EN BANC Upon the resumption of the canvassing in the
[G.R. No. 134163-64. December 13, 2000] evening of May 31, 1998, counsel for Mañara again
MUSLIMIN SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RODEL
MAÑARA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 141249-50. December 13, 2000]
RODEL MAÑARA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and MUSLIMIN
SEMA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 141534-35. December 13, 2000]
RODEL MAÑARA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and MUSLIMIN
SEMA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Muslimin Sema*and Rodel Mañara were two (2) of
the eleven (11) candidates for city mayor of Cotabato
City during the May 11, 1998 elections.
During the canvassing of the election returns from
the three hundred sixty-two (362) precincts of
Cotabato City by the City Board of Canvassers (CBC),
numerous petitions for exclusion of election returns
were filed. For his part, Sema objected to thirty (30)
election returns from the following precincts,
namely: Precinct Nos. 295A/A1, 274A/275A, 46A2,
262A/263A, 218A/219A, 178A, 255A/256A,
158A/158A1, 214A/214A1, 104A/104A1, 154A/154A1,
92A, 212A/212A1, 109A/109A1, 184A1; 175A1,
168A/168A1, 233A/233A1, 209A/209A1, 121A1, 275A,
198A/198A1, 237A/237A1, 176A, 213A1/213A2, 241A,
167A, 180A, 103A, 264A/265A/266A and thereafter,
filed a petition for exclusion of such returns with the
CBC on the ground that the same contained material
defects, were allegedly tampered with or falsified,
prepared under duress, threat, coercion, and
intimidation, or substituted with fraudulent ones. If the
30 election returns were to be excluded, Sema and
Mañara would obtain 13,338 and 12,484 votes,
respectively. Including the 30 election returns, the
votes of Sema and Mañara would be 13,713 and
15,442, respectively.
On May 22, 1998, the CBC issued an order
dismissing one hundred-sixteen (116) petitions for
exclusion of election returns including the petitions for
exclusion filed by Sema with respect to thirteen (13) of
the thirty (30) contested returns he filed.
On May 23, 1998, the CBC issued another order
dismissing fifty-five (55) petitions for exclusion of
election returns including Sema’s petitions for
exclusion with respect to fifteen (15) of the remaining
seventeen (17) contested returns. In effect then, only
two (2) election returns remained contested.
No appeal was taken from these orders.
Nonetheless, on May 30, 1998, the CBC issued
another order dated May 29, 1998, this time granting
Sema’s petition for exclusion of the thirty (30) election
returns. A copy of this order was actually served upon
Mañara in the morning of May 31, 1998. On May 30,
1998, counsel for Mañara, already aware of the
existence of the May 29, 1998 order, questioned the
illegal proceedings of the CBC saying that it had
previously ruled upon the inclusion of twenty-eight (28)
of said thirty (30) contested returns. In addition,
Mañara questioned the composition of the CBC, the
legality of its proceedings and the capacity of the
board to act fairly and judiciously. The latter did not
rule on his objection.
called the CBC’s attention to the fact that it had
already ruled upon and dismissed the petition for
exclusion of Sema in its Orders dated May 22, and 23,
1998, and which orders had already become final and
executory because no appeal was taken
therefrom. But the CBC ignored the manifestation,
explaining that the previous orders did not include
Sema’s objections. Consequently, Mañara’s counsel
manifested his intent to appeal from the May 29, 1998
order of the CBC.
On May 31, 1998, Sema and the other winning
candidates for the City of Cotabato were proclaimed by
the CBC. Notably, said proclamation was based on the
canvass of only three hundred thirty-two (332) election
returns, thirty (30) returns having been excluded from
the total of three hundred sixty-two (362) returns
pursuant to the CBC’s Order of May 29, 1998.
On June 2, 1998, Mañara filed his written notice of
appeal with the CBC.
On June 5, 1998, Mañara filed his appeal with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as SPC
No. 98-240, questioning the exclusion of the thirty (30)
election returns in the canvass and the proceeding of
the CBC in promulgating the May 29, 1998 order which
he claimed to be illegal. The appeal was anchored on
the following grounds: (1) the CBC exceeded its
authority in its ruling of May 29, 1998 excluding from
the canvass the 30 election returns, considering that
the CBC had already dismissed the petition for
exclusion in its orders dated May 22 and 23, 1998; (2)
the CBC was illegally constituted when it issued its
ruling of May 29, 1998 because it was presided by
Casan Macadatu, who had already been replaced by
Atty. Lintang Bidol effective May 25, 1998; and (3) the
CBC’s proclamation of Sema as Mayor of the City of
Cotabato was invalid as it was only on May 31, 1998
that the CBC completed the canvassing of 362 election
returns and it was in the morning of the same day
when the Board was not in session that Mañara was
furnished with a copy of the CBC’s questioned ruling of
May 29, 1998; such being the case, it was only at
nightfall of May 31, 1998 when the Board held session
that Mañara was able to manifest his intent to appeal
from the said ruling.
On June 9, 1998, Mañara filed with the COMELEC a
petition for annulment of the proclamation of Sema
which was docketed as SPC No. 98-262.
Initially, the hearing of Mañara’s appeal and
petition for annulment of proclamation was set on June
19, 1998 before the COMELEC en banc. However, the
hearing was cancelled and the two (2) cases were
referred to the First Division of the COMELEC instead.
Said cases were then heard on June 27, 1998 by
the First Division of the COMELEC afterwhich they were
submitted for resolution.
On June 29, 1998, the First Division of the
COMELEC issued an order which reads as follows:
Without prejudice to the issuance at a later time of a
formal Resolution in these cases, but based on the
pleadings, the evidence adduced by the parties during
the hearing on June 27, 1998, and the facts established
therein, the effects and consequences of the
proclamation for the position of City Mayor per
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation dated
May 31, 1998 issued by the City Board of Canvassers
of Cotabato City is HEREBY SUSPENDED.
Respondent Muslimin Sema is directed to cease and
desist from taking his oath of office as City Mayor
and/or from discharging the functions of said office.
The Clerk of the Commission is directed to furnish a
copy of this order to the Hon. Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, and
Land Bank of the Philippines, thru its branch at
Cotabato City.
The Regional Election Director, Atty. Hector Masna
shall serve immediately to the parties a copy of this
Order.[1]
Despite the above order of the COMELEC, Sema
assumed the office of the city mayor of Cotabato and
commenced to discharge the functions of said office.
On July 3, 1998, Sema filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition before this Court to annul the order of
the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998 with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction directing the COMELEC to desist
from enforcing the questioned order. The case was
docketed as G.R. Nos. 134163-64. As grounds
therefor, Sema alleged that:
The pendency of the appeal which was apparently
filed out of time and the petition for annulment of
proclamation is not a sufficient basis to enjoin
petitioner from discharging the functions of the
contested office especially where, as here, he had
already taken his oath of office and assumed the
same in accordance with law.
The evidence submitted by the private respondent
before the Comelec proved beyond doubt that his
appeal (SPC No. 98-240) was filed out of time and
that he failed to comply with the requirements of
a pre-proclamation controversy.[2]
On July 14, 1998, this Court issued a resolution
directing the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing at the time of the issuance of the order
of the COMELEC dated June 29, 1998 in SPC Nos. 98-
240 and 98-262.[3]
On August 17, 1999, this Court directed the
COMELEC to resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the resolution
and to make a report of the same to the Court within
five (5) days from its promulgation.[4]
On September 17, 1999, the COMELEC filed a
manifestation and motion for extension of time to
resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262 stating that the
Commissioner to whom the cases were raffled to and
assigned for writing of the Commission’s opinion was
out of the country and would be back on October 8,
1999. Consequently, it asked for a period of thirty (30)
days from October 8, 1999 or until November 7, 1999
to resolve the said cases.[5]
On October 19, 1999, the Court noted the
manifestation and granted the motion for extension of
time to resolve the said cases.[6]
On October 27, 1999, the COMELEC submitted its
compliance[7] to the Court’s Resolution of August 17,
1999 and attached therewith a copy of the resolution
of the First Division of the COMELEC dated October 18,
1999[8] denying due course to SPC No. 98-240 for
having been filed out of time, dismissing SPC No. 98-
262 for lack of merit and affirming the proclamation of
Sema as mayor of Cotabato City.
On November 5, 1999, Mañara filed his comment
on the COMELEC’s compliance stating, among other
things, that the same is premature since it is only a
resolution of the First Division and not a final resolution
of the Commission en banc.[9]
Consequently, on December 7, 1999 this Court
issued a resolution directing the COMELEC en banc to
resolve SPC Nos. 98-240 and 98-262 with finality within
a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of the resolution and to forthwith make a report
thereon to the Court within five (5) days from the
promulgation of the resolution.
On January 19, 2000, respondent COMELEC
submitted its compliance and reported that it issued a
resolution[10] on January 2, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by Mañara.[11]
On January 24, 2000, Sema filed a manifestation
with motion to consider G.R. Nos. 134163-64 closed
and terminated.
On January 27, 2000, Mañara filed a counter-
manifestation with motion to resolve the petition in
G.R. Nos. 134163-64 on the merits.
On February 14, 2000, Sema filed a motion for
leave of court to file an incorporated reply to Mañara’s
counter-manifestation.
All motions were noted by this Court.
Previously, or on January 13, 2000, Mañara filed a
petition for certiorari captioned “petition ex abundanti
cautela”, docketed as G.R. Nos. 141249-50,
questioning the COMELEC Resolutions dated October
18, 1999 and January 2, 2000. He prayed that the
proclamation of Sema as mayor of Cotabato City be
annulled and that the COMELEC be ordered to canvass
the thirty (30) election returns excluded by the
CBC. This petition, however, was dismissed by the
Court on January 25, 2000 for lack of a verified
statement on material dates. An addendum to said
petition was noted without action by the Court on
February 8, 1999.[12]
On February 7, 2000, Mañara seasonably [13] filed a
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. Nos. 141534-
35.[14] Aside from questioning the non-observance of
the COMELEC of its own Rules of Procedure, the
petition challenges the illegal proclamation of Sema
which proceeded from the illegal proceedings of the
CBC in excluding thirty (30) election returns in the
canvassing of votes for mayor in the City of Cotabato
when it had earlier ruled for the inclusion of twenty-
eight (28) of said returns. It ascribes to the COMELEC
the following errors, viz:
A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH
JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING ONE AND THE SAME COMMISSIONER
AS PONENTE FOR BOTH THE CHALLENGED
RESOLUTIONS;
B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH
JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ALLOWING A COMMISSIONER OF THE SECOND
DIVISION TO SIGN AS MEMBER OF THE FIRST
DIVISION ON THE CHALLENGED SPLIT
RESOLUTION, ANNEX "A" HEREOF,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS
 NO VACANCY IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIRST
DIVISION;
C It was blatantly absurd for the CBC to rationalize
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH
SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT PRIORLY RESOLVING THE
CRISES IN QUORUM OF THE COMMISSION EN
BANC SO AS TO ACCORD TO PETITIONER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW;
D petitions/cases were dismissed, then, these necessarily
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH
SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN BY-PASSING IN ITS
CHALLENGED SPLIT RESOLUTION THE ISSUES
RAISED BY PETITIONER IN HIS SPC NO. 98-240
AND SPC NO. 98-262;
E CBC of May 22 and 23, 1998 had not become final and
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH
SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN DISTORTING THE MATERIAL
FACTS OF THE CASE, WHICH THE HONORABLE
COURT, IN ITS RESOLUTION OF AUGUST 17, 1999,
HAS ALREADY ASCERTAINED;
F 1998. Following the instructions of the provisions
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH
JURISDICTION OR SOUND DISCRETION, OR
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
UPHOLDING THE BOARD IN ITS ILLEGAL
PROCLAMATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MUSLIMEN SEMA AS THE ELECTED MAYOR OF
COTABATO CITY WHICH PETITIONER IN SPC NO.
98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-262 CHALLENGED AND
QUESTIONED FOR BEING NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO.
G mandatory and shall be strictly observed by the Board
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ACTED WITH
SOUND DISCRETION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO
PETITIONER'S SPC NO. 98-240 AND SPC NO. 98-
262, ON THE TECHNICALITY GROUND THAT THE
SAME WERE ALLEGEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME,
WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT.[15]
I session that Mañara manifested his intent to appeal
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the
order of the CBC of Cotabato City dated May 29, 1998
granting Sema’s 28 petitions for exclusion of the 30
contested election returns is null and void for having
been issued after its earlier ruling embodied in its
orders of May 22 and 23, 1998 directing the exclusion
of the same returns had already become final.
It may be recalled that on May 22, 1998, the CBC
issued an order dismissing 13 of the 30 petitions for
exclusion filed by Sema. On May 23, 1998, the CBC
issued another order dismissing 15 of the remaining 17
petitions for exclusion he filed. He did not appeal from
these orders within the reglementary period,
consequently, the same already became
final. However, the CBC issued another order on May
29, 1998, this time granting Sema’s petitions for
exclusion of 30 election returns, among which were the
28 election returns already ordered included for
canvass.
that the May 22 and 23, 1998 orders dismissing the
petitions for exclusions refer only to candidates
Guiani’s and Leyretana’s petitions and not
Sema’s. The wordings of the May 23, 1998 order is
plain and unequivocal. It says: “all petitions/cases
against the hereunder contested precincts are hereby
being DISMISSED for lack of merit xxx.” If all
included Sema’s petition. Furthermore, there was
nothing in the aforementioned orders which would
indicate that the CBC reserved its right to rule on
Sema’s petition at a later time. Neither do the minutes
of the board even intimate such a reservation.
II
Even assuming arguendo that the orders of the
executory, we are not persuaded by the COMELEC’s
pronouncement that Mañara belatedly filed his appeal
from the May 29, 1998 ruling of the CBC on June 5,
1998. According to the COMELEC's First Division in its
Resolution dated October 18, 1999:
Records show that the ruling which aggrieved
appellant was issued on or about 4:00 p.m. of May 30,
above-cited, Mañara had, until 4:00 p.m. of June 1,
1998 to file his notice of appeal with the Board. As it
was, he filed said notice only on June 2, 1998. In this
regard alone, appellant had already committed a
procedural lapse. He aggravated his errors when he
filed his appeal before the Commission on June 5,
1998, a full day beyond the 5-day reglementary
period. The law, we have to stress, specifically ruled
out any extension of the five-day period. It is most
unfortunate that in committing not only one but two
fatal lapses, appellant disregarded a procedure which
according to COMELEC Resolution No. 2962 “is
of Canvassers”. It cost him his appeal because the
same had, for all intents and purposes prescribed. The
May 30, 1998 ruling of the City Board of Canvassers of
Cotabato City, not having been seasonably questioned
can no longer be disturbed.[16]
It would appear that the May 29, 1998 ruling of
the CBC was received by Mañara only on May 31, 1998
which was the same date the CBC declared that it had
completed the canvassing of 362 returns. It was also
in the evening of May 31, 1998 while the CBC was in
from said ruling. The appeal was therefore filed with
the COMELEC on June 5, 1998 within the period
prescribed in Section 20 (e) and (f) of R.A. No. 7166. [17]
Further assuming that the reckoning date for
appeal was May 30, 1998 and not May 31, 1998, it
bears stressing that the petition brought by Mañara to
the COMELEC on June 5, 1998, docketed as SPC No. 98-
240, in effect challenged the composition of the CBC
and the legality of its proceedings. If such be the
situation, the proceedings would be governed by
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 8, Rule 27 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166 reads:
SEC. 19. Contested Composition or Proceedings of the
Board; Period to Appeal; Decision by the Commission.
—Parties adversely affected by a ruling of the board of
canvassers on questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the board may appeal the matter to the
Commission within three (3) days from a ruling
thereon. The Commission shall summarily decide the
case within five (5) days from the filing thereof.
Section 8, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Procedure Before the Board of Canvassers
When Composition or Proceedings of Board are
Contested.— (a) When the composition or proceeding
of the board of canvassers are contested, the board of
canvassers shall, within twenty-four (24) hours, make a
ruling thereon with notice to the contestant who, if
adversely affected, may appeal the matter to the
Commission within three (3) days after the ruling with
proper notice to the board of canvassers. The
Commission en banc shall summarily decide the case
within five (5) days from the filing thereof.
(b) Upon receipt of such appeal, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall immediately set the case for hearing,
with due notice to the parties, by the Commission en
banc.
(c) During the pendency of the appeal, the board of
canvassers shall immediately suspend the canvass
until the Commission orders the continuation or
resumption thereof.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the party
adversely affected by a ruling of the board must take
an appeal within three (3) days from the date of the
ruling. In this case, the facts would suggest that the
CBC adjourned its proceedings on May 30 and 31, 1998
without making any ruling on Mañara’s objections to
the CBC’s proceedings. When Mañara filed his appeal
in SPC No. 98-240 on June 5, 1998, it cannot be
correctly argued that the 3-day period set by law for its
submission had expired because the CBC never ruled
on his objections to the board’s proceedings. The
failure or refusal of the CBC to rule on Mañara’s
objections should not prevent his right to elevate the
matter to the COMELEC for proper review. [18] On this
score, we find persuasive and logical the dissent of
Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores to the First
Division’s ruling, thus:
Mañara filed the present Appeal on 5 June
1998. Whether it is within the three day period to file,
nobody knows, because the Board never issued any
ruling from 30 May 1998 when the proceedings of the
board was challenged up to the time it adjourned on 31
May 1998. It never made a ruling at all even after
that. The board’s adjournment without making any
written and express ruling thereon means that the
Board has not complied with its duty to rule
thereon. The absence of any ruling makes it
impossible for Mañara to file his appeal within the
prescribed period because there was no ruling to
appeal from in the first place. The absence of
compliance of the duty by the board makes it legally
unjustifiable for this Commission to dismiss the present
appeal because the three-day period within which to
appeal must be counted from the time the ruling was
made which in the case at bar is absent.
Mañara has every right to expect a ruling from the
Board on its objection over the latter’s
proceedings. Up to this time, however, the Board has
not complied with its statutory responsibility to come
up with a ruling thereon. The failure of the Board to
discharge this obligation should not in any way
prejudice Mañara’s right to elevate the matter to this
Commission on appeal. Otherwise, all that a partial
board can do to favor a party is to refuse to make a
ruling on the latter’s opponent’s objections effectively
preventing its review by this Commission. (Abella vs.
Larrazabal 180 SCRA 509). It is in this light that the
instant appeal must be considered seasonably
filed. This Commission must assume jurisdiction,
entertain the allegations raised and resolve the issues
involved in SPC No. 98-240.[19]
It is clear that the CBC acted without authority
when it issued its May 29, 1998 ruling. Consequently,
the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it
rendered the questioned resolution of October 18,
1999 denying due course to SPC No. 98-240 for
allegedly having been filed out of time and affirming
the proclamation of Sema as Mayor of Cotabato City;
and the resolution of January 2, 2000 denying Mañara’s
motion for reconsideration of the October 18, 1999
resolution.
Accordingly, the proclamation of Sema is null and
void as it was based on an incomplete canvass. An
incomplete canvass is illegal and cannot be the basis of
a valid proclamation.[20] A proclamation made where
the contested returns set aside will affect the result of
the election and the board of canvassers proceeded to
proclaim without the authority from the COMELEC is
null and void.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, docketed
as G.R. Nos. 141534-35 is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated
October 18, 1999 and January 2, 2000 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The COMELEC is ORDERED
to direct the City Board of Canvassers of Cotabato City
to reconvene within ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision for the purpose of completing the canvass of
votes and proclaiming the winner. The petition for
certiorari in G.R. Nos. 134163-64 is deemed
CLOSEDand TERMINATED. The status quo order dated
July 14, 1998 is hereby ordered LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY
T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R.
TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged
to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora,
the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually
became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A.
No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a
plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of
the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into
a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No.
7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of
the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted
"yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these
results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in
effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending
that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three
specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own
legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next
national elections after the passage of
this Act. The remainder of the former
legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the
new legislative district of San Juan with
its first representative to be elected at
the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision
of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI,
Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed
Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject
is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675
since the said law treats of the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed
in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49
treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title
of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been
complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article
VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which
provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of
Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of
registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following
the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this
section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an
increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI,
Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that said division was not made pursuant to
any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the
effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as
aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of
the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a
population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section
5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated
constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate
congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is
decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not
a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural
and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a
Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under
Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court
so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus,
in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled
that the constitutional requirement as now expressed
in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v.
Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not
require Congress to employ in the title
of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform
the legislators, the persons interested
in the subject of the bill and the public,
of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues
raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no
mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify
their separation into two legislative districts, the same
does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No.
7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any
rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered
by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the
present limit on the number of representatives as set
forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is
that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No.
7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and
San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative
districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in
effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts, the said argument borders on the
absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that
it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a
right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No.
7675, petitioners present further arguments against
the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should
have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A.
No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their
legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit
since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite
was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the
inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from
the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the
change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the
subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is
the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of
credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora,
the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By
dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable
to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo
Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a
resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they
assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A.
No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not
properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, in relation
to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts
to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section
8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the
legislative district of
Makati only by special
law (the Charter in
violation of the
constitutional provision
requiring a general
reapportionment law to
be passed by Congress
within three (3) years
following the return of
every census;
(b) the increase in
legislative district was
not expressed in the
title of the bill; and
 (c) the addition of
another legislative
district in Makati is not
in accord with Section
5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of
the latest survey (1990
census), the population
of Makati stands at
only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H.
Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I government, legislators felt that the dispute should be
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land
areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The
Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city
to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present
territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it
has jurisdiction bounded on the
northeast by Pasig River and beyond
by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast
by the municipalities of Pateros and
Taguig; on the southwest by the City of
Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
The foregoing provision shall
be without prejudice to the resolution
by the appropriate agency or forum of
existing boundary disputes or cases
involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati
and the adjoining local government
units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this
delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a
local government unit should be made by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the
territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within
the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state,
any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided
by the Local Government Code in requiring that the
land area of a local government unit must be spelled
out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot
perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation
of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land
area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. In language that
cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's
land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a
legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed
City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions. At the time of the
consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over
Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a
becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of
left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of
fact which could decide the issue. This would have
ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed
city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does
not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which
will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable
certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress
maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed
City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them
subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not
prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the
Local Government Code, it is beyond
cavil that the requirement stated
therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction
of newly created or converted cities
should be described by meted and
bounds, with technical descriptions" —
was made in order to provide a means
by which the area of said cities may be
reasonably ascertained. In other words,
the requirement on metes and bounds
was meant merely as tool in the
establishment of local government
units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so
long as the territorial jurisdiction of a
city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to
common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it
may be concluded that the legislative
intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that
laws creating new cities must contain
therein detailed technical descriptions
similar to those appearing in Torrens
titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To
require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity
would be to defeat the very purpose
which the Local Government Code to
 seeks to serve. The manifest intent of
the Code is to empower local
government units and to give them
their rightful due. It seeks to make
local governments more responsive to
the needs of their constituents while at
the same time serving as a vital cog in
national development. To invalidate
R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that
no cadastral type of description was
used in the law would serve the letter
but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master
serving the slave, instead of the other
way around. This could not be the
intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws
must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with
the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the
true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose
of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051;
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105).
Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should
be so construed as not to defeat but to
carry out such ends and purposes
(Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520).
The same rule must indubitably apply
to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the
constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati.
— The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as
the officials of the City of Makati and
shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new
election is held and the duly elected
officials shall have already qualified
and assume their offices: Provided, The
new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and
employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions
and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8,
Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he
was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
No Member of the House of
Representatives shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective
local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are
prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854
restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously
served by them. In particular, petitioners point that
section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor,
respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for
two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that
should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win
as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run
for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-
year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section
51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the
constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law
are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these
requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections;
that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties
to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail
the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
 Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit.,
its conversion into a highly-urbanized we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
city, Makati shall thereafter have at construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as
least two (2) legislative districts that not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution
shall initially correspond to the two (2) does not command that the title of a law should
existing districts created under Section exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all
3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient
implemented by the Commission on compliance if the title expresses the general subject
Elections to commence at the next and all the provisions are germane to such general
national elections to be held after the subject."
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for
barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas lack of merit No costs.
and Forbes shall be with the first SO ORDERED.
district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe- EN BANC
Viejo which shall form part of the [G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
second district. (emphasis supplied) VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG
They contend. that the addition of another legislative BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT
reapportionment 6cannot made by a special law, (2) the MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA,
title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty FARMERS PARTY, petitioners,
thousand (450,000). vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON,
of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,
city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER,
shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L,
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS,
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA,
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List
No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker
reapportionment can only be made through a general of the House of
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative Representatives,respondents.
districts allotted to each local government unit [G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN
where a new city or province created by Congress will AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA
be denied legislative representation for an SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN
indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE
situations will deprive the people of a new city or ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES
province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. ELECTIONS (COMELEC), HOUSE OF
It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. REPRESENTATIVES represented by
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA,
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
the latest survey (1990 census), the population of MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN,
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE,
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP,
representative. Even granting that the population of ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP,
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT,
be increased since it has met the minimum population AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). [G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD),
Constitution provides that a city whose population NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY
congressional representative. 14 (BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
that the creation of an additional legislative district in AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
 AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-
BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP,
VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN,
KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style
party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable
parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the
combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
“qualified” to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
“qualifying” and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed “in proportion to their total number
of votes.”
Because the Comelec violated these legal
parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and
administer election-related laws. It has no power to
contravene or amend them. Neither does it have
authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality
of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations,
methods and formulas to implement election laws --
not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent
them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-
list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of
government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel
questions, which demand innovative legal solutions
convertible into mathematical formulations which are,
in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions
for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution[1] of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division,
in Election Matter 98-065;[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999
Resolution[3] of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said
disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the
proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list
representatives "to complete the full complement of 52
seats in the House of Representatives as provided
under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. 7941.”
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature
into our presidential system of government -- the
party-list method of representation. Under this system,
any national, regional or sectoral party or organization
registered with the Commission on Elections may
participate in the election of party-list representatives
who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in
the House of Representatives as regular members. [4] In
effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House --
one for a district congressman and another for a party-
list representative.[5]
Specifically, this system of representation is
mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:
“Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected by a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.”
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide
by law the “selection or election” of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March
3, 1995. Under this statute’s policy declaration, the
State shall "promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies but
who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible.” (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list
seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941)
in this wise:
“Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The
party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under
the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five
(5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second
vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec
en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing
the rules and regulations governing the election of
party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List
Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from
twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had
obtained at least two percent of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the
proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The
proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor
were as follows:[6]
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special
elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec
en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine
Coconut Planters’ Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one
party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes,
which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total
votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first
nominee, Emerito S. Calderon, was proclaimed on
September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list
representative.[7]
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive
Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed
with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full
Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the
Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty
percent membership of party-list representatives in the
House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that
the literal application of the two percent vote
requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list
organizations[8] filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by
PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASA’s Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August
28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior
Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL,
MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW,
FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second
Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the
proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition
to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total
number of congressional[9] seats must be filled up by
eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In
allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-
vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA
7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the
party-list system," which should supposedly determine
"how the 52 seats should be filled up."First, "the
system was conceived to enable the marginalized
sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in
the House of Representatives." Second, "the system
should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine
society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-
party system.” (Boldface in the original.) Considering
these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold
requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-
list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at
least one representative.” It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881),
Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the
Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to
GRANT the instant petition and motions for
intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list
hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names
submitted by their respective parties, organizations
and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list
representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
 10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the
House of Representatives as provided in Section 5,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.”
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of
inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No.
2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had
unanimously promulgated a set of “Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System.” Under
these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall
be given for every two percent of the vote, a formula
the Comelec illustrated in its Annex “A.” It apparently
relied on this method when it proclaimed the 14
incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each
for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for
inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous
Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three
“elements,” the “Group of 38” private respondents.[10]
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which
had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of
having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast
for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation
of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations
or coalitions garnering at least two percent of the votes
for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the
House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not
exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those
which had garnered the two percent threshold in
proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning
parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and
oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House
"should be filled up,” the Comelec en banc resolved
only the issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the
issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats
allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the
thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at
least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group
of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had
not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining
seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent
vote requirement "will mean the concentration of
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations
representing two political parties, three coalitions and
four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and
peasantry x x x. Such strict application of the 2%
'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of
the Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system in order
to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives x x x.” Additionally, it "will also
prevent this Commission from complying with the
constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list
representatives to compose 20% of the House of
Representatives.”
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the
Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three
commissioners concurring[11] and two
members[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its
Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the
proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS),
"pending the resolution of petitions for correction of
manifest errors.”
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or
void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA
7941, the Commission blithely rejected and
circumvented its application, holding that there were
more important considerations than this statutory
threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of
preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by
the parties and organizations that had obtained at
least two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-
list system.[13] In the suits, made respondents together
with the Comelec were the 38 parties, organizations
and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body
as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of
Representatives.Collectively, petitioners sought the
proclamation of additional representatives from each
of their parties and organizations, all of which had
obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status
Quo Order directing the Comelec “to CEASE and
DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date
and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the
parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution
or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders
from this Court.”
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from
the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for
petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A.
Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty.
Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795;
Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for
all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for
Intervenor NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for
Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court,
retired Comelec Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong
acted asamicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P.
Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a friend
of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were
required to submit their respective Memoranda in
amplification of their verbal arguments.[14]
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main
question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by
addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for
party-list solons be filled up completely and all the
time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the
three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how
should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court
agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions
should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all
be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent
Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision[15] of the Constitution on
the composition of the House of Representatives reads
as follows:
“Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area
in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected by a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.”
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List
Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of
district representatives the determinant in arriving at
the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers,
who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the
party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a
mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation[16] means that any increase in the
number of district representatives, as may be provided
by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding
increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national
elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52,
computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is
easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution
require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the
time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is
“No.”
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list.”
According to petitioners, this percentage is a
ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has
been left to Congress. In the exercise of its
prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which
it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list election must obtain at
least two percent of the total votes cast for the system
in order to qualify for a seat in the House of
Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional
provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number
of participating parties, organizations or coalitions
which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and
thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation
in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be
filled up completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for
the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their
right of suffrage, determine who and how many should
represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec,
together with the respondent parties, avers that the
twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement
in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict
application would make it mathematically impossible to
fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally
simple message that Congress was vested with the
broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of
the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of
the total membership in the House of Representatives
reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative,
Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress
declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list
representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them. It
however deemed it necessary to require parties,
organizations and coalitions participating in the system
to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-
list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage
could have "additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes.” Furthermore, no winning party,
organization or coalition can have more than three
seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the
relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
“(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.”
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements,
it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides
a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the
two percent threshold may result in a “mathematical
impossibility,” suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage
requirement rests in Congress.[17] Our task now, as
should have been the Comelec’s, is not to find fault in
the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios
of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative
mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election
process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well
as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply
the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess
it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective,
insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a
statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that
must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the
essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and
Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned
from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote
below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
“SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I
would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I
think, Senator Osmeña when he said that a political
party must have obtained at least a minimum
percentage to be provided in this law in order to qualify
for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must
obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or
10 percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said,
this will actually proliferate political party groups and
those who have not really been given by the people
sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents
and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of the party-list
system, Mr. President."[18]
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the
bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the
following shows:
“MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which
this computation is based at, arriving at a five percent
ratio which would distribute equitably the number of
seats among the different sectors. There is a
mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after
that of the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of
Germany.”[19]
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution
had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly
determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S.
Monsod explained:
“MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications
in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is
that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the
votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast
their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent
would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a
seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two
percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The
average vote per family is three. So, here we are
talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there
are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the
Assembly because many of them have memberships of
over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational
implication of our proposal. What we are trying to
avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat
system. We believe that it is our job to open up the
system and that we should not have within that system
a reserve seat. We think that people should organize,
should work hard, and should earn their seats within
that system.”[20]
The two percent threshold is consistent not only
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and
the law, but with the very essence of "representation."
Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but
is exercised by representatives chosen by them.[21] But
to have meaningful representation, the elected persons
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the
party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a
threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" [22] to ensure
meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on
this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts
is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.[23]
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-
list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty
system of representation. Again, we quote
Commissioner Monsod:
“MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say
that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to
a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But
we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics
and operation in the implementation of a concept that
has very serious shortcomings of classification and of
double or triple votes. We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to
be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to
put a ceiling on the number of representatives from
any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. This way, we will open it
up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional
groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. x x x.”[24]
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's
pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three
(3) for each qualified party, organization or
coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large
its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if
not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the
validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional
Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat
allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and
the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now
proceed to the method of determining how many
party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is
no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating
parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter
collectively referred to as "parties") according to the
votes they each obtained.The percentage of their
respective votes as against the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system is then determined. All
those that garnered at least two percent of the total
votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering
more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." The problem is how to distribute additional
seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat
limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional
seat for every additional proportion of the votes
obtained equivalent to the two percent vote
requirement for the first seat. [25]Translated in figures, a
party that wins at least six percent of the total votes
cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that
gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one
that gets two percent will be entitled to one seat
only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and
ease of comprehension. Problems arise, however, when
the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example,
when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes
cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6
percent. Under the method just described, Party A
would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and
Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit
imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have
three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of
a party garnering two or more times the number of
votes obtained by another, yet getting the same
number of seats as the other one with the much lesser
votes. In effect, proportional representation will be
contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this
suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was
the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a
German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its
method of distributing party-list seats in the
Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of
additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining
number of seats to be allocated by the total number of
votes obtained by that party and dividing the product
by the total number of votes garnered by all the
qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting
product will be the number of additional seats that the
party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left
among the qualified parties in the descending order of
the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based
on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-
list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as
follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit
of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more
than the limit will have to give up their excess
seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen
qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the
previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate
the principle of "proportional representation," a basic
tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for
Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting,
because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory
character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both
our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold
requirements -- two percent for us and five for
them. There are marked differences between the two
models, however. As ably pointed out by private
respondents,[26] one half of the German Parliament is
filled up by party-list members. More important, there
are no seat limitations, because German law
discourages the proliferation of small parties. In
contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a
three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the
multiparty system. This major statutory difference
makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable
to the Philippines.
 Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the
Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because
of fundamental environmental differences, neither can
the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here
because of essential variances between the two party-
list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the
Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list
system is a unique paradigm which demands an
equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible
and logical solution to determine the number
of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to,
we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-
list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as
follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the
combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those
parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the
total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
“qualified” to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
“qualifying” and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the
additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed “in proportion to their total number
of votes.”
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to
translate “proportional representation” into a the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by
mathematical formula that will not contravene,
circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such
formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the
petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court, that the initial step
is to rank all the participating parties, organizations
and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio
for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the
total votes cast for all the parties participating in the
system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties
shall be considered in the computation
of additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the
“first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the
number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to
be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation,
the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000
votes and is determined to be entitled to
two additional seats. Another qualified party which
received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same
number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of
the votes won by the first party. Depending on the
proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party
whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less
than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted
less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first
party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula
does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because
there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an
arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the
twenty percent allocation. An academic mathematical
demonstration of such incipient violation is not
necessary because the present set of facts, given the
number of qualified parties and the voting percentages
obtained, will definitely not end up in such
constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v.
Gonzales[27] that a fractional membership cannot be
converted into a whole membership of one when it
would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional
membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no party can
claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.”
In any case, the decision on whether to round off
the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since
Congress did not provide for it in the present law,
neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not
make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of
facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the
First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats
the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive
twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats
and so on.The formula, therefore, for computing the
number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as
follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first
party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list
groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or
greater than four percent, but less than six percent,
then the first party shall have one additional or a total
of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four
percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because
the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18
or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the
number of seats to which all the parties are entitled
may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats
reserved in the House of Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received
5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one
additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable
only in determining the number of additional seats
the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to
determine the number of additional seats of the other
qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the
same formula for all would contravene the proportional
representation parameter. For example, a second party
obtains six percent of the total number of votes
cast. According to the above formula, the said party
would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. However, if the first party received
a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty
percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the
second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only
six percent of the votes will have an equal number of
representatives as the one obtaining twenty
percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the
first party a total of three seats; and the party
receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to
those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified
Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the
number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
------------------
Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of
seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the
following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat,
since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome
of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1
= 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 =
0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1
= 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any
additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes
for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied
by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat
for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact
mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be
entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number
is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not
rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To
repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a
number of seats in excess of that provided by the
law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party
limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase
in the maximum number of additional representatives
a party may be entitled to would result in a more
accurate proportional representation. But the law itself
has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we
need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for
determining additional seats happily coincides with the
present number of incumbents; namely, two for
the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other
qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the
incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use
of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our
methodology for being too strict. We say, however,
that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal
parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no
less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA
7941 to make it “less strict,” then the formula will also
be modified to reflect the changes willed by the
lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused
its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein
respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are
each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly
violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent
threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these
statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated
unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly
vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion
to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the
system. The wisdom and the propriety of these
impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial
review.[28]
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in
these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have
failed to demonstrate that our
lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in
prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29]
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce
and administer election-related laws,[30] cannot simply
disregard an act of Congress exercised within the
bounds of its authority.As a mere implementing body,
it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of
such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the
law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution
reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict
enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down
a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the
Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.[31]
Neither can we grant petitioners’ prayer that they
each be given additional seats (for a total of three
each), because granting such plea would plainly and
simply violate the “proportional representation”
mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the
1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total
failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new
system of representation. It should not be deemed a
conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by
RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the
system. Be it remembered that the party-list system,
though already popular in parliamentary democracies,
is still quite new in our presidential system. We should
allow it some time to take root in the consciousness of
our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of
republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated
litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first
election for party-list representatives should serve as a
challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It
should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their
campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking
body. It should also serve as a clarion call for
innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system
of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the
public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future
party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance
and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will
fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in
Congress under the aegis of the party-list system,
Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby
partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The
proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list
representatives - two for APEC and one each for the
remaining twelve (12) qualified parties -
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941,
represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO,
Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL
REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA
P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY,
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKAKULONG NA WALANG
SALA (KAKUSA), BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), AHON PINOY, AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
ALLIANCE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (AGAP),
PUWERSA NG BAYANING ATLETA (PBA), ALYANSA
NG MGA GRUPONG HALIGI NG AGHAM AT
TEKNOLOHIYA PARA SA MAMAMAYAN, INC.
(AGHAM), BABAE PARA SA KAUNLARAN (BABAE
KA), AKSYON SAMBAYANAN (AKSA), ALAY SA
BAYAN NG MALAYANG PROPESYUNAL AT
REPORMANG KALAKAL (ABAY-PARAK), AGBIAG
TIMPUYOG ILOCANO, INC. (AGBIAG!), ABANTE
ILONGGO, INC. (ABA ILONGGO), AANGAT TAYO
(AT), AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN (ANAK), BAGO
NATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (BAGO), ANGAT ANTAS-KABUHAYAN
PILIPINO MOVEMENT (AANGAT KA PILIPINO),
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONAL
(ABS), ASSOSASYON NG MGA MALILIIT NA
NEGOSYANTENG GUMAGANAP INC. (AMANG),
SULONG BARANGAY MOVEMENT, KASOSYO
PRODUCERS CONSUMER EXCHANGE
ASSOCIATION, INC. (KASOSYO), UNITED
MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS (UNI-MAD),
PARENTS ENABLING PARENTS (PEP), ALLIANCE
OF NEO-CONSERVATIVES (ANC), FILIPINOS FOR
PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROGRESS MOVEMENT
(FPJPM), BIGKIS PINOY MOVEMENT (BIGKIS), 1-
UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UNTAK),
ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS (ABC),
BIYAYANG BUKID, INC., ALLIANCE FOR
NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), AKBAY
PINOY OFW-NATIONAL INC., (APOI), ALLIANCE
TRANSPORT SECTOR (ATS), KALAHI SECTORAL
PARTY (ADVOCATES FOR OVERSEAS FILIPINO)
AND ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS,
PROFESSIONALS AND SENIORS
(AAPS), Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007
REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN
FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two consolidated petitions
for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-
list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271,
petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short)
and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short)
assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on
May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining
whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sector each
seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No.
177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn
Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007
effectively denying their request for the release or
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups
mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-
request.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the
Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the
petitions,1 the petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the
following additional prayers: 1) that the 33 private
respondents named therein be "declare[d] as
unqualified to participate in the party-list elections as
sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to
comply with the guidelines prescribed by the [Court] in
[Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec2]" and, 2)
correspondingly, that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the
May 2007 elections.
In separate resolutions both dated April 24, 2007, the
Court en banc required the public and private
respondents to file their respective comments on the
petitions within a non-extendible period of five (5) days
from notice. Apart from respondent Comelec, seven (7)
private respondents3 in G.R. No. 177271 and one party-
list group4 mentioned in G.R. No. 177314 submitted
their separate comments. In the main, the separate
comments of the private respondents focused on the
untenability and prematurity of the plea of petitioners
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR to nullify their accreditation as
party-list groups and thus disqualify them and their
respective nominees from participating in the May 14,
2007 party-list elections.
The facts:
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution
No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern
the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and
submission of names of nominees under the party-list
system of representation in connection with the May
14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of
organized groups filed the necessary manifestations.
Among these – and ostensibly subsequently accredited
by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections -
are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1)BABAE KA; (2) ANG
KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA;
(6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY;
(9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN;
(11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD;
(14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list.
Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing
with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of
certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear
not to have the names of the nominees sought to be
disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list
of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No
07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception
that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14
party-list groups do not, as they should, actually
represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner
Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter5 dated
March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the
Comelec’s Law Department requesting a list of that
groups’ nominees. Another letter6 of the same tenor
dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner
Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular
urgency of the subject request.
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department
officially responded to petitioner Rosales’ requests. The
April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however,
carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC
WON’T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES",7 with the
following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not
personality oriented."
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-
Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as
counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to
the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive
decision on Rosales’ earlier plea for information
regarding the names of several party-list nominees.
Invoking their constitutionally-guaranteed right to
information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the
same time drew attention to the banner headline
adverted to earlier, with a request for the Comelec,
"collectively or individually, to issue a formal
clarification, either confirming or denying … the
banner headline and the alleged statement of
Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently
unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the
issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-
07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the
nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying
petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. In its
relevant part, Resolution 07-0724 reads as follows:
RESOLVED, moreover, that the Commission will
disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in
connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after
3:00 p.m. on election day.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution and
reply to all letters addressed to the Commission
inquiring on the party-list nominees. (Emphasis added.)
According to petitioner Rosales, she was able to obtain
a copy of the April 3, 2007 Resolution only on April 21,
2007. She would later state the observation that the
last part of the "Order empowering the Law
Department to ‘implement this resolution and reply to
all letters … inquiring on the party-list nominees’ is
apparently a fool-proof bureaucratic way to distort and
mangle the truth and give the impression that the
antedated Resolution of April 3, 2007 … is the final
answer to the two formal requests … of Petitioners".10
The herein consolidated petitions are cast against the
foregoing factual setting, albeit petitioners BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR appear not to be aware, when they filed
their petition on April 18, 2007, of the April 3, 2007
Comelec Resolution 07-0724.
To start off, petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would
have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by
the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named
in their petition on the ground that these groups and
their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified. In the words of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and
UP-LR, Comelec -
xxx committed grave abuse of discretion … when it
granted the assailed accreditations even
without simultaneously determining whether the
nominees of herein private respondents are qualified or
not, or whether or not the nominees are likewise
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector they claim to represent in Congress, in
accordance with No. 7 of the eight-point guidelines
prescribed by the Honorable Supreme in the Ang
Bagong Bayani11 case which states that, "not only the
candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also
must its nominees." In the case of private respondents,
public respondent Comelec granted accreditations
without the required simultaneous determination of the
qualification of the nominees as part of the
accreditation process of the party-list organization
itself. (Words in bracket added; italization in the
original)12
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their
petition. For, such course of action would entail going
over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups
or parties in question, particularly whether or not they
indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented
groups. The exercise would require the Court to make
a factual determination, a matter which is outside the
office of judicial review by way of special civil action for
certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not
called upon to decide factual issues and the case must
be decided on the undisputed facts on record.13The
sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues
of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and
does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of
the evidence.14
Not lost on the Court of course is the pendency before
the Comelec of SPA Case No. 07-026 in which
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR themselves seek to
disqualify the nominees of the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the
Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted the assailed accreditations without
simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is
there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list
nominee be determined simultaneously with the
accreditation of an organization. And as aptly pointed
out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran
(Babae Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a
petition for registration of a party-list organization to
be filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90)
days before the election" whereas the succeeding
Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-
five (45) days before the election" of the list of names
whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.
Now to the other but core issues of the case. The
petition in G.R. No. 177314 formulates and captures
the main issues tendered by the petitioners in these
consolidated cases and they may be summarized as
follows:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to
reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right
to information and free access to documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated
by the Constitution to disclose to the public the
names of said nominees.
While the Comelec did not explicitly say so, it based its
refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of
subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This
provision, while commanding the publication and the
posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list
system participating groups, nonetheless tells the
Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-
list nominees in said certified list. Thus:
SEC. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.- The
COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have
applied or who have manifested their desire to
participate under the party-list system and distribute
copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling
places on election day. The names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified
list. (Emphasis added.)
And doubtless part of Comelec’s reason for keeping the
names of the party list nominees away from the public
is deducible from the following excerpts of the news
report appearing in the adverted April 13, 2007 issue
of the Manila Bulletin:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) firmed up
yesterday its decision not to release the names of
nominees of sectoral parties, organizations, or
coalitions accredited to participate in the party-list
election which will be held simultaneously with the May
14 mid-term polls.
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. … said he
and [the other five COMELEC] Commissioners ---
believe that the party list elections must not be
personality oriented.
Abalos said under [R.A.] 7941 …, the people are to
vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or
coalitions, not for their nominees.
He said there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the
Comelec to disclose the names of nominees. xxx
(Words in brackets and emphasis added)
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the
petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the
Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to
information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7,
Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right
to information is another constitutional provision
enunciating the policy of full disclosure and
transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
The right to information is a public right where the real
parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be
precise. And for every right of the people recognized as
fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of
those who govern to respect and protect that right.
This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime.16 Without a government’s
acceptance of the limitations upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties,
without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties
exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill
of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge
any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to
information and may seek its enforcement by
mandamus.17 And since every citizen by the simple fact
of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed,
objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily
unavailing.18
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information and its companion right of access to official
records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi,
supra, the people’s right to know is limited to "matters
of public concern" and is further subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the
policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions
involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the
need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on
some matters, such as military, trade, banking and
diplomatic secrets or those affecting national
security.19
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have
eluded precise definition. But both terms embrace, to
borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary
citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to
determine, on a case to case basis, whether or not at
issue is of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a
citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil
service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for a
lofty elective public office should be a matter of
highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns
is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus,
therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading:
"[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying
card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure.
To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under
said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which
the same provision requires to be posted in the polling
places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the
prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law
something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of
the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before
the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given
by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional
dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No.
7941.
The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is
not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It
cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-
disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a
weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it
does, on a fundamental right to information.20 While
the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a
party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually
sit in the House of Representatives.
The Court is very much aware of newspaper reports
detailing the purported reasons behind the Comelec’s
disinclination to release the names of party-list
nominees. It is to be stressed, however, that the Court
is in the business of dispensing justice on the basis of
hard facts and applicable statutory and decisional laws.
And lest it be overlooked, the Court always assumes, at
the first instance, the presumptive validity and
regularity of official acts of government officials and
offices.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the
people have the right to elect their representatives on
the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for
voters to be informed about matters that have a
bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved
in a system of blind voting, as veritably advocated in
the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court,
since the 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo,21 has
consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any
interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in
any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in
an election.22 So it must be here for still other reasons
articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent
Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly
DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation
of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as
it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish
the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors
or organizations accredited to participate in the May
14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition
in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups, sectors or organizations accredited to
participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The
Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its
compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice
hereof.
This Decision is declared immediately executory upon
its receipt by the Comelec.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172103 April 13, 2007
CITIZENS’ BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION
(CIBAC), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GARCIA, (COMELEC),
represented by CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS,
SR., Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assailing the March 7, 2006
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 06-
0248,2 which rejected the Motion for Proclamation of
the Second Nominees of Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), et al. under the party-list system in
connection with the May 2004 National and Local
Elections.
The Facts
The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers for the Party-List System, issued Resolution
No. NBC 04-0043 promulgated on June 2, 2004, which
proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one of those which
qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received
the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List
Canvass Report No. 19,4 CIBAC received a total number
of 493,546 votes out of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all
the party-list participants, which, by applying the
formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC,5 resulted in a percentage
of 3.9084.6 In the computation for additional seats for
the parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula
of one additional seat per additional 2%, thereby
foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional
seat under the party-list system for having received
less than what was prescribed by the poll body.7
On June 22, 2004, petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng Manggagawa
(PM), filed a Joint Motion for Immediate
Proclamation8 entreating the COMELEC en banc to
recognize their entitlement to an additional seat and
that their second nominees be immediately proclaimed.
They based their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna), applying the following Veterans formula:
1awphi1.nét
Votes Cast for
Additional Qualified Party x Allotted
Seats = Seats
Votes Cast for First
Party for First Party9
On March 7, 2006, the COMELEC en banc issued the
challenged Resolution No. 06-0248 contained in the
Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular En Banc
Meeting of the COMELEC,10 which adopted the March 6,
2006 Memorandum of the Supervisory Committee
relative to the Urgent Motion to Resolve the Motion for
Proclamation of the Second Nominees of CIBAC, BUTIL,
and PM party-lists, in connection with the May 2004
elections for party-list representatives. The pertinent
portion reads:
"On 01 May 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, then
CIC on Party-List Concerns, acting on queries from
several party-list candidates regarding the formula to
be used by the Commission in determining the
additional seats for party list winners in the 10 May
2004 elections, issued a memorandum on the matter to
the Commission en-banc. As a result, on the [sic] 08
May 2004, the Commission en banc promulgated
Resolution No. 6835 (Annex ‘A’) the resolutory portion
of which reads… ‘RESOLVES, to adopt the simplified
formula of one additional seat per additional two
percent (underscoring supplied) of the total party-list
votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in the
coming 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections.’
The Party List Canvass Report No. 22 of the National
Board of Canvassers, (Annex ‘B’) shows that CIBAC,
BUTIL and PM have the following percentage of total
votes garnered:
CIBAC - 3.8638
BUTIL - 3.3479
PM - 3.4947
Following the simplified formula of the Commission,
after the first 2% is deducted from the percentage of
votes of the above-named party-lists, they are no
longer entitled to an additional seat. It is worth
mentioning that the Commission, consistent with its
formula, denied the petition for a seat of ABA-AKO and
ANAD after garnering a percentage of votes of 1.9900
and 1.9099 respectively.
For consideration."
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation
of the Supervisory Committee to deny the foregoing
Motion of CIBAC, BUTIL and PM party-lists for
proclamation of second nominees, following the
simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per
Comelec Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May
2004.
The Issues
Undeterred, CIBAC filed the instant Petition for
Certiorari11 before this Court, raising two issues,
viz:1^vvphi1.net
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, IN
ADOPTING THE SIMPLIFIED FORMULA OF ONE
ADDITIONAL SEAT PER ADDITIONAL TWO PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL PARTY-LIST VOTES IN THE PROCLAMATION
OF THE PARTY-LIST WINNERS IN THE MAY 10, 2004
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTION, THUS, ADJUDGING
THE PETITIONER HEREIN AS ENTITLED ONLY TO ONE (1)
SEAT, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CIBAC, AND OTHER
PARTY-LIST GROUPS SIMILARLY SITUATED, ARE
ENTITLED TO ONE (1) ADDITIONAL SEAT BASED ON THE
FORMULA CRAFTED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
CASES OF ANG BAGONG BAYANI AND BAYAN MUNA.12
In gist, the core issue is whether or not the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner
CIBAC an additional seat in the House of
Representatives under the party-list system by using
the simplified formula instead of the claimed Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula.
Petitioner CIBAC asseverates that the COMELEC
committed a serious departure from settled
jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of discretion
when it mistakenly relied on the "simplified formula" as
the basis for its resolution. Moreover, it stressed that
the COMELEC simplified formula runs counter to the
Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which
used the "number of allotted seats for the first party" as
multiplier. If the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna
formula were applied, CIBAC would be entitled to one
additional seat, thus:
495,193
Additional x3 = regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
seats =
1,203,30 1.2345
5
Lastly, petitioner faults the COMELEC for its failure to
act on and so dismiss the petitions for disqualification
filed by the other party-list groups which could have
enabled the COMELEC to "make an accurate
determination of the votes that each party-list group
has actually obtained." It therefore asks the Court to set
aside the assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 06-0248;
and direct the COMELEC to declare CIBAC as entitled to
one (1) additional seat and to immediately proclaim Ma.
Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, its second nominee, as
member of the House of Representatives.
The Court’s Ruling
Entitlement to an additional seat
In deciding the controversy at hand, a second look at
the enabling law, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, "An Act
Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives
through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor," is in order. The objective of the law was
made clear in Section 2, thus:
Declaration of Policy.––The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In determining the number of seats a party-list is
entitled to, Sec. 11 prescribes that:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each:
provided, that those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats (emphasis
supplied).
The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the
four (4) inviolable parameters to determine the winners
in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the
Constitution and R.A. 7941, as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation––the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
Second, the two percent threshold––only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit––each qualified party,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
"qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation––the additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes."13 (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining the number of additional seats for each
party-list that has met the 2% threshold, "proportional
representation" is the touchstone to ascertain
entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to
additional seats of the first party and other qualified
party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans:
[H]ow do we determine the number of seats the first
party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is
that a party receiving at least two percent of the total
votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the
first party were to receive twice the number of votes of
the second party, it should be entitled to twice the
latter’s number of seats and so on. The formula,
therefore, for computing the number of seats to which
the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes Proportion of votes of
of first party first party relative to
=
Total votes for total votes for party-list
party-list system system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party
without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of
the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups,
then the first party shall be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion
of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater
than four percent, but less than six percent, then the
first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent,
then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
We adopted the six percent bench mark, because the
first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18
or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the
number of seats to which all the parties are entitled
may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats
reserved in the House of Representatives.
xxxx
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
The next step is to solve for the number of additional
seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation. x x x
xxxx
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
1ªvvphi1.nét
No. of
votes of
Additional No. of additional
concerne
seats seats allocated
d party
for = x to first party
No. of
concerned (Emphasis
votes of
party supplied.)
the first
party
 xxxx
The above formula does not give an exact
mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be
entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number
is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded
off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat,
rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of
seats in excess of that provided by the law.
Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party
limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase
in the maximum number of additional representatives a
party may be entitled to would result in a more
accurate proportional representation. But the law itself
has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we
need to work within such extant parameter.14 (Emphasis
supplied.)
On June 25, 2003, the formula was put to test in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna.1ªvvphi1.nét In
determining the additional seats for the other qualified
parties—BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS,
and ABANSE! PINAY––the following computation was
made:
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we
arrive at 0.51:
Votes Cast for
x Allotted
Additiona Qualified Party
= Seats for
l Seats Votes Cast for
First Party
First Party
290,760
= x3
1,708,253
= 0.51
Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not
entitled to any additional seat.15
From a scrutiny of the Veterans and Ang Bagong Bayani
and Bayan Muna formulae in determining the additional
seats for party-list representatives, it is readily
apparent that the Veterans formula is materially
different from the one used in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna. In Veterans, the multiplier used was "the
[number] of additional seats allocated to the first
party," while in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna formula, the multiplier "allotted seats for first
party" was applied. The dissimilarity in the multiplier
used spells out a big difference in the outcome of the
equation. This divergence on the multiplier was pointed
out and stressed by respondent COMELEC.
Nevertheless, petitioner insists that the correct
multiplier is the ALLOTTED seats for the first party
referring to the three (3) seats won by Bayan Muna
which emerged as the winning first party, as allegedly
prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. On
this issue, petitioner ratiocinates this way:
It cannot be emphasized enough that the formula in the
Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna cases rendered in
2003, effectively modified the earlier Veterans formula,
with the clear and explicit use of the "allotted seats for
the first party". Considering that the first party, Bayan
Muna, was allotted to the maximum three (3) seats
under the law, it is therefore clear that the multiplier to
be used is three (3), the allotted seats for the first
party.16
However, this postulation is bereft of merit and
basis.1awphi1.nét
A careful perusal of the four corners of Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna betrays petitioner’s claim as it
did not mention any revision or reshaping of the
Veterans formula. As a matter of fact, the Court had in
mind the application of the original Veterans formula in
Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. This conclusion is
based on the aforequoted formula in Ang Bagong
Bayani and Bayan Muna, as follows:
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we
arrive at 0.51:
Votes Cast for Allotted
Addition Qualified Party Seats
= x
al Seats Votes Cast for First for First
Party
Party
290,760
= x 3
1,708,253
= 0.51
The phrase "applying the relevant formula in Veterans
to BUHAY" admits of no other conclusion than that the
Court merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in resolving the
additional seats by the other qualified party-list groups.
However, it appears that there was an inaccurate
presentation of the Veterans formula as the Court used
the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead of the
"[number] of additional seats allocated to the first
party" prescribed in the Veterans formula. It is apparent
that the phrase "[number] of additional" was omitted,
possibly by inadvertence from the phrase "allotted
seats for First Party." The disparity is material,
substantial, and significant since the multiplier
"[number] of additional seats allocated to the First
Party" prescribed in the Veterans formula pertains to a
multiplier of two (2) seats, while the multiplier "allotted
seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna formula can mean a multiplier of maximum
three (3) seats, since the first party can garner a
maximum of three (3) seats.
Moreover, footnote 37 of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna states that "for a discussion of how to compute
additional nominees for parties other than the first, see
Veterans x x x." It clarifies the confusion created by the
imprecise formula expressed in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna. Thus, the Court rules that the claimed Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula has not
modified the Veterans formula. As a matter of fact,
there was really no other formula approved by the
Court other than the Veterans formula in fixing the
number of additional seats for the other qualified party-
list groups. Also, in Partido ng Manggagawa v.
COMELEC, the Court found that the confusion in the
computation of additional seats for the other qualified
party-list groups arose "[from] the way the Veterans
formula was cited in the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the
Court in Ang Bagong Bayani." We reiterated that "the
prevailing formula for the computation of additional
seats for party-list winners is the formula stated in the
landmark case of Veterans x x x."17
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we
reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an
additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No.
2018 contained in the petition shows that the first party,
Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes,
that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on
the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was
proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was Court, in granting BUHAY an additional seat, meant to
entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats19 based on apply it on that specific case alone, not being a
June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the precedent––pro hac vice (for this one particular
COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula occasion); thus, this Resolution cannot be applied as a
would therefore lead us to the following result: precedent to future cases. The simplified formula
1awphi1.nét having already been abandoned, the COMELEC should
No. of have used and adhered to the Veterans formula.
additio The Court has consistently reminded the COMELEC of
nal its "function to enforce and administer all laws and
seats regulations relative to the conduct of an election." As
allocat Addition judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, the
No. of votes of COMELEC cannot just ignore or be oblivious to the
ed to al Seats
concerned party rulings issued by the Court. Basic is the rule that lower
x the = for
No. of votes of the courts and quasi-judicial tribunals must bow to the
first concerne
first party decisions and resolutions of the highest court of the
party d party
(Empha land. The COMELEC is not an exception. It cannot do
sis otherwise.
supplied WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
.) The assailed March 7, 2006 Comelec Resolution No. 06-
0248 is hereby AFFIRMED only insofar as it denied
Applying this formula, the result petitioner CIBAC’s motion for the proclamation of its
is as follows: second nominee to an additional seat under the 2004
party-list elections. The portion of Comelec Resolution
495,190 No. 06-0248, which adopted and applied the "simplified
x 2 =
1,203,305 formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec
Resolution No. 6835 promulgated 08 May 2004," is
0.82304 annulled and set aside. Respondent Comelec is ordered
0.41152493 x 2 =
986 to strictly apply the Veterans formula in determining
This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani the entitlement of qualified party-list groups to
and Bayan Muna formula which used the multiplier additional seats in the party-list system. No costs.
"allotted seats for the first party," viz: SO ORDERED.
Votes Cast G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
for ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under
Qualified the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
Additional Allotted Seats secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR
= Party x
Seats for First Party FAJARDO, petitioner,
Votes Cast
for vs.
First Party ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY GO!
GO! PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST
Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE
Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
result: JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE;
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS
Additional 495,190 ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
= x 3 = 1.2345
seats 1,203,305 FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani ORGANIZATION and others under
and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges. "Organizations/Coalitions" of Omnibus Resolution
Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS
which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain or NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION;
reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON
to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that "in order to DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY;
be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG
number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not entitled YUMABONG; and others under "Political Parties"
to an additional seat. of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
COMELEC’s application of Ang Bagong Bayani and x---------------------------------------------------------x
Bayan Muna is incorrect G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
The Court laments the fact that the COMELEC insisted BAYAN MUNA, petitioner,
in using a simplified formula when it is fully aware of vs.
the ruling in the Veterans case. The COMELEC explained COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST
that it "merely based its judgment on Comelec PEOPLE'S COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
Resolution No. 6835 which cited Supreme Court DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG
Resolution20 dated 20 November 2003 granting MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;
BUHAY’s Motion for Reconsideration and entitling it to LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG AYAW SA DROGA;
one additional seat for having garnered more than four CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE
percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI
for the party-list system, thus recognizing once again ORGANIZATION, respondents.
the simplified formula." However, in said Resolution, the PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed
not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to
become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered
to participate directly in the enactment of laws
designed to benefit them. It intends to make the
marginalized and the underrepresented not merely
passive recipients of the State's benevolence, but
active participants in the mainstream of representative
democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups,
including those which now dominate district elections,
to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list
elections would desecrate this lofty objective and
mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an
atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case
Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785 1 issued by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved
the participation of 154 organizations and parties,
including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties,
the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec
received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties.
According to the Comelec, "[v]erifications were made as
to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and
night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number
of these petitions and the observance of the legal and
procedural requirements, review of these petitions as
well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to
arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions
promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and
individual resolution on political parties. These
numerous petitions and processes observed in the
disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release
of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were
promulgated only on 10 February 2001." 2
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline
prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and
organizations filed their respective Manifestations,
stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and
organizations whose registrations were denied also filed
Motions for Reconsideration, together with
Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-
list elections. Still other registered parties filed their
Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the
Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its
assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
which we quote:
"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having
in mind that this system of proportional representation
scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance
the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral
window.
"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system'
is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered
with the Commission on Elections.
"However, in the course of our review of the matters at
bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to
keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and
coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only
those who substantially comply with the rules and
regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions." 3
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed
before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names
of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the
'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and
that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also
asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the
latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11,
2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents. 5
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the
respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the
date for hearing on April 26, 2001, 6 but subsequently
reset it to May 3, 2001. 7 During the hearing, however,
Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. 8
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec,
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This
Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated
April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period
of five days from notice. 11
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed
before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, 13 the
Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions
before it; directed respondents named in the second
Petition to file their respective Comments on or before
noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral
Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec
may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes
cast for the party-list elections, but barred the
proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders
of the Court.
Thereafter, Comments 14 on the second Petition were
received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order
given in open court, the parties were directed to submit
their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a
non-extendible period of five days. 15
Issues:
During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed
the parties to address the following issues:
"1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper
under the premises. More specifically, is there no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law?
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in
the party-list elections.
"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to
'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.
"4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785." 16
The Court's Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should
be remanded to the Comelec which will determine,
after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154
parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed
Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65
Respondents contend that the recourse of both
petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are
other plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law.17 The Office of the Solicitor
General argues that petitioners should have filed before
the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for
cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20,
21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A 18 dated
November 9, 2000. 19
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity
of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it
allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitution 20 and the Rules of Court, such challenge
may be brought before this Court in a verified petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was
promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 21
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had
filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. 22The Comelec, however, did not act on
that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections,
Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time.
Subsequent events have proven the urgency of
petitioner's action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet
formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution
may just be a formality because the Comelec, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position
on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule
that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 23 It has been
held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, "where the issue raised is
one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and
in case of urgency." 24Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with
extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the
composition of 20 percent of the House of
Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional
issues on the party-list system, which this Court must
urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to "formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules." 25
Finally, procedural requirements "may be glossed over
to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the
decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the
only adequate and speedy remedy available." 26
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is the most objectionable portion of
the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major
political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of
the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political
parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941
allow political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact,
open to all "registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations." 29
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and
RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that
they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party,
organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those
registered under the party-list system as provided in
this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions
registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of
election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30
During the deliberations in the Constitutional
Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out
that the participants in the party-list system may "be a
regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO, 31 Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao." 32 This was also clear from the following
exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas
Ople:33
"MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay
pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP,
Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list
system sa lahat ng mga partido."
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose
of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in
order to give a chance to parties that consistently place
third or fourth in congressional district elections to win
a seat in Congress. 34 He explained: "The purpose of
this is to open the system. In the past elections, we
found out that there were certain groups or parties that,
if we count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always
third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would
have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if
they would not win individually in legislative districts.
So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a
party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x
x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties." More to the point, the law defines "political
party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government and which, as the most
immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office."
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as
to the participation of political parties in the party-list
system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
"x x x
"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five
(5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the
start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not
be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x"
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major
ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list
elections does not mean, however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter --
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of
the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a
distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission
declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was
to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress.
Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly
announced: "On this first day of August 1986, we shall,
hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national
history, by giving genuine power to our people in the
legislature." 35
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not
self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases
like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by
law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the
lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was
enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-
defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their
chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature,
and shall provide the simplest scheme possible."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become
Lawmakers Themselves
The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of
promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the
election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional
representation," "marginalized and underrepresented,"
and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the
number of people in a particular district, because the
party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation
of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law;
namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim
representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party
must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section
5. 36 Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituenc[y] " refers to
the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or
territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the
"marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that
only those Filipinos who are "marginalized and
underrepresented" become members of Congress
under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine
power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x
x x, to become members of the House of
Representatives." Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express
terms. 37
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be
represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons
may register as a party, organization or coalition for
purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization
or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and
other relevant information as the COMELEC may
require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it
demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system.
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction
that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by
reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a
term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association. 38
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG
Contentions
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the
Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941
"does not limit the participation in the party-list system
to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of
society." 39 In fact, it contends that any party or group
that is not disqualified under Section 6 40 of RA 7941
may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted
during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmariñas Village could participate in the party-list
elections. 41
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We
stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain
Filipino citizens – specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties – to be elected to the House
of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the
party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized
and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory
policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of
the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar
disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park.
The interests of these two sectors are manifestly
disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast,
and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-
Kapunan 42 admitted during the Oral Argument that a
group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could
not join the party-list system as representatives of their
respective sectors. 43
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are,
numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality
is that their economic clout engenders political power
more awesome than their numerical limitation.
Traditionally, political power does not necessarily
emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it
is likely to arise more directly from the number and
amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and
underrepresented in our midst are the majority who
wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for
them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give
them not only genuine hope, but genuine power; to
give them the opportunity to be elected and to
represent the specific concerns of their constituencies;
and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and
in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense,
the party-list system truly empowers the masses and
ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites
those marginalized and underrepresented in the past –
the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even
those in the underground movement – to come out and
participate, as indeed many of them came out and
participated during the last elections. The State cannot
now disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and
desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had
not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians
and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House
of Representatives were set aside for the party-list
system. In arguing that even those sectors who
normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the
House could participate in the party-list elections for the
remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec
disregard the fundamental difference between the
congressional district elections and the party-list
elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision
was to open up the system, 44 in order to enhance the
chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain
representation in the House of Representatives through
the simplest scheme possible. 45 Logic shows that the
system has been opened to those who have never
gotten a foothold within it -- those who cannot
otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore
need the "simplest scheme possible" to do so.
Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to
those who have long been within it -- those privileged
sectors that have long dominated the congressional
district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more
vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory "open house," which by its nature allows
outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the "open
house" is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the
open party-list system is only for the "outsiders" who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise;
it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and
overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under
the party-list system would not only dilute, but also
prejudice the chance of the marginalized and
underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law
to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the
benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have
given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the
intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system
to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that
flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy
must permeate every discussion of the qualification of
political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues,
Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers
of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional
construction, however, is that the primary source from
which to ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is
the language of the provision itself. The presumption is
that the words in which the constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be
attained. 46 In other words, verba legis still prevails.
Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear
and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids
of construction and interpretation, such as the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or
Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the
true intent or purpose of the provision being
construed. 47
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice
Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary 48 that "the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be
consulted] in order to arrive at the reason and purpose
of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary
the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of
value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority
who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument
the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face.' The proper interpretation therefore depends more
on how it was understood by the people adopting it
than in the framers' understanding thereof."
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the
party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law
first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should
the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted
to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is
obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2
thereof unequivocally states that the party-list system
of electing congressional representatives was designed
to "enable underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x." The
criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is
no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not
even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the
framers' deliberations merely express their individual
opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing
the meaning and purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity
of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here.
Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be
applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that
the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of
the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems
to have ignored the facet of the party-list system
discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted
before the Court that any group, even the non-
marginalized and overrepresented, could field
candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the
Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by
this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. 49 Indeed, the function of all judicial and
quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as
they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately
pleads for the outright disqualification of the major
political parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC,
LP and PMP – on the ground that under Comelec
Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the
five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in
the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of
this, they have the "advantage of getting official
Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass,
preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that
this accreditation does not refer to the party-list
election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which
parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26
of Republic Act No. 7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances,
however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154
previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out
Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because "it is a government entity using government
resources and privileges." This Court, however, is not a
trier of facts. 51 It is not equipped to receive evidence
and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that
respondents should first be given an opportunity to
show that they qualify under the guidelines
promulgated in this Decision, before they can be
deprived of their right to participate in and be elected
under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the
case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties
and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list
elections comply with the requirements of the law. In
this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other
words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles
of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of
government and track record -- that it represents and
seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such
sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly
allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate
in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives." In other words, while they are not
disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent
the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly
situated political parties admitted as much during the
Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
"JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my
question. All I am saying is, the political party must
claim to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes."52
Third, in view of the objections53 directed against the
registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express
constitutional provision that the religious sector may
not be represented in the party-list system. The extent
of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the
following discussion during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
"MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with
nationwide and even international networks of
members and supporters, in order to circumvent this
prohibition, decides to form its own political party in
emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as
deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-
established religious faiths, will that also not fall within
this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention
is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the
Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction."54
The following discussion is also pertinent:
"MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed
"EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS," he is not, of course,
prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be
elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to
represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody
who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera."55
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious
denominations and sects shall not be
registered."56 The prohibition was explained by a
member57 of the Constitutional Commission in this
wise: "[T] he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any
prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate.
That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a
religious sect as a political party."58
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be
disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization
or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its
goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered."59
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies
a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with
election laws and regulations. These laws include
Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list
system seeks to "enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties x x x to become members of
the House of Representatives." A party or an
organization, therefore, that does not comply with this
policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct
of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the
party-list system, the party or organization must be a
group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by
citizens. It must be independent of the government. The
participation of the government or its officials in the
affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal60 and
unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the
objective of the law: to enable citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the
requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. – No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization
must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under
Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens "who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully
represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban
poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-
defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained
during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the
nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district x x x."61
Epilogue
The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of
the law: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives."
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental
social justice principle that those who have less in life
should have more in law. The party-list system is one
such tool intended to benefit those who have less in
life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine
hope and genuine power. It is a message to the
destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the
underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation
for them to come out of their limbo and seize the
opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the
submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents
that the party-list system is, without any qualification,
open to all. Such position does not only weaken the
electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut
the substance of the party-list system. Instead of
generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of
enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken
them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the
party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are
nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery
of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar
of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have
been the intention of the framers of the Constitution
and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec,
which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct
summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of
the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme
urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings
for the parties and organizations that appear to have
garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in
the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further
DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report
within 30 days from notice hereof.1âwphi1.nêt
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001,
directing the Comelec "to refrain from proclaiming any
winner" during the last party-list election, shall remain
in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied
and reported its compliance with the foregoing
disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the
Commission on Elections' receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
[G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000]
ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN
and JACQUELINE M. SERIÑO, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as
a qualification for seeking and holding elective public
office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potentials for growth and all matters vital to the
welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the
electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications
and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as
Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his
family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in
1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held
office there during his three terms as provincial
governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol
being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter
in the city during the period required by law, he could
not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" when he ran
for and was overwhelmingly voted as city
mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to
give effect to the popular mandate.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the January
18, 1999 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298, which upheld
the July 14, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Comelec First
Division. The assailed Resolutions ruled that Private
Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum
period of residence to be eligible to vote in Cagayan de
Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.
The Facts
The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the
records, are as follows.
During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran
for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of
Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as
governor of the province. In his Certificate of
Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was
declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of
Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration
Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located
in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized
city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On
March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence
for the preceding two years and five months was at
1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city
in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing,
counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998,
Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan
and Jacqueline M. Seriño, all residents of Cagayan de
Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, docketed
as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the
ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-
year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of
their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private
respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on
May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before
the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,[3] in which
they sought (1) the annulment of the election of
private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of
Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next
highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of
the city.
In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec
First Division denied the Petition for
Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the two
cases were consolidated.[4]
Ruling of the Comelec
As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the
findings and conclusions of the First Division, holding
that "[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is
an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City for such a
period of time necessary to qualify him to run for
mayor therein. This fact is clearly established by the
respondent having a house in the city which has been
existing therein since 1973 and where his family has
been living since then."
Additionally, it ruled:
"There is nothing in the law which bars an elected
provincial official from residing and/or registering as a
voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not
given the right to vote for and be elected to a position
in the province embracing such highly urbanized city
as long as he has complied with the requirements
prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.
"Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence
for the petitioners showing that the respondent was a
registered voter as of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No.
12, Barangay Poblacion, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental
bolster the petitioner's argument that the respondent
is not a resident [or a] registered voter in Cagayan de
Oro City since registration in said Precinct No. 12 does
not preclude the respondent from registering anew in
another place."
Hence, this recourse[5] before this Court.
Issues
In their Memorandum,[6] petitioners submit that
the main issue is whether the "Comelec gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the questioned Resolutions." Allegedly, the resolution
of this issue would depend on the following:[7]
"1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's
(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Cagayan
de Oro City on March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998
election;
(b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act
as governor of said province until said date; and
(c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a
resident of Misamis Oriental,
precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of
choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City
prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify
him for being a candidate for city mayor of said City.
2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing
a residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City, holding
offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol
Building located in Cagayan de Oro City and having a
house therein where [he had] stay[ed] during his
tenure as governor, and registering as a voter in said
City in June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as
against the undisputed facts above enumerated, to
constitute a change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental in favor of a new domicile of choice in
Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1) year for
purposes of qualifying him to run for city mayor in the
May 11, 1998 elections.
3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for
mayor of Cagayan de Oro City in the May 11, 1998
elections, who received the second highest number of
votes, can be declared winner, considering that
respondent Emano was disqualified to run for and hold
said office and considering that his disqualification or
ineligibility had been extensively brought to the
attention and consciousness of the voters prior to the
May 11, 1998 election as to attain notoriety,
notwithstanding which they still voted for him."
Petitioners are seeking the resolution of
essentially two questions: (1) whether private
respondent had duly established his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May
11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the
mayorship thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo
Damasing, the candidate who had received the second
highest number of votes, should be proclaimed mayor
of the city.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners
Although not raised by the parties, the legal
standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by the
Court. We note that petitioners pray, among others,
for judgment "declaring Atty. Erasmo B. Damasing as
entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor in the May
11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro City."[8] And yet,
Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition
for Certiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65" brought
before us.
Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be
brought only by (1) the solicitor general or (2) a public
prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to
the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held
or exercised by another.[9] A reading of the Rules shows
that petitioners, none of whom qualify under any of the
above three categories, are without legal standing to
bring this suit.
However, the present Petition finds its root in two
separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC 98-
298 for disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo
warranto. Under our election laws and the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to
disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law,
[10]
or to contest the election of a city officer on the
ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic.
[11]
The petitioners herein, being "duly-registered
voters" of Cagayan de Oro City, therefore satisfy the
requirement of said laws and rules.[12]
Main Issue: Residence Qualification for
Candidacy
Petitioners argue that private respondent
maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental,
not in Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the
following facts: (1) he had run and won as governor of
the province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive
terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections; (2) in
the pleadings he filed in connection with an election
protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he
had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and
prerogatives of governor until he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as
provincial governor, private respondent remained a
resident of the province. They aver that residence is a
continuing qualification that an elective official must
possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent
could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de
Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis
Oriental.
Petitioners further contend that the following were
not sufficient to constitute a change of
domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro City,
residing therein while exercising one's office as
governor (the city being the seat of government of the
province), securing a residence certificate and
registering as voter therein.
Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges
that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de
Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three
consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial
government was located at the heart of that city.[13] He
also avers that one's choice of domicile is a matter of
intention, and it is the person concerned who would be
in the best position to make a choice. In this case,
Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his
place of residence after the May 1995 elections. In
fact, in January 1997, he secured his Community Tax
Certificate at the City Treasurer's Office, stating therein
that he was a resident of 1409 San Jose Street,
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. During the general registration of voters in June
1997, he registered in one of the precincts of Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the time,
Emano had been a voter of the city for the minimum
period required by law. No one has ever challenged
this fact before any tribunal.
Private respondent contends further that his
transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him
of his position as provincial governor. First, there is no
law that prevents an elected official from transferring
residence while in office. Second, an elective official's
transfer of residence does not prevent the performance
of that official's duties, especially in private
respondent's case in which the seat of government
became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled
in Frivaldo v. Comelec,[14] the loss of any of the
required qualifications for election merely renders the
official's title or right to office open to challenge. In
Emano's case, no one challenged his right to the Office
of Provincial Governor when he transferred his
residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally, he
continued to discharge his functions as such, until he
filed his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.
Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the
people's will, as expressed in the election result, must
be respected. He is not, after all, a stranger to the city,
much less to its voters. During his three terms as
governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and actuations
have been closely interwoven with the pulse and beat
of Cagayan de Oro City.
Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially
on Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec[15] in its
Memorandum[16]which supports the assailed
Resolutions, and which has been filed in view of the
solicitor general's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Comment.[17] Thus, the poll body argues that "x x x the
fact of residence x x x ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the Constitution's residency qualification requirement."
Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials
The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is
Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991,[18] which provides for the qualifications of local
elective officials, as follows:
"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter
in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for
at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect."
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a
minimum period of residence in the area in which they
seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends
to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter from
[seeking] an elective office to serve that
community."[19]Such provision is aimed at excluding
outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral
gain."[20] Establishing residence in a community merely
to meet an election law requirement defeats the
purpose of representation: to elect through the assent
of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the
area for a given period or who have been domiciled in
the same area either by origin or by choice."[21]
Facts Showing Change of Residence
In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v.
Comelec,[22] this Court ruled that private respondent
therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of
the Third District of Cagayan, had duly proven his
change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of
the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of the
Third District in which he sought election as
congressman). He proved it with the following
facts: (1) in July 1990, he leased and lived in a
residential apartment in Magallanes Street,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2) in July 1995, he leased
another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, 1998
Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his
second wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of
Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various
letters addressed to him and his family showed that he
had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one
year immediately preceding the May 1998
elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of
much importance that in his [Aguinaldo's] certificates
of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of
1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that
he was a resident of Gattaran."[23]
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private
respondent and his family had actually been residing in
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in
a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during
the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of
Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where
the seat of the provincial government was located. In
June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same
city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts
indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident
of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to
qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover,
the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of
Emano in his choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that
Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose
voters cannot participate in the provincial
elections. Such political subdivisions and voting
restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of
parity in representation. The classification of an area
as a highly urbanized or independent component city,
for that matter, does not completely isolate its
residents, politics, commerce and other businesses
from the entire province -- and vice versa -- especially
when the city is located at the very heart of the
province itself, as in this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an
integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a
geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the
center of the province; more important, it is itself the
seat of the provincial government. As a consequence,
the provincial officials who carry out their functions in
the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less,
getting acquainted with its concerns and
interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor
of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently
residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period,
could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the
city in the last year of his third term, when he decided
to adopt it as his permanent place of residence.
Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-
Perez that "although private respondent declared in his
certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998
elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan,
the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third
District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11,
1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since
July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident of
Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that
he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it
would be convenient for him to maintain his residence
in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of the province of
Cagayan."
Similarly in the instant case, private respondent
was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro
City while discharging his duties as governor of
Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and
resided there together with his family. He even paid
his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter
therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution
and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City
and eligible to run for mayor thereof.
To petitioners' argument that Emano could not
have continued to qualify as provincial governor if he
was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we
respond that the issue before this Court is whether
Emano's residence in the city qualifies him to run for
and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have
continued sitting as governor of the province. There
was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running
the province; hence, this Court cannot make any
pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due
process prevent us from adjudging matters not
properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the
facts proven before the Comelec, we hold that he has
satisfied the residence qualification required by law for
the mayorship of the city.
We stress that the residence requirement is
rooted in the desire that officials of districts or
localities be acquainted not only with the metes and
bounds of their constituencies but, more important,
with the constituents themselves -- their needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
development, and all matters vital to their common
welfare. The requisite period would give candidates
the opportunity to be familiar with their desired
constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to
evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the
offices they seek.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal
presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de
Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to
fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate
his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very
legalistic, academic and technical approach to the
residence requirement does not satisfy this simple,
practical and common-sense rationale for the
residence requirement.
Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate
There is no question that private respondent was
the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de
Oro City. He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.
[24]
Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that
the manifest will of the people as expressed through
the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of
doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life
and spirit to the popular mandate.[25] Verily, in Frivaldo
v. Comelec,[26] the Court held:
"x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the
importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any
action involving the possibility of a reversal of the
popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote."
In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v.
Comelec[27] that "election cases involve public interest;
thus, laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections."
 Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of
popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but AND HARMONY TOWARDS
little understood legalisms."[28] EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot
be faulted with abuse, much less grave abuse, of and
discretion in upholding private respondent's election.
Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Winner on Second Placer
Petitioners, YNARES-
With the resolution of the first issue in the
positive, it is obvious that the second one posited by SANTIAGO,
petitioners has become academic and need not be
ruled upon. CARPIO,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed Comelec Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs AUSTRIA-
against petitioners. MARTINEZ,
SO ORDERED.
CORONA,
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R.
- versus - CARPIO
No. 179271
MORALES,
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
TING
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
A,
Petitioner,
CHIC

