R iga p a p er S

The Riga Conference was organized by

NATO's only future:

the west abroad
Christoph Bertram

Riga, Latvia – November 27 – 29, 2006

With the support of

© 2006 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved.

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 Riga Papers

NATO’s Only Future:

The West Abroad
Christoph Bertram

Riga, Latvia
November 27 – 29, 2006
 

Preface
Over the last decade it has become a tradition to gather the world’s leading thinkers on NATO in advance
of a major Alliance summit. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, along with the Latvian
Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) and the Commission of Strategic Analysis, are proud to host this
conference on the eve of the November 2006 Riga NATO summit.
This summit comes at a critical moment in NATO’s history. The Alliance is deeply engaged in a difficult
mission in Afghanistan and is at a critical juncture in terms of transforming itself for a very different
strategic era in the 21st century. Should NATO aspire to new, more global missions in the wider Middle
East and elsewhere? If so, then does it need new arrangements with non-NATO global partners? When
and where should NATO seek to act and with what kinds of coalitions?
Should NATO continue to keep its door open to future enlargement to new democracies further East and
South at a time when there are signs of enlargement fatigue in Europe? How should NATO transform
itself to better be able to work together with the European Union around the world? And, what future
should we envision for NATO-Russia relations in light of recent trends in Russia? Last but not least, does
NATO have a role to play in new areas and on new issues ranging from energy security to homeland
defense?
These are just some of the difficult questions that the Alliance must confront. In the spirit of stimulating
thinking and debate on both sides of the Atlantic, we have commissioned five Riga Papers to address
these and other issues.
In Re~reinventing NATO, Ronald D. Asmus and Richard C. Holbrooke provide a bold and ambitious
American view on how to overhaul the Alliance so that it may assume more global responsibility and
meet future global threats from two individuals deeply involved in NATO reform in the 1990s.
In NATO’s Only Future: The West Abroad, Christoph Bertram offers a European perspective on the
Alliance’s future from one of the foremost thinkers and writers on NATO affairs on the continent. He
warns that the Alliance is losing the support of its members and that it must do a much better job in
addressing their real security needs by broadening its ambitions and horizons, if it is ever to regain its
former centrality.
In NATO in the Age of Populism, Ivan Krastev analyzes the dangers of the rise in populism in Europe and
the challenge this presents for maintaining public support for the Alliance as well as effective decision-
making as NATO tries to respond to new global threats. He argues that the only way NATO can go global
without falling victim to a populist backlash is to transform itself into a two-pillar Alliance.
In Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia, Žaneta Ozoliņa provides the perspective of a smaller,
Northern European country on these issues and debates. This essay highlights the complexity of the
challenge that NATO’s transformation poses for smaller NATO members as well as ongoing priority and
commitment to keeping NATO’s door open for additional new members.
The fifth and final Riga Paper is entitled NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside. Edited by
Ronald D. Asmus, it consists of four essays by authors from Israel, the Persian Gulf, Australia and Japan.
These authors explore what their countries might expect from the Alliance in the future, as NATO seeks
to develop a new concept of global partnership.
GMF is delighted to offer these papers as part of the intellectual legacy of this Riga conference and
summit. We consider them a key contribution to the spirit of transatlantic debate and partnership that
it is our mission to support.

Craig Kennedy
President of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
 

NATO’s Only Future:

