ARTICLE VIII, JUDICIAL DEPATMENT

SECTION 1

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

1. TATAD VS GARCIA

FACTS: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along Edsa. EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd.,
a foreign corporation was awarded the contract to build, lease and transfer the said light railway. The
said award was questioned by the petitioners on the basis that a foreign corporation cannot own the
EDSA LRT III, a public utility as it violates the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not an owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility constitute a public
utility?

HELD: EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd Is admittedly a foreign corporation “duly incorporated and existing
under the laws of Hong Kong”. However, there is no dispute that once the EDSA LRT III is constructed,
the private respondent, as lessor, will turn it over to DOTC as lessee, for the latter to operate the
system and pay rentals for the said use. What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling
stocks, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to
operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not themselves constitute a public utility. What
constitutes a public utility in not their ownership but their use to serve the public. The Constitution, in
no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does not
require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it
does not operate them to serve the public. In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation”
of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and the equipment used to serve the public.

2. KILOSBAYAN VS MORATO

FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC
leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket
or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease
is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was
filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA
was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no
longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different
from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is
advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek
to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties
to the contract

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

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HELD: NO, STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a
Departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. LAW OF THECASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a
former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the
Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at
issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question
is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in
INTEREST.

3. LOZADA VS COMELEC

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an
election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on
Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973Constitution which provides: “In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang
Pambansa eighteen months or more before regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a
special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve
the unexpired term.” COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack
standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the
1973Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.

HELD: The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision,
orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which
reads: “Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.” There is in this
case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under
its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the afore quoted provision, which is the only known
provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is obvious
that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail
huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation
for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much
less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play
in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would
seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the
vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive
prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for
mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended
to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
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4. PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork
barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure
on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said
bill to the President for consideration and approval. On December 30, 1993, the President signed the
bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO.7663, entitled “AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THEPHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions,
as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly
done through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether
foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act
and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No.
292, the Administrative Code of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUC’s),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics
Drugs Law (R.A. No.6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of
the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval
of the Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire
Special Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization
Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) Additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18SF-260
Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers”

6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension
and gratuity funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994:

(a) For the Supreme Court,

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 (b) Commission on Audit (COA),

(c) Ombudsman,

(d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR),

(e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional

3. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional.

HELD:

LOCUS STANDI

We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal
standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution
(Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzmanv. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).

VETO OF THE PROVISIONS

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). There is, therefore, sound basis to
indulge in the presumption of validity of veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity
thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The vetoed provision on the debt
servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O.
No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these
laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law. In the veto of the provision
relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special
provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government
agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws
authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy”

(e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange
Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Management’s Procurement Service).The
veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto.
It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the
said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The Special Provision
which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate” provision. Being
directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP,
the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item (Bolinao
Electronics Corporation v.Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).The requirement in Special Provision No. 2
on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases

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of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the “congressional or legislative
veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the
legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2
and 3 were properly vetoed. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the
Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have
been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws
that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the
Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which
allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the
AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article
VI of the Constitution. Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language
used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members
all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for
such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGU’s to be amended. On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is
less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he
will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or
inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take“necessary
and proper steps” to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]).
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

5. OPOSA VS FACTORAN

FACTS: Principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court.

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the
issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory
and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. On 18
July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the
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said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of
the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again,
the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in
this case. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20
and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the
DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable
right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are
not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause,
it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

ISSUE:

HELD: It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement
of aright vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review.

6. KILOSBAYAN VS GUIGONA

FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42)
which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other
similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of
increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after
learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad, “a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,” “became
interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad
(through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine
corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended
to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project
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would be offered and delivered to PCSO.” Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993,
PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it
had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system and that
the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993“for
final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive. “On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open
letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the
basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President
of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that “only a court
injunction can stop Malacañang,” and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in
February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition. Petitioner
claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests,
nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigber to Tañada
and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees
of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and
Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and
concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents meanwhile allege that the petitioners
have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Court’s resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office.

ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi
Whether the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” is legal and
valid.

HELD: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications
of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in
the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The
legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion,
this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage
of. The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its
franchise with another byway of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign,
transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the
PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions
of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the
instrument. Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that
any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and
management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the
franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are
provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint
venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system. We
thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B,
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to
law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the
petitioners

7. LEGASPI VS CSC

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8. BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION VS LARON

FACTS: A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a
city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract
due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions. Thereafter, the City issued a
resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay Construction for the establishment of
a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City
assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the
counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest

HELD: No, The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no
disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will
fund the planned construction of the market building.

9. DUMLAO VS COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52as
discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4
provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payments of
retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which
he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and
Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person
who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by
the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of
those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact.

