A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

S P E C I A L R E P O R T S

A SHORT
HISTORY OF
MODERN
RUSSIA
 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

A Short History of
Modern Russia

R
ussian President Vladimir Putin described the Sovi-
et Union’s collapse in 1991 as “the greatest political
catastrophe” of the 20th century. To those outside
of Russia it may sound like hyperbole, but to those who lived
there it’s a different story. In short order, they witnessed their
government in Moscow, a power on par with the United States
for nearly five decades, lose its footing and never fully recover.
Russia became destitute, even aimless.

So traumatic was the union’s collapse that it continues to de-

fine Russia’s identity today. And though the country remains
formidable in its near abroad, it is less capable than it once
was of securing its national interests farther afield. To under-
stand why this is so, we need to begin by looking at a map.

Geography, or the
Dangers of the West
Indeed, Russia’s most fundamental and strategic challenge
– which has both international and domestic dimensions –
stems from the country’s geography. The vast majority of Rus-
sian territory sits between 50 degrees and 70 degrees latitude.
For perspective, London’s latitude is about 51 degrees, Berlin’s
is 52 and Ottawa’s is 45. Russia’s climate is generally cool, and
vegetation and human life tend to inhabit areas that are below

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

60 degrees latitude. The heartland of Russian agriculture is in

the southwest, along its borders with Ukraine, the Caucasus
and Kazakhstan.

Russia’s Spring Wheat Production

Russia’s Winter Wheat Production

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

Climate and agriculture go a long way to explain why three-quar-

ters of the population lives in the area between Russia’s border
with Europe and the Ural Mountains. The country’s most crit-
ical cities, including the seat of its government, moreover, are
all close to Europe. Russia
has few rivers, and those Russian Railroads
it does have flow mostly
west, making it difficult to
transport goods domesti-
cally. Russia offsets these
natural disadvantages by
relying on railways, which
further highlight the impor-
tance of the western and
southern regions. And so
it is that Russia is dispro-
portionately preoccupied –
and imperiled – by its west-
ern reaches.

As a land power, Russia is inherently vulnerable. Its border with

Europe is extremely susceptible to invasion, situated as it is on
North European Plain the North European Plain.
This flat expanse of land
begins in Germany and,
just east of the Carpathian
Mountains, pivots south-
ward, opening up right on
Russia’s doorstep. Histor-
ically, it has been a major
thoroughfare of western
military encroachment.
Because Russia’s enemies
have so often used this in-
vasion route, Moscow has
tried to make it more diffi-

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

cult for invaders to reach its territory by pushing Russia’s bor-

ders as far west as possible. When national borders could not
be extended, Moscow established buffer
zones between Russia’s core and Europe. In 1989, St. Petersburg
At the height of the Soviet Union, Mos-
cow enjoyed an extensive buffer zone that was about 1,000 miles from
stretched well into Central Europe. With the NATO troops. Today, that
collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Rus-
sia lost most of these territories and has
distance is about 200 miles.
been on the defensive ever since. Consider
that in 1989, St. Petersburg was about 1,000 miles from NATO
troops. Today, that distance is about 200 miles.

Cold War Europe The European Peninsula and Russia

A Concentration of Wealth
Russian geography presents an obvious challenge: Whoever
governs the country must manage the largest country in the
world, comprising vastly different peoples, climates, natural re-
sources and infrastructure networks. The Russian Federation
consists of 85 federal subjects that range in structure from
autonomous regions and republics to individual cities. As a re-
sult, Russia is home to highly regionalized economies in which
wealth and prosperity are unevenly distributed.

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

Russia’s Gross Regional Product by District 2015

Wealth is concentrated in the west, particularly in Moscow and

the Central Federal District. In times of prosperity, economic
disparities can be papered over, and the pressure on high-earn-
ing districts is fairly easily relieved. But in times of economic
duress, as was the case when oil prices dropped in late 2014,
the central government faces added social pressure from the
poorer districts in the interior.