The West Abroad
Christoph Bertram

S ummit Meetings can be misleading. While presidents, prime ministers and

chancellors convene in Riga for their 2006 conference, surrounded by their
entourages, the North Atlantic Treaty group of nations and their almost sexagenarian
organization will command the front pages of the press and the opening news of the
electronic media for a few fleeting days. No speech at the Summit and no toast at
its festive dinners will fail to compliment NATO for being the world’s most successful
alliance and to praise its impressive transformation over the past fifteen years. But,
the event will be like a Christmas service for agnostics, who, for most of the year do
not pray together or sing from the same hymn book. Any serious look at the future
of NATO must, therefore, start with the realization that prospects for the Alliance to
regain the commitment and attachment of its members are, at least, uncertain. And,
any one formulating proposals for NATO’s future must remain conscious of the current
shallowness of that commitment and attachment among most member governments.
Only one thing is certain. Unless NATO addresses the real needs that members share,
it will not regain their support.
On an abstract level, the continuing and objective desirability of this alliance is not
in question. What other kind of institution would be most suitable to addressing the
challenges of globalized insecurity, from instability and strife in significant parts
of the world, to international terrorism? It should be one that allows for close and
permanent consultation among members, well ahead of any contingency. It should
be able to combine political with military expertise. It should have at its disposal a
military staff capable of defining whatever military requirements a particular challenge
might pose, equipped with staff and forces that can work together and are able to
establish close working relations with non-military stabilization efforts. It should allow
both for a smaller group of members operating together in ad hoc-coalitions, as well
as for integrating the forces of non-members willing to take part in specific military
operations. Theoretically, NATO offers all of these advantages. It would be desirable
to invent something like it, if it did not already exist.
If, nevertheless, the institution no longer automatically commands the support of
many a member state on both sides of the Atlantic, it is because these abstract assets
are not adequately translated into practice. The future challenge for NATO is to do just
that. It will require two major commitments from members and the organization. In
the first place they will have to endorse fully, in purpose, structure, forces and culture,
the task of military stabilization beyond the Atlantic area. Second, they will have to
re-establish the institution as the chief strategic council room for the West. Neither
of these steps has yet been taken and both remain controversial. But, it is difficult to
imagine that the Alliance can recover from its present trough unless it embraces both
of them fully.
 Christoph Bertram

Stabilization without Borders

NATO is not a global organization but the potential reach of its operations is now global
in the sense that there is no conflict on the globe beyond its mandate. Significantly,
most of its current “out-of-area” operations are conducted under United Nations
authorization. To have accepted this wider role bears witness to the organization’s
capacity for adaptation. As the security challenges have moved beyond the old Atlantic
and European security parameter, so has the willingness of NATO’s members to make
use of the Alliance to meet them. The slogan “out of area or out of business” coined
in the early 1990s has been borne out. NATO is active out of area and is in business.
Today, far-away Afghanistan has become its primary theatre of operations.
But, this new focus requires not only acquaintance with, hitherto, distant regions
and their conflicts. It has also practically ended NATO’s role as an alliance designed
for fighting wars. Individual members, first and foremost the United States, may still
want to retain, perhaps even give priority to, the capability for prevailing in modern
conventional conflict. NATO, however, is neither any longer suited to this task nor any
longer required. Its only future lies in concentrating on its new role as the provider of
stabilization forces.

Wars No More
It is no longer required because the likelihood of traditional conventional war has
receded dramatically and for those that still may occur, the United States has more
than enough military might to fight and win them against any power on the globe.
There is no need for America’s partners to follow suit, at least for as long as the U.S.
remains committed to their security. In contrast, the likelihood of instability in regions
relevant to Alliance security has grown and continues to grow. Instead of maintaining
the pretence of a war-fighting alliance, NATO should accept that its value for its
members, the U.S. included, is defined by its ability to generate sufficient consensus
and forces for international stabilization tasks.
The growing demand for military stabilization capability can best be judged not only by
NATO’s own involvement in this field, but even more so by UN blue-helmet statistics.
Their number has increased five fold since 2000. If the decisions taken by the UN
Security Council over the past few months for conflict regions such as Lebanon and
Darfur are fully implemented, further sizeable increases are in store.
These will only be met if NATO governments are willing to contribute significant
numbers forces of their own, both in the UN and the NATO context. It is a task for which
NATO is well-suited, while it is no longer suited to fighting traditional wars. Given the
absence of any old-fashioned military threat to NATO territory, the wars that can occur
will be those of choice, not necessity. Inevitably, not all of NATO’s members will want to
make that choice and the consensus which is at the heart of NATO’s cohesion will not
materialize. Some may argue that the Kosovo campaign of 1999 suggests otherwise.
After all, Serbia then posed no direct threat to the territory of any NATO member state.
 NATO’s Only Future: The West Abroad 

