RST 2d §479 - Last Clear Chance: Helpless Plaintiff

A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from the defendant’s subsequent negligence may
recover for harm caused thereby if, immediately preceding the harm,
(a) The plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, and
(b) The defendant is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to
avoid the harm, when he
(i) Knows of the plaintiff’s situation and realizes or has reason to realize the peril involved in it or
(ii) Would discover the situation and thus have reason to realize the peril, if he were to exercise the vigilance which it
is then his duty to the plaintiff to exercise

RST 2d §479, Comment a

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RST 2d §480 - Last Clear Chance: Inattentive Plaintiff

A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable vigilance, could discover the danger created by the defendant’s negligence
in time to avoid the harm to him, can recover if, but only if, the defendant
(a) Knows of the plaintiff’s situation, and
(b) Realizes or has reason to realize that the plaintiff is inattentive and therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time to
avoid the harm, and
(c) Thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid
the harm

RST 2d §480, Comment a

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Strict Liability
RST 2d §519 - General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of
another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.

RST 2d §520 - Abnormally Dangerous Activities

In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) Existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others;
(b) Likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) Inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) Extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) Inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) Extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.

RST 2d §520, Comment e - Not limited to the defendant's land

- In most cases, strict liability applies in cases where the activity is conducted on the defendant's land, but this is not a
requirement; strict liability may still apply to an abnormally dangerous activity even if it is carried out in a public place
or on somebody else's land

RST 2d §520, Comment f - "Abnormally dangerous"

- Label given to dangers that arise, either from activities that are in themselves unusual, or from unusual risks created by
normal activities undertaken in particular circumstances
- Ordinarily, several factors in §520 must be met for strict liability to apply, but it is not required that any specific factor
be met and will depend upon the relative weight of each factor
- The essential question is whether risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the
circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the resulting harm, even though the
activity is undertaken with reasonable care
- Are the dangers and inappropriateness for the locality so great that, despite any usefulness the activity may have for the
community, the defendant should be required as a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes, without the need of a
finding of negligence

RST 2d §520, Comment i - Common usage

- Activities are common if they're customarily carried out by much of the community or much of mankind
- The activity is the relevant consideration, not the purpose for which the activity is carried out
- Common Examples
- Cars are common, tanks or other motor vehicles of great size and weight are not
- Although blasting is a proper means of excavation or clearing, it is not carried out by a large percentage of the
population and is not common
- Same logic with anything having to do with high explosives or oil lands
- The usual dangers resulting from an activity that is one of common usage are not regarded as abnormal, even though a
serious risk of harm cannot be eliminated by reasonable care
- Differences in manner or degree can also push things from common to uncommon
- Common to have water in a cistern or in a barnyard tank, but not common to collect a large quantity in a hillside
reservoir in the midst of a city
- Common to store gas and electricity in household pipes/wires, but not in large storage tanks/power lines; common
to store fire in fireplaces, but not to make fire on highways

RST 3d (LPEH) §20 - Abnormally Dangerous Activities

(a) An actor who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability for physical harm resulting from
the activity.
(b) An activity is abnormally dangerous if:
(1) The activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is
exercised by all actors; and
(2) The activity is not one of common usage.
Respondeat Superior
RST 2d §416 - Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions
One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its
progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the
employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.

RST 2d §416, Comment d

- Not essential that the work the contractor is employed to do is extra hazardous or abnormally dangerous or that it
involve a high degree of risk to those in the vicinity
- It only needs to involve a peculiar risk of harm unless special precautions are taken, even if the risk is not
abnormally great
- A peculiar risk involves some special hazard from the nature of the work done, which calls for special precautions, as
opposed to common risks which must only be protected against through normal care
 - e.g. If a contractor is employed to transport goods by truck over a public highway, the employer is not liable for
contractor's failure to inspect brakes or driving or the speed limit, because the risk is not peculiar; but If the
contractor is employed to transport giant logs (a peculiar risk), the employer will be subject to strict liability for
contractor’s failure to properly anchor them to the truck

Intentional Torts
RST 2d §2 - Act
The word “act” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote an external manifestation of the actor’s will
and does not include any of its results, even the most direct, immediate, and intended.

RST 2d §13 - Battery: Harmful Contact

An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) He acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an
imminent apprehension of such contact, and
(b) A harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results

RST 2d §14 - Necessity of Act by Defendant

To make the actor liable for a battery, the harmful bodily contact must be caused by an act done by the persons whose
liability is in question.

RST 2d §14, Comment b

- Muscular movements that are purely reflective or the convulsive movements of an epileptic or movements of the body
during sleep or while the will is otherwise in abeyance are not acts

RST 2d §18 - Battery: Offensive Contact

(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) He acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an
imminent apprehension of such contact, and
(b) An offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1,a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a
mere offensive contact with the other’s person although the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflict it and,
therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.

