1) In Re: Justice Ong (A,M. No.
SB-14-21-J) Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was
PER CURIAM: The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
it is done.- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Factual Antecedents
This case involves the disbursement of billions of government funds to bogus
foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam.
The Court's Ruling
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or
bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his
dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond
allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."12 We agree with
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the
pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her
acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence
of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is
satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for
the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or
even preponderant.13
Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with
the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received.14
A judge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court
commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest
possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by one charged with the
responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely
corrodes respect for law and the courts.15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Concededly, the
evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against
the respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent,
we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case.
grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."28Dishonesty, being a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture
of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that
has no place in the Judiciary.29
2. Barias vs. Judge Marino E. Rubia
CANON I FIDELITY TO DUTY. . . .
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to
anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to
influence their official acts or duties.. . . .
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their
official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed
statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano:138
The behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice,
from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility.
Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying
integrity, honesty and uprightness.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety
but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrate’s
activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife - above
suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in
prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the
performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual.
Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By
participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for
her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee
of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in
both its individual and institutional aspects.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the
judiciary and its personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its
integrity. In effect, both respondents are guilty of gross misconduct. This court defined
misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."155 In Camus v.
The Civil Service Board of Appeals,156 this court held that "[m]isconduct has been
defined as ‘wrong or improper conduct’ and ‘gross’ has been held to mean ‘flagrant;
shameful’. . . . This Court once held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment."157
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge
Rubia is also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either.
As a litigant, she is enjoined to act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the
proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the subject of these proceedings.
To ensure that these actions will no longer be committed by any party, respondents
must be sanctioned accordingly, in keeping with the court’s mandate to uphold a
character of trust and integrity in society. WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket
the case as a regular administrative matter. Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment in
any public office, including government owned or -controlled corporations.
Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross misconduct. SO
ORDERED.
3. GARAY VS. VENADAS
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the
basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.1
ISSUES
(1) whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession; and (2) whether he should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
OUR RULING
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court.
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance
of the Writ of Possession.1hIn fact, the title over the subject property had already been
consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue
the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.
Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it
was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the
alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ
of Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property. Thus,
there was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession
because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject
property as a matter of right.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with the
findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule
and the required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge
Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving
PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the
motion was personally served on PNB and its counsel but they refused to receive the
same.
However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to substantiate
such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that Judge Venadas, Sr.
is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure for
blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is
gross ignorance of the law,83which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by
either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding
six months, or a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.84
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Order, and considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge
Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law
and is hereby fined the amount of ₱20,000.00. SO ORDERED.
4. Re: Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority, nor that it is articulated by a lawyer." xxx Judicial officers, like
other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of
public opinion.
The Court's Disposition
In invoking her constitutional guarantee to freedom of speech, she explains though that
she is not unaware of the corresponding obligation to exercise said right responsibly.
The right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize the
courts or any of its officers., is not without limitations.
Atty. Kapunan should be reminded that comments made against the courts must not
go beyond the bounds of courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust
in the judicial system. As held in In re Almacen:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
Likewise, in Spouses Tiongco v. Aguilar, the Court wrote:
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression
in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility,
but freedom with responsibility.
In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, it was held:
Freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public
interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice.
There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression
itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
Atty. Kapunan , as a member of the Bar, she is under the obligation to maintain at all
times a respectful attitude toward the courts.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Specifically, Canon 10 and 1 1 provide:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
Under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the first canon of the Canons
of Professional Ethics, thus:
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are
not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts.
He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity xxx to the courts; and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers."
The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. "
These rules of courteous demeanor must, according to the Court, be observed not only
in open court, but also out of court.
Justice Brion: In his Reflections, he said, that the Court should "proactively react to
the smoke that Atty. Kapunan has raised" as a fire must have existed somewhere behind
her statements which, according to him, should not be left unattended to.
Atty. Kapunan's disclosures were made in one of the most watched program in the
country before millions of televiewers, an audience that largely does not appreciate
what hearsay means.
Hence, according to him, the Court's inaction on this case would certainly place in
question the integrity of the justice system in the public's eyes. He, thus, suggests as an
alternative that the matter be referred for further investigation as done in the "Ma'am
Arlene" inquiry.
Justice Leonen concurs with Justice Brion's proposal.
Justice Leonen in his Concurring Opinion also expresses his support on the
ponencia's recognition that lawyers do enjoy the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression. For this reason, he does not fault Atty. Kapunan for her statements on
national television. He, however, finds Atty. Kapunan liable for acknowledging that she
has heard and probably experienced acts of corruption and for admitting that she has
done nothing to make the perpetrators answerable.
5. RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-
J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
Court find ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA guilty of indirect contempt.
A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint7 shows an apparent failure to
understand that cases are not always decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation of
bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendants to the merits
and the developments in the case.
In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his
client the features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and
respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a
professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before
our courts.
A person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding,
must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity
to explain his side.11
There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings
against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the
discipline of lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings spring from two
different powers of the Court.
The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power
granted to courts in general.14 Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts;
and, consequently, in the administration of justice;15 thus, it may be instituted against
any person guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court.16
Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in
nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to
contempt proceedings.
A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed
in the same manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an
accused’s acquittal.17

