Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Ralph W. Mathisen
One of the great questions that have confronted historians for the past
1500 years is the nature of and reasons for the decline and fall of the West-
ern Roman Empire in the 5th century ce. All too often, this question has
been posed in the context of opposition between the Romans and the
barbarians who eventually established their own kingdoms in the West-
ern Empire. However, when looked at from the perspectives of citizenship
and identity, a rather different picture emerges. Rather than being invari-
ably viewed as ‘outsiders’, barbarians had a long history of immigrating
into the Roman Empire and then becoming integrated under the social
and legal umbrella of Rome. In the 3rd century ce, Rome’s inclusive citi-
zenship policy became extended to include new barbarian settlers. By the
time of the barbarian invasions of the 5th century, Romans and barbar-
ians had more similarities than differences, a consideration that helps to
explain the largely non-violent nature of the barbarian occupation of the
Western Roman Empire.
At the beginning of the Roman Empire, Roman citizenship was an elite
legal status to which certain rights, privileges, and obligations accrued
under civil and criminal law.2 For example, in private life, citizens (or
cives Romani) could marry, make wills and carry out business under the
protection of Roman law. Under the criminal code, citizens could not
be questioned under torture, had the right of appeal, and if sentenced
to death, were given a simple execution rather than crucifixion or death
in the arena. However, not everyone living in the Roman Empire at this
time was a citizen. Far from it. The majority of the free population in the
1 Sections of this study draw upon Mathisen 2006, © 2006 by the American Historical
Association.
2 For Roman citizenship in general, see Sherwin-White 1979; Sherwin-White 1972; Gau-
thier 1986; Nicolet 1980; Nicolet 1989; Donati Giacomini and Poma 1996; Gardner 1993; Noy
2000; de Ste-Croix 1981: 453–461; Ratti 2002; Kaser 1971: 1.279–82. Many studies of Roman
law barely mention citizenship status, e.g., Brunner 1906: 157–179; Brunner 1928: 9, 128;
Mitteis 1965: 19.
empire lived in the provinces and did not hold citizenship. These people
were known as provinciales (provincials) or peregrini (foreigners) and they
remained subject to whatever legal system was in force in their communi-
ties at the time of their annexation by Rome.
One of the great successes of the Roman Empire was that Roman citi-
zenship became available to everyone living in the empire. The usual ways
for provinciales to become citizens was by becoming members of city
councils or by serving in the auxilia, the provincial branch of the Roman
army (Figures 1–2), the rationale for this being that citizenship should be
a reward either for services expected or services already rendered.
Even slaves (servi) had the opportunity to become citizens. Slaves were
frequently manumitted and thus became free. A freed slave of a provincial
gained the legal status of a provincial, and accordingly had the citizen-
ship opportunities that were available to provincials, while a freed slave
of a Roman was given the legal status of libertus, with partial citizenship
rights. The children of a libertus gained full citizenship rights. Thus, there
was a regular filtering upwards of individuals from lesser to higher legal
status, and accordingly, a constant increase in the number of full Roman
citizens.
As the centuries wore on, the citizen body increased due to grants of
citizenship to provincial army veterans and local elites, and the passing
on of citizenship rights by inheritance. Thus, citizenship and access to
Roman civil law (ius civile), became less and less a special status and more
the lowest common denominator. This process culminated with the issu-
ing in 212 ce of the Antonine Constitution, through which the emperor
Caracalla (211 to 217) granted citizenship to nearly all of the inhabitants
of the Roman Empire who did not already possess it.3 The descendants
of previous barbarian settlers would have become citizens along with
everyone else. The only surviving copy of Caracalla’s law, a papyrus Greek
translation of the Latin original, is unfortunately very fragmentary,4 but
the crucial words translates as, “I grant to all those in the Roman world the
citizenship of the Romans”. Many additions have been proposed for the
3 For the Constitutio Antoniniana, see Condurachi 1958; Sasse 1958; Lukaszewicz 1990; Bell
1947; Hagedorn 1996; Donati Giacomini and Poma 1996: 165; Garnsey 2004.
4 For the text, see Riccobono1968: no. 88, 445–9; Heichelheim 1940.
Figure 1. Diploma granting Roman citizenship, 98 ce. Credits: James Egbert, Introduction to the Study of Latin Inscriptions (New York,
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194 ralph w. mathisen
gaps in the text,5 but all that can be currently stated for certain is that a
class of persons called the dediticii were excluded from the grant.