O-NAZARIO,
- versus -
VELA

SCO, JR.,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(sitting as the National Board of

NACH
Canvassers),
URA,
Respondent.

LEON
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
ARDO-
PROFESSIONALS,
DE
Intervenor.
CASTR

O,
AANGAT TAYO,
BRION
Intervenor.
,

PERAL
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
TA, and
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
BERS
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
AMIN, JJ.
CITIZENS),

Intervenor.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No.
Respondent.
179295
________
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
_______________
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - upon completion of the canvass of the party-list

-----x results, it would determine the total number of seats of

each winning party, organization, or coalition in

accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.

DECISION COMELEC[5] (Veterans).

CARPIO, J.: Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President

and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed

The Case a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and

179295.

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay

Association for National Advancement and The Facts

Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and

mandamus,[1]assails the Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 The 14 May 2007 elections included the

August 2007 by the Commission on Elections elections for the party-list representatives. The

(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties

resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the under the Party-List System.[6]

recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to

National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives

deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-

filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, 041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition

a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List because “[t]he Chairman and the Members of the

Representatives Provided by the Constitution. [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national

papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the

179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals Panganiban formula in allocating party-list

(ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations seats.”[7] There were no intervenors in BANAT’s

of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum

Citizens). on 19 July 2007.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,

Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC

Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties

Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay

certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, [3] assails Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’

NBC Resolution No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women

2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric

parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s

least two percent of the total votes cast under the Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party

Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-
 coalitions receiving at
NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for
(ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60
the party-list system
in its entirety below: shall be entitled to one
seat each: provided, that
those garnering more
WHEREAS, the Commission on than two percent (2%) of
Elections sitting en banc as National the votes shall be
Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub- entitled to additional
Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July seats in proportion to
2007, had officially canvassed, in open their total number of
and public proceedings, a total votes: provided, finally,
of fifteen million two hundred that each party,
eighty three thousand six hundred organization, or coalition
fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under shall be entitled to not
the Party-List System of more than three (3)
Representation, in connection with the seats.
National and Local Elections conducted
last 14 May 2007; WHEREAS, for the 2007
Elections, based on the above
WHEREAS, the study conducted projected total of party-list votes, the
by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of presumptive two percent (2%)
the National Board of Canvassers threshold can be pegged at three
reveals that the projected/maximum hundred thirty four thousand four
total party-list votes cannot go any hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
higher than sixteen million seven
hundred twenty three thousand WHEREAS, the Supreme Court,
one hundred twenty-one in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption
(16,723,121) votes given the (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its
following statistical data: ruling in Veterans Federation Party
versus COMELECadopting a formula for
Projected/Maximum Party- the additional seats of each party,
List Votes for May 2007 Elections organization or coalition receving more
than the required two percent (2%)
votes, stating that the same shall be
i. Total party-list votes already 15,283,659 determined only after all party-list
ballots have been completely
canvassed/tabulated canvassed;

ii. Total party-list votes WHEREAS, the parties,

organizations, and coalitions that have
remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032 thus far garnered at least three
untabulated (i.e. canvass hundred thirty four thousand four
hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes
deferred) are as follows:

iii. Maximum party-list votes

RAN PARTY/ORGANIZATI VOTES
(based on 100% outcome) from
K ON/ RECEIVED
areas not yet submitted for
COALITION
canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; 102,430
1 BUHAY 1,163,
Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
218
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,

Maximum Total Party-List 16,723,121
730
Votes

3 CIBAC 760,
WHEREAS, Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List 260
System Act) provides in part:
4 GABRIELA 610,
The parties,
organizations, and
 banc as the National Board of
451 Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to
PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to
5 APEC 538, certain conditions set forth below, the
following parties, organizations and
971 coalitions participating under the Party-
List System:
6 A TEACHER 476,

036 1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

7 AKBAYAN 470, 2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

872
3 Citizens Battle Against CIBAC

8 ALAGAD 423, Corruption

076
4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

9 BUTIL 405,
5 Association of Philippine APEC
052
Electric Cooperatives

10 COOP-NATCO 390,
6 Advocacy for Teacher A TEACHER
029
Empowerment Through

11 BATAS 386, Action, Cooperation and

361 Harmony Towards

Educational Reforms, Inc.