In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature;

To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We
it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a
have to strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the
disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether
Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need to protect the independence and efficiency of
a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves an
the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other.
investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary
objective, public interest.18
Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into
inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we shut our
Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary
doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide
proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of the ruling.
the outcome of their cases.
Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a
subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.19
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, a litigant in indirect contempt of
court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different
members of the Judiciary.
procedures.1â

We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due
Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of
whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules138 and 139
court.
thereof.20

Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adaza’s acts constitute an
improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus
punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt
proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is
independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt.
6. CARBAJOSA VS. JUDGE PATRICIO
Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the ideal
administration of justice. Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be
hampered or evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed
by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice.23 Our
penal laws and rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the judgment of
conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial.24
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply
them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution
for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given
the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution
without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment.
Judge Patricio’s actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.
Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owe sit to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross ignorance of the
law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and
changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no
one ― not even judges ― from compliance therewith.
Canon18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity
of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the
inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority x x
x.
While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional
mistakes or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant
with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit the confidence of the
citizenry.
7.GARADO VS. TORRES (A.M. NO. MTJ-11-1778)
Respondent’s failure to submit her Comment and compliance as required by the OCA
and this Court is tantamount to insubordination, inefficiency, and neglect of duty.14
By her failure to comply with the OCA and this Court’s directives, respondent judge has
completely lost her chance to defend herself.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed
with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from
the date they are submitted for decision or resolution.
With respect to cases falling under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, first
level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to
render judgment.
Section 6 of the said Rule also requires first level courts to render judgment motu
proprio or upon motion of the plaintiff if the defendant fails to file an answer to the
complaint within the allowable period.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters pending
before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges
to "dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be
prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending
before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS: He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY: He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties,
recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the
judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create
dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
8. DECENA VS. MANLAYAON (A.M. NO. RTJ-02-1669)
The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the
audience hurling various accusatory remarks and insults at the council members. The
heckler is a judge, the incident, the subject of this case.
Admitting his presence during the Sanggunian session, Judge Malanyaon explained,
however, that he was there not as a judge but in his private capacity as a taxpayer.
Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous behavior as it clearly
violates the Code of Judicial Conduct.
First. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and even vulgar. Indeed, such
utterances should not be expected of a public official worthy of his office. At fault is not
the sentiment harbored, but the impolitic choice of words employed to express such
sentiment.[11] It is not even particularly relevant if Judge Malanyaon was inebriated at
that time, for the reckless character of his remarks are in themselves palpable, whether
they were delivered in a drunken or sober state.
Second. The members of the Sanggunian are, by reason of their public office,
entitled to the respect of other people, especially their fellow public officers. Judge
Malanyaons diatribe indicates his inability to accord his fellow public officials their due.
Third. Judge Malanyaon made his remarks in a public forum. Obviously,
however, he forgot or even failed to realize that he is a representative of the judicial
branch of government, the judge being the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly, of justice.[12] The judiciary is loathe to interfere with the due exercise by
co-equal branches of government of their official functions, absent any justiciable
action brought in due course.
Judge Malanyaons active participation in apparent concert with Canets
supporters exposed him as nothing but a common lobbyist, as he forgot to act as a judge
with the standard judicial temperament and prudence.
 Fifth. As a judge, respondent should very well know how deleterious it would be
to the discharge of his functions if the court hearings he presides over would be rudely
interrupted by fulsome tirades delivered by a spectator in the audience. If such a
situation arise in his courtroom, Judge Manlayaon would have every right to take
offense to the disruption in the proceedings.
A legislative session is no less an official proceeding as a court session and anyone
who disrupts either proceedings deserves to be sanctioned.
Sixth. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall neither allow
family relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor allow the prestige of
judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests of others.[15]
Judge Malanyaon needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at
the end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when garbed in casual wear
outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority and moral ascendancy
that he or she wields inside the sala. As the Court once held:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private
life should be above suspicion.[17]
Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 in particular, mandates that a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, as
well as behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
9. OCA VS. NECESSARIO (A,.M. NO. MTJ-07-1691)
PER CURIAM: This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It requires that everyone involved
in its dispensation ― from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk ― live up to the
strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public service."1
THE ISSUE: Whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are
guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross
misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURT’S RULING
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy
burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public.65
In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official
functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.66
The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the
prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the
ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of
a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to
the contrary.
In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:
…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and
it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the
duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,125 that "the presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."
The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the
existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title;
and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
(53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
In performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels
of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s trust and confidence in this institution.
Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the
honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence in the
Judiciary.145