But, there were exceptional circumstances at play then. For one, NATO forces were
engaged more in a demonstration of force than a proper war, conducted entirely from
the air. For another, Kosovo is part of the Balkans, where NATO had invested heavily to
promote a stability which now seemed threatened. Even then, consensus was brittle
and would probably have collapsed if NATO had decided to launch a ground attack, in
other words, to fight a proper conventional war against Serbia’s army. Thus the Kosovo
experience would seem to confirm rather than dispute the rule that wars of choice
overtax NATO’s cohesion.
This is likely to apply even in instances where, say, a third country would threaten the
Atlantic area with long-range missiles or even a nuclear weapon (short of an attack).
Just as the old NATO was never capable of launching an offensive war, so the new
NATO will be loath to undertake preventive war. Conceivably, one or several members,
coming together in a coalition of the willing, might undertake such action. NATO as
a whole, however, would muster neither the unity of interests nor the consensus for
action and means that such an operation would require.
The Alliance will not wage wars of choice. But, it can and will conduct stabilizations
of choice. That was the motive for NATO’s Balkan engagement. Well before the stark
reminder of September 11, 2001, NATO members realized the dangers that instability
even further afield could cause and were willing to provide military forces to deal with
them. Afghanistan has become its chief and most demanding theatre of operations.
Others are likely to follow. The NATO Response Force (NRF), once initiated by the U.S.
to help European armed forces catch up with U.S. high-end combat capabilities, has
seen its first deployment on a humanitarian mission in earthquake-hit Kashmir.
Stabilization is what NATO can do and has learned to be quite good at. Politically, too,
consensus for stabilization operations has been relatively forthcoming. And, while no
European force will obtain the funds and the equipment to compare with U.S. high-
end war-fighting capabilities, many are experienced in stabilization tasks. It is true
that, often, both the United States and its NATO partners have been slow in meeting
the force goals defined by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE)
for such missions. Yet, compared to Cold War standards, even those of the Balkan
conflicts that followed it, the post-Cold War willingness of European governments to
send forces into overseas stabilization operations has been remarkable. The principle
is not disputed, even if it is not always fully honored in implementation. NATO’s
members have accepted that stabilization has become NATO’s legitimate role. What is
more, it is a role they want NATO to perform.
For good reason. The NATO Council offers a permanent framework for consultation
between member governments. The Secretary General serves as a representative
of NATO consensus to the outside world and as NATO’s conscience internally. The
Military Committee can coordinate between national military authorities. SHAPE can
do the necessary staff work and generate staffs for operations abroad within a short
time, it has also learned to coordinate non-member forces willing to be included in
the operations. SHAPE’s long-standing (if only partially fully successful efforts) to
promote interoperability among NATO forces are at least paying off in Afghanistan
as they have in the Balkans. It is true that the adaptation of these institutions is still
far from complete. The organization is still unduly voluminous and top-heavy and the
 Christoph Bertram

command structure is a half-way house between past and present requirements. But,
the organizational assets designed for war-fighting have proven their worth in the new
task of military stabilization.