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,

036 7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action AKBAYAN

Party
13 ARC 338,

194 8 Alagad ALAGAD

14 ABONO 337, 9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

046
10 Cooperative-Natco Network COOP-NATCCO

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Party

Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng
Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), 11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
against which an URGENT PETITION
FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer
for the Issuance of Restraining 13 Abono ABONO
Order) has been filed before the
Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07- This is without prejudice to the
250, all the parties, organizations and proclamation of other parties,
coalitions included in the organizations, or coalitions which may
aforementioned list are therefore later on be established to have
entitled to at least one seat under the obtained at least two percent (2%) of
party-list system of representation in the total actual votes cast under the
the meantime. Party-List System.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of The total number of seats of

the powers vested in it by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code, Executive Order No. 144,
Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941,
and other election laws, the
Commission on Elections, sitting en
each winning party, organization or
coalition shall be determined pursuant
to Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of
the canvass of the party-list results.
 The proclamation of Bagong
Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Party-List Projected total
Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is
hereby deferred until final resolution of number of votes
SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render
the proceedings therein moot and 1 BUHAY 1,178,747
academic.
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
Finally, all proclamation of the
nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with 3 CIBAC 755,964
pending disputes shall likewise be held
in abeyance until final resolution of 4 GABRIELA 621,718
their respective cases.
5 APEC 622,489
Let the Clerk of the Commission
implement this Resolution, furnishing a
copy thereof to the Speaker of the 6 A TEACHER 492,369
House of Representatives of the
Philippines. 7 AKBAYAN 462,674

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in
8 ALAGAD 423,190
the original)

9 BUTIL 409,298

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the 10 COOP-NATCO 412,920

COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution 11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats
12 ARC 375,846
allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from

the COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula 13 ABONO 340,151

as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, based on the above
Report, Buhay Hayaan
Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the
highest number of votes among the
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the thirteen (13) qualified parties,
Commission on Elections sitting en organizations and coalitions, making it
banc as the National Board of the “first party” in accordance
Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) with Veterans Federation Party versus
qualified parties, organization[s] and COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle
coalitions based on the presumptive Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus
two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 COMELEC;
votes from the projected maximum
total number of party-list votes of WHEREAS, qualified parties,
16,723,121, and were thus given one organizations and coalitions
(1) guaranteed party-list seat each; participating under the party-list
system of representation that have
WHEREAS, per Report of the obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may
Tabulation Group and Supervisory be entitled to an additional seat or
Committee of the National Board of seats based on the formula prescribed
Canvassers, the projected maximum by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
total party-list votes, as of July 11,
2007, based on the votes actually WHEREAS, in determining the
canvassed, votes canvassed but not additional seats for the “first party”,
included in Report No. 29, votes the correct formula as expressed
received but uncanvassed, and in Veterans, is:
maximum votes expected for Pantar,
Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and Number of votes of first
that the projected maximum total party Proportion of votes of first
votes for the thirteen (13) qualified - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
parties, organizations and coalition[s] - = party relative to total votes
are as follows: for
Total votes for party-list
system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes APEC 1.05 1
received by the first party (without
rounding off) shall entitle it to A TEACHER 0.83 0
additional seats:

AKBAYAN 0.78 0
Proportion of votes Additional seats
ALAGAD 0.71 0
received

by the first party BUTIL 0.69 0

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

seats
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

Equal to or greater than 4% One (1) additional

ARC 0.63 0
but less than 6% seat
ABONO 0.57 0
Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of

formula, Buhay obtained the following the powers vested in it by the
percentage: Constitution, Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act
1,178,747 Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other
-------- = 0.07248 elections laws, the Commission on
or 7.2% Elections en banc sitting as the
16,261,369 National Board of Canvassers, hereby
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
which entitles it to two (2) additional proclaim the following parties,
seats. organizations or coalitions as entitled
to additional seats, to wit:
WHEREAS, in determining the
additional seats for the other qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions,
the correct formula as expressed Party List Additional Seats
in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is,
as follows: BUHAY 2

No. of
BAYAN MUNA 1
votes of
concerne
d party No. of additional CIBAC 1
Additional seats
for = ------------------- x se GABRIELA 1
ats allocated to
a concerned party No. of
APEC 1
votes of first party
first
party This is without prejudice to the
proclamation of other parties,
WHEREAS, applying the above organizations or coalitions which may
formula, the results are as follows: later on be established to have
obtained at least two per cent (2%) of
the total votes cast under the party-list
Party List Percentage Additional system to entitle them to one (1)
guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate
Seat percentage of votes to entitle them to
one (1) additional seat.
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
Finally, all proclamation of the
nominees of concerned parties,
CIBAC 1.28 1
organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held
GABRIELA 1.05 1
 in abeyance until final resolution of 2% threshold votes,
their respective cases. should be harmonized
with Section 5, Article
Let the National Board of VI of the Constitution
Canvassers Secretariat implement this and with Section 12 of
Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the same RA 7941 in
the Speaker of the House of that it should be
Representatives of the Philippines. applicable only to the
first party-list
SO ORDERED.[9] representative seats to
be allotted on the basis
of their initial/first
ranking.

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC 3. The 3-seat limit

prescribed by RA 7941
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August shall be applied; and
2007, which reads as follows: 4. Initially, all
party-list groups shall
be given the number of
seats corresponding to
This pertains to the Petition to every 2% of the votes
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List they received and the
Representatives Provided by the additional seats shall be
Constitution filed by the Barangay allocated in accordance
Association for National Advancement with Section 12 of RA
and Transparency (BANAT). 7941, that is, in
proportion to the
Acting on the foregoing Petition percentage of votes
of the Barangay Association for obtained by each party-
National Advancement and list group in relation to
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. the total nationwide
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board votes cast in the party-
of Canvassers Legal Group submitted list election, after
his comments/observations and deducting the
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 corresponding votes of
(PL)], which reads: those which were
allotted seats under the
COMMENTS / 2% threshold rule. In
OBSERVATIONS: fine, the
formula/procedure
Petitioner Barangay prescribed in the
Association for National “ALLOCATION OF
Advancement and PARTY-LIST SEATS,
Transparency (BANAT), ANNEX “A” of COMELEC
in its Petition to RESOLUTION 2847
Proclaim the Full dated 25 June 1996,
Number of Party-List shall be used for [the]
Representatives purpose of determining
Provided by the how many seats shall
Constitution prayed for be proclaimed, which
the following reliefs, to party-list groups are
wit: entitled to
representative seats
1. That the full and how many of their
number -- twenty nominees shall seat
percent (20%) -- of [sic].
Party-List
representatives as 5. In the
mandated by Section 5, alternative, to declare
Article VI of the as unconstitutional
Constitution shall be Section 11 of Republic
proclaimed. Act No. 7941 and that
the procedure in
2. Paragraph (b), allocating seats for
Section 11 of RA 7941 party-list representative
which prescribes the prescribed by Section
 12 of RA 7941 shall be
followed. the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution

and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the

RECOMMENDATION:
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during
The petition of BANAT
is now moot and the proceedings of the NBC.[11]
academic.

The Commission En Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations

Banc in NBC
Resolution No. 07- proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed
60 promulgated July 9,
2007 re “In the Matter three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
of the Canvass of Votes entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List
and Partial
Proclamation of the System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines,
Parties, Organizations
and Coalitions Inc. (AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An
Participating Under the
Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the
Party-List System
During the May 14, following party-list organizations have been proclaimed
2007 National and Local
Elections” resolved as of 19 May 2008:
among others that the
total number of seats of
each winning party,
organization or Party-List No. of Seat(s)
coalition shall be
determined pursuant to 1.1 Buhay 3
the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC 1.2 Bayan Muna 2
formula upon
completion of the 1.3 CIBAC 2
canvass of the party-
list results.”
1.4 Gabriela 2
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the National Board of 1.5 APEC 2
Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the 1.6 A Teacher 1
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to 1.7 Akbayan 1
DENY the herein petition of BANAT for
being moot and academic.
1.8 Alagad 1
Let the Supervisory Committee
implement this resolution. 1.9 Butil 1

SO ORDERED.[10] 1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1

1.11 Anak Pawis 1

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and 1.12 ARC 1

mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No.
1.13 Abono 1
07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration
1.14 AGAP 1
of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
1.15 AMIN 1

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A

Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),
stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because against which an Urgent Petition for
 principle of proportional
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and representation under
RA 7941.
Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for

the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed 2. The use of two
formulas in the allocation
before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final of additional
seats, one for the “First Party”
resolution of SPC No. 07-250. and another for the
qualifying parties, violates
Section 11(b) of
Issues RA 7941.

3. The proportional
relationships under the First
BANAT brought the following issues before this
Party Rule are different
Court: from those required under
RA 7941;

1. Is the twenty percent allocation C. Violates the “Four

for party-list Inviolable Parameters” of the
representatives provided in Philippine party-list system as
Section 5(2), Article VI of the provided for under the same case
Constitution mandatory or is it of Veterans Federation Party,
merely a ceiling? et al. v. COMELEC.

2. Is the three-seat limit provided II. Presuming that the Commission

in Section 11(b) of RA on Elections did not commit
7941 constitutional? grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
3. Is the two percent threshold jurisdiction when it implemented the
and “qualifier” votes prescribed by First-Party Rule in the allocation of
the same Section 11(b) of RA seats to qualified party-list
7941 constitutional? organizations, the same being merely
in consonance with the ruling
4. How shall the party-list in Veterans Federations Party, et al.
representatives be allocated?[16] v. COMELEC, the instant Petition
is a justiciable case as the
issues involved herein are
constitutional in nature, involving the
correct interpretation and
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other implementation of RA 7941, and are
of transcendental importance to our
hand, raised the following issues in their petition: nation.[17]

I. Respondent Commission on
Elections, acting as National Board Considering the allegations in the petitions and
of Canvassers, committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined
excess of jurisdiction when it the following issues in our advisory for the oral
promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule arguments set on 22 April 2008:
in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations as said rule:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation
A. Violates the for party-list representatives
constitutional principle of in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
proportional representa Constitution mandatory or merely
tion. a ceiling?

B. Violates the provisions of 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section

RA 7941 particularly: 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

1. The 2-4-6 3. Is the two percent threshold

Formula used by the First Party Rule prescribed in Section 11(b) of
in allocating RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
additional seats for the “First constitutional?
Party” violates the
 4. How shall the party-list
representative seats be allocated?
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
5. Does the Constitution prohibit
the major political parties
from participating in the party-list Section 5. (1) The House of
elections? If not, can the Representatives shall be composed of
major political parties be barred from not more than two hundred and fifty
participating in the party- members, unless otherwise fixed by
list elections?[18] law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
The Ruling of the Court with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of
that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
four inviolable parameters as clearly stated

in Veterans. For easy reference, these are: (2) The party-list

representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of
First, the twenty percent representatives including those under
allocation — the combined number the party-list. For three consecutive
of all party-list congressmen shall not terms after the ratification of this
exceed twenty percent of the total Constitution, one-half of the seats
membership of the House of allocated to party-list representatives
Representatives, including those shall be filled, as provided by law, by
elected under the party list; selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous
Second, the two percent cultural communities, women, youth,
threshold — only those parties and such other sectors as may be
garnering a minimum of two percent of provided by law, except the religious
the total valid votes cast for the party- sector.
list system are “qualified” to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No.

limit — each qualified party, regardless
7941 reads:
of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of
three seats; that is, one “qualifying”
and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional
representation— the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed “in proportion to
their total number of votes.”[19]
Section 11. Number of Party-
List Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number
of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under
the party-list.
xxx

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states
its mathematical interpretation of the term
that the “House of Representatives shall be composed
“proportional representation,” this Court is compelled
of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional
unless otherwise fixed by law.” The House of
seats to party-list organizations.
Representatives shall be composed of district

representatives and party-list representatives. The

Number of Party-List Representatives:
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
number of the members of the House of

Representatives.

All parties agree on the formula to determine the

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-

other hand, states the ratio of party-list List System, as well as on the formula to determine the

representatives to the total number of guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at

representatives. We compute the number of seats least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However,

available to party-list representatives from the number there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of

of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of “additional

from the first formula in Veterans, thus: seats” under the Party-List

System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,[20] and

Number of Number of seats Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent

seats available x .20 = available to in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer

to legislative party-list formula[21] as an alternative.

districts representatives
The Constitution left to Congress the
.80
determination of the manner of allocating the seats

for party-list representatives. Congress enacted

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11
the number of seats available for party-list and Section 12 of which provide:
representatives whenever a legislative district is
th Section 11. Number of Party-
created by law. Since the 14 Congress of the
List Representatives. — x x x
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are
In determining the allocation of
55 seats available to party-list representatives. seats for the second vote,[22] the
following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and

220 x .20 = 55
coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the
.80 number of votes they garnered during
the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and

After prescribing the ratio of the number of coalitions receiving at least two
party-list representatives to the total number of percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled
representatives, the Constitution left the manner to one seat each: Provided, That
those garnering more than two
of allocating the seats available to party-list percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be
Allocation of Seats for Party-List entitled to not more than three (3)
seats.
Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Section 12. Procedure in

Allocating Seats for Party-List
Percent Threshold Representatives. — The COMELEC shall
tally all the votes for the parties,
and the Three-Seat Cap organizations, or coalitions on a
 nationwide basis, rank them according
to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives The second interpretation presented by BANAT
proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
party, organization, or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
for the party-list system. (Emphasis
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No.
supplied)
7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two parties, organizations, or
coalitions on a nationwide basis;
interpretations through three formulas to allocate (b) rank them according to the
number of votes received; and,
party-list representative seats. (c) allocate party-list
representatives
proportionately according to
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the the percentage of votes obtained by
each party, organization
provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this
list system.[24]
procedure as follows:

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results:

(a) The party-list representatives
shall constitute twenty percent (20%) one is based on the proportional percentage of the
of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from votes received by each party as against the total
the party-list groups as prescribed by
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, nationwide party-list votes, and the other is “by
Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and making the votes of a party-list with a median
Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25
June 1996. Since there are 220 District percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the
Representatives in the 14thCongress,
there shall be 55 Party-List allocation of seats.”[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats
Representatives. All seats shall have
will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.
to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall

initially be allotted one (1) seat for In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
every two per centum (2%) of the total
party-list votes they obtained; Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6
provided, that no party-list groups shall formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
have more than three (3) seats
(Section 11, RA 7941). preventing all the party-list seats from being filled

(c) The remaining seats shall, after up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the
deducting the seats obtained by the
total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject
after deducting from their total the
votes corresponding to those seats, the the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list determining the qualified parties, a second percentage
groups which have not secured the is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified
maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with party by the total votes of all qualified parties
Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]
only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified

party is computed by multiplying the total party-list

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under
seats available with the second percentage. There will
BANAT’s first interpretation.
be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of 8 ALAGAD 423,149 55PBA 71,544
seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all
9 COOP- 409,883 56GRECON 62,220
the qualified parties are given their seats, a second
NATCCO
round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions,

or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked 10 BUTIL 409,160 57BTM 60,993

from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the

11 BATAS 385,810 58A SMILE 58,717
basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are
12 ARC 374,288 59NELFFI 57,872
filled up.[26]

13 ANAKPA 370,261 60AKSA 57,012

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to WIS
allocate seats for party-list representatives.
14 ABONO 339,990 61BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62BANDILA 54,751

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the

ranking of the participating parties from the highest to 16 AGAP 328,724 63AHON 54,522
the lowest based on the number of votes they
17 AN 321,503 64ASAHAN 51,722
garnered during the elections.
WARAY MO

18 YACAP 310,889 65AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66SPI 50,478

Table 1. Ranking of the participating
parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes garnered 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67BAHANDI 46,612
during the elections.[27]
21 ABS 235,086 68ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69AMANG 43,062

Votes Votes
Ra Ran
Party Garner Party Garnere 23 KABATAA 228,637 70ABAY 42,282
nk k
ed d N PARAK

1 BUHAY 1,169,2 48KALAHI 88,868 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71BABAE KA 36,512

34
25 ALIF 217,822 72SB 34,835

2 BAYAN 979,039 49APOI 79,386

26 SENIOR 213,058 73ASAP 34,098
MUNA
CITIZENS

3 CIBAC 755,686 50BP 78,541

27 AT 197,872 74PEP 33,938

4 GABRIELA621,171 51AHONBAY 78,424

28 VFP 196,266 75ABA 33,903
AN
ILONGGO

5 APEC 619,657 52BIGKIS 77,327

29 ANAD 188,521 76VENDORS 33,691

6A 490,379 53PMAP 75,200

30 BANAT 177,028 77ADD- 32,896
TEACHER
TRIBAL

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54AKAPIN 74,686

31 ANG 170,531 78ALMANA 32,255
 KASANGG seat each.” This clause guarantees a seat to the two-

A percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-

list candidates for illustration purposes. The

32 BANTAY 169,801 79AANGAT 29,130
percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived
KA
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
PILIPINO
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80AAPS 26,271 all party-list candidates.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81HAPI 25,781

Table 2. The first 20 party-list
candidates and their respective
35 TUCP 162,647 82AAWAS 22,946 percentage of votes garnered over the
total votes for the party-list.[28]
36 COCOFED 155,920 83SM 20,744

Votes
37 AGHAM 146,032 84AG 16,916
Garnere
38 ANAK 141,817 85AGING 16,729
d over
PINOY
Votes Total
Ran Guarante
39 ABANSE! 130,356 86APO 16,421 Party Garnere Votes
k ed Seat
PINAY d for

Party-
40 PM 119,054 87BIYAYANG 16,241
List, in
BUKID
%
41 AVE 110,769 88ATS 14,161
1 BUHAY 1,169,23 7.33% 1
42 SUARA 110,732 89UMDJ 9,445
4

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90BUKLOD 8,915

2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1
FILIPINA
MUNA

44 DIWA 107,021 91LYPAD 8,471

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

45 ANC 99,636 92AA- 8,406

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
KASOSYO
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
46 SANLAKA 97,375 93KASAPI 6,221
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
S

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,

900 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1

NATCCO
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
states that “parties, organizations, and coalitions

receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes 11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1

cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
 13 ANAKPAWI 370,261 2.32% 1 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two

S percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible

to achieve the maximum number of available party list

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
seats when the number of available party list seats
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two

percent threshold in the distribution of the additional

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of

Total 17 Representatives shall consist of party-list

representatives.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the

100 participants in the party list elections. A party

that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million

votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-
that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only
list candidates received at least 2% from the total
50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters,
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we
are the party-list candidates that are “entitled to one
increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
seat each,” or the guaranteed seat. In this first round
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
even if the maximum number of parties get two
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
percent of the votes for every party, it is always
7941 provides that “those garnering more than two
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
seatsin proportion to their total number of
threshold is present.
votes.” This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’

problem with the formula

in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets
proportion to their total number of votes” to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of
R.A. No. 7941.
We therefore strike down the two percent
the clause “in
threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the

Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the

We rule that, in computing the allocation
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
of additional seats, the continued operation of the
group interests in the House of Representatives.”[30]
two percent threshold for the distribution of the

additional seats as found in the second clause

of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941

 In determining the allocation of seats for party- list candidates. There are two steps in the second

list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is

the following procedure shall be observed: multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which

is the difference between the 55 maximum seats

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions reserved under the Party-List System and the 17

shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole

on the number of votes they garnered during the integer of the product of the percentage and of the

elections. remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s

share in the remaining available seats. Second, we

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in

receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes rank until all available seats are completely

cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38

guaranteed seat each. seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally,

we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number

3. Those garnering sufficient number of of seats each qualified party-list candidate is

votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled. Thus:

entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total

number of votes until all the additional seats are

allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall

be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-

In computing the additional seats, the List Seats
guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because

they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to Ra Party Votes Votes Guaran Additi (B) Applyi

every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available nk Garne Garne teed onal plus ng

seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the red red Seat Seats (C), the

maximum seats reserved under the Party List System over in three

less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are Total whol seat

disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. Votes e cap

7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. for integ

Party ers

In declaring the two percent threshold List, (First (Secon

unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of in % Round) d

additional seats in Table 3 below to the two- Round

percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each (B) )

party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the (E)

number of votes garnered by each party by (A) (C)

15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-

 (D) 17 AN 321,50 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

WARAY 3
1 BUHAY 1,169, 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

234 18 YACAP 310,88 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

9
2 BAYAN 979,03 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.

MUNA 9 19 FPJPM 300,92 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

3
3 CIBAC 755,68 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

6 20 UNI-MAD 245,38 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

2
4 GABRIEL 621,17 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

A 1 21 ABS 235,08 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

6
5 APEC 619,65 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

7 22 KAKUSA 228,99 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

9
6 A 490,37 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

Teacher 9 23 KABATA 228,63 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

AN 7
7 AKBAYA 466,11 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

N 2 24 ABA- 218,81 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

AKO 8
8 ALAGAD 423,14 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

9 25 ALIF 217,82 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

2
9[31 COOP- 409,88 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
]
NATCCO 3 26 SENIOR 213,05 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.

CITIZEN 8
10 BUTIL 409,16 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
S
0

27 AT 197,87 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,81 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
2
0

28 VFP 196,26 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

12 ARC 374,28 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
6
8

29 ANAD 188,52 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

13 ANAKPA 370,26 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
1
WIS 1

30 BANAT 177,02 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,99 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
8
0

31 ANG 170,53 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,18 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
KASANG 1
5
GA
16 AGAP 328,72 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
32 BANTAY 169,80 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
4
1
 the 50 allocated under the party
33 ABAKAD 166,74 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A. list system. x x x.

A 7 xxx

34 1-UTAK 164,98 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD. Madam

President, the candidacy for the 198
0 seats is not limited to political
parties. My question is this: Are we
35 TUCP 162,64 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A. going to classify for example Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats as
7 political parties? Can they run under
the party list concept or must they be
36 COCOFE 155,92 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. under the district legislation side of it
only?
D 0
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to
To 17 55 that query, I think these parties that
the Commissioner mentioned can field
tal candidates for the Senate as well as for
the House of
Representatives. Likewise, they can
also field sectoral candidates for
the 20 percent or 30 percent,
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as whichever is adopted, of the seats
that we are allocating under the
illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
party list system.
representatives from the 36 winning party-list
MR. MONSOD. In other words,
organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are the Christian Democrats can field
district candidates and can also
filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties participate in the party list system?
with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in
MR. VILLACORTA. Why
no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, not? When they come to the party
list system, they will be fielding
are shown in column (D). only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party- clarified on that? Can UNIDO
participate in the party list system?
List Elections
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why
not? For as long as they field
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi- candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that
party system that allowed all political parties to we shall designate in this
Constitution.
participate in the party-list elections. The
MR. MONSOD. Suppose
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly
Senator Tañada wants to run under
bear this out, thus: BAYAN group and says that he
represents the farmers, would he
qualify?
MR. MONSOD. Madam
President, I just want to say that we MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator
suggested or proposed the party list Tañada would not qualify.
system because we wanted to open up
the political system to a pluralistic MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can
society through a multiparty field candidates under the party list
system. x x x We are for opening system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
up the system, and we would like farmer. Who would pass on whether
very much for the sectors to be he is a farmer or not?
there. That is why one of the ways
to do that is to put a ceiling on the MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner
number of representatives from Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin
any single party that can sit within ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the will be attractive to many mass
party list election if they can prove organizations. In the opposition parties
that they are also organized along to which we belong, there will be a
sectoral lines. stimulus for us to contact mass
organizations so that with their
MR. MONSOD. What the participation, the policies of such
Commissioner is saying is that all parties can be radically transformed
political parties can participate because this amendment will create
because it is precisely the contention conditions that will challenge both the
of political parties that they represent mass organizations and the political
the broad base of citizens and that all parties to come together. And the
sectors are represented in party list system is certainly available,
them. Would the Commissioner agree? although it is open to all the parties. It
is understood that the parties will enter
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang in the roll of the COMELEC the names
namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO of representatives of mass
na isang political party, it will dominate organizations affiliated with them. So
the party list at mawawalang saysay that we may, in time, develop this
din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng excellent system that they have in
political parties ang party list Europe where labor organizations and
system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng cooperatives, for example, distribute
diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve themselves either in the Social
seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung Democratic Party and the Christian
titingnan natin itong 198 seats, Democratic Party in Germany, and
reserved din ito sa political parties. their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po philosophies and the leadership of
reserved iyon kasi anybody can run those parties.
there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably It is also a fact well known to all
also to Commissioner Tadeo is that that in the United States, the AFL-CIO
under this system, would UNIDO be always vote with the Democratic
banned from running under the party Party. But the businessmen, most of
list system? them, always vote with the Republican
Party, meaning that there is no reason
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I at all why political parties and mass
said, UNIDO may field sectoral organizations should not combine,
candidates. On that condition reenforce, influence and interact with
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to each other so that the very objectives
register for the party list system. that we set in this Constitution for
sectoral representation are achieved in
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire a wider, more lasting, and more
from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares institutionalized way. Therefore, I
that answer? support this [Monsod-Villacorta]
amendment. It installs sectoral
MR. TADEO. The same. representation as a constitutional gift,
but at the same time, it challenges the
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po sector to rise to the majesty of being
ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. elected representatives later on
through a party list system; and even
xxxx beyond that, to become actual political
parties capable of contesting political
MR. OPLE. x x x In my power in the wider constitutional arena
opinion, this will also create the for major political parties.
stimulus for political parties and mass
[32]
organizations to seek common xxx (Emphasis supplied)
ground. For example, we have the
PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the
reason why they should not be able to concepts put forward by the Constitutional
make common goals with mass
organizations so that the very Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
leadership of these parties can be
transformed through the participation
of mass organizations. And if this is Definition of Terms. (a) The
true of the administration parties, this party-list system is a mechanism of
will be true of others like the Partido ng proportional representation in the
Bayan which is now being election of representatives to the
formed. There is no question that they House of Representatives from
 national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations or coalitions thereof parties to participate in party-list elections through
registered with the Commission on their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
form part does not participate in the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
party-list system.
groups.[33] In defining a “party” that participates in
(b) A party means either a
political party or a sectoral party or a party-list elections as either “a political party or a
coalition of parties.
sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
(c) A political party refers to an that major political parties will participate in the party-
organized group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles and list elections. Excluding the major political parties in
policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most party-list elections is manifestly against the
immediate means of securing their
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
members as candidates for public
office. engage in socio-political engineering and judicially

It is a national party when its legislate the exclusion of major political parties from
constituency is spread over the the party-list elections in patent violation of the
geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional Constitution and the law.
party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the
provinces comprising the region.
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
(d) A sectoral party refers to an
organized group of citizens belonging that major political parties are allowed to establish, or
to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral
advocacy pertains to the special or political purposes. There should not be a problem if,
interests and concerns of their sector,
for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
(e) A sectoral organization
refers to a group of citizens or a list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
coalition of groups of citizens who
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major
share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with,
or concerns.
their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
(f) A coalition refers to an
aggrupation of duly registered national, Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to
regional, sectoral parties or participate in the party-list election, and this
organizations for political and/or
election purposes. fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk

nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat do the same for the urban poor.
cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list

elections. The qualifications of party-list nominees are

prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941

prohibits major political parties from participating in

Qualifications of Party-List
the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of Nominees. — No person shall be
the Constitution clearly intended the major political nominated as party-list representative
 unless he is a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The
resident of the Philippines for a period three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats
of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,
elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
organization which he seeks to
party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats
represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age
on the day of the election. accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

In case of a nominee of the

youth sector, he must at least be However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to
twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the political parties from participating in the party-list
age of thirty (30) during his term shall
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to
be allowed to continue until the
expiration of his term. continue disallowing major political parties from the

party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary in his separate opinion. On the formula to
that the party-list organization’s nominee “wallow in allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in
[34]
poverty, destitution and infirmity” as there is no concurring with this ponencia.
financial status required in the law. It is enough that

the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the

belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
[35]
sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No.
nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
be a senior citizen. threshold in the distribution of additional party-list

seats. The allocation of additional seats under the

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 Party-List System shall be in accordance with the
mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major
party-list representatives found in the political parties are disallowed from participating in
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section party-list elections. This Decision is immediately
5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
the members of the House of Representatives to

Congress: “The House of Representatives shall be SO ORDERED.

composed of not more than two hundred and fifty [G.R. No. 157870, November 03, 2008]

members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.” The SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), PETITIONER, VS.
20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than RESPONDENTS.
20% of the members of the House of
[G.R. No. 158633]
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the