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient 10.ANONYMOS VS. ACHAS
in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be
skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is
against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity.
not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.132
If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove
his defense.7
The respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently provides:

This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence,
CANON 2: INTEGRITY
and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an
indication of lack of integrity."140
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges.
In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and
upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes
the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice.141 SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following
done.
employees:

Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel
from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongaya’s claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from
other offices as the usual practice143 is inexcusable.
This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct."144 Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave
offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first
offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice;
parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel,
irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary.
CANON 4 PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding that it is not commendable,
proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife.
Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the Judiciary.
While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a
crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due
him.
As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
Seven years later, similar charges have again been levelled against Judge Achas.
Considering that his immoral behaviour is not a secret around town, it is apparent that
respondent judge has failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived to be above
reproach by the reasonable observer, and has failed to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in his activities, to the detriment of the judiciary as a whole.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant
than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence,
honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court
and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his activities. His personal behaviour outside the court,
and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach,
for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act
of a judge degrades the institution he represents.10
Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of
the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than Pl,000.00 but not exceeding
₱10,000.00; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; ( 4) admonition with warning. The
Court, thus, finds that the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and reprimand
are proper under the circumstances.
11. In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism against Justice del Castillo
PER CURIAM:
Plagiarism, defines as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's
original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own."2
-The presentation of another person’s ideas as one’s own must be deliberate or
premeditated—a taking with ill intent.
-"plagiarism is identified not through intent but through the act itself. Thus, Students
who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not excused."3
But the Court’s decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision
makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the
originality of the writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of
stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and
related studies in their decisions.
-The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The
strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents
and long held legal opinions it draws from.4
-In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an
original piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government
for the public good.
-There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the
Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws
involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written.
But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of
such laws as are applied to specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand
by precedent and not to disturb settled point."
Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts,
it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same."6
-because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and practitioners alike, by
practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and writings, at times
omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the
law, they effectively place their ideas, their language, and their work in the public
domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being in the public domain,
other lawyers can thus freely use these without fear of committing some wrong or
incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is everything.
Legal disputes often centre round the way in which obligations have been expressed in
legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit the meaning of the words in
which the obligation is contained. This, in conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers
means that refuge will often be sought in articulations that have been tried and tested.
In a sense therefore the community of lawyers have together contributed to this body
of knowledge, language, and expression which is common property and may be utilized,
developed and bettered by anyone.7
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public
domain is not unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria
Lourdes Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion
Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a
charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel
thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used
without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem
appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption
applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not
writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a
dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal
plagiarism.8
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are
not. Their decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the
relevant from the irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or issues that need
to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws, rulings, principles, or authorities that the
parties to the case invoke. The decisions then draw their apt conclusions regarding
whether or not such laws, rulings, principles, or authorities apply to the particular cases
before the Court. These efforts, reduced in writing, are the product of the judges’
creativity. It is here—actually the substance of their decisions—that their genius,
originality, and honest labor can be found, of which they should be proud.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like
all lawyers handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to
this. Although as a rule they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file
in court or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for
technical accuracy in their writings. They should not be exposed to charges of
plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from
the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.SO ORDERED.
12. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY TO THE SC ON ALLEGATIONS
OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATIONS IN SC
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law
professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the
Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate
and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted
explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly
unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call
the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the
relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to
their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as
follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal
or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak
their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards
of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the
Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially
during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of
plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this
plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern
of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent
members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional
conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or
interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that
it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their
Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
(Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition.
Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the
respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this
Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can
similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is
precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and
mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of
intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
(e) Academic freedom
They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which
provided that "[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise
academic freedom."
They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom
as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s
field of study without fear of reprisal.
It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the
Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as
teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation of students,
professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research
and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public
that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that
intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the
following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v.
Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course
from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a
lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines
needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests
of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well
tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the
lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and
of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly,
for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple
misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon
him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed
academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach
their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the
Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can
teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure,
even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in
his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case
springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt
in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s purported failure to follow the
procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the
Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt
proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As
explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an
administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the
review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through
a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the
Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that
the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a
trial type hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits
is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial
of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal
or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the
requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given
the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the
opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and
Manifestation filed before this Court.146(Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and
their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither
have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing
in this instance. They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary
or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal
hearing.SO ORDERED.
13. HABAWEL VS. CTA
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on
similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:
Rule 11.03. – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and
their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate
channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression
to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:25
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where
the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the court’s actuation are
thrown open to public consumption.xxx
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as
a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges.xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this
right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." xxx
xxxThe test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety.
By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of
propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts.
An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially
in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation,30 and constitutes direct contempt
of court.
It is settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings
or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the proceedings
are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice.31
Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside,
however, for the characterization that the statements were "strong, tactless and
hurtful," although obviously correct, provides no ground to be lenient towards the
petitioners, even assuming that such "strong, tactless and hurtful" statements were
used to explain their client’s position in the case.37
The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the members of its First
Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their "strong, tactless and
hurtful" language minimized on the basis that "snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos
made by counsels are not considered contemptuous considering that unfavorable
decision usually incite bitter feelings."38
This result became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and Section
7(a)(5) of Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the
CTA really had jurisdiction, to wit:
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to
punish contempt of court in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail.46
The treatment has dealt with contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt
of court or administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged
from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a
repetition of the misconduct, a fine of ₱2,000.00, a fine of ₱5,000.00, and even
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive
language is viewed as contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. SO
ORDERED.
14. TORMIS VS. PAREDES
The Court’s Ruling
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence.
Simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct.
Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure
some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.19
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the acts
complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge
Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as "misconduct." They are
simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge
Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudicematter, however, is another thing.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 ofthe New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
CANON 3: IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before
them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of
such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make
any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing
the administration of justice.21
THE RATIONALE FOR THE RULE: Where it was stated that it is a traditional
conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues
of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should
be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts
should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.23
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to
project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was
correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges
to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4 instructs:
CANON 4: PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
x x xSEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required
by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a magistrate.
Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by
Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of
expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes
that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right,
however, is not without limitation.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the
exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a
manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him asa judge not
only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private
activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court,
should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized
that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but
also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy
of morality, a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that
a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot simply
be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial
integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in
the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.27
Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond:
Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, authorizes executive judges to act on
petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays, official
holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash
bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and
issue a temporary receipt therefor.
15. ANDRES VS. NAMBI (A.C. NO. 7158, 9 MARCH 2015)
As a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law,
there must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to support a conclusion
that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty.
As respondents are duly notified and aware of the execution proceedings, the argument
of denial of due process is untenable.15
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondent’s conclusion had some
bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act
whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be characterized as
imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith.
Based on the above-quoted disquisition, his conclusion was reached after an
examination of the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of the
arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented;
on the contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties.
In any event, we hold that respondent should not be held accountable for committing
an honest mistake or an error in the appreciation of the facts of the case before him.
Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that matter,
would be continually plagued with the possibility of being administratively sanctioned
for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this would not augur well to the
administration of justice as a whole.
Pertinently, the Court ruled in Andrada v. Judge Banzon,16 viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice,
respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions
and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases.
Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule or
decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for
no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of the
administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment.17 SO ORDERED.
16. Complaint of Parreno against Justices Leagogo, Ybañez, Lazaro-Javier
Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is without merit.
The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within
12 months from the submission of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself.
This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
to wit:
Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be
decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the
Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower
collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself.
x x x xDid the respondents incur any administrative liability for the delay?
Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of
the assigned Justice and the Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged.
But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of eight months should
depend on the relevant circumstances.
 Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge
from disposing his cases within the reglementary period,22 the Court has applied this
rule by considering the causes of the delay.
In Marquez v. Manigbas,23 the Court relieved the respondent judge from liability
because the delay had been caused by the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the
expansion of the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts.
In Santos v. Lorenzo,24 the Court held that a delay of seven months in deciding a case
could be excused because of the heavy caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital
Judicial Region.
In Lubaton v. Lazaro,25 the Court, in sparing the respondent from the sanctions earlier
imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the judge, the motivation of the
complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload of 3,500 cases,
1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her cases
and the resolution of pending incidents and issuance of the proper orders. The Court,
in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the
part of the Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and
literal compliance with the rule."26
The delay could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybañez with malice or
deliberate attempt to impede the dispensation of justice.1âwphi1 He assigned C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the
meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter
subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus,
Justice Ybañez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His
explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted. WHEREFORE, the
Court DISMISSES.
17. RIVERA VS. JUDGE BLANCAFLOR
The Court’s Ruling
Re: charge of bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. No. 3019
While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to reduce
bail, it appears from the records that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday
and Namplata. Through Judge Blancaflor’s inaccessibility (he was usually not in the
court in the afternoon)22 and refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional
liberty, Catuday and Namplata and the people working for the approval of their motions
(Rivera and De Mata) suffered inordinate delay and frustrations in securing the
motions’ approval. In more ways than one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Riveraa
run-around in Catuday’s and Namplata’s cases for no plausible reason other than the
judge’s strong antipathy towards Rivera.
This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary23 which mandates that "judges shall perform their judicial duties
without favor, bias or prejudice,"24 and that they "shall ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."25
Judge Blancaflor’s interference in the case in the way just described is not only gross
misconduct; it also constitutes a violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, particularly Section 3(e) which provides: "In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x
Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence x x x."
To be sure, even if Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the Leron case, he cannot
extricate himself from the legal mess he brought upon himself. His interference in the
case caused an undue injury to the party who should have prevailed had the case pushed
through; and an unwarranted benefit to the party who should have lost had the case
been decided on the merits. Worse, he exhibited evident bad faith when he gave both
parties expectations of winning the case. Thus, there is every reason to find probable
cause against him for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards demanded
of the office of a judge in the Leroncase. Time and again, judges have been reminded
thatas magistrates, they must comport themselves in such a manner that their conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
them as the epitome of integrity and justice.48 Sad to state, Judge Blancaflor failed to
pass this "searching scrutiny."
Re: charge of immorality
Justice Fernando stressed that Judge Blancaflor did not categorically deny the
allegations of an illicit relationship with Villamar. While he stated that his marriage to
his wife NoraLopez was already annulled, the annulment became final only on July 18,
2012 by virtue of an entry of judgment from the RTC, Br. 199, Las Piñas City. Thus, he
was still a married man at the time of his liaison with Villamar.55
For maintaining a relationship with Villamar, Judge Blancaflor crossed the line of a
proper and acceptable conduct as a magistrate and a private person.
In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children against Judge Ferdinand
J. Marcos,56 we said: "x x x The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of
his official duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals.
The code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. x x x."SO
ORDERED.
18. LORENZANA VS. JUDGE AUSTRUA
The Court’s Ruling
The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should
be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority ;Irregularity in the Performance of Duty;
Grave Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving
the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the
allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave
bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the
complainant failed to establish the respondent’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The
complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and
suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the
accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held
administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of
official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions,
these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial
remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An administrative complaint is
not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by
a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23 Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead
through judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
The truth about the respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply
relying on the complainant’s verified complaint.
Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation
under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give
equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.26
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence and Gross Ignorance of the Law
Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders
him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous."28
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to
bad faith.
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every
erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need not observe due
care in the performance of his/her official functions.35
When a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error
can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of
the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly ordering
the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite
the demand for one, was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observethe Reglementary Period
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one
(1) year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown,
is able to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondent’s
approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers
and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole.
He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-
restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in
expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a judge
should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court; he
should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and
overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and
sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court declared that
"although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty,
his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in
and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and
in language."
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus
violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in
social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their
status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities
and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in
this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted
her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a
judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking site such as
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes
the freedom to hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas
through any media regardless of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an
exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The respondent judge’s act of joining
Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges
must bear in mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal
matter or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s
opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This
is especially true when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her
family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire
she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for
public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she
holds as a judge, may be the object of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of
cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this
rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem
harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public.
As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher
standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal
matters.1âwphi1 The very nature of their functions requires behavior under exacting
standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties
and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily
accept this standard of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
19. OCA VS. JUDGE BALUT
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.7
The standard of substantial evidence is justified when there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.8
Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification10 stating that his cash
accountability as of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was ₱207,774.42 and there
were certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his
accountabilities with the court funds.
Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11
Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the
highest degree of honesty and integrity and to observe exacting standards of morality,
decency and competence.12
regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to
follow."
Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed
to present himself as an example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no
compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules and regulations. His dishonesty,
gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and
would have warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal. were it not for the fact that
he had already been dismissed from the service in another administrative case.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

He should adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his action erode
the public faith in the Judiciary.13

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the
court. He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on
the proper administration of court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role model
of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct,
punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first offense.15 For said reason,
the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal.

This Court has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the
norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the
people in the justice system.16

His unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves administrative sanction

and not even the full payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It
matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that
these funds were used outside of official business."17

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His
offense was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a
span of several years. In other words, he was a repeated offender, perpetrating his
misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different
stations.

Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:

"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor
or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law."

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that