Oil Prices andAND

OIL PRICES Russia’s Reserve
RUSSIA’S RESERVE FUND Fund

BILLION USD USD PER BARREL

150 150
Russian
budget
estimate

120 120
Oil price
per barrel

90 90

60 60
Russia's
Reserve Fund

30 30

0 0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; Energy Information Administration; Reuters © 2016 Geopolitical Futures

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

It’s little wonder, then, that Russia’s economic development since

the end of the Cold War has been similarly uneven. The 1990s were
meant for survival, not economic growth. The reforms of the de-
cade were aimed at one thing: preventing Russia from reverting to
communist rule. Most Russians lived in or near poverty while most
state enterprises were privatized – at a discount. The 1998 Russian
financial crisis and the associated protests brought about a major
change. The people were ready for stronger government and so
welcomed a stronger ruler. Enter Vladimir Putin, who endeavored
to fix the economy and then rebuild the government. Since then,
Russia’s development has been predicated on energy exports,
which in turn have fueled budget spending and consumption.

This worked well enough when energy prices were high. But when
they fall, so too do Russian revenues. This inevitably leads to peri-
odic economic downturns. From 2015 to 2017, for example, citi-
zens protested unemployment, wage arrears, cuts in government
programs, lower real wages, bankruptcy and general frustration
with reduced standards of living. The protests were small, but they
could threaten Putin in the long term. So Putin must not only main-
tain control but also show the people that he is responding to their
needs.

Labor Protests and

LABOR PROTESTS GDP
AND Change
GDP CHANGE in Russia
IN RUSSIA

ANNUAL GDP CHANGE (PERCENT) LABOR PROTESTS

6 500 120

4
400
100
2

300
0

-2
200

-4
10
-6

-8 0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Note: 2017 Protest numbers are for January - June only

Source: TrudPrava, IECONOMICS, The World Bank © 2018 Geopolitical Futures

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

One way he has done so is to erect a two-tier economic sys-

tem. He controls one tier through his “inner circle,” which runs
state-owned companies, while the
other tier is subject to free market
The Russian people still
laws. These state-run companies
constitute about one-fifth of the support Putin – and they
Russian economy. The Russian
may even trust him – but they
people still support Putin – and
they may even trust him – but they regard oligarchs and regional
regard oligarchs and regional ad- administrators as corrupt.
ministrators as corrupt. The pres-
ident must weigh the needs of his
people against the needs of the companies that sustain his
economy. In 2001, he sided with the people, leading a cam-
paign against the oligarchs and then taking control of media
and energy companies.

He has also reorganized some of the state security agencies

that help maintain order. He established the National Guard,
which unifies several domestic security forces under the di-
rect control of the president. The troops’ stated purpose is to
protect the public order, combat extremism, guard govern-
ment cargo and facilities, help protect the border and control
the arms trade. He also installed officials loyal to his govern-
ment in important places. For instance, he recently removed
16 generals from their posts in the Ministry of Civil Defense,
Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of National
Disasters, a body responsible for responding to civil defense,
public unrest and protests, and in the Interior Ministry, replac-
ing them with officials he personally selected. The dismissals
primarily affected the Caucasus, the Far East and cities within
Moscow’s reach – cities where, as recently as the end of 2017,
there had been reports of increased unrest.

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 GENERALS REMOVED FROM EMERCOM BANKS WITH LICENSES REVOKED
(As of Feb. 2, 2017) (Aug. 18, 2014-Jan. 23, 2017)

GENERALS REMOVED FROM EMERCOM

A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA BANKS WITH LICENSES REVOKED
(As of Feb. 2, 2017) (Aug. 18, 2014-Jan. 23, 2017)

SIGNSSigns of Instability
OF INSTABILITY in Russia
IN RUSSIA

WAGE ARREARS
GOVERNORS WHO HAVE LOST OR ARE AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR POSTS AREAS OF PROTEST (Jan. 1, 2017)
(Reported Dec. 12, 2016 and Feb. 5, 2017) (October 2016-February 2017) Percent of total wage arrears in Russia
21.2 Primorsky region (#79)
No data reported
WAGE ARREARS
(Jan. 1, 2017) 4.5 %
4.0
Percent of total wage arrears in Russia
21.2 Primorsky region (#79) 3.5
No data reported
4.5 %
3.0
4.0 2.5
3.5 2.0
3.0 1.5
2.5
1.0
2.0
41 0.5
1.5
1.0 0.0
41 0.5