Still a Halfway House

More serious is the unsatisfactory compromise between old and new. NATO’s culture,
self-image and pride is still that of a collective defense alliance, conveying the message
that NATO needs to meet the highest dangers of military aggression, not primarily to
contribute forces to global stabilization tasks. The communiqués of ministerial and
summit meetings usually start with a commitment to collective defense, only to be
followed by a detailed discussion of all out of area stabilization missions. The July 2006
edition of the official NATO Review appearing under the programmatic title “NATO’s
Past, Present and Future” is, apart from a few historical reminiscences, devoted
entirely to stabilization efforts including a discussion of NATO’s growing humanitarian
role, a debate over Kosovo independence, profiles of “our men” in Sarajevo and Kabul,
a survey of current operations and an analysis of the challenge in Afghanistan. The
discrepancy between the old rhetoric and the new action is striking.
This is, to some extent, understandable. The Alliance’s finest hours were the decades
when it could deter and did not need to fight. The challenges of today and tomorrow
are, by comparison, messy and mundane and entail the use of force against an often
elusive enemy, promising neither decisive victories nor clear exit strategies. Yet, to
cling to the old culture and rhetoric is an expensive luxury. It only delays the necessary
transformation of minds and of forces that the “transformation of strategic affairs”
demands.
The transformation of forces would require NATO to make stabilization capabilities
the clear priority. Instead, the organization as well as the military establishments
of member states, continue to cling to the principle that the NATO forces should be
capable of performing across the board, over “the full range of missions”. Given the
severe financial constraints on the defense budgets of most NATO countries, the
implied official encouragement to arm for high-intensity regular combat and, at the
same time, for effective stabilization has the effect of obstructing both.
By now, thanks to the experience gathered in Afghanistan and Iraq, it should have
become amply apparent that many of the weapons, most of the training and all of
the tactics of regular war-fighting are very different from those needed for the kind of
irregular combat that stabilization may require. While there is some overlap between
the two missions, it is only a partial one. Hence to ask member nations, as NATO
communiqués routinely do, to prepare for “the full range of missions” means that
they are inevitably less well prepared for either. Quite apart from the fact that, as has
been pointed out earlier, the likelihood of regular war-fighting is remote, it is real for
stabilization-type conflicts.

  Lawrence Freedman, “Transformation of Strategic Affairs”, Adelphi Paper No.379, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 2006.
 NATO’s Only Future: The West Abroad 

Why NATO Can Afford Failure

When the territorial integrity of one of its members is threatened by an attack, NATO
cannot afford to lose. It would sacrifice its credibility as an alliance. Article five
encapsulates this commitment. But, in stabilization operations the existence of NATO
is not threatened. Here NATO can afford to fail without losing its credibility as an
alliance.
Geography may have an impact on this distinction. One can argue that failure by
NATO to impose order in the immediate vicinity of the Atlantic region would severely
discredit it. That is the reason why in the end it had no alternative but to become
involved in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Had the Alliance not intervened or, as in
the Kosovo conflict, not held together, it would have been severely, perhaps even
mortally, weakened. Those years, moreover, were marked by wide-spread doubts over
its continuing relevance, on both sides of the Atlantic. Had the hitherto mighty Alliance
and its leading members not succeeded in pacifying the Balkans, NATO’s days would
have been numbered and the Atlantic security link severed. It was essential, therefore,
that here NATO, to quote a favorite term of President George W. Bush, did not “cut and
run”, but rather “stayed the course”.
The same, however, does not apply to the stabilization operations which NATO conducts
in places far away from the Atlantic region. When military forces seek to impose stability
through intervention in fragile states, the usual candidates for stabilization efforts,
failure is often more likely than success. Foreign military forces can often do no more
than freeze the conflict for a while, hoping that this will be enough for indigenous
structures of stability to emerge. But, the alliance that sent them there must be able
to withdraw them once it becomes clear that the mission cannot be completed or that
it is becoming too costly, too dangerous or both. That may affect NATO’s interests,
but it does not jeopardize the security of its members. Nor does it undermine NATO’s
credibility in terms of collective defense.
To insist on this distinction is not merely an exercise in intellectual discipline. It
is politically imperative in order to limit the damage that failure in stabilization
operations, which will often be unavoidable, would otherwise cause for the Alliance.
These are operations in which NATO can afford not to succeed. This does not mean
they should not be undertaken in earnest or that they should be given up easily. But,
when weighing the pros and cons of ending them, the argument frequently made by
NATO leaders, namely that NATO must prevail for the sake of its own authority and
credibility, has no place.
These are by definition undertakings with no clear start or end. They do not begin with
a military attack and do not end with a military victory. Whatever stability is advanced
by the presence of NATO forces holds no guarantee of longevity. Exit strategies can
rarely be made dependent on the situation in the host country. They will have to be
made on the basis of what is politically possible for the intervening countries.
There are, thus, fundamental differences between collective defense credibility and
stabilization credibility. To lump them together or to blur the distinction between
the two, shows a lack of understanding for the very nature of such interventions.
The consequence of getting stuck in hopeless operations as well as holding NATO’s
 Christoph Bertram

authority and standing hostage to fortune is doubly dangerous. The UN, the institution
with the widest experience in post-conflict stabilization to date, has never made these
operations a test for its credibility. NATO needs to do likewise.
To recognize fully that, for the foreseeable future, stabilization abroad will be its chief
function, with all the implications, is the central requirement for assuring NATO’s
future. The Alliance, to its credit, has done so in principle. It still has to master the
consequences for its internal organization, its institutional culture, its forces, its
concepts and its rhetoric. This, its most important transformation, is still incomplete.

