G.R. No.

102976 October 25, 1995

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority ("ISA") was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 272 dated 9
August 1973 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines.

P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of five (5) years counting from 9 August 1973.

The National Steel Corporation ("NSC") then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an
expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan
City. The construction of such a steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the
Government.

Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on 16 November 1982
withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land (totalling about 30.25 hectares in area)
located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of
NSC.However, certain portions of the public land under Proclamation 2239 were occupied by Maria Crist
ina Fertilizer Corp.

Letter of Instruction (LOI), No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to
"negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of
MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject land.

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.

ISA commenced
expropriation proceedings against MCFC.

A writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of ISA.

MCFC then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA
which had ceased to be a juridical person.

The trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case.

Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration of the trial court's Order, contending that despite the
expiration of its term, its juridical existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
completed.

The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner went on appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial court.

Issue:
Does the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of
ISA’s term?

Ruling:

Yes.
The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippin
es.The
Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with full panoply of powers and attributes
which are compendiously described as “legal personality.”

G.R. No. 90482 August 5, 1991

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through the SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, and
REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

Facts:

This case is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, filed on 25 October 1989 by the Office of
the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines "acting through
the Sugar Regulatory Administration" (SRA) and the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) seeking the review of
the 13 October 1989 Decision of the Court of Appeals (15th Division) in CAGR No. 17188.

The assailed decision1 dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Petitioners against herein public
respondents Judge and deputy sheriffs and private respondents for the nullification of the Orders of
respondent Judge of 13 March 1989, 21 March 1989 and 27 March 1989 in Civil Case No. 86-35880 of
Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on the following grounds: (a) the funds upon which the
attorney's fees are sought to be executed now belong to the Republic of the Philippines due to legal
subrogation, (b) execution is not proper against the Republic which is not a party to the case, (c) the
issuance of a writ of execution would violate the Constitution since according to it no money shall be
paid out of the treasury except in pursuance to an appropriations made by law, and (d) execution for
attomey's fees is unwarranted.

Issue:

Does the petitioner may lawfully bring an action in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioner Sugar Regulatory Administration may not
lawfully bring an action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel does not have the authority to represent said petitioner in this case.

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Facts:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this
court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting
Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and
Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn
vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to
Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11
p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth
Act 548.

Issue:

Does the regulation valid?

Ruling:

Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained
of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in
the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was
prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.

G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.

Facts:

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985.

His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
POEA.

The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by
the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.

The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties
ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00
for burial expenses.

The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue:

Does the issuance of the memorandum of the POEA a violation of non-delegation of powers?

Ruling:

No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797,
reading as follows.

The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).

G.R. No. L-45839 June 1, 1988

RUFINO MATIENZO, GODOFREDO ESPIRITU, DIOSCORRO FRANCO, AND LA SUERTE TRANSPORTATION

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LEOPOLDO M. ABELLERA, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, HON.
GODOFREDO Q. ASUNCION, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, ARTURO DELA CRUZ, MS
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., NEW FAMILIA TRANSPORTATION CO., ROBERTO MOJARES, ET
AL., respondents.

Facts:
Rufino Matienzo and other petitioners and also all respondents are authorized taxicab operators in
Metro Manila.

Respondents admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab units.

Respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization
of their unauthorized “excess” taxicab units citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973:

“to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to
become legitimate and responsible operators.” Within a matter of days, the respondent Board
promulgated its orders setting the application for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority
to operate their “excess taxicab units” for which legalization was sought.

Rufino Matienzo and other petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents.

The petitioners argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the
time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such
power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the Decree on
January 17, 1973.

Issue:

Does the BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations?

Ruling:

Yes, because Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional
permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time
limitation.

G.R. No. 71837 July 26, 1988

CHUNG KA BIO, WELLINGTON CHUNG, CHUNG SIONG PEK, VICTORIANO CHUNG, and MANUEL CHUNG
TONG OH, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (2nd Special Cases Division), SECURITIES and EXCHANGE
COMMISSION EN BANC, HON. ANTONIO R. MANABAT, HON. JAMES K. ABUGAN, HON. ANTERO F.L.
VILLAFLOR, JR., HON. SIXTO T.J. DE GUZMAN, JR., ALFREDO CHING, CHING TAN, CHIONG TIONG TAY,
CHUNG KIAT HUA, CHENG LU KUN, EMILIO TAÑEDO, ROBERTO G. CENON and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS COMPANY, INC., respondents.

Facts:

The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. was incorporated on January 19, 1952, for a term of 25
years which expired on January 19,1977.
The members of its board of directors executed a deed of assignment of all of the accounts receivables,
properties, obligations and liabilities of the old PBM in favor of Chung Siong Pek in his capacity as
treasurer of the new PBM, then in the process of reincorporation.

The new PBM was issued a certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Chung Ka Bio and the other petitioners herein, all stockholders of the old PBM, filed with the SEC a
petition for liquidation (but not for dissolution) of both the old PBM and the new PBM.

The allegation was that the former had become legally non-existent for failure to extend its corporate
life and that the latter had likewise been ipso facto dissolved for non-use of the charter and continuous
failure to operate within 2 years from incorporation.

Issue:

Does the new corporation has not substantially complied with the two-year requirement of Section 22
of the new Corporation Code on non-user because its stockholders never adopted a set of by-laws?

Ruling:

No, because as already shown, it is undeniable that the new PBM has in fact been operating all these
years. The petitioners' argument that Alfredo Ching was merely continuing the business of the old PBM
is self-defeating for they themselves argue that the old PBM had already been dissolved. As for the
contention that the election of Wellington Chung and J.R. Blanco as directors was subject to the
outcome of the petition for liquidation, this is clearly self-serving and completely without proof.
Moreover, failure to file the by-laws does not automatically operate to dissolve a corporation but is now
considered only a ground for such dissolution.

G.R. No. L-14535 January 30, 1960

BENITO SYMACO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
HON. PATERIO AQUINO, ETC., respondent-appellant.

Facts:

Petitioner was on May 22, 1957, and is still up to the present, the registered owner of a certain lt at
Calle Gen. Luna, Malabon Rizal.

Petitioner filed an application for building permit with the Office of the Mayor of Malabon, particularly
seeking authority to repair the eaves and partitions of Petitioner's house of strong materials located at
Gen. Luna Street, Malabon, Rizal.

The Municipal Mayor granted or issued a permit to the petitioner herein pursuant to the application
filed.

Mr. Carlos R. Mendoza, a duly appointed building inspector of the Municipality of Malabon, and acting
under the orders and direction of respondent, wrote a letter to herein petitioner information the letter
that he should file the necessary building permit for the contract in of a new building.
Petitioner filed a civil action for forcible entry, with prayer for preliminary, injunction, against herein
petitioner by A.M. Raymundo and Company before the Justice of the Peace Court of Malabon.

Alberto de Joya, as counsel of the A.M. Raymundo & Company, sent a letter to respondent asking the
latter to withheld issuance of the building permit to petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus.

The trial court commamded the respondent Mayor to issue immediately the building permit to the
petitioner.

G.R. No. 106611 July 21, 1994

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:

The Citytrust Banking Corporation filed a refund of overpaid taxes.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue denied on the ground of prescription.

The Citytrust Banking Corporation filed a petition for review before the CTA.

The case was submitted for decision based solely on the pleadings and evidence submitted by the
Citytrust Banking Corporation because the CIR could not present any evidence by reason of the repeated
failure of the Tax Credit/Refund Division of the BIR to transmit the records of the case, as well as the
investigation report thereon, to the Solicitor General.

CTA rendered the decision ordering BIR to grant the respondent's request for tax refund amounting to P
13.3 million.

Issue:

Does the failure of the CIR to present evidence to support the case of the government, should the
respondent's claim be granted?

Ruling:

No, because it is a long and firmly settled rule of law that the Government is not bound by the errors
committed by its agents. In the performance of its governmental functions, the State cannot be
estopped by the neglect of its agent and officers. Although the Government may generally be estopped
through the affirmative acts of public officers acting within their authority, their neglect or omission of
public duties as exemplified in this case will not and should not produce that effect.