SIGNS OF INSTABILITY IN
42
RUSSIA
43
42
65
0.0

85
43 65 82
64 85
44 Ural 64
82
Northwestern Siberia Far Eastern
40 44 83
NS OF INSTABILITY IN RUSSIA
Ural Far Eastern
40 Northwestern 63 Siberia 83
63
39 38 37 39 38 3758
66
GOVERNORS WHO HAVE LOST OR ARE AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR POSTS 35
36
33
AREAS OF PROTEST
32 31 3645 32 31 6245 61 62 61
30 35 52 3357 30 52 57
58 66
74 74 81 81
(Reported Dec. 12, 2016 and Feb. 5, 2017) 34 27 34 29 27
24(October 2016-February 2017)
46 51 53 29 46 59 51 53 67
60 56 59 60 68
67
7068 70
84 84
28 26 24 23 22Central
22 47
2847 26
50 541923205621 48 50 54 55 71
69
71 7575 76
77
77
Central 19 20 21 48 25 49 69 73 76
25 18 16 49 18 5516 15 7273 80
80
Volga 72
THEIR POSTS AREAS OF PROTEST 17 15
17
Volga
12 14
78
141 11 13 Southern
(October 2016-February 2017) 1 11 12Crimea*
13 2 Southern
10
9
8
78 79
Crimea* 9 79
2 10 8 3 4 5 6 7 North
Caucasian
3 4 5 6 7 North
GENERALS REMOVED FROM EMERCOM BANKS WITH LICENSES REVOKED
Caucasian
(As of Feb. 2, 2017) (Aug. 18, 2014-Jan. 23, 2017)
GOVERNORS WHO HAVE LOST OR ARE AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR POSTS
AREAS OF PROTEST
GOVERNORS WHOREMOVED
GENERALS HAVE LOST
FROMOR ARE AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR POSTS
EMERCOM
AREAS OFBANKS WITH LICENSES REVOKED
PROTEST
GENERALS REMOVED
Crimea*: 3.2% FROM EMERCOM Volga: 12.3%
BANKS WITH of
1 Republic LICENSES
Crimea REVOKED 45 Kirov region
2 City of Sevastopol 46 Nizhny Novgorod region
Crimea*: 3.2% Volga: of
47 Republic 12.3%
Mordovia
NS OF INSTABILITY IN RUSSIA 1 Republic North
of Crimea
Caucasus: 2.3% 45 Kirovregion
48 Penza region
2 City of Sevastopol
3 Karachay-Cherkess Republic 46 Nizhnyregion
49 Saratov Novgorod region
4 Kabardino-Balkar Republic 50 Ulyanovsk region
47 Republic of Mordovia
5 Republic of North Ossetia-Alania 51 Chuvash Republic
North Caucasus:
6 Republic of2.3% Ingushetia 48 Penza
52 Mari region
El Republic
THEIR POSTS AREAS OF PROTEST 3 Karachay-Cherkess
7 Chechen Republic Republic 49 Saratovofregion
53 Republic Tatarstan
(October 2016-February 2017)
4 Kabardino-Balkar
8 Republic ofRepublic
Dagestan 50 Ulyanovsk
54 Samara regionregion
5 Republic9 Stavropol
of Northregion
Ossetia-Alania 55 Orenburg
51 ChuvashregionRepublic
GENERALS REMOVED FROM EMERCOM BANKS WITH LICENSES REVOKED 56 Republic of Bashkortostan
(As of Feb. 2, 2017) 6 Republic
(Aug. of18,
Ingushetia
Southern:2014-Jan.
2.5% 23, 2017) 52 Mari El Republic
57 Udmurt Republic
7 Chechen Republic
10 Republic of Adygea 53 Republic
58 Perm regionof Tatarstan
BANKS WITH LICENSES REVOKED 8 Republic of Dagestan
11 Krasnodar region
WAGE ARREARS
54 Samara region
(Aug. 18, 2014-Jan. 23, 2017) 9 Stavropol12 Rostov
regionregion (Jan. 1, 2017)55 Ural: 2.0% region
Orenburg
13 Republic of Kalmykia 59 Chelyabinsk region
56
Percent of total wage arrears Republic of Bashkortostan
14 Astrakhan region 60in Kurgan
Russia
region
Southern: 2.5% region
15 Volgograd 21.2 Primorsky region 57 Udmurt
(#79) region
61 Tyumen Republic
10 Republic of Adygea No data reported 58 Perm region
62 Sverdlovsk region
11 Krasnodar region11.9%
Central: 4.5 % 63 Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region
16
12 Rostov regionVoronezh region 4.0 64 Yamalo-Nenets
Ural: 2.0% Autonomous Region
17 Belgorod region
13 Republic of Kalmykia
18 Kursk region
Chelyabinsk
3.5 59 Siberia: 21.6% region
14 Astrakhan19 Oryolregion
region 3.0 60 Kurgan region
