Francisco Chavez v. Raul M.
Gonzales and resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press
National Telecommunications
Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February
15, 2008
D E C I S I O N
(En Banc)
PUNO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
As a consequence of the public
release of copies of the “Hello Garci”
compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation
between then-President Gloria Arroyo and
Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,
respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD
and those broadcasting or publishing its
contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to
arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he
had ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation to go after media organizations
“found to have caused the spread, the playing
and the printing of the contents of a tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC
warned in a press release all radio stations
and TV network owners/operators that the
conditions of the authorization and permits
issued to them by government like the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority explicitly provides that they shall
not use their stations for the broadcasting or
telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the
continuous airing or broadcast of the “Hello
Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV
stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority. It warned that their
broadcast/airing of such false information
and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a
just cause for the suspension, revocation
and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations issued to the said media
establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held
between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which
Statement which stated, among others, that
the supposed wiretapped tapes should be
treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition
under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary
Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Will a purported violation of law
such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of
respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno,
joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes
and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ.
Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura,
Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the
minority) in granting the petition insofar as
respondent Secretary Gonzalez’s press
statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted
10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales,
Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority,
as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in
the minority) in granting the same insofar as
NTC’s press statement was concerned.]
1. NO, a purported violation of law
such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT
justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality
by the clear and present danger rule. This
rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to
show that these acts do not abridge freedom
of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the
clear and present danger test. [T]he great
evil which government wants to prevent is
the airing of a tape recording in alleged
violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The
records of the case at bar however are
confused and confusing, and respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate
the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the
taped conversation is also suspect. The Press
Secretary showed to the public two versions,
one supposed to be a “complete” version and
the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the
evidence of the respondents on the who’s and
the how’s of the wiretapping act is
ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s
different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and
other related and relevant proofs are some of
the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given
all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even
arguable whether its airing would violate the
anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a
law will justify straitjacketing the exercise
of freedom of speech and of the press.
Our laws are of different kinds and
doubtless, some of them provide norms of
conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only
an adverse effect on a person’s private
comfort but does not endanger national
security. There are laws of great significance
but their violation, by itself and without
more, cannot support suppression of free
speech and free press. In fine, violation of
law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure,
which should be weighed in adjudging
whether to restrain freedom of speech and of
the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public
interest must be calibrated in light of the
preferred status accorded by the Constitution
and by related international covenants
protecting freedom of speech and of the
press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all
these factors to determine compliance with
the clear and present danger test, the Court
should not be misinterpreted as
devaluing violations of law. By all means,
violations of law should be vigorously
prosecuted by the State for they breed their
own evil consequence. But to repeat, the
need to prevent their violation cannot per
se trump the exercise of free speech and
free press, a preferred right whose breach
can lead to greater evils. For this failure of
the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy
the clear and present danger test, the Court
has no option but to uphold the exercise of
free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press
statements of respondents
DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that
has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not
reduced in or followed up with formal
orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the
press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their
official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent
Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of
Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as
the regulatory body of media. Any act done,
such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf
of the government in an official capacity is
covered by the rule on prior restraint. The
concept of an “act” does not limit itself to
acts already converted to a formal order or
official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official
order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior
restraint. The press statements at bar are
acts that should be struck down as they
constitute impermissible forms of prior
restraints on the right to free speech and
press.
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15;
Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. EDSA I EDSA II
146738, March 2 2001 exercise of people
power of freedom
FACTS: of speech and
It began in October 2000 when allegations of freedom of
wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal assemblyto
gambling, and other forms of corruption were petition the
made against Estrada before the Senate Blue exercise of the government for
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, people power of redress of
Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on revolution which grievances which
December 7, impeachment proceedings were overthrew the only affected the
begun in the Senate during which more whole office of the
serious allegations of graft and corruption government. President.
against Estrada were made and were only
intra
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 constitutional and
extra
senators, sympathetic to the President, constitutional and the resignation of
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence the legitimacy of the sitting
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment the new President that it
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire government that caused and the
prosecution panel walked out and Senate resulted from it succession of the
President Pimentel resigned after casting his cannot be the Vice President as
vote against Estrada. subject of judicial President are
review subject to judicial
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also review.