ISSUES: Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with

HELD: No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are:
1) There must be an actual case or controversy;
2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
4)The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself.
As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision. His question is
posed merely in the abstract, and without the benefit of a detailed factual record. As to (2), neither
Igot nor Salapantan has been charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being
candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. Igot
and Salapantan have institute the case as a taxpayer’s suit, but the institution of a taxpayer’s suit per
se is no assurance of judicial review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in this particular case.
Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent

10. JOYA VS PCGG

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FACTS: Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then Pres.
Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York to auction off Old Masters
Paintings and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres.
Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for
Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought
to enjoin PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule.
Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the
preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth and that the paintings and silverware are
public properties collectively owned by them and the people in general to view and enjoy as great
works of art alleging that they have been deprived of their right to public property without due
process of law, they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to
their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the
Constitution and RA 4846.

ISSUE: Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites for the Court to exercise its power
of judicial review over this case.

HELD: No, Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, because they are not the legal owners of the
artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned since such artworks are
in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation
established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to the Marcos couple
on their silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the petitioners
seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not because they are after
the fulfillment of a positive duty required of the respondent public officials which is the only ground
for a writ of mandamus to be issued.

The taxpayers’ suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were acquired from private
sources and not with public money. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication there must be an
actual controversy – one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic
when its purpose has become stale, such as this case. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition
is to enjoin the respondents from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date which
had long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic. Nevertheless, the Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or
legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. However, there is no such justification
in this petition.

11. DAVID VS ARROYO

FACTS: As the nation celebrated EDSA’s 20th anniversary, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring
a state of national emergency and thereby commanded the AFP and PNP to immediately carryout
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence. This declaration led to cancellation of all programs and activities related to the EDSA
People Power I celebration. Rally permits were revoked and warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including the media, were implemented. Assemblies and rallyists were dispersed. Along with
the dispersal, petitioner was arrested without warrant. A week after PP 1017, PP1021 was issued
lifting the state of emergency.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual controversy or case subject for judicial review.

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Whether or not there petition is with legal standing particularly on his qualification to sue.

HELD: The Solicitor General’s refute that the case has been moot and academic was not upheld by the
Court. According to the Supreme Court, courts will decide cases otherwise found moot and academic
if: there is grave Constitutional violation, the situation’s exceptional character and paramount public
interest involved, issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, bar
and public, and lastly it is capable of repetition yet evading review. Petitioner was found to be of legal
standing on the grounds that his personal rights were involved. The petitioner qualifies under the
direct injury test. The personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury qualifies him to impugn the validity of the statute. To wit some of these direct
injuries he sustained are the illegal arrest and unlawful search he experienced. Given this fact, the
court entertained his petition as he has adequately shown that he entitled to judicial protection.
However, the court does not liberally declare statutes as invalid although they may be abused and
misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the
end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into
consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. The Court partly grants the petitions.
PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence is
declared unconstitutional. Such proclamation does not also authorize the President to take over
privately-owned public utilities or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.
General Order No. 5 is constitutional as it is a standard on how the AFP and PNP would implement
PP1017, but portion where ³acts of terrorism´ has not been defined and punishable by congress is
held unconstitutional.

Furthermore, the following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of
the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP
800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as
warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and
other materials.

12. MACASIANO VS NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

FACTS: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic
Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992. He predicates his
locust standi on his being a consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments
on Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January 1992 from
the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections 28
and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties
regarding demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the
demolition of illegal structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past."

As a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully disbursed."

On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He maintains that, the instant
petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial
review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or
controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks

10 | P a g e
for an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as he does not
state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no showing that the question of
constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not
constitutionality infirm.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

HELD: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented
in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be very lis mota presented.

To reiterate, the essential requisites for successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law
are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the
constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the decision of the case.

A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result
of the acts or measures complained of. It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2)
fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not
claim that, in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually
prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner
because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections of the said Act.
Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."

13. PORMENTO VS ESTRADA

FACTS: Private respondent Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He was however ousted [“resigned
“according to the decision of the Supreme Court in Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March
2,2001] from office and was not able to finish his term. He sought the presidency again in the general
elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed Erap’s candidacy and filed
a petition for the latter’s disqualification, which was however denied by the COMELEC
2nd Division. His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court,
the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or
resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence,
private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May
10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President
from any reelection.
HELD:

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14. LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC

FACTS: Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Olivia Paras,
her rival, and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong.
Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her
father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage
to Limkaichong’s dad during the pendency of the case against Limkaichong before the (Commission on
Elections) COMELEC. Election Day came and votes were cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over
her rival Paras. COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. About 2 days after the
counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate.

On the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’
petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise
jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on.
COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUE: 1. whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid.

2. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD: 1. the proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint
Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc
her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended,
12 | P a g e
there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration – A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision,
resolution, order and ruling.