Reestablishing the West

Making NATO fit for stabilization is, however, only part of the answer. The organization
must also become the center for coordinating related strategies and policies. Together
with its members it must reestablish the West as an actor in the age of globalization.
NATO once was the symbol of Western cohesion and cooperation. It has lost this
status due to intra-Western apathy and tension, pressure to expand its membership
beyond the Atlantic region and a failure to make use of the opportunities for strategic
consultation that the institution offers.
Today, the very concept of “the West” has fallen into neglect. After the end of the Cold
War the reunification of a Europe whole and free was the West’s finest achievement,
unthinkable without the firm commitment and intimate involvement of the United
States in the affairs of the old continent. But, then both sides of the Atlantic turned their
attention elsewhere. The United States began to focus on the globe and the Europeans
on themselves. The West defined itself more by the problems left in abeyance, as a
result of its absence, rather than by the commitment of Western governments to look
at the world together and coordinate their approaches to it. NATO became a political
orphan, the notion of “the West” a nostalgic reference, supposedly no longer relevant
to the new strategic condition.
Events since then have taught a different lesson. In the globalized world there are few,
if any problems that are easier to solve in the absence of U.S.-European cooperation.
A common approach is the condition sine qua non for progress in the relationship
with Russia or China, in dealing with the Middle East, in coping with nuclear and
other proliferation, in addressing the challenge of energy and climate change. The
idea that the U.S. has global and Europe only regional interests, has not survived the
advent of globalized insecurity and the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Both sides
of the Atlantic have experienced the futility of going it alone. They have had ample
opportunity to find out that they are significantly less effective if they do not work
together or, worse, if they work against each other.
The fact that Atlantic interests increasingly coincide is one element of “Westerness”.
Familiarity with each others’ history and society, the network of personal relations, the
habit of working together for half a century as well as cultural affinity are the other. No
other two continents and societies are similarly interwoven. These are unique assets.
In combination, they offer the chance for reestablishing the West as an actor in global
affairs and for NATO to serve the West again.
 NATO’s Only Future: The West Abroad 

Global In Mandate,
Not In Membership
Some, in particular in the U.S., are arguing that this West is too Atlantic oriented,
that globalized insecurity requires global institutions and, hence, a NATO with global
membership. In the words of Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, two of the most forceful
proponents of this position, “NATO’s next move must be to open its membership to
any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment
of NATO’s new responsibilities. Only a truly global alliance can address the global
challenges”.
This is a mistaken view, for more than one reason. For one, the regional character
of NATO’s current membership has in no way limited its focus to the Atlantic region,
as the Alliance has demonstrated convincingly through global operations and global
cooperation. On the contrary, it is open for close cooperation with countries outside
this region willing to engage. For another, the idea of turning NATO into a kind of UN
for democracies fails to explain why such a large group of countries with diverse
concerns and cultures, ranging from the East of Europe to the East of Asia, should be
able to work together better, or at least as effectively as the Atlantic partners. It is at
least conceivable, if not downright probable, that a larger membership will give more
countries a veto against common action. Most of all, de-Atlanticising the West would
jeopardize the unique asset of NATO’s current membership. The special, emotional,
glue, which has held the Atlantic club together throughout, would be diluted and
destroyed. Instead of replacing (and losing) the West, NATO members must seek to
reestablish it.
This does not mean that any further NATO enlargement should be stopped forthwith.
But, the central criteria for all future candidates, be they Ukraine, Georgia or any
others, should be their qualification as a family member of the West, in addition to
their sharing the democratic nature and strategic outlook of the existing membership.
For many advocates of enlargement, the prime consideration today is the strategic
advantage of extending the NATO stability zone, whether in Europe’s East, in the
Caucasus or even the Middle East. That is a short-sighted argument. For one, what may
look like a strategic advantage today could become a strategic quagmire tomorrow.
For another, it makes membership open-ended in principle. Any candidate fulfilling
the formal conditions of membership will interpret rejection as discrimination. And,
the Alliance will have no incentive to establish what it will need in the future no less
than in the past, namely a credible and acceptable alternative to membership.
The country with which this need becomes particularly pronounced and urgent (even
more so once Ukraine and Georgia are included in the Alliance) is, of course, Russia.
For NATO to recognize that military stabilization beyond the Atlantic region has to be its
central function is necessary, as has been argued above, to assure the organization’s
future. It also, however, has relevance for the impact of any further enlargement in the
post-Soviet space on NATO’s relationship with Russia. Once the stabilization priority
is fully manifested in the Alliance’s doctrine, structure and action, the admission of

  Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO” in Foreign Affairs, pp. 105-113, September-October, 2006, p.106.
 Christoph Bertram

any of Russia’s neighbors will be seen by Moscow much less as an encroachment on

Russian security and it will facilitate pragmatic NATO-Russia cooperation in future
stabilization operations elsewhere.

Making Minds Meet

Prior to Action
Nothing has weakened the West more in recent years than the unwillingness to
engage together at an early stage in the definition of specific threats and the tools to
address them. NATO has accepted its new role as the provider of stabilization forces in
conflicts of common concern. But, it has not been given the related role of organizing
a meeting of minds prior to action. It has not become the place where the West
examines its strategy together. And, nor has any other institution. Granting NATO that
role now would help to generate a Western consensus on the challenges confronting
the international order and would enable the West to be a player in the new world of
globalized insecurity.
It is an idea which lately has been taken up by NATO communiqués. At the 2005
Brussels Summit, NATO heads of government solemnly declared: “We will further
transform the Alliance and its capabilities to respond to our common security challenges.
We are committed to strengthening NATO’s role as a forum for strategic and political
consultation and coordination among Allies, while reaffirming its place as the essential
forum for security consultation between Europe and North America”.
Unfortunately, matters rest there. No member state has yet taken the initiative to
translate these words into action. The decisive initiative, of course, would have to
be taken by the United States. But, since the demand for more NATO involvement
in working out common strategies was first raised by European governments, it is
deplorable that they have not tried to do so themselves. Making NATO the West’s chief
forum for security consultation between Europe and America, in which the EU would
also be present, would create much needed synergies between the stabilization efforts
of both institutions. And, it could help the United States to return to the spirit in which
it had so ably conducted alliance relations during the Cold War period and after.
Enabling NATO thus is, however, more than just a sensible gesture. It is essential to
ensure the future of the Alliance as it embraces its new role. Military stabilization in
conflicts far beyond the Atlantic region entails considerable risks of which governments
and their publics need to be aware in advance. Members, therefore, must be involved
in the political and military deliberations that predate joint operations. Their relevance
for the Alliance, the objective, the composition and extent of military involvement
needed, the coordination with other, non-military, organizations and the possible
duration of the intervention, all need to be discussed. It is highly unlikely that alliance
consensus for stabilization will be reached, or maintained, without such efforts. The
role NATO has rightly accepted as its own in today’s world would be discredited.
 NATO’s Only Future: The West Abroad 

The final test for NATO’s future is whether other institutions would be better or at least
as suited for the military tasks it is taking on and for the policy consultation that has to
precede them. Neither the UN nor the European Union, their importance and potential
notwithstanding, can match what NATO offers. For the West to become effective as
a contributor to international order, the transatlantic partners have to act together.
Developing procedures for building transatlantic consensus is a strategic requirement
that exceeds the narrower issue of the North-Atlantic Alliance. NATO, nevertheless,
is the obvious candidate as the institution that could promote and manage such a
procedure, now even more than in its past.