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined
presented
the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for
a political involves legal
a snap presidential election to be held
question; questions.
concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he
will not run in this election. On January 20, RULING:
SC declared that the seat of presidency was
1. Political questions- "to those questions
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
which, under the Constitution, are to be
resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her
decided by the people in their sovereign
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at
capacity, or in regard to which full
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his
discretionary authority has been delegated to
family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
the legislative or executive branch of the
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition
government. It is concerned with issues
with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting
particular measure."
any further proceedings in cases filed against
Legal distinction between EDSA People
him not until his term as president ends. He
Power I EDSA People Power II:
also prayed for judgment “confirming
The cases at bar pose legal and not political
Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
questions. The principal issues for resolution
President of the Republic of the Philippines
require the proper interpretation of certain
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of
provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of
his office.
Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation
of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art
ISSUE(S):
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable
the scope of presidential immunity from suit.
controversy.
They also involve the correct calibration of
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President. the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from
suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be 2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent
to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both
enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
were present when President Estrada left the president made by a co-equal branch of
Palace. government cannot be reviewed by this
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior Court.
facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President Estrada is 4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal
deemed to have resigned— constructive in character. They involve plunder, bribery
resignation. and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
SC declared that the resignation of President imagination can these crimes, especially
Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by plunder which carries the death penalty, be
his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of
release containing his final statement: a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the decision of this Court licensing the President
respondent as President; to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace with post-tenure immunity from liability. The
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
healing process (he did not say that he was are not acts of the State and the officer who
leaving due to any kind of disability and that acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
he was going to reassume the Presidency as in the same footing as any trespasser.
soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for 5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a
the opportunity to serve them as President fair trial and the free press are incompatible.
(without doubt referring to the past Also, since our justice system does not use
opportunity); the jury system, the judge, who is a learned
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any and legally enlightened individual, cannot be
future challenge that may come in the same easily manipulated by mere publicity. The
service of the country; Court also said that Estrada did not present
5. He called on his supporters to join him in enough evidence to show that the publicity
promotion of a constructive national spirit of given the trial has influenced the judge so as
reconciliation and solidarity. to render the judge unable to perform.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act Finally, the Court said that the cases against
of relinquishment—act or omission before, Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
during and after January 20, 2001. investigation, so the publicity of the case
would really have no permanent effect on the
3. The Congress passed House Resolution judge and that the prosecutor should be more
No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria concerned with justice and less with
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the prosecution.
Republic of the Philippines and subsequently
passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of
Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President.
Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the
Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and
has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition
is the premise that the inability of Estrada is
no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its
judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada
can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and
the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
People vs. Perez
FACTS:
Isaac Perez while holding a discussion with
several persons on political matters uttered
the following words "And the Filipinos, like
myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for
the Philippines.” Because of such utterances,
he was charged in the CFI of Sorsogon with
violation of Art. 256 of the RPC which has
something to do with contempt of ministers
of the Crown or other persons in authority. He
was convicted. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON Perez’s remarks is protected by the
constitutional protection on freedom of
speech.
Or WON the provisions of Act No. 292
should be interpreted so as to abridge the
freedom of speech and the right of the people
to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.
HELD:
No, it is not. Agreed with the lower court in
its findings of facts but convicted the accused
for violation of Act No.292 (Section 8).1
It is of course fundamentally true that the
provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of
speech and the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted
to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government.
Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary,
is within the range of liberty of speech,
Unless the intention and effect be seditious.
But when the intention and effect of the act is
seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly
1
Every person who shall utter seditious words or
speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or against the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish
utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any
act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing his office or in performing his
duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes, or which
and petition must yield to punitive measures
designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence
of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp.
2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7
Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra)
In this instance, the attack on the Governor-
General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used, which could
easily produce disaffection among the people
and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws. In the
words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious
words. He has made a statement and done an
act which tended to instigate others to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes. He
has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies.
He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities. He has made a statement
and done an act which tended to disturb the
peace of the community and the safety or
order of the Government. All of these various
tendencies can be ascribed to the action of
Perez and may be characterized as penalized
by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which
tends to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of
the community or the safety or order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such
evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars United States currency or by imprisonment
not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of
the court.
