Baxter 1

Robert C. Baxter III

Mrs. Rebecca Urciuoli-Curtis

ELA1

28th January 2015

Europe’s Overdependence on Russian Energy Exports

Europe’s overdependence on Russia’s energy leads to the loss of the European way of

life and results in people living in fear. Russia will not change, so in order to keep their freedom

and way of life, Europeans must become more energy independent.

Russia has a long history of using countries’ energy dependency to strong-arm them into

submitting to Russia’s will. The policy of withholding energy from countries to force them into

submission began in 1948, with the Soviet Union’s institution of a blockade around Berlin,

Germany. “At 6 A.M. there on June 24, 1948, … the Russians, in order to capture control of the

entire city, halted the trains, trucks, and barges that brought food, coal, and every other supply

into the western portions of the capital on a daily basis” (Cherny 3). Fortunately, the United

States of America managed to supply the city throughout the blockade, in what is now known as

the Berlin Airlift, for almost a year, until the Soviet Union lifted the blockade on May 11, 1949.

In the 1990’s when the Soviet Union was nearing its end, Lithuania decided to declare

independence. “When the Supreme Soviet voted 124-0 to declare independence in April 1990,

Gorbachev cut off the oil and gas for the first time, successfully using energy as a blunted

foreign policy tool. The disruption didn’t last, however, and in August 1991, Gorbachev resigned

and the Soviet Union recognized Lithuania’s independence” (Steinberg 26). On January 1st,

2006, Russia cut off gas shipments to Ukraine. Three years later, Russia cut off gas to Ukraine
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again. This time, many countries were affected by the shut offs. Most recently, Russia has cut off

gas to Ukraine three times in 2014. In conclusion, since the end of World War II and the Berlin

blockade, Russia has used its neighbors’ energy dependency to strong-arm them into submitting

to Russia’s demands. Although the seven examples presented above may seem to be many, it is

necessary to realize that they are, in reality, only a small portion of an occurrence that has

happened innumerable times.

This policy has resulted in the loss of a normal way of life for hundreds of millions of

people over the last eighty years. And what has replaced their ways of life? Fear of a disruption

of a normal way of life, and dependency on another country for basic necessities. During the

Berlin Blockade, many people were given a small paper bag of coal for them to stretch out over a

month or more. “Citing a West Berliner in November of 1948, ‘I’m not a defeatist, but when I

ask myself how we’re going to get through this winter, I just don’t know’” (Cherny 466). Many

people despaired as to their living conditions. “‘To be living here among the ruins seems

equivalent to already be lying in one’s own coffin,’ wrote the poet Gottfried Benn in a letter to a

friend” (Cherny 466). In addition, the blockade also prevented food, as well as fuel, from

reaching the city’s inhabitants. “While they shivered, they also starved” (Cherny 469). In more

recent years, the type of energy withheld from people has changed, but the reaction of the

citizens forced to cope with harsh European winters have not. “Russia shut off all gas supplies to

Europe through Ukraine on Wednesday, leaving more than a dozen countries scrambling to cope

during a winter cold snap” (nbcnews.com 1). Although the Russians shut off the gas shipments

only to Ukraine, other European countries were also affected, reporting either a complete stop in

shipments or a reduced intake of gas. “Tens of thousands of people … were without central
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heating” (nbcnews.com 1). Some countries, such as Poland, had adequate reserves to ride out the

winter, while others had to rush to acquire other sources of fuel. “In Bosnia, where gas operator

Sarajevogas said the situation was close to a humanitarian disaster, woodcutters … cut wood for

fireplaces” (nbcnews.com 2). In June of 2014, Russia again cut off gas shipments to Ukraine.

However, this time the shut offs coincided, not coincidentally, with the Russian aggression

against Ukraine. This prompted officials in the Ukrainian government, such as Prime Minister

Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk, issued statements on what they thought of the recent events. “‘This is not

about gas,’ Mr. Yatsenyuk said. ‘This is a general plan for the destruction of Ukraine’”

(MacFarquhar 2). The countries that are most afraid of Russian shutoffs are usually small,

Eastern European countries that were formerly parts of the USSR, and thus still have a lingering

fear of Russian dominance in their consciousness. Russia’s history of using energy as a leverage

to tip the balance in their favor, and the staggering amount of people affected by the results of

Russia’s actions, gives overwhelming evidence as to why this issue is so severe. This can be

likened to Napoleon’s use of the windmill in Animal Farm, in the sense that Napoleon kept his

control over the farm by forcing the animals to construct a windmill, which he promised would

help the animals become wealthy. Instead, the windmill was destroyed, and the animals were

forced to reconstruct it. Just like the windmill was the primary instrument in Napoleon’s policy

of subjugation, Russia’s policy also uses a tool, albeit a much more powerful and controversial

one.

