Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
2010
ILLINOIS
Prepared by:
Sequoyah Information Systems!
The Economic Judicial Report!
Criminal Law Edition
Bar Graphs
An overall cumulative score has been computed for each justice in the study. The higher
the justice’s evaluation score, the more favorable his or her rulings have been with respect
to public safety.
A justice who has been on the Court longer will have participated in more cases. Justices
are not scored if they did not participate in a decision or were not on the Court at the time
of the decision. A justice who wrote the opinion of the case is not scored differently for
having authored the opinion. Minority opinions (dissents) are substantively reviewed to
determine each justice’s position on the important issue(s) in each case.
Supreme Court
7 justices
The Supreme Court is the court of last resort. It has mandatory jurisdiction in some civil,
administrative agency, juvenile, original proceeding, and interlocutory decision cases. The
Court also has mandatory jurisdiction in capital criminal and disciplinary cases.
The Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction in some civil, administrative agency, juvenile,
original proceeding, and interlocutory decision cases. The Court also has discretionary
jurisdiction in non-capital criminal cases and certified questions from federal courts.
Appellate Court
5 District Courts
Circuit Court
23 Circuits
Sources: The National Center for State Courts (www.ncsconline.org) Calendar Year 2006,the Illinois Constitution Article
IV, and the Illinois Courts Website (www.state.il.us/court).
The Supreme Court may exercise original jurisdiction in cases relating to revenue,
mandamus, prohibition or habeas corpus, redistricting of the General Assembly and the
ability of the Governor to serve or resume office. The Court considers direct appeals from
the Illinois Circuit Courts in cases involving the death penalty. It hears appeals from the
Appellate Court when a question arising under either the Illinois or United States
Constitution is made an issue for the first time and as a result of the action of the Appellate
Court or if the Appellate Court certifies a case as being of such importance that it should
be decided by the Supreme Court. The Court has general administrative control over all
courts in Illinois.
*Justice Freeman will reach mandatory retirement age at the end of his current term of office.
Sources: Court information was provided by the Judicial Yellow Book (Spring 2009 Edition), the Illinois Constitution Article VI, and the
Illinois Courts Website (www.state.il.us/court). The judges' terms of office were provided by the Judicial Yellow Book (Spring 2009
Edition), the Illinois Courts Website (www.state.il.us/court), and the Illinois State Board of Elections Website (www.elections.state.il.us).
The higher the score, the better the justice’s public safety rating.
Justice Burke did not receive a score because she did not participate in a sufficient number of
cases during the time period evaluated in the study.
In November of 2003, the legislature passed significant reforms and gave the Illinois
Supreme Court authority to overturn any death sentence the Court considered
“fundamentally unjust,” without requiring a finding of a specific procedural or constitutional
basis for overturning the sentence.
Beginning with their dissent in People v. Hickey, 792 N.E.2d 232 (2001) and continuing
with all capital cases following, Justices Kilbride and Harrison stated that these new rules
should be applied retroactively. The practical outcome of such a ruling would require that
all death penalty cases be re-tried from beginning to end. (A table summarizing these
cases follows.)
Case Summaries
A few cases from the report have been summarized below to give the reader an insight
into the process involved in evaluating the cases. The full case list provided in the index
of the report does not contain summaries, but indicates the current judges and their
rulings in those decisions.
Defendant drove his truck onto the Chicago Skyway entering from an Illinois on-ramp.
Officers who had been monitoring his activity as a suspected drug dealer followed him.
They had just witnessed him loading boxes into his trunk. Other officers had stopped
his associate and discovered a bag of full of cash. The officers stopped Defendant and
found two boxes full of marijuana in his trunk. The stop took place 0.8 miles past the
Illinois-Indiana border. The officers arrested Defendant and took him to his mother's
house in Chicago where he lived. There they recovered cocaine, $10,000 in cash and
two pistols.
Defendant asserted that his arrest was illegal because it took place in Indiana and he
should have been taken before an Indiana judge for a bond hearing. Instead,
Defendant had been taken before an Illinois judge for the bond hearing.
The Court declined to quash Defendant's arrest or suppress the evidence against him.
Noting that the officers were in fresh pursuit of a suspected felon and did not even
realize they had entered Indiana, the Court observed that officers had the common law
authority to arrest Defendant under both Illinois and Indiana law. Failure to comply with
Indiana's post-arrest procedural requirement did not violate Defendant's due process
rights since he did, in fact, go before a neutral magistrate in Illinois. Further, the arrest
did not involve any police misconduct or willful disregard of the law.
The dissenting justices (Freeman and Kilbride) argued that failure to take Defendant
before an Indiana judge was grounds for suppressing the evidence and quashing the
arrest.
Defendant was convicted of the Class 2 felony of theft of property, sentenced to six
years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution. He and his family had moved into
a two-room suite at a hotel and billed the room to the company he owned. The
company never responded to the bills. The family had lived in the hotel for four months
without payment when the hotel contacted the police. The police visited the room and
left a message with Defendant's wife. Later that night, Defendant and his family
vacated the hotel without checking out. The bill exceeded $15,000. The hotel
attempted to charge Defendant's credit card, but the true owner of the card disputed
the charges.