RST 2d §18, Comment c

- Unnecessary for contact with the other’s person to be caused directly by some actor the actor
- All that’s necessary is for the actor to intend to cause the other, either directly or indirectly, to come into contact with a
foreign body or substance in a manner which the other will reasonably regard as offensive

RST 2d §18, Comment d

- Unnecessary for the other to know of the offensive contact that is inflicted upon him at the time it’s inflicted

RST 2d §18, Comment g

- Actor is not liable for an act which involves a risk, no matter how unreasonable, that it will cause only an offensive
contact

RST 2d §19 - What Constitutes Offensive Contact

A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity
RST 2d §52 - Consent: To Whom Given

RST 2d §52, Comment b

- If a plaintiff is relying upon a hospital that assigns a doctor, rather than seeking out a particular doctor, the consent
given to one doctor may reasonably be interpreted to include the acts of others, or of subordinates

RST 2d §892 - Meaning of Consent

(1) Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by action or inaction and need not be
communicated to the actor.
(2) If words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent
and are as effective as consent in fact.

RST 2d §892, Comment c - Apparent consent

- Even when person doesn’t actually agree to conduct, their words or action or inaction may manifest a consent that will
justify the other in acting in reliance upon them if they would be understood by a reasonable person as intended to
indicate consent and they are so understood by the actor

RST 2d §892A – Effect of Consent

(1) One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort
for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.
(2) To be effective, consent must be
(a) By one who has the capacity to consent or by a person empowered to consent for him, and
(b) To the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.
(3) Conditional consent or consent restricted as to time, area or in other respects is effective only within the limits of the
condition or restriction.
(4) If the actor exceeds the consent, it is not effective for the excess.
(5) Upon termination of consent its effectiveness is terminated except as it may have become irrevocable by contract or
otherwise, or except as its terms may include, expressly or by implication, a privilege to continue to act.

RST 2d §892B - Consent Under Mistake, Misrepresentation, or Duress

(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), consent to conduct of another is effective for all consequences of the conduct and
for the invasion of any interests resulting from it.
(2) If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the nature
of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other
or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.
(3) Consent is not effective if it is given under duress.

RST 2d §57 - Fraud or Mistake as to Collateral Matter

RST 2d §892C - Consent to Crime

(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), consent is effective to bar recovery in a tort action although the conduct consented
to is a crime.
(2) If conduct is made criminal in order to protect a certain class of persons irrespective of their consent, the consent of
members of that class to the conduct is not effective to bar a tort action.

RST 2d §895J - Deficient Mental Capacity

One who has deficient mental capacity is not immune from tort liability solely for that reason.

RST 2d §895J, Comment c

- A rational choice is not required
 - An insane person may have an intent to invade the interests of another, even though his reasons and motives for
forming that intention may be entirely irrational

RST 2d §35 - False Imprisonment

(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment if:
(a) He acts intending to confine the other or a third person within boundaries fixed by the actor, and
(b) His act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the other, and
(c) The other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
(2) An act which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable to the other for a
merely transitory or otherwise harmless confinement, although the act involves an unreasonable risk of imposing it
and therefore would be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.

RST 2d §36 - What Constitutes Confinement

(1) To make the actor liable for false imprisonment, the other's confinement within the boundaries fixed by the actor must
be complete.
(2) The confinement is complete although there is a reasonable means of escape, unless the other knows of it.
(3) The actor does not become liable for false imprisonment by intention- ally preventing another from going in a
particular direction in which he has a right or privilege to go.

RST 2d §38 - Confinement by Physical Barriers

The confinement may be by actual or apparent physical barriers.

RST 2d §416 - Work Dangerous in Absence of Special Precautions

One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its
progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the
employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.

RST 2d §416, Comment d

- Not essential that the work the contractor be employed to do be extra hazardous or abnormally dangerous or that it
involve a high degree of risk to those in the vicinity
- Only needs to involve a peculiar risk of harm unless special precautions are taken, even if the risk is not
abnormally great
- Peculiar risk involves some special hazard from the nature of the work done, which calls for special
precautions, as opposed to common risks which people in general are subjected to protect against through
normal care
- e.g. If a contractor is hired to transport goods by truck over a public highway, the person who hired is not liable for
their failure to inspect brakes or driving or the speed limit, because the risk is not peculiar; if the contractor is hired to
transport giant logs, the person who hired them will be subject to strict liability for injuries caused by their failure to
ensure that the logs were properly secured to the truck

RST 3d (LPEH) §17 - Res Ipsa Loquitur

The factfinder may infer that the defendant has been negligent when the accident causing the plaintiff’s physical harm is a
type of accident that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of actors of which the defendant is the
relevant member.

RST 2d §288A, Comment f - Knowledge

Where the actor neither knows nor should know of any occasion or necessity for action in compliance with the legislation
or regulation, his violation of it will ordinarily be excused.