UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

In re BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. )
ATX, ATX II AND WILDERNESS TIRES ) Master File No. IP 00-9373-C-B/S
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION ) MDL No. 1373
____________________________________) (Centralized Before Judge Sarah
THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO ) Evans Barker)
ALL CLASS ACTIONS )
____________________________________)

____________________

BRIEF III

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS: REASONS TO DISMISS

PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR VIOLATION OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES,
VIOLATIONS OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT, BREACH OF WARRANTY, REDHIBITION,
NEGLIGENCE, AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (COUNTS I, IX, X-XIV)

____________________

Hugh R. Whiting John H. Beisner

Mark Herrmann Stephen J. Harburg
JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
North Point 555 13th Street, N.W.
901 Lakeside Avenue Washington, D.C. 20004
Cleveland, Ohio 44114 (202) 383-5370
(216) 586-3939

Mark J.R. Merkle Randall R. Riggs

KREIG DEVALUT ALEXANDER LOCKE REYNOLDS LLP
& CAPEHART, LLP 201 N. Illinois Street, Suite 1000
One Indiana Square P.O. Box 44961
Suite 2800 Indianapolis, Indiana 46244-0961
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-2017 (317) 237-3814
(317) 636 4341

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC. FORD MOTOR COMPANY
 Defendants submit this brief in support of their motion to dismiss Counts One, Nine, Ten, Eleven,

Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen of the Master Complaint (“Complaint”).

I. P L A I N T I F F S ’ CLAIMS FOR VIOLATION OF STATE CONSUMER

PROTECTION STATUTES MUST BE DISMISSED (COUNT TEN).

In their Tenth Claim for Relief (“Violation of All States’ Consumer Protection
Statutes”), plaintiffs plead that Firestone and Ford violated “any and all” state consumer
protection statutes by allegedly engaging in misrepresentation and concealment, which amounted
to deceptive practices under those statutes.1 (Compl. ¶¶ 307-312.) Plaintiffs, however, do not
cite any specific statute that was supposedly violated by either Firestone or Ford. Further, they
make no effort to plead the elements of any state consumer protection statute.2 All of the named
plaintiffs’ consumer protection act claims must therefore be dismissed. See, e.g., In re General
Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brake Prod. Liab. Litig., 966 F. Supp. 1525, 1536 (E.D. Mo. 1997)
(dismissing claims based on state consumer protection statutes because plaintiffs failed to plead
the essential elements of each “unique” state statute, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)), aff’d
sub nom., Briehl v. General Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999); FDIC v. Bathgate, 27
F.3d 850, 876 (3d Cir. 1994) (pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to claims based on state
consumer fraud statutes).3 Firestone and Ford believe that there is no need for the Court to
inquire further. But if the Court wishes to do so, the claims are invalid for other reasons as well.4

Assuming that the plaintiffs intended to invoke the consumer protection statutes
of their respective home states, only the consumer protection statutes of the twenty-seven states
in which plaintiffs reside are at issue.5 Under those statutes (which are examined in more detail

1
Plaintiffs allege that Firestone and Ford engaged in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . when they
represented, through their advertising, warranties, and other express representations, that the Tires and Explorers had
benefits or characteristics that they did not actually have.” Plaintiffs further allege that defendants violated state
consumer protection statutes “when they falsely represented that the Tires and Explorers were of a particular
standard or quality when they were not.” Moreover, plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the state consumer
protection statutes when “they advertised the Tires and Explorers with the intent not to sell them as advertised, and
when, in so doing, they concealed and suppressed facts material to the true characteristics, standards and quality of
these products.” (Compl. ¶ 308.)
2
If it is plaintiffs’ intent is to invoke application of some sort of amalgam of the disparate consumer fraud
laws of the fifty states, the Seventh Circuit has held such an approach to be unconstitutional. See In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300-1302 (7th Cir. 1995)(rejecting district court’s attempt to apply “an
amalgam, an averaging, of the nonidentical negligence laws of 51 jurisdictions”).
3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) provides in relevant part: “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”
4
Given the lack of allegations for the plaintiffs listed in Exhibit A, their consumer protection claims must
also be dismissed for failure to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pleading requirements.
5
With respect to all state law-based claims, defendants assume that each named plaintiff wishes to assert
claims under the laws of his/her home state (which is presumably where the allegedly defective products were
bought). Defendants make this assumption because the named plaintiffs may not assert claims under the laws of
states with no connection to the actual sale of the vehicle or tires at issue. See, e.g, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (in nationwide class action based on state law claims, the law of a particular state
cannot constitutionally be applied to a sales transaction having little or no relationship to that state). Assuming that

2
below), the named plaintiffs’ claims are each flawed in several respects, each of which dictates
dismissal.

First, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), plaintiffs are required to plead their fraud-based
claims with particularity. See General Elec. Capital v. Lease Resolution, 128 F.3d 1074, 1078
(7th Cir. 1997). Rule 9(b)’s mandate requires plaintiffs to plead not only the elements of the
specific state consumer protection statutes they purportedly are invoking (as discussed above),
but also the “who, what, when, and where of the alleged fraud.” See Lachmund v. ADM Investor
Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 777, 782 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); see
also Unique Coupons, Inc. v. Northfield Corp., No. 99 C 7445, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6767, *9-
10 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2000) (“Claims under the Consumer Fraud Act are subject to the
heightened pleading standard under Rule 9(b).”). Under Rule 9(b), plaintiffs must plead with
particularity “the circumstances constituting fraud;” thus, the Seventh Circuit has required that
plaintiffs must plead “the identity of the person who made the misrepresentation, the time, place
and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the misrepresentation was
communicated to the plaintiff.” See General Elec. Capital, 128 F.3d at 1078 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that Rule 9(b) particularity “means the who, what, when, where, and how: the first
paragraph of any newspaper story”). None of the named plaintiffs meets these rigorous
requirements. Although the Complaint contains a laundry list of allegedly deceptive
advertisements and representations (see Compl. ¶¶ 124-129), not one named plaintiff alleges that
he or she saw any of those supposed misrepresentations, or, if so, when or where the
misrepresentation was allegedly encountered. These omissions are fatal to their fraud-based
consumer protection statute claims. Likewise, the claims of the “Exhibit A” plaintiffs must also
be dismissed on this ground as well.

Second, as discussed in more detail in Brief I, the named plaintiffs have not
alleged that they experienced any manifestation of the alleged defect or injury, an essential
element under all the relevant state consumer protection statutes.6 See, e.g., Briehl v. General
Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1999) (dismissing, inter alia, plaintiffs’ state
consumer protection statute claims under Texas, Florida, Illinois, New York and Mississippi law,
because plaintiffs failed to plead damages, an essential element of those causes of action); 73 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2 (cause of action for “ascertainable loss of money or property”); Ala. Code
§ 8-19-10 (requiring “actual money damages”); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §17.50(a) (requiring
“damages”). Consequently, the vast majority of the claims of the named plaintiffs, as well as the
“Exhibit A” plaintiffs’claims, must be dismissed on this ground as well.

named plaintiffs acquired their vehicles and tires in their respective home states, they may assert a consumer fraud
claim only under the relevant statute of that state. See, e.g., Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 542 A.2d 1200,
1202 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1988) (Delaware consumer protection statute does not apply where there is no transaction in the
state and the consumers are not in the state); Tylka v. Gerber Prods., 182 F.R.D. 573, 576-78 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(holding that only Illinois consumers and any non-resident consumers who purchased the allegedly misrepresented
items in Illinois within the relevant time period have standing to sue under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act).
6
Only Gary Gustafson, William Wehking, and Allan Simpson have alleged that the purported tire defect
manifested itself. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 22.) Their consumer protection claims, as well as all of their other claims,
fail for other reasons.

3
 Third, many named plaintiffs have failed to allege other necessary elements
under the relevant consumer protection statutes. For instance, the New York named plaintiff
failed to allege that any underlying conduct took place in New York, as required by New York’s
consumer protection statute. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349, 350. Many named plaintiffs have
failed to allege that they “purchased” or “leased” their vehicle or tires.7 The failure to allege a
consumer transaction is fatal under some of the relevant statutes. See, e.g, Ohio Rev. Code. §
1345.01(D); § 1345.09 (A)(B)(only a “consumer” may bring an action under the Ohio Consumer
Sales Practice Act, “consumer” defined as a “person who engages in a consumer transaction with
a supplier [e.g. seller, franchisor].”). No named plaintiff has even alleged that any particular
action of either Firestone or Ford constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice, as defined by
the specific consumer protection statute. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a) (authorizing right of
action to any consumer who is injured by any act or practice declared to be unlawful by Cal. Civ.
Code § 1770).