Primicias vs. Fugoso
[L-18000. Jan 27, 1948]
Doctrine:
Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of
Assembly and Expression
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted
by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of
the Coalesced Minority Parties, against
respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano
Fugoso, to compel the latter to issue a permit
for the holding of a public meeting at the
Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The
Petitioner requested for a permit to hold a
“peaceful public meeting”. However, the
respondent refused to issue such permit
because he found “that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous
utterances and upon the fact that passions,
especially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches
will be delivered tending to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly peace and a
disruption of public order.”
Respondent based his refusal to the Revised
Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense
against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful
purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119,
Free-use of Public Place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to
refuse to issue permit hence violating
freedom of assembly.
HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states
that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitution. However,
these rights are not absolute. They can be
regulated under the state’s police power –
That they should not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
to the rights of the community or society. The
Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations
of Sec. 1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of
Manila is vested with unregulated discretion
to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other
public places of the City of Manila; and 2)
The right of the Mayor is subject to
reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used with the
view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and
public places by others, and to provide
adequate and proper policing to minimize the
risk of disorder. The court favored the second
construction since the first construction is
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to
prohibit the use of the streets. Under our
democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to
any officer of the government, except
perhaps in cases of national emergency. It is
to be noted that the permit to be issued is for
the use of public places and not for the
assembly itself. The Court holds that the
assembly is lawful and thus cannot be struck
down. Fear of serious injury cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must
be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil
will result if free speech is practiced. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the
danger apprehended is imminent. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the evil
to be prevented is a serious one. The fact that
speech is likely to result in some violence or
in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS
Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza
Miranda - The Mayor cannot be compelled to
issue the permit. A permit should recognize
the right of the applicants to hold their
assembly at a public place of their choice,
another place may be designated by the
licensing
authority if it be shown that a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil if no
change was made.
Nelson Navarro vs. Mayor Antonio
Villegas
FACTS: On February 24, 1970, the
petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement
of a Democratic Philippines, wrote a letter to
the respondent, the Mayor of the city of
Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza
Miranda February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.On
the same day, the respondent wrote a reply,
denying his request on the grounds that, they
have temporarily adopted the policy of not
issuing any permit for the use of Plaza
Miranda for rallies or demonstration during
weekdays due to the events that happened
from the past week. On the same letter, the
respondent gave the petitioner an option to
use the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for its
rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end
before dark. The petitioner filed suit
contesting the Mayor’s action on the ground
that it violates the petitioner’s right to
peaceable assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances (ART.
3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioner’s right to the
equal protection of the law (art. 3, sec. 1).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents act on
denying the request of the petitioner violates
the petitioners’ Right to peaceable assembly
and right to the equal protection of the law.
Held: The right of peaceable assemble is
subject to regulation under the police power
of the state. The right to freedom of speech
and peaceful assembly, though granted by the
Constitution, is not absolute for it may be
regulated in order that it may not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right of community and society, This
power may be exercised under the police
power of the state, which is the power of the
state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, and good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. While the
privilege of the citizen to use streets and
parks for communication may be regulated in
the interest of all, said privilege is not
absolute. It must be exercised
insubordination to the general comfort and
convenience and in consonance with peace
and good order, but it must not guise of
regulation be abridged or denied.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment
Organization V. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co. (1973)
G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition
of Human Rights, Human Right is superior to
property rights, Social justice, jurisdiction
over violation of constitutional right
Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of
free expression, rights of free assembly and
rights of petition
FACTS:
• March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming
Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming
Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO)
decided to stage a mass demonstration as a
valid exercise of their constitutional right of
freedom expression in general and of their
right of assembly and petition for redress of
grievances in particular before appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
alleged abuses of the police officers of the
municipality of Pasig at Malacañang on
March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the
workers in the first, second and third shifts
(6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm
respectively)
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming
Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and
afternoon where PBMEO confirmed the
demonstration which has nothing to do with
the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. That
Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by
the Constitution but emphasized, however,
that any demonstration for that matter should
not unduly prejudice the normal operation
thus whoever fails to report for work the
following morning shall be dismissed for
violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV:
NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting
to an illegal strike.