The Court of Appeals held that because a hotel room is neither tangible personal
property nor an item specifically listed in the statute, the right to use a hotel room is not
property that can be stolen by deception.
On appeal, the Court noted that the statute does not define "property," but the statute
does specifically list certain non-portable items such as real estate, electricity and
telecommunication services, and also includes "anything of value." The Court
concluded that use of a hotel room is a thing of value and Defendant had permanently
deprived the hotel owner of the benefit of each night's income from occupancy of the
room.
The dissenting justices (Kilbride and Fitzgerald) argued that Defendant merely used
labor and services and the hotel owner had not shown that the room would have been
rented to any other person. Further, the dissent argued this is a contractual issue not
subject to criminal punishment for theft.
Defendant had broken into his victim's home while she slept. He stuffed a washcloth
into her throat, strangled her and fought her to her death. He then mutilated her body
with a knife and posed it in the living room. While Defendant did not contest his
conviction for first degree murder, home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual
assault, he did appeal his sentence to death.
At trial and sentencing, evidence was presented that Defendant was fixated on sex,
death and violence. Evidence against Defendant included the following:
- conviction for battery of a girl on the street after he pushed her down and threatened
her with a dagger;
- choked his girlfriend, pulled her by the hair, and threatened to kill her;
- slashed tires and seats of a jeep;
- told his friends that he was responsible for burning the building across the street from
his home;
- told his friends that he was responsible for the murder of a girl who was murdered in
the same manner as the present victim;
- kept photographs and news articles about the girl who was murdered in the same
manner as the present victim;
- often entered homes using a credit card to trip the lock;
- his computer ID was "CerealKilr2000";
- had sex, bestiality and child pornography on his computer; and
- four DUI arrests.
The majority of the Court found all the evidence was either relevant and reliable
evidence of future dangerousness or that its admission was harmless error. Justice
Kilbride dissented, arguing that the new statutory rules for capital crimes should be
applied retroactively and a new sentencing hearing should be granted.
People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202 (2003) and 851 N.E.2d 26 (2006)
In 1998, Defendant was stopped for speeding. The officer observed that Defendant had an
atlas, and open ashtray, two suits in the back seat, no visible luggage, and the car smelled like
air freshener. The officer had Defendant come to his patrol car because it was raining, and he
told Defendant he was writing a warning. Defendant told the officer he was moving from
Chicago to Las Vegas. Defendant appeared nervous. While waiting for the dispatcher to
check for warrants and the validity of Defendant's license, the officer asked Defendant if he had
ever been arrested, and Defendant said he had not. The officer asked permission to search
Defendant's car and Defendant said no. While writing the warning ticket, another officer arrived
with a drug-detection dog and approached Defendant's car. The dog alerted and the officer
searched Defendant's truck, finding marijuana. Defendant was convicted of drug trafficking,
sentenced to twelve years in prison and ordered to pay $256,000, the street value of the drugs.
Defendant appealed, arguing the evidence was improperly obtained and should not have been
allowed at trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction finding the officer did not need a
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the canine sniff. On appeal, the Supreme Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Kilbride, said the officer's stated reasons for suspicion constituted
"nothing more than a vague hunch Defendant may have been involved in possible
wrongdoing." The Court held that probable cause is needed to allow a canine sniff of a vehicle
that has already been detained. The majority in the 4-3 decision reversed the conviction. The
dissent, written by Justice Thomas, argued that canine sniffs of detained cars are not searches
entitled to constitutional protection
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the Illinois
Supreme Court, agreed with Justice Thomas, and held that "official conduct that merely reveals
the possession of contraband does not compromise a legitimate privacy interest." The case
was remanded back to the Illinois Supreme Court which, following the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court, held that "a dog sniff of a vehicle during a routine traffic stop does not
implicate the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution." Therefore, the evidence was properly
admitted. The three dissenting justices (which included Justice Kilbride) complained that the
Illinois Constitution is not always in step with the Federal Constitution and that this is a case
that "necessitates our divergence from federal precedent."
Defendant entered the home of a woman and her 10-year-old daughter. He restrained
them, sexually assaulted them, cut their throats and then used an accelerant to set their
apartment on fire. Defendant admitted his guilt but argued he was mentally unable to
control his sexually-sadist impulses, which might be biologically linked to the death of
his mother when he was a 17-year-old. The jury rejected verdicts based on
psychological impairment and found Defendant guilty of first degree murder.
During the sentencing phase the jury heard evidence that Defendant had brutally raped
eight other girls and had killed seven of them. He had dismembered or burned all of his
murder victims. Defendant had also escaped from custody and suggested during his
admission tape that he had evidence regarding murders that took place during periods
when he was on parole. The jury sentenced Defendant to the death penalty.
Defendant appealed, arguing among other things, that one of the jurors had not been
impartial. The Court's majority found that the juror had been candid with the trial judge
when questioned and had been appropriately dismissed during the sentencing phase
when he revealed he had prematurely decided the death penalty was appropriate. The
Court deferred to the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the juror's
demeanor first hand. The dissenting justices (Justices Burke, Freeman and Kilbride)
would have granted a new trial.
Case
Index