The Antonine Constitution grant applied to all those living in the
Roman Empire at the time it was made, and most discussions about
Roman citizenship simply stop at this point,6 on the assumption that once
everyone who was eligible had Roman citizenship, citizen status ceased
to be a meaningful component of personal or legal identity in the Roman
world. Indeed, modern writers have often downplayed the significance of
Caracalla’s grant and have suggested that henceforth Roman citizenship
had little value.7 For example, Peter Brown suggests: “The brittle privileges
and self-respect once associated with the notion of citizenship slipped
away”.8 According to Peter Garnsey, “for some modern observers, it was
all over for Roman citizenship after Caracalla’s edict . . . citizenship had
lost whatever residual value it formerly possessed”.9
However, in practice it took a while for Caracalla’s edict to be fully
implemented10 and there still were some loose ends. Some were short-
term and did not outlast the 3rd century. For one thing, it took a while for
the significance of the law to penetrate all levels of the bureaucracy and,
perhaps as a consequence of sheer bureaucratic inertia, formal grants of
citizenship continued to be made, at least for a time.11 In addition, there
are continued occasional 3rd century references to groups, clubs or Roman
citizens, such as the ‘Roman citizens of Mainz’,12 as if the distinction still
meant something. There also are occasional references to peregrini resi-
dent in the empire who did not seem to have been citizens and did not
5 For example, “I therefore grant Roman citizenship to all the foreigners (peregrini) in the
world”: Abbott and Johnson (1968) 1926: no. 192.
6 E.g. Donati Giacomini and Poma 1996: 165.
7 Sherwin-White 1979: 444: it “introduced no material alteration”; Garnsey 2004 dis-
misses it as “an accident of history” (133), a “whim” (135) that “came out of the blue” (137);
Williams 1979: 69–72, deems it an “impulsive measure”.
8 Brown 1992: 154. Note also, e.g. Kunkel 1973: 79ff; Sollner 1980: 97; Donati Giacomini
and Poma 1996: 165; Gardner 1993: 187; Sherwin-White 1979: 445.
9 Garnsey 2004: 140.
10 See Garnsey 2004: 143, for “geographically, ethnically, and culturally marginal people
allowed to slip through the net”.
11 Herodian (8.4.2) notes that in 238 ce, the inhabitants of Aquileia received “in place of
war, peace, and a sharing of Roman citizenship”. For grants in military diplomas as a “combi-
nation of utility and legal archaism”, see Sherwin-White 1979: 388.
12 For example, Riese 1914: 4.2125, 236 = Corpus inscriptionum latinarum [= CIL] 13.6733:
“Marcellinius Placidinus d. c(ivium) R(omanorum) Mog(untiaco) Tacito et Aemiliano cos”
(276 ce). Also Riese 1914 = CIL 13.6769: “. . . T. Florius Saturninus . . . allectus in ordinem
c(ivium) R(omanorum) Mog(untiaco)” (222–35 ce). See Sherwin-White 1979: 387.
belong to any of the identified non-citizen categories,13 but given that the
few examples are early, this too may be a case of archaism.
Over the longer term, citizenship continued to be granted. In particu-
lar, slaves continued to be freed and as a consequence became eligible to
become cives Romani. Several late Roman laws discuss how liberti, or even
servi, became full cives Romani.14 A law of 349, for example, decreed that
manumitted mothers, “for whom, of course, the rights of Roman citizen-
ship had been obtained”, could have their cases heard in court, as could
any freed sons and daughters who had become “Roman citizens in a simi-
lar manner”.15 In 447, a novel (new law) of the emperor Valentinian III
(425 to 455) spoke of the testamentary rights of “a libertus, who will have
obtained the privilege of Roman citizenship”.16 In exceptional cases,
slaves could become citizens directly, without any intermediate process.17
Therefore, for some people the process of becoming a citizen still counted.
Indeed nearly all, if not all, of the acquisitions of citizenship attested after
212 resulted from promotions from servile to free status.
13 Note Riese 1914: 1.237, 1 = CIL 13.4679, “. . . Genio pagi Dervet(ensis) peregrini qui
posuer(unt) vico Soliciae . . . Lupo et Maximo cos” (232 ce); see also Garnsey 2004: 143, for
“geographically, ethnically, and culturally marginal people allowed to slip through the net”.
14 A point missed, e.g. by Liebeschuetz 1998: 135.
15 Codex Theodosianus [=CTh] 8.13.1 (349).
16 Novella Valentiniani 25 (ad 447) of Novel (New Law) 25 of the emperor Valentinian
III (ad 425–455).
17 E.g., CTh 9.21.2.1 (321); CTh 4.7.1 (321).
18 See van den Bergh 1992.
19 For cives of cities, see CTh 1.10.4 (391 ce), 11.16.6 (346 ce) (Constantinople); 12.1.17 (329)
(“consensu civium vel curiae”), 12.1.53 (362 ce) (“eiusdem oppidi cives”), 15.5.3 (409) (“ex qua-
cumque civitate in aliud oppidum . . . cives”); 15.5.4 (424 ce) (“civium intra propriam civi-
tatem”). Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 19.2.14, 27.3.2 (“magna civium laetitia”: Rome).
20 See Jones 1968: 136, for the assumption “that all Roman citizens are municipes of some
municipium”.
21 See Garnsey 2004: 137: “local citizenships were tolerated”. See also El-Abbadi 1962.
22 Riese 1914: 3.1176, 132; see Sherwin-White 1979: 388.
23 Digest 50.1.1.2: “Qui ex duobus igitur Campanis parentibus natus est, Campanus
est . . . Celsus etiam refert Ponticis ex beneficio Pompeii Magni competere, ut qui Pontica
matre natus esset, Ponticus esset”.