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston,
adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the
Company: REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES
JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4,
1969
• The Company filed for violation of the
CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no
violation since they gave prior
notice. Moreover, it was not a mass
demonstration for strike against
the company.
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO
guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO
officers directly responsible for ULP losing
their status as employees
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for
reconsideration – dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE:
1. W/N to regard the demonstration against
police officers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining
and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly
the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is an inhibition of the rights of
free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD:
YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of
CFI and reinstate the petitioners.
• In a democracy, the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well
as the cardinal article of faith of our
civilization. The inviolable character of man
as an individual must be "protected to the
largest possible extent in his thoughts and in
his beliefs as the citadel of his person
• The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve
the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion
of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with
general principles.
• The freedoms of expression and of
assembly as well as the right to petition are
included among the immunities reserved by
the sovereign people
• The rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition, are not only civil
rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness
and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate
not merely in the periodic establishment of
the government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs as
well as in the discipline of abusive public
officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate
governmental officers or agencies for redress
and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers
and employees.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized.
o Property and property rights can be lost
thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.
o a constitutional or valid infringement of
human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired
or adequately compensated. The debasement
of the human being broken in morale and
brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him
to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing
salt on bruised tissues.

o injunction would be trenching upon the
freedom expression of the workers, even if it
legally appears to be illegal picketing or
strike
• The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a
plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights.
o There was a lack of human understanding
or compassion on the part of the firm in
rejecting the request of the Union for excuse
from work for the day shifts in order to carry
out its mass demonstration. And to regard as
a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police,
not against the company, is gross
vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
o The most that could happen to them was
to lose a day's wage by reason of their
absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to
a laborer, more especially if he has a family
to support. Yet, they were willing to forego
their one-day salary hoping that their
demonstration would bring about the desired
relief from police abuses. But management
was adamant in refusing to recognize the
superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition
for redress.
o the dismissal for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent
from work, constitutes a denial of social
justice likewise assured by the fundamental
law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon
the State "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security
of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section
6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the
State shall afford protection to labor ...".
Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the
policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and
protecting the exercise by employees of their
right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion
of their moral, social and economic well-
being."
• The respondent company is the one guilty
of unfair labor practice defined in Section
4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial
Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8
guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid
or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards
as an unfair labor practice for an employer
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests
the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of
constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long
after the finality of the judgment. There is no
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The
right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the
delivery of one speech, the printing of one
article or the staging of one demonstration. It
is a continuing immunity to be invoked and
exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified,
abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in
the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal.
The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. And in such a contest between an
employer and its laborer, the latter eventually
loses because he cannot employ the best an
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest
with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as
he is of the financial resources with which to
pay for competent legal services
• enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule which
impinges on such human rights. It is an
accepted principle that the Supreme Court
has the inherent power to "suspend its own
rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require."
JBL Reyes vs. Bagatsing
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the
members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought
a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the
front gate of the US embassy which is less
than two blocks apart. The permit has been
denied by then Manila mayor Ramon
Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there
have been intelligence reports that indicated
that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless
elements. He also issued City Ordinance No.
7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within
the 500 feet radius of the US embassy.
Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention
to provide protection to the US embassy from
such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. And that under our constitution we
“adhere to generally accepted principles of
international law”.
Malabanan vs. Ramento
FACTS:
Petitioners, all officers of the Supreme
Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation, sought and were
granted a permit to hold a meeting. At such
gathering they manifested their opposition to
the proposed merger of the Institute of
Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. They marched and demonstrated
outside the place indicated in the permit,
disturbing the classes being held. They were
later suspended for one academic year for
holding an illegal assembly.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not there was an infringement of
the right to peaceable assembly and its
cognate right of free speech in the
disciplinary action and the penalty imposed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may RULING:

supersede provisions of the YES. Petitioners are entitled to their rights to
Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists peaceable assembly and free speech. They
should be granted the permit. enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom
HELD: to express their views and communicate their
thoughts to those disposed to listen in
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for gatherings. While the authority of
the protection of foreign diplomats from any educational institutions over the conduct of
lawless element. And indeed the Vienna students must be recognized, it cannot go so
Convention is a restatement of the generally far as to be violative of constitutional
accepted principles of international law. But safeguards.
the same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which Petition is GRANTED.
upholds and guarantees the rights to free
speech and peacable assembly. At the same
time, the City Ordinance issued by
respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the
application thereof would collide with a
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass
the clear and present danger test. The mere
assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice.