continued existence of a provision in the law which will ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE
systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 161658]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., PETITIONER, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as
follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result
as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory
test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug
testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary
schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x
x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices.—Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained
in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall
be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office
with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed
or elected both in the national or local government
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this
Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs
use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of
this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office in connection with the May
10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The
pertinent portions of the said resolution read as
follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the
national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo
mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of
candidates they are electing and they will be assured
that only those who can serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would
be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the
authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA]
9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following
rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.—All candidates for public
office, both national and local, in the May 10,
2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the
Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates
filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices
and employees concerned shall submit to the Law
Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The
first list shall consist of those candidates who complied
with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall
consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates.—Before the start of the campaign period,
the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates
who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug
test and file drug test certificate.—No person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and
filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2
hereof the drug test certificate herein required.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the
Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10,
2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3,
Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day
of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able
to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of
the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes
a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC,
by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first
be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements
of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec.
36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when
they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to
harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable.
And for a third, a person's constitutional right against
unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v.
Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and
taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and
(g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the
right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases
at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners
SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA
assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident
amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights
mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with abona fide controversy
which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.[3]
But even with the presence of an actual case or
controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish
that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.[5]
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of
procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as
senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May
10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing
since he has substantial interests in the subject matter
of the petition, among other preliminary
considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court
is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily
to the transcendental importance and the paramount
public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36
of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet
the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken
the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or
enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.[9]
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they
may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power
in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of
the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments acting
under delegated authority, the powers of each of the
departments x x x are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against
which the waves of legislative enactment may dash,
but over which it cannot leap.[10]
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense
that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the
power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.
[11]
The substantive constitutional limitations are
chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes.
If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen
in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by
the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec.
3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to
be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-
condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for
senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to
be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as
senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the
chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed,
therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership
in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before
or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume
office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test
imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to
nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may
be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is
optional. But the particular section of the law, without
exception, made drug-testing on those covered
mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for
not adhering to the statutory command. And since the
provision deals with candidates for public office, it
stands to reason that the adverse consequence
adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure
jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover
only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the
candidates running in that electoral event.
Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on
its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that
the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as
senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g]
of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f)
of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students
and public and private employees, while mandatory, is
a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in
the process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the
policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved
via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and
unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of
dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of
planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-
drug abuse policies, programs and projects."[14] The
primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as
those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of
this random testing are not necessarily treated as
criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal
liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on
this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.—A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of
this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x
for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall
bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order
that the applicant be examined for drug dependency.
If the examination x x x results in the certification that
the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be
ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x
x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under
the Voluntary Submission Program.—A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program,
who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be
exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of
this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most
vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive
effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the
young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and
are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery
is also at a depressingly low rate.[15]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in
this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution.
But while the right to privacy has long come into its
own, this case appears to be the first time that the
validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through
the medium of mandatory random drug testing among
students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made
the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of
persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug
testing among school children, we turn to the
teachings of VernoniaSchool District 47J v.
Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),
[18]
both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided
cases involving the constitutionality of governmental
search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon
wanted to address the drug menace in their respective
institutions following the discovery of frequent drug
use by school athletes. After consultation with the
parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing
for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school
student, was denied participation in the football
program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis
drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the
school's drug testing policy violated,inter alia, the
Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the
issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1)
schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2)
school children, while not shedding their constitutional
rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3)
athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes
since the former observe communal undress before
and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports
activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves
to a higher degree of school supervision and
regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade
a student's privacy since a student need not undress
for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for
the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of
illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held
that the policy constituted reasonable search under the
Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the
random drug-testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a
school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for
high school students desiring to join extra-curricular
activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir,
marching band, and academic team declined to
undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing
policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the
Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike
athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-
athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the
constitutionality of drug testing even among non-
athletes on the basis of the school's custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court
made no distinction between a non-athlete and an
athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in
place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of
safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding
that the school could implement its random drug-
testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a
kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might
need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the
above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult,
and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and
well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court
is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is
within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies.
To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-
being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and
school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug
testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is
not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population, doubtless
a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia,
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the
Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact
that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited
not just upon the users, but upon the entire student
body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against
the idea that the testing aims to incriminate
unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes
in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that
"subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"[23] has failed
to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful
and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2
of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Laserna's lament is
just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does
not merit serious consideration. Consider what he
wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of
Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school
and the workplaces. The US courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy
and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25]
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from
intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as
to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities.
[27]
And while there has been general agreement as to
the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract
prohibition against `unreasonable searches and
seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.[28]
Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
public and defers to the state's exercise of police
power.[29]
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion.[30] And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government-mandated
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against
the promotion of some compelling state interest.[31] In
the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing
of probable cause to be personally determined by a
judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for
employees—and students for that matter—under RA
9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing
what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal
disciplinary procedures," the probable-cause standard
is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may,
the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,
intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as
the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness
of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy
interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed
by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and
efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation
in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;
and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has
been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of
the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople
v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search
"narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?[32]
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For
one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place
them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone
when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what,
in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the
employees concerned shall be subjected to "random
drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in
the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that
the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e.,
the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless
to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of
the results. But the more important consideration lies
in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody.[33]In addition, the IRR issued
by the DOH provides that access to the drug results
shall be on the "need to know" basis;[34] that the "drug
test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential
subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results."[35] Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to
the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy,
under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test
results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to
stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium,
among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test.[36] To the Court, the
need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug
use is substantial enough to override the individual's
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can
consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture,
or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market,
would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal
and immoral components of any of such activities.
The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial
law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The
state can no longer assume a laid back stance with
respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug
enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random
drug test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private offices,
the threat of detection by random testing being higher
than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen
method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the
problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth
in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct
of the random testing, we hold that the challenged
drug test requirement is, under the limited context of
the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants,
who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of
power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not
so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to
schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
and officers/employees of public/private offices should
be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall
undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the
testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing
shall take into account the company's work rules. In
either case, the random procedure shall be observed,
meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test
shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And
in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the
DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR
necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing
scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug
tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a
quiet area in the constitutional landscape.[39] In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as
here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c],
[d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting
their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and
one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in
the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled
before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy.[40] To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art.
III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the
petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 asUNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY
GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633
by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies
are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No
costs
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA
T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of
the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003)[1] suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual
and material legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and
lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the
instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the
present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, “An Act Providing for A
System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds
Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” appropriates funds
under Section 29 thereof which provides that a
supplemental budget on the General Appropriations
Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide
for the necessary amount to carry out its
provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have
the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional
statute.[2] The Court has held that they may assail the
validity of a law appropriating public funds[3] because
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State
for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.[4]
The challenged provision of law involves a public
right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court
has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases
whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly
presented an issue of transcendental significance to
the Filipino people. This has been explicitly
pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,[5] where the
Court held:
Objections to taxpayers’ suit for lack of sufficient
personality standing, or interest are, however, in the
main procedural matters. Considering the importance
to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with
the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them, the Court has
brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has
taken cognizance of these petitions.[6]
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside
procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage
of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition
which may appear to be visited by the vice of
prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in
any tribunal, board or before a government official
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, dims in light of the importance of the
constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner. In Tañada vs. Angara,[7] the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains
to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld.” Once a “controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.”
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino
people, it has been expressed that it is illogical to await
the adverse consequences of the law in order to
consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial
resolution.[8] In yet another case, the Court said that:
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court
when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not
hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this
conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution
and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe
its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives
and political considerations are irrelevancies that
cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as
ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power
of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not
hesitate “to make the hammer fall heavily,” where the
acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the
people’s will as expressed in the Constitution . . .[9]
The need to consider the constitutional issues
raised before the Court is further buttressed by the fact
that it is now more than fifteen years since the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress
to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy
demand that the Court resolves the instant
petition[10] and determine whether Congress has acted
within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely
abused the discretion entrusted to it.[11]
The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189
allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other
countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law
empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and
party list representatives including the
President and the Vice-President violate the
constitutional mandate under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-
President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created
in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise
the power to review, revise, amend, and
approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission on
Elections shall promulgate without violating
the independence of the COMELEC under
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189
violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?
Section 5(d) provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be
disqualified from voting under this Act:
... ... ...
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for
the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she
shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be
cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place where he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner
cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals[12] to support his claim. In that case, the Court
held that a “green card” holder immigrant to the
United States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution does not allow provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise;
[13]
that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the
right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which
in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence
requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. [14] He
claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted
to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting
on this issue.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the
Solicitor General filed his comment for all public
respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional
challenge to Section 5(d) must fail because of the
absence of clear and unmistakable showing that said
provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution. He
stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional;
by the doctrine of separation of powers, a department
of government owes a becoming respect for the acts of
the other two departments; all laws are presumed to
have adhered to constitutional limitations; the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just
law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is
a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. Thus, he cites Co vs.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives[16] wherein the Court held that the
term “residence” has been understood to be
synonymous with “domicile” under both
Constitutions. He further argues that a person can
have only one “domicile” but he can have two
residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the
other temporary;[17] and that the definition and
meaning given to the term residence likewise applies
to absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC[18] which reiterates the Court’s ruling
inFaypon vs. Quirino,[19] the Solicitor General maintains
that Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent
residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned
their Philippine domicile.[20]
Taking issue with the petitioner’s contention that
“green card” holders are considered to have
abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor
General suggests that the Court may have to discard
its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[21] in so far as it
relates to immigrants and permanent residents in
foreign countries who have executed and submitted
their affidavits conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A.
No. 9189. He maintains that through the execution of
the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the Philippines
with the concurrence of the President of the Republic
had in fact given these immigrants and permanent
residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article
V of the Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact
never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that
indubitably, they would have formally and categorically
expressed the requisite intentions, i.e., “animus
manendi” and “animus revertendi;” that Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents abroad possess
the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution
upon approval of their registration, conformably with
R.A. No. 9189.[22]
 The seed of the present controversy is the
interpretation that is given to the phrase, “qualified
citizens of the Philippines abroad” as it appears in R.A.
No. 9189, to wit:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the prime duty of
the State to provide a system of honest and orderly
overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot. Towards this end, the State
ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of
the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this
fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act:
a) “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by
which qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad, exercise their right to vote;
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
f) “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of
the Philippines who is qualified to register and
vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law,
who is abroad on the day of elections. (Emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines
abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by
law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of
elections, may vote for president, vice-president,
senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis
supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the
Constitution which read:
SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. No
literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well
as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
... ... . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically
provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1) all
citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise
disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age,
(4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the
election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of
those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or
permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country unless he/she executes an affidavit
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three years from approval of his/her registration under
said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act
of execution of an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos
abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to
vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the
provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to
provide a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A.
No. 9189 may indeed give the impression that it
contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents overseas
are perceived as having left and abandoned the
Philippines to live permanently in their host countries
and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising
those who do not possess the residency requirement of
the Constitution by the mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intent to return to the
Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration of
unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more
apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.[23] Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be
constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional
limitations. The responsibility of upholding the
Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the
legislature as well. The question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the legislative
department of the government itself.[24]
Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be
overcome convincingly:
. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy
of that law to the Constitution must be clear and
unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the
attainment of some public good, no infringement of
constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law
there must be a clear showing that what the
fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute
allows it to be done.[25]
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise
overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court to
take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both
the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in
constitutional construction that the Constitution should
be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,
[26]
the Court held that a constitutional provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its
terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all
other provisions of that great document. Constitutional
provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by
express statement or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest.[27] The intent of the
Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language
of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the
Court may consider the intent of its framers through
their debates in the constitutional convention.[28]
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the
mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of
the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system
for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be
stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in
enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of
restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly
exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The
Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is
necessary to dwell first on the significance of absentee
voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively
new. It is viewed thus:
The method of absentee voting has been said to be
completely separable and distinct from the regular
system of voting, and to be a new and different
manner of voting from that previously known, and an
exception to the customary and usual manner of
voting. The right of absentee and disabled voters to
cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory;
absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized
at, the common law.
Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and
economic conditions devised to accommodate those
engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it
impracticable for them to attend their polling places on
the day of election, and the privilege of absentee
voting may flow from constitutional provisions or
be conferred by statutes, existing in some jurisdictions,
which provide in varying terms for the casting and
reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other
qualified voters absent on election day from the district
or precinct of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege
and not a right, or an absolute right. When the
legislature chooses to grant the right by statute,
it must operate with equality among all the class
to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature
may be limited in their application to particular
types of elections. The statutes should be
construed in the light of any constitutional
provisions affecting registration and
elections, and with due regard to their texts prior to
amendment and to predecessor statutes and the
decisions thereunder; they should also be
construed in the light of the circumstances
under which they were enacted; and so as to carry
out the objects thereof, if this can be done without
doing violence to their provisions and mandates.
Further, in passing on statutes regulating
absentee voting, the court should look to the
whole and every part of the election laws, the
intent of the entire plan, and reasons and spirit
of their adoption, and try to give effect to every
portion thereof.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice
versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee.[30] However, under our
election laws and the countless pronouncements of the
Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered synonymous withdomicile.
In Romualdez-Marcos,[31] the Court enunciated:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their
place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic, this
court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction
between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the
purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It
is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have
different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile
in favor of another domicile of choice. InUytengsu vs.
Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
“There is a difference between domicile and
residence. ‘Residence’ is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; ‘domicile’
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for
the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any
means necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.”
For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged
is the fact that residence for election purposes is
used synonymously with domicile.[32] (Emphasis
supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an
overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the
framers of the Constitution considered the
circumstances that impelled them to require Congress
to establish a system for overseas absentee voting,
thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear
whether the right of suffrage, which here has a
residential restriction, is not denied to citizens
temporarily residing or working abroad. Based on the
statistics of several government agencies, there ought
to be about two million such Filipinos at this time.
Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that
these provisions are really lifted from the two previous
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of
the last paragraph. They could not therefore have
foreseen at that time the phenomenon now described
as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about
600,000 contract workers and employees, and
although the major portions of these expatriate
communities of workers are to be found in the Middle
East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies, the
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon
Felipe, said that there was no insuperable obstacle to
making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos
overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino
citizenship notwithstanding strong temptations are
exposed to embrace a more convenient foreign
citizenship. And those who on their own or under
pressure of economic necessity here, find that they
have to detach themselves from their families to work
in other countries with definite tenures of employment.
Many of them are on contract employment for one,
two, or three years. They have no intention of changing
their residence on a permanent basis, but are
technically disqualified from exercising the right of
suffrage in their countries of destination by the
residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months preceding the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper
time they might entertain an amendment that will
make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for
Filipino citizens an effective, rather than merely a
nominal right under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider
that. But more than just saying that, I would like to
make a comment on the meaning of “residence” in the
Constitution because I think it is a concept that has
been discussed in various decisions of the Supreme
Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a
1954 case which dealt precisely with the meaning of
“residence” in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for
greener pastures, as the saying goes, to improve his
lot and that, of course, includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, reengaging in
business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to
return to his native town, to cast his ballot, but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other
reason, he may not absent himself from the place of
his professional or business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the
qualifications to be one, and is not willing to give up or
lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to
run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has
not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment
or loss of such residence of origin.
In other words, “residence” in this provision refers to
two residence qualifications: “residence” in the
Philippines and “residence” in the place where he will
vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is
concerned, the word “residence” means domicile, but
as far as residence in the place where he will actually
cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be
different. He could have a domicile somewhere else
and yet he is a resident of a place for six months and
he is allowed to vote there. So that there may be
serious constitutional obstacles to absentee
voting, unless the vote of the person who is
absent is a vote which will be considered as cast
in the place of his domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million
Filipinos who should enjoy the right of suffrage, at least
a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino
communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that
when this Article of the Constitution explicitly and
unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to
Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of
global proportions. In effect, this will require
budgetary and administrative commitments on the
part of the Philippine government, mainly through the
COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this
mechanism that will be put in place to make effective
the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in
some wise jurisprudence of the past may not be
sufficient to meet the demands of the right of
suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have
mentioned. But I want to thank the Committee for
saying that an amendment to this effect may be
entertained at the proper time. . . . ... ...
[33]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized
the fact that while millions of Filipinos reside abroad
principally for economic reasons and hence they
contribute in no small measure to the economic uplift
of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the
choice of this country’s leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under
the laws then existing and considering the novelty of
the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction,
vesting overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would
spawn constitutional problems especially because the
Constitution itself provides for the residency
requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire
from Commissioner Monsod if the term “absentee
voting” also includes transient voting; meaning, those
who are, let us say, studying in Manila need not go
back to their places of registration, for instance, in
Mindanao, to cast their votes.
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee
voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot
go back to the places where they are registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there
are provisions for allowing students and military people
who are temporarily in another place to register and
vote. I believe that those situations can be covered by
the Omnibus Election Code. The reason we want
absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a
mandate to the legislature is that there could be
inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a
question of legislation by Congress. So, by
allowing it and saying that this is possible, then
legislation can take care of the rest.[34] (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into
being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of
the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely
to avoid any problems that could impede the
implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest
number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines that the Constitutional Commission
explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for
overseas absentee voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission
on the effect of the residency requirement prescribed
by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the
proposed system of absentee voting for qualified
Filipinos abroad is enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a
clarification. There are certain qualifications for the
exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where they propose to vote for at least six months
preceding the elections. What is the effect of these
mandatory requirements on the matter of the exercise
of the right of suffrage by the absentee voters like
Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to
answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given
by Commissioner Bernas, that the domicile
requirements as well as the qualifications and
disqualifications would be the same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to
devise the system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem
raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is
clarified.
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified
with regard to the residence requirement or the place
where they vote in practice; the understanding is that
it is flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of
Naga or domiciled therein, but he satisfies the
requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to
vote in Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest
to the Committee to change the word “Filipinos” to
QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of “VOTING BY
FILIPINOS ABROAD,” it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO
VOTERS. If the Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS
LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy the
requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod
say?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept
the phrase “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD” because
“QUALIFIED” would assume that he has the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee
accept?
FR. BERNAS. “QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD”?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the
amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is
recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked
me to read my proposed amendment, I specifically
stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a
system which will enable qualified citizens, temporarily
absent from the Philippines, to vote. According to
Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase
“absentee voting” already took that into account as its
meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens
temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to
say that with respect to registration we will leave it up
to the legislative assembly, for example, to require
where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the
diplomatic corps who may be continuously abroad for a
long time, perhaps, there can be a system of
registration in the embassies. However, we do not like
to preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner
Monsod’s amendment is only to provide a system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here
that he wants new qualifications for these absentee
voters.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which
they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.
[35]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission is to entrust to Congress the responsibility
of devising a system of absentee voting. The
qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall
remain except for the residency requirement. This is in
fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission
opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with
respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress
should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod,
by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to
Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the
“qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
vote.” In fine-tuning the provision on absentee voting,
the Constitutional Commission discussed how the
system should work:
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want
to state for the record that in the case of qualified
Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their
right of suffrage, they can cast their votes for the
candidates in the place where they were registered to
vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any
complications, for example, if they are registered in
Angeles City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga
City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in
Angeles City, then he can vote only for the local and
national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to
make that clear for the record.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner
Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note
on the statement of Commissioner
Suarez that this envisions Filipinos
residing abroad. The understanding in
the amendment is that the Filipino is
temporarily abroad. He may not be
actually residing abroad; he may just be
there on a business trip. It just so
happens that the day before the
elections he has to fly to the United
States, so he could not cast his vote. He
is temporarily abroad, but not residing
there. He stays in a hotel for two days
and comes back. This is not limited
only to Filipinos temporarily
residing abroad. But as long as he is
temporarily abroad on the date of
the elections, then he can fall within
the prescription of Congress in that
situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for
his further clarification. Precisely, we
need this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify
what we mean by “temporarily
abroad,” it need not be on very
short trips. One can be abroad on a
treaty traders visa. Therefore, when we
talk about registration, it is possible that
his residence is in Angeles and he would
be able to vote for the candidates in
 Angeles, but Congress or the
Assembly may provide the
procedure for registration, like
listing one’s name, in a registry list
in the embassy abroad. That is still
possible under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one
clarification if Commissioner Monsod
agrees with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a
diplomatic officer who reaches the
voting age while living abroad and he
has never registered here. Where will he
register? Will he be a registered voter of
a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the
system will enable that child to comply
with the registration requirements in an
embassy in the United States and his
name is then entered in the official
registration book in Angeles City, for
instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a
registered voter of Los Angeles, but a
registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have
to come home to the Philippines to
comply with the registration procedure
here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come
home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor
Leader wishes to inquire if there are
more clarifications needed from the
body.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that
there are no more registered Commissioners to
propose amendments. So I move that we close the
period of amendments.
[36]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from these discussions of the members
of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and
consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the
Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after
the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory
construction, which may be applied in construing
constitutional provisions,[37] the strategic location of
Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission
provided for an exception to the actual residency
requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified
Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect
declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they
do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1,
Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an
exception to the residency requirement found in
Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of
debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A.
No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor,
thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill
should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the
sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute
that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution
entitled, “Suffrage.” It says:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who
are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says,
“who shall have resided in the
Philippines.” They are permanent
immigrants. They have changed
residence so they are barred under the
Constitution. This is why I asked
whether this committee amendment
which in fact does not alter the original
text of the bill will have any effect on
this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr.
President. And this has been asked in
various fora. This is in compliance with
the Constitution. One, the interpretation
here of “residence” is synonymous with
“domicile.”
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President,
“domicile” is the intent to return to one’s
home. And the fact that a Filipino
may have been physically absent
from the Philippines and may be
physically a resident of the United
States, for example, but has a clear
intent to return to the Philippines,
will make him qualified as a
resident of the Philippines under
this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the
constitutional mandate that we – that
Congress – must provide a franchise to
overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the
suffrage principle literally as
demanding physical presence, then
there is no way we can provide for
offshore voting to our
offshorekababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the
Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article
V, it reads: “The Congress shall provide a
system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.”
The key to this whole exercise, Mr.
President, is “qualified.” In other
words, anything that we may do or
say in granting our compatriots
abroad must be anchored on the
proposition that they are qualified.
Absent the qualification, they
cannot vote. And “residents” (sic) is
a qualification.
 I will lose votes here from permanent
residents so-called “green-card holders”,
but the Constitution is the
Constitution. We cannot compromise on
this. The Senate cannot be a party to
something that would affect or impair
the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says – “In the
place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding
the election.”
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for
office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where
Senator Cayetano lives. We are
separated only by a creek. But one who
votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros
unless he resides in Pateros for six
months. That is how restrictive our
Constitution is. I am not talking even
about the Election Code. I am talking
about the Constitution.
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want
to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so.
But he must do so, make the transfer six
months before the election, otherwise,
he is not qualified to vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I
think we have a fundamental difference
here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise,
Mr. President. But it is a point already
well-debated even in the constitutional
commission of 1986. And the reason
Section 2 of Article V was placed
immediately after the six-
month/one-year residency
requirement is to demonstrate
unmistakably that Section 2 which
authorizes absentee voting is an
exception to the six-month/one-year
residency requirement. That is the
first principle, Mr. President, that one
must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that
under our jurisprudence – and I think this
is so well-entrenched that one need not
argue about it – “residency” has been
interpreted as synonymous with
“domicile.”
But the third more practical reason, Mr.
President, is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman,
then it is legally and constitutionally
impossible to give a franchise to
vote to overseas Filipinos who do
not physically live in the country,
which is quite ridiculous because
that is exactly the whole point of
this exercise – to enfranchise them
and empower them to vote.
[38]
(Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides
for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines
abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at
least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of
elections, may vote for president, vice-president,
senators and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the
Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which
enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be
disqualified from voting under this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in
accordance with Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their
Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance
to a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in
a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year, including those who have committed and been
found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137
of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having
been removed by plenary pardon or
amnesty: Provided, however, That any person
disqualified to vote under this subsection shall
automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration
of five (5) years after service of
sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may
take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign
courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and
subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by
the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for
the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she
shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant
or permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously
declared insane or incompetent by competent
authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the
Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service
establishments concerned, unless such competent
authority subsequently certifies that such person is no
longer insane or incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A.
No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is
“recognized as such in the host country” because
immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his
country of origin. However, same Section allows an
immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register
as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to
show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in
pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in
Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law” must be
entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that
Congress must establish a system for absentee voting;
for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the
Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to
establish a system for absentee voting.
 Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution
of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d)
is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or
permanent resident to go back and resume residency
in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as
an explicit expression that he had not in fact
abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct
to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
“provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise.”
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants
and permanent residents abroad because by their
status in their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this country;
thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate
proceedings discloses another reason why the Senate
required the execution of said affidavit. It wanted the
affiant to exercise the option to return or to express his
intention to return to his domicile of origin and not to
preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.
It states that: “For Filipino immigrants and
those who have acquired permanent
resident status abroad,” a requirement
for the registration is the submission of
“a Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return
duly sworn before any Philippine
embassy or consulate official authorized
to administer oath…”
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of
this provision? Is the purpose of this
Sworn Declaration to include only those
who have the intention of returning to be
qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant
has no purpose of returning? Is he
automatically disbarred from exercising
this right to suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this,
Mr. President, is that we want to be
expansive and all-inclusive in this
law. That as long as he is a Filipino,
no matter whether he is a green-
card holder in the U.S. or not, he
will be authorized to vote. But if he
is already a green-card holder, that
means he has acquired permanent
residency in the United States, then
he must indicate an intention to
return. This is what makes for the
definition of “domicile.” And to
acquire the vote, we thought that we
would require the immigrants and the
green-card holders . . . Mr. President, the
three administration senators are
leaving, maybe we may ask for a
vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr.
President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back
to the business at hand. The rationale
for the requirement that an immigrant or
a green-card holder should file an
affidavit that he will go back to the
Philippines is that, if he is already an
immigrant or a green-card holder, that
means he may not return to the country
any more and that contradicts the
definition of “domicile” under the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr.
President, is really provide the
choice to the voter. The voter, after
consulting his lawyer or after
deliberation within the family, may
decide “No, I think we are risking our
permanent status in the United States if
we file an affidavit that we want to go
back.” But we want to give him the
opportunity to make that decision.
We do not want to make that
decision for him. [39] (Emphasis
supplied)
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court
of Appeals that green card holders are disqualified to
run for any elective office finds no application to the
present case because the Caasi case did not, for
obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of
Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents
in their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they may still be considered
as a “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” upon
fulfillment of the requirements of registration under the
new law for the purpose of exercising their right of
suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not
only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three years from approval of his/her
registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare
that they have not applied for citizenship in another
country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines;
otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the
removal” of their names “from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.”
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration
by which a Filipino voter permanently residing abroad
who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine
citizenship and who has not actually abandoned his/her
intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the
Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the
Philippine embassy, consulate or other foreign service
establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over
the country where he/she has indicated his/her address
for purposes of the elections, while providing for
safeguards to a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.
–
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad
whose application for registration has been approved,
including those previously registered under Republic
Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with
the officer of the embassy, consulate or other foreign
service establishment authorized by the Commission, a
sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed
by the Commission. The authorized officer of such
embassy, consulate or other foreign service
establishment shall transmit to the Commission the
said application to vote within five (5) days from
receipt thereof. The application form shall be
accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with
the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter
certificate of registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be
done personally at, or by mail to, the embassy,
consulate or foreign service establishment, which has
jurisdiction over the country where he/she has
indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in
connection with the overseas absentee voting
processes shall be made available at no cost to the
overseas absentee voter.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d)
circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the
law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting
in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a
system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the
country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are
components of the system of overseas absentee voting
established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino
abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have
retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. His having become an
immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his
intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given
the opportunity to express that he has not actually
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing
the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the
law.
Petitioner’s speculative apprehension that the
implementation of Section 5(d) would affect the
credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is
important is to ensure that all those who possess the
qualifications to vote on the date of the election are
given the opportunity and permitted to freely do
so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign
Affairs have enough resources and talents to ensure
the integrity and credibility of any election conducted
pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad
would renege on his undertaking to return to the
Philippines, the penalty of perpetual
disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would
suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with
his/her undertaking under the affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of
“immigrants” renege on their promise to return, the
result of the elections would be affected and could
even be a ground to contest the proclamation of the
winning candidates and cause further confusion and
doubt on the integrity of the results of the
election. Indeed, the probability that after an
immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he shall opt
to remain in his host country beyond the third year
from the execution of the affidavit, is not
farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to
determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise. As
expressed in Tañada vs. Tuvera,[40] the Court is not
called upon to rule on the wisdom of the law or to
repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability
and in fact, it has addressed the expected
problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence
which is that the Filipino who fails to return as
promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under
Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter
fail to vote for two consecutive national elections, his
name may be ordered removed from the National
Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised
would be: what happens to the votes cast by the
qualified voters abroad who were not able to return
within three years as promised? What is the effect on
the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of the
winning candidates? The votes cast by qualified
Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three years
shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to
vote on the date of the elections, but their failure to
return shall be cause for the removal of the names of
the immigrants or permanent residents from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and their
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the
Constitution, the Court does not find Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in
relation to Section 4 of the same Act in
contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the
overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. –
... ... ...
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of
the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome
of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the
fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in
a particular country or countries, if the holding of
elections therein has been rendered impossible by
events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such
country or countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of
the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5
of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order
the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the following
provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the
Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law,
canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall
be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall
have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.
...
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes
and proclaim the winning candidates for president and
vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision
must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to
mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning
Senators and party-list representatives but not the
President and Vice-President.[41]
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the
matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning
candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation
of the winning candidates for the presidency and the
vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be
repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the
authority given to Congress by the Constitution to
proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of
the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the
canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of
Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail,
or any other means of transmission equally safe and
reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements
of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that the returns of every
election for President and Vice-President shall be
certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to
usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as
aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power
of Congress to canvass the votes for president and
vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.” The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should
be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and
the proclamation of the winning candidates for
president and vice-president for the entire nation must
remain in the hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in
violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A.
No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall
be independent, are the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No.
9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC
which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control
of either the executive or legislative departments of
government; that only the COMELEC itself can
promulgate rules and regulations which may be
changed or revised only by the majority of its
members; and that should the rules promulgated by
the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has
the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent
COMELEC submitted its Comment. It agrees with the
petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent
COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of
said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution providing for the independence of the
constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. It
asserts that its power to formulate rules and
regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.
[42]
where this Court held that the power of the
COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit
in its power to implement regulations under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C[43] of the Constitution. COMELEC
joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent
constitutional body, it may not be subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and
that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and
only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another
provision, vis-à-vis its rule-making power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. –
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission
shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three
(3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by
mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-
developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established
identification system that would preclude multiple or
proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of
mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other
foreign service establishments concerned are adequate
and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be
allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
... ... . . . (Emphasis supplied)
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1,
Article IX-A mandating the independence of
constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his
prefatory statement that the constitutional challenge
must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections
19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the
ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the
Constitution on Legislative Department that would as
much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to
enforce and administer election laws with the
COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius est
exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare
tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of
Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of
all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that
Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section 17.1 are
unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged
on this question raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound
on the role of Congress through the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis-à-vis the
independence of the COMELEC, as a constitutional
body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:
SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – A
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby
created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators
designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman
of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven
(7) members to be designated by each House of
Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and
the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
shall have the power to monitor and evaluate
the implementation of this Act. It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate
Rules. – The Commission shall issue the necessary
rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by
virtue of this Act for prior approval.
... ... . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is
no question that the authority of Congress to “monitor
and evaluate the implementation” of R.A. No. 9189 is
geared towards possible amendments or revision of
the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its
legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation
functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following
functions: (a) to “review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations” (IRR)
promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19];
and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section
17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
countries for the May 2004 elections and in any
country determined by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of
the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section
1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that
constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall
be “independent.”
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935
Constitution providing that there shall be
an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that
“[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of
the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the
other departments of the Government.”[44] In an earlier
case, the Court elucidated:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It
is intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its
functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions
that would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. The Commission may err, so
may this court also. It should be allowed considerable
latitude in devising means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the great objective for which it
was created – free, orderly and honest elections. We
may not agree fully with its choice of means, but
unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross
abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions
must be dealt with realistically – not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on
Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its
contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge
derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position
to decide complex political questions.
[45]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has no general powers of supervision
over COMELEC which is an independent body “except
those specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is,
to review its decisions, orders and rulings.[46] In the
same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its
recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress
has empowered the COMELEC to “issue the necessary
rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty days from the
effectivity of this Act.” This provision of law follows the
usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to
implement a law – the legislature grants an
administrative agency the authority to craft the rules
and regulations implementing the law it has enacted,
in recognition of the administrative expertise of that
agency in its particular field of operation.[47] Once a
law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative
function may spring back to Congress relative to the
same law only if that body deems it proper to review,
amend and revise the law, but certainly not to
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the
COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve,
review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond
the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress
trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to
withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a
provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of
Section 19 stating that “[t]he Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue
of this Act for prior approval,” and the second sentence
of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that “[i]t
shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Commission,” whereby Congress, in both
provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not
specifically vested by the Constitution, should be
stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional
infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate
on the independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, “subject to the approval of
the Congressional Oversight Committee” in the first
sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the
Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more
than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and
the phrase, “only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee” found in the
second paragraph of the same section are
unconstitutional as they require review and approval of
voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the
authority to approve or disapprove the countries
wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined
by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided
for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. [48] Otherwise,
Congress would overstep the bounds of its
constitutional mandate and intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the
Court agreed to adopt the separate opinion of Justice
Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the
unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A.
No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of and
the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly
GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the
first paragraph of Section 17.1, to
wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee;”
b) The portion of the last paragraph of
Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;”
c) The second sentence of the first
paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The
Implementing Rules and Regulations
shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval;” and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of
Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of
the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution mandating the independence of
constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No.
9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority
given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives but not as to the power to canvass the
votes and proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President which is lodged with
Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest
of the provisions of said law continues to be in full
force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
“Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a
Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and
infidels, but at the same time bend with the refreshing
winds of change necessitated by unfolding events.”[1]
The deliberations on this case have been blessed
with extensive and exhaustive discussions by the
justices. The ponencia itself as well as the separate,
the concurring and the dissenting opinions ably written
by my esteemed colleagues scrutinized its many
aspects and ramifications. Their thoroughness and
scholarship helped distill the issues and enabled the
Court to arrive at an informed judgment.
It is quite clear that there is unanimity of opinion
in declaring unconstitutional those portions of RA 9189
(1) granting Congress oversight powers over the
Comelec Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR);
and (2) giving Comelec authority to proclaim
presidential and vice-presidential winners -- a power
expressly lodged in Congress by the Constitution.
Obviously, however, there is diversity of opinion
on the question of whether Filipinos, who have become
permanent foreign residents, may be allowed to vote
after executing an affidavit showing an intent to reside
in the Philippines within three years therefrom.
I will no longer belabor the penetrating legal pros
and contras discussed by the justices in connection
with this important issue. Let me just add one more
point in favor of the constitutionality of the
aforementioned provision in Section 5(d) of RA 9189.
[2]
It is a point that is borne, not of strict legalese, but
of practical common sense that even lay persons will
understand.[3] The Information Age has shrunk the
world, enabled Filipinos abroad to keep abreast with
current events in our country, and thus empowered
them to be able to vote wisely for our national leaders.
Qualifications
of Voters
Let me start my explanation of my position by
recalling that our Constitution[4] requires voters to
possess, on the day of the election, a minimum of
three qualities or attributes relating to (1) citizenship,
(2) age and (3) residence. In addition, our fundamental
law says that the citizen must “not otherwise be
disqualified by law” from voting.
On the first, only those who owe allegiance to a
country have the right to select its leaders and
determine its destiny. This is a worldwide
phenomenon. Thus, only Filipinos may vote in the
Philippines; aliens cannot. By the same token, only
Americans may vote in America,[5] and only Indians
may vote in India.[6]
The second qualification, age, assures that only
those who have reached the natural mental maturity
are enfranchised to choose independently and
sensibly. Hence, only those who have reached 18, the
age of majority, are allowed to vote; only those
capacitated by the law to enter into binding obligations
and contracts[7] are allowed to elect the persons who
would make and execute the law.
On the third, residence of at least one year in the
Philippines -- of which six months must be in the place
where the ballot is cast -- is required of voters. In our
case today, this residence requirement is the crux or
centerpoint. I respectfully submit that to understand
how to interpret this qualification in relation to the
Overseas Absentee Voting Law, it is necessary to
inquire into the reason for requiring it as a condition
for suffrage. Why does the Constitution insist on
residence as a prerequisite to voting?
Reason for
Residence Requirement
I believe that, traditionally, the law requires
residence[8] because presence in a certain locality
enables a person to know the needs and the problems
of that area. Equally important, it also makes one
become acquainted with the candidates -- their
qualifications, suitability for a particular office and
platform of government.
Thus, the fundamental law requires, not just that
there be a minimum of one-year residence in the
country, but also that six months of that period be
spent in the place where the ballot is to be cast. Such
detailed requirement will hopefully give the voters
sufficient knowledge about a specific town as to help
them choose its local officials wisely, quite apart from
understanding enough of the entire country so as to
prepare them to vote sagaciously for national leaders.
The Supreme Court had occasions to discuss this
common-sense reason for the residence requirement,
in this wise:
“We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in
the desire that officials of districts or localities be
acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their
constituencies but, more important, with the
constituents themselves – their needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and development,
and all matters vital to their common welfare. The
requisite period would give candidates the opportunity
to be familiar with their desired constituencies, and
likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former’s
qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.”[9]
“[T]he purpose of the residency requirement [is] to
ensure that the person elected is familiar with the
needs and problems of his constituency[.]”[10]
Although the foregoing discussions were used to
justify the residence requirement vis-à-
vis candidates for elective public offices, I believe that
their rationale can easily and analogically fit the needs
of voters as well.
The Essence
of My Opinion
The defining essence of my position is this: in the
midst of the now available e-age communications
facilities, actual presence in the Philippines is no longer
indispensible to make discerning Filipinos know the
