RemRev 2 – SpecPro Digests
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE (RULES 73-90)
EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS G.R. No. 133743, February 6,
2007
FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis, during his lifetime, contracted three marriages, to wit:
(1) first with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children, one of which is herein
petitioner; (2) on 1968 he was married to Merry Lee, with whom he had a son, Tobias;
but said marriage was divorced by virtue of a decree granting said divorce by Family
court of Hawaii; (3) On 1984, he married Felicidad San Luis with whom he had had no
children but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death
on December 18, 1992.
Claiming to be the widow of the decedent, Respondent sought the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate and filed a petition for letters of administration before RTC Makati.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Petitioner further
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court finding merit on petitioner’s arguments dismissed
the petition for letters of administration. On appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the
orders of the trial court. The appellante court ruled: (1) that under Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal
residence or domicile. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed
in Makati City; and (2) that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay- Somera. On July 2, 1998, Petitioners appealed to this Court
via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not a surviving spouse whose marriage to the decedent is assailed
on the ground of prior marriage may be considered an interested party in the settlement
of the decedent’s estate.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to
the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which
was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties
who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co- ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of
couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v.
Court of Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
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RemRev 2 – SpecPro Digests
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA
JENNIFER QUIAZON vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
FACTS: Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Elise filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration and claimed that she is the natural child of Eliseo
having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous
for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4
signed by Eliseo as her father.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, wife of the
decedent, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac
and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise
to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City
and directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the residence of the decedent as indicated in the death
certificate should be taken into account for purposes of determining the venue for the
probate of the will. (2) Whether or not the natural child of the decedent may be
appointed as an administrator.
HELD: (1) Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death
The word “resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence
at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in
1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for
judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went
to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that
the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must
be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
(2) Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be
filed by an interested person
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
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RemRev 2 – SpecPro Digests
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP vs. SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO
G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011
FACTS: Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 without any known debts or
obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia (died
on April 24, 1924) with whom he had three children, Jesus (died prior to 1994 without
issue), Milagros (died on 1996 with a will subject to a separate probate proceedings) and
Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa – herein
respondent); and second with Caridad with whom he also had three children—Eduardo
(herein petitioner), Sebastian, and Mercedes. At the time of his death, Joaquin left two
parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City. On September 15, 1994, petitioner
Eduardo filed a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased
father Joaquin Agtarap.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two
subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon
Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject
properties. On October 23, 2000, RTC issued an Order of Partition and declared that
bulk of the estate property were acquired during the existence of the second marriage
as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its face that
decedent was married to Caridad Garcia
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution declaring that the real
estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. On appeal,
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and included in its resolution is the settlement not
only of the estate of Joaquin, but also the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria,
and Milagros.
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
They proferred the following contentions: (1) that the estate must have already been
settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph, and
Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros’ name and of TCT No.
8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose; (2) CA erroneously settled, together with the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria,
and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only one estate in one
proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the estate of Milagros in the
intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court
for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that
she would receive from Joaquin’s estate. He states that this violated the rule on
precedence of testate over intestate proceedings; and (3) that RTC, acting as an intestate
court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to determine
questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court with general
jurisdiction.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not estate is considered settled upon payment of inheritance
tax. (2) Whether or not the share of the heir who died pending the settlement of the
estate of predecessor decedent may be settled in the said pending settlement case of the
decedent. (3) Whether or not the intestate court has the authority to determine questions
of
ownership over properties covered by the estate.
HELD: (1) No. Sebastian’s claim that Joaquin’s estate could have already been settled
in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax cannot be upheld. Payment of the
inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As provided in
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court—an estate is settled and distributed among the
heirs only after the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The records of these cases
do not show that these were complied with in 1965.
(2) The answer is in the affirmative provided the estate of the heirs who died during the
pendency of the settlement their predecessor is not subject of a separate proceedings.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above, the RTC was
specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well
as their respective shares after the payment of the obligations of the estate, as
enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and
Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the
settlement of Joaquin’s estate, they being his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardo’s position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquin’s
estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show
that a separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed
by Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.34 While there has been no
showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquin’s
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estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and approved, prudence dictates
that this Court refrain from distributing Milagros’ share in Joaquin’s estate.
(3) As to the issue on the ownership of the subject real properties, we hold that the
RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.
Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court
is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the
parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the
resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the
subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to
settle the estate of Joaquin.
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY G.R. No.
183053, October 10, 2012
FACTS: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June
1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five
grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and
two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and
Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by
the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her
siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following
the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along
with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a
case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually
acquitted.
Three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren,
Emilio III and Nenita. On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate. Federico, opposed the
petition.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November
2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of
decedent Cristina’s intestate estate. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC and appointed Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. On appeal by
certiorari, Supreme Court reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court
included Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest
in Federico’s estate. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that the
explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference
for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of
the Civil Code must be followed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child has preference over the illegitimate child with
respect to the appointment as administrator of the estate of their grandparent.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The general rule in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court. The rule lists an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator.
This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of
kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in
jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the
estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This
is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the
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estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a
wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. In
all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an
interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
The court further drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the
nearest of kin in the category being preferred. The "next of kin" has been defined as
those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s
property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest
in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among
members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance
of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.
It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside
and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.
Mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs
nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in
Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate
of the one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of
kin.”
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO et al. vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 et al. G.R. No. 146006, February 23, 2004
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez died on July 21, 1980 and was survived by his wife
(Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez)
and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent).
During the pendency of the intestate proceeding, Juliana Ortañez and her two children,
Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of
agreement (MOA) for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez,
partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
Pursuant to the MOA, Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, claiming to be owners, sold
the Philinterlife shares to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG). Having failed to
repurchase the shares, petitioner FLAG, after one year, consolidated in its name the
ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock
On July 12, 1995, private respondent filed a motion for appointment of special
administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. The motion was granted by the intestate
court. Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion: (1) to declare void ab initio
the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982; and (2) to declare the partial nullity
of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate.
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court granted the motions of Special Administratrix
Enderes for the annulment of the MOA. Jose Ortañez assailed the order of the intestate
court by filing a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
denied his petition. He then elevated the CA decision to the SC via petition for review.
The SC dismissed the petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez and such decision
became final and was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution filed by private
respondent. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao, officers of FLAG filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not sale of property included in the inventory of the estate by some
of the heirs made during the pendency of the intestate proceeding without intestate
court’s approval may be declared null and void.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. The rule is clear that (1) any disposition
of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final
adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of
estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a
separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration
under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property
is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final
adjudication, that is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees
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shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or
undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein.