65 Krasnoyarsk region
15 Volgograd region
20 Lipetsk region 2.5 61 66 Tomsk
Tyumen region
region
21 Tambov region 67 Omsk region
2.0 62 Sverdlovsk region
22 Ryazan region 1.5 63 68 Novosibirsk region
Central: 11.9% Khanty-Mansi
69 Altai region Autonomous Region
23 Tula region 1.0 64 Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region
16 Voronezh region
24 Kaluga region 70 Kemerovo region
41 0.5 71 Republic of Khakassia
17 Belgorod region region
25 Bryansk
0.0 72 Altai Siberia:
Republic 21.6%
18 Kursk region
26 Smolensk region
BANKS WITH LICENSES REVOKED 19 Oryol 27 Moscow region
region WAGE ARREARS 73 Tuva
65 Republic region
Krasnoyarsk
42 (Aug. 18, 2014-Jan.
43 23, 2017) 65 28 City of Moscow** (Jan. 1, 2017)66 74 Irkutsk region
Tomsk region
20 Lipetsk29region
Vladimir region 85 arrears75in Russia
Percent of total wage Republic of Buryatia
21 Tambov
82 region
30 Ivanovo region 67 Omsk region
76 Transbaikal region
WAGE
64 ARREARS 21.2 Primorsky region (#79)
44 Ural (Jan. 1, 2017) 22 Ryazan31region
Kostroma region 68 Novosibirsk region
Far Eastern No data reported
Northwestern Siberia 32 Yaroslavl region 83 69 Far Eastern:
Altai region26.6%
40 Percent of total wage arrears in Russia 23 Tula region 4.5 %
63 77 Amur region
39 21.2 Primorsky region (#79)
Tver region
24 Kaluga33region 70 Kemerovo region
4.0 78 Jewish Autonomous Region
38 37 71 Republicregion of Khakassia
58 62 No data reported
66
25 Bryansk region
Northwestern: 17.5% 3.5 79 Primorsky
36 31 45
35 33
32
30 52 57 61 4.5 %
74
26 Smolensk region region
34 Kaliningrad 3.0 72 Altai Republic
80 Sakhalin Republic (Yakutia)
67 81 84
2.5 73 Tuva Republic
29 46 51 53 27 Moscow regionregion
35 Pskov 81 Khabarovsk region
34 27 59 60 68 4.0 70
28 26 24 23 22 47 50 54 56 3.5 71 75 28 77 of36
City Novgorod region
Moscow** 2.0
82 Sakha
74 Irkutsk region
region
Central 19 20 21 48 55 69 76 37 Vologda region 83 Magadan region
25 18 16 49 3.0 73 29 Vladimir region 1.5 75 Republic
84 Kamchatka region
of Buryatia
72 38 Leningrad80 region
17 15 Volga 2.5 30 Ivanovo 39region
City of St. Petersburg 1.0 76 Transbaikal
85 Chukotka region Region
Autonomous
14
1 11 1241 13 Southern 2.0 31 Kostroma regionof Karelia
78 40 Republic 0.5
Crimea* 9 1.5 32 Yaroslavl4179Arkhangelsk
region region 0.0 Far Eastern: 26.6%
2 10 8 1.0 42 Murmansk region
33 Tver region 77 Amur region
42 3 4 5 6 7 North 43 0.5 43 Nenets Autonomous Region
65 78 Jewish Autonomous Region
Caucasian 44 Komi Republic
0.0 85 79 Primorsky region
Northwestern:
82 17.5%
64
WAGE ARREARS 80 Sakhalin Republic (Yakutia)
44 Ural (Jan. 1, 2017)
34 Kaliningrad region
65 Northwestern Siberia 35 Pskov region Far Eastern 81 Khabarovsk region
40 85 83
82 GOVERNORS WHO
63Percent of totalHAVE LOST
wage arrears in RussiaOR ARE AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR POSTS
36 Novgorod region 82 Sakha region
39 83 Magadan region
Siberia
38 37
Far AREAS
Eastern
58 OF PROTEST
21.2 Primorsky region (#79)
No data reported
37 Vologda region
66
35
36
33
32 31
www.geopoliticalfutures.com
30 52 57
45
GENERALS
62 83
61 REMOVED
67
FROM
4.5 % EMERCOM74 9
38 Leningrad region
39 City of 81 Petersburg
St. 84
© 2018
84 Kamchatka region
Geopolitical Futures
85 Chukotka Autonomous Region
29 46 53 BANKS 59 WITH LICENSES
34 27
24
51 60 68 4.0 70 REVOKED
6 28 26 23 22 47 50 54 56 71 75 40 Republic
77 of Karelia
19 48 3.5
 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