America the Indispensable

Yet, the West and its institutions cannot prosper just because they make sense. They
need a sponsor. The United States was once that indispensable sponsor. The richest
and most powerful state on earth lent its ideas, its talents and its enthusiasm to the
creation and leadership of the West and of NATO. In recent years, however, it has
become less enthusiastic, more willing to command and less willing to lead. The U.S.’
political and military classes have become convinced that membership in Atlantic and
international institutions has enhanced U.S. influence less than it has constrained its
freedom of action. As a result, the North Atlantic Alliance and its organization, too,
lost its sponsor.
Whether NATO will remain marginal or regain a pivotal place in the strategic interests
of the West will depend essentially on the United States. No other member or group
of members can make up for American indifference. There will be no West unless the
primary power of the West wants it.
Will the United States become NATO’s sponsor once again? This is for the United
States alone to answer. One consideration may be the recognition that the United
States’ unique position as the world’s pivotal power is under siege from two major
developments: in the words of Australian historian Carol Bell, the rise of the non-West
and the division of the West. Re-launching the West would, thus, seem to be very
much in the interest of the United States. If it were to choose that path, its Atlantic
partners would follow. And, nobody would have to worry about NATO’s future.

  Coral Bell, “The Twighlight of the Unipolar World” in The American Interest, Washington DC, Winter 2005-6.
10

About the Author

Christoph Bertram directed the London International Institute for Strategic
Studies in the United Kingdom for eight years from 1974. In 1982 he
joined the editorial staff of the German weekly DIE ZEIT as Diplomatic
Correspondent. From 1998 to 2005 he headed Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, the German Institute for Foreign and Security Affairs in Berlin,
Germany. He joined the Bologna Center of the Paul H. Nitze School for
Advanced International Studies in Bologna, Italy, as a Visiting Professor
during 2005 to 2006, teaching European Security and German Foreign
Policy. He lives in Hamburg, Germany.
 11

About the Organizers of the

Riga Conference
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan
American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting
greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and
Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working
on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing
transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic
cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition,
GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall
Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the
Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has
six offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, and
Ankara (www.gmfus.org).

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) is a non-governmental
organization established in March 2000 to promote Latvia’s full and active
membership in NATO and to work for international security and democracy
in NATO and the EU near neighborhood region. It unites members from
different social groups in terms of age and professional interests. LATO
was established with the objective of facilitating Latvia’s membership in
NATO. Education and information activities, aimed at increasing public
support for NATO membership, have been carried out. These activities
explained and built public awareness about the principles and values
that unite NATO member states. Since Latvia achieved its main foreign
policy goal of joining the EU and NATO, LATO has continued its work
providing information on international defense and security issues and
questions related to Latvia’s full participation in NATO. LATO has also
become an active partner in the promotion of democratic values and the
strengthening of civil society in the neighboring region, including Belarus,
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The scope of LATO activities is both local
and international. Its activities include conferences, seminars, summer
schools and work with partner organizations and mass media. The LATO
Information Center ensures accessibility of information and facilitates
understanding about security and defense policy questions, as well as
encouraging interest in participation in LATO activities.

The Commission of Strategic Analysis

Latvia’s Commission of Strategic Analysis under the auspices of the
President of the Republic of Latvia was established on April 2, 2004,
at the initiative of the President of Latvia, Dr. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. Its
founding resolution was jointly signed by the President and the Prime
Minister. The Commission’s main goal is to generate a long-term vision
of Latvia’s development through interdisciplinary and future-oriented
studies. The Commission of Strategic Analysis is a think tank that seeks
to consolidate Latvia’s scholarly potential for the benefit of Latvia’s future
development. It has undertaken research on Latvia’s opportunities as a
member of the European Union and NATO, along with Latvia’s place in
global development processes. The Commission also stimulates high-
quality dialogue with the country’s legislative and executive powers, as
well as the general public, on matters that concern Latvia’s development
and the consolidation of democracy.
 R iga p a p er S
The Riga Conference was organized by

re~reinventing nato
Ronald D. Asmus
and Richard C. Holbrooke

Riga, Latvia – November 27 – 29, 2006

With the support of