In this case, no less than the police chief
assured that they have taken all the necessary
steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the
ordinance cannot be applied yet because there
was no showing that indeed the rallyists are
within the 500 feet radius (besides, there’s
also the question of whether or not the mayor
can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the
SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this
case).
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by its National
President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H.
HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE
“LITO” ATIENZA
[G.R. No. 175241; February 24,
2010] Constitutional Law| Freedom of
Expression| Freedom of Assembly|
FACTS:
In 2006, the IBP, through its then National
President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed an
application with the Office of the City Mayor
of Manila for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP
officers and members, law students and
multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent
Mayor Atienza issued a permit allowing the
IBP to stage a rally on given date but
indicated Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead
of the Mendiola Bridge. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari but having been unresolved within
24 hours from its filing, petitioners again,
filed before the SC assailing the appellate
court’s inaction or refusal to resolve the
petition within the period provided under the
Public Assembly Act of 1985.
The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge,
and as alleged by the Petitioners, the
participants voluntarily dispersed after the
peaceful conduct of the program. A few days
later, the MPD instituted a criminal
action,against Cadiz for violating the Public
Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit.
ISSUE:
Whether the partial grant of the application
runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and
violates the constitutional right to freedom of
expression and public assembly.
HELD:
The Court finds for petitioners.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent
gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have
been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the
venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes
the action on the permit, since the applicant
may directly go to court after an unfavorable
action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had
arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present
danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification.
Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, which “blank” denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the
appellate court would have it, render illusory
any judicial scrutiny thereof.
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)
Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991
calling for a national referendum on 16
October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
("barangays") to resolve, among other things,
the issues of martial law, the interim
assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers.20 days after
or on 22 September 1976, the President
issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the
provisions of Presidential Decree 229
providing for the manner of voting and
canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976.
Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031
repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential
Decree 991.On the same date of 22
September 1976, the President issued
Presidential Decree 1033, stating the
questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976.
The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses
that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly
evinces their desire to have such body
abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite of October 16.The Commission on
Elections was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27
September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and
Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
October 16; to declare without force and
effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033,
insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and
conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend
that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
there is no grant to the incumbent President
to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16 has no constitutional or legal
basis. On 30 September 1976, another action
for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction,
docketed as L-44684, was instituted by
Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, asserting that the
power to propose amendments to, or revision
of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred on the interim
National Assembly under action 16, Article
XVII of the Constitution. Still another
petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed on 5October 1976 by
Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and
Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to
restrain the implementation of Presidential
Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a
referendum for the amendment of the
Constitution.
Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution on Amendments ordains that
"(1) any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National
Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all
its Members, call a constitutional convention
or, by a majority vote of all its Members,
submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election.
"Section 2 thereof provides that "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not later than three
months a after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In the present period
of transition, the interim National Assembly
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is
conferred with that amending power. Section
15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The
interim National Assembly, upon special call
by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose
amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods
contemplated in the constitutional life of the
nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of
transition. In times of normalcy, the
amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of
all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional
Convention may be submitted to the
electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the
National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority
vote of all the Members of the interim
National Assembly upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino
v. COMELEC, had already settled that the
incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall
initially convene the interim National
Assembly. The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the
determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National
Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country.
When the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention voted on the Transitory
Provisions, they were aware of the fact that
under the same, the incumbent President was
given the discretion as to when he could
convene the interim National Assembly. The
President's decision to defer the convening of
the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the
plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which
the ratification of the 1973Constitution was
submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly.
In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the
Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated
their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly.
Again, in the referendum of 27 February
1975, the proposed question of whether the
interim National Assembly shall be initially
convened was eliminated, because some of
the members of Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who were
deemed automatically members of the
interim National Assembly, were against its
inclusion since in that referendum of January,
1973 the people had already resolved against
it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm
of the state undertakes the proposals of
amendment to a Constitution, that body is not
in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not
legislating when engaged in the amending
process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar
power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is
provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory
Provisions (for the interim National
Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business
of the legislating body to legislate for the
nation by virtue of constitutional conferment,
amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made between constitutional
content of an organic character and that of a
legislative character. The distinction,
however, is one of policy, not of law. Such
being the case, approval of the President of
any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The
prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do
with proposition or adoption of amendments
to the Constitution.