2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s proclamation. The SC has invariably held
that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the lower house, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper
proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its
members.

15. MARIANO VS COMELEC

FACTS: A petition for prohibition and declaratory relief against R.A. No. 7854, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati," was filedby
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, FrankieCruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of
the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD: The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence
of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents
of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
16. SANTIAGO VS BAUTISTA

FACTS:

13 | P a g e
Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his
parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against
the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD
claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become
academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part
of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions,
under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function

ISSUE: Whether judicial function be exercised in this case.

RULING:
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the
doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist,
Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions:
1) There must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for
hearing and determination.
2) That the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a
decision.
3) The tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at
least the not the legislative nor the executive)
It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the
legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy.

Judicial power is defined:

o As authority to determine the rights of persons or property.
o Authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
o The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
o The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights
of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring
there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine

17. PACU VS SEC OF EDUC

FACTS: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706
otherwise known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges
obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction” and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth
Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school
and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will
also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3)
its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules
and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers.
Section 1 of Act No. 2706“It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them,
and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise,
14 | P a g e
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in
the same,”
The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school
is not originally included in the original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the
petitioners they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could
exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum
contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of
deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said
act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and Commonwealth Act no.180 may be
declared void and unconstitutional?

HELD: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek
to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established
principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is
not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive and
legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public.
Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of
litigant requires the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such,
Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the
validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the
constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only
in the last resort and it must be necessary to determine a real and vital controversy between litigants.
Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court
does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court
however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is
to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law because it needs no argument to show that abuse by
officials entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality
of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation
of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the
Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally
objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for
prohibition.

18. DAZA VS SINGSON

FACTS: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment
in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They
withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the
chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except
Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.

ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of
the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of

twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively
15 | P a g e
on the basis of proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the
authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it
may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.

SECTION 2
The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

1. MALAGA VS PENACHOS

2. MANTRUSTE SYSTEM INC VS CA

FACTS: MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel, where it would
operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other
3rd parties by DBP.
The Bay view Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50 and was consequently
transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the
interim lease agreement to effect the disposition of the property. The APT granted the President of MSI's condition
an extension of 30 days within which to effect the delivery of the Bay view Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for more than 1 year the
agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in buying the property, while emphasizing
that MSI has a legal lien on the property because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which
amounted to P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took place but MSI did not
participate. Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were awarded the property as the highest
bidder for P85 Million. MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the
winning bidders. Trial court granted, but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of
Proclamation No. 50: "No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the
trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. Nor shall such order or
injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking
possession of any assets purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up held that it continues to be
operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not
been deprived of its property rights since those rights are non-existent and its only property right was the alleged
reimbursable advances made to DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of
judicial power for MSI does not have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the said
property.

ISSUE: whether the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50, prohibiting the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the TC.

RULING: Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the
inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution).
16 | P a g e
Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its
functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it
violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without
jurisdiction.

3. LUPANGCO VS CA

FACTS: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the RTC
a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against
respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the
same unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending
review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?

RULING: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak
to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an
examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions.

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and
every examinee during the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes
for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to
how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from
taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors.

SECTION 3
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by
the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be
automatically and regularly released.
1. BENGSON VS DRILON

17 | P a g e
FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed”
during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws
in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino
vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain
or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the
court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644)
because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v.
Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never
repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment
in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein
are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government; among such
obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired
justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed
when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive
Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary

HELD: Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary. The
veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should
be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make
adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including
the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the
judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It
knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand
on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

SECTION 4
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
18 | P a g e
 orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en
banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

1. MACALINTAL VS PET

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his arguments that
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position,
petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot be
created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that
if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot
create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional.

HELD: Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same
Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the
last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice presidential elections
contests includes the means necessary to carry it into
effect. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides th
at the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."
Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is
apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include
"the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the patrol any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded,
but it remained absolute. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text
of the provision itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PET’s constitutionality. The Court reiterates
that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the
discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. The explicit
reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory before is not diluted
by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal .

Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording required by
petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.“ The set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. At the
barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal
or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively. At the higher levels -
city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial -exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged
in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election
contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-
C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

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Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to
judicial review -via a petition for
certiorari filed by the proper party - if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission , Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels." In fact,
Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the
1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, and
paragraph 2 of the present
Constitution. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, inconjunctio
n with latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative
of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. If the logic of
petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would
violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among
the first to acknowledge that
this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices
shall sit in theSenate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section4,
Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the
sameprohibition. We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of theCourt
were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e. , the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v.State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it is a nullity." The vehicle for
the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view,
like the petitioner's, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power”
Finally, petitioner’s application of the Court’s decision in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission
to the present case is an unmitigated quantum leap. The decision therein held that the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC) “finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.” A plain reading of the
constitutional provisions,i.e., last paragraph of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch,
reveals that the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive and the Judicial
Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the PET was, in fact,
mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting of the present
Constitution.