Gazprom is “Russia’s natural gas monopoly, the country’s largest company, and the

producer of more than a third of the world’s supply of natural gas” (Kramer 1). However, in

recent times, Gazprom has taken on another role. In the words of Volodymyr I. Polokhalo, “‘In
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this case, Gazprom is not a company. It’s an instrument entirely in the hand of the president’ of

Russia” (Kramer 4). Most recently, Ukraine has been the recipient of three Gazprom shut offs,

all either explicitly ordered by President Putin or condoned by him. Another factor in Gazprom’s

primary position in Russian policy is the fact that many government officials own Gazprom

stock. “Gazprom’s new pricing policy in Ukraine would also benefit stockholders; Gazprom

could earn more than $3 billion next year by raising prices. Far from being a mere tool, some

analysts see Gazprom … as a driving force in pushing the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy with the

intention of increasing profits from energy sales” (Kramer 1). Also, “The wide acquisition of

Gazprom stock by the Moscow elite in recent years means that now many of the same people

who craft Russia’s foreign policy are also large Gazprom stockholders, according to some

analysts. Their inclination to use Gazprom as a foreign policy tool is thus tempered by their

personal stake in seeing the company run as a business” (Kramer 3). Russia has found many

ways to assert its dominance over other countries. As the Soviet Union, they primarily used

military might. Now, Russia uses Gazprom, “a personal instrument of Russia’s emerging foreign

policy doctrine, which rests on energy exports … in place of lost military might” (Kramer 1).

An accurate picture has been presented, showing the problem and the consequences.

However, the solution is not as simple as the problem. Europe must become more energy

independent. But what does this mean? First of all, Europeans as a whole must begin to reach out

to other suppliers of energy, and some are already on that track. “Poland is already paying a stiff

price … buying liquefied natural gas from Qatar, which costs more than Russian pipelines.

Lithuania is doing much of the same by buying L.N.G. from Norway” (Buchan 2). However,

achieving energy independence is somewhat complicated by the fact that Western and Eastern
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Europeans are not in agreement on how to go it. To further complicate matters, “East Europeans

are themselves divided in their views about Russian gas. The Baltic states remain eager to reduce

their energy dependence on Russia by building pipelines that would enable them to exchange gas

with Nordic countries and Poland, and by buying L.N.G” (Buchan 3). Other East European

countries have a different viewpoint. “Several countries in southeast Europe … remain

enthusiastic about obtaining a direct feed of Russian gas through the South Stream pipeline”

(Buchan 3). Even though Europe as a whole remains divided on how to achieve energy

independence from Russia, some countries have taken the steps to begin this process. Importing

LNG is also a prospect being considered by other countries in Eastern Europe. Also, “the

Southern Gas Corridor project will open in a few years importing gas from the Caspian region

and – for the first time – circumventing Russia, which will lose its gas export monopoly from the

region to Europe” (Russian-Ukrainian-EU gas conflict 2). This will allow Europe to take a big

step in the direction of energy diversity, but Russia might retaliate with higher prices and/or gas

shutoffs. Another feasible option for Europe to achieve energy independence would be for the

US to begin exporting energy to Europe, and also to impose more sanctions on Russia. Some

European countries, such as Germany and Denmark, have also constructed offshore wind farms,

and other countries are planning similar projects (www.offshorecenter.dk 1). In conclusion,

Europe must become more energy independent by reaching out for other sources of energy,

creating more pipelines that allow Europe to obtain gas from countries other than Russia, and for

the US to increase sanctions on Russia and increase energy exports to Europe, in order to stay

free and keep their way of life.

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Europe’s overdependence on Russia’s energy leads to the loss of the European way of

life and results in people living in fear. Russia will not change, so in order to keep their freedom

and way of life, Europeans must become more energy independent. The reason that this is a

serious problem is because Russia has a long history of cutting off energy exports to other

countries, resulting in a sense of fear and dependency on the part of the recipients. The primary

tool for the implementation of this policy is Gazprom, the Russian natural gas company, and to

offset this problem, Europeans must increase their energy independence by reaching out for other

sources of energy. Russia has a long history of bullying their European neighbors, and it is

doubtful that they will change. Therefore, a restructuring of Russian foreign policy is simply not

feasible. To maintain its freedom, Europe must work to develop their own energy independence,

either by increasing their energy imports from other sources, and instituting more renewable

energy sources, such as wind farms. The US can help, but it is up to Europe to lead the way.
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Works Cited

Cherny, Andrei. The Candy Bombers; The Untold Story of the Berlin Airlift and America’s

Finest Hour. The Penguin Group, 2008. Print.

Steinberg, Julie. Return of the Bear? The Extent of Russian Revisionism as Applied to Oil and

Gas Machinations; A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Political Science Department at the

University of Pennsylvania In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Bachelor of

Arts. [University of Pennsylvania] 2009. Web. 27 January 2015.

MacFarquhar, Neil. Gazprom Cuts Russia’s Natural Gas Supply to Ukraine. [New York Times]

2014. Web. 27 January 2015.

[Author Unknown]. Europe Strives to Overcome Its Reliance on Russian Gas. [New York

Times] 2014. Web. 27 January 2015

Kramer, Andrew E. Gazprom Becomes the Bear of Russia. [New York Times] 2005. Web. 27

January 2015

[Author Unknown] Europeans Shiver As Russia Cuts Gas Shipments. [Associated Press] 2009.

Web. 27 January 2015

[Author Unknown] Just How Important is Russian Gas for Europe?. [Publisher Unknown]

[Published Date Unknown] Web. 29 January 2015.

Panin, Alexander. Russia’s South Stream Alternative Rests on Shaky Ground. [Publisher

Unknown]. 2014. Web. 29 January 2015.

[Author Unknown]. How does Europe wean itself off Russian Gas?. [Publisher Unknown].

[Published Date Unknown] Web. 29 January 2015.

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[Author Unknown] Russian-Ukrainian-EU Gas Conflict: Who Stands to Lose Most?. [Publisher

Unknown] [Published Date Unknown]. Web. 29 January 2015.

[Author Unknown] http://www.offshorecenter.dk/offshorewindfarms.asp. [Offshore Center

Denmark] [Published Date Unknown] Web. 2 February 2015