essential to the ways
in which signs represent objects, the theory of reasoning is similarly
indispensable to discovering how propositional signs relate to one
another. Needless to say, this is vast. Here I can only suggest
topic
a few ideas which Peirce seems to have learned from his Scholastic
sources.

First, Peirce understands the crucial difference between deduction

and inference. Deduction is a purely formal relationship between

propositions. Inference is the delivery (Matto) of a conclusion from

premises, and inferences may be formal or material.16 You can do

someone's deductions for them; you cannot do their inferences for
them. Second, Peirce conceives the rules of logic not as theorems
but rather as "leading principles" which the habit of inference.
guide
Moreover, he holds that the rules logic must
of apply to dialectical

(probabilistic) and rhetorical no less than to scientific

reasoning
a normative
reasoning.17 Third, Peirce conceives of logic as disci

pline which indicates how one ought to reason; and he adopts ex

plicitly evaluative terms for Careful

assessing arguments.18 study
of the medieval texts confirms that Peirce's own of rea
conception
soning divided into formal and material agrees with the medieval
division of inferences into formal and material.
(consequentiae)
Peirce's notion of logic as normative and his use of "good" and "bad"
as evaluative terms in follows the medieval of
logic practice using
the Latin equivalents "bona" and "mala" for the same purpose. Fi
Peirce's use of all of these devices in the conduct of probable
nally,
argument is very close to the medieval of dialectical rea
practice
soning.19

Conclusion
To sum up, I refer to several items on Fisch 's list of unfinished
research tasks in Peircean Semeiotic.20
(1) In addition to a bibliography for primary and secondary sources,
a lexicon of Peirce's "best definitions" of semeiotic terms is needed.

Certainly, Scholastic authors will be important entries in the bibliog

raphy of primary sources. The Scholastic of terms in several

origins
key areas, e.g. signification, representation, inference should also be
evident.
 Peirce 's Semeio tic 47

(2) Peirce's to Cerberus" was

his explanation of signification
"sop
in terms of human acts of Whereas the ideal of
understanding.
Grammar which Peirce inherited from the medieval
Speculative
was to in or "universal" or
modistae explain signification "pure"
"essential" terms.

(3) A full elaboration of "A System of Logic, considered as

Semiotic" if composed today by Peirce would include a number of
divisions and rules of inference which would apply to rational dis

course whether written, or The nearest

equally spoken thought.
ancestors of such a of are the treatises
surviving system logic logic
of the laterMiddle Ages.
(4) Modern studies of Peirce's Semeiotic have emphasized the

first of the three of the Semeiotic trivium. A fuller study of

parts
Semeiotic would show how supposition, and inference
signification,
?
are foundational to each of the three parts of the trivium Specu
lative Grammar, Critic, Methodeutic.
Peirce's from a Nominalist to a Realist theory of signs
(5) passage
must be studied the Scholastic background which exercised
against
a influence on his thinking in this area.
powerful
I have tried in a preliminary
to show way where and how some

basic of medieval are apparent in Peirce's philosophical

concepts logic
Scholastic sources prove useful to understanding
thought. might

precisely Peirce's views on many other topics, e.g. on mathematics,

the positive sciences, and the sign theory of cognition.
synechism
Those views, like several mentioned in this paper, await develop
ment in further research on Peirce.

University of Kentucky

NOTES

1. See John Boler, "Peirce, Ockham and Scholastic Realism," The

Monist, Volume 63, 1980,

pp. 290-303. Allan B. Wolter, "An Oxford
July
on Language and Metaphysics," Review of Metaphysics 31, 1978,
Dialogue
pp. 615-648; 32, 1978, pp. 323-348.
2. C. S. Peirce, "Evolutionary Love," The Monist 1893, in Collected
edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, 1932.
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
References are to this collection in the standard form, vis. (CP 6.302-317).
 48 Alan R. Perreiah

3. See I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic (Notre Dame:

Notre Dame University Press, 1961). Ernest Moody, Truth and Consequence
in Mediaeval Logic (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1953). Philotheus Boehner,
Medieval Logic (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1952). William
and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1962). L. M. DeRijk, Logica Modernorum (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967). For
later developments see: E. J. Ashworth, and Logic in the Post
Language
Medieval Period (Boston: D. Reidel, 1974). For a review of recent work see:
Paul V. Spade, "Recent Research on Medieval Logic," Synthese 40, pp. 3-18.
4. C. S. Peirce, "The Ethics of Terminology," (CP 2.236).
5. Emily Michael, "A Note on the Roots of Peirce's Division of
Logic
into Three Branches," Notre Dame Journal of Formal 18, October 1977,
Logic
pp. 639-40. On the Scholastic authors and sources available to Peirce see:
Frederick Michael and Emily Michael, "Peirce on the Nature of Logic," Notre
Dame Journal of Formal 20, January 1979, pp. 84-88.
Logic Emily Michael,
"Peirce's Earliest Contact with Scholastic Transactions
Logic," of the Peirce
Society 12, Winter 1976, pp. 46-55.
6. Max H.
Fisch, "Peirce's Central Theory of Signs," in Sight, Sound
and Sense, edited
by Thomas A Sebeok, Advances in Semiotics, Bloomington
and London: Indiana University Press, 1978. pp. 31-70.
7. See: Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales, J. P. Mullally (transi.)
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1945). William of Sherwood,
Introduction to Logic, N. Kretzmann (transi.) of
(Minneapolis: University
Minnesota Press, 1966). Paul of Venice, Logica Parva, A. R. Perreiah (trans?.)
(Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1984).
8. On grammar see: G. L. Bursill-Hall, Grammars
Speculative of
the Middle Ages (Paris: Mouton. 1971). Where the grammarians emphasized
the first two domains, vis. the partes orationis and the compositiones, the
rhetoricians such as Lorenzo Valla who was known to Peirce discussed spoken
discourse in all three areas. See Laurentii Valle, Dialectice et
Repastinatio
Philosophie, Gianni
Zippel (ed.) 2 volumes, (Padua: Antenore, 1982).
9. Roger Bacon: "grammatica una et eadem est secundum sub
stantiam in omnibus Unguis, licet accidentaliter varietur." {Gram Graec, Ox
ford MS, ed. Charles, p. 278) cited in Bursill-Hall, p. 12. See also
p. 26 ff.
10. "The first [branch of Semeioticl is called by Duns Scotus gram
matica speculativa.'1 in C. S. Peirce, "Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs,"
CP 2.227-9. A treatise entitled Grammatica was included in a col
Speculativa
lection of Scotus' works edited Luke in 1639.
by Wadding Long attributed
to Scotus, the work is now to be
generally accepted by Thomas of Erfurt. See
Bursill-Hall, p. 34, n. 79.
11. See Paul of Venice, p. 143 ff.
 Peirce's Semeiotic 49

12. C. S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," CP

5.264-8.
13. See Emily Michael, "Peirce's Early Study of the Logic of Rela
tions," Transactions of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society 10, No. 2, pp. 63-75.
14. C. S. Peirce, "The Nature of Mathematics," CP 4.232, 238-43,
246.
15. CP 3.405.
16. C. S. Peirce, "On The Algebra of Logic," CP 3.154-66, 168.
17. C. S. Peirce, "Leading Principle," CP 2.588-9.
18. C. S. Peirce, "Minute Logic," CP 2.169-73.
19. See Paul of Venice, Logica Parva, p. 167 ff.
20. Fisch, pp. 64-66.