National Press Club v. COMELEC
207 SCRA 1-March 5, 1992
Ponente: Feliciano
Case: 3 consolidated petitions, with the
common question: the constitutionality of
§11(b), of RA6646
Petitoners: representatives of mass
media which are prevented from selling or
donating space and time for political
advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1
national, 1 provincial) in the coming May
1992 elections; taxpayers and voters who
claim that their right to be informed of
election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed. (I will refer to
these folks as Petitoners (P))
Facts: Petitioners’ argument:
 That §11(b), of RA6646 invades and
violated the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression;
 That the prohibition imposed by
§11(b) amounts to censorship, because it
selects and singles out for suppression and
repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely,
media-based election or political propaganda
during the election pd. of 1992;
 That the prohibition is in derogation
of media’s role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and
public opinion relevant to election issues;
 That §11(b) abridges the freedom of
speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or
political propaganda except those appearing
in the Comelec space of the newspapers and
on Comelec time of radio and tv broadcasts,
would bring about a substantial reduction in
the quantity or volume of info concerning
candidates and issues in the election, thereby
curtailing and limiting the right of voters to
info and opinion.
Issue: WON §11(b) of RA 6646 has gone
beyond the permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to
constitute unconstitutional repression of
freedom of speech & freedom of the press
SC says: Nope. It has not gone outside the
permissible bounds of supervision or
regulation of media operations during
election periods.
Ratio:
The assailed statute
 The statutory text the P want to strike
down as unconstitutional is §11(b) of RA
6646, aka the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
Section 11. Prohibited Forms of
Election Propaganda-in addition to the forms
of election propaganda prohibited under
Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it
shall be unlawful;
(b) for any newspapers, radio
broadcasting or television station, other mass
media, or any person making use of the mass
media to sell or to give free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other
political purposes except to the Commission
as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer, or
personality who is candidate for any elective
public office shall take a leave of absence
from his work as such during the campaign
period.
 §11(b) of RA 6646 should be taken
together with Sections 90 & 92 of BP 881 aka
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.
(for the full text, see p. 7)
§90 refers to the “Comelec space”-
space in the newspaper to be allocated
equally and impartially to all the candidates
within the area of coverage, free of charge
§92 refers to the “Comelec time” air
time in radio and tv to be allocated equally
and impartially to all the candidates within
the area of coverage, free of charge.
Objective of the statute
 Objective of §11(b)-to equalize, as far
as practicable, the situations of rich and poor
candidates by preventing the rich from
enjoying undue advantage offered by huge
campaign “war chests.”
 It prohibits the sale or donation of
print space and air time “for campaign or
other political purposes” except to Comelec.
 §90&92 of the OEC on the other
hand, require the Comelec to procure
Comelec space and Comelec time to be
allocated to all candidates for free.
 No one seriously disputes the
legitimacy or the importance of the objective
sought to be secured by §11(b) of RA 6646 in
relation to §90&92 of the OEC.
 The objective is of special importance
and urgency in a country which, like ours, is
characterized by extreme disparity in income
distribution between the economic elite and
the rest of the society.
 It is important to note, that the
objective, is not only a legitimate one, it has
also been given constitutional status by the
terms of Art. IX(C)(4) of the 1987 Consti.
Art. IX-C, Section 4. The
Commission may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by
the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or
regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, and equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in
connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
Anent Constitutionality of §11(b)
 The Comelec has been expressly
authorized by the Cosnti to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation of
media of communication and info.