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR
SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff, respectively, respondents.

Facts:

Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government
is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines.

Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6 and contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.

Issue:

Does President (Aquino) acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling:

Yes, because the court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of
the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return
to the Philippines

G.R. No. 109113 January 25, 1995

CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM

(MWSS), petitioners,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE LARGE DIAMETER
PRESSURE PIPE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (PLDPPMA), respondents.

In order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in the metropolitan
area, MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply optimization ("AWSOP") which would be, in most part,
financed by funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund ("OECF") of Japan to the national
government and allocated to MWSS in the form of equity. . . The projects were denominated Projects
APM-01 and APM-02.

On 30 August 1991, MWSS caused the publication in 2 leading newspapers of an "Invitation for Pre-
qualification and Bids" for Projects opened for international competitive bidding, copies of the
"Invitation for pre-qualification and Bids" were sent to the respective embassies and trade missions of
member countries of the OECF. . / Out of the 25 prospective applicants, only 14 contractors submitted
corresponding applications to the PBAC-CSTE.

private respondent Philippine Large Diameter pressure Pipes Manufacturers' Association ("PLDPPMA"),
sent 7 letters, between to the MWSS requesting clarification, as well as offering some suggestions, on
the technical specifications for APM-01 and APM-02.

The bidding was conducted by PBAC on the previously scheduled date of 31 March 1992. The Three (3)
lowest bidders for the said project (APM-01) were the following: 1. PLDPPMA (Joint Venture)
P267,345,574.00 2. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. P268,815,729.00 3. J.V. ANGELES DEVT. CORP.
P278,205,457.00 20 while the three lowest bidders for Project APM-02 included: 1. ENG'G. EQUIPMENT,
INC. (EEI) P219,574,538.00 2. FF CRUZ & CO., INC. P233,533,537.00 3. J.V ANGELES DEVT. CORP.
P277,304,604.00.

After the three lowest bidders for both projects were known, a meeting was held by the PBAC-CSTE,
composed of MWSS Deputy Administrator for Engineering Eduardo M. del Fierro, as Acting Chairman,
and deputy Administrator for Operations Ruben A. Hernandez, Acting Chief of Legal office Precioso E.
Remolacio, and Project Manager Cesar S. Guevarra, as members, to decide on what should be done
about Contract APM-01. Three of the members, namely, Hernandez, Guevarra and Asuncion,
recommended for rebidding on the following grounds: “a. Ambiguity of Addendum No. 6 . . . subject
to different interpretations because there was no illustrations provided. Further, it could also be said
that some contractors did not use the FRP because said Addendum was not clearly explained.

Remolacio abstained; he felt that "technical evaluation was more essential in deciding the issues in the
Contract." For his part, Del Fierro recommended that no rebidding should be undertaken and that an
award should be made to either the lowest or the second lowest bidder.

PBAC-CSTE met again to discuss and evaluate the bids in APM-02. Guevarra, Hernandez and Asuncion,
opined that a rebidding should be conducted, while Del Fierro and Remolacio believed that the contract
should be awarded to the lowest bidder.

Finally, the PBAC-CSTE formally submitted its report saying that while Joint Venture bid might have been
the lowest it was, however, invalid due to its failure to acknowledge Addendum No. 6, a major
consideration that could not be waived. It recommended that the contract be instead awarded to the
second lowest but complying bidder, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., subject to the latter's manifestation that it
would only hire key personnel with experience in the installation of fiberglass pressure pipes (due to
PBAC-CSTE's observation in the report that the company and its key personnel did not have previous
experience in the installation of fiberglass reinforced pipes). Del Fierro, Guevarra and Asuncion,
approved the PBAC-CSTE's findings and recommendation. Hernandez and Remolacio both disagreed
with the findings of the PBAC- CSTE's findings and recommendation. Hernandez and Remolacio both
disagreed with the findings of the PBAC-CSTE; the former opted for a rebidding while the latter batted
for awarding the contract to Joint Venture.

Issue:

Does the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of PLDPPMA's complaint and to
correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to set aside the
recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE?

Ruling:

No, because it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act
have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or
discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.