24 For example, Gregory of Tours, Gloria confessorum 69.1: “Africanae provinciae civis”;
Hydatius, Chronicon 217, s.a. 462: “Agrippinus Gallus et comes et civis”.
25 CTh 1.34.1 (400): “cives . . . provinciae”. Popular usage: Gregory of Tours, Gloria confes-
sorum 69.1; Hydatius, Chronicon 217, s.a. 462: and the Vita Eugendi 2: Sources chrétiennes
vol. 142 (Paris, 1968), 364–435.
26 See Roueché 2000: 572, “many people chose to describe themselves as inhabitants of
their province . . . rather than as citizens of particular towns”.
27 For example, CTh 1.5.1, 1.16.6–7, 2.26.3, 2.30.1, 7.4.26, 7.9.1, 7.13.7–8, 7.13.16, 7.20.8, and
throughout; also 8.10.2, 11.8.3.1.
28 CTh 4.13.5 (358 ce): “vectigalium quartam provincialibus et urbibus Africanis . . . conce-
dimus”; 2.1.4 (365 ce): “si senatores aliquid a provincialibus poscunt”.
29 CTh 1.16.2 (317 ce): “decreta provincialium”; 11.20.4.3; 12.12.12.1 (392 ce): “Ad provinciale
concilium in una frequentiore totius provinciae urbe cunctos volumus convenire, qui prima-
tum honorantur insignibus”; 12.12.13 (392 ce): “in consilium communia vota deducunt”; 12.12.14
(408 ce): “omnium legationum provincialium instructiones”. See Larsen 1934. Multi-provincial
diocesan councils also existed: CTh 12.12.9; Larsen 1934: 213; and Zeller 1905.
30 Codex Justinianus [= CJ] 9.29.3 (385 ce): “Ne quis . . . intellegat gerendae . . . administra-
tionis officium intra eam provinciam, in qua provincialis et civis habetur”.
31 CTh 3.1.8 (399 ce): “hi, qui imposita fuga munera civitatis provinciarumque destituunt”
(“those who, having taken flight, disregard the obligations of a city or the provinces”); see also
CTh 12.12.11 (386 ce): “si quis vel civitatis vel provinciae” (“if anyone either from a city or from
a province”).
32 See CTh 4.13.5 (358); 7.4.26 (401); 7.4.1 (325); 3.1.8 (399); 6.29.5 (359); 1.16.2 (317); 8.2.5
(401); 8.12.3 (316); 8.12.8 (415); 11.30.63 (405).
33 Larsen 1934; Ando 2000: 359–361.
34 E.g., Novella Theodosii 3.7 (438); see Lo Nero 2001; and N.Q. King 1961: 95.
35 For example, Paul, Ephesians 2.19: “non estis hospites et advenae sed estis cives sancto-
rum et domestici Dei” (“you are not guests and newcomers but you are citizens of sainthood
and domestics of God”); and Augustine, De Civitate Dei. 22.17: “civis supernae Hierusalem”
(“the citizen of the heavenly Jerusalem”). See Garnsey 2004: 150–155; and Clévenot 1988.
36 CIL 3.3505, 7533, 14214; Année epigraphique (1924) nos. 142–8 (237–246); see Sherwin-
White 1979: 56, 210, 269, 387, 269.
37 CIL 11.1731 (423).
38 Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistulae 7.6.2–3.
39 CIL 11.3576 (Aquincum, near Budapest).
40 Ammianus Marcellinus 27.9.9; also Novella Valentiniani 5 (440).
ued to be valid alongside Roman civil law.41 Even in the 6th century, the
Digest acknowledged: “Those practices that have been approved by long
practice and observed for many years are preserved as law, as if by a tacit
agreement of the citizens, no less than those laws that are written”.42 In
addition, the official recognition of the Christian church brought with it
an acknowledgment of Christian legal jurisdiction in cases involving the
maintenance of proper Christian belief and behaviour. The result was a
growing body of canon law that sometimes competed with or contra-
dicted Roman civil and criminal law.43
In 212 ce, virtually all the peregrini resident in the Roman Empire became
Roman citizens, but what about the peregrini who arrived after 212? Did
the continuing influx of barbarian peregrini from outside the empire
41 For law other than ius civile after 212, see Levy 1943; Levy 1956; Stühff 1966; Sirks 1996:
150 (“Roman and indigenous law still coexisted”); Carrié 2005: 271–272 (“Roman power pre-
served for local laws the same place that they occupied . . . within provincial law”); Kunkel
1973: 79; Garnsey 2004: 138–141, 146. For a dissenting opinion, see Honoré 2002: 80: after
212, “the contrast between the civil law and common custom was now of purely historical
interest”.
42 Digest 1.3.35.
43 See, e.g. Gaudemet 1985.
44 Gaius, Institutionum 1.93; see de Visscher 1958; also Sherwin-White 1979: 310, “barbar-
ian peasantry secured [citizenship] by long service in the provincial militia”.