 The fundamental purpose of such
“supervision or regulation” has been spelled
out in the Consti as the ensuring of “equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply,’ as well as uniform and reasonable
rates of charges for the use of such media
facilities, in connection with “public info 2. §11(b) is limited in its scope of
campaigns and forums among candidates.” application. Analysis shows that it purports
 It seems a modest proposition that the to apply only to the purchase and sale, incl.
provision of the Bill of Rights which purchase and sale disguised as a donation, of
enshrines the freedom of speech, freedom of print space and air time for campaign
expression, and freedom of the press2, has to purposes or other political purposes.
be taken in conjunction with Art. IX (C) (4) a. It does not purport in any
which may be seen to be a special provision way to restrict reporting by newspapers or
applicable during a specific limited period, radio or tv stations of news or newsworthy
i.e. during election pd. events relating to candidates, their
 The rights of free speech and free qualifications, political parties and gov’t
press are not unlimited rights for they are not programs.
the only important and relevant values even b. It does not restrict
in the most democratic of polities. commentaries and expressions of belief or
 In our own society, equal opportunity opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc.
to proffer oneself for public office, without with respect to candidates, their qualifications,
regard to one’s financial capacity, is clearly etc.
an important value. This is what distinguishes
 One of the basic state policies given this case from Sanidad v. Comelec-There, the
constitutional rank by Art. II, §26, Consti, is provision prohibiting columnists,
the egalitarian demand that “the State shall commentators or announcers from
guarantee equal access to opportunities for campaigning for their candidate was declared
public service and prohibit political by SC as unconstitutional because nothing in
dynasties as may be defined by law. the consti gave Comelec the power to regulate
 The technical effect of Art. IX(C)(4) their acts, as they are not franchise holders nor
of the Consti, may be seen to be that no candidates.
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of
exercises of supervisory or regulatory c. It does not prohibit
authority on the part of the Comelec for the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of
purpose of securing equal opportunity among print space or air time. And Comelec is
candidates for political office, although such required to allocate the same equally and
supervision or regulation may result in some impartially to all the candidates.
limitation of the rights of free speech and free Re apprehension on
press. possibility of abuse: Angara v. Electoral
 Supervision and regulation of the Commission: the possibility of abuse is no
operations of media enterprises is scarcely argument against the concession of power or
conceivable without accompanying authority involved, for there is no power or
limitations. authority in human society that is not
 Thus the time-honored rule: A statute susceptible of being abused.
is presumed to be constitutional and that the
party asserting its unconstitutionality must If the Comelec fails to do its
discharge the burden of clearly and duty (procure print space or air time), then
convincingly proving that assertion. candidates can seek judicial relief.
In Summary, §11(b)
 It is important to note that the
restrictive impact upon freedom of speech 1. Does not cut off the flow of media
and freedom of the press of §11(b) is reporting, opinion, or
circumscribed by certain important commentary about candidates,
limitations: their qualifications, and platforms
1. §11(b) is limited in the duration and promises
of its applicability and enforceability. It is 2. Does not authorize any
limited to election periods. intervention and much less control
on the content of the normal
operations of the media
2Art. III, Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people grievances
 3. Does not prohibit Comelec from
procuring print space and air time
for the candidates.
 Whatever limitation §11(b) entails
bears a clear and reasonable connection with
the objective set out in Art. IX(C)(4) and Art.
II(26) of the Consti.
Anent Cruz’s assigned flaw-that it still does
not restrict the rich candidate from spending
on other campaign activities.
 A regulatory measure that is less than
perfectly comprehensive or which does not
completely obliterate the evil sought to be
remedied, is not for that reason alone
constitutionally infirm.
 The Consti does not, and cannot exact
perfection in governmental regulation.
 All it requires, in accepted doctrine, is
that the regulatory measure under challenge
bear a reasobable nexus with the
constitutionality sanctioned objective.
Anent invasion of privacy
 Plus, super daming paid campaigns
constitute invasion of privacy of the general
electorate. Kaya daw ok lang to control
especially the rich who can afford to bombard
the helpless electorate with paid
advertisements.
 The right of the general listening and
viewing public to be free form such
intrusions and their subliminal effects is at
least as important as the right of the
candidates to advertise themselves.
Held: Petitions DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R.
No. 103956, March 31, 1992
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
A Resolution No. 2347 was promulgated by
the COMELEC which provides that decals
and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting
in "mobile" places, public or private.
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong is a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Adiong is assailing the Resolution. In
addition, Adiong believes that with the ban
on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the
field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with this prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the COMELEC’s prohibition
is unconstitutional.
Held:
The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen's fundamental right of free speech.