In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the
estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner FLAG. This
they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate
court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as
what happened in the present case.
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son,
Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, Montes and his three granddaughters (private
respondents) with Edmond as the executor. Four years after the testator's death, private
respondent Montes filed a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz's will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.
During the pendency of the probate proceedings, the court ordered Edmond to deposit
with the Branch Clerk the rental deposit and payments representing the one- year lease
of the Valle Verde property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over
the amount net of expenses for repair and maintenance on the estate.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as
executor, filed a motion praying for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion
and prayed for the release of the said rent payments to the testator’s grandchildren and
for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and
the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
The probate court denied petitioner's motion but granted respondent Montes' motion.
The probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond
but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the
release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse
of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals but the CA dismissed the
petition and sustained the probate court's order. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC and argued that affirming the Probate Court’s order
would have the following effect: (1) disallow the executor/administrator of the estate of
the late Hilario M. Ruiz to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the
estate; (2) grant support, during the pendency of the settlement of an estate, to certain
persons not entitled thereto; and (3) prematurely partition and distribute the estate
pursuant to the provisions of the holographic will even before its intrinsic validity has
been determined, and despite the existence of unpaid debts and obligations of the estate.
ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will
to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority to
grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's
grandchildren.
HELD: It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not
be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's
death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law
is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education,
subsist even beyond the age of majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds
of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children"
and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or
incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of
his estate.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005
FACTS: During his lifetime, Efraim M. Santibañez obtained two (2) set of loans used
to by three (3) tractors which remained unpaid upon his death. Upon his death, his heirs
commenced a testate settlement proceeding pursuant to his holographic will. During
the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
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Florence executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves
and take possession of the three (3) tractors. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them.
FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Petitioner Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank. Pursuant to the assigned assets and liabilities, Union sent demand letters to
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, the petitioner
filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund
and Florence.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence filed her Answer and alleged that
considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not
approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the
petitioner under the joint agreement.
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending,
as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent.
The trial court ruled in favor of Florence and Edmund.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the heirs may, during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, enter into an agreement distributing among themselves properties of the
testator and by virtue of such agreement assumed the indebtedness corresponding to
such properties. (2) Whether or not a creditor of the testator may, during the pendency
of the probate proceedings, file a separate complaint for collection against the heirs
based on an agreement executed by the heirs whereby they distribute the properties of
the estate and assume the debts corresponding to such property.
HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. The act of the heirs in the instant case of
dividing the 3 tractors amounts to partition. Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although
it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-
judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot
just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over
all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them
in any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with
jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.
(2) The loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of
the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is
mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs
of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint
agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them
to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated
which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the
validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding
to the chattel that they were each to receive.
PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES vs. HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO R. BRIONES G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007
FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings
to settle her husband’s estate. CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata
as the administratrix of Maximino’s estate. Subsequently, CFI issue an Order, dated 2
October 1952, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata.
Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the
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RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her
husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s intestate
estate.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the
heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through
fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other
heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate
estate of Maximino.
After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of
the heirs of Maximino. The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision before the
Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed the decision. Unsatisfied the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata elevated the case before the SC. SC reversed
the decisions of CA and RTC and dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case
No. CEB-5794.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment awarding ownership of the properties included in
the decedent’s estate to his surviving wife may be assailed on the ground of fraud after
more than 30 years had lapse from the promulgation of the said judgment.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real
properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the
absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of
Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the
real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order,
dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI
Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute,
and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire
estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the
other heirs of her deceased husband.
The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
effectively settled the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir of her deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the
said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the
presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court, reproduced below –
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether
in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any
clear and convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-
R had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment
valid in every respect; and it could not give credence to the following statements made
by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving
siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal
notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of
estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in
the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the
same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence
of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the
settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors
in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily
made.
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG vs. NICOLASITO S. SOLAS A.M. No. P-01-1448,
June 25, 2013
FACTS: The subject of this controversy is Lot No. 11 which is part of the Hodges
Estate. Hodges Estate is the subject of a pending intestate proceedings.
Herein complainant is the son of Trinidad Sabidong, one of the longtime occupants of
Lot 11. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed
at the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4. On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said
case ordering the occupants to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased to her
and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs. At the time,
respondent was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
On January 8, 1986, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of
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234 square meters for the amount of P35,100. Under the Order dated November 18,
1986 issued by the probate court, respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved.
On January 21, 1987, the probate court issued another Order granting respondent’s
motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor. The writ of possession over
Lot 11 was eventually issued on June 27, 1989. On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale
With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to
respondent on installment for the total purchase price of P50,000. Thus, a new
certificate of title in the name of respondent was issued.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court
employee respondent cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer
in good faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression and grave abuse of authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not an estate proceeding may be considered a pending litigation in
relation to the property included is such estate which disallows a court official from
purchasing the same on the ground of Art. 1491 of the Civil Code.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code provides that he following
persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the
mediation of another: Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place
during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the
Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long
become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property is no longer "in
litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under
settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be
subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the
distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered
to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp.
Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already been closed and terminated
at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21,
1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491
(5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, it was held that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not
violate the rule on disqualification to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was
then pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where he was Clerk of Court.
ESCHEAT (RULE 91)
CASTORIO ALVARICO vs. AMELITA L. SOLA G.R. No. 138953, June 6, 2002
FACTS: Fermina A. Lopez, a widown, was an awardee of Lots Nos. 4, 5, 3-B, 3-C and
6-B, Sgs-3451 and being the winning bidder at the auction sale of these parcels by the
Bureau of Lands. On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and
Transfer of Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the
obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No.
V-81066. The document of transfer was filed with the Bureau of Lands.
Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the
amendment of the application from Fermina to Amelita. Consequently, an OCT was
issued in the name of Amelita and her husband.
On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-1419110 for reconveyance
against Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him
and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same. He averred that the
donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina
was no longer the owner of the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner,
the property having been transferred earlier to her. She added that the donation was
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void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly
acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the
land for petitioner. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. On
appeal, RTC decision was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person imputing bad faith on the transfer of land patents may
assailed the validity of an OCT subsequently issued to the transferee of the land patents.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita
Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For one, the execution of
public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the
presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and
controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was issued in 1989 in the
name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the Original
Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of
issuance. A Torrens title, once registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All
persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of its registration.
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only
the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act, to wit: All actions
for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted
by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action
which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate
of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land covered thereby will again form
part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.30 Clearly then, petitioner
has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita's title. It follows that he cannot
"recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful
owner thereof.
GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP (RULES 92 TO 97)
PILAR Y. GOYENA vs. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO G.R. No. 147148,
January 13, 2003
FACTS: On July 8, 1996, respondent (Amparo) filed a "PETITION FOR LETTERS
OF GUARDIANSHIP" over the person and properties of her sister Julieta, as the latter
is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of a guardian to
manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises. Petitioner
(Goyena) opposed the petition for letters of guardianship on the following grounds: (1)
that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a
guardian to take charge of her person/property; (2) Respondent is not fit to be
appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests are antagonistic; and
(3) because Petitioner thinks that the Respondent dislikes her.
The trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and
her property" and appointed respondent as guardian of her person and properties. On
appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. CA held
that there are really no antagonistic interests to speak of between petitioner [Amparo]
and Julieta, they being co-owners of certain properties. There is also no showing that
petitioner's business decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision having been
denied, she filed the present petition
ISSUE: Whether or not a grant for letters of guardianship may be assailed on the
ground of antagonistic interest and mere presumed dislike by the appointed guardian of
the oppositor.
HELD: While, it was held in the case of Garchitorena v. Sotelo that a person with
antagonistic interest with that of the ward may not be appointed as guardian, no such
antagonistic interest exist in the present case as between the appointed guardian, i.e., the
Respondent and the ward, Julieta.
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals
directly with the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and
diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons for
and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be
disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
Finally, it should be noted that Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of
respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she
was disliked by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for
appointment as guardian. Furthermore, Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state of
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mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian,
AMPARO EVANGELISTA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 110427,
February 24, 1997
FACTS: Amparo A. Evangelista, judicially appointed legal guardian of the person and
estate of Carmen Cañiza, representing the latter in the said capacity filed an unlawful
detainer suit against the Respondent Estradas. The Complaint alleges that: (1) plaintiff
Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question; (2) that out of kindness, she
had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children et al. to temporarily reside in her house,
rent-free; (3) Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced
age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment;" (4) through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the
Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house; and (5) the complaint was filed
within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990.
In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that Cañiza executed a
holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the
house and lot in question.
Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC in Cañiza's favor. But on appeal, the decision
was reversed by the RTC. RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants'
possession should be resolved is accion publiciana. Later on, the Appellate Court
affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. Hence, Cañiza, through her guardian, elevated the
case before the SC.
While the case was pending before the SC, Carmen Cañiza died and her heirs — the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and
nephew, respectively — were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a holographic will purportedly executed by the registered
owner of the property in favor of the defendants is a valid defense against an action for
unlawful detainer. (2) Whether or not a legal guardian had authority to bring an action
for unlawful detainer in representation of his/her ward. (3) Whether or not a guardian
may continue to represent the ward after the latter's death.
HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time
prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate,
it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, NCC).
Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal
right to the property, whether as possessors by tolerance or sufferance, or as owners.
They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended.
They could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house;
their status as owners is dependent on the probate of the holographic will by which the
property had allegedly been bequeathed to them — an event which still has to take place;
in other words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them
would be premature and inefficacious.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . only
to determine the issue of possession.
(2) The answer is in the affirmative. In bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely
discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly
imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.: A guardian must manage the estate
of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe
necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and
if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real
estate, upon being authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to
such maintenance.
(3) While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, 39 the rule affords
no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one
of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C.
Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court of June 20, 1994, they were
in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance
with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: “ xxx The heirs of the deceased may
be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs. Xxxxx”
To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not
extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not
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being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now
represent her interests in the appeal at bar.
NAPOLEON D. NERI, et al. vs. HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND
JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
FACTS: Anunciacion had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo
Illut (Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage
with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several
homestead properties.
When Anunciacion died intestate, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural
guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and
Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and
thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
(spouses Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
17 years after, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the
said homestead properties against spouses Uy arguing that (1) the sale was made within
the prohibited period; and (2) children of Anunciacion from her first marriage were
excluded and deprived of their legitimes.
RTC ruled that the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their
hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor
children, Rosa and Douglas.
On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. CA found it unconscionable to
permit the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s possession thereof for 17
years. Furthermore, CA held that the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid as far as the
heirs of Anunciacion on the following grounds: (1) as to the children of the first
marriage, while they are not bound by the extrajudicial settlement, they belatedly filed
their claim or more than 2 years from knowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994
when their stepfather died; (2) as to the children of the second marriage who as a minor
at the time of the sale, because they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they
failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set
in because of their inaction for a long period of time.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not compulsory heirs who have not notice of the fact that the
some of the heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale are bound thereof. (2)
Whether or not surviving spouse of the decedent, as natural guardian of the minor heirs
may dispose the share of such minor heirs in the properties inherited. (3) Whether or
not the heirs who have no notice of the execution of the extrajudicial settlement and
sale or minor heirs who was represented by their surviving parent in the said settlement
may still question extrajudicial settlement and sale after 17 years.
HELD: (1) No. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides: Extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x The fact of the extrajudicial settlement
or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated.
Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors
Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
(2) No. Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining
to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father
or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides: When the property of the child
under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the
necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more
than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property,
with the duties and obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by
Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation,
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or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration. Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property
and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children
without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil
Code.
(3) Yes. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in
Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial
settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were
deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe" in accordance
with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA1 G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012
FACTS: Nilo Oropesa (petitioner) filed a petition to be appointed as guardians over
the property of his father, Cirilo Oropesa (Respondent). He alleged among others that:
(1) the respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over
ten (10) years after suffering from stroke on 2003; (2) that his judgment and memory
were impaired; (3) that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside
aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation
by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
Respondent opposed the petition for guardianship. After the presentation of evidence
of the petitioner, Respondent filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner
to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his
Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents
of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File
Demurrer to Evidence.
The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence. The Trial Court noted the
absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa
does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs.
On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report
which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the
domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide
solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses
intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning
and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and
able.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court. Accordingly,
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a medical expert is required to prove the
incompetency of the purported ward in a petition for guardianship.
HELD: A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive
and definite evidence. In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind
of the proposed ward was at issue, it was held that "where the sanity of a person is at
issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that the observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will
suffice."
The trial court in its order denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration stated its
own observation of respondent’s physical and mental state, i.e., “that oppositor is still
sharp, alert and able.”
EDUARDO T. ABAD vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO
G.R. No. 191993, December 5, 2012
FACTS: Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura
B. Abad. When the petition was called for hearing, nobody entered an opposition and
Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte. On June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason
(Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition. Biason alleged that
he is also a nephew of Maura and opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian
as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while
Maura maintains her abode in Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as
Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney
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to manage her properties.