45 Note, in particular, Demougeot 1981; Demougeot 1984; Liebeschuetz 1998; Garnsey
2004.
46 Garnsey 2004: 133–134.
47 For the peregrini dediticii as disadvantaged freedmen who were specifically excluded
from receiving citizenship, see Gaius, Institutionum 1.13–14; also Sasse 1958: 104–110; Jones
1968; Sherwin-White 1979: 380–398.
48 E.g. Heather 1991: 113, suggests that groups from beyond the frontier submitted “not
as full citizens but as dependent subjects”. However, with regard to this question, now see
Mathisen 2006.
Roman law, because the following model will be based on the premise
that Roman law did have a place for foreigners who settled in the Roman
Empire.
It has at times been suggested that by some unknown process, a num-
ber of barbarians became Roman citizens.49 For example, Demougeot
conjectured that barbarians who became members of the field army, held
Roman military or civilian office, or married a Roman, must somehow
have become citizens.50 Demougeot also suggested that barbarians held
some kind of special ‘barbarian citizenship’ that limited them only to
military careers.51 However, this kind of halfway house is totally unprec-
edented (not to mention undocumented) in Roman law.
An exhaustive search of sources turns up only a handful of references
to barbarians being described as Romans or Roman citizens. In 383, the
orator Themistius opined that Goths were “no longer called barbarians
but Romans”, a sentiment seconded by Pacatus, who stated in 389 that
Theodosius I (379 to 395) ordered defeated barbarian soldiers to “become
Roman”.52 It is difficult to imagine how ‘becoming Roman’ would not have
involved some degree of Roman citizenship. Citizenship was specifically
mentioned by Claudian, who in his panegyric to Stilicho in 400 observed
of Rome, “She calls together as citizens those whom she has conquered”.53
Even if one argues that Claudian was speaking historically, there is noth-
ing to suggest that this policy did not continue into his own time. This
view further continued to remain current in the mid-6th century, when
the panegyricist Corippus said, in a North African context, “Whatever gen-
tes the Roman Empire sees being faithful and subject, it considers them
to be Latin citizens”.54 More specifically, the rhetor Synesius stated that
Theodosius I “considered the Goths worthy of citizenship”.55 However,
was Synesius suggesting that Theodosius actually ‘made’ Goths citizens,
49 E.g. Sherwin-White 1979: 380ff; Soraci 1974; Blockley 1982; Demougeot 1981: 387;
Heather 1991: 164–165; and Liebeschuetz 1998: 138 (“given . . . a mere formality”). But Sirks
1996: 149, states simply, “they did not become Roman citizens”.
50 Arguing by assertion, with much use of “asssurément”, “implicitément”, “indéniable”,
“vraisemblablement” and “sans doute”: Demougeot 1981: 384–387.
51 Demougeot 1981: 384.
52 Themistius, Orationes 167.211–212; Pacat. Pan.Lat. 2/12.36.4, “iussisti esse Romanam”.
53 Claudian, De consulatu Stilichonis 3.152–3: “civesque vocavit /quos domuit”.
54 Corippus, Iohannide 8.461–462: “cives putat esse latinos”.
55 “πoλιτε∴αs ≥ξιoυ”: De regno 21/25C: 50, 13–14; Terzaghi 1944: 50, ll.13–14. Liebeschuetz
1998: 135, suggests that ‘politeia’ here “has acquired a new meaning”, being applied to “non-
naturalized barbarians who had acquired the right to live within the empire”. The old
meaning of ‘citizenship’, however, seems to fit perfectly well.
61 Bastien 1989. The possibility that this scene represents repatriated Roman captives is
belied by the depiction of barbarian deditio (surrender) in the upper register (Pl. 2).
62 Panegyrici Latini. 7/6.6.
The historian Ammianus reported that in the 360s and 370s Alamanni
were relocated to Gaul, where they became “subject to taxes and a source
of income”, and to Italy, “where, having received fertile fields, they now
cultivate the Po as taxpayers”.63 Many of these barbarian settlers had the
status of colonus (tenant farmer), a quite respectable Roman legal status.
The Augustan History, for example, claims that after Claudius II’s defeat of
the Goths c. 270, “the provinces were filled with Gothic farmers; the Goth
became a colonus”.64 Ausonius in 368 spoke of “fields recently harvested
by Sarmatian coloni”.65 Indeed, barbarian coloni are directly attested in
legal sources. A ruling of 409 noted that groups of Scirians were settled as
coloni in the Eastern Empire. They were granted special protection from
enslavement and from being put to work on city public works projects.66
Barbarian settlers such as these, farmed Roman land either as tenant
farmers or as landowners in their own right, statuses that were certainly
covered under ius civile.67
In addition to mass settlements, individual barbarians gained title to
Roman land through actual or potential military service. By the 3rd cen-
tury, other barbarian settlers had the status of laeti, barbarians (often,
defeated enemies) who were allowed to settle on land within the empire
in exchange for the payment of taxes and military service when need-
ed.68 Laeti soon gained legal rights that approximated those of Roman
citizens, as the aforementioned panegyric to Constantius of 297/8 also
spoke of, “the laetus, who has been restored by postliminium”.69 The right
of postliminium allowed Roman citizens to recover property that had been
lost, either because they had been forced into exile or because their prop-
erty had been seized by foreign invaders.70 It is important to note that for
laeti to have had this right, they must have been covered by Roman law.