All Politics Is Local

Politically, the Russian government under Putin consolidated
its power fairly early on. Under his administration, Russian
political parties are relatively unimportant; the system favors
pro-Kremlin parties. Parties that do not support the govern-
ment have little chance of gaining seats in the Duma, the lower
house of parliament. In 2000, shortly after assuming his first
presidency, Putin actually reduced the number of parties rep-
resented in the Duma. In 2012, then-President Dmitri Medve-
dev appeared to backpedal on this move by passing a law that
simplified the registration procedures for political parties. On
paper, the new legislation was meant to open the party system
to alternative interest groups. In practice, the system remained
closed.

Four political parties, all of them pro-government to a degree,

currently hold seats in the Duma. United Russia, Putin’s party,
holds 343 of 450 seats, doing whatever Putin tells it to do. The
Communist Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and A Just
Russia hold the remaining seats. The latter three parties are
not seen as official pro-government parties and therefore at
least partly represent the opposition. Notably, the term “oppo-
sition” is used loosely; the representatives rarely defy Putin-led
initiatives. Votes cast by officials of these parties reflect a dis-
agreement with United Russia and bureaucracy while simulta-
neously staying loyal to the president and system. They have
some mild distance from the regime but do not outright op-
pose it.

More recently, Putin has consolidated political power by purg-

ing Russian governors – an important move, considering the
relationship between governors and members of the national
government. They often work together, depend on each other
and look out for one another’s interests. Gubernatorial elec-

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

tions were reintroduced in 2012, but while the law to reintro-

duce them was making its way through the system, more than
20 governors were reappointed by the Kremlin, delaying elec-
tions in these locations until 2017. Then, in 2013, Putin signed
a law that permitted regional legislatures to decide between
directly electing governors or having the regional legislature
select and appoint a governor from a short list drawn up by
Putin.

Approval Ratings
APPROVAL RATINGSof
OF Putin and
PUTIN AND Governors
GOVERNORS

PERCENT CHANGE IN GDP VS. PREVIOUS QUARTER PERCENT WHO APPROVE OF...
8 100 120
...Putin’s activities
6 90

4 80
100
2 70

0 60

-2 50
...governors’ activities
-4 40

-6 30

-8 20

-10 10

-12 0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Source: Levada Center © 2016 Geopolitical Futures

Regional governors, in turn, play a role in appointing members

to Russia’s Federation Council, the upper chamber of parlia-
ment. The council consists of two representatives from each
of Russia’s 83 federal entities. One representative is chosen
by the regional legislature and one is selected by the region’s
governor. The length of the representative’s term varies with
the federal entity. Built into this system is a level of reciproc-
ity between governor and president, further enabling Putin to
wield influence. He is able to ensure that a candidate gains a
gubernatorial office, and in return, the governor can appoint
a pro-Kremlin member to the council. This relationship be-
comes even more important considering that the council ap-

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

proves presidential decrees for martial law, declares a state of

emergency, deploys troops abroad, oversees the presidential
appointment for attorney general and decides impeachment
verdicts. Putin’s ultimate objective is to remove governors who
have fallen out of favor in regions where social unrest is be-
coming more commonplace and replace them with people the
national government believes can develop relationships with
local elites, promote the economy and support Putin’s policies
and who are not involved in corruption.

Putin has dedicated much of his political capital and resourc-

es to consolidating his power through reforms in various gov-
ernment security bodies. By rebuilding his inner circle and re-
vamping the power structure, Putin has demonstrated that he
needs to extend his power network to ensure that his decrees
and policies are implemented properly and that dissenters re-
main silenced.