RTC denied Abad’s petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s guardian. Abad filed a
motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but the RTC denied the same. On
appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Thus, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. Abad contends that:
(1) CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the fact that it did not hold any
hearing to determine whether Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as
provided by law; (2) he was not given the opportunity to submit evidence to controvert
Biason’s appointment; and (3) the fact that he does not reside in the place where the
ward is residing is not a ground for his disqualification as guardian.
Pending the resolution of the instant petition, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion,
informing this Court that Biason died. She averred that Biason’s death rendered moot
and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be
dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the appointed guardian terminate the guardianship
and renders all issues assailing his appointment moot.
HELD: Yes. With Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed
with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship
of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety
of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been
dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone
else for that matter, any substantial relief.
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS (RULES 99 TO 100)
CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and
MARIA CLARA CLAVANO G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally separated with
the custody of their three (3) children remained with the latter. After the separation,
Petitioner then left for the United States where he divorced Anna Marie.
On September 25, 1987, private respondents Spouses Clavano, respectively the brother
and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor Cang children.
The petition bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband
had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his children; that her brothers and sisters
including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that
because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, "leaving
the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture
abroad;" and that her husband had "long forfeited his parental rights
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. The trial court issued a decree of adoption.
The said decree was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC
alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603,
the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not minor children may be legally adopted without the written
consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them.
HELD: While the law requires that the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement
of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that
such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case even, without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption
from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this
Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children
as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral
desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. 24 While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural
and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular
communication with his wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to
send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
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TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. 135216,
August 19, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo.
During the pendency of the said proceedings, Respondent sought to intervene therein
claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole
surviving heir.
Respndent presented the Order in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding
Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared
therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.
As the presiding judge was already 79 years old and was suffering from "glaucoma", his
deposition was taken at his residence. During the taking of the deposition, when asked
to identify his signature on the alleged adoption decree, he said: “I do not remember
having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose; I can’t make out clearly what
comes after the name; Jose Moya is not my signature.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moya's signature. Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the
trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in
the challenged Order as genuine and authentic.
ISSUE: Whether or not the fact of adoption may be proved merely by a decree of
adoption wherein the signature of the issuing judge is in question.
HELD: The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however,
Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded
guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always
indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this
information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his
own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he
performed thereafter.
In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was
no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996
FACTS: Private respondent spouses filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change
of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with
which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been
called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since he arrived at private
respondents' residence.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition
for adoption. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the
surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and
as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change
of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change
of one's legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly
be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive
joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the
policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for change of name of the adopted may be filed
jointly with the petition for adoption.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. If a change in one's name is desired, this can
only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed
out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem. It is an independent and
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discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori,
it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident
or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and
liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action.
While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there
should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of
law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.
Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition
against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, there is no relation
between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do
they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their
joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual
unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive
joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also
present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and
comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or
actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that
they are best taken up individually.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME
B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P. CARANTO G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996
FACTS: private respondents' petition for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon with prayer
for the correction of the minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael." The Solicitor General
opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the child from
"Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only
a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically
for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The RTC dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the
ground that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of
persons. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a petition for adoption may be denied on the ground that
the publication thereof contains the misspelled name of the person to be adopted. (2)
Whether or not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to a correction of name prayed
for in a petition for adoption.
HELD: (1) The answer is in the affirmative. The present case involves an obvious
clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction
involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what
appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General
admits that the error is a plainly clerical one. The purpose of the publication requirement
is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can make their
objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.
(2) The answer is in the affirmative. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case
and because its provision was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar
as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is void and without force or effect.
This case falls under letter "(o)," of Rule 108, referring to "changes of name."
Now §3 of this Rule further provides that “the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
The local civil registrar is thus an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less
given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the
prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a
case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint
including the judgment.
NB: SC ruled that granting of correction of name is invalid for failure to comply with
the provisions of Rule 108 but failed to discuss whether correction of name may be
prayed for in a petition for adoption.
EUGENIO R. REYES, et al. vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and
LEONIDA F. MAURICIO G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010
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FACTS: Respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan
and between Librada and Petitioner Eugenio as parties.
Librada died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by her alleged
daughter Leonida F. Mauricio. Leonida’s legal standing as a party was assailed by
Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of
Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere
ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
ISSUE: whether or not legal standing of person who substituted the original
complainant may be assailed of by questioning the validity former’s adoption by the
latter in an action for annulment of contract
HELD: The answer is in the negative. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally
attacked. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a
collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, Supreme Court reiterated that adoption cannot be
assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.
Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, Supreme Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that
purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
FACTS: Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia;
that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her
surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
The trial court granted the petition for adoption and declared that the minor shall be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
HELD: There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. The middle name or the
mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1) of the Civil Code, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case,
the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. In the
case of an adopted child, the law provides that “the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters.” What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for
the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and
Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above.
This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
IN RE: ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND MICHAEL LIM GR No168992-93
21 May 2009
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina Lim (Petitioner) seeking
to set aside the Decision of the RTC of Gen San, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael Jude Lim.
Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. She married Primo Lim and they were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a a
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certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have a child on their own, Petitioner and Lim
registered the child to make it appear that they were the parents of the children.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They were sent
to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in all their school records and
documents. Unfortunately, her husband died. Later on, Petitioner married Angel Olario,
an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given
under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, Petitioner
filed petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the Trial Court. At the time
of the filing of the petition, both Michelle and Michael were already of age.
Michelle and Michael, as well as Olario, Petitioner’s new husband executed an Affidavit
of Consent.
RTC, however, dismissed the petitions on the ground that P should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband as she has already remarried citing Sec. 7(c) of
Art. III RA 8552 and Art. 185 of FC.
Petitioner on appeal, contends that the rule must be relaxed. She argued that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed,
both Michelle and Michael were already of age. Thus, parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority.
Issue: Whether Petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
Decision: No. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
Petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined
by her husband. The petitions must be denied. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit on
requiring Husband and wife SHALL jointly adopt.
The use of the word “shall” means that the joint adoption by the husband and wife is
mandatory.
CASTRO VS GREGORIO GR No 188801 15 October 2014
Facts: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which
denied the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before
the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’
decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they
separated later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual
tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death
after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta
Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana
Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s
housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of
the TC, the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose
had been remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that
she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been
showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and
consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to
Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged
that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s why he adopted them. Later on
Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the
decision of the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting
as Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth
certificates shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set
of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina
are not actually Jose’s illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and
Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.
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CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the 2) RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
adoption, it ruled that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate
legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally notified of the hearing.” children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment.
The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action
for annulment of judgment.
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law,
however, provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock. In
this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt
must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

Issues: In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario
remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be
Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case? eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the
adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter
is required?
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are
10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
Decision:

1) The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act
validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the
obtained through extrinsic fraud. spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are
protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of substantive statutory rights.
whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or
perjured testimony during the trial. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of
the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and
participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he
SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC. G.R. No. 192531 November
failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other
12, 2014
conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree
of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

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TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as
beneficiary
FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.
He was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
He died due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death,
childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the
parent of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is
Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed
to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our
consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if
the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned,
the provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is
still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds
for rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter
and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of
the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is
not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits
arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right
to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by
virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled,
include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by
adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.
CHANGE OF NAME V. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES
(RULE 103 V. RULE 108)
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA BORBON G.R. No. 130277, May
9, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition seeking to correct the
following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname
"Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding
should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B.
Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner
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alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the
boy's father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore
illegitimate and should follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local
Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.
The trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that, only
CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS NATURE may be
the subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code),
authorizing changes or corrections. Thus, Petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
ISSUE: whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article
412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even
if the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
In was held in Republic vs. Valencia that even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the proceedings
under Rule 108 adversary, thus:
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice, file his opposition thereto.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO I. KHO, et al. G.R. No.
170340, June 29, 2007
FACTS: Carlito and his siblings filed a verified petition for correction of entries in the
civil registry. The corrections to be made are as follows: (1) with respect to his and his
siblings’ birth certificate, the deletion of the word married opposite the phrase “date of
marriage of parents” as his parent were not legally married; (2) with respect to his birth
certificate alone, to change the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”
and to delete his second name; and (3) with respect to his marriage certificate, to change
the date of marriage from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their
marriage certificate.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks4 in Mindanao Daily
Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing
on August 9, 2001.
The trial court granted the petitions. Trial Court’s decision was affirmed by the CA.
Herein petitioner assailed the decision of the Trial Court and the CA. Petitioner
contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature, they
could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties,
such as Marivel and respondents’ parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for correction of substantial entries in the birth and
marriage certificates for which corresponding publication was made is invalidated by
failure to implead indispensable parties, i.e. the mother and the wife respectively.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The defect was cured by compliance with Section
4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication. The purpose precisely of Section 4,
Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The
sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under
Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
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Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the
whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel or Carlito’s mother were
unaware of the proceedings. First, notices were sent to the residence of Carlito which
He shared with Marivel and their children. As for Carlito’s mother, she was presented
as witness during the proceedings.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005
FACTS: The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore. Since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated
against because of his current registered name which carries a middle name. Thus,
Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa
Wang, filed a petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in
the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle
name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian
Lin Wang.
The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the
petition—that is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in
Singapore because of his middle name—did not fall within the grounds recognized by
law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the
child. Thus, trial court denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not middle name may be dropped on the ground of convenience.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Firstly, the law does not allow one to drop the
middle name from his registered name.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as
further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname
as he has. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
father’s surname.
Secondly, petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name could not
warrant favorable action on his petition. Before a person can be authorized to change
his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper
or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when
the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that
the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, et al. vs. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, et al. G.R. No. 181174,
December 4, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo) were married with
three (3) children. When Pablo died, Lucille Titular began introducing her co-
respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza Patrick as her and Pablo's son. Ma.
Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth
certificate which states that Patrick was the legitimated son of Pablo by reason of his
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marriage to Lucille Titular subsequent to the birth of Patrick.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the
correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a
directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3)
the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate
and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for correction of birth entries may be made praying
the declaration of illegitimacy of filiation and of nullity of marriage of the parents of the
person whose birth certificate is sought to be corrected.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or
a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction
of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners
seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous
and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order
Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. These causes of action are governed not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171
of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court
as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the
petition filed before the court a quo.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio underwent sex change from male to female
by way of surgery. Thereafter, he filed a petition for the change of his first name and
sex in his birth certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person may successfully petition for a change of name and
sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery.
HELD: A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds
for which change of first name may be allowed: (1) The petitioner finds the first name
or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname
in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal
capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name
for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and
the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
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procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 4072 and 4083 of the Civil Code.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained
no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex,
were all correct. No correction is necessary.
2 ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register.
3 ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages;
(3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN G.R.
No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male
and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate
be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not correction of entry under rule 108 does not allows change
of "sex" or "gender" in the birth certificate on the ground of the petitioner’s inborn
medical condition. (2) Whether or not change of name may be allowed without
complying with Rule 103 when such change is merely incidental to the substantial
correction as to the gender following Rule 108.
HELD: (1) Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
(2) As a rule the change of name is a matter of judicial discretion under Rule 103.
However, the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male. The
trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change
of a feminine name to a masculine name. Thus, the change of name to conform to the
proper sex without filing a separate petition under Rule 103 is proper.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY
G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013
FACTS: respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth. Her petition seeks to change her name from “Anita Sy” to “Norma S. Lugsanay”
following her mother’s surname as her parents where never married. She also contended
that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname
Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded
as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition
and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto
by the CA. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties
was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to implead indispensable parties aside from the local
civil registrar in petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate is cured by the
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publication of the order setting the case for hearing.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. While there may be cases where the Court held
that the failure to implead and notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by
the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where
the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no
actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a
party is inadvertently left out.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be
detrimental and far reaching.
MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, et al. G.R. No. 196049,
June 26, 2013
FACTS: Marinay contracted two marriages, first with Petitioner Fujiki and second with
Maekara. The first marriage ended without being legally annulled due to Fujiki’s parents
who does not favor the marriage. The second marriage ended due to an alleged physical
abuse committed by Maekara against Marinay.
Fujiki and Marinay met again in Japan and reestablished their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office
of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC motu proprio dismissed of the petition on the following grounds: (1) that a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Original Registry) may not be done to recognize a foreign judgment
which is effect collaterally attacks the validity of or to nullify marriages; and (2) that
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
HELD: (1) The answer is in the affirmative. A recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "a special proceedingis a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule
108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
While it was repeatedly held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for a direct action to invalidate a marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws, this does not apply in a
petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts
under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
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judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign
law.
The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
(2) The answer in the affirmative. Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Any
person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree
of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a
bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR G.R. No.
189538, February 10, 2014
FACTS: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate
of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she
did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in
the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as
parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as
a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. Respondent also presented as witness a certain
Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage
of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that
the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for correction of entry in the civil registrar may be
availed of to correct the marriage status of a person who claimed that she had never
been married.
HELD: The answer is in the affirmative. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be
availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before
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the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the
parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
PREROGATIVE WRITS
WRIT OF AMPARO
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ et al. vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL
ROSARIO, et al. G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008
FACTS: Private respondents spouses Sanson claiming to be owners of 1+ hectare
parcel of land located at Boracay filed complaint for forcible entry on the ground of
force, intimidation and threats and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners. The MCTC rendered a
decision in the private respondents' favor. On appeal with RTC, RTC upheld the
decision of MCTC and subsequently issued a writ of permanent mandatory injunction
and order of demolition. Assailing the RTC decision, petitioners filed a petition for
review with the CA. CA denied the petition but petitioners filed an MR. Pending
resolution of the MR, petitioners filed herein petition for certiorari and for the issuance
of the writs of amparo and habeas data
Contrary to the factual findings of the MCTC, the factual allegations of the petition for
the issuance of the writ of amparo provides that the private respondents availed of the
help of armed men and intrude into the property alleged to be owned by petitioners by
firing shotguns and burning their houses.
Petition for a writ of habeas data is prayed for so that the PNP may release the report
on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence allegedly
employed against them by the private respondents.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not, a petition for issuance of writ of amparo may be availed of
against an alleged violence or threats committed against a person’s life, property and
security arising from property dispute. (2) Whether or not writ of habeas data may be
availed of for purposes of mandating the authorities to release an information on alleged
arson committed in relation to a property dispute where such information was never
sought in the main action over possession of the property in dispute.
HELD: (1) The answer is in the negative. Writ of Amparo is not a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. The writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the
petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and
focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of
ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of amparo.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point
in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security - the personal concern
that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
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separately filed criminal case.
(2) The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency
of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had in
mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the
outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, et al. vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I –
XIII, INC., et al. G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008
FACTS: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the
time of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a judgment of
the Supreme Court.
Petitioners alleging that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to
shelter filed the instant petition for the issuance of writ of amparo. They alleged that the
titles which is the basis of a final judgment ordering the demolition of their houses is
spurious and is issued by fraudulently by unprincipled land officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not a demolition of dwelling pursuant to a final and executory
judgment is a ground for the issuance of writ of amparo on the ground that petitioners
had been deprived of their liberty and/or right to shelter.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue
of a final judgment affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court, is not included among
the enumeration of rights as stated in Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo for
which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling,
assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them,
does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis
for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO et al. vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ,
NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ G.R. No. 182165, November
25, 2009
FACTS: Provincial Government of Bulacan is the winning party in an unlawful detainer
case against Respondent Spouses Cruz. Notwithstanding that the judgment in the said
case had become final and executory, the latter as able to obtain an injunction from the
RTC. RTC further ordered the remand of the case to MTC. Upon remand, MTC again
decided in favor of the Provincial Government of Bulacan and issued a writ of
demolition. Despite execution of the writ of execution, Respondent obtained a TRO
from the RTC.
Invoking the TRO, respondents refused to vacate the property and clashed with Police
Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor to
"protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property," entered the property.
Consequently, respondents were arrested.
Respondents later filed a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data and averred that despite the TRO petitioners unlawfully entered the property with
the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents, and arrested
them when they resisted petitioners’ entry
RTC granted the petition. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant
to Section 1910 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC),11 which
is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-
SC).12
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of amparo may be issued against those who allegedly
entered the petitioner’s property unlawfully in violation of a previously issued TRO.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. In the case of Tapuz v. Del Rosario, it was held that a
wirt of amparo is not a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right tolife, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property
dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable
nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty
and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the
property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent
or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in
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unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and
feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners
(respondents)" will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo.
No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able
to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS G.R. No. 182498,
February 16, 2010
FACTS: On December 3, 2009, the Supreme Court rendered confirming the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granting the Writ of Amparo.
The decision was based, among other considerations, on the finding that Col. Julasirim
Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim) informed the respondent Mary Jean Tagitis (respondent)
and her friends that her husband had been under surveillance since January 2007
because an informant notified the authorities, through a letter, that Tagitis was a liaison
for the JI;5 that he was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity
with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of
Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism (Kasim evidence).
The Supreme Court considered Col. Kasim’s information, together with the consistent
denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, the
dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance, as well
as the haphazard investigations conducted that did not translate into any meaningful
results, to be indicative of government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis.
Herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was no
sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure unequivocally points to
some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners
contend that Supreme Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to
Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence "asset" without any other evidence to support it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of Writ of Amparo on the basis of a hearsay evidence
is valid.
HELD: Yes. although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus
incompetent and inadmissible under our rules of evidence), the unique evidentiary
difficulties posed by enforced disappearance cases compel us to adopt standards that
were appropriate and responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. We noted that
while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must also observe flexibility in
considering the evidence that we shall take into account. Thus, we introduced a new
evidentiary standard for Writ of Amparo cases in this wise:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all the other pieces of adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO
AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,
MELISSA C. ROXAS vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et al. G.R. No.
189155, September 7, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen of Filipino descent, filed a Petition for the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court. She alleged that while
doing a volunteer work in La Paz, Tarlacm she and her companions were abducted and
tortured for five day. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost
echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the
case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.
CA granted the petition for issuance of writ of habeas data. However, the Court of
Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the
acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.
Petitioner contested the CA decision and filed a petitioner for review on certiorari.
Petitioner argues that (1) the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried
out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in
detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court,
are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement; and (2) petitioner
invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian
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and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a government officials may be impleaded as respondent in a
writ of amparo on the ground of command responsibility.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition
According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative
case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature
of the writ itself.
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting
of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in
order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof
had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance,
killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law.
The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition
were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders
may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on
the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
EDITA T. BURGOS vs. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON et al. G.R. No.
178497, February 4, 2014
FACTS: This case relates the proceedings on the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Burgos. A petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus and writ of amparo was
filed before the SC.
SC, pursuant to CHR’s initial report, issued a writ of habeas corpus but hold in abeyance
the ruling on the merits of Amparo and referred the same to CA to allow Lt. Baliaga, Jr.
to comment on the CHR Report. CA denied petition for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus (The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal
confinement or detention of Jonas, but his enforced disappearance) and granted the
issuance of writ of amparo. The CA found that the totality of the evidence supports the
petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in the enforced disappearance of
Jonas. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and the PNP
were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
CA directed PNP and AFT to conduct an exhaustive investigation of the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos. CHR was also directed to continue with its own
independent investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same
degree of diligence required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking
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the Court among others to: xxx (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the
CA for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.
The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain
anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together,
captured Jonas on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City.
ISSUE: Whether or not after the grant of petition for issuance of writ of amparo, a new
writ of amparo may be issued on the basis of newly discovered evidence
HELD: No. The SC resolved to deny the motion for re-issuance of the writ of amparo
and to refer the case to the CA based on newly discovered evidence.
It should be emphasized that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court
a wide latitude in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot
(without violating the nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides
rapid judicial relief) grant remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than
expedite the investigations already ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined
with finality that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance.
The ROLE of SC in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to determine whether an
enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable;
and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to
police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the enforced
disappearance of an individual. The Writ of Amparo serves both a preventive and a
curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
through the investigation and remedial action that it directs. The focus is on procedural
curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a specific criminal or the resolution of
administrative liabilities.
In this case, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served with the
CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga.
At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the
reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
INFANT JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER,
MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM VS SEGUI GR No 193652 05 August 2014
Facts: Petitioner Christina Caram had a child with Marcelino Constantino without the
benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, she misled Marcelino that she had an
abortion, which in fact she did not. She intends to give up her baby for adoption. Her
baby, which she named Julian, was surrendered to the DSWD where she signed a deed
of voluntary commitment. Later, she changed her mind and wants her baby back.
She filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of QC seeking
to obtain custody of baby Julian from the DSWD. In her petition she accused DSWD
of blackmailing her into surrender the custody of her child to the DSWD who made
misrepresentations by utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability
for adoption. She argued that due to the misrepresentation of the DSWD, it had acted
beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of
the said child and depriving of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.
RTC issued the said writ and commanded DSWD to produce the body of baby Julian
at the hearing and required them to file their verified written return pursuant to Section
9 of the Amparo Rule.
DSWD complied with the writ and filed their Return and prayed that the petition be
denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating to a biological parent’s
custodial rights over her child.
After hearing the case, RTC dismissed the petition without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate action in court. It held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain
custody of her child. RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for
custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
Hence, this petition.
Christina argued that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated or
threatened by the DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary
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Commitment between her and Sun and Moon Home for Children in PQ. She claimed
that she had been blackmailed through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and the
Sun and Mood representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the “forced
separation” of the said infant from his mother.
Issue: Whether the Writ of Amparo is the proper remedy in the case herein?
Decision: No. The writ shall cover extrajudicial/legal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
As discussed in the landmark case of Sec. of National Defense el al vs Manalo, SC held:
“The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intracable problem of “extralegal
killings” and “enforced disappearances.” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to
these two instances or to threats thereof.
“Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.
“Enforced disappearances” are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or
a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of libery which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
WHAT CONSTITUTES “ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE”
As laid down in Navia vs Pardico, the elements thereof are:
1. that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
2. that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
3. that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and
4. that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.
In this case, there is no “enforced disappearance” as used in the context of the Amparo
Rule as the 3rd and 4th elements are missing.
VIVARES VS ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE GR No 202666 29 September 2014
Facts: This case involves graduating students of the STC-Cebu City; wherein, the
students involved posted pictures on their Facebook account of them wearing wearing
no shirt, but only brassieres from waist up. Said photos were taken while they were
changing into their swimsuits for a beach party. The said photos were reported to the
STC’s computer teacher, named Mylene Rheza Escudero. Escudero asked several of her
students to show her other photos of Julia and Julianne, above-mentioned graduating
students, they saw photos of: them along the streets of Cebu wearing clothing which
shows their black brassieres (duh, Sinulog? Hello?); them drinking hard liquor and
smoking cigarettes inside a bar (Private property OUTSIDE school premises); and that
their Facebook accounts were accessible to any Facebook user.
Upon discovery thereof, Escudero reported the matter to the school authorities. The
poor students involved were investigated and were barred to attend their highschool
graduation rites which is experienced by a person once in their lifetime. Heartless.
A case was filed against the STC and its officials for Injunction and Damages. Injunction
as to the order of the school not to allow the poor children to attend their graduation
rites. A petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data was also filed. Petitioners
(Parents of the students involved) assert that the privacy of the children were unlawfully
invaded. Since the Facebook accounts of the children are set at “Friends Only”; That
the photos were owned by the ladies, thus cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Old hag, however, violated this by saving digital copies and subsequently
showed them to the STC’s officials.
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RTC issued the writ and directed the respondents to file their verified written return
within 5 working days from service of the writ.
Respondent denied the petitioners allegation, among others, because there can be no
violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data.
Issue: Whether the writ of habeas data is a proper remedy?
Decision: No.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
PURPOSE:
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY CONFINED TO CASES OF
EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas
data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition
may be filed by: (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely:
the spouse, children and parents; or (b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative
of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in
default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section
2, a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
It is designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.
RESPONDENT CONTENDS THAT IT IS NOT AN ENTITY ENGAGED IN
THE GATHERING, COLLETING OR STORING OF DATA OR
INFORMATION REGARDING THE PERSON, FAMILY, HOME AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTY. -THIS IS ERRONEOUS.
Such individual need not be in the business of such.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor. To
“engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that
the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or
entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Regularity is immaterial.
THREE STRANDS OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
1. Locational/Situational
2. Informational (case at bar)
3. Decisional
RIGHT TO PRIVACY WAS NOT VIOLATED because:
1. Facebook has privacy safeguard tools.
2. Utilization of this tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s
invocation of his right to informational privacy.
That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does not necessarily bolsters the
petitioners’ contention. It is well emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile
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detail’s to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who
is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former.
MERALCO, et al. v. Lim, G.R. No. 184769, 05 October 2010.
FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, an administrative
clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), learned of an anonymous letter
that was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of
MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing
respondent. The letter reads:
“Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB…”
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” in light of the receipt of “… reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which
could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.”
Respondent questions the propriety of MERALCO’s action in a letter as “highly
suspicious…” and being “punitive”, but the latter never responded. Respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer
to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s
transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether the RTC lacked jurisdiction to over the case and cannot restrain
MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees.
[2] Is the issuance of the writ outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data?
HELD:
[1] YES.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint
the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It
is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty
and security against abuse in this age of information technology. It bears reiteration that
like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided
under prevailing Rules.
[W]rits of …habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague
or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the
real reasons for her transfer – a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions
of one’s employment – are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of
habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters.
[2] YES.