71 CTh 13.11.10.
72 See Mathisen 2004.
73 CTh 7.15.1 (409). Similarities to laeti: Notitia dignitatum occidentalium 42.
74 Such as Ellebichus, Master of Soldiers 383–388: Libanius, Epistulae 898; Areobindus,
Master of Soldiers 434–49: Theodoret, Epistulae 18.23; and Fl. Valila qui et Theodobius (dis-
cussed below). See Blockley 1982.
75 E.g., CTh 7.20.3 (320), 7.20.4 (325), 7.20.8 (364), 7.20.11 (373).
76 CTh 7.20.12 (400).
77 CTh 5.11.7 (365). Because the following four constitutions dealt with deserted land,
this one probably also did.
78 For barbarian taxpayers, see also Themistius, Orationes 167.211–212.
79 CTh 3.14.1 (365/373): see Sivan 1996; also Demandt 1989; Blockley 1982; Soraci 1974:
81–108 (for earlier bibliography).
80 See Demandt 1989; Soraci 1974; Blockley 1982; Bianchini 1988.
81 For a similar distinction, compare CTh 3.4.1 (374), “non solum in barbaris, sed etiam
in provincialibus servis”.
82 Military gentiles are attested in Africa in legal sources (CTh 7.15.1 [409], 12.12.5 [364],
11.30.62 [405]), and in Italy and Gaul in Not. dig. occ. 42.
83 As assumed, e.g. by Gaudemet 1958: 223ff; Bianchini 1988: 225, 249.
84 See Mathisen 2009a.
85 CTh 3.7.3 (428).
86 E.g. CTh 3.7.2 = 9.7.5, 3.12.1 (342), 3.12.3 (422); see Evans-Grubbs 1995.
87 Sivan 1996; Soraci 1974; Bianchini 1988.
gentiles might claim that they were no longer liable to provincial munera.
All kinds of problems could have arisen. Marital restrictions had been
imposed on soldiers in the Roman past and this could be a similar, late-
imperial manifestation.88 If this interpretation is correct, then this law
provides an example of barbarian soldiers having been integrated into the
Roman legal system in a manner similar to the way in which other legally
disadvantaged groups (slaves, freedmen and Jews) were likewise incorpo-
rated. Indeed, an unappreciated legal parallel is provided by an Italian law
of 465 dealing with laeti who had illegally married coloni.89 The illegality
did not concern ethnicity, but legal status: coloni were bound to the land
that they worked, but laeti were not and were claiming that the children
of these marriages did not therefore have tenant-farmer status. The law
permitted the status quo for existing children, but stated that any future
offspring of such marriages would be under the authority of the owner of
the tenant-farmer’s land. In this case then, barbarian laeti not only had
recognized legal status, but also actually ranked higher than coloni on the
Roman social and legal scale.
With regard to intermarriage, therefore, the empirical evidence is cor-
rect. Barbarians and Romans were perfectly free to marry each other so
long as the marriages were “between persons equal in status, with no
law impeding them”. This notion of marital non-exclusivity was in fact
current in other spheres of contemporary Roman thought. The late-4th
century Spanish poet Prudentius, for example, stated: “A common law
makes us equal . . . the native city embraces in its unifying walls fellow
citizens . . . Foreign peoples now congregate with the right of marriage
(ius conubii): for with mixed blood, one family is created from different
peoples”.90 Even though Prudentius was speaking metaphorically about
the city of God, his words, which described people as far away as India,
seem uncannily applicable to the subject of late-Roman multi-ethnic
marriage.
Barbarians also received other kinds of acknowledgement in Roman
law. Three laws demonstrate that, even though the distinction was worth
making, slaves of both barbarian and ‘provincial’ extraction received essen-
tially the same treatment.91 Another example concerns barbarian soldiers
involved in legal cases. A law of 405, addressed to the Proconsul of Africa,
stated: “In cases that come on appeal, we desire the ancient custom to
be upheld, making this addition (illud addentes), that, if ever an appeal
is introduced by gentiles or by their prefects, let a sacred examination of
a proconsular hearing be awaited”.92 The phrase ‘illud addentes’ suggests
that an exception was being made to accommodate barbarian soldiers.93
The general Roman imperial attitude that barbarians could be included
under Roman law is seen in the panegyric to Constantius, which spoke
of “the Frank, who has been received into the laws (receptus in leges)”,94
a statement that can only mean that Frankish immigrants were covered
by Roman law. This attitude also was reflected in a fictitious prophecy of
100 years later, suggesting that the emperor “would place the Franks and
Alamanni under Roman law”,95 and in Zosimus’ report about barbarian
soldiers of Theodosius I who robbed the provincials: “This was not the
behaviour of men who were ready to live according to the laws of the
Romans”.96 The idea that barbarians who acknowledged Roman suzer-
ainty should be sheltered under Roman law also is suggested by a novel
of Theodosius II, issued in 439, which began:
Thus, it is advantageous that barbarian peoples be taken possession of
(mancipari) by the empire of Our Godliness, thus our victories will seem
most fruitful for those who are obedient (oboedientibus) if the advantages
of peace are regulated by the rule of law. Therefore . . . we considered it fit-
ting . . . that each one may make a testament according to his own wishes.97
The law said no more about barbarians and went on to provide a sum-
mary of Roman testamentary practices that applied to the entire empire.
