ONDOY vs.
GARCIA to grant the claim finds no
FACTS:
The mother of one Jose Ondoy, who
was drowned while in the employ of
private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio.
A motion to dismiss was filed based
on the alleged absence of an
employment relationship. What
cannot be ignored, however, is that
subsequently, in the hearing of such
claim, private respondent submitted
affidavits executed by the chief
engineer and oiler of the fishing
vessel that the deceased, a
fisherman, was in that ship,
undeniably a member of the working
force, but after being invited by
friends to a drinking spree, left the
vessel, and thereafter was found
dead.
Sometime in October,
1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-
worker, was in the actual
performance of his work with said
fishing enterprises, he was drowned
and died on October 22, 1968. That
the deceased died in line of Duty."
ISSUE:
WON Ondoy can be compensated
for the death.
RULING:
Yes
In the present case, there is
evidence of the fact of death due to
drowning. That was not controverted.
Under the circumstances, the failure
justification in law.
It bears repeating that there is
evidence, direct and categorical, to
the effect that the deceased was
drowned while "in the actual
performance of his work" with the
shipping enterprise of private
respondent. Even without such
evidence, the petitioner could have
relied on the presumption of
compensability under the Workmen’s
Compensations Act once it is shown
that the death or disability arose in
the course of employment, with the
burden of overthrowing it being cast
on the person or entity resisting the
claim.
This Court, in recognizing the right of
petitioner to the award, merely
adheres to the interpretation
uninterruptedly followed by this Court
resolving all doubts in favor of the
claimant.
There is need, it seems, even at this
late date, for [private respondent]
and other employers to be reminded
of the high estate accorded the
Workmen's Compensation Act in the
constitutional scheme of social
justice and protection to labor.
No other judicial attitude may be
expected in the face of a clearly
expressed legislative determination
which antedated the constitutionally
avowed concern for social justice
and protection to labor. It is easily
understandable why the judiciary
frowns on resort to doctrines, which
even if deceptively plausible, would
result in frustrating such a national
policy.
To be more specific, the principle of
social justice is in this sphere
strengthened and vitalized. A realistic
view is that expressed in Agustin v.
Workmen's Compensation
Commission: 'As between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the
employer, who has resources to
secure able legal advice, the law has
reason to demand from the latter
stricter compliance. Social justice in
these cases is not equality but
protection.
SALONGA vs. FARRALES
In an ejectment case filed by the
appellee Farrales, the titled owner of
the land in question against the
possessors, the appellants Salongas,
who erected a house thereon, the
Olongapo City Court rendered a
decision ordering the Salongas to
vacate the land and Pay the rentals
in arrears. When aforesaid decision
was affirmed by the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo
City and the decision was partially
satisfied by the payment of rentals,
Salonga offered to purchase from
Farrales said land but the latter
persistently refused. Instead Farrales
insisted on the execution of the
judgment. Salonga filed a complaint
against Farrales and the Sheriff with
the Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City for
specific performance which was
dismissed on the ground that there
exists no legally enforceable
compromise agreement by which
Farrales can be compelled to sell the
land in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals certified this case to
the Supreme Court on purely
question of law. The Supreme Court
held that: (a) no compromise
agreement to sell the land was ever
perfected between the defendant-
appellee as vendor and the Plaintiffs-
appellants as vendees and (b) under
Art. 1678 of the New Civil Code the
Salongas as lessees, may remove
the improvements should Farrales
refuse to reimburse them but the
former do not have the right to buy
the land.
Appeal dismissed.
As to the contention that Sec. 6,
Article II of the New Constitution is
applicable to the case at bar, it must
be remembered that social justice
cannot be invoked to trample on the
rights of property owners who under
our Constitution and laws are also
entitled to protection. The social
justice consecrated in our
constitution was not intended to take
away rights from a person and give
them to another who is not entitled
thereto. Evidently, the plea for social
justice cannot nullify the law on
obligations and contracts, and is,
therefore, beyond the power of the
Court to grant.
VIRTUOSO vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE
Petitioner filed an application for
habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court on the grounds that the
preliminary investigation conducted
by respondent Judge which led to the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest
was constitutionally deficient, and
that the bail recommended was
excessive. During the oral argument
however, it was ascertained that
petitioner was a seventeen-year old
minor entitled to the protection and
the benefits of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code,
particularly the provision affording
youthful offenders the opportunity to
be provisionally released on
recognizance at the discretion of the
Court.
The Supreme Court without passing
upon the issue of whether or not the
preliminary investigation conducted
was constitutionally deficient
resolved to release petitioner on
recognizance pursuant to the
provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code without prejudice to
further proceedings of his pending
criminal case.
Petition granted in accordance with
the Court's resolution.
FACTS:
Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application
for the writ of habeas corpus on
February 23, 1978, premised his plea
for liberty primarily on the ground that
the preliminary examination which
led to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against him was a useless
formality as respondent Municipal
Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, 1 failed
to meet the strict standard required
by the Constitution to ascertain
whether there was a probable cause.
He likewise alleged that aside from
the constitutional infirmity that tainted
the procedure followed in the
preliminary examination, the bail
imposed was clearly excessive.
Judge, in his return filed on March 8,
1978, justified the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, alleging that there
was no impropriety in the way the
preliminary examination was
conducted.
It was ascertained that petitioner is a
seventeen-year old minor entitled to
the protection and benefits of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, a
youthful offender being defined
therein as "one who is over nine
years but under eighteen years of
age at the time of the commission of
the offense. Such, he could be
provisionally released on
recognizance in the discretion of a
court.
Accordingly, after the
hearing, the Court issued the
following resolution: "Acting on the
verbal petition of counsel for
petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the
Court Resolved pursuant to section
191 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
petitioner being a 17-year old minor,
to [order] the release of the petitioner
on the recognizance of his parents
Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela
Virtouso and his counsel, Atty.
Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open
court, agreed to act in such capacity,
without prejudice to further
proceedings in a pending case
against petitioner being taken in
accordance with law."
This Court should, whenever
appropriate, give vitality and force to
the Youth and Welfare Code, which
is an implementation of this specific
constitutional mandate: "The State
recognizes the vital role of the youth
in nation building and shall promote
their physical, intellectual, and social
well-being."

Thus was the petition resolved,

without the need of passing upon the
issue of whether or not the procedure
by respondent Judge in ascertaining
the existence of probable cause was
constitutionally deficient.
Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in
mind by occupants of
the bench that they should always be
on the alert lest by sloth or
indifference or due to the economic
or social standing of the alleged
offended party, as was intimated in
this petition, the rights of an accused,
instead of being honored, are
disregarded.

Laguna Lake vs CA
Facts: