G.R. Nos.
197592 & 20262 November 27, 2013 Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for temporary restraining order
THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JODY KING CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari seek to reverse and set aside the following:
(1) Decision1 dated October 18, 2010 and Resolution2 dated July 5, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754; and (2) Decision3 dated August 31, 2011 and
Resolution4 dated June 27, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073.
Facts:
The Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp.
(respondent) entered into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port
and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost is ₱38,900,000. During
construction, petitioner issued variation/change orders for additional works which was agreed
by them. Petitioner entered into a another negotiated contract with respondent for the
construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) for ₱2,475,345.54.7
Months after, respondent made a demand for the total amount of ₱22,419,112.96 such as
unpaid accomplishments of additional works, refund taxes and others which petitioner allegedly
failed to settle. Thus, respondent sued petitioner in the RTC of Marikina City to collect the
aforesaid amounts.9 The trial court rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff Corporation and
against defendant Province of Aklan.
Petitioner filed its MR which was denied (for MR which was filed one day after the finality of the
decision). The trial court issued a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff to demand from
petitioner the immediate payment of ₱67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the respondent.
Sheriff Gamboa served notices of garnishment on LBP, PNB, DBP for the satisfaction of the
judgment debt from the funds deposited under the account of petitioner. Said banks, however,
refused to give due course to the court order.
(TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing the Writ of Execution which was denied. The notice
of appeal filed in RTC likewise denied.
The CA said that petitioner failed to provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely motion
for reconsideration; The CA also held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COA’s primary jurisdiction after its notice of
appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.
Issue:
WON the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable to this case. (estopped na ba si
respondent)
Ruling:
Yes. COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondent’s money claims Petitioner is not
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires
the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts
even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. 22 It applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within
the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the
claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged,
dismiss the case without prejudice.23
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether
it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before
the court.24
As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by
petitioner, a local government unit.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,25 as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445,26 it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 26. General jurisdiction. The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to
and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls, the keeping
of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for
a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers relating
to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds
or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination,
audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all
government-owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-
governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed,
including non-governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations
through the government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which
the government has put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by the 1987 Constitution 27 and existing laws,
the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Rule
II, Section 1 specifically enumerated those matters falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction,
which include "money claims due from or owing to any government agency." Rule VIII, Section
1 further provides:
Section 1. Original Jurisdiction - The Commission Proper shall have original jurisdiction over:
a) money claim against the Government; b) request for concurrence in the hiring of legal
retainers by government agency; c) write off of unliquidated cash advances and dormant
accounts receivable in amounts exceeding one million pesos (₱1,000,000.00); d) request for
relief from accountability for loses due to acts of man, i.e. theft, robbery, arson, etc, in amounts
in excess of Five Million pesos (₱5,000,000.00).
In Euro-Med Laboratories Phil., Inc. v. Province of Batangas,28 we ruled that it is the COA and
not the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to pass upon petitioner’s money claim against
respondent local government unit. Such jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties’ failure
to argue the issue nor active participation in the proceedings.
Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC’s jurisdiction
over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To
this, we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte
and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists
for the proper distribution of power between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the
convenience of the parties.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent’s collection suit being directed against a local government unit, such money claim
should have been first brought to the COA.30 Hence, the RTC should have suspended the
proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and
before the CA.
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where
there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged
administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where
the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e)
where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts
of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo
warranto proceedings.31 However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the
present case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence.32 All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine and all
orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.33
Writ of Execution issued in violation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is void
Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case is no judgment at all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation.34 All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect and the
void judgment can never be final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.
G.R. No. 173840 April 25, 2012
SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, composed of DEBORAH T. MARCO (Immediate Past President), ATTY.
MEDINO L. ACUBA, ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL DE
GUZMAN and PONCIANO R. ROSALES (General Manager and Ex
OfficioDirector), Petitioners,
vs.
ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Individual petitioners (BOD of SAMELCO II) passed Resolution to disallowed the respondent
to attend succeeding meetings of the BOD effective until the end of his term as director and to
disqualified him for one (1) term to run as a candidate for director in the upcoming district
elections.
Respondent filed an Petition for Prohibition against petitioner in the RTC in Calbiga, Samar.
Respondent prayed for the nullification of Resolution contending that it was issued without any
legal and factual bases and issuance of TRO which was granted by the trial court.
In their answer petitioners raised the affirmative defense of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over
the subject matter of the case. Individual petitioners assert that, since the matter involved an
electric cooperative, SAMELCO II, primary jurisdiction is vested on the National Electrification
Administration (NEA).
The RTC judge sustained the jurisdiction of the court over the petition for prohibition and barred
the petitioners and/or their representatives from enforcing the Resolution. CA affirmed RTC
Decision.
ISSUE: Who between the RTC and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the
validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II.
Ruling: The NEA.
P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and
control over electric cooperatives. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. 5 If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.6 Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. 7 Section 38 (1),
Chapter 7, Book 4 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987 provides, thus:
Supervision and control shall include the authority to act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs;
and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs x x x.
The Court, therefore, finds it erroneous on the part of the CA to rule that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not apply in the present case. It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
petition for prohibition filed by respondent.
A careful reading of P.D. No. 1645 clearly shows that, pursuant to its power of supervision and
control, the NEA is granted the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as
well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric
cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of
Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his position as a member
of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing election, is
a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within the ambit of the
powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.
To sustain the petition for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an
unnecessary intrusion into the NEA's power of supervision and control over electric
cooperatives.
While the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the NEA, in
the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the
issue of the validity of the subject resolution.
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement
of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been
placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.9 In such a case, the court in
which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.10 the Court of Appeals as well as the Orders of the Regional Trial are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.The Court, in a long line of cases,11 has held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s
power of judicial review can be sought.12 The premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s
cause of action.13 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.14

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal

reasons.15 The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies.16Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity
and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. 17

True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject
to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where
the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.18

Respondent, however, failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the above-
enumerated exceptions. Mere allegation of arbitrariness (violation of his right to due process)
will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been specifically granted by law to
special government agencies.19 This case are not purely legal questions, they involve a
determination of factual matters which fall within the competence of the NEA to ascertain. G.R. No. 160367 December 18, 2009
CABUNGCAL, ELVIRA J. CANLAS, MARIANITA A. BULANAN, REMEDIOS S. DE
JESUS, and NUNILON J. MABINI, Petitioners,
vs.
SONIA R. LORENZO, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija,
CECILIO DE GUZMAN, Vice Mayor, CESARIO LOPEZ, JR., EMILIO PACSON,
BONIFACIO CACERES, JR., NAPOLEON OCAMPO, MARIO CRUZ, PRISCILA REYES,
ROLANDO ESQUIVEL, and CRISENCIANO CABLAO in their capacity as members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, and EDUARDO N. JOSON IV, Vice
Governor, BELLA AURORA A. DULAY, BENJAMIN V. MORALES, CHRISTOPHER L.
VILLAREAL, JOSE T. DEL MUNDO, SOLITA C. SANTOS, RENATO C. TOMAS, JOSE
BERNARDO V. YANGO, IRENEO S. DE LEON, NATHANIEL B. BOTE, RUDY J. DE
LEON, RODOLFO M. LOPEZ, MA. LOURDES C. LAHOM, and JOSE FRANCIS
STEVEN M. DIZON, in their capacity as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Nueva Ecija, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
SB of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, issued Resolution declaring the reorganization of all offices
of the municipal government, which was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan via
resolution.
The Municipal Mayor respondent Sonia R. Lorenzo, issued a memorandum 8 informing all
employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the reorganization, all positions
were deemed vacant and that all employees must file their respective applications for the
newly created positions listed in the approved staffing pattern on or before January 10,
2002. Otherwise, they would not be considered for any of the newly created positions.
Instead of submitting their respective applications, petitioners, on January 17, 2002, filed
with the CA a Petition alleging that they were permanent employees of the RHU of the
Municipality, with the corresponding salary grade and date of employment:10
They sought to prohibit respondents from implementing the reorganization and prayed for
the nullification of said Resolutions.
While the case was pending, respondent Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a letter
terminating the services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not
selected for the new positions effective April 21, 2002.11
CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit, upheld the validity of
resolution. Ruled that the assailed acts of respondents are clearly authorized under
Section 76 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Organizational Structure and Staffing
Pattern – for budgetary savings purposes)
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners contend that the Resolution of the CA were not in accordance with RA No.
6656, otherwise known as "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers
and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization", specifically Section
2 thereof and RA 7305, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta of Health Workers".
Respondents’ Argument
Respondents, for their part, argue that petitioners’ separation from service was a result of
a valid reorganization done in accordance with law and in good faith.
Issues: 1) Whether petitioners’ automatic resort to the Court of Appeals is proper.
2) Whether the case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Ruling: Petitioners’ recourse should have been with the Civil Service Commission and not
with the Court of Appeals
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over
disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating
to the civil service.
In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose services were
terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution Nos.
27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they
belong to the civil service, the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office.
Even the laws upon which petitioners anchor their claim vest jurisdiction upon the CSC.
Under RA 6656 and RA 7305, which were cited by the petitioners in their petition, it is the
CSC which determines whether an employee’s dismissal or separation from office was
carried out in violation of the law or without due process. Accordingly, it is also the CSC
which has the power to reinstate or reappoint an unlawfully dismissed or terminated
employee.
Consequently, petitioners’ resort to the CA was premature. The jurisdiction lies with the
CSC and not with the appellate court.
2) The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the
matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.18 This, however, is
not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions,19 viz:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition
for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the
remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.20 Moreover,
being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where
the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.21
Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first
brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case.22 Thus, we find
that the CA correctly dismissed the petition but not the grounds cited in support thereof.
The CA should have dismissed the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
are AFFIRMED but, on the ground, that petitioners failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to them.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013
MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as
represented by its incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, which was operated by respondent PAGCOR,
a government-owned or controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1869.4
Petitioner encountered trouble to his client while he was performing his functions as teller.
He received a Memorandum informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy.
Another Memorandum, stating that the BOD of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy
and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense.
Petitioner filed a MR, but it was denied. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure filed before the CA. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner
explained that he did not appeal to the CSC because the penalty imposed on him was only
a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction.
The CA out rightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking
Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,17 the CA held that the CSC has
jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR which was
created directly by PD 1869.
Petitioner claims: CSC may entertain appeals only, among others, from a penalty of
suspension of more than 30 days. Petitioner asserts that his case, involving a 30-day
suspension penalty, is not appealable to the CSC. Thus, he submits that his case was
properly brought before the CA via a petition for certiorari.25
PAGCOR alleges that petitioner’s remedy of appeal is limited as Section 37 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that a decision
rendered by heads of agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than 30 days
is imposed shall be final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before
it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
RULING: No.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party can seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.
The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of
comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits
of the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule
of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot.29
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides
no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is
covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for
not more than 30 days.

Additional Notes: (For Civil Procedure)

It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA
is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing GADALEJ on the part of PAGCOR, not an
appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under
Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed
of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only
when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite
the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy
of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive.33

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.

Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question
involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing
factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are
constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support
those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare
or incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the circumstances and since this
Court is not a trier of facts, 35 remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in
order.