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There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to
life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation
of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats
and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her letter as
“highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work “betray[s] the real intent of
management]” and could be a “punitive move.” Her posture unwittingly concedes that
the issue is labor-related.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE VS. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN G.R. No. 203254,
October 08, 2014
FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance of Writ of Habeas Data
against Joy, her former common law partner. According to him, sometime in July 2011,
he visited Joy’s condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived at his office, he
noticed his digital camera missing. On August 23,2011, Joy confronted him about a
purported sex video she discovered from the digital camera showing him and another
woman. He denied the video and demanded the return of the camera, but she refused.
The had an altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against a wall and then
walked away.
Because of this, Joy filed several cases against him, including a case for violation
of Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the Napolcom, utilizing the said
video. The use of the same violated his life to liberty, security and privacy and that of
the other woman, thus he had no choice but to file the petition for issuance of the writ
of habeas data.
After finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ and
directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce Neri’s digital camera, as well as the
original and copies of the video, and to make a return within five days from receipt. In
her return, Joy admitted keeping the memory card of the digital camera and reproducing
the video but only for use as evidence in the cases she filed against Neri. Neri’s petitions
should be dismissed because its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence in the
cases she filed against him; and she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing
of data regarding the person of Neri. The RTC granted Neri’s petition and ordered the
turn-over of the video to Neri and enjoined Joy from reproducing the same. It
disregarded Joy’s defense that she is not engaged in the collection, gathering and storage
of data, and that her acts of reproducing the same and showing it to other persons
(Napolcom) violated Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it ruling
only on the return of the video and not on its admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy
filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the filing of the petition for issuance of the writ ofhabeas data was proper
The Court’s ruling:
NO. A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data(Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. It
was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially
the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to control
the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ ofhabeas data now stands as
“a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of
the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition
must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in
the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation,
it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague and doubtful.
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In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right
to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan
purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video–which he fears would
somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption–
he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of his right
to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of
possible transgressions. As the rules and
existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventuallyproving the nexus
between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in
habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally
be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show,
all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which
hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data
Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to
commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty
or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that
Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends–say for
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee
even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject
video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative
cases that she filed against Ilagan. Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as
well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse
the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
MARICRIS D. DOLOT vs. HON. RAMON PAJE (DENR) G.R. No. 199199,
August 27, 2013
FACTS: On September 15, 2011, petitioners filed a petition for continuing mandamus,
damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon. On September 16, 2011, the
case was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. RTC relied on SC Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions
1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008, designating the
environmental courts "to try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions."
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. RTC further ruled
that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits and
furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required
by the rules. Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not RTC may motu proprio dismiss a petition for continuing
mandamus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction following A.O. No. 7 defining the
territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12. (2) Whether or not a
final judgment finding that the public officials failed to act on the contemplated
environmental issue is a condition precedent for the issuance of the writ of continuing
mandamus. (3) Whether or not a petition for issuance of continuing mandamus requires
the attachment of judicial affidavits.
HELD: (1) Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O.
No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in
determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
These administrative order issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an
action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any
court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress. It also
cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.
Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action
or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It
is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and
does not restrict their access to the courts. Consequently, the RTC’s motu proprio
dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is patently
incorrect. At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the
RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue.
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Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice if the Court orders the transfer of
Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with
the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
(2) The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based
on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4(c), Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon
full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ
shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A writ
of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a
final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision."
(3) RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits.
Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and
must be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing
in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only
if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of testimony of witnesses that it would
be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer
form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al. G.R. No.
206510 September 16, 2014
FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US
Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines
and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic
Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about
80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have
been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUES: Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this
case.
HELD: NO.
The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and
not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against
a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond
the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
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The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which
have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery
of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same
violation of an environmental law.
VICTORIA SEGOVIA, ET AL. VS. THE CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS EXCELLENCY
BENIGNO S. AQUINO, ET AL. G.R. No. 211010 March 7, 2017
FACTS:
To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on
Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through
EO 774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as
members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the
petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:
Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels,
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task
Group to reform the transportation sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men
and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must have
more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and
collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train).
In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group
on Fossil Fuels or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable
Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly
mentioned, thus:
SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF - In addition to the functions provided in EO
774, the TGFF shall initiate and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy
for the Philippines. Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions:
(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new
paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those
who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall
favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking,
bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train).
Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate
Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead
policy-making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor
and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate
change.[7] Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for
implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and
transportation system in the whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
said letter-foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and
government fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%).Claiming to have not received a
response, they filed this petition. The Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines,
parents, representing their children, who in tum represent "Children of the Future, and
Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe,
convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are entitled to the
issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents
to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws
resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and
property of all Filipinos.
[9] These identified violations include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric
trust" as provided under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless
extravagance in the midst of acute public want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for
failure to reduce personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent
(50%); (b) DOTC and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing Principle under
EO 774; (c) DA's failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and
parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section 12(b)[11] of EO 774;
(d) DILG's failure to coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on
the Road Sharing Principle under Section 9(g)[12] of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to
reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's failure to make available Road
Users' Tax for purposes stated in Section 9(e)[13] of EO 774.
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In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws
and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly
in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources
or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process of law.[15] They also
decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety--
eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-
owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets
are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for
sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.
[16] Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment
seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere
to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The respondents denied the specific violations
alleged in the petition, stating that they have taken and continue to take measures to
improve the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the environment
condition - through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for
climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is
aimed to decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign,
Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs.
These projects are individually and jointly implemented by the public respondents to
improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of motorized vehicles on the
environment.Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that they
consider the impact of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the
Philippine National Implementation Plan on Environment Improvement in the
Transport Sector which targets air pollution improvement actions, greenhouse gases
emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution standards for the transport sector.
In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they
raised in the Petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;
2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts; and
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.
HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED. Procedural
Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC),
respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite
standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of
society and without a concrete interest or injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the
suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been
relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal
standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion.
The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the
requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of
rights and obligations under environmental laws. This has been confirmed by this
Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift, and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines).However, it
bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants
prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the
issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is
personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
Requisites for issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus The petitioners
failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for. For a writ of
kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur: there is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; the actual or
threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and the actual or threatened violation involves
or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ of
continuing mandamus cannot issue.
Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing
mandamus as follows: RULES 8 : WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS
SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any agency or instrumentality
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of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the
connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation
or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such of roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents
right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of were able to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging that seek to improve air quality.
the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the
petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or
regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts
attributable to the respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of
standing had been liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-
interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus.

Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated a principle. It cannot

be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public
respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered
in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary,and the official can only be
directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being
enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself.
Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving
discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not
to act one way or the other.

This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel
the respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate
all roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino
- made transport - when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that
require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good
intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's
discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.

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