The preferred freedom of expression calls all
the more for the utmost respect when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called
balancing of interests — individual freedom
on one hand and substantial public interests
on the other — is made even more difficult in
election campaign cases because the
Constitution also gives specific authority to
the Commission on Elections to supervise the
conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
When faced with border line situations where
freedom to speak by a candidate or party and
freedom to know on the part of the electorate
are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the
police, local officials and COMELEC, should
lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of
election campaign activity may not pass the
test of validity if it is too general in its terms
or not limited in time and scope in its
application, if it restricts one's expression of
belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or
her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of
media reporting, and if the regulatory
measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus
with the constitutionally sanctioned
objective.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile
places like cars and other moving vehicles
does not endanger any substantial
government interest. There is no clear public
interest threatened by such activity so as to
justify the curtailment of the cherished
citizen's right of free speech and expression.
Under the clear and present danger rule not
only must the danger be patently clear and
pressingly present but the evil sought to be
avoided must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing
instrument to be stilled. The regulation
strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it
on his car, to convince others to agree with
him. A sticker may be furnished by a
candidate but once the car owner agrees to
have it placed on his private vehicle, the
expression becomes a statement by the
owner, primarily his own and not of anybody
else. The restriction as to where the decals
and stickers should be posted is so broad that
it encompasses even the citizen's private
property, which in this case is a privately-
owned vehicle. In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed
by the Constitution would be violated.
Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of
his property without due process of law.
Bayan et.al. vs. Ermita
Facts:
Petitioners come in three groups.
Bayan, et al, Jess del Prado, et al, ,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al, KMU,
et al.,
The rally was scheduled to proceed along
España Avenue in front of the University of
Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola
bridge. Police officers blocked them along
Morayta Street and prevented them from
proceeding further. They were then forcibly
dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
Three other rallyists were arrested in the case
of Bayan, et al allege that they are citizens
and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
rights as organizations and individuals were
violated when the rally they participated in on
October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 880
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No.
880, some of them in toto and others only
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well
as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive
Response". They seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no
rally" policy and the CPR policy recently
announced.
Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires
a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also
curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which
the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is
not content-neutral as it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government.
The words "lawful cause," "opinion,"
"protesting or influencing" suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase "maximum
tolerance" shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because
they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny
test.
Issue:
Whether or not the implementation of B.P.
No. 880 volated their rights as organizations
and individuals when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005
Held:
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously
challenged. Their right as citizens to engage
in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which
requires a permit for all who would publicly
assemble in the nation’s streets and parks.
They have, in fact, purposely engaged in
public assemblies without the required
permits to press their claim that no such
permit can be validly required without
violating the Constitutional guarantee.
Respondents, on the other hand, have
challenged such action as contrary to law and
dispersed the public assemblies held without
the permit.
Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the
Constitution
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances
The first point to mark is that the right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress
of grievances is, together with freedom of
speech, of expression, and of the press, a right
that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights
constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other
rights would be meaningless and unprotected
Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances and,
for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law,
as well as to engage in peaceful concerted
activities. These rights are guaranteed by no
less than the Constitution, particularly
Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section
2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article
XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting
the people’s exercise of these rights
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is
not an absolute ban of public assemblies but
a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies, it as a
"content-neutral" regulation of the time,
place, and manner of holding public
assemblies
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880
thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies22 that would use public
places. The reference to "lawful cause" does
not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the
definition of public assembly content based,
since they can refer to any subject. The words
"petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions
in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied
on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health
the so-called calibrated preemptive response
policy has no place in our legal firmament
and must be struck down as a darkness that
shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to
justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No.
880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use
of public places as to the time, place and
manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the
benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue
rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to
the constitutionally-sound "clear and present
danger" standard.
In this Decision, the Court goes even one step
further in safeguarding liberty by giving local
governments a deadline of 30 days within
which to designate specific freedom parks as
provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that
period, no such parks are so identified in
accordance with Section 15 of the law, all
public parks and plazas of the municipality or
city concerned shall in effect be deemed
freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever
kind shall be required to hold an assembly
therein. The only requirement will be written
notices to the police and the mayor’s office to
allow proper coordination and orderly
activities.