The Focus of Its

Foreign Policy
Much of Putin’s political machinations, though, are meant to
perpetuate a myth abroad. The myth: that Russia is as strong
as it appears. Without the ability to act as decisively as it could
during the Cold War, Russia is relegated to focusing on its own
backyard. The vulnerabilities along its western border compel
Russia to maintain a strong foothold in Ukraine and Belarus.
Russia needs these two countries to insulate it from outside
threats. Though Belarus has remained firmly within Russia’s
sphere of influence in the post-Soviet era, Ukraine has not. Af-
ter pro-Western supporters overthrew the Russia-friendly gov-
ernment in Kiev, Moscow had no choice but to respond with
force. In early 2014 it seized the Crimean Peninsula and sent
troops and supplies to pro-Russia rebels fighting in eastern
Ukraine.

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

Crimea was annexed partly to ensure a foothold in Ukraine and

partly to secure the port of Sevastopol, home to the Black Sea
Fleet. Russia’s navy consists primarily of four main fleets –
the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific. The first three are
all based on the European side of Russia and are constrained
by major chokepoints that limit their access to global waters.
Since much of Russia is landlocked, the loss or compromising
of the headquarter ports for any one of these fleets would se-
verely reduce Russia’s naval power and negatively affect mari-
time trade. From the Black Sea, through the Bosporus, Russia
gains access to the Mediterranean and from there the Atlantic.

Russia’s Maritime Chokepoints Through it all, though,

Ukraine has remained Rus-
sia’s top priority and the
focus of its foreign policy,
even when Moscow ap-
pears ambivalent. Russia
has neither the resources
nor the wherewithal to re-
take Ukraine. Russia’s di-
minished power has forced
Moscow to adopt a strate-
gy of global disruption tar-
geted primarily at the Unit-
ed States. (Their rivalry is
one element of the Cold War era that remains intact.) Moscow
has done so most visibly in Syria – where it hopes to parlay its
influence in the conflict’s resolution to a more beneficial out-
come with the United States over Ukraine – though it has also
been active in Venezuela and North Korea.

For example, in mid-2013, Russia inserted itself into the inter-

national crisis by negotiating a deal to destroy Syria’s chemical
weapons program. Later that year, the Euromaidan protests

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

in Ukraine ousted the Russia-friendly government in Kiev and

replaced it with one that favored the West. In a much weak-
er position than it was just a few months earlier, Russia once
more turned to the conflict in Syria. It launched an air cam-
paign in support of the Bashar Assad regime, hoping that it
would prove integral to any negotiated settlement and use
concessions from that settlement to its advantage in Ukraine.
After reshaping perceptions of Russian power, strengthening
the position of Assad’s forces and prompting negotiations
with the U.S., the limited Syrian intervention largely fulfilled its
strategic purpose for Russia.

Russia’s Perspective

Russia’s moves in Ukraine prompted NATO and the United

States to boost defense ties with countries along NATO’s east-
ern edge. The crisis led to new agreements for Western troop
rotations in Central and Eastern Europe as well as for the es-
tablishment of new NATO integration centers. NATO created

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 A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN RUSSIA

a new task force to respond more rapidly to threats against

NATO allies and increased the size of its rapid reaction force.
Furthermore, in 2017, the U.S. had three fully manned combat
brigades in continuous rotation in Europe. An alliance structure
that includes Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states,
among others, is emerging. For Russia, increased NATO pres-
ence – and in particular U.S. presence – in its backyard consti-
tutes a major threat.

But for now, it is a threat it cannot fully manage. More than

25 years after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia is still trying
to find its way. In the lives of nations, 25 years is not so long
a time, and the fall of empires tends to reverberate for years
thereafter. Russia has not,
moreover, fully recovered from
More than 25 years after the
the fall of the price of oil. This
is particularly problematic in a Soviet Union collapsed, Russia
region as complex and danger-
is still trying to find its way.
ous as Russia’s, a region where
appearing weak can be as big
a threat as being weak. Russia must simultaneously try to ap-
pear more powerful than it is and meticulously manage what
power it has. This strategy is reflected both in Putin’s attempts
to rein in control over domestic politics and mildly intervene
in international affairs that have little impact on Russia geo-
politically. But real power is durable. Illusions are ephemeral.
Actions taken by weak nations designed to make them appear
stronger nearly always fail in the long run.

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