problems of their country and to decide who among
candidates for national positions deserve their
mandate.
Indeed, the Information Age has given overseas
Filipinos convenient means to inform themselves of our
country’s needs, as well as of the suitability of
candidates for national offices. After all, many of them
live abroad, not because they want to abandon their
land of birth, but because they have been constrained
to do so by economic, professional, livelihood and
other pressing pursuits. Ineluctably, they remit their
hard-earned money to help their relatives here and
their country as a whole.
Verily, their easy access to Philippine mass media
keep them constantly aware of happenings in their
native country. National dailies and other periodicals
are sold regularly in Filipino enclaves in foreign
shores. Several local and community publications in
these areas cater mainly to Filipino expatriates,
publishing news and opinions not only about their alien
neighborhoods, but also quite extensively about their
homeland.[11]
So, too, Philippine news and magazine-type
broadcasts are available to overseas Filipinos on a
daily basis over cable television, giving them the
feeling and the intellectual status of being
home. Interactive TV talk shows are now routinely
participated in via long distance phones and cell phone
text messages by people everywhere. Even more
conveniently available are the websites of major
dailies. Whatever news and views they print locally are
instantly accessible everywhere on earth via the
Internet.
Truly, the e-age has opened windows to the
Philippines in a pervasive and thorough manner, such
that actual presence in the country is no longer needed
to make an intelligent assessment of whom to vote for
as our national leaders.
I make this emphasis on national officials, because
the Absentee Voting Law allows overseas voting only
for President, Vice President, senators and party-list
representatives.[12]This distinction is important,
because the information available through websites
and other modern media outlets is addressed mainly to
national concerns.
To insist that only those who can demonstrate
actual physical residence in the country for one year --
or only those who have complied with the more
difficult-to-understand concept of domicile -- would be
entitled to vote would be to cling adamantly and
unreasonably to a literal interpretation of the
Constitution without regard for its more liberating spirit
or rationale. Such insistence would result in rendering
inutile any meaningful effort to accord suffrage to
Filipinos abroad.[13] Such proposition would make
the constitutional interpretation anachronous in the face
of the refreshing and pulsating realities of the world. In
my view, it would be thoroughly unreasonable to expect
foreign-based Filipinos to come back here for one year
every three years and abandon their jobs just to be able
to comply literally with the residential requirement of
suffrage.
On the other hand, the advances of science and
technology -- especially in the fields of
computerization, miniaturization, digitization, satellite
communications and fiber optics -- has so expanded
the capabilities of our brothers and sisters abroad as to
enable them to understand our national needs, without
having to sit back and stay here for one continuous
year. They are now able to help us bridge those needs,
not only by remitting their hard-earned currency, but
also by assisting locally based Filipinos to choose
national leaders who will steer the country in the
perilous new paths of development and peace.
Conclusion
In sum, I respectfully submit that physical
presence in the country is no longer indispensible to
arm Filipinos abroad with sufficient information to
enable them to vote intelligently. The advent of the
Information Age and the globalization of knowledge
have empowered them to know enough about the
Philippines to enable them to choose our national
officials prudently and, in the process, to have a
significant voice in the governance of the country they
love and cherish.
I maintain that the constitutional provision on
voter residence -- like every other law -- must be
interpreted “not by the letter that killeth but by the
spirit that giveth life.” As heralded by the quotation
from Tañada v. Angara, cited at the opening of this
Opinion, our Constitution should be construed so it
may “bend with the refreshing winds of change
necessitated by unfolding events.”
Finally, may I stress that when the reason for the
law is accomplished, then the law itself is
fulfilled. Since the law requiring residence is
accomplished by the globalization of information, then
the law itself is fulfilled. It is time to empower our
overseas brothers and sisters to participate more
actively in nation building by allowing them to help
elect our national leaders.
WHEREFORE, I vote to uphold the
constitutionality of Section 5 (d) of RA 9189. I also
vote to declare as unconstitutional portions of Section
18.5 thereof insofar as they authorize Comelec to
proclaim presidential and vice-presidential winners;
and of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 insofar as they subject
to congressional oversight, review and approval the
implementation of voting by mail and the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Comelec.
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of
Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD
SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary,
House of representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M.
Fernando for petitioner.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected
Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections.
He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and
thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights
and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the
Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was
scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the
Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded
petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67,
Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As reported by
the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a
communication from the Commission
on Elections which states that the
Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of
the Second District of Lanao del Sur
filed a certificate of candidacy for the
regional elections in Muslim Mindanao
on February 17, 1990. The House
Secretariat, performing an
administrative act, did not include the
name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in
the Rolls pursuant to the provision of
the Election Code, Article IX, Section
67, which states: Any elective official
whether national or local running for
any office other than the one which he
is holding in a permanent capacity
except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso factoresigned
from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.' The
word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words
and Phrases as by the very act itself –
by the mere act. And therefore, by the
very act of the (sic) filing his certificate
of candidacy, the Honorable Ali
Dimaporo removed himself from the
Rolls of the House of Representatives;
and, therefore, his name has not been
carried in today's Roll and will not be
carried in the future Rolls of the House.
...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections,
petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and
addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his
intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." The record
does not indicate what action was taken on this
communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed
in his bid to regain his seat in Congress since this
petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed
on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping
of his name from the Roll, petitioner was excluded from
all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he
was not paid the emoluments due his office; his staff
was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites
were occupied by other persons. In effect, he was
virtually barred and excluded from performing his
duties and from exercising his rights and privileges as
the duly elected and qualified congressman from his
district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of
Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did
not thereby lose his seat as congressman because
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative
under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto,
and therefore not applicable to the present members
of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that
the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the
incumbency of said members may be shortened, are
provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII
thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials first
elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The
Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election." On
the other hand, the grounds by which such term may
be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of
his seat by holding any other office or
employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or
subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a
disciplinary action for disorderly
behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as
determined by resolution of the
Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary
renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it
provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of
office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
For if it were the intention of the framers to include the
provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as
among the means by which the term of a Congressman
may be shortened, it would have been a very simple
matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution.
They did not do so. On the contrary, the Constitutional
Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously
found in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and
deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by
respondents in excluding him from the Roll of Members
is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner
consequently concludes that respondents acted
without authority. He further maintains that
respondents' so-called "administrative act" of striking
out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as
Congressman. Neither can it be justified as an
interpretation of the Constitutional provision on
voluntary renunciation of office as only the courts may
interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be
said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a
congressman holds another office or employment that
forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is
not equivalent to holding another office or
employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly
elected member of the House of Representatives be
recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the
following issues raised in this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P.
BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE
PRESENT CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER
AND/OR THE RESPONDENT
SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE
ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY
PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING
HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN,
AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS
AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of
the Solicitor General contend that Section 67, Article IX
of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present
Constitution, as the voluntary act of resignation
contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term
"voluntary renunciation" of office enunciated in par. 2,
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the
ground provided in Section 67 is not included in the
Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds
mentioned therein are not exclusive. There are, in
addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office
of Members of Congress, among which are resignation,
death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty
of disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a
Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which
estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed
to be aware of existing laws. They further maintain that
their questioned "administrative act" is a mere
ministerial act which did not involve any encroachment
on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or
local running for any office other than
the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for
President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of
Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or
city official running for an office, other
than the one for which he has been
lastly elected, shall be considered
resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180
reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office.
— Any elective provincial, municipal or
city official running for an office, other
than the one which he is actually
holding, shall be considered
resigned from office from the moment
of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on
local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective
office. — Any elective provincial, sub-
provincial, city, municipal or municipal
district officer running for an office
other than the one which he is holding
in a permanent capacity shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath
of office on the day his term of office
commences, or within ten days after
his proclamation if said proclamation
takes place after such day. His failure
to take his oath of office as herein
provided shall be considered forfeiture
of his right to the new office to which
 he has been elected unless his failure
is for a cause or causes beyond his
control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political
offices. — Governors, mayors,
members of various sanggunians, or
barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a
certificate of candidacy, be considered
on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are
members of the legislature included in the
enumeration of elective public officials who are to be
considered resigned from office from the moment of
the filing of their certificates of candidacy for another
office, except for President and Vice-President. The
advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article
IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the rationale of this
inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election
Code, Your Honor, in
the 1971 Election
Code, the provision
seems to be different
— I think this is in
Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial,
sub-provincial, city,
municipal or municipal
district officer running
for an office other than
the one which he is
holding in a permanent
capacity shall be
considered ipso
facto resigned from his
office from the moment
of the filing of his
certificate of
candidacy.
May I know, Your
Honor, what is the
reason of the
Committee in departing
or changing these
provisions of Section 24
of the old Election Code
and just adopting it en
toto? Why do we have
to change it? What
could possibly be the
reason behind it, or the
rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for
this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind
repeating it. The purpose is that the
people must be given the right to
choose any official who belongs to, let
us say, to the Batasan if he wants to
run for another office. However,
because of the practice in the past
where members of the legislature ran
for local offices, but did not assume the
office, because of that spectacle the
impression is that these officials were
just trifling with the mandate of the
people. They have already obtained a
mandate to be a member of the
legislature, and they want to run for
mayor or for governor and yet when
the people give them that mandate,
they do not comply with that latter
mandate, but still preferred (sic) to
remain in the earlier mandate. So we
believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's
latest mandate must be the one that
will be given due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the
query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the
constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the
Committee, we made this proposal
based on constitutional grounds. We
did not propose this amendment
mainly on the rationale as stated by
the Gentlemen from Manila that the
officials running for office other than
the ones they are holding will be
considered resignednot because of
abuse of facilities of power or the use
of office facilities but primarily because
under our Constitution, we have this
new chapter on accountability of public
officers. Now, this was not in the 1935
Constitution. It states that (sic) Article
XIII, Section 1— Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain accountable
to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this
new provision on accountability of
public officers? This only means that all
elective public officials should honor
the mandate they have gotten from
the people. Thus, under our
Constitution, it says that: 'Members of
the Batasan shall serve for the term of
6 years, in the case of local officials
and 6 years in the case of barangay
officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have
precisely included this as part of the
Omnibus Election Code because a
Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself
out with the people and seek (sic) their
support and mandate should not be
allowed to deviate or allow himself to
run for any other position unless he
relinquishes or abandons his office.
Because his mandate to the people is
to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a
Batasan or a governor or a mayor who
was mandated to serve for 6 years to
file for an office other than the one he
was elected to, then, that clearly
shows that he has not (sic) intention to
service the mandate of the people
which was placed upon him and
therefore he should be considered ipso
facto resigned. I think more than
anything that is the accountability that
 the Constitution requires of elective
public officials. It is not because of the
use or abuse of powers or facilities of
his office, but it is because of the
Constitution itself which I said under
the 1973 Constitution called and
inserted this new chapter on
accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere
filing is not the intention to run. Now,
what is it for? If a Batasan Member files
the certificate of candidacy, that
means that he does not want to serve,
otherwise, why should he file for an
office other than the one he was
elected to? The mere fact therefore of
filing a certificate should be considered
the overt act of abandoning or
relinquishing his mandate to the
people and that he should therefore
resign if he wants to seek another
position which he feels he could be of
better service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with
the statements of the Gentleman from
Manila because the basis of this
Section 62 is the constitutional
provision not only of the fact that
Members of the Batasan and local
officials should serve the entire 6-year
term for which we were elected, but
because of this new chapter on the
accountability of public officers not
only to the community which voted him
to office, but primarily because under
this commentary on accountability of
public officers, the elective public
officers must serve their principal, the
people, not their own personal
ambition. And that is the reason, Mr.
Speaker, why we opted to propose
Section 62 where candidates or
elective public officers holding offices
other than the one to which they were
elected, should be considered ipso
factoresigned from their office upon
the filing of the certificate of
candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis
for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 remains
written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of
Article XI on "Accountability of Public Officers" is more
emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the
questioned statutory provision is no longer operative
does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather
than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that
such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public
office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making
it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they
cannot go back to their former position. This is
consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and
not trifle with the mandate which they have received
from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration
cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress,
petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of
office. As succinctly distinguished by the Solicitor
General:
The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature (22
R.C.L.), but the period during which an
officer actually holds the office (tenure)
may be affected by circumstances
within or beyond the power of said
officer. Tenure may be shorter than the
term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration
of the term of office (see Topacio
Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective
official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and
his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired
portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a
mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides
that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such
constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the
four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution
by which the tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened are not exclusive. As held in the case
of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring
about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all
others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from
prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in
the constitution or statutes are merely conditions the
occurrence of any one of which the office shall become
vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect
of any one of the events. And would it not be
preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die
and cut his tenure because death is not one of the
grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers
of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of
legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional
measure is presumed to be created. This Court has
enunciated the presumption in favor of
constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-
founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not
to be applied with the same rigor in construing a
constitution as a statute and only those things
expressed in such positive affirmative terms as plainly
imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be
considered as inhibiting the power of legislature. The
maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a
constitutional command. This maxim expresses a rule
of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering
legislative intent where such intent is not otherwise
manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of
office under Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is
broad enough to include the situation envisioned in
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. As discussed by
the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory
question to the Committee? The term
'voluntary renunciation' does not only
appear in Section 3; it appears in
Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the
constitution. Could the Committee
please enlighten us exactly what
'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this
akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other
words, he cannot circumvent the
restriction by merely resigning at any
given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term
voluntary renunciation is more general
than abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy for
another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of
voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently
being held is evident from this exchange between then
Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will
make the person ... my, shall we say,
basis is that in one case the person is
intending to run for an office which is
different from his own, and therefore it
should be considered, at least from the
legal significance, an intention to
relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes ...
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same
position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are
you going to compel a person to quit
an office which he is only intending to
leave? A relinquishment of office must
be clear, must be definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker,
what I'm saying that while I do not
disagree with the conclusion that the
intention cannot be enough, but I am
saying that the filing of the certificate
of candidacy is an over act of such
intention. It's not just an intention; it's
already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving
Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court
categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic
and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only
the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and
nothing save a new election or appointment can
restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to
remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Castro vs.
Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly
indicates that only the date of filing of
the certificate of candidacy should be
taken into account. The law does not
make the forfeiture dependent upon
future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable, since the vacating is
expressly made as of the moment of
the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. ...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for
another office produces automatically the permanent
forfeiture of the elective position being presently held,
it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other
position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of
voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2
of Article VI of the Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for
another office having been spelled out in Section 67,
Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory
interpretation was indulged in by respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of Representatives in
excluding petitioner's name from the Roll of Members.
The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of
Representatives and he exercises administrative
powers and functions attached to his office. As
administrative officers, both the Speaker and House
Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was
their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll
considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article
IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on Elections
communicated to the House of Representatives that
petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for
regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents
had no choice but to abide by the clear and
unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of
B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on
the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have
not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers
of the government from the highest to the lowest are
creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a
public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder
thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as
the law may impose and he cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 140335. December 13, 2000]
THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon.
CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. FLORES
and EMMANUEL M.
DALMAN, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is a special civil action of certiorari
seeking to annul and set aside two “decisions” of the
Commission on Audit ruling that petitioner’s term of
office as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on
February 02, 1999, as set forth in her appointment
paper.
The Facts
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines
appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad
interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She
assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath
of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on
Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed
the appointment. We quote verbatim her
appointment paper:
“ Commissioner for five years, and another
11 June 1993
“Madam:
“Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws,
you are hereby appointed, ad interim,
COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, for
a term expiring February 2, 1999.
“By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter
upon the performance of the duties of the office,
furnishing this Office and the Civil Service
Commission with copies of your oath of office.”[1]
However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought
clarification from the Office of the President as to the
expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her
request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a
letter dated April 07, 1998[2] opined that petitioner’s
term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not
on February 02, 1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner
remained in office after February 02, 1999. On
February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de
Leon, wrote the Commission on Audit requesting
opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their
salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their
appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel,
Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that “the term
of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02,
1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with
the constitutional intent.”[3]
Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance
No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries
and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-
terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999.[4]
On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the
disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. On
June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued
Decision No. 99-090 dismissing petitioner’s
appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the
propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of
petitioner’s term of office may be properly addressed
by mere reference to her appointment paper which set
the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an
extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President.[5]
In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration;
however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit
denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129.[6]
Hence, this petition.[7]
The Issue
The basic issue raised is whether the term of
office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner,
Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed
on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02,
2000, as claimed by her.
The Court’s Ruling
The term of office of the Chairman and members
of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the
1987 Constitution, as follows:
“Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners
shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no
case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.”[8]
The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system
of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the
Civil Service Commission. The provision on the 1973
Constitution reads:
“x x x The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be
appointed by the Prime Minister for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of the Commissioners
first appointed, one shall hold office for seven years,
another for five years, and the third for three
years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for
the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor.”[9]
Actually, this was a copy of the Constitutional
prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of a
rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman
and members of the Commission on Elections. The
Constitutional amendment creating an independent
Commission on Elections provides as follows:
“Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other
Members to be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall
hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first
appointed, one shall hold office for nine years, another
for six years, and the third for three years. The
Chairman and the other Members of the Commission
on Elections may be removed from office only by
impeachment in the manner provided in this
Constitution."[10]
In Republic vs. Imperial,[11] we said that “the
operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1)
that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners
should start on a common date, and, (2) that any
vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before
the expiration of the term should only be filled only for
the unexpired balance of the term.”[12]
Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions
under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common
date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of
appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in
order that the expiration of the first terms of seven,
five and three years should lead to the regular
recurrence of the two-year interval between the
expiration of the terms.[13]
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at
bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the
terms of office of the first appointees to the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987
Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a
belated appointment or qualification, the interval
between the start of the term and the actual
qualification of the appointee must be counted against
the latter.[14]
In the law of public officers, there is a settled
distinction between “term” and “tenure.” “[T]he term
of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of
the incumbent. The term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-
over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.”[15]
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper
starting point of the terms of office of the first
appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a
staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain
language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C),
Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the
1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-
year term of office for Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first
appointees terms of seven, five and three years,
without re-appointment. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. There is no need to expressly state the
beginning of the term of office as this is understood to
coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its
ratification (on February 02, 1987).
On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory
Provisions, 1987 Constitution provides:
“SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one
year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless
they are sooner removed for cause or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or
appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case shall
any Member serve longer than seven years including
service before the ratification of this Constitution.”[16]
What the above quoted Transitory Provisions
contemplate is “tenure” not “term” of the incumbent
Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, who “shall continue in office for
one year after the ratification of this Constitution,
unless they are sooner removed for cause or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or
appointed to a new term thereunder.” The term
“unless” imports an exception to the general rule.
[17]
Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the
incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions
shall continue in office for one year after the
ratification of this Constitution under their existing
appointments at the discretion of the appointing
power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their
removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or
(3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of
which events may occur before the end of the one year
period after the effectivity of the Constitution.
However, the transitory provisions do not affect
the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a
seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first
appointees under this Constitution.
At the time of the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, the incumbent Chairman and members of
the Civil Service Commission were the following: (1)
Chairperson Celerina G. Gotladera. She was initially
appointed as OIC Chairman on March 19, 1986, and
appointed chairman on December 24, 1986, which she
assumed on March 13, 1987. (2) Atty. Cirilo G.
Montejo. On June 25, 1986, President Corazon C.
Aquino appointed him Commissioner, without any
term. He assumed office on July 9, 1986, and served
until March 31, 1987, when he filed a certificate of
candidacy for the position of Congressman, 2nd District,
Leyte, thereby vacating his position as
Commissioner. His tenure was automatically cut-off by
the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (3) Atty. Mario
D. Yango. On January 22, 1985, President Ferdinand E.
Marcos appointed him Commissioner for a term
expiring January 25, 1990. He served until February 2,
1988, when his term ended in virtue of the transitory
provisions referred to. On May 30, 1988, President
Aquino re-appointed him to a new three-year term and
served until May 31, 1991, exceeding his lawful term,
but not exceeding the maximum of seven years,
including service before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Under this factual milieu, it was only
Commissioner Yango who was extended a new term
under the 1987 Constitution. The period consumed
between the start of the term on February 02, 1987,
and his actual assumption on May 30, 1988, due to his
belated appointment, must be counted against him.
Given the foregoing common starting point, we
compute the terms of the first appointees and their
successors to the Civil Service Commission under the
1987 Constitution by their respective lines, as follows:
First line : Chairman – seven-year term. February
02, 1987 to February 01, 1994. On January 30, 1988,
the President nominated Ms. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
Chairman, Civil Service Commission. On March 02,
1988, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the Civil Service Commission. On December 04, 1991, the
nomination. She assumed office on March 04, Commission on Appointments confirmed the
1988. Her term ended on February 02, 1994. She nomination. He assumed office on December 12, 1991,
served as de facto Chairman until March 04, 1995. On for a term expiring February 02, 1997.[21]
March 05, 1995, the President appointed then Social Commendably, he voluntarily retired on February
Welfare Secretary Corazon Alma G. de Leon, Chairman, 02, 1997. On February 03, 1997, President Fidel V.
Civil Service Commission, to a regular seven-year Ramos appointed Atty. Jose F. Erestain, Jr.
term. This term must be deemed to start on February Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term
02, 1994, immediately succeeding her predecessor, expiring February 02, 2004. He assumed office on
whose term started on the common date of the terms February 11, 1997.
of office of the first appointees under the 1987 Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy every
Constitution. She assumed office on March 22, 1995, two (2) years, namely, February 02, 1994, for the first
for a term expiring February 02, 2001. Chairman,[22] February 02, 1992, for the first five-year
This is shown in her appointment paper, quoted term Commissioner,[23] and February 02, 1990, for the
verbatim as follows: first three-year term Commissioner.[24] Their successors
“ must also maintain the two year interval, namely:
March 5, 1995 February 02, 2001, for Chairman;[25] February 02, 1999,
“Madam: for Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February
“Pursuant to the provisions of Article VII, 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereñeta, Jr.
Section 16, paragraph 2, of the Constitution, you The third batch of appointees would then be
are hereby appointed, ad interim, CHAIRMAN, having terms of office as follows:
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, for a term expiring First line : Chairman, February 02, 2001 to
February 2, 2001. February 02, 2008;
“By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter Second line: Commissioner, February 02, 1999 to
upon the performance of the duties of the office, February 02, 2006;[26] and, Third line: Commissioner,
furnishing this Office and the Civil Service February 02, 1997 to February 02, 2004,[27] thereby
Commission with copies of your oath of office. consistently maintaining the two-year interval.
“(Sgd.) FIDEL V. The line of succession, terms of office and tenure
RAMOS” of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Second line : Commissioner – Five-year Commission may be outlined as follows:[28]
term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1992. On Chairman Term
January 30, 1988, the President nominated Atty. Samilo Tenure
N. Barlongay Commissioner, Civil Service (7-year original)
Commission. On February 17, 1988, the Commission Sto. Tomas – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987
on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines, to Mar. 04, 1988 to
confirmed the nomination. He assumed office on Feb. 02,
March 04, 1988. His term ended on February 02, 1994 March 08, 1995
1992. He served as de facto Commissioner until March De Leon – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1994
04, 1993. to March 22, 1995 to
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. (incumbent) Feb. 02,
Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service 2001 Feb. 02, 2001
Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. _______ - 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 2001 to
[18]
This terminal date is specified in her appointment Feb. 02, 2008
paper. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on 2nd Member Term
Appointments confirmed the appointment. She Tenure
accepted the appointment and assumed office on June (5-year original)
22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the Barlongay – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987
appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, to March 04, 1988 to
1999. In this connection, the letter dated April 07, Feb. 02,
1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. 1992 March 04, 1993
Corona[19] clarifying that her term would expire on Gaminde – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1992
February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to June 11, 1993 to
to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination Feb. 02,
for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the 1999 Feb. 02, 2000
term of her successor[20] must be deemed to start on Valmores – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1999
February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006. to Sept. 08, 2000 to
Third line : Commissioner – Three-year (incumbent) Feb. 02,
term. February 02, 1987 to February 02, 1990. Atty. 2006 Feb. 02, 2006
Mario D. Yango was incumbent commissioner at the 3rd Member Term
time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. His Tenure
extended tenure ended on February 02, 1988. In May, (3-year original)
1988, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him Yango - 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission to a new to May 30, 1988 to
three-year term thereunder. He assumed office on Feb. 02,
May 30, 1988. His term ended on February 02, 1990, 1990 May 31, 1991
but served as de facto Commissioner until May 31, Ereñeta – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1990
1991. On November 26, 1991, the President to Dec. 12, 1991 to
nominated Atty. Ramon P. Ereñeta as Commissioner,
 Feb. 02,
1997 Feb. 02, 1997
Erestain, Jr. – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1997 to Feb.
11, 1997 to
(incumbent) Feb. 02,
2004 Feb. 02, 2004
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office
of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, under an appointment extended
to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993,
expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served
as de facto officer in good faith until February 02,
2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other
emoluments for actual service
rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit
erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other
emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.
ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the
Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the
salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P.
Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure
as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until
February 02, 2000.
This decision shall be effective immediately.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C.
MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO
and SENATOR GREGORIO B.
HONASAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside
Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
(“Resolution No. 01-005”) and Resolution No. NBC 01-
006 dated 20 July 2001 (“Resolution No. 01-006”) of
respondent Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”).
Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates
elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while
Resolution No. 01-006 declared “official and final” the
ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution
No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in
January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(“Senator Guingona”) as Vice-President. Congress
confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who
took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingona’s confirmation, the
Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
(“Resolution No. 84”) certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election
to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on
14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election.
[1]
Resolution No. 84 further provided that the
“Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,”
which ends on 30 June 2004.[2]
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed
the election results from all the provinces but one
(Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-
005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the
elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided
that “the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a
term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th)
Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)
years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was
appointed Vice-President.”[3] Respondents Ralph Recto
(“Recto”) and Gregorio Honasan (“Honasan”) ranked
12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and
Arturo Mojica (“petitioners”), as voters and taxpayers,
filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading
only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to
enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the
candidate for Senator receiving the 13 th highest
number of votes as the winner in the special election
for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly,
petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No.
01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such
effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1)
it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be
filled in the special election as required under Section 2
of Republic Act No. 6645 (“R.A. No. 6645”);[4] (2) it
failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in
their certificates of candidacy whether they seek
election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881;[5] and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify
in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates
seeking election under the special or regular senatorial
elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 (“R.A. No.
6646”).[6] Petitioners add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for
the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections
without distinction such that “there were no two
separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just
a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of
term.”[7]
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held
simultaneously, a special and a regular election must
be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. To support their claim,
petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously
held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951
and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by
Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia,
respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their
tenures in the Senate.[8] Petitioners point out that in
those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the
votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under
the regular elections from the votes cast for the
candidates running under the special
elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the
winners in each of those elections.[9]
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary
restraining order during the pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required
COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed
the results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution
No. 01-006 declaring “official and final” the ranking of
the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July
2001.
 In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006,
the Court required petitioners to file an amended
petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional
respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended
petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised
in their original petition and, in addition, sought the
nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto
all claim that a special election to fill the seat vacated
by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May
2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary
issues on the mootness of the petition and on
petitioners’ standing to litigate. Honasan also claims
that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his
proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo
warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the
same for lack of jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the
12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party
to this case because the petition only involves the
validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in the 14
May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for
resolution:
(1) Procedurally –
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo
warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill
a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held
on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Court’s
Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one
to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise
of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his
claim is not well-founded.[10] Under Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the
instant petition shows, however, that what petitioners
are questioning is the validity of the special election on
14 May 2001 in which Honasan was
elected. Petitioners’ various prayers are, namely: (1) a
“declaration” that no special election was held
simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May
2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as
having won in the special election; and (3) to annul
Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these
Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the
special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on
COMELEC’s alleged failure to comply with certain
requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special
election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek to
determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office
as Senator. Petitioners’ prayer for the annulment of
Honasan’s proclamation and, ultimately, election is
merely incidental to petitioners’ cause of action.
Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June
2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent
confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13
Senators render the instant petition to set aside
Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and
academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is
to command a tribunal or board to desist from
committing an act threatened to be done without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[11]
Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts
already done.[12] However, as an exception to the rule
on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise
moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
[13]
Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol,[14] we took cognizance
of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general
elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (“SK”) on 4
December 1992 despite that at the time the petition
was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We
noted inAlunan that since the question of the validity
of the order sought to be annulled “is likely to arise in
every SK elections and yet the question may not be
decided before the date of such elections,” the
mootness of the petition is no bar to its resolution. This
observation squarely applies to the instant case. The
question of the validity of a special election to fill a
vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELEC’s failure
to comply with requirements on the conduct of such
special election is likely to arise in every such
election. Such question, however, may not be decided
before the date of the election.
On Petitioners’ Standing
Honasan questions petitioners’ standing to bring
the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because
petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally
disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim
that they sustained personal injury because of the
issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
“Legal standing” or locus standi refers to a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
because of the challenged governmental act. [15] The
requirement of standing, which necessarily “sharpens
the presentation of issues,”[16] relates to the
constitutional mandate that this Court settle only
actual cases or controversies.[17] Thus, generally, a
party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[18]
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate
will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in
their capacity as voters, the validity of the special
election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm
classified as a “generalized grievance.” This
generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal
measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters,
who voted in that election. [19] Neither have petitioners
alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court
should give due course to the petition because in the
special election held on 14 May 2001 “tax money [was]
‘x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative
power’ or that there [was] misapplication of such funds
by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to
any improper purpose.”[20]
On the other hand, we have relaxed the
requirement on standing and exercised our discretion
to give due course to voters’ suits involving the right of
suffrage.[21] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar
of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we gave the same
liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (“IBP”). The IBP questioned the
validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements
of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine
Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even
though the IBP presented “too general an interest.” We
held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the
IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi.
The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve
the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly
true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the
court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to
craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of
the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and
order are under constant threat and lawless violence
occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated
by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will
not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It,
therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than
later.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in
the instant case in their capacity as voters since they
raise important issues involving their right of suffrage,
considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely
to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-
Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a
special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the
Senate and the House of Representatives “in the
manner prescribed by law,” thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
(Emphasis supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution,
Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides in
pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at
least eighteen (18) months or in the House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the next
regular election for Members of Congress, the
Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, certifying to the existence of such
vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a
special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in
recess, an official communication on the existence of
the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be
sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of
the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the
date of the special election, which shall not be earlier
than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days
from the date of such resolution or
communication, stating among other things the office
or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if
within the said period a general election is scheduled
to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently
amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special
Elections. – x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall
occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at
least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the
Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill
the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer
than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the
vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the
Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least
one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to
call a special election by fixing the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days
nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the
vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice
to the voters of, among other things, the office or
offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial
election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular
elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELEC’s resolutions relating to the
conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections reveals that they
contain nothing which would amount to a compliance,
either strict or substantial, with the requirements in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere
in its resolutions[24] or even in its press releases[25] did
COMELEC state that it would hold a special election for
a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously
with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did
COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as
winner the senatorial candidate receiving the
13th highest number of votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC’s
failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the
requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, invalidated the conduct of the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly
rendered Honasan’s proclamation as the winner in that
special election void. More precisely, the question is
whether the special election is invalid for lack of a
“call” for such election and for lack of notice as to the
office to be filled and the manner by which the winner
in the special election is to be determined. For reasons
stated below, the Court answers in the negative.
COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice
of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made
by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty
to give such call, is indispensable to the election’s
validity.[26] In a general election, where the law fixes
the date of the election, the election is valid without
any call by the body charged to administer the
election.[27]
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is
that a statute that expressly provides that an election
to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general
elections fixes the date at which the special election is
to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Consequently, an election held at the time
thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the
body charged by law with the duty of calling the
election failed to do so.[28] This is because the right and
duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and
not from any call for the election by some
authority[29] and the law thus charges voters with
knowledge of the time and place of the election.[30]
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time
and place for holding a special election but empowers
some authority to fix the time and place after the
happening of a condition precedent, the statutory
provision on the giving of notice is considered
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election
a nullity.[31]
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate,
the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could
not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters
with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s
failure to give the additional notice did not negate the
calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present
case involved a special election to fill a vacancy in the
House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding
of the special election is subject to a condition
precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at
least one year before the expiration of the term. The
time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC
subject only to the limitation that it holds the special
election within the range of time provided in Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory
the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, for COMELEC to “call x x x a special election
x x x not earlier than 60 days nor longer than 90 days
after the occurrence of the vacancy” and give notice of
the office to be filled. The COMELEC’s failure to so call
and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a
special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be
well-nigh impossible for the voters in the congressional
district involved to know the time and place of the
special election and the office to be filled unless the
COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELEC’s
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special
election in relation to the failure to give notice of the
special election is whether the want of notice has
resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special election. If the
lack of official notice misled a substantial number of
voters who wrongly believed that there was no special
election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void.[32]
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May
2001 special senatorial election covers two
matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special
election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate
seat simultaneously with the regular elections
scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC
will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate
receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the
special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor
proved that COMELEC’s failure to give this required
notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would
change the result of the special senatorial election or
led them to believe that there was no such special
election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since
COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election
took place. This bare assertion carries no
value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended,
charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May
2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the
Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s appointment
as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in
the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001.
Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC
does not preclude the possibility that the voters had
actual notice of the special election, the office to be
voted in that election, and the manner by which
COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual
notice could come from many sources, such as media
reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election
propaganda during the campaign.[33]
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in
favor of Honasan, the party who stands most
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot
disenfranchise those who voted for Honasan, in the
absence of proof that COMELEC’s omission prejudiced
voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to
negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this
Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so
when it is “impossible to distinguish what votes are
lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain
result whatever, or that the great body of the voters
have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and
threats from exercising their franchise.”[34]
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect
the electorate’s will and let the results of the election
stand, despite irregularities that may have attended
the conduct of the elections. [35] This is but to
acknowledge the purpose and role of elections in a
democratic society such as ours, which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of
their government, either in determining who shall be
their public officials or in deciding some question of
public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal
voters should be permitted, unhampered and
unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done
and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should
be counted and the election should not be declared
null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their
participation in the affairs of their government for
mere irregularities on the part of the election officers,
for which they are in no way responsible. A different
rule would make the manner and method of
performing a public duty of greater importance than
the duty itself.[36] (Emphasis in the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing
not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners’ claim that the
manner by which COMELEC conducted the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because
COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast
for the special election. No such requirements exist in
our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC “fix the date of the
election,” if necessary, and “state, among others, the
office or offices to be voted for.” Similarly, petitioners’
reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of
certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A.
No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally
sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These
provisions govern elections in general and in no way
require separate documentation of candidates or
separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and
special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in
conducting the special election on 14 May 2001 merely
implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original draft of
Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco
Tatad (“Senator Tatad”) made no mention of the
manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator
Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (“Senator Roco”), the
Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by
providing, as it now appears, that “the senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.”
Senator Roco introduced the amendment to spare
COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures
and the voters further inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we
now consider Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934
[later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any
objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is
approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is
now in order. With the permission of the Body, the
Secretary will read only the title and text of the
resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No.
934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A
VACANCY IN THE SENATE AND CALLING ON THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP
SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON
MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO
SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was
elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a term
which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo nominated Senator
Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has
been confirmed by a majority vote of all the members
of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of
Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on February
9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the
election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective Members
of the House of Representatives, and all elective
provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on
the second Monday and every three years thereafter;
Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to
certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through
election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus elected
to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
FRANCISCO S. TATAD
S
enator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the
adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmeña is
recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Thank you, Mr.
President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader,
Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this
resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President.
[Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). What a way of flattery.
[Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or
1953, there was a special election for a vacant seat in
the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was
elected in that special election was then Congressman,
later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates
contested the seat. In other words, the electorate had
to cast a vote for a ninth senator – because at that
time there were only eight – to elect a member or
rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran
after the EDSA revolution, twice there were 24
candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year
term and the next 12 were elected to a three-year
term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done
in this election? Is the candidate with the 13th largest
number of votes going to be the one to take a three-
year term? Or is there going to be an election for a
position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen.
Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution,
we are leaving the mechanics to the Commission on
Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that
probably, the candidate obtaining the 13thlargest
number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the
unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEÑA] (J). Is there a law that would
allow the Comelec to conduct such an election? Is it
not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I
am really at a loss. I am rising here because I think it
is something that we should consider. I do not know if
we can… No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom
of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that
under Republic Act No. 6645, what is needed is a
resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need
for the holding of a special election to fill up the
vacancy created, in this particular case, by the
appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as
Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so
that a slot for the particular candidate to fill up would
be that reserved for Mr. Guingona’s unexpired
term. In other words, it can be arranged in such a
manner.
xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-
minute caucus, wordings to the effect that in the
simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore
deemed to be the special election for this purpose. So
we just nominate 13 and it is good for our
colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also
less expensive because the ballot will be printed and
there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore
under this resolution to be such a special election,
maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a
guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. – to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have
the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the
13th placer of the forthcoming elections that will be
held simultaneously as a special election under this law
as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good
compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can
introduce that later, maybe it will be better, Mr.
President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most
satisfactory proposal because I do not believe that
there will be anyone running specifically –
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. – to fill up this position for three
years and campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to
happen is the 13th candidate will be running with
specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define
that as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that
amendment and if there will be no other amendment, I
move for the adoption of this resolution.
xxxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move
that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this
resolution. Is there any objection? [Silence] There
being none, the motion is approved.[37]
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its
discretion to use means and methods to conduct the
special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645,
merely chose to adopt the Senate’s proposal, as
embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has
consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELEC’s
wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry
out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections subject only to the limitation that the means
so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave
abuse of discretion.[38]COMELEC’s decision to abandon
the means it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 special elections and adopt the
method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a
legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely, this
Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent
special senatorial elections, choose to revert to the
means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts
means that are novel or even disagreeable is no
reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of
discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional
body. It is intended to play a distinct and important
part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of
its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of
a less responsible organization. The Commission may
err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods
that will insure the accomplishment of the great
objective for which it was created — free, orderly and
honest elections. We may not agree fully with its
choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or
constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should
not interfere.[39]
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and
the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary
information regarding a special election, are central to
an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the
circumstances attendant to the present case have led
us to conclude that COMELEC’s failure to so call and
give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial
election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not
take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC
to comply strictly with all the requirements under
applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular
elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista,
Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Tañada for respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera,
Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a
vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the
petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more
extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain
the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have
been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949,
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañadare quested that his right to
speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to
formulate charges against the then Senate President
Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the
session Senator Tañada and Senator Tañada and
Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of
the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against
the then Senate President and ordering the
investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute
a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the
appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was
already in his office, said petitioner delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M.
When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested
from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted
by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence
of the public he read slowly and carefully said
resolution, after which he called and conferred with his
colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be
opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a
hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United
States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice,
moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but Senator
Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of
a premeditated plan of petitioner and his partisans to
make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada
from delivering his privilege speech. The roll was
called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice,
to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but this
motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and
David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the
reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly
stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour
privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of
the minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being
recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that
he would order the arrest of any senator who would
speak without being previously recognized by him, but
all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower,
Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at
Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter
would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in
the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At about
this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the
petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner,
and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently,
again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy
to muzzle Senator Tañada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the
adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the
motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another
commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment
and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to
the adjournment and again moved that the motion of
Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and
abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona,
Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest
of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator
Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged
by those senators present took the Chair and
proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of
record — it was so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue
the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested
that respondent be designated to preside over the
session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the
respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved
Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting
as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the
latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair,
was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete
text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was
unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again
occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded
it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.
67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of
the President of the Senate and designated the
Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of
the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was
unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines
recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding
petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust
respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the
controversy and believes that these are the crucial
points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-
matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly
approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in
view of the separation of powers, the political nature of
the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate
of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera
case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case
because the selection of the presiding officer affect
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any
time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate
Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of
the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede
might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of
things has been proved that might change the temper
of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding
citizens. And we should not allow ourselves to be
stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the
calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply,
because among other reasons, the situation is not
where two sets of senators have constituted
themselves into two senates actually functioning as
such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question
that there is presently one Philippines Senate only. To
their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his
partisans have not erected themselves
into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely
that respondent has not been duly elected in his place
in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded
by the Chief Executive to the respondent makes it
advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off
policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of
similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-
questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled
with twenty two Senators in the morning of February
21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr.
Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it
useless, for the present to pass on these questions
once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion
of the other four on those four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is
unanimity in the view that the session under Senator
Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and
that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the
morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say
there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly,
because at the beginning of such session there were at
least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun
and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence
from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve
three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum,
"the House: does not mean "all" the members. Even a
majority of all the members constitute "the House".
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239).
There is a difference between a majority of "the
House", the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members
of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr.
Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the
twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be
no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would
have been elected just the same inasmuch as there
would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being
confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the
Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco
and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it
would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the
rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will
of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any
session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators,
in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the
benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify
all their acts and thereby place them beyond the
shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove
mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C.J., concurring:
I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the
case.1 The present crisis in the Senate is one that
imperatively calls for the intervention of the Court.
Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-
interference by the courts with the Senate because the
legal capacity of his group of twelve senators to acts as
a senate is being challenged by petitioner on the
groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel.
Werts vs. Rogers et al., Atl. 726; 23 L. R. A., 352). If this
group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under
the Constitution, then its proceedings should be free
from interference. But if it is not possessed of a
valid quorum, then its proceedings should be voided.
The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group
to act as a senate cannot be considered a political
question the determination of which devolves
exclusively upon the Senate. That issue involves a
constitutional question which cannot be validly decided
either by the Cuenco group or by the Avelino group
separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the
Avelino has decidedly less. And for obvious reasons,
the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the
members of the Avelino group, possibly to avoid
trouble, do not attend the sessions presided by the
respondent believing as they do that the latter was
illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco
group believing itself as possessing the
constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any
semblance of admission to the contrary, does not find
it convenient to compel the attendance of any senator
of the Avelino group. Then the question arises--who will
decide the conflict between the two groups? This
anomalous situation will continue while the conflict
remains unsettled, and the conflict will remain
unsettled while this Court refuses to intervene. In the
meantime the validity of all the laws, resolutions and
other measures which may be passed by the Cuenco
group will be open to doubt because of an alleged lack
of quorum in the body which authored them. This
doubt may extend, in diverse forms, to the House of
Representative and to the other agencies of the
government such as the Auditor General's Office. Thus,
a general situation of uncertainty, pregnant with grave
dangers, is developing into confusion and chaos with
severe harm to the nation. This situation may, to a
large extent, be stopped and constitutional processes
may be restored in the Senate if only this Court, as the
guardian of the Constitutional, were to pronounce the
final word on the constitutional mandate governing the