So what was the point, one might ask, of beginning the law by speaking of
defeated barbarians being regulated by Roman law? Is this merely conven-
tional, albeit extraneous, aggressive boasting? This is possible, although
no similar examples survive anywhere in Roman legislation. Therefore,
it may be that the law mentioned barbarians for a purpose, especially if,
as seems virtually certain, the word oboedientibus refers to the barbarians
who had just been mentioned. If so, the inclusion of barbarians was a
92 CTh 11.30.62 (405). Pace Sirks 1996: 149, “Barbarians were not subjected to Roman
courts”.
93 Modéran 2003: 500 (cf. 348, 510), however, suggests that these gentiles already were
citizens; contra: Ste-Croix 1981: 515.
94 Panegyrici Latini 8/5.21.1; Nixon and Saylor-Rodgers 1994: 105.
95 Historia Augusta (HA), Tacitus 15.2: “sub Romanis legibus”.
96 Zosimus, Historia nova 3.30.4; discussed by Ando, Provincial Loyalty, 341, cf. Sidonius
Apollinaris Carmen 7.495–496, 510–511.
97 Novella Theodosii 16 (439).
98 Codex Justinianus 1.3.28.3 (468). Significantly, this law was included in two barbarian
law codes, the Visigothic Breviarium and the “Roman Law of the Burgundians” (45.2).
99 Municipality: CTh 6.4.21.4, 8.12.3, 12.1.98, 12.1.119, 12.1.146, 12.18.2, 14.9.1, 15.1.42; Empire:
CTh 9.37.2, 10.10.25.
100 CTh 7.20.8: “quam volunt patriam damus”.
101 De regno 19/23C.
102 Zosimus, Historia nova 5.13.1.
The barbarian general Aspar even rose to hold the position of princeps
senatus (first man in the Senate) at Constantinople.103 Barbarians also
participated in traditional senatorial euergetism. In the East during the
460s, the aforementioned Aspar provided Constantinople with a new
cistern104 and in Italy, around the same time, the barbarian patrician
Ricimer underwrote mosaics for an Arian church in Rome.105 In 471, the
barbarian Master of Soldiers Fl. Valila qui et Theodobius dictated, proof-
read and subscribed to an extant donatio (deed or gift) that established
a Nicene church at Tivoli.106 Wealthy barbarians also disposed of their
property using Roman testamentary law. Aspar named another barbar-
ian, the Ostrogoth Theoderic Strabo, as one of his heirs.107 The emperor
Leo, however, refused to allow Strabo to claim his inheritance, perhaps
because of the strained political relations between the two, or perhaps
because Strabo was not covered by ius civile. Valila also bequeathed to the
church the house of Junius Bassus on the Esquiline Hill in Rome.108 In this
way, very important barbarians, frequently those with a family history of
imperial service,109 fulfilled the traditional civic roles expected of wealthy
and influential Roman citizens. Their ability to make property transfers
and testamentary bequests further demonstrates that they had full access
to Roman ius civile.
Nevertheless, barbarians who lived under the Roman legal umbrella did
not necessarily give up their barbarian identity. Multitudes of barbarian
settlers were no doubt absorbed into Roman society and retained, at most,
only sentimental attachments to their old country, but other barbarians
who served in the Roman Empire had dual residences, living part of the
time in the Roman Empire but also returning home.110 Barbarians who
wanted to keep feet in both camps were able to maintain dual citizenship,
so to speak. As already seen, one could hold Roman citizenship along with
municipal or provincial citizenship without any contradictions. In addi-
tion, a ruling of 398 permitted Jews to choose their own legal identity.
In civil cases, they could use their own laws within their own religious
communities or if both parties agreed, but if they were “living by Roman
common law” (Romano et communi iure viventes) they were expected to
“initiate and conclude all legal actions according to Roman law”.111 Nor is
there any indication that the Jews who chose to live by Roman law did so
in any other manner than by simply following the rules. The opportunity
to hold dual citizenship also was formally extended to barbarians even
prior to the Antonine Constitution. During the 160s, Roman citizenship
was granted to North African gentiles (salvo iure gentis) “with the law of
their people preserved”.112 These barbarians retained whatever legal obli-
gations or benefits accrued from their belonging to a barbarian people,
whilst at the same time Roman ius civile became available to them.113 Like
the Jews, they could use their own law when they identified themselves as
gentiles, or Roman law when they identified themselves as cives Romani.