2. DE CASTRO VS JUDICIAL BAR

FACTS: Seven days After 2010 Presidential Election, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno had his compulsory Retirement
by May 17, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the
incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
But under Section 4 (1), Article III judicial Department of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the
Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, “from a "list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy." This provision sin in contrast with the provision
mentioned above.

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The question now arises whether the incumbent president has the right to appoint the next chief Justice upon the
retirement of Chief Justice Puno. The JBC has unanimously agreed in their meeting on January 18, 2011, to start the
process of the filling the Vacant position of the Retired Chief Justice. Judicial Bar Council has published the said
announcement in the Daily inquirer and Philippine Star newspapers on January 20, 2010. Despite of the issues JBC
has decided to proceed to the next step of the process by announcing the names of the following Associate Justices:
Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De
Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval and inviting the public to file their sworn complaint,
written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to the Following Candidates. The
announcement was printed at Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star on February 13, 2010.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the Judiciary.

RULING: No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition
to appointments made in the Executive Department. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the
President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within
90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the
President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President
after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to
make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby
effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment. The duty of the JBC to
submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but
its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the
discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the
President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of
duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. The distinction between a ministerial and
discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.

3. LIMKETKAI SON MILLING INC VS CA

FACTS: On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker was given formal authority by BPI to sell
the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. The owners of the Philippine Remnants concurred this arrangement.
Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of Petitioner Company who agreed to buy the land. On July 9, 1988, Revilla
formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner. On July 11, 1988, petitioner's officials,
Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm the sale. Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-
President Arom in entertained them. The parties agreed that the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 per square meter
to be paid in cash. The authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive basis; there is no dispute
over petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served. Alfonso Lim then asked if it was possible to
pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask for payment on terms because in
previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It was the understanding, however, that should the term
payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash. Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its
offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of
P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused because Albano stated that the authority to sell that
particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn from his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI Vice-
President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive payment. An action for specific performance with damages was
thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court
that it had sold the property under litigation to NBS on July 14, 1989.Upon elevation of the case to the Court of
Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and the complaint dismissed on 12 August 1994. It washeld

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that no contract of sale was perfected because there was no concurrence of the three requisites enumerated in
Article 1318 of the Civil Code. On its decision in Dec. 1, 1995, the Supreme Court reversed and set asidethe
questioned judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the 10 June1991 judgment of Branch 151 of the RTC
of The National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig, Metro Manila except for the award of P10,000,000.00
damages, which was deleted. On March 26, 1996, Motion for Reconsideration was granted. Petitioner’s
opposition to the MR was denied. The SC sets aside Dec. 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the decision of CA.
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration by Petitioner.

ISSUE: WoN the case should be referred to the court en banc

HELD: The Petitioner is contending that the case should be referred to the court enbanc because as the doctrines
laid down in Abrenica v. Gonda and DeGracia, 34 Phil. 739, Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, 43 SCRA 473, and
VilloncoRealty Co. v. Bormaheco, Inc., et. al., 65 SCRA 352, have been modified or reversed. The court held that a
more circumspect analysis of these cases vis-a- vis the case at bench would inevitably lead petitioner to the
conclusion that there was neither reversal nor modification of the doctrines laid down in the Abrenica ,Talosig and
Villonco cases. In fact, the inapplicability of the principle enunciated in Abrenica and Talosig to this case has
already been extensively discussed in the Court’s resolution, hence the same will not be addressed anew. As
regards the case of Villonco, petitioner mistakenly assumes that its case has a similar factual milieu with the
former. The Court finds no further need to elaborate on the issue, but will simply point out the significant fact that
the offer of the buyer in Villonco, unlike in this case, was accepted by the seller, Bormaheco, Inc.;and Villonco
involves a perfected contract, a factor crucially absent in the instant case as there was no meeting of the minds
between the parties. What petitioner bewails the most is the present composition of the Third
Division which deliberated on private respondents’ motions for reconsideration and by a majority vote reversed
the unanimous decision of December 1, 1995. More specifically, petitioner questions the assumption of Chief
Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly rams its idea on how each Division should
be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief Justice Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr.
Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice and the Third Division by Mr. Justice Regalado, the third in line.
We need only to stress that the change in the membership of the three divisions of the Court was inevitable by
reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano’s retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which
petitioner certainly has no business at all.

In fact, the current “staggered” set-up in the chairmanships of the Divisions is similar to that adopted in1988.
In that year, the Court’s Third Division was likewise chaired by then Chief Justice Fernan, while the First and
Second Divisions were headed bythe next senior Justices--Justices Narvasa and Melencio-Herrera,respectively.

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