existing conflict between the two groups. And, in my
opinion, under the present circumstances, this Court
has no other alternative but to meet challenge of the
situation which demands the utmost of judicial temper
and judicial statesmanship. As hereinbefore stated, the
present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively
calls for the intervention of this Court.
As to the legality of respondent's election as acting
President of the Senate,2I firmly believe that although
petitioner's adjournment of the session of February 21,
1949, was illegality cannot be countered with another
illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected
as acting President of the Senate was illegal because
when Senator Mabanag raised the question of
a quorum and the roll was called, only twelve senators
were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four
senators, and therefore, the quorum must be thirteen.
The authorities on the matter are clear.
The constitution of our state ordains that a
majority of each house shall constitute
a quorum. the house of representative consist
of 125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum.
When a majority or quorum are present, the
house can do business; not otherwise.
A quorum possessed all the powers of the
whole body, a majority of which quorum must,
of course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan., 155; 32
P., 470, 476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)
Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec.
8, providing that a majority of each house shall
constitute aquorum to do business, is, for the
purpose of the Assembly, not less than the
majority of the whole number of which the
house may be composed. Vacancies from
death, resignation or failure to elect cannot be
deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion
of Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)
The general rule is that a quorum is a majority
of all the members and a majority of this
majority may legislate and do the work of the
whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23 S.
E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)
. . . a majority of each House is necessary to
transact business, and a minority cannot
transact business, this view being in keeping
with the provision of the Constitution
permitting a smaller number than a quorumto
adjourn from day to day merely.
(Earp vs. Riley, 40 OKL., 340; p. 164;
Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL., 323; 138 P. 158.)
The Constitution provides that "a majority of
each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, when a majority are
present the House is in a position to do
business. Its capacity to transact business is
then established, created by the mere
presence of a majority, and depend upon the
disposition or assent or action of any single
member or faction of the majority present. All
that the Constitution required is the presence
of a majority, and when that majority are
present, the power of the House arises. (U.
S. vs.Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed. 321,
325.)
If all the members of the select body or
committee, or if all the agents are assembled,
or if all have been duly notified, and the
minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the
other, a majority of those present may
act,provided those present constitute a
majority of the whole number. In other words,
in such case, a major part of the whole is
necessary to constitute a quorum, and a
majority of the quorum may act. If the major
part withdraw so as to leave no quorum, the
power of the minority to act is, in general,
considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th
ed., sec. 283.)3
Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more
extensive opinion, if necessary, I believe that
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco has not been legally
elected as acting President of the Senate. It is true that
respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate
President because he represent the majority of the
members now present in Manila, and, at any new
session with a quorum, upon the present senatorial
alignment, he will be elected to said office. But
precisely he is now the master of the situation, he must
win his victory in accordance with the Constitution. It is
absolutely essential in the adolescent life of our
Republic to insist, strictly and uncompromisingly, on
thedemocratic principles consecrated in our
Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the
future of our political life as a republican form of
government under the sovereignty of a Constitution
from being a mockery.
The situation now in this Court is this — there are four
members who believe that there was no quorum in
respondent's election as against four other member
who believe that there was such quorum. Two
members declined to render their opinion on the
matter because of their refusal to assume jurisdiction.
And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus,
the question of whether or not respondent has been
legally elected is, to say the least, doubtful in this
Court under the present conditions. This doubt, which
taint the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other
measures that the Cuenco group has passed and may
pass in the future, can easily be dispelled by them by
convening a session wherein thirteen senators are
present and by reiterating therein all that has been
previously done by them. This is a suggestion coming
from a humble citizen who is watching with a happy
heart the movement of this gallant group of prominent
leaders campaigning for a clean and honest
government in this dear country of ours.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to
who among the parties is entitled to hold the position
of President of the Senate is in issue.
There is no question that up to Monday, February 21,
1949, at the time the controversial incidents took
place, petitioner Jose Avelino was rightful occupant of
the position. the litigation has arisen because of the
opposing contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to
respondent's election as acting President of the
Senate, on February 21, 1949.
Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a
resolution was passed declaring the position of
President of the Senate vacant and electing
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of
the Senate were illegal because, at the time, the
session for said day has been properly adjourned, and
the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall
had no right to convene in a rump session, and said
rump session lacked quorum, while respondent
contents that the session which was opened by
petitioner had not been legally adjournment, the
Senators who remained in the session hall had only
continued the same session, and there
was quorum when the position of the President of the
Senate was declared vacant and when respondent was
elected as acting President of Senate, to fill the vacate
position.
Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his
petition, is to the effect that on Monday, February 21,
1949, at the time petitioner opened the session in the
Senate session hall, there were twenty two Senators
present who answered the roll call; Vicente J.
Francisco. Fernando Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo
Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres,
Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin,
Melencio Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad,
Lorenzo Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,
Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera,
Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag, and the petitioner Jose
Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding session
was being read the crowd of more than 1,000 people
who entered the Senate hall to witness the session,
became unruly, the repeated efforts of petitioner as
well as the sergeant-at-arms and other peace officers
to maintain peace and order notwithstanding. Fights
and commotions ensued and several shots were fired
among the audience. The Senator who spoke could not
be heard because the spectators would either shout to
drown their voices or would demeans that some other
Senator should take the floor and be recognized by
petitioner. Pandemonium reigned and it was impossible
for the Senate to proceed with its deliberations free
from undue pressure and without grave danger to its
integrity as a body and to the personal safety of the
members thereof. Senator Pablo Angeles David moved
for adjournment until Thursday, February 24, 1949.
There being no objection, petitioner adjourned the
session until February 24, 1949. Thereupon petitioner
and nine other Senator namely, Vicente J. Francisco,
Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles
David, Sulipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enriquez
Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin left the
session hall. Senator Melencio Arranz, President Pro-
Tempore of Senate, went up the rostrum and,
assuming the presidency of the chamber, convinced
the remaining twelve Senators into a rump session, in
which a resolution was passed declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and electing
respondent as President of the Senate. Thereupon
respondent pretended to assume the office of
president of the Senate and continues to pretend to
assume said office.
Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that
respondent is usurping or illegally exercising the office
of the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner had
adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment
having been properly moved and, without objection,
favorably acted upon; 2. Petitioner had full power to
adjourn the session even without motion under chapter
II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the Rules of the Senate;
3 The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no
other session could be called in the Senate on the
same day; 4 The President Pr-tempore had no authority
to assume the presidency except in the cases specified
in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the Senate, and
none of the conditions therein mentioned obtained at
the time in question; and 5. The twelve Senators that
convened in the rump session did not constitute
a quorum to do business under the Constitution and
the rule of the Senate, being less than one-half plus
one of the twenty four members of the Senate.
Respondent's version of the events as follows:
(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator
Lorenzo M. Tañada announced and reserved in open
session of the Senate that on Monday, February 21,
1949, he would make use of his one-hour privilege, it
was known that formal charges would be filed against
the then Senate President, petitioner in this case, on
said date. Hours before the opening of the session on
Monday, February 21, 1949, Senators Lorenzo M.
Tañada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office
of the secretary of the Senates a resolution in which
serious charges were preferred against the herein
petitioner. A certified copy of said resolution, marked
as Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an integral
part hereof:
(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to
constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time for the session to
begin, and in spite of the fact that the petitioner was
already in his office, said petitioner deliberately
delayed his appearance at the session hall until about
11:35 A.M.;
(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum,
he did not immediately open the session, but instead
requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution
submitted by Senator Tañada and Sanidad and in the
presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and
carefully said resolution, after which he called and
conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and
Tirona;
(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent
requested of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that the
session be opened, the petitioner finally called the
meeting to order;
(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long
established in the Senate, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with as it was evident that with the presence
of all the 22 senator who could discharges their
functions, there could be no question of a quorum, but
Senator Tirona opposed said motion, evidently in
pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of
petitioner and his followers to make use of all sorts of
dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from
delivering his privilege speech on the charges filed
against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively showed
the presence of the following 22 Senators; Vicente J.
Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo
Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres,
Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio
Arranz, M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo M.
Tañada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo
Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas
Cabili, Alejo Mabanag and Jose Avelino;
(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual
practice, to dispense with the reading of the minute,
but this motion was likewise opposed by senator Tirona
and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy;
(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the
reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly
took the floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour
privilege speech in support of the charges against
petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually
ignored him; and when after the reading of the
minutes, Senator Tañada instead on being recognized
by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would
being previously recognized by him, but all the while,
tolerating the antics of his follower, Senator Tirona,
who was continuously and vociferously shouting at
Senator Sanidad "Out of order! Out of order! Out of
order! . . .," everything the latter would ask the
petitioner to recognized the right of Senator Tañada to
speak.
(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out
in the Senate gallery, as if by prearrangement, but the
police officers present were able to maintain order. No
shots were fired among the audience, as alleged in the
petition. It was at about this same time that Senator
Pablo Angeles David, one of petitioner's followers, was
recognized by petitioner, and he moved for
adjournment of the session, evidently again, in
pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to
prevent Senator Tañada from speaking;
(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the
adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the
motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote;
(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment
and herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to
the adjournment and again moved that the motion of
Senator David be submitted to a vote;
(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and
hurriedly walked out of the session hall.
(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators
David, Tirona, Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and Clarin
followed the petitioner out of the session hall, while the
rest of the senators, as afore-named in sub-paragraph
(e) hereof, remained to continue the session
abandoned by petitioner, whereupon Senator Melencio
Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore, took the Chair and
proceeded with the session.
(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a
speech, whereby he asked that it be made of record —
as it was in so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz
and the remaining members of the Senate to continue
the session in order not to impede and paralyze the
functions of the Senate;
(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then
suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session, which suggestion was carried
unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the
Chair.
(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried
unanimously, Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting
Secretary, as the Assistance Secretary, who was then
acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when
the latter abandoned the session;
(p) Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the
Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech, Which took more than hours, on the charges
against the petitioner contained in the Resolution,
attacked hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the
immediate consideration and approval ofsaid
Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion,
after having firstread aloud the complete text of said
Resolution, and thereafter the same was unanimously
approved;
(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again
occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yield
edit to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.
67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of
the President of the Senate and designated the
Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of
the Senate," a copy of which is herewith attacked and
made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "2". Put a vote,
the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved,
respondent having abstained from voting;
(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting
President of the Senate, immediately took his oath of
Office in open session, before Senate President Pro-
Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since then, has been
discharging the duties and exercising the rights and
prerogatives appertaining to said office;
(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly
appears that the petitioner had only nine senators in
his favor and twelve, decidedly against him, which fact
negates the petitioner's assertion that there was no
opposition to the motion for adjournment submitted by
Senator David;
(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21,
1949, to the allegedadjournment, it was evidently and
manifestly the purpose of the petitioner to deprive
Senator Tañada of his right to take the floor and to
speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that
said petitioner resorted to all means to deprive the
Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on
Senate Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and that when
the petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator
who were present in the said session was ready to
approved said resolution, the petitioner abandoned the
session;
(u) The minute of the session held on February 21,
Exhibit 1949, a copy of which is hereto attacked and
made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "3", show that
the petitioner illegally abandoned the Chair while the
Senate was in session and that the respondent has
been duly elected Acting Senate President in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Respondent alleges further that Senator David's
motion for adjournment was objected to and not
submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not have
been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had the
power to adjourn the session even without motion; that
the session presided over, first by petitioner and then
by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been
threatened or intimidated by anybody, and after
petitioner abandoned the session continued peacefully
until its adjournment at 4:40 P.M.; that there was only
one session held on said date; that petitioner's
abandonment of the Chair in the face of an impending
ouster therefrom constituted a temporaryincapacity
entitling the Senate President Pro-tempore to assume
the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the absence
of Senator Tomas Confessor, whowas in the U. S. and
of Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill and
confined in the Lourdes Hospital, the presence of at
least twelve senators constitutes a quorum; that,
despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session
to February 24, 1949, convinced that he did not count
with the majority of the Senators and not wanting to be
investigated by the specialinvestigation committee
regarding the grave charges preferred against him, the
petitioner deliberately did not appear at the session
hall on said date.
Three special defenses are advanced by respondent:
(a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; (b) No
cause of action as there are only nine Senators who
had recognized petitioner's claim against twelve
Senators or who have madepatent their loss of
confidence in him by voting in favor of his out ouster;
and (c) The object of the action is to make the supreme
Court a mere tool of a minority group of ten Senators
to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the
twelve other members of the Senate, to entrench
petitionerin power.
In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
respondent contends that the present case is not
justiciable, because it involves a purely political
question, the determination of which by the Senate is
binding and conclusiveupon the court
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino,
77 Phil., 192) respondent has been recognized as
acting President of the Senate by the President of the
Philippines and said recognition is binding and
conclusive on the courts (Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil.,
87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366); the
Senate is the only body that can determine from time
to time who shall be its President and petitioner's only
recourse lies in said body; and this Court's action in
entertaining the petition would constitute an invasion
and an encroachment upon the powers, rights and
prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to
Congress, of which the Senate is a branch.
Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real
events, this Court authorized the reception of
evidence. Before passing to consider and to weigh said
evidence so as to determine the true events, it is only
logical that we should first pass upon the question of
jurisdiction raised by respondent.
In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
respondent alleges, as first ground, that the present
controversy is not justiciable in nature, involving, as it
does, a purely political question, the determination of
which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is
binding and conclusive on the courts.
The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs
question. It assumes as premises that the question has
been determined by the Senate, when the two
opposing parties claim that each one of them
represents the will of the Senate, and if the
controversy should be allowed to remainunsettled, it
would be impossible to determine who is right and who
is wrong, and who really represent the Senate.
The question raised in the petition, although political in
nature, are justiciable because they involve the
enforcement of legal precepts, such as the provisions
of the Constitution and of the rules of the Senate.
Thepower and authority to decided such questions of
law form part of the jurisdiction, not only expressly
conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by
express prohibition of the Constitution, it cannot be
divested.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various court, but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or
the rules of the court may provide, final
judgment and decrees of inferior courts in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or
regulations is in question.
(2) All case involving the legality of any tax,
impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any
trial court is in issue.
(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is death or life imprisonment.
(5) All cases in which an error or question of
law is involved.
Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot
be decided without decided also what is the truth on
the controversial facts, by the very natureof things, the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reached the
settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.
Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by
the President of the Philippines as acting President of
the Senate and that executive recognition is binding
and conclusive on the courts. The contention is
erroneous. The actions of the President of the
Philippines cannot deprive the Supreme Court of the
jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If the
Congress of the Philippines, in which the Legislature
power is vested, cannot deprive the Supreme Court of
its jurisdiction to decide questions of law, much less
canthe president of the Philippines, on whom is vested
the Executive power, which in the philosophical and
political hierarchy is of subordinate category to the of
the Legislative power, do so. The power to enact laws
is higher than the power to execute them.
The third argument of argument of respondent,
although based on truth, has nothing to do with the
legal questions raised in this case. It is true that the
Senate is the only body that can determine from time
who is and shall be its President, but when the legal
questions are raised in a litigation likein the present
case, the proper court has the function, the province
and the responsibility to decide them. To shirk that
responsibility is to commit a dereliction of official duty.
Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the
petition, is invade and encroach upon the powers,
rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively
appertaining to the Legislative Department, of which
the Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous.
The controversy as to thelegality of the adjournment
declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ousters, as a
result of the resolution declaring vacant the position of
President of the Senate, or respondent's election as
acting President of the Senate, and as to whether or
not the twelve Senators who remained in the session
hall could continue holding session and if they
constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which
courts of justice have jurisdiction and the
SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.
From the evidence, it appears that in the session of
Friday, February 18, 1949, at the time the resolution of
confidence in favor of petitioner, introduced by the
Senator Lopez, was being put to vote, Senator Tañada
voted,Senator Tañada voted in the negative, alleging
as ground damaging facts, supported by several
checks, highly detrimental to the personal and
officialhonesty of petitioner. At the same time, Senator
Tañada announced his intention of filing in the next
session, to be held on Monday, February 21, 1949,
formal charges against petitioner and of delivering
during the so-called privilege hour a speech in support
of said charges.
On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of
the ordinary daily session, Senator Tañada and
Sanidad registered with the Secretary of the Senate a
resolution for the appointment of a Committee of
three, composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David,
and Mabanag, with instructed to proceed immediately
to investigate the serious charges against petitioner
embodiedin the document.
Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the
respondent's answer, is as follow:
RESOLUTION ORDERING THE
INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED
AGAINST THE SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE
AVELINO.
WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a
caucus of high government officials of the
Philippines Government and leaders of the
Liberal Partyheld at Malacañang palace on
January 15, 1949, delivered a speech,wherein
he advocated the protection, or, at least,
tolerance, of graft and corruption in the
government, and placed the interest of grafters
and corrupt officials as supreme and above the
welfare of the people, doctrine under which it is
impossible for an honest and clean
governmentto exist;
WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose
Avelino was given wide publicity by the press,
especially the Chronicle Publication in their
issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as follows:
The senate President defenses the abuses
perpetrated by Liberal Party men. He called the
investigations of the surplus property
commission irregularities and the immigration
quota scadal as acts of injustice he describe
the probe as "criminal" and "odious." He flayed
the National Bureau of Investigation agents for
persecuting Liberal party leaders.
"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we
all go to hell. It is better to be in hell because in
that place are no investigations, no secretary
of justice, no secretary of interior to go after
us."
Avelino, who is the present President of the
Liberal party, ensured the President for his
actuations which, he claimed, were mainly
responsible for the division of the party into
two hostile camps.
Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he
could not "permit", the abuse of the party in
power, because why should we be saints when
in reality we are not?
He stressed that the present investigation
being conducted by President Quirino on the
surplus property scandal and the immigration
quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the
Liberal Party in the eyes of the people, and is a
desecration to the memory of the late
President Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against
the Liberal Party", Avelino said.
Defining his attitude regarding rights and
privileges of those who are in power in the
government, Avelino maintained that the
Liberal Party men are entitled to more
considerations and should be given allowance
to use the power and privilege. If they abuse
their power as all humans are prone to do, they
will be given a certain measure of tolerance,
Avelino said, adding, "What are we in power
for?"
Avelino cited the surplus property
investigations as an attempt to besmear the
memory of Presidential Roxas. As a result of
these investigations, the members of Congress
are subjected to unjust and embarrassing
questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is
worse is the fact that these senators and
representatives are being pilloried in public
without formal charges filed against them.
(Manila Chronicle issue of Jan. 16, 1949).
At last Saturday night's caucus Senate
President Avelino for two hours
lectured to President Quirino on Liberal
Party discipline. At the same time he
demanded "tolerance" on the part of
the Chief Executive by the party in
power.
The investigations were conducted on
vague charges, Avelino claimed.
Nothing specific has teen filed against
atop Liberal Party man. And yet
National Bureau of Investigation agents
have persecuted top leader of the
LiberalParty. That is not justice. That is
injustice. . . . It isodious. . . . It is
criminal.
Why did you have to order an
investigation Honorable Mr. President?
If you cannot permit abuses, you must
at leasttolerate them. What are we in
power for? We are not hypocrites. Why
should we pretend to be saints when in
 realitywe are not? We are not angels.
And besides when we die we all go to
hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go to
hell wherethere are no investigations,
no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of
Interior to go after us.
When Jesus died on the Cross. He
made a distinction between a good
crook and the bad crooks. We can
prepare to be good crooks.
Avelino related the story of St. Francis
of Assisi. Athief sought sanctuary in St.
Francis' convent. When thesoldiers
came to the convent and ordered St.
Francis to produce the wanted thief, St.
Francis told the soldiers that thehunted
man had gone the other way.
Avelino then pointed out that even a
saint had condoned the sins of a thief.
xxx xxx xxx
The investigation ordered by President
Quirino, Avelino said, was a
desecration of the memory of the late
President Roxas. The probe has
lowered, instead of enhanced, the
prestige of the Liberal Party and its
leader in the eyes of the public.
If the present administration fails, it is
Roxas and not Quirino that suffers by
it, because Quirino's administration is
only a continuation of Roxas, Avelino
said.
Avelino compared all political parties to
business corporations, of which all
members are stockholders. Every year
the Liberal Party makes an accounting
of its loss profit. The Liberal Party, he
said, has practically no dividends at all.
It has lost even its original capital.
Then he mentionedthe appointments to
the government of Nacionalistas like:
Lino Castillejo,as governor of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
Nicanor Carag, consulto Madrid; and
Vicente Formoso, General Manager of
the National Tabacco
Corporation."(Manila Chronicle issue of
January 18, 1949.).
WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said
speech in the Manila Chronicle issue of January
16, 1949, the Senate President, in a letter to
the said news report was a "maliciously
distorted presentation of my remarks at that
caucus, under a tendentious headlines", and
threatened that "unless the proper redness is
given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to
take the necessary steps to protect my
reputation and good name";
WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only
refuse to retract or make the rectification
demanded by the Senate President, but on the
contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949,
challenged him to take his threatened action,
stating that "in order to est abolished the truth,
we are inviting the Senate President to file a
libel suit against the Chronicle" and further
repeated the publication of their reports on the
Senate President speech in the same issue of
January 18, 1949 as quoted above;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable
length of time that has elapsed, the Senate
President has not carried out his threat of filing
action against the Chronicle Publication,
thereby confirming, in effect, his doctrine of
tolerance of graft and corruption;
WHEREAS, in open and public session of the
Senate on February 18, 1949, there were
exhibited photostatic copies of four checks
totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have
come into the possession and control of the
Senate President, after he had assumed his
office;
WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check,
which is Manager's Check No. M5375 of the
National City Bank of the National City Bank of
New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in
favor of the Senate President in the amount of
P312,500.00, was indorsed by him to his wife,
Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in
her current account with the Philippine National
Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks,
which is Manager's Check No. 49706 of the
Nederlands Indische Handelsbank, drawn on
October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate
President in the amount of P196,905.60, was
indorsedby him to his son, Mr. Jose Avelino, Jr.,
who cashed it October 22, 1946;
WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks,
which is Check No. 37262 of the Nederlandsch
Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October
23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a
Chinese concern, in favor of "cash", in the
amount of P10,000.00, was indorsed by the
Senate President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C.
Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving Account
No. 63436 with the Philippines National Bank
on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks,
which is Check No. 37268 of the Nederlandsch
Indische Handelsbank, drawn by the
aforementioned Chinese concern, Chiung Liu
Ching Long and Co., Ltd., in the amount of
P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate President,
was indorsed by him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta
C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current
account with the Philippines National Bank on
October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned,
the one for P196,905.60 was cashed by the
Senate President's son, Jose Avelino, Jr., on
October 22, 1946; while of the three other
checks totalling P370,000.00 which was
deposited by the Senate President's wife, Mrs.
Enriqueta C. Avelino, in her saving and current
accounts with the Philippines National Bank on
October 26, 1946, P325,000.00 were withdraw
by her on same day;
WHEREAS, in the course of the speech
delivered by the Senate President on the floor
of the Senate on February 18, 1946, in an
attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he
refused to be interpolated on the same, and his
explanation lacked such details and
definiteness that it left many doubts unsettled;
WHEREAS, in the case of the check for
P312,500.00 the Senate President explanation
that the same represented proceeds from the
sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is
directly contradicted by the source of the
same, Ching Ban Yek, who declared under oath
before the Horilleno Investigating Committee
that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been
loaned byhim to the Senate President, who
repaid the same within ten days;
WHEREAS, it appears that during the period
from December 29, 1945 to April 30, 1948,
deposits totalling P803,865.45 were made in
the current account of the Senate President's
wife Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in the Philippine
National Bank, of which amount P6,204.86
were deposited before his election to office and
the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after his
election;
WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate
President do not bear explanation madein his
speech of February 18, 1949 to the effect that
he and his wife had made substantial amounts
in commercial transaction in shoes and liquor;
WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18,
1949, the Senate President said that "en
politica todo vale", and that inasmuch as the
Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it
was right for the Liberals to commit frauds in
the electionsto even up with frauds committed
by the opposition;
WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18,
1949 delivered by the SEnate President
justified the commission of electoral frauds,
which justification is a direct attack on the
sovereignty of the people and may be a cause
of unrest or resolution;
WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-
officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments which passes upon all
Presidential appointment, including thoseto the
judiciary, has abused the prerogatives of his
office by seeking in several instances to
interfere with and influence some judge in
decidingcase pending before, thereby
imperilling the independence of the
judiciaryand jeopardizing the impartial
administration of justice;
WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of
the people and of the membersof the Senate
demand a through, impartial and immediate
investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,
1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they
are hereby appointed
2 Committee of three (3) members of
this Senate, to be com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles
David and Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to
investigate the charges mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the
attendance of witnesses
6 and the production of books of
account, documents, and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities
and the services of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may
deem necessary, with in
9 structions to render its report and
recommendations to the
10 Senate on or before Friday,
February 25, 1949.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
Although a sufficient number of Senators to
constitute quorum were already present in said
morning at and before 10:00 o'clock, the schedule time
for the daily session to begin, the session was not then
opened, because petitioner failed to appear in the hall
until about 11:35, the time petitioner ascended the
rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to order,
he asked for a copy of the resolution introduced by the
Senators Tañada and Sanidad and, after reading it
slowly, he called to his side Senators Angeles David
and Tirona and conferred with them.
Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad
and Cuenco that thesession be opened, that petitioner
called the meeting to order shortly before 12:00 o'clock
noon.
Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed
with. Senator Tirona opposed the motion and the roll
call showed the presence of the following twenty two
Senators: Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez,
Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada
Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos
Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Jesus
Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Tañada, Vicente
Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos
Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo
Manag and Jose Avelino.
Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the
minutes be dispersed with, but the motion was again
opposed by Senator Tirona whose opposition was
joined by Senator Angeles David, and the reading of
the minutes proceeded.
Senator Tañada repeated took the floor to floor to
claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech
in support of the charges against petitioner,pursuant to
the announcement he made in the session of February
18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the
reading of the minutes. he wasignored by the Chair
and petitioner announced that he would order the
arrestof any Senator who speak without having been
previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad
requested the Chair to recognized the right of Senator
Tañada to speak, and every time he would make the
request, Senator Tirona would oppose him upon the
ground that the requests were out of order.
Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the
Senate gallery. Shout were heard from individuals of
the audience, where two fist fight took place. The
detonation of a gun shot was heard from outside.
Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the
Chair, moved for adjournment of the session. The
motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the
same time, moved thatthe motion be submitted to
vote. Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the
motion to adjourn, banged the gavel and declared the
session adjourned until next Thursday, February 24,
1949, and, thereupon, left the session hall followed by
the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando
Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona,
Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him.
Twelve SEnator, respondent and his eleven supporters,
remained in the session hall. Senator Arranz, President
Pro-tempore of the SEnate, ascended the rostrum,and
called those Senators present to order. Senator
Mabanag raised the question of quorum and the
question of quorum and the President Pro-tempore
ordered a roll call, to which all the twelve Senators
remaining in the sessionhall answered.
The President Pro-tempore declared the presence
of quorum and those presentproceeded to continue
transacting business. Senator Cabili took an made it of
record that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by
petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate
President Pro-tempore and those remainingmembers of
the Senate to continue the session in order not to
impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senator Arranz suggested that respondent be
designated to preside over the session and the
suggestion was carried unanimously and respondent
took the Chair.
Senator Tañada delivered his privilege speech, which
took two hours on the charge against petitioner
contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and moved
for the immediate consideration and approval of said
resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The
motion was seconded by Senator Sanidad, and the
resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent
yielded the Chair to the President Pro-tempore and
Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit
"2", which read as follows:
RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND DESIGNATING
THE HONORABLE MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING
PRESIDENT OFTHE SENATE.
Resolved by the Senate in session assembled,
That a quorum exists; that the Honorable Jose
Avelino, President of the Senate having
abandoned the chair, his position is hereby
declared vacant; and that, the Honorable
Mariano JesusCuenco of Cebu, designated
Acting President of the SEnate, until further
orders from this Body.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
The resolutions unanimously approved, with
respondent abstaining from voting. Pursuant to said
resolution, respondent took his oath of office inopen
session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz and has
started, since then,to discharge the duties, rights and
privileges of acting President of theSenate.
The above recital of facts is based on our findings on
the evidence on record. From the said facts we believe
the following conclusions are unavoidable.
1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was
arbitrary and illegal.
2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him
had walked out from the session hall, the Senate could
not continue holding session and transact business for
lack of quorum.
In the following discussion we will express the reasons
in support of the above conclusions.
ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT
A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when
a question is under debate and, with certain restriction,
it has the highest privilege under all other conditions.
Under parliamentary practice, even questions of
privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The
motion to adjourn may be made after the "yeas'' and
"nays" are ordered and before the roll call has begun,
before reading of the journal. The motion is not
debatable and, after the motion is made, neither
another motion nor an appeal may intervene before
the taking of the vote.
The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive
prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation
of the collective prerogatives. It is too tremendous a
power to be wieldedby a single individual. The
functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact
official business cannot be left to the discretion of a
single individual without jeopardizing the high
purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is
established in a democratic social order. Single-
handedindividual discretion on the matter may not
mean anything other than placing the legislative
chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.
There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate
which expressly or impliedly authorizes an
adjournment without the consent of the body or one
which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu
proprio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary
practice and experience in thiscountry and in the
United States of America, upon which ours is
patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a
provision.
Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment
because the motion of Senator Angeles David to said
effect was properly made and met with no objection. If
this version of the facts is true, then it was right for
petitioner to declare the adjournment, because the
absence of anyobjection, provided the motion was
properly made and the other Senators after having
been properly apprised of the motion, did not object to
it, was an evidence of an implied consent of all the
members. The evidence, however, fails to support
petitioner's claim.
We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be
more in consonance with truth. We are of opinion that
the motion to adjourn was actually objected to. Senator
Tañada was bent on delivering a speech he had ready
onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by
himself and by Senator Sanidad, which both filed early
in the morning, long before the session was opened.
The formulation of said charges had been announced
days before,since the session of Friday, February 18,
1949, when he showed photostatic copies of some
checks as basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In
said Friday session respondent's group suffered defeat
on the approval of the resolution of confidence
fathered by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable
that respondent's group of Senators, believing
themselves to constitute the majority, did not want to
waste any time to give a showing of said majority and
must have decided to depose petitioner as soon as
possible to wrestfrom him the Senate leadership that
upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.
As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding
events that would give them the control of the Senate,
Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with the roll call
and the reading of the minutes, and had been
requesting that Senator Tañada be recognized to take
the floor. Senator Tañada himself made attempts to
deliver his speech.
Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to
adopt a blocking strategyto obstruct the process that
would give due course to the investigationof the
serious charges made in resolution No. 68, Exhibit 1,
and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the
Senate.
This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of
petitioner and his supporters at the session hall and
petitioner's procrastination in opening the session, by
taking all his time in reading first the Tañada and
Sanidad resolution, formulating charges against him,
and conferring with Senators Angeles David and Tirona
and in not calling to order the members of the Senate
before Senator's Cuenco and Sanidad began urging
that the session beopened.
Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from
any member, he could adjourn the session under the
rules of the Senate, is not well taken. There is nothing
in the rules of the Senate giving petitioner such
authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition
authorizes the Senate President to take measures to
stop disorder, but that power does not include the one
to adjourn.
The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal
adjournment and the walk out of the petitioner and his
supporters from the session hall had the purpose of
defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed
investigation of the charges against petitioner and of
his impedingouster, by the decisive votes of
respondent's group of Senators.
The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary
and illegal.
QUORUM
There is no controversy that at the session in question
there were present in the session hall only twelve
Senators, those composing respondent's group, and
this fact had been ascertained by the roll call ordered
by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator
Mabanag had raised the question of quorum.
The Constitution provides:
A majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel
the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such
House may provide. (Sec. 10, Sub-sec. 2 Article
VI.)
The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot
be other than the majority of the actual members of
the Senate. The words "each House" in the above
provision refer to the full membership of each chamber
of Congress.
The Senate was and actually is composed of 24
Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than
thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-four. Nowhere
and at no time has one-half even been the majority.
Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.
We have heard with interest the arguments advanced
by respondent's counsel, premised on the fact that the
above constitutional provision does not use the words
"of the members" and the theory of the amicus
curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution
refers only to the majority of the members who can be
reached by coercive processes. There is, however,
nothing in said arguments that can validly change the
natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of
the Constitution. "Majority of each House" can mean
only majority of the members of each House, and the
number of said members cannot be reduced upon any
artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the
context of the Constitution itself or by the sound
processes of reason.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that:
1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner in this case, notwithstanding their political
nature and implications, are justiciable and within the
jurisdiction expressly conferred to the Supreme Court,
which cannot be divested from it by express prohibition
of the Constitution. Should there be analogous
controversy between two claimants to the position of
the President of the Philippines, according to the
Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for respondent,
the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to decide
the controversy, because it would raise a constitutional
question. Whether there was a quorum or not in the
meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent was
elected acting President of the Senate, is a question
that call for the interpretation, application and
enforcement of an express and specific provision of the
Constitution. Should the two absent Senators comeand
attend the session and side with the petitioner's group,
it is agreed that the Senate will be kept at a stand still,
because of the deadlock resulting from twelve
Senators, each group supporting petitioner's and
respondent's opposing claims to the position of
President of the Senate. Admitting that pressure of
public opinion may not break the impasse, it hasbeen
suggested from respondent's side that it may invite
revolution. Between the two alternatives, jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court and revolution, there is only one
choice possible, and that is the one in consonance with
the Constitution, which is complete enough to offer
orderly remedies for any wrong committed within the
framework of democracy it established in this country.
Should this Supreme Court refuse to exercise
jurisdiction in this case,such refusal can only be
branded as judicial abdication, and such shirking of
official responsibility cannot expect acquittal in the
judgment of history. The gravity of the issues involved
in this case, affecting not only the upper branch of
Congress, but also the presidential succession as
provided by Republic Act No. 181, is a challenge to our
sense of duty which we should not fail to meet.
2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the
Monday session, without the authority of the Senate,
was illegal and, therefore, null and void.
3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the
respondent and his supporters, after petitioner and his
nine supporters had walked out from the session hall,
had no constitutional quorum to transact business.
4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the
President of the Senate and choosing respondent as
acting President of the Senate, has been adopted in
contravention of the Constitution for lack of quorum.
The fact that respondent has been designated only as
acting President of the Senate, a position not
contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic Act
No. 181 on presidential succession, so much so that his
position in acting capacity, according to his own
counsel, would not entitle respondent to Succeedto the
position of the President of the Philippines, emphasizes
the invalidity of respondent's election.
Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal
issues involved are very simple, and it would not be
hard to reach a prompt conclusion if we could view the
controversies with the attitude of a mathematician
tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations
which, from the point of view of laymen, of the press,
of public opinion in general and the people at large,
may appear of great importance, such as who will
wield the power to control the Senate and whether or
not petitioner is guilty of the serious charges filed
against him, are completely alien to the questions that
this Court must answer. The motives and motivations
of petitioner and respondent of their respective
supporters in the Senate in taking the moves upon
which this case has arisen are their exclusive business
and should not be minded for the purposes of our
decision.
The members of the Senate were and are free to
depose petitioner and to elect another Senator as
president of the Senate, and their freedom to make
such change is subject only to the dictates of their own
conscience and to anyverdict that the people, through
the electorate, may render at the polls, and to the
judgment of historians and posterity. But in making
such changes of leadership, the Senate and the
Senators are bound to follow the orderlyprocesses set
and outlined by the Constitution and by the rules
adopted by the Senate as authorized by the
fundamental law. Any step beyond said legal bounds
may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the
proper courts of justice, the latter cannot simply wash
their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of
lack of jurisdiction, adopting the indifferent attitude of
a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of
the wind may causea live wire to ignite a neighboring
house.
When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the
Supreme Court, complaining that the President of the
Senate has adjourned or is adjourning the daily session
of the Senate over and above objections voiced from
thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or
consent of the majority, we cannot close our eyes to
the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich
fashion: Otherwise, we would be disregarding ours
sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we
would be printing the stamp of our approval to the
existence and continuation of a unipersonal tyranny
imposed upon the upper chamber of Congress, a
tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the functioning
and actuations of the Senate and, consequently, of the
whole Congress, thus depriving the country of the
benefits of legislation.
When a member of the Senate comes to us
complaining that he is being deprived of the powers
and prerogative of the position of President of the
Senate, to which he has been duly elected because
twelve Senators, without constituting a quorum, have
illegally convened and voted to depose him and to
elect another Senator in his place, he raises a
constitutional question of momentous importance
which we should not fail to answer without betraying
the official trust reposed on us. Such complaint
constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of
authority by the twelve Senators, in utter violation of
the fundamental law. The situation would demand
ready and noother agency of government can offer
that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom
the complaint has been filed.
The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an
indispensable condition for effective collective action.
Because a society or collective body is composed of
separate and independent individual units, it cannot
exist without the moral annectent of proper of
organization and can onlyact in organized form. Every
time it has to act, it has to an organic whole,
and quorum here is the organizing element without
which the personality of the body cannot exist or be
recognized. The importance of such organizing element
has been recognize by the members of our
Constitutional Convention, and that is the reason why
they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring
the existence of quorum for the former National
Assembly to transact official business and that
requirement was also imposed by the National
Assembly when, amending the Constitution, it voted
itself out ofexistence, to be replaced by a bicameral
Congress. The requirement, both in the original text of
the Constitution and in the amendment, had been
ratified by the sovereign will of the people.
When we required a majority of a legislative chamber
to constitute a quorum we did it for mighty reasons,
such as that democracy is based on the rule of the
majority and, to allow a quorum of less than the
majority of the members, one-half of them for
example, as in the present controversy, is to allow the
anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent
bodies where the Constitution provides for only one. If
the twelve Senators of respondent's group
constitute quorum to transact official business, what
willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from
constituting themselves into a quorum to transact
official business? This is not impossible, should Senator
Sotto decide to attend the session, even if carried in a
stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad
and sides with petitioner's group. Then there will be, in
effect, two Senate and, according to respondent's
theory the Supreme Court will have no jurisdiction to
decide the conflict, and noone decide it except public
opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd
situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:
Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which
weak courts may take shelter when afraid to displease
the powerful.
Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in this case, everybody must congratulate
himself because petitioner, instead of resorting to any
high-handed mean to enforce his right to continue
holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has
come to us for proper redress by the orderly by the
orderly processes of judicial settlement.
Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago, he
impugned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
won his case on that ground — the injustice then
committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera,
Diokno and Romero now being more generally
recognized — petitioner came to this Court to submit
his case to our jurisdiction.
The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint
with this Supreme Court is premised on this sharing the
conviction that said Tribunal is the last bulwark of the
rights and liberties of the people, the final arbiter on all
constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the
majesty of the law. That conviction and faith should not
be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more
imperatively nowadays when the majesty of the law,
the basic tenets of the Constitution, the principles of
humanity springing fromthe golden rule, which is the
law of laws, are being the subject of bold onslaughts
from many elements of society, bent on taking justice
in their own hands or on imposing their will through
fraud or violence. The malady is widespread enough to
imperatively and urgently demand a more complete
respect and faith in the effectiveness of our system of
administration of justice.
For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in
this case is to disappoint the believers in a philosophy
and social order based on constitutional processes and
on legal juridical settlement of all conflicts that may
beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of
this case that for this Court to refuse cognizance of it
may not have other alternative,if the pressure of public
opinion may fail — and by experience we know that it
had suffered many failures — than revolution. This
immeasurable responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it
should falter in the performance of its plain duty and
should dispose of this case with the indifference with
which a beach vacationist would dismiss a gust of
wind.
The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked,
to bind the hands of justice into futility, should not be
understood as absolute. It is an apt rule of the tri-
partite division of government as enunciated by
Aristotle and further developed by Montequieu, as the
best scheme to put in practice the system of check and
balance considered necessary for a workable
democracy. To make absolute that principle is to open
the doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three
separate governments within a government and three
independent states within a state. Indeed, it is to avoid
such a teratologiccreature that the Constitutional
Convention had not inserted among the principles
embodied in the fundamental law.
Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal
controversies is the inherent function of courts. The
Constitution of the United States of America, unlike our
own Constitution, is silent a to the power of courts of
justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress.
Notwithstanding the silence, when the proper case
arose, the United States Supreme Court, under the
wise leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, had not
hesitated in declaring null and void a law enacted in
contravention of constitutional provisions. The
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
should not fail to match such and outstanding evidence
of evidence of judicial statesmanship.
To bolster the stand against our assumption of
jurisdiction in this case the theory has been advanced
that, the President of the Philippines having recognized
respondent as a duly elected acting President of the
Senate, that recognition is final and should bind this
Court. The theory sprouts from the same ideology
under which a former king of England tried to order
Lord Coke how the latter should dispose of a pending
litigation. Our answer is to paraphrase the great
English judge by saying that nothing should guide us
except what in conscience we believe is becoming of
our official functions, disregarding completely what the
President of the Philippines may say or feel about it.
As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the
office. As in the present case, Congress may split into
two groups after a presidential election and each group
may proclaim a different candidate as the duly elected
Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken
ideas to the scope of the principle of separation of
powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall
we, as Pontious Pilate, wash our hands and let the
people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of
revolution?
There is absolutely no merit in invoking the
unfortunate decision in the case of Vera vs. Avelino,
(77 Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret more that
such a decision had been rendered than petitioner
himself, the very one whowon it upon the
pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of jurisdiction. The
more said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one
of the blemishes without which the escutcheon of the
post-liberation Supreme Court would be spotless.
We vote to render judgment granting the petition and
ordering respondent to relinquish the powers,
prerogative and privileges of the position of the
President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on
the other side, should be restrained from putting any
obstacle or obstruction by illegal adjournments or
otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily session of
the Senate. Said body should be allowed to continue
transacting official business unhampered by any
procedure intended to impede the free expressionof
the will of the majority.
BRIONES, M., dissente:
Sin perjuicio de redactar una opinion mas extensa
sobre mi voto en ese asunto, me permito adelantar las
siguientes observaciones:
(1) Esta Corte Suprema tiene jurisdiccion sobre el
asunto. — Reafirmo la posicion tomada por mi en los
asuntos de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192) y
Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1). La cuestion
constitutional y legal aqui debatida no es de caracter
puramente politico en el sentido de que esta Corte
deba inhibirse de enjuiciarla, sino que es
perfectamente justiciable. Se plantea la cuestion de si
el grupo de senadores que eligio al recurrido como
presidente interino del Senado tenia facultad para
hacerlo. Se alega y se sostiene que no existia dicha
facultad, puesto que cuando dicho grupo se reunio no
habia un quorum presente de conformidad con los
terminos de la Constitucion y de los reglamentos del
Senado. Esta cuestion es justiciable y puede y debe ser
enjuiciada, determinada y resuelta por esta Corte, ya
que la parte agraviada ha venido a nosotros en
demanda de remedio. Esta Corte no puede lavarse las
manos en un ademan de inhibicion pilatista; no puede
continuar con la politica de esconde-cabeza-en la
arena-del-desierto estilo aveztruz. El issue
constitucional y legal discutido es importante, muy
importante. Tiene repercusiones directas y vitalisimas
en la vida, libertad y hacienda de los ciudadanos. Es el
negocio supremo de legislar lo que esta en debate. Es,
por tanto, una de las esencias de la misma republica el
tema de la controversia. La escaramuza politica es lo
de menos; el meollo juridico-constitucional es lo
esencial e importante.
Es tanto mas urgente que esta Corte asuma
jurisdiccion sobre el caso cuanto que el conflicto
surgido en el Senado entre los dos grupos politicos en
guerra ha cobrado las proporciones de una tremenda
crisis nacional, preñada de graves peligros para la
estabilidad de nuestras instituciones politicas, para el
orden publico y para la integridad de la existencia de la
nacion.
Tenemos un precedente tipico en la jurisprudencia del
Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de America. Es
el caso de Werts vs. Rogers, del año 1894, Atlantic
Reporter, Vol. 28, p. 728, N. J. La analogia es completa.
Tambien se disputaban la presidencia del Senado dos
Senadores, cada cual pretendiendo ser al legitimo.
Tambien hubo dos facciones, cada cual reclamando
ostentar la genuina representacion popular. Un grupo
se llamo "Adrian Senate" y el otro grupo "Rogers
Senate", por los nombres de los presidentes en
disputa. Se arguyo igualmente que la Corte Suprema
de New Jersey no podia asumir jurisdiccion sobre el
caso por tratarse de una cuestion eminentemente
politica, por tanto no justiciable. La Corte, sin embargo,
conocio del caso y, por boca de su Presidente el
eminente jurisconsulto Mr. Beasley, hizo el siguiente
categorico pronunciamiento:
. . . . That this court has the legal right to
entertain jurisdiction in this case, displayed by
this record, we have no doubt; and we are
further of opinion that it is scarcely possible to
conceive of any crisis in public affairs that
would more imperatively than the present one
call for the intervention of such judicial
authority. (supra, p. 758.)
Ademas de la justiciabilidad de la materia en
controversia, una de las principales razones invocadas
por la Corte Suprema de New Jersey para asumir
jurisdiccion sobre el caso fue la extrema necesidad de
resolver un dead lock que paralizaba la maquinaria
legislativa, afectaba a la estabilidad del gobierno y
ponia en grave peligro los intereses publicos. Pregunto:
no existe la misma razon de extrema necesidad en el
presunto caso? que duda cabe de que el conflicto entre
las dos facciones en nuestro Senado esta afectando
seriamente a los intereses publicos? que duda cabe de
que la normalidad constitucional esta rota, con grave
preocupacion de todo el mundo y con grave daño de la
tranquilidad publica?
(2) El levantamiento de la sesion ordenado por el
presidente Avelino fue ilegal y arbitrario. — Estimo que
el presidente Avelino obro ilegal y arbitrariamente al
ordenar el levantamiento de la sesion frente a la
oposicion firme, energica y tenaz de algunos senadores
adversos a el. En vista de esta oposicion, el deber de la
Mesa era someter a votacion la mocion de
levantamiento de la sesion presentada por el Senador
Angeles David. Avelino no tenia el derecho, por si y
ante si, de declarar levantada la sesion. Solamente
cuando no se formula ninguna objection es cuando
rutinariamente el presiding officer puede dar por
aprobada una mocion de levantamiento de la sesion. Si
la facultad de levantar la sesion no estuviera sujeta a
la expresa voluntad de la mayoria, seria un arma
sumamente peligrosa en manos de un presidente
despotico y arbitrario.
La pretension de que el Senador Avelino ordeno el
levantamiento de la sesion en uso de sus facultades
inherentes, en vista de que el mismo creia que habia
un peligro inminente de desorden y tumulto en la sala
de sesiones, es completamente insostenible. Las
circunstancias del caso no justifican semejante
pretension, a tenor de las pruebas obrantes en autos.
Lo que debia haber hecho el Senador Avelino era tratar
de apaciguar al publico y prevenir todo conato de
desorden. Tenia medios para hacerlo. No lo hizo. En
cambio, dejo la silla presidencial juntamente con los
senadores de su grupo. Esto equivalia a una desercion
y los senadores del otro grupo tenian perfecto derecho
a proceder como procedieron, quedandose en el salo
para continuar celebrando la sesion. Esta sesion venia
a ser una tacita reconduccion — una simple
prolongacion de la sesion que habia sido declarada
abierta por el presidente Avelino con
un quorum presente de 22 miembros.
(3) Sin embargo, la sesion prolongada se convirtio en
ilegal por falta de quorum. — Es cosa establecida y
admitida por ambas partes que al reanudarse la sesion
estaban presentes los 12 miembros del grupo llamado
"Senado de Cuenco" mas tres senadores del grupo
llamado "Senado de Avelino". En esta coyuntura el
Senador Mabanag, del grupo de Cuenco, suscito la
cuestion del quorum, de cuyas resultas se ordeno por
el Senador Arranz, que entonces presidia la sesion, la
lectura de la lista. Tambien es cosa establecida en
autos y admitida por ambas partes que al comenzar
el roll call o lectura de la lista, lot tres senadores del
grupo de Avelino salieron del salon y solamente
respondieron al roll call los 12 senadores del grupo de
Cuenco.
Resulta evidente de estos hechos que no
habia quorum, por cuanto que componiendose el
Senado de 24 miembros debidamente elegidos y
cualificados, el quorum para celebrar sesion valida
debe ser de 13 miembros. Tanto la jurisprudencia
federal como la de los estados de la Union americana
esta repleta de decisiones en las que se ha sentado
firmemente la doctrina de que la base para determinar
el quorum legislativo es el numero totalde miembros
elegidos y debidamente cualificados de cada
camara.1 En el presente caso, como se ha dicho, ese
numero total es 24. Por tanto, el grupo Cuenco no
podia seguir celebrando validamente sesion, en vista
de la falta de quorum. De acuerdo con la Constitucion y
los reglamentos, el grupo Cuenco tenia ante si dos
caminos para actuar: (a) suspender la sesion de dia en
dia hasta obtener el necesario quorum; (b) o compeler
la asistencia de suficientes senadores del otro grupo
para constituir dicho quorum, pudiendo a dicho efecto
ordenar inclusive el arresto de los huelguistas.
(Constitucion de Filipinas, art. VI, sec. 10, ap.
2;2 Reglamento del Senado, Cap. VI, arts. 23 y 24.3) Asi
que todos los procedimientos efectuados por el grupo
Cuenco en dicha sesion eran nulos e ilegales.
Se ha insinuado que el cambio de fraseologia en el
precepto constitucional sobre quorum es significativo.
Efectivamente en el texto original de 1935 se decia lo
siguiente: "A majority of all the Members shall
constitute aquorum to do business" . . . , mientras que
en el texto enmendado de 1940 se dice: "A majority of
each House shall constitute a qurrum to do
business" . . . . De esto se quiere deducir la
consecuencia de que esta reforma habra sido por algo,
y este algo acaso sea la posibilidad de una base menor
de la totalidad de miembros para determinar la
existencia de un quorum. El argumento, a mi juicio, es
insostenible, por no llamarlo futil. Los autores de la
enmienda no han hecho mas que copiar literalmente la
fraseologia de la Constitucion federal americana; y ya
hemos visto que esta se ha interpretado en el sentido
de que señala, como base para determinar el quorum,
la totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de
cada camara. Por tanto, el cambio fraseologico, en vez
de denotar cambio en el significado, refuerza el sentido
tradicional de que la base para la determinacion
del quorumla totalidad de los miembros electos y
cualificados de cada camara. Aparte de que es
elemental en hermeneutica legal que una misma cosa
puede expresarse en terminos diferentes.
Tambien se ha insinuado, con bastante ingenio, que en
el caso que nos ocupa, la base mas racional para
elquorum es 23, excluyendo al Senador Confesor que
se halla en America, pero incluyendo al Senador Sotto,
que si bien no pudo estar presente en la sesion de
autos por estar gravemente enfermo, hallabase, sin
embargo, en Manila susceptible en cualquier momento
de ser llamado por el Senado. El fundamento de esta
opinion es que para la determinacion del quorum no
debe ser contado un miembro que esta fuera de la
accion coercitiva de la camara. La proposicion es
igualmente inaceptable. No solo no tiene ningun
precedente en la jurisprudencia, sino que es
convencional, arbitraria, sometiendo el quorum, que
debe ser algo permanente, a ciertas eventualidades y
contingencias. Hay que tener en cuenta que el
precepto constitucional y la regla pertinente no
establecen ninguna salvedad. Donde la ley no
distingue, no debemos distinguir.
(4) Cual es el remedio. — No cabe duda de que una
mayoria de Senadores tiene derecho a reorganizar el
Senado en la forma que les plazca, siempre que ello se
sujete a las normas prescritas por la Constitucion, las
leyes y los reglamentos. En el presente caso el grupo
Cuenco que al parecer forma la mayoria, por lo menos
hasta la fecha, tiene en sus manos los instrumentos
constitucionales y legales para efectuar una
reorganizacion. Puede convocar una sesion y compeler
la asistencia de un numero suficiente de Senadores
para formar quorum, ordenando el arresto si fuese
necesario de dichos senadores. Esto en el supuesto de
que el Senador Avelino y su grupo sigan boicoteando
las sesiones del Senado para impedir la existencia de
un quorum. Pero si el grupo Avelino acude
voluntariamente al Senado, entonces los dos grupos
pueden buenamente restaurar la normalidad
constitucional, procediendo a efectuar la
reorganizacion que desee y dicte la mayoria.
Hasta que esto se haga, el Senador Avelino es
tecnicamente presidente del Senado. Es verdad que
Avelino cometio una grave arbitrariedad ordenando el
levantamiento de la sesion sin derecho y facultad para
ello; pero una arbitrariedad no justifica otra
arbitrariedad; la de destituirle por medios
anticonstitucionales, ilegales y antireglamentarios. Los
motivos de la accion de Avelino y de la de sus
adversarios no nos interesan para nada ni caen dentro
de nuestra provincia; lo unico que nos concierne son
sus repercusiones juridicas.
Es de suma importancia, sobre todo en estos
momentos incipientes de la republica, el que
mantengamos rigida e implacablemente la integridad
de la Constitucion y de los procedimientos que
prescribe. Solo de esta manera podremos evitar el
ciego desbordamiento de las pasiones politicas y
personales, con todas sus funestas consecuencias. A
toda costa hay que impedir la formacion de un clima
politico, social o moral que facilite las cuarteladas, los
pronunciamientos, los golpes de mano y de estado
(coup d'main, coup d'etat) — eso que caracteriza la
historia azarosa de las llamadas "banana republicas".
Un 19 Brumario solamente se puede prevenir
imponiendo con todo rigor, sin blandas transigencias,
la observancia de la Constitucion y de las leyes y
reglamentos que la implementan.
Voto, por tanto, en favor de la concesion del recurso
interpuesto.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that
the twelve senators who elected Senator Cuenco
Acting President of the Senate did not constitute
a quorum and, consequently, that his election was
illegal.
It appears tome that the basis for computing
a quorum of the Senate is thenumber of senators who
have been elected and duly qualified and who have not
ceased to be senators by death or legal
disqualification. If this were not so, what is the
standard of computation? No satisfactory, reasonable
alternative has been or can be offered.
Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by
such absence, under the Constitution, a member of the
Senate loses his office, emoluments, and other
prerogatives, temporarily or permanently. There is no
claim that this happens when a senators' presence at
the session be the criterion, then serious illness or
being in a remote island with which Manila has no
regular means of communication should operate to
eliminate the sick or absent members from the
counting for the purpose of determining the presence
of a majority.
The distinction made between absentees form
legislative sessions who are in the Philippines and
absentees who are in a foreign country is, to my
arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the theoretical
and the practical by members of Congress are
sometimes found necessary to fulfill their missions. If
we test the interpretation by its consequences, its
unsoundness and dangers become more apparent. The
interpretation would allow any number of legislators,
no matter how small, to transact business so long as it
is a majority of the legislators present in the country.
Nothing in my opinion could have been farther from
the minds of the authors of the Constitution than to
permit, under circumstances, less than a majority of
the chosen and qualified representatives of the people
to approve measures that might vitally affect their
lives, their liberty, happiness and property. The
necessity of arresting absent members to complete
a quorum is too insignificant, compared with the
necessity of the attendance of an absolute majority, to
make unamenability to arrest a factor for ruling out
absentees who are beyond the legislature's process.
The Congress is eminently a law-making body and is
little concerned with jurisdiction over its members. The
power to order arrest is an emergency measure and is
rarely resorted to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if
the authority to arrest could always afford a
satisfactory remedy even in the cases of members who
were inside the Philippines territory. This is especially
true in the United States of America, after whose form
of government ours is patterned and whose territorial
possession extend to the other side of the globe.
This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs.
Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
(78 Phil., 1).
In those cases the petitions were directed against an
action of a recognized Senate exercising authority
within it own domain. Here the process sought is to be
issued against an appointee of a senate that, it is
alleged was not validly constituted to do business
because, among other reasons alleged, there was
not quorum. The Court is not asked to interfere with an
action of a coordinate branch of the government so
much as to test the legality of the appointment of the
respondent.
Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court
provides:
An action for usurpation of office of franchise
may be brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:
 (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created
by authority of law;
xxx xxx xxx
This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its
scope does not exclude officers appointed by the
legislative branch of the government. Although this
Court has no control over either branch of the
Congress, it does have the power to ascertain whether
or not one who pretends to be its officer is holding his
office according to law or the Constitution. Political
questions as a bar to jurisdiction can only be raised by
the supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one
of its creatures. (Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1,
12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of
the Senate appointed by different faction thereof and
contesting each other's right to the office, it would not
be the Senate by the Court which would be called upon
to decide the controversy. There is more reason for the
Court to intervene when the office of the President of
the Senate is at stake. The interest of the public are
being greatly imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a
speedy determination of the same is imperatively
demanded, in the interest of good government and
public order.
Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney
General, ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers' Reports,
annotated, 354, to which I am indebted for much of the
reasoning adduced in this dissent on the question of
this Court's jurisdiction.
March 14, 1949
RESOLUTION
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner in case G.R. L-2821, Jose Avelino vs. Mariano
J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice towriting later
an extended opinion, has resolved, by a majority of
seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light
of subsequent events whichjustify its intervention; and,
partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of
this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Mr.
JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice
Briones in their separate opinions, to declare that there
was a quorum at the session where respondent
Mariano J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate President.
The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's
pronouncement of the quorum upon the ground that,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case,the
constitutional requirement in that regard has become a
mere formalism,it appearing from the evidence that
any new session with a quorum wouldresult in the
respondent's election as Senate President, and that the
Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions,
has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino
group, but to no avail, because of the latter's
persistent effortsto block all avenues to constitutional
processes. For this reason, he believethat the group
has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is in
conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest.
The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that
respondent Mariano J. Cuencohas been legally elected
as Senate President and the petition is petition is
dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice
Bengzon dissents on the question of jurisdiction but
concurs on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of
jurisdiction but dissents on that on that of quorum.
Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of
jurisdiction and reserves his vote on the question
of quorum.
Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the
reasons for his vote.
FERIA, J., concurring:
In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil.,
192), the principal question raised was whether this
Supreme Court had jurisdiction to set aside the
Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners Vera,
Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as
members of the Senate, and compel the respondents
had no power to pass said resolution, because it was
contraryto the provisions of Sec. 11, Article VI, of the
Constitution, which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representative,
and provided that said Tribunal shall be judge of all
contestsrelating to the election returns and
qualifications of their respective members. Respondent
Avelino et al., who were represented by Senator
Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned
the jurisdiction of this Court to take this Court to take
cognizance of said case on the ground that the
question therein involved was a political question, and
petitioners Veraet al., who were represented by
Attorney Jose W. Diokno, who is now oneof the
attorneys for respondents, who now contends that this
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the present
case, then maintained that this Court had jurisdiction.
And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et
al., 78 Phil., 1, the question involved was whether it
was within the jurisdiction of this Court to take
cognizance of the case and prohibit the respondents
from enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both
Houses proposing an amendment to the Philippines to
be appended as an ordinance there", grantingcertain
rights to the citizens of the United states of American
in the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and
void because it was not passedby the vote of three-
fourths of the members of the Senate and House of
Representatives, voting separately, as required by Sec.
1, Art. XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of
Congress who were not allowed to take part had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been short of the necessary
three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners Mabanag et al. contended that the Court
had jurisdiction and the respondents maintained the
contrary on the ground that the question involved was
apolitical one and within the exclusive province of the
Legislature.
The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the
Courts of last resortfrom the State Constitution of the
United States of American, after which our owns is
patterned, has given rise to the distinction between
justiceable question which fall within the province of
the judiciary, and politicalquestions which are not
within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and are to be
decided, under the Constitution, by the People in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government,
except to the extent that the power to deal with such
question has been conferred upon the court byexpress
or statutory provision. Although it is difficult to define a
politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a
justiceable one, it has been generally held that the first
involves political rights which consist in the power to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment
or managementof the government of the government,
while justiceable questions are those which affect civil,
personal or property rights accorded to every member
of the community or nation.
Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial
Supremacy is the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate case and controversies that present
justiceable issues, which fall within the jurisdiction or
power allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is
a political one which comeswithin the exclusive sphere
of the legislative or executive department of the
Government to decide, the judicial department or
Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or
not the act of the Legislative or Chief Executiveis
against the Constitution. What determines the
jurisdiction of thecourts is the issue involved, and not
the law or constitutional provisionwhich may be
applied. Divorced from the remedy sought, the
declaration of this Court on the matter of