This kind of dual citizenship did not create any problems of political alle-
giance, as by the late Roman Empire, being a Roman citizen had become
purely a statement of legal status and coverage. It no longer had anything
to do with politics and there were other institutions—military oaths for
soldiers and provincial council meetings for civilians—that dealt with
declaring oneself a loyal subject of the emperor.114
So where does this leave the barbarians who settled on Roman territory
and were assimilated under the umbrella of Roman law? Could they be
deemed to have been ‘Roman citizens’? There is no evidence of any pere-
grinus having been formally granted Roman citizenship after 212.115 If this
ever did happen, it is fair to expect that we would continue to find evi-
dence for it. Given the great number of references to such awards during
the Principate, the lack of them during the later empire has to be signifi-
cant and cannot be dismissed as an argument born of silence. After 212,
the only formal grants of Roman citizenship that continued to be made
were to freedmen and slaves, who thus experienced not so much a change
from ‘non-citizen’ to ‘citizen’, as a transfer to a greater measure of legal
freedom under ius civile. It was a difference of degree rather than kind.
However, peregrini no longer received grants of citizenship. Thus, when
considering the question of whether barbarians were considered to have
been Roman citizens, one must not assume that this happened as a conse-
quence of some legal act. It must have happened in some other manner.
Nevertheless, it certainly did happen, for as noted above, there is much
evidence for barbarians having behaved as if they were Roman citizens.
They held office,116 owned and transferred property, made wills, went to
Roman courts and generally made use of ius civile: all without formally
receiving citizenship. The most reasonable explanation for their ability
to do all this is that the Antonine Constitution was meant to be self-
perpetuating. All free foreign peregrini who settled in the Roman Empire
and took up the obligations and identity of cives of a municipality or a
province were potential Roman citizens. Being a foreign barbarian did not
exclude one from access to some, if not all, elements of Roman ius civile
and from other citizen privileges. What counted was not ethnicity, but
distinctions between slaves, freedmen and full citizens, who had different
levels of access to ius civile. Indeed, the primary distinction in prevailing
Roman law was not even between citizen and non-citizen, but between
degrees of legal access, as denoted by being a slave, freedman, colonus,
dediticius or under a sentence of infamia. Free status conveyed full access
to ius civile, whereas non-free status equated to non-citizen status in the
sense of incomplete access to ius civile. Conversely, anything less than full-
citizen status necessarily implied restricted legal access. It was therefore
a contradiction to suggest that a free person could be a non-citizen. This
would explain why there are no cases during the later empire of anyone
being denied access to ius civile on the basis of ethnic, or any other non-
servile, status. This is in stark contrast to the Principate, when accusations
of non-citizens passing themselves off as citizens were rampant.117
116 And to hold the office of Consul certainly implied that one had the ius honorum, the
right of Roman citizens to hold office.
117 E.g. Epictetus, Disccourses 3.41, “those who falsely claim Roman citizenship are
severely punished”; see Reinhold 1971.
The fall of the Western Roman Empire and the establishment of barbar-
ian successor states in the 5th century ce brought about a sea change in
the political and social organization of the western Roman world. Com-
monplace social and economic structures were turned upside down.
118 A point made by Ando 2000: 352, for the pre-212 period.
119 Digest 50.1.33. For this concept, see Thomas: 1996.
120 Historia Augusta (HA), Probus 18.4.
121 For Roman rule of the “orbis terrarum” (“circle of the lands”), see Ando 2000: 278ff.
Barbarians, who in the past had been disparaged by haughty and arrogant
Romans for their lack of social graces and ungrammatical Latin, were now
in positions of authority, lording it over the Romans. One might think that
this was the time for some payback, but that is not how the transition
usually played out. Indeed, one of the great mysteries of history is why
the transition from Roman to barbarian rule was accomplished with such
a relatively minimal amount of disruption. Barbarians certainly occupied
large amounts of Roman territory (although much of it had been the prop-
erty of the Roman government and was not, in fact, violently expropriated
from Roman landowners) and did appropriate the role previously held by
Roman emperors as supreme secular administrators. However, in other
regards, life went on. Romans continued to serve in administrative posi-
tions. Roman law continued as the law of the land. Latin continued as
the language of administrative and intellectual discourse. Roman culture
continued to provide literary and artistic models. Further, of course, the
Roman Christian religion became the greatest cultural and even political
force of the times.122
Barbarian kingdoms preserved concepts of citizenship that were some-
times, but not always, related to legal jurisdiction. They paid particular
attention to safeguarding the rights of those identified as Roman citizens.
Both the Visigoths and the Burgundians preserved a law of Constantine
dealing with slaves who had been made ‘Roman citizens’.123 Regarding
inheritances, the Visigothic interpretation of a law of Valentinian III
referred to “the succession rights of liberti who are Roman citizens”,124 and
the “Burgundian Law of the Romans” included regulations dealing with
witnessing procedures and the wills of Roman citizens.125 In late-6th cen-
tury Italy and 7th century Spain, slaves still were being formally manu-
mitted and granted Roman citizenship.126 Well into the 9th century, legal
forms in the Frankish kingdom continued to convey ‘Roman citizenship’,
which “included the right to make a will, to give testimony, to buy, to sell,
122 For the post-Roman world, see, inter alios, Brown 1974; Moorhead 2001; Halsall
2007.