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of alegislative or
executive act, would be a mere advisory opinion,
without a coercive force.
Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs.
Governor General, 16 Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood, 45
Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, the
Supreme Court upheld the contention of said
respondent in both casesthat the question involved
was a political question and therefore this Court had no
jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice who held that
this Courthad jurisdiction, and dissented from the
decision of the majority.
When the present case was first submitted to us, I
concurred with the majority, in view of the ruling of the
Court in said two cases, which constitutes a precedent
which is applicable a fortiori to the present case and
must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the
doctrine or maxim of stare decisis, and in order to
escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce inAmerican
Commonwealth when he said that "The Supreme Court
has changed its colori.e., its temper and tendencies,
from time to time according to the political proclivities
of the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed
naturally from the habits of though they had formed
before their accession to the bench and from the
sympathy they could not but feel for the doctrineon
whose behalf they had contended." (The ANNALS of the
American Academyof Political and Social Science, May,
1936, p. 50).
Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling
favorable to his contention in the Vera-Avelino
case, supra, insist in his motion for reconsideration that
this Court assume jurisdiction and decide whether or
not there was quorum in session of the Senate of
February 21, 1949, and is willing to abide by the
decision of this Court (notwithstanding the
aforementioned precedent),and several of the Justices,
who have held before that this Supreme Courthad no
jurisdiction, now uphold the jurisdiction of this Court, I
gladly change my vote and concur with the majority in
that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the
present in accordance with my stand inthe above
mentioned cases, so as to establish in this country the
judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well.
But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution
sought to be reconsidered,that there was a quorum in
the session of the Senate of Senate of February
21,1949, for the following reasons:
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided
that "the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the
fact that said provision was amended in the
Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business,"
shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution
to basethe majority, not on the number fixed or
provided for the Constitution,but on actual members or
incumbents, and this must be limited to actual
members who are not incapacitated to discharge their
duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from
the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which
make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each
house is empowered to issue to compel itsmembers to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.
That the amendment was intentional or made for some
purpose, and not a mere oversight,or for considering
the use of the words "of all the members" as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5)
Title VI of the original Constitution which required
"concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member" was amended
by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitutional,
so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the members of each House". Therefore, as Senator
Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the
SEnate at its session of February 21, 1949, were
twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a
majority.
This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative
and judicial precedent. In the Resolution of both
Houses proposing an amendment of the Constitution of
the Philippines to be appended to the Constitution,
granting parity rightto American citizen in the
Philippines out of which the case of Mabanag vs.
Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in
computing the three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and the House of Representative
votingseparately, required by Sec. 1, Article XV of the
Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was
based, not on the number fixed or provided for in the
Constitution, but on the actual members who have
qualifiedor were not disqualified. And in the case
of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec.
1, subsection 2, of Act No. 3104, which
requiredunanimity of vote of the Supreme Court in
imposing death excepted from the court those
members of the Court who were legally disqualified
from the case, this Court held that the absence of the
Chief Justice Avanceña, authorized by resolution of the
Court, was a legal disqualification, and his vote was not
necessary in the determination of the unanimity of the
decision imposing death penalty.
PABLO, J., concurrente:
Aungue los Sres. Magistrados Paras, Feria, Bengzon y
yo, sosteniamos que este Tribunal no tenia jurisdiccion
sobre el asunto porque era de naturaleza
eminentemente politico, emitimos, sin embargo,
nuestra opinion de que los doce senadores
constituian quorum legal para tomar resoluciones.
Desde luego, la opinion no surtio el efecto deseado. La
huelga en el Senado continua. Los recientes
acontecimientos pueden trascender a peores, con sus
inevitables repercusiones dentro y fuera del pais.
Cuando las pasiones politicas no van por el cauce de la
prudencia pueden desbordase y causar fatales
consecuencias. Es un sano estadismo judicial evirtarlo
y, si es necesario, impedirlo.
El recurrente pide que se reconsideresa nuestra
dividida opinion. alegando que las divisiones civiles en
varias naciones han producido sangrientes luchas
fratricidas. Si no tuviera en cuenta mas que la solitud
original y los hechos probados, la mocion de
reconsideracion debe ser denegada en cuanto a mi
voto sobre la falta de jurisdiccion. La jurisdiccion no se
confiere por la simple solicitud de una parte, ni por la
anuencia de amas, sino por la ley o por la Constitucion.
La apelacion del recurrente de que este Tribunal
asuma jurisdiccion para evitar derramamiento de
sangre llega al corazon. Como magistrado, no deben
importante las consecuencias; pero como ciudadano,
me duele ver una lucha enconada entre dos grupos en
el Senado sin fin practico. Al pueblo interesa que la
Legislatura reanude su funcionamiento normal. Fuerza
es transigir, pues, para que haya seis votos que
sostengan que este Tribunal tiene jurisdiccion. Si
insisto en mi opinion anterior, fracasara todo esfuerzo
de reajustre de nuestras opiniones para dar fin a la
crisis en el Senado.
El Sr. Presidente del Tribunal y los Sres. Magistrados
Perfecto y briones opinian hoy que hubo quorum en la
continuacion de la sesion despues de la marcha del
Senador Avelino y compañeros. Con ellos, ya hay siete
votos que sostienen que las resoluciones votadas por
los doce senadores son legales y validas. pero para dar
fuerza legal a esta conclusion, es indispensable que el
tribunal la declare con jurisdiccion. Contribuyo mi
grando de arena a la feliz conclusion de un conflicto
que esta minando el interes publico: voto hoy por que
el Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para dar fuerza a mi
opinion anterior de que los doce senadores
formaban quorum.
De be denegarse la mocion de reconsideracion.
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
The problem of democracy must be faced not in the
abstract but as practical question, as part of the
infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be
considered as scientific propositions or hypothesis
independently from the actual workings of the
unpredictable flights of the spirit which seen to elude
the known laws of the external world. Experience
appears to be the only reliable guide in judging human
conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness
are complied in statistics for the study and
determination of human behavior, and statistics are
one of the means by which the teaching may render
their quota of contribution in finding the courses
leading to the individual well-being and collective
happiness.
The way this case has been disposed of by the
Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from many
quarters and sectors, is provenly far from being
conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We intended to
settle the controversy between petitioner and
respondent, but actually we left hanging in the air the
important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed
before us in quest of enlightenment and reasonable
and just in a quandary.
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has
been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary
functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the
non-attendance to sessions of about one-half of the
members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly
defied, and remained unexecuted like mere scraps of
paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be
arrested are prominent persons with well-known
addresses and residences and have been in daily
contact with news reporters and photographers. Farce
and mockery have been interspersed with actions and
movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed.
It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our
people that, notwithstanding the overflow of political
passions and the irreconcilable attitude of warring
factions, enough self-restraint has been shown to avoid
any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the
situation, as abstaining in the upper chamber of
congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the
House of the Representatives. It has already involved
in the House of the Representatives. It has already
involved the President of the Philippines. The situation
has created a veritable national crisis, and it is
apparent that solution cannot be expected from any
quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the
quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the
hopes of the people for an effective settlement are
pinned.
The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators
almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous in
belief that this Court should take jurisdiction of the
matter and decide the merits of the case one way or
another, and they are committed to abide by the
decision regardless of whether they believe it to be
right or mistaken. Among the members of the so-called
Cuenco group, there are several Senators who in not
remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) have shown their
conviction that in cases analogous to the present the
Supreme Court has and should exercise jurisdiction. If
we include the former attitude of the senator who is at
present abroad, we will find out that they are in all
eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another
recognized the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for
the settlement of such momentous controversies as
the one now challenging our judicial statesmanship,
our patriotism, our faith in democracy, the role of this
Court as the last bulwark of the Constitution.
In the House of Representatives unmistakable
statements have been made supporting the stand of
the eighteen (18) senators, or of three-fourths (3/4) of
the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and of the contention that we
should decide this case on the merits.
Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of
official inferiority complex. Consequently like its
parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on
notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an upshot
of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to
become unable to have a healthy appraisal of reality in
its true form.
It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an
abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in the
Alejandrinovs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely
devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a colonial
Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the
masters. That explains its glaring inconsistencies.
Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in
Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned
after the colonial philosophy pervading the decision in
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial
emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to
ripen into maturityif it has to be true to its role as
spokesman of the collective conscience, of the
conscience of humanity.
For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction
in the case is toviolate the Constitution. Refusal to
exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress
the fundamental law. This case raises vital
constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or
decide if this Court should refuse to decide them. It
would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom,
foresight and statesmanship of our Constitutional
Convention to have drafted a document leaving such a
glaring hiatus in the organization of Philippine
democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court
the authority to decide such constitutional questions.
Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as
unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike to
attend the sessions of the Senate and toperform their
duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the legislative
powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial
walkouts are even more harmful than a laborers' strike
or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally
while laborers temporarily stop to work. Society may
not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery.
But society is menaced with dissolution in the absence
of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy and
chaos are its alternatives.
There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or
walkout by the highest organs and officers of
government. If they should fail to perform their
functions and duties, what is the use for minor officials
and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional
question of quorum should not be leftunanswered.
Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators
constitute the majority requiredfor the
Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal
changes made in the constitutional amendment, upon
the creation of Congress to replace the National
Assembly, have not affected the substance of the
constitutional concept of quorum in both the original
and amended contexts. The words "all the members"
used in the original, for the determination of
thequorum of the National Assembly, have been
eliminated in the amendment, as regards the house of
Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. The
writer of this opinion, as Member of the Second
National Assembly and in his capacity as Chairman of
the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who
proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because
"majority of each House" can mean only the majority of
the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that
is, of all the members.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as
such, a precise and exactmathematical meaning. A
majority means more than one-half (½). It can neverbe
identified with one-half (½) or less than one-half (½). It
involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis
between more and less is etched in the background of
reality as a metaphysical absolute as much as the
antithesis of all opposites, and in the same way that
the affirmative cannot be confused with the negative,
the creation with nothingness, existence withnon-
existence, truth with falsehood.
The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators.
The majority of said senators cannot be less than
thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not constitute the
majority in a group composed of twelve four (24) units.
This is so evident that is not necessary to have the
mathematical genius of Pythagoras, Euclid, Newton
and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school student
may immediately perceive it.
No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly
will convince anyone that one of the two equal number
constitute a majority part of the two numbers
combined. The five (5) fingers of one hand cannot be
the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two
hands. Majority is incompatiblewith equality. It implies
the idea of superiority.
Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a
derivative of the Latin "magnus," meaning great.
Majority means the greater of two numbers that are
regarded as part of a total: the number greater than
half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater
part or portion. It presupposes the existence of a total
and, in the present case, the total number of twelve
four (24) senators composing the Senate.
The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are
now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing respondent merely as Acting of the Senate,
asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum created by
petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer
by his walked in the session of February 21, 1949, the
presence of the twelve (12) senators was
enough quorum.
The Constitution provides:
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel
the attendance of absent members in such
manner and under such penalties as such
House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article VI.)
The "smaller number" referred to in the above
provision has to act collectively and cannot act as
collective body to perform the function specially vested
in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among
theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said
"smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the
attendance of absent member in such manner and
underpenalties as such House may provide," so as to
avoid disruption in the functions of the respective
legislative chamber. Said "smaller number" maybe
twelve or even less than twelve senators to constitute
a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting
president, who will have to act until normalcy is
restored.
As events have developed after the decision in this
case has been rendered on March 4, 1949, the picture
of the petitioner's attitude has acquired clearerand
more definite form, and that picture brings us to the
conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.
At the hearing of this case for the reception of
evidence before Mr. Justice Bengzon, Senator Mariano
J. Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-examination
bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel for petitioner,
manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to
renounce the position of Acting President of the
Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the petitioner,
should attend the sessions. He would only make of
record his protest, and never resort to force or violence
to stop petitioner from presiding over said sessions.
The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside
over the sessions was made by respondent under oath
twice, and petitioner, although he refused to attend the
hearing of this case, so much so that, instead of
testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the
rules of procedure, is inadmissible as incompetent and
is as valueless as an empty gesture, could not fail to
learn about respondent's testimony, because it was
given publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and
petitioner's counsel, Senator Francisco, would certainly
not have failed to inform him about it.
Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner
failed to take advantage of it and continues to refuse
to attend the sessions of the Senate since he and his
group of senators have walked out from the historic
Monday session of February 21, 1949.
If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over
the sessions of the Senate, for which reason he has
sought the help of the Supreme Court, why has he
failed to take advantage of the commitment made
under oath by respondent since February 26, 1949?
Why has he, since then, been not only failing but
refusing to attend the sessions and preside over them?
Why is it that petitioner and his group of Senators have
given occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the
Cuenco group to issue warrants of arrest to remedy the
lack of quorum that has been hampering the sessions
of the Senate? Why is it that the Senate sergeant-at-
arms, his subordinates and the peace officers helping
him, have to be hunting for the senators of the Avelino
group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical endeavor to
compel them to attend the sessions?
The events that have been unfolding before our eyes,
played up everyday in screaming headlines in all
newspapers and of which, by their very nature, we
cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered, weighed
and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the
Friday and Monday sessions, February 18 and 21,
1949, have driven into our mind the conviction that,
powers and prestige which command the position of
President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest
desire to preside over the sessions of the Senate, the
most characteristic and important function of President
of the Senate.
His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding
respondent's commitment to allow him to preside over
them, can and should logically be interpreted as an
abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.
(Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De
Guzman, 49 Phil., 371; 46 Corpus Juris p. 980-981;
Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43
American Jurisprudence p. 27).
What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the
Senate sessions? What are his group's reason? They
say that they want a square decision on the merits of
this case, for which reason the motion for
reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe
that the Supreme majority vote, to exercise jurisdiction
in this case, and the inconsistency in the position taken
by some Members of the majority has only increased
public bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner
and his group to sabotage the sessions of the Senate.
If this Court had decided this case as the four
dissenters would have it, there cannot be any doubt
that the Senate impasse would have been settled
many days ago and, with it, the present national crisis
hampering and armstringing the legislative
machinery. .
The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The
showings of open defiance to warrants of arrest are
highly demoralizing. People are asking and wondering
if senators are placed above the law that they can
simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the
authority of the officers entrusted with the execution.
Threats of violence pervade the air. Congress is
neglecting the public interests that demand remedial
legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of
bewilderment, of strife would have ended if, for the
reasons we have stated in our dissenting opinion, the
Supreme Court would have ordered petitioner's
reposition.
Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be
the President of the Senate, he would certainly have
attended the Senate sessions to preside over them.
Then the sessions with senators of the Avelino group
attending, would have been held with the
constitutional quorum. The twelve senators of the
Cuenco group would have the opportunity of voting
solidly to ratify or to reenact all the disputed actuations
of the rump session of February 21, 1949, and there is
no doubt that they would have succeeded in ousting
petitioner and electing respondent to the position of
President of the Senate.
Everything then would have followed the normal
course. With the presence of a clear and
unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his followers
would have no ground for any complaint, and
respondent could have assumed the Senate's
presidency without any hitch.
Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group
might have resorted again to the same strategy,
by quorum the rump session of February 21, 1949, but
it is not probable that they would have taken the same
course of action after this Court, almost unanimously
declared that petitioner's action in adjourning the
session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and illegal.
At any rate, the Senators of the Cuenco group would
have been by then well prepared to have orders of
arrest ready for immediate execution before the
striking senators could leave the building housing the
session hall.
The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped
at once. Legislation must go on. The serious charges
filed or may be filed against petitioner, respondent and
other senators demand imperatively investigation and
action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty
ones. Public interest cannot demand less.
Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title
to claim the position in controversy. This result will not
legally or practically close any door for him to again
seek the position by attending the sessions of the
Senate and by securing a majority that would support
him in his bid.
The motion for reconsideration should be denied.
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN
HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E.
TAÑADA, and RONALDO B.
 ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE
VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO,
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition
challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called “sin taxes”
(actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of
beer and cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority
Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are “constitutionally
mandated” so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of
Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved
on third reading on September 12, 1996 and
transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate
which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted
its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,
1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means,
proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento
was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep.
Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a
head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker
Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.[1] Rep.
Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion
was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of
the sponsor thereafter proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to
interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep.
Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep.
Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a
question on the quorum, although until the end of his
interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter
is shown in the following transcript of the session on
November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives,
as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we
now approve and ratify the conference
committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any
objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There
being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr.
Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what
is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was
a motion by the Majority Leader for
approval of the report, and the Chair
called for the motion.
MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I
wanted to object.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The
session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The
session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn
until four o’clock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The
session is adjourned until four o’clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been
finally passed by the House of Representatives and by
the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four
different versions of the transcript of this portion of
Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-
sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall
immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound
system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November
21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the
transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40
p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of
the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published
version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the
four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the
audio-sound recording the word “approved,” which
appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot
be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November
21, 1996 the word “no” on line 17 appears only once,
while in the other versions it is repeated three times;
and (3) the published version does not contain the
sentence “(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I
will raise the question of the quorum,” which appears
in the other versions.
Petitioners’ allegations are vehemently denied by
respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this
point as petitioners have announced that, in order to
expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit,
without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts
relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that
for purposes of this proceeding the word “approved”
appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of
Representatives on the conference committee report
on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners’ principal
argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House; that these rules embody the “constitutional
mandate” in Art. VI, §16(3) that “each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings” and that,
consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation
of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in
violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the
rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the House, did not call
for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its approval
by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from
questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation
of Rule XIX, §112,[3] the Chair deliberately ignored Rep.
Arroyo’s question, “What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?” and
did not repeat Rep. Albano’s motion to approve or
ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97,[4] the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead
proceeded to act on Rep. Albano’s motion and
afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in
violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and
Rule XVIII, §109,[5] the Chair suspended the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo’s question which, it
is alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It
is argued that Rep. Arroyo’s query should have been
resolved upon the resumption of the session on
November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary
situation at the time of the adjournment remained
upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was
hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996
and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to
prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a
reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the
certification of the Speaker of the House that the law
had been properly passed, considering the Court’s
power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave
abuse of discretion by the other departments of the
government, and they ask for a reexamination of
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the
changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of
all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia
filed a supplemental comment. Respondents’ defense
is anchored on the principle of separation of powers
and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the
Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
the rules of the House and that there is no justification
for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although
the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the
adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings,
enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the
courts except insofar as they implement constitutional
requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill
which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as
well as parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere motion, were
faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De
Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is
false and spurious and contends that under the journal
entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners
is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of
Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20
and 21, 1996, shows that “On Motion of Mr. Albano,
there being no objection, the Body approved the
Conference Committee Report on House Bill No.
7198.”[7] This Journal was approved on December 2,
1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman.[8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the
Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A.
No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that
what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment
of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure
of the House rather than constitutional requirements
for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-
27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum
but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation
of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were
adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that
“each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings”[9] and that for this reason they are
judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention
stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,
[10]
the constitutional provision that “each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings” was invoked by
parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct
its business free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose
of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying
forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: “At
any rate, courts have declared that ‘the rules adopted
by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.’ And it has been said that
‘Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body.’ Consequently, ‘mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.’”
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule
was stated thus: “The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule
that a different one has been prescribed and in force
for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by
the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal.”
In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: “The
provision that each House shall determine the rules of
its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a
mere formulation of standing rules, or to the
proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters;
but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and
when exercised by a majority of
constitutionalquorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action
as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise
of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in
the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution.”
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,
[14]
the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: “The provision
for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-
matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the
courts of last resort of many states, and also by the
United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will
not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules.”
In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: “The
Constitution declares that each house shall determine
the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all
powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a
free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are
the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the
House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it
would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence
of the legislative department for the court to set aside
such action as void because it may think that the
House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules
of procedure.”
In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held: “When it appears that an act was so
passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain
whether the two houses have or have not complied
strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the
bill, intermediate its introduction and
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have
done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of
the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules
of procedure made by itself, or the respective branches
thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at
will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to
follow them.”
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in
these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided
for three readings on separate days before a bill may
be passed by each house of the legislature, with the
proviso that in case of an emergency the house
concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the
operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the
district court of violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling
statute was not properly passed by the legislature
because the suspension of the rule on three readings
had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds
vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the
legislature should read a bill in any particular
manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as
it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or in
violation thereof, or without making any rules. The
provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory
provision for the direction of the legislature in its action
upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force
from legislative sanction, and it exists only at
legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to
a properly weigh and consider an act, its passage
through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be
reasons for the governor withholding his signature
thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a
violation of a rule which the legislature had made to
govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the
court’s refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature,
and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature void on account of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself
to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis.
407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W.
187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway
Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary
of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando,
commenting on the power of each House of Congress
to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The
prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other
than members of the legislative body the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private
rights are involved.[18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are
final involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the
dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members
of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long
as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three
departments of our government has its separate
sphere which the others may not invade without
upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working
of our system of government, more than mere comity,
compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the
House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to
exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion’s sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, “nothing
involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of
the government] amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is beyond judicial review.”[19] Implicit in this
statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is
subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art.
VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in
the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has
broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas
normally left to the political departments to decide,
such as those relating to national security, [20] it has not
altogether done away with political questions such as
those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As
we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s
function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of]
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to
look into what it thinks is apparent error.[21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature void on account
merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made
by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has
“gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our
Art. VIII, §1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the
law in the House was “railroaded.” They claim that
Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when
the latter declared Rep. Albano’s motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,
Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval
and ratification of the conference committee
report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none,
approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is
that . . . Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion,
the approval of the conference committee report had
by then already been declared by the Chair,
symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the
rules of the House, Rep. Albano’s motion for the
approval of the conference committee report should
have been stated by the Chair and later the individual
votes of the Members should have been taken. They
say that the method used in this case is a
legislator’s nightmare because it suggests unanimity
when the fact was that one or some legislators
opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been
cited which specifically requires that in cases such as
this involving approval of a conference committee
report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct
a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as
the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198
was approved was by no means a unique one. It has
basis in legislative practice. It was the way the
conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the
Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being
contrary to the rules of the House. The point was
answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and
his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr.
Tolentino said:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter
of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the
procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then
a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the
gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude
is now on his point of order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a substantial
compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my
mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote
by saying “Is there any objection?” and nobody
objects, then the Chair announces “The bill is approved
on second reading.” If there was any doubt as to the
vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So,
if that motion is not presented, we assume that the
House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a
division of the House he can always ask for it, and the
Chair can announce how many are in favor and how
many are against.[22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate
and even more just.[23] The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not
present any matter for judicial consideration.[24] In the
words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, “this Court
cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best
procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem
that is properly tendered to individual congressional
actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as
a whole and for the constitutional command that the
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs
precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem.”[25]
Nor does the Constitution require that
the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every
time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,
[26]
at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
[27]
and in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members
by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would
have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from
seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of
the session.[29] It would appear, however, that the
session was suspended to allow the parties to settle
the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on
that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything
anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader
moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of
the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have
objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The
fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of
November 21, 1996 of the House shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the
Chair declared the session adjourned until four o’clock
in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996.
(emphasis added)
This Journal was approved on December 2,
1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except
Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners’ predicament
was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting
the proper motions for the House to act upon,
petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo’s
question as an obstacle to the passage of the
bill. But Rep. Arroyo’s question was not, in form or
substance, a point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyo’s
question were so, Rep. Albano’s motion to adjourn
would have precedence and would have put an end to
any further consideration of the question.[31]
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can
plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the
House be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase “grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction”
has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As
Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this
provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII,
§1 extends to cases where “a branch of the
government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.”[32]
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter
of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not
that there was noquorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of
a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for
lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly — especially when the quorum is
obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.[33] Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor
for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence
of a quorum.[34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111
members of the House earlier found to be present on
November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in
this case, are questioning the manner by which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo,
appears to have objected to the manner by which the
report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not
participate in the bicameral conference committee
proceedings.[35] Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora
objected to the report[36] but not to the manner it was
approved; while it is said that, if voting had been
conducted, Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor of
the conference committee report.[37]
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the
signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the
separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice
Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is
no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT
cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the
enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In
one case[38] we “went behind” an enrolled bill and
consulted the Journal to determine whether certain
provisions of a statute had been approved by the
Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the
contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been
duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to
determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to
pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had
not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated bill
or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on
the courts.”[39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on
Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if
old-fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with
the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings
of Legislatures. They have set such store by the
Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made
them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in
the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful
Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they
should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by
asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll
may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into
allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President
contained provisions which had been “surreptitiously”
inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures
for the passage of bills have not been observed have
no more basis than another allegation that the
Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should
decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of
the bill. To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such
cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government.[41]
It has refused to look into charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in
violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that
“upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be
allowed.” [42]
In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims
that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified
by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is
well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests
on the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a
bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face,
a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively,
with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that
it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal
and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the court to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.[45]
To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent
urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our
cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to
warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that,
with a change in the membership of the Court, the
three new members may be assumed to have an open
mind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually,
not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and
Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our
decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since
been taken by four new members (Francisco,
Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners
are thus simply banking on the change in the
membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment
of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the
House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that
day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the
Constitution. Art. VI, §16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and
from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security;
and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect
to matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in
United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals
as “public memorials of the most permanent
character,” thus: “They should be public, because all
are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time,
by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.” As
already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is
shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has
been duly proven.
___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court
either to set aside a legislative action as void because
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints,
real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would
be acting in excess of its power and would itself be
guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do
so. The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the
enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of
R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any
House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference
rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.[49]
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR.,
VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO
G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO,
ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO
G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA,
TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ,
and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as
members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla
San Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida
K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created
by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of
such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his
parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally,
that said members of the special committee be
enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it,
particularly the portion authorizing them to require him
to substantiate his charges against the President with
the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show
cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No.
59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the
House of Representatives from the Second
District of the province of Cebu, took the floor
of this chamber on the one hour privilege to
deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the
Congressman from the Second District of Cebu
stated the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing
of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get
from the government are now for sale at
premium prices. They say that even pardons
 are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit
can always be bailed out forever from jail as
long as he can come across with a handsome
dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation
would reflect badly on the kind of justice that
your administration is dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from
the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in
truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the
Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one
visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino
people, and would expose said office to
contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that
a special committee of fifteen Members to be
appointed by the Speaker be, and the same
hereby is, created to investigate the truth of
the charges against the President of the
Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña,
Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960,
and for such purpose it is authorized to
summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to
appear before it to substantiate his charges, as
well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena
duces tecum to require the attendance of
witnesses and/or the production of pertinent
papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to
show cause why he should not be punished by
the House. The special committee shall submit
to the House a report of its findings and
recommendations before the adjournment of
the present special session of the Congress of
the Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña
alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in the House; second, his words constituted
no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up
other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of
House provides that if other business has intervened
after the member had uttered obnoxious words in
debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be
subject to censure by the House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts
of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's
jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter
further, and required respondents to answer, without
issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of
such circumstance with its implications, and pressed
for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the
legislative session, the special committee continued to
perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña
a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on
July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of
serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such
report, the House approved on the same day—before
closing its session—House Resolution No. 175,
declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending
him from office for fifteen months.
Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the
exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres
Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer,
challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline
its members with suspension, upheld a House
Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the
fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18,
1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole
respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a
privilege speech delivered before the House, made the
serious imputations of bribery against the President
which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he
refused to produce before the House Committee
created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such
imputations. There is also no question that for having
made the imputations and for failing to produce
evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of
the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen
months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created
under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly
behaviour for making without basis in truth and
in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and
irresponsible charges against the President of
the Philippines in his privilege speech of June
23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in
character that they affronted and degraded the
dignity of the House of Representative: Now,
Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives.
That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as
he hereby is, declared guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and . . .
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition
that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in
the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his
speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which
he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be
questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost
the power to do so because it had taken up other
business before approving House Resolution No. 59.
Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the
House has no power, under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that
"for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representative "shall not
be questioned in any other place." This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the
Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that
although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in
Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be
questioned in any other place" than Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner
himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for
words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as
the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may
occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this
country from the practices of Parliamentary as
construed and applied by the Congress of the United
States. Its extent and application remain no longer in
doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative
body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was
censured for using the following language on the floor
of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most
infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous
Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799).
Two other congressmen were censured for employing
insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents,
799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was
summoned to testify on a statement made by him in
debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The
Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-
124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament
or of Congress have been, or could be censured,
committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of
their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply
attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding
the practice and the traditional power of legislative
assemblies to take disciplinary action against its
members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a
legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in
April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of
Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall
apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House
may no longer take action against me, he argues,
because after my speech, and before approving
Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business.
Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was
unanimously approved by the House, that such
approval amounted to a suspension of the House
Rules, which according to standard parliamentary
practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may
suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not,
however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take
action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to
laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The
Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such
laws as against the contention that they impaired
vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold
divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to
revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them."5 And it has been said that
"Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
their observancem, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body."
Consequently, "mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited
number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the
Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary
procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is
within the power of all deliberative bodies to
abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of
procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of
business, and as security against hasty action.
(Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433;
Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of
Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W.
276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend.
[N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell,
196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St.
Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of
Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888;
McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W.
632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145
Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.)
[Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of
Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of
Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the
Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was
presented, the House approved the resolution, despite
the argument that other business had intervened after
the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp.
799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches
attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many
arguments pro and con have been advanced. We
believe, however, that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but
which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For
one thing, if this Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed
appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the
Government. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within
its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature.
— The principle is well established that the
courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case
amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature since each
department is equally independent within the
power conferred upon it by the
Constitution. . . . .
 The general rule has been applied in other
cases to cause the courts to refuse to
intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is
given the power to example a member, the
court will not review its action or revise even a
most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur.,
Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged
the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905,
several senators who had been expelled by the State
Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed
mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement,
alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a
chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges
of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to
interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial
department has no power to revise even the
most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house
thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by
the Constitution. It has been held by high
authority that, even in the absence of an
express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general
legislative power of the state
has the implied power to expel a member for
any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec.
768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every
legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions,
and is necessary to the safety of the state;'
'That it is a power of self-protection, and that
the legislative body must necessarily be the
sole judge of the exigency which may justify
and require its exercise. '. . . There is no
provision authority courts to control, direct,
supervise, or forbid the exercise by either
house of the power to expel a member. These
powers are functions of the legislative
department and therefore, in the exercise of
the power this committed to it, the senate is
supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or
control the legislature, or either house thereof,
in the exercise of the power, would be an
attempt to exercise legislative functions, which
it is expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those
lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles
controlling this litigation. Although referring to
expulsion, they may as well be applied to other
disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at
bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have
no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers
as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative
chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to
disregard the allocation of constitutional functions
which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the
interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a
conscientious survey of governing principles and/or
episodic illustrations, we found the House of
Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions, that personal
attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in
several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been
considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's
power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In
1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate,
suspended from office for 12 months because he had
assaulted another member of the that Body or certain
phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a
debate. The Senator applied to this Court for
reinstatement, challenging the validity of the
resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the
separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel
the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went
on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the
resolution because suspension for 12 months
amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which
the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no
power to remove an appointive member, like Senator
Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that
"each house may punish its members for disorderly
behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note
particularly the word "elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the
Governor General to appoint "without consent of the
Senate and without restriction as to residence senators
. . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth
District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter
dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district
of representation without that district being afforded
any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that
remark should be understood to refer particularly to
the appointive senator who was then the affected party
and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the
duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the
view of the Government of the United States or of the
Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the
Legislature had only those power which were granted
to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has
the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a
sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case,
the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones
Law did not give the Senate the power it then
exercised—the power of suspension for one year.
Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the
inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which
the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already
pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator
for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine
Congress is plenary, subject only to such
limitations are found in the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be
legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless
the Constitution provides otherwise.
(Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the
deprivation of the district's representation can not be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the
case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative
bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one criminally approve the application for legalization of
of their members to jail.12 aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1,
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated
petition intended to prevent the Special Committee April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of
from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. the same, thereby causing undue injury to the
Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
Committee performed its task, reported to the House, advantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the
and the latter approved the suspension order. The official and administrative functions of said accused.
House had closed it session, and the Committee has " CONTRARY TO LAW.
ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the "Manila, Philippines, 9 May, 1991.”[2]
case should be dismissed for having become moot or On May 19, 1994, the prosecution filed an
academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent amended Information, which reads:
petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all “x x x
members of the House as respondents, ask for "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior
reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and
cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
however, will be a pronouncement of lack of MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Qeuaon.15 Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official
important questions of political law, the Court thought functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such criminally approve the application for legalization of
issues as were deemed relevant and decisive. the stay of the following aliens:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby 1. Jhamtani, Shalini Narendra
dismissed. So ordered. 2. Ting Siok Hun
[G.R. No. 123792. March 8, 1999] 3. Ching Suat Liong Ting
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. 4. Cu Kui Pein Uy
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND 5. Cu Kui Pwe Uy
PEOPLE OF THE 6. Hong Shao Guan
PHILIPPINES, respondents. 7. Hong Xiao Yuan
DECISION 8. Xu Li Xuan
PARDO, J.: 9. Qui Ming Xia Ong
The case before the Court is a special civil action 10. Wu Sui Xin Quiu
for certiorari with preliminary injunction or temporary 11. Wu Hong Guan Qiu @ Betty Go
restraining order assailing the resolutions of the 12. Wu Hong Ru Qiu @ Mary Go
Sandiganbayan, First Division,[1] which ordered the 13. Xu Yin Yin Kua
reopening of Criminal Case No. 16698 against 14. Hong Shao Hua Xu
petitioner, after the parties had stipulated on the facts 15. Hong Shao Wei Xu
and formally offered their respective evidence, and 16. Lu Shi Qing
accused had filed her memorandum. The 17. Lu Shi Tian
Sandiganbayan reasoned that it reopened the case to 18. Lu Se Chong
allow the prosecution to present a complaining witness 19. Shi Qing Yu
"to bring the case to its proper perspective" which is 20. Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin
irrelevant to the agreed issues in the case. Worse, the 21. Xu Pinting
Sandiganbayan did not give the accused an 22. Wang Xiu Jin
opportunity to rebut the proposed testimony of the 23. Cai Pian Pian
prosecution witness. 24. Cai Wen Xu
We grant the petition. 25. Cai Min Min
The facts may be related as follows: 26. Cai Ping Ping
In 1988, petitioner Miriam Defensor Santiago was, 27. Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez
as alleged in the information, the duly appointed and 28. Yen Liang Ju @ Joslyn Gan
qualified Commissioner of Immigration and 29. Cai Ya Nan
Deportation. However, in the May 8, 1995 elections, 30. Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan
she was duly elected Senator of the Philippines, and is 31. So Chen Yueh-O
presently serving her term of six (6) years. 32. Cai Ya Rong
On May 13, 1991, Special Prosecution Officer who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in
Gualberto J. de la Llana filed with the Sandiganbayan, violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13,
assigned to the First Division, an Information charging 1988 which prohibits the legalization of the said
Miriam Defensor Santiago with violation of R. A. 3019, disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens
Section 3 (e), as amended, committed as follows: are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits
“x x x to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime unlawfully legalized by said accused.
prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and “CONTRARY TO LAW.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused "Manila, Philippines, May 19, 1994."[3]
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the At the arraignment on June 27,1994, the accused
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and entered a plea of not guilty.[4] Consequently, the
Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest Sandiganbayan scheduled the case for pre-trial
partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and conference on August 29, 1994 at 8:00 a.m.[5] On
August 29, 1994, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
parties to inform it by October 10, 1994, whether or
not they intended to present other evidence more
particularly testimonial evidence.[6]
On January 7, 1995, the parties submitted to the
Sandiganbayan, a stipulation of facts, worded as
follows:
“x x x
“1. Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport
Requirements for Immigrants under Certain
Conditions", dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to Section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as
amended, the Philippines Immigration Act of 1940,
which provides that:
" Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the
President is authorized:
"(a) when the public interest so warrants:
xxx xxx xx
x possession of the parties, they will, respectively, make
(3) to waive the passport requirements for
immigrants, under such conditions as he may
prescribe."
" 2. Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien
may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation for waiver of passport requirements during
a 12-month period beginning on a date to be
designated by the Commissioner.
" 3. The Order provides, among other things, that the
alien " must establish that he entered the Philippines
before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided
continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status
from such date to the filing of his application".
" 4. Accused Miriam Defensor Santiago, as the then
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, was
authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to
apply and administer and enforce its provisions.
“5. Except for Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez who
arrived on July 26, 1975 (Exh. "AA") and So Chen
Yueh-O who arrived on May 9, 1979 (Exh." EE"), the
persons named in the information as having been
admitted by the Board of Commissioners of the
Commission on Immigration, presided by accused
Miriam Defensor Santiago, entered the Philippines after
January 1, 1984.
"6. Except for Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez and
So Chen Yeah-O, the persons named in the information
applied jointly with their husbands/fathers/mothers
who were themselves qualified, having entered the
Philippines before January 1, 1984.
"7. As Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation,
accused Miriam Defensor Santiago, is empowered
under paragraph 11 of Executive Order No. 324 to
waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act
"for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or
for public interest."
" 8. The Board of Commissioners of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, composed of accused
Miriam Defensor Santiago and two (2) Associate
Commissioners, waived the passport requirements of
alien wives and minor children, arriving after January
1, 1984, of qualified aliens who had themselves arrived
in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of
Executive Order No. 324 for humanitarian purposes in
the interest of allowing family unity.
" 9. The main issue in this case is whether the accused
Miriam Defensor Santiago had the right to waive the
requirement in Executive order No. 324 that the alien
applicant" must establish that he entered the
Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that he has
resided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful
status from such date to the filing of his application."
"Manila, Philippines, January 7, 1994."[7]
On January 30, 1995, the parties submitted
supplemental stipulations and motion for time to file
written formal offer of evidence and memorandum, the
full text of which is as follows:
" 1. The accused admits the genuineness and due
execution of all the exhibits which were pre-marked by
the prosecution on September 29, 1994, Exhibits "A" to
"NN", inclusive, together with all their sub-markings.
“ 2. The prosecution admits the genuineness and due
execution of all the exhibits which were pre-marked by
the accused on October 25, 1994, Exhibits "1" to "
17", inclusive, together with all their sub-markings.
" 3. Since the aforementioned exhibits are still in the
a formal offer of the same in writing within fifteen (15)
days from today.
" 4. The parties will file their respective memorandum
and reply memorandum after the above documentary
evidence shall have been admitted by the Honorable
Court."[8]
Nonetheless, the parties did not indicate whether
or not they would present any testimonial evidence.
On January 31, 1995, the Sandiganbayan gave the
parties fifteen (15) days within which to formally offer
their respective documentary evidence, thirty (30)
days after receipt of the ruling on the offer to submit
their respective memoranda and fifteen (15) days
thereafter to file their reply if they so
desire. Thereafter, the case will be deemed submitted
for resolution.[9] On May 25, 1995, the prosecution filed
with the Sandiganbayan a Manifestation and Motion
praying the court to reopen the case to allow the
prosecution to present witnesses "to bring the case to
its proper perspective in the light of the admission of
the exhibits already marked and admitted by the
Honorable Court."
On June 19, 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to
the manifestation and motion arguing that the motion
was out of place as the prosecution had rested its case
with its formal offer of evidence, that the exhibits were
public documents which were self evident, that there
were only legal issues involved, and the testimonial
evidence to be introduced would be immaterial and
irrelevant to the agreed issues in the case.
On August 3, 1995, respondent Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution ordering a reopening of the case,
and allowing the prosecution to present the testimony
of complainant Rodolfo Pedellaga to show the
accused's "evident bad faith and manifest partiality."
On August 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's resolution
dated August 3, 1995.
On January 25, 1996, respondent Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
On March 11, 1996, we required respondents to
comment on the petition. On June 5, 1996,
respondents, through The Special Prosecutor, Office of
the Ombudsman, filed their comment.
We now resolve to give due course to the petition.
We recognize that even after the parties have
closed their evidence, the court in its discretion may
re-open the case for the reception of further
evidence. However, such re-opening must not
prejudice the accused or deny him the opportunity to
introduce counter evidence.[10]
In this instance, we find no well-grounded reason
for the Sandiganbayan to re-open the case to allow the
prosecution to adduce testimonial evidence to show
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality" of the
accused.
First, the parties agreed that there were no factual
issues involved; only questions of law.
Second, the proposed testimony of complainant
Pedellaga that the accused "berated" him and ordered
him to process the applications for legalization of stay
of certain aliens even without payment of filing fees
would not constitute proof of "evident bad faith and
manifest partiality." Petitioner simply wanted
expeditious action on the applications, a prerogative of
the head of office. The alleged loss of revenue to the
government from non-payment of legalization fees is
not charged in the amended information.
In any event, payment of the filing fees may be
done before the Commissioner takes final action on the
applications with no loss of revenue to the
government. After all, filing fees are considered
regulatory in nature, not imposed for revenue
purposes. Hence, the proposed testimony of
complaining witness was not material or within the
issues raised.
What is more, in ordering the reopening of the
case, the Sandiganbayan did not give petitioner an
opportunity to rebut the evidence to be introduced by
the prosecution, a virtual denial of due process that will
obviously prejudice the substantial rights of the
accused.
In so ruling, the Sandiganbayan incurred in error,
amounting to grave abuse of discretion, and depriving
petitioner of her day in court.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the
petition for certiorari and ANNULS the resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan, dated August 3, 1995, and January
25, 1996, in Criminal Case No. 16698.
The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith
decide Criminal Case No. 16698, which has been
pending for almost eight (8) years from the filing of the
original information, within a reasonable time not
exceeding six (6) months from notice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.
Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera,
Felixberto Serrano, J. Antonio Araneta, Antonio
Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Tañada,
and First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes for
respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the
enforcement of a congressional resolution designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment
to the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as
an ordinance thereto." The members of the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines, the Auditor General, and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the
petitioners are eight senators, seventeen
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic
Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth
Party. The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is
attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of
facts. In our view of the case it is unnecessary to go
into the facts at length. We will mention only the facts
essential for the proper understanding of the issues.
For this purpose it suffices to say that three of the
plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff
representatives had been proclaimed by a majority
vote of the Commission on Elections as having been
elected senators and representatives in the elections
held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of
the first session of Congress following the elections, on
account of alleged irregularities in their election. The
eight representatives since their election had not been
allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in
the election of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been formally suspended. A
resolution for their suspension had been introduced in
the House of Representatives, but that resolution had
not been acted upon definitely by the House when the
present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight
representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary
three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either
branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the
jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that
this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the
conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or
resolution. There is some merit in the petitioners'
contention that this is confusing jurisdiction, which is a
matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of an
enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence
and practice. This objection, however, is purely
academic. Whatever distinction there is in the juridical
sense between the two concepts, in practice and in
their operation they boil down to the same thing.
Basically the two notions are synonymous in that both
are founded on the regard which the judiciary accords
a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments
of the Government. If a political question conclusively
binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of
that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of
authorities, that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred
upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated
on the principle of the separation of powers, a principle
also too well known to require elucidation or citation of
authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what
matters fall within the meaning of political question.
The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government.
But there is one case approaching this in its
circumstances: Coleman vs. Miller, a relatively recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court reported
and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a
majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
is authority for the conclusion that the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political
question and hence not justiciable. The Court further
held that the decision by Congress, in its control of the
Secretary of State, of the questions of whether an
amendment has been adopted within a reasonable
time from the date of submission to the state
legislature, is not subject to review by the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a
proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political
question. The two steps complement each other in a
scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to