123 Visigoths: CTh 4.7.1 = Breviarium Alarici 4.7.1 (506). Burgundians: Lex Romana Bur-
gundionum 3.
124 Nov. Val. 25, interpretatio (506). Novella Valentiniani 25 (interpretatio) (ad 447).
Interpretation in the Breviarium of Alaric II of ad 506 of Novel (New Law) 25 of the
emperor Valentinian III (ad 425–455).
125 Lex Romana Burgundionum 45.2 (derived from Nov.Theod. 16, also included in the
Visigothic Breviarium): 45.4.
126 Gregory the Great, Regularum 6.12 (595): “vos . . . liberos . . . civesque romanos effici-
mus”; Lex Visigothorum 12.2.13–14.
127 Formulae Arvernenses 27: MGH, Formulae 30, cf. 141, 172, 182, 246, 257–8, 311–3, 518,
and throughout.
128 E.g. Gregory of Tours, Historiae 7.31, 8.20, 10.31, 9.6, 2.11, 4.16, 9.13, 10.31. 6.13, 10.31;
CTh 1.29.6 = Brev.1.10.1 interpretatio.
129 E.g. Cassiodorus, Variarum 1.21.1, 2.37.1, 3.44.1, 6.23, 7.8, 7.11–12, 7.29, 7.44, 8.30.3, 8.31,
9.2.4–6, 9.5.1, 9.14.2, 11.12, 12.13.1, 12.15.6; special attention was given to the citizens and Sen-
ate of Rome: e.g. Var. 1.41, 2.32, 3.10, 9.17, 10.13.
130 Var. 6.11.1, 7.37.1, cf. 4.16.1, 6.1.1–4, 11.13.3, 11.5.4.
131 Lex Visigothorum (= Liber iudiciorum) 1.3.
132 Sidonius Apollinaris, Epistulae 8.9.3.
133 For Romans vis-á-vis barbarians in barbarian law codes, see, e.g. Mathisen and Sivan
1999.
134 See Barnwell 1992.
would have eased the transition is that being identified as a Roman citi-
zen was simply a statement of coverage under Roman ius civile. It did not
carry any sense of political loyalty to the Byzantine emperor or the old
Roman Empire.
Over the longer term, however, the Roman concept of universal citizen-
ship was lost. After all, barbarian kingdoms had none of the ideological
or conceptual underpinnings that had led to Roman ideas of inclusive
citizenship. In particular, they had no claim to universal political hege-
mony. Quite the contrary, as each was confronted by a welter of other
kingdoms, not to mention a resurgent Roman Empire in the East, with
which they usually competed. Exclusivity rather than inclusivity was their
watchword. As the Roman afterglow petered out, Roman concepts of citi-
zenship, whether of a world, a nation, a province or a city, did likewise, to
be replaced in the Middle Ages by models of subjugation to bishops and
kings.135 Any idea of universal citizenship was now transferred from the
cosmopolitan city of the secular world to the heavenly city of God, more
meaningful in the context of the world to come than in the here-and-now.
Not until the later Middle Ages did ancient-appearing forms of citizenship
based on city centres begin to re-emerge.136 It was only during the Renais-
sance that Roman concepts of individual citizen liberty, not to mention
ideas of world citizenship, reappeared.137
This study of how barbarians were integrated legally into the Roman
world adds one piece to the puzzle of how the Roman Empire evolved
into barbarian Europe. There was no great legal, and hence no great
social or even cultural, divide between Romans and barbarians in the late
Roman Empire. Evolving concepts of citizenship and the extension of legal
rights facilitated the integration of foreign, barbarian populations into the
Roman world and the essentially peaceful transition from Roman to bar-
barian rule in the Western Roman Empire during the 5th and 6th centu-
ries. Since the fall of the Western Roman Empire, no nation has been so
grand that it could claim to encompass the whole world or attempt to cre-
ate a form of universal citizenship that was open to all comers. However
now, at the beginning of the 21st century, there is again much discussion
of the different forms that universal citizenship could take. In spite of, or
135 See Blackstone 1765–1769: 1.354, “The first and most obvious division of the people is
into aliens and natural-born subjects”. Note also Post 1976. Most discussions of Roman law
in the Middle Ages do not even mention citizenship, e.g. Vinogradoff 1929.
136 See Howell 1988.
137 See Kant 1974: 4.
perhaps because of, the chronological gap between the ancient and mod-
ern phenomena of world citizenship, it may be that the Roman model
for dealing with issues of ethnicity, identity and religion in the context of
legal definitions of citizenship has much to teach us.138 In particular, the
time might have come once again for a form of citizenship unburdened
by the baggage of nationalism or political allegiances.