be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution
"consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and
ratification." There is no logic in attaching political
character to one and withholding that character from
the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a
highly political function performed by the Congress in
its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even independent of any intervention by the
Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to
safeguard public interest, there is less reason for
judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into
that of a ratification. As the Mississippi Supreme Court
has once said:
There is nothing in the nature of the
submission which should cause the free
exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could
render it dangerous to the stability of the
government; because the measure derives all
its vital force from the action of the people at
the ballot box, and there can never be danger
in submitting in an established form, to a free
people, the proposition whether they will
change their fundamental law. The means
provided for the exercise of their sovereign
right of changing their constitution should
receive such a construction as not to trammel
the exercise of the right. Difficulties and
embarrassments in its exercise are in
derogation of the right of free government,
which is inherent in the people; and the best
security against tumult and revolution is the
free and unobstructed privilege to the people
of the State to change their constitution in the
mode prescribed by the instrument.
(Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note, 10
L.R.A., N.S., 150.)
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas, in
Miller vs.Coleman, supra, finds no basis for
discriminating between proposal and ratification. From
his forceful opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive
power to control submission of constitutional
amendments. Final determination by Congress
that ratification by three-fourths of the States
has taken place "is conclusive upon the
courts." In the exercise of that power,
Congress, of course, is governed by the
Constitution. However, whether submission,
intervening procedure or Congressional
determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, call for
decisions by a "political department" of
questions of a type which this Court has
frequently designated "political." And decision
of a "political question" by the "political
department" to which the Constitution has
committed it "conclusively binds the judges, as
well as all other officers, citizens and subjects
of . . . government." Proclamation under
authority of Congress that an amendment has
been ratified will carry with it a solemn
assurance by the Congress that ratification has
taken place as the Constitution commands.
Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment
must be accepted as a part of the Constitution,
leaving to the judiciary its traditional authority
of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's
opinion in the present case even impliedly
assumes a power to make judicial
interpretation of the exclusive constitutional
authority of Congress over submission and
ratification of amendments, we are unable to
agree.
The State court below assumed jurisdiction to
determine whether the proper procedure is
being followed between submission and final
adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial
review of or pronouncements upon a supposed
limitation of a "reasonable time" within which
Congress may accept ratification; as to
whether duly authorized State officials have
proceeded properly in ratifying or voting for
ratification; or whether a State may reverse its
action once taken upon a proposed
amendment; and kindred questions, are all
consistent only with an intimate control over
the amending process in the courts. And this
must inevitably embarrass the course of
amendment by subjecting to judicial
interference matters that we believe were
intrusted by the Constitution solely to the
political branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of
the Constitution in some respects as subject to
judicial construction, in others as subject to the
final authority of the Congress. There is no
disapproval of the conclusion arrived at in
Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution impliedly
requires that a properly submitted amendment
must die unless ratified within a "reasonable
time." Nor does the Court now disapprove its
prior assumption of power to make such a
pronouncement. And it is not made clear that
only Congress has constitutional power to
determine if there is any such implication in
Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand,
the Court's opinion declares that Congress has
the exclusive power to decide the "political
questions" of whether as State whose
legislature has once acted upon a proposed
amendment may subsequently reverse its
 position, and whether, in the circumstances of
such a case as this, an amendment is dead
because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed.
No such division between the political and
judicial branches of the government is made by
Article 5 which grants power over the
amending of the Constitution to Congress
alone. Undivided control of that process has
been given by the Article exclusively and
completely to Congress. The process itself is
"political" in its entirely, from submission until
an amendment becomes part of the
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial
guidance, control or interference at any point.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to
which the other three justices subscribed, arrives at
the same conclusion. Though his thesis was the
petitioner's lack of standing in court — a point which
not having been raised by the parties herein we will
not decide — his reasoning inevitably extends to a
consideration of the nature of the legislative
proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that
case assailed. From a different angle he sees the
matter as political, saying:
The right of the Kansas senators to be here is
rested on recognition by Leser vs. Garnett, 258
U.S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of a
voter's right to protect his franchise. The
historic source of this doctrine and the reasons
for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon, 273
U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct.,
446. That was an action for $5,000 damages
against the Judges of Elections for refusing to
permit the plaintiff to vote at a primary
election in Texas. In disposing of the objection
that the plaintiff had no cause of action
because the subject matter of the suit was
political, Mr. Justice Homes thus spoke for the
Court: "Of course the petition concerns political
action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for
private damage. That private damage may be
caused by such political action and may be
recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been
doubted for over two hundred years, since
Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92 Eng.
Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld.
Raym., 320; 92 Eng. Reprint, 710, and has
been recognized by this Court." "Private
damage" is the clue to the famous ruling in
Ashby vs. White, supra, and determines its
scope as well as that of cases in this Court of
which it is the justification. The judgment of
Lord Holt is permeated with the conception
that a voter's franchise is a personal right,
assessable in money damages, of which the
exact amount "is peculiarly appropriate for the
determination of a jury," see Wiley vs. Sinkler,
179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct.,
17, and for which there is no remedy outside
the law courts. "Although this matter relates to
the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an
injury precedaneous to the parliament, as my
Lord Hale said in the case of
Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83
Eng. Reprint, 175. The parliament cannot judge
of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff
for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2
Ld. Raym., 938, 958; 92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1
Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)
The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the
practice which has followed it leave intra-
parliamentary controversies to parliaments and
outside the scrutiny of law courts. The
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies
— who are members, how and when they
should vote, what is the requisite number of
votes for different phases of legislative activity,
what votes were cast and how they were
counted — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action but are of the very
essence of political action, if "political" has any
connotation at all. Marshall Field &
Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et seq.; 36
Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495;
Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130, 137; 66 Law.
ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are
they matters of "private damage." They pertain
to legislators not as individuals but as political
representatives executing the legislative
process. To open the law courts to such
controversies is to have courts sit in judgment
on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies.
If the doctrine of Ashby vs. White vindicating
the private rights of a voting citizen has not
been doubted for over two hundred years, it is
equally significant that for over two hundred
years Ashby vs. White has not been sought to
be put to purposes like the present. In seeking
redress here these Kansas senators have
wholly misconceived the functions of this
Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas
Supreme Court should therefore be dismissed.
We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they
accord with sound principles of political jurisprudence
and represent liberal and advanced thought on the
working of constitutional and popular government as
conceived in the fundamental law. Taken as persuasive
authorities, they offer enlightening understanding of
the spirit of the United States institutions after which
ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than
persuasive value. As will be presently shown, they are
the opinions which should operate to adjudicate the
questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point
clear, it is necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening
this decision, to make a statement and an analysis of
the Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the
annotation on that case in the American Law
Reports, supra, comes to out aid and lightens our labor
in this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding
in mandamus brought in the Supreme Court of Kansas
by twenty-one members of the Senate, including
twenty senators who had voted against a resolution
ratifying the Child Labor Amendment, and by three
members of the House of Representatives, to compel
the Secretary of the Senate to erase in indorsement on
the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by
the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as not
passed." They sought to restrain the offices of the
Senate and House of Representatives from signing the
resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from
authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been
that the Child Labor Amendment was proposed by
Congress in June, 1924; that in January, 1925, the
legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it
and a copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary
of State of the United States; that in January, 1927, a
new resolution was introduced in the Senate of Kansas
ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were
forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty
against the resolution; and that as a result of the tie,
the Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor of the
resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was
challenged, and the petition set forth prior rejection of
the proposed amendment and alleged that in the
period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed
amendment had been rejected by both houses of the
legislatures of twenty-six states and had been ratified
only in five states, and that by reason of that rejection
and the failure of ratification within a reasonable time,
the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction
of all the issues but dismissed the petition on the
merits. When the case reached the Supreme Court of
the United States the questions were framed
substantially in the following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is,
whether the petitioners had standing to seek to have
the judgment of the state court reversed; second,
whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote
in case of a tie, as he did, it being the contention of the
petitioners that "in the light of the powers and duties of
the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the Senate
under the state Constitution, as construed by the
Supreme Court of the state, the Lieutenant Governor
was not a part of the 'legislature' so that under Article
5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to
have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed
amendment, when the Senate was equally divided";
and third, the effect of the previous rejection of the
amendment and of the lapse of time after its
submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The
second question, regarding the authority of the
Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court avoided,
stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable
controversy, or a question which is political in its
nature and hence not justiciable, is a question upon
which the Court is equally divided and therefore the
court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the
third question, the Court reached the conclusion before
referred to, namely, (1) that the efficacy of ratification
by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the
Federal Constitution is a political question, within the
ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its
control and of the promulgation of the adoption of
amendment, and (2) that the decision by Congress, in
its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the
questions whether an amendment to the Federal
Constitution has been adopted within a reasonable
time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Kansas was affirmed but in the grounds stated
in the United States Supreme Court's decision. The
nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices
Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that
the petitioners had no personality to bring the petition
and that all the questions raised are political and non-
justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that
all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had
jurisdiction of all such questions, and that the petition
should have been granted and the decision of the
Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that
the proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded
some of the issues as political and non-justiciable,
passed by the question of the authority of the
Lieutenant Governor to case a deciding vote, on the
ground that the Court was equally divided, and took
jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler
and Mr. Justice McReynolds, on the one hand and the
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice Reed, on
the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on the
result to be reached, these two groups were divided.
The agreement between Justices Roberts, Black,
Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one hand, and the
Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other,
was on the result and on that part of the decision
which declares certain questions political and non-
justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes,
therefore going four opinions "show interestingly
divergent but confusing positions of the Justices on the
issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law
Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in
Half," which, in the light of the divergencies in the
opinions rendered, aptly queries" whether the proper
procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been
to reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of
the suit for want of jurisdiction." It says that these
divergencies and line-ups of the justices "leave power
to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the
decision should be rested with the four justices who
concurred in Mr. Justice Black's opinion." Referring to
the failure of the Court to decide the question of the
right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article
points out that from the opinions rendered the "equally
divided" court would seem under any circumstances to
bean equal division of an odd number of justices, and
asks "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse to
vote on this issue? And if he did, was it because he
could not make up his mind, or is it possible to saw a
justice vertically in half during the conference and have
him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more serious
vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue
could not be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if
the court had jurisdiction of the case, decision of the
issue in favor of the petitioners would have required
reversal of the judgment below regardless of the
disposal of the other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring
opinions should be considered as laying down the rule
of the case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the
contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United
States, "In point of numbers, the jurisdictions are
divided almost equally pro and con the general
principle (of these, two or three have changed from
their original position), two or three adopted a special
variety of view (as in Illinois), three or four are not
clear, and one or two have not yet made their
decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685,
footnote.) It is important to bear in mind, in this
connection, that the United States Supreme Court is on
the side of those which favor the rule.
(Harwood vs. Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069;
Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs. Clark, 36
Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the
expressed policy of our law making body, we choose to
follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:
"Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2)
the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of
any legislative body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the
clerk or secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for
conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of
decisions and commentaries written with evident
vehemence. Arguments for and against the rule have
been extensive and exhaustive. It would be
presumptuous on our part to pretend to add more,
even if we could, to what has already been said. Which
such vast mass of cases to guide our judgment and
discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent
selection and borrowing of materials and arguments
under the criterion of adaptability to a sound public
policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as
contrasted with those which opposed it are, in our
opinion, almost decisive. Some of these reasons are
summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150
as follows:
SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. — It has
been declared that the rule against going
behind the enrolled bill is required by the
respect due to a coequal and independent
department of the government, and it would be
an inquisition into the conduct of the members
of the legislature, a very delicate power, the
frequent exercise of which must lead to
endless confusion in the administration of the
law. The rule is also one of convenience,
because courts could not rely on the published
session laws, but would be required to look
beyond these to the journals of the legislature
and often to any printed bills and amendments
which might be found after the adjournment of
the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the
prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution,
for years, it might be ascertained from the
journals that an act theretofore enforced had
never become a law. In this respect, it has
been declared that these is quite enough
uncertainty as to what the law is without
saying that no one may be certain that an act
of the legislature has become such until the
issue has been determined by some court
whose decision might not be regarded as
conclusive in an action between the parties.
From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV
Wigmore on Evidence, 696, 697, we extract these
passages:
I think the rule thus adopted accords with
public policy. Indeed, in my estimation, few
things would be more mischievous than the
introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule
contended for is that the Court should look at
the journals of the Legislature to ascertain
whether the copy of the act attested and filed
with the Secretary of State conforms in its
contents with the statements of such journals.
This proposition means, if it has any legal value
whatever, that, in the event of a material
discrepancy between the journal and the
enrolled copy, the former is to be taken as the
standard of veracity and the act is to be
rejected. This is the test which is to be applied
not only to the statutes now before the Court,
but to all statutes; not only to laws which have
been recently passed, but to laws the most
ancient. To my mind, nothing can be more
certain than that the acceptance of this
doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire
statute law of the State. We have before us
some evidence of the little reliability of these
legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that
if the laws of the State are to be tested by a
comparison with these journals, so imperfect,
so unauthenticated, the stability of all written
law will be shaken to its very foundations? . . .
We are to remember the danger, under the
prevalence of such a doctrine, to be
apprehended from the intentional corruption of
evidences of this character. It is scarcely too
much to say that the legal existence of almost
every legislative act would be at the mercy of
all persons having access to these journals. . . .
([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young,
32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)
But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is
conclusive upon the Courts, then less than a
quorum of each House may be the aid of
corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon
the State in defiance of the inhibition of the
Constitution. It must be admitted that the
consequence stated would be possible. Public
authority and political power must of necessity
be confided to officers, who being human may
violate the trusts reposed in them. This
perhaps cannot be avoided absolutely. But it
applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit
that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity
beyond all others; nor has it been able at all
times with truth to say that its high places
have not been disgraced. The framers of our
government have not constituted it with
faculties to supervise coordinate departments
and correct or prevent abuses of their
authority. It cannot authenticate a statute; that
power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a
legislative journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in
Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)
Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence —
considered a classic, and described by one who himself
is a noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a permanent
contribution to American law" and having "put the
matured nineteenth-century law in form to be used in a
new era of growth" — unequivocally identifies himself
with those who believe in the soundness of the rule.
The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument
of Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of
securing in any other way the enforcement of
constitutional restrictions on legislative action, says:
(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible
of consistent application. If, as it is urged, the
Judiciary are bound to enforce the
constitutional requirements of three readings,
a two-thirds vote, and the like, and if therefore
an act must be declared no law which in fact
was not read three times or voted upon by two-
thirds, this duty is a duty to determine
according to the actual facts of the readings
and the votes. Now the journals may not
represent the actual facts. That duty cannot
allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be
shown beyond doubt that the facts were
otherwise than therein represented. The duty
to uphold a law which in fact was
constitutionally voted upon is quite as strong
as the duty to repudiate an act
unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will
be going as far wrong in repudiating an act
based on proper votes falsified in the journal as
it will be in upholding an act based on improper
votes falsified in the enrollment. This supposed
duty, in short, is to see that the constitutional
facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with
the journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is
unanimously conceded that an examination
into facts as provable by the testimony of
members present is not allowable. If to support
that it be said that such an inquiry would be
too uncertain and impracticable, then it is
answered that this concedes the supposed
constitutional duty not to be inexorable, after
all; for if the duty to get at the facts is a real
and inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at
them at any cost; and if it is merely a duty that
is limited by policy and practical convenience,
then the argument changes into the second
one above, namely, how far it is feasible to
push the inquiry with regard to policy and
practical convenience; and from this point of
view there can be but one answer.
(2) In the second place, the fact that the
scruple of constitutional duty is treated thus
inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain
point suggests that it perhaps is based on
some fallacious assumption whose defect is
exposed only by carrying it to its logical
consequences. Such indeed seems to be the
case. It rests on the fallacious motion that
every constitutional provision is "per se"
capable of being enforced through the Judiciary
and must be safeguarded by the Judiciary
because it can be in no other way. Yet there is
certainly a large field of constitutional provision
which does not come before the Judiciary for
enforcement, and may remain unenforced
without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is
not necessary to invoke in illustration such
provisions as a clause requiring the Governor
to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature
to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the
Constitution may remain unexecuted by the
failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and
yet the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce
the constitutional duty. A clearer illustration
may be had by imagining the Constitution to
require the Executive to appoint an officer or to
call out the militia whenever to the best of his
belief a certain state of facts exists; suppose
he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no
such belief; can the Judiciary attempt to
enforce the Constitution by inquiring into his
belief? Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on
the Legislators to pass a law upon a certain
subject whenever in their belief certain
conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the
law void by inquiring and ascertaining that the
Legislature, or its majority, did not have such a
belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands
the Judiciary to decide a case only after
consulting a soothsayer, and in a given case
the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be
done?
These instances illustrate a general situation in
which the judicial function of applying and
enforcing the Constitution ceases to operate.
That situation exists where the Constitution
enjoins duties which affect the motives and
judgment of a particular independent
department of government, — Legislature,
Executive, and Judiciary. Such duties are
simply beyond enforcement by any other
department if the one charged fails to perform
them. The Constitution may provide that no
legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would
not be treated as void because the majority
had been bribed. So far as the Constitution
attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading
up to and motivating the action of a
department, injunctions must be left to the
conscience of that department to obey or
disobey. Now the act of the Legislature as a
whole is for this purpose of the same nature as
the vote of a single legislator. The Constitution
may expressly enjoin each legislator not to
vote until he has carefully thought over the
matter of legislation; so, too, it may expressly
enjoin the whole Legislature not to act finally
until it has three times heard the proposition
read aloud. It is for the Legislature alone, in the
latter case as well as in the former, to take
notice of this injunction; and it is no more the
function of the Judiciary in the one case than in
the other to try to keep the Legislature to its
duty:
xxx xxx xxx
The truth is that many have been carried away
with the righteous desire to check at any cost
the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set
such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that
they have almost made them a second and
higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong
direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary
to check an inefficient Legislature, they should
turn to improve the legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors
by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle
and to do impossibilities with the Constitution;
but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of
 whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular
government. (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 699-
702.)
The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has
not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the
case of United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is
argued that this Court examined the journal in that
case to find out whether or not the contention of the
appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in
error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210,
that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving
legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified
by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and
(2) in case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed
by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United
States vs. Pons because, in all probability, those were
the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear
that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in
existence or was placed before the Court; and it has
not been shown that if that had been done, this Court
would not have held the copyconclusive proof of the
due enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that
the Court expressly stated that it "passed over the
question" of whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as
to its contents and the mode of its passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of
the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue
by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already
stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act
No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals
no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and
did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did
not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the
journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine
the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if
the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict
with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been
noted between the two documents and the court did
not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the
journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly
certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it
unnecessary to decide the question of whether the
senators and representatives who were ignored in the
computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were
members of Congress within the meaning of section 1
of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO.,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor
General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as
Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor
General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known
as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central
Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its
Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the
circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum
establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided
in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in
November and December 1959, petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding
lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood
producers — bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the
main raw materials in the production of said glues —
and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee
aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made
another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the
sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the
first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated
November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from
said fee. Soon after the last importation of these
products, petitioner made a similar request for refund
of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding
margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts,
the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and
approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
exemption granted by the Monetary Board for
petitioner's separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of
section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On
appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General
subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the
Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is
whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt
by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No.
2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board
pursuant to the provision of section one hereof
shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture
of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that
the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by
this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"
appearing in this provision should be construed as
"ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that
respondents herein, the Auditor General and the
Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding
otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that,
whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal
raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology
has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view
that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution.
It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions
of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and
time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive
fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for
use in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the
bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress
intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of
the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde",
not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of
this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof. But, said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the
Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the
House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate
Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon
Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727
[February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled
that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" —
is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm.
on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there
has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it
was certified by the officers of Congress and approved
by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of
our democratic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-11530 August 12, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan
Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of
illegal importation of opium, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915,
the said accused, conspiring together and
plotting among themselves, did, knowingly,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to
wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez
y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city
of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing
125 kilograms of opium of the value of
P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then
and there, the said accused, also conspiring
together and plotting among themselves, did
receive and conceal the said quantity of opium
and aided each other in the transportation,
receipt and concealment of the same after the
said opium had been imported, knowing that
said drug had been unlawfully brought,
imported and illegally introduced into the
Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an
act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso
were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet
been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be
confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to
pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he
was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed.
Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the judgment as
to him has become final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five
assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by
their reiteration in a somewhat changed form of
statement under the many propositions embraced in
the elaborate printed brief, but their essence, when
correctly understood, are these: The court erred (a) in
denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915,
and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that
the legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of the
appellant, Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and
offered to prove that the last day of the special session
of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day
of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must
be punished if found guilty, was not passed or
approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of
that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and
void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise
questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the
special session was, under the Governor-General's
proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is
charged with having violated the provisions of Act No.
2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of
the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others,
namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the
legislative journals or extraneous evidence and (2)
whether the court can take judicial notice of the
journals. These questions will be considered in the
reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the
Commission shall perform the duties which would
properly be required of the Recorder of the
Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and
16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine
Commission provides, among other things, "that the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and
accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be
the duty of the Secretary "to keep a correct journal of
the proceedings of the Commission." On page 793 of
volume 7 of the Commission Journal for the ordinary
and special sessions of the Third Philippine Legislature,
the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914,
was approved. Adjournment sine die of the
Commission as a Chamber of the Philippine
Legislature. The hour of midnight having
arrived, on motion of Commissioner Palma, the
Commission, as a Chamber of the Philippine
Legislature, adjourned sine die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides,
among other things, in section 7, that the Philippine
Assembly "shall keep in journal of its proceedings,
which shall be published . . . ." In obedience to this
mandate, the journal of the Assembly's proceedings for
the sessions of 1914 was duly published and it appears
therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the Assembly
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February
28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that the existence of the "official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments of the United
States and of the Philippine Islands ... shall be judicially
recognized by the court without the introduction of
proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of
the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for
its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence."
And section 313 [as amended by sec. 1 of Act No.
2210], of the same Code also provides that:
Official documents may be proved as
follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for the Philippine Islands, or
of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or
of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by
the clerk or secretary or printed by their
order:Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature when there is in existence a copy
signed by the presiding officers and the
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Act and of the
due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction
upon the exact question whether the courts may take
judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well
settled in the United States that such journals may be
noticed by the courts in determining the question
whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The
State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases
cited therein.) The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial
notice of the legislative journals of the special session
of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals
are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual
time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute
certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12
o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No.
2381), published by authority of law, is conclusive
evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will
inquire whether the courts may go behind the
legislative journals for the purpose of determining the
date of adjournment when such journals are clear and
explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal
science which embraces and illustrates the laws of
evidence. On the one hand, it is maintained that the
Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at
midnight on February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and
that this allegation or alleged fact may be established
by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is
urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In
order to understand these opposing positions, it is
necessary to consider the nature and character of the
evidence thus involved. Evidence is understood to be
that which proves or disproves "any matter in question
or to influence the belief respecting it," and "conclusive
evidence is that which establishes the fact, as in the
instance of conclusive presumptions." (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et seq.) Counsel for the
appellant, in order to establish his contention, must
necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of
witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of
the Government or sovereign itself. From their very
nature and object the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into
the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the
spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in
his argument says that the public knows that the
Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at
midnight and left so until the determination of the
discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words,
the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable
the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently
within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation
for the expiration of the special session, in direct
violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the
clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the
resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative
records, and making the proof of legislative action
depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by
death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the
treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these
considerations of public policy led to the adoption of
the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to
legislative records. If that character is to be taken
away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all,
and the evidence of the laws of the state must rest
upon a foundation less certain and durable than that
afforded by the law to many contracts between private
individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters."
(Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1089.)
Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel.
Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
 Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in
looking up the various cases upon this
question; and, out of a multitude of citations,
not one is found in which any court has
assumed to go beyond the proceedings of the
legislature, as recorded in the journals required
to be kept in each of its branches, on the
question whether a law has been adopted. And
if reasons for the limitation upon judicial
inquiry in such matters have not generally
been stated, in doubtless arises from the fact
that they are apparent. Imperative reasons of
public policy require that the authenticity of
laws should rest upon public memorials of the
most permanent character. They should be
public, because all are required to conform to
them; they should be permanent, that right
acquired to-day upon the faith of what has
been declared to be law shall not be destroyed
to-morrow, or at some remote period of time,
by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the
court cited numerous decisions of the various states in
the American Union in support of the rule therein laid
down, and we have been unable to find a single case of
a later date where the rule has been in the least
changed or modified when the legislative journals
cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine
Government is modeled after those of the Federal
Government and the various states, we do not hesitate
to follow the courts in that country in the matter now
before us. The journals say that the Legislature
adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish
mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from
Spain, bringing, among other cargo, twenty-five barrels
which were manifested as "wine" and consigned to
Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had been, prior to the
arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business of a wine
merchant, with an office and warehouse located at 203
Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and
bill of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered
to Gregorio Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso.
These documents were indorsed as follows: "Deliver to
Don Gabino Beliso" and signed "Jacinto Lasarte."
Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident to the
release of the merchandise from the customhouse and
the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to
the warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned street
and number. Beliso signed the paper acknowledging
delivery. Shortly thereafter the custom authorities,
having noticed that shipments of merchandise
manifested as "wine" had been arriving in Manila from
Spain, consigned to persons whose names were not
listed as merchants, and having some doubt as to the
nature of the merchandise so consigned, instituted an
investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the
twenty-five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided
by the customs registry number of the shipment, the
entry number, and the serial number of each barrel. It
was found that the twenty-five barrels began to arrive
on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse about 11 o'clock on
the morning of April 9. Before the merchandise arrived
at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons, went to Beliso's
warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's office,
where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left
and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived
and were unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called one of
his employees, Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go
out and get a bull cart. This Sese did and returned with
the vehicle. Beliso then carefully selected five barrels
out of the shipment of twenty-five and told Sese to
load these five on the cart and to deliver them to Juan
Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was
complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to
Pons at the place designated. Pursuing their
investigation, which started on the 10th, the customs
secret service agents entered Beliso's bodega on that
date before the office was opened and awaited the
arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and
placed under arrest. The agents then proceeded to
separate the recent shipment from the other
merchandise stored in the warehouse, identifying the
barrels by the customs registry and entry numbers.
Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be found
on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or
interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents that
the five missing barrels had been delivered by him to
Pons at 144 Calle General Solano by order of Beliso.
The agents, accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144
Calle General Solano and here found the five missing
barrels, which were identified by the registry and entry
numbers as well as by the serial numbers. The five
barrels were empty, the staves having been sprung
and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each
corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels,
were found on the floor nearby. The customs officers
noticed several baskets of lime scattered about the
basement of the house and on further search they
found 77 tins of opium in one of these baskets. There
was no one in the house when this search was made,
but some clothing was discovered which bore the
initials "J. P." It then became important to the customs
agents to ascertain the owner and occupant of house
No. 144 on Calle General Solano where the five barrels
were delivered. The owner was found, upon
investigation, to be Mariano Limjap, and from the
latter's agent it was learned that the house was rented
by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was
produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw
that the same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons."
After discovering these facts they returned to the
house of Beliso and selected three of the twenty
barrels and ordered them returned to the
customhouse. Upon opening these three barrels each
was found to contain a large tin fitted into the head of
the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed.
Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A
comparison of the large tins taken out of the three
barrels with the empty ones found at 144 Calle General
Solano show, says the trial court, "that they were in
every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and
warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons,
apparently unaware that anything unusual was going
on, arrived there and was placed under arrest, and
taken to the office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the
customs secret service, and according to Hawkins,
voluntarily confessed his participation in the smuggling
of the opium. He maintained, however, that the 77 tins
of opium found at 144 Calle General Solano
represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the
customhouse under arrest at the time the three barrels
were opened and the customs officers appearing to be
no doubt as to which end of the barrels contained the
opium, Pons showed the officers how to open the
barrels and pointed out that the end of the barrel,
which had the impression of a bottle stamped in the
wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of
opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated
that he had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this
shipment to a Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning
of April 10, following the instructions given him by
Beliso. On being further questioned, Pons stated that
he and Beliso had been partners in several opium
transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle General
Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of
Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug;
and that he and Beliso had shared the profits of a
previous importation of opium. Sese testified that he
had delivered a previous shipment to 144 Calle
General Solano. The customs agents then went with
Pons to his house and found in his yard several large
tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at
144 Calle General Solano and those taken from the
barrels at the customhouse. At first Pons stated that F.
C. Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling in the
between the Provinces of Isabela and Cagayan, and
later he retracted this statement and admitted that
Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial of
this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia
was a wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that
Garcia had written him a letter directing him to rent a
house for him (Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in
the Philippine Islands of Garcia. According to Pons this
letter arrived on the same steamer which brought the
25 barrels of "wine," but that he had destroyed it
because he feared that it would compromise him. On
being asked during the trial why he insisted, in
purchasing wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the
wine which had just arrived on the Lopez y Lopez,
answered, "Naturally because F. C. Garcia told me in
this letter that this opium was coming in barrels of
wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto
Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these
barrels of wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the
trial court and these fats establish the guilt of the
appellant beyond any question of a doubt,
notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show that the
opium as shipped to him from Spain by a childhood
fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in
this huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is in accordance
with la and the decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from
is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-
Mayor of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of
Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Civil Service, EDUARDO
QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of
Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as
City Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE
SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN
ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO,
LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO,
APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR.,
ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA,
GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA,
PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE
BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA
FRANCISCO, in their capacities as members of
the Municipal Board,respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio
Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of
Manila, etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L.
Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive Secretary
and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici
curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage
of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act
4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties
of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further
Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of
Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as
Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear
undisputed:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local
application, was filed in the House of Representatives.
It was there passed on third reading without
amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was
sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred
to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal
Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M.
Roxas. The committee favorably recommended
approval with a minor amendment, suggested by
Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be
the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who
should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's
incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate
on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator
Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in
toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by
Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a
letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill
No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20,
1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one
recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved
by the Senate. The House of Representatives
thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266
as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to
be printed. The printed copies were then certified and
attested by the Secretary of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the
Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of
the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to
the President of the Philippines, who affixed his
signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18,
1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No.
4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the
public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor
drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who
on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by
the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of
the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did
not embody the amendments introduced by him and
approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the
Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate,
addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President
of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both
Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was
not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he
considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid
and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21,
1964 made the further clarification that the
invalidation by the Senate President of his signature
meant that the bill on which his signature appeared
had never been approved by the Senate and therefore
the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it
did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a
message to the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress informing them that in view of the
circumstances he was officially withdrawing his
signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been
returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that
"it would be untenable and against public policy to
convert into law what was not actually approved by the
two Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio
Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to
the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of
Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police
force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the
then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition
with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus,
Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel
respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary,
the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of
Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of
the municipal board to comply with the provisions of
Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act
4065 never became law since it was not the bill
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in
the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself
should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor,
who was then going abroad on an official trip, this
Court issued a restraining order, without bond,
"enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
from exercising any of the powers of an Acting Mayor
purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila
under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not
otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any
other law until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since
been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila.
Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with
previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae,
and have filed extensive and highly enlightening
memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of
authorities, principally decisions of United States
Federal and State Courts, have been submitted on the
question of whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the
"journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this
jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this
Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of
Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947),
78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in
that case applied the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot
be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and
that the decision therein constitutes a binding
precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution
of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment
to the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an
ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision)
had been passed by "a vote of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason
and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran,
Guillermo F. Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that
the case involved a political question which was not
within the province of the judiciary in view of the
principle of separation of powers in our government.
The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to
bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the
reasoning being that "if a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the
political departments, a duly certified law or resolution
also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born
of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion,
concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the
Court had jurisdiction to resolve the question
presented, and affirming categorically that "the
enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative
journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of
Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210.
This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code
of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only
statutory basis on which the "enrolled bill" theory rests.
It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislative body
that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress (may
be proved) by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or
secretary, printed by their order;
provided, that in the case of acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is in existence
a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of
 such acts and of the due enactment
thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills
duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the
signatures of their respective presiding officers and
secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill. 2 It
has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of
authentication, 3 to signify to the Chief Executive that
the bill being presented to him has been duly approved
by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection. 4 The function of an attestation is therefore
not of approval, because a bill is considered approved
after it has passed both Houses. Even where such
attestation is provided for in the Constitution
authorities are divided as to whether or not the
signatures are mandatory such that their absence
would render the statute invalid. 5 The affirmative view,
it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding
officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong
argument to the contrary 6 There is less reason to
make the attestation a requisite for the validity of a bill
where the Constitution does not even provide that the
presiding officers should sign the bill before it is
submitted to the President.
In one case in the United States, where the
(State)Constitution required the presiding officers to
sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory,
the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as
conclusive proof of its due enactment. 7 Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the
enrolled bill was not conclusive evidence. 8 But in the
case of Field vs. Clark, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the signatures of the presiding officers on a bill,
although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive
evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United
States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in
the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and, by the
President of the Senate, in open
session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such
bill as one that has passed Congress. It
is a declaration by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to
him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the
public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress,
an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the
official attestations of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries,
on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments
of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent
departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the
courts to determine, when the question
properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based
mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial
department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all
billsauthenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has
also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is
absent and the same is not required for the validity of
a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in
a number of decisions, 10although they are silent as to
whether the journals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall
constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not
require the presiding officers to certify to the same.
But the said Constitution does contain the following
provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a
Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may in its
judgment require secrecy; and the
yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by
either House unless it shall have been
printed and copies thereof in its final
form furnished its Members at least
three calendar days prior to its
passage, except when the President
shall have certified to the necessity of
its immediate enactment. Upon the last
reading of a bill no amendment thereof
shall be allowed, and the question
upon its passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the
Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect
due to a co-equal department of the government, 11 is
neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid
and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does
not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words it is
the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935)
Constitution says that "[e] very bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to
the President. 12 In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the
Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar
provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
"makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final
passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding
officer, of the proof that it has "passed both houses"
will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not
mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by
the Senate President, granting it to have been validly
made, would only mean that there was no attestation
at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute.
Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would
remain valid and binding. This argument begs the
issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence
or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its
absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry,
however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a
result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being
no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly
enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal
should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not
authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case,
this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal
for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial
and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor
and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated
in the printed text sent to the President and signed by
him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is
a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was
not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate
and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President
of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court
to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and
bring about mischievous consequences not intended
by the law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled
"AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES
OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND
ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED
NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is
declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore
did not become law. The temporary restraining order
dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968
ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil
Service, respondent.
Vicente Rodriguez, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
The question for resolution in this case is whether a
person who has served as captain in the police
department of a city for at least three years but does
not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for
appointment as chief of police. The question calls for
an interpretation of the following provisions of section
10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864):
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief
of Police Agency. — No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
National Bureau of Investigation, or has served
as chief of police with exemplary record, or has
served in the police department of any city
with the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years; or any high
school graduate who has served as officer in
the Armed Forces for at least eight years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the
detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and
holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his
present position. Upon the resignation of Brig. Gen.
Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968, the petitioner was
designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the
same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the mayor of Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner
of Civil Service Abelardo Subido approved the
designation of the petitioner but rejected his
appointment for "failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for
the said position." Instead, the respondent certified
other persons as qualified for the post and called the
attention of the mayor to section 4 of the
Decentralization Act of 1967 which requires the filling
of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming into
existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in
the metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief
of police of Manila was vacant and listed the
qualifications which applicants should possess.
The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a
demand that the respondent include him in a list of
eligible and qualified applicants from which the mayor
might appoint one as chief of police of the city. He
contended that his service alone as captain for more
than three years in the Manila Police Department
qualified him for appointment. The demand was
contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent
on October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter
favorably, but the respondent refused to reconsider his
stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to compel the
respondent to include the petitioner in a list of "five
next ranking eligible and qualified persons."
The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act
of 1966 is, per his own phrasing, as follows:
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless HE
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning AND has
served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
OR the National Bureau of Investigation, OR
(2) has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, OR
(3) has served in the police department of any
city with the rank of captain or its equivalent
therein for at least three years; OR
(4) any high school graduate who has served
as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
As he has served successively as captain, major and
lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, the
petitioner's insistence is that he falls under the third
class of persons qualified for appointment as chief of a
city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy
of the Act "to place the local police service on a
professional level,"1 and contends that a bachelor's
degree does not guarantee that one who possesses it
will make a good policeman, but that, on the other
hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from
patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of
professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's
view still we do not see how the requirement of a
college degree as additional qualification can run
counter to the avowed policy of the Act. On the
contrary, we should think that the requirement of such
additional qualification will best carry out that policy.
The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its
assumption that the choice is between one who has
served long and loyally in a city police agency and
another who, not having so served, has only a
bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case.
The issue rather is whether, within the meaning and
intendment of the law, in addition to service
qualification, one should have educational qualification
as shown by the possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9
of the Act which provides:
Persons who at the time of the approval of this
Act have rendered at least five years of
satisfactory service in a provincial, city or
municipal police agency although they have
not qualified in an appropriate civil service
examination are considered as civil service
eligibles for the purpose of this Act.
In effect, he contends that if a person who has
rendered at least five years of satisfactory service in a
police agency is considered a civil service eligible, so
must a person be considered qualified even though he
does not possess a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects.
First, it fails to distinguish between eligibility and
qualification. For the statute may allow the
compensation of service for a person's lack of eligibility
but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, section 9 governs the
appointment of members of apolice agency only. On
the other hand, the appointment of chiefs of police is
the precise gravamen of section 10, the last paragraph
of which states:
Where no civil service eligible is available,
provisional appointment may be made in
accordance with Civil Service Law and rules:
Provided, that the appointee possesses the
above educational qualification: Provided,
further, That in no case shall such appointment
extend beyond six months, except for a valid
cause, and with the approval of the Civil
Service Commission.
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it
to compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in
the case of a member of a police agency, it gives no
such credit for lack of civil service eligibility in the case
of a chief of police. On the contrary, by providing that a
person, who is not a civil service eligible, may be
provisionally appointed2 chief of police "[ p]rovided,
[t]hat the appointee possesses the above educational
qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the
possession of a college degree or a high school
diploma (in addition to service) is an indispensable
requisite.
It is next contended that to read section 10 as
requiring a bachelor's degree, in addition to service
either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or in the
National Bureau of Investigation or as chief of police
with an exemplary record or as a captain in a city
police department for at least three years, would be to
create an "absurd situation" in which a person who has
served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI is in
law considered the equal of another who has been a
chief of police or has been a captain in a city police
agency for at least three years. From this it is
concluded that "the only logical equivalence of these
two groups (Chief of Police with exemplary record and
Police Captain for at least 3 years in a City Police
Agency) is the bachelor's degree."
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in
what capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must
have been rendered, but an admission of the existence
of the ambiguity in the statute does not necessarily
compel acquiescence in the conclusion that it is only in
cases where the appointee's service has been in the
AFP or in the NBI that he must be required to have a
bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the
petitioner's argument that a person who has served as
captain in a city police department for at least three
years need not have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is
that such person need not even be a high school
graduate. If such be the case would there still be need
for a person to be at least a high school graduate
provided he has had at least eight years of service as
captain in the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to
(the meaning of which is not in issue in this case),
section 10 of the Act needs no interpretation because
its meaning is clear. That the purpose is to require both
educational and service qualifications of those seeking
appointment as chief of police is evidence from a
reading of the original provision of House Bill 6951 and
the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section 12
of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of
1966) read:
Minimum Qualification for Appointment as
Chief of a Police Agency. — No chief of a police
 agency of a province or chartered city shall be
appointed unless he is a member of the
Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's
degree in police administration. Any holder of a
bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police
department of any city from the rank of captain
or inspector, second class, or its equivalent for
at least three years shall be eligible for
appointment to the position of chief of the
police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be
appointed unless he is a holder of a four-year
college degree course or a holder of a
Bachelor's degree in Police Administration or
Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available
provisional appointment may be made in
accordance with Civil Service Law and rules,
provided the appointee possesses the above
educational qualification but in no case shall
such appointment exceed beyond six months.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood
as requiring both educational and service qualifications
that the following exchanges of view were made on the
floor of the house of Representatives:
MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum
Qualification for Appointment of Chief of a
Police Agency, provides that the chief of a
police agency of a province or a chartered city
should be at least a member of the Philippine
Bar or a holder of a bachelor's degree in Police
Administration; and the chief of police of a
municipality should be at least a holder of a
four years' college degree or holder of a
bachelor's degree in Police Administration or
Criminology.
At first blush, there is no reason why I should
object to these minimum requirements; but I
find such requirement very rigid because it
would not allow a man to rise from the ranks.
Take a policeman who rose from the ranks. He
became a corporal, a sergeant, a police
lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed to go
higher? If he merited it, he should also be
appointed chief of police of a city or
municipality.
MR. AMANTE. During our committee
discussions, I objected to this provision of the
bill because it is a very high qualification.
However, somebody insisted that in order to
professionalize our police system and also to
attain a high standard of police efficiency, we
must have a chief of police who has a college
degree. The point which the gentleman is now
raising was brought up by one Member in the
sense that a policeman who rose from the
ranks through serious hard work, even after
serving for fifteen or twenty years in the police
force, cannot become chief of police for lack of
a college degree.
The gentleman's objection is a very good and
reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it
up during the period of amendments, I will
consider it.
MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee
will accept my amendment. My only regret,
however, is that because I made a number of
proposed amendments, I will not be ready to
submit them immediately. We should just limit
ourselves to the sponsorship this evening.3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational
requirement contained in the bill that objections were
expressed, but while it was agreed to delete this
requirement during the period of amendment, no
motion was ever presented to effect the change.4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government
Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred,
reported a substitute measure.5 It is to this substitute
bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and
substance.
Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on
the meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the National Bureau of Investigation." The provision of
the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau
of Investigation or police department of any
city and has held the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city for at least 8 years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be
in the capacity of captain for at least three years.
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase
"has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was
inserted so as to make the provision read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau
of Investigation or police department of any
city and has held the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the
police department of a city or who has served
as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in
the nature of an addition to the phrase, "who has
served the police department of a city for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher," under
which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high
school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner
finished the second year of the law course) could
possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative
process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo
amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion
was made by mistake, the writer of this opinion
personally and painstakingly read and examined the
enrolled bill in the possession of the legislative
secretary of the Office of the President and found that
the text of section 10 of the Act is as set forth in the
beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act bears on
page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the
Senate Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the House
of Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16
thereof those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the
Senate, and Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the
House of Representatives, and of President Ferdinand
E. Marcos. Under the enrolled bill theory, announced
in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito8 this text of the Act must be addressed to the judgment of Congress and unless
deemed as importing absolute verity and as binding on such enlargements are by it accepted courts are
the courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States without power to make them. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark:9 put the matter with lucidity:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of An omission at the time of enactment, whether
Representatives and, by the President of the careless or calculated, cannot be judicially
Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is supplied however much later wisdom may
an official attestation by the two houses of recomment the inclusion.
such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is The vital difference between initiating policy,
a declaration by the two houses, through their often involving a decided break with the past,
presiding officers, to the President that a bill, and merely carrying out a formulated policy,
thus attested, has received in the form, the indicates the relatively narrow limits within
sanction of the legislative branch of the which choice is fairly open to courts and the
government, and that it is delivered to him in extent to which interpreting law is inescapably
obedience to the constitutional requirement making law.12
that all bill which pass Congress shall be In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of
presented to him. And when a bill, thus the law, the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible
attested, receives his approval, its for appointment as chief of police of the city of Manila.
authentication as a bill that has passed Consequently, the respondent has no corresponding
Congress should be deemed complete and legal duty — and therefore may not be compelled
unimpeachable. As the President has no by mandamus to certify the petitioner as qualified and
authority to approve a bill not passed by eligible.
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied.
Secretary of State, and having the official No pronouncements as to costs.
attestations of the Speaker of the house of
Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance
by the legislative and executive departments
of the government, charged, respectively, with
the duty of enacting and executing the laws,
that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to co-equal and independent department
requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears
that, when the two chambers of the legislature met in
conference committee, the phrase "has served as chief
of police with exemplary record" was added, thereby
accounting for its presence in section 10 of the Act.11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically
means that — except for that vagrant phrase "who has
served the police department of a city for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher" — a high
school graduate, no matter how long he has served in
a city police department, is not qualified for
appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who
has served as captain in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines for eight years irrespective of the branch of
service where he served can be Chief of Police of
Manila, why not one who holds an A.A. degree,
completed two years in Law School, and served as
Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the
successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not
to mention the fact that he was awarded three
Presidential Awards, and was given the Congressional
Commendation — the highest award ever conferred in
the history of the Manila Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were
to concede its soundness, still we would be hard put
reading it in the law because it is not there. The
inclusion of desirable enlargements in the statute is