A. Each Named Plaintiffs’ Consumer Protection Act Claim Fails.

The following is a state-by-state summary of selected additional (but certainly not

all ) reasons why the consumer protection act claim of each plaintiff named in the body of the
Complaint fails.8

1. Alabama.

The Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“ADTPA”) claim of the sole
Alabama named plaintiff – Margaret Clarke – should be dismissed for several reasons. First, the
ADTPA authorizes a private right of action only where the allegedly deceptive trade practice
“causes monetary damage.” See Ala. Code § 8-19-10(a). Clarke, however, has not alleged any
monetary damage. (See Compl. ¶ 32.) See, e.g., Billions v. White and Stafford Furniture Co.,
Inc., 528 So.2d 878, 880 (Ala. Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting claim under ADTPA where plaintiffs
suffered no monetary damages as a result of defendant’s actions); Ford Motor Co. v. Rice, 726
So.2d 626, 629 (Ala. 1998) (plaintiffs did not successfully allege any “adverse economic
consequences” when they claimed that their vehicles’ risk of rollover was greater than suggested
by Ford’s silence).

Second, Clarke has not alleged that she “purchased” the vehicle and tires, let
alone purchased them for personal, family, or household use, a necessary element to bring a
claim under the ADTPA. See Ala. Code § 8-19-3 (2) (defining “consumer” as “any natural
person who buys goods or services for personal, family or household use) (emphasis added).
Clarke alleges nothing more than that she “has” a 2000 Ford Explorer equipped with Wilderness
AT Tires. (Compl. ¶ 32.) See Deerman v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 955 F. Supp.
7
See, e.g., Compl ¶ 31 (“Plaintiff Kurt Kellerman resides in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and is a citizen of the
State of Lousiana”); Compl. ¶¶ 32-42, 44, 49 (plaintiffs are alleged only to “have” a vehicle and/or tires, not to have
“purchased” them).
8
In the interest of not making this brief even longer, the following state-specific treatment of the reasons
why plaintiffs’ claims fail is not exhaustive. Firestone and Ford, however, reserve the right to raise additional
arguments in subsequent briefing if any of plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims should survive. Moreover, just
because certain arguments are made with respect to certain states and not others, does not mean that those arguments
are foreclosed in the other states.

4
1393, 1399 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (finding that plaintiffs could not bring suit because “the Alabama
DTPA provides a cause of action for a ‘consumer’” and plaintiffs failed to meet that
requirement).

Finally, Clarke’s claim must fail for the additional reason that she did not provide
a written demand for relief to the defendants at least fifteen days before filing an action under the
ADTPA. See Ala. Code § 8-9-10(e); Givens v. Rent-a-Center, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ala.
1988), aff’d, 885 F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1989).9

2. Arizona.

The one Arizona named plaintiff, Florence Bruemmer, fails to state a claim under
the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (“ACFA”) for several reasons. Under the ACFA, a private
individual’s relief is limited to the recovery of “actual damages” suffered as a result of
defendant’s unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Peery v. Hansen, 585 P.2d 574, 577 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978). Bruemmer has alleged nothing more than that she “has” a 1999 Ford Ranger that was
equipped with Wilderness Tires. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Because plaintiff makes no allegations of
personal injury to herself or damage to property, she has not pleaded “actual damages.” See,
e.g., Nataros v. Fine Arts Gallery of Scotsdale, Inc., 612 P.2d 500, 504 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)
(under ACFA, “the misled consumer must have suffered some damage as a result of the
misrepresentation”).

Moreover, Bruemmer has failed to allege any specific facts demonstrating

reliance, an essential element of a consumer fraud claim in Arizona. See, e.g., Peery, 585 P.2d at
577 (“It is clear that before a private party may exert a claim under the statute, he must have been
damaged by the prohibited practice. A prerequisite to such damages is reliance on the unlawful
acts.”). She does not identify a specific alleged misrepresentation that she relied on in acquiring
her vehicle or tires. Instead, the Complaint merely alleges in a conclusory fashion as to all
plaintiffs that “[i]n the absence of the material information uniformly concealed by [defendants],
it may reasonably be inferred that Plaintiffs and Members of the Plaintiff Classes relied on the
advertising campaigns of [defendants] and they may be presumed to have done so.” (Compl.
¶129 (emphasis added); see also Compl. ¶¶ 113, 131.) Such a conclusory assertion is no
substitute for the specificity required to plead reliance. Accordingly, Bruemmer’s claim must be
dismissed.

3. Arkansas.

A private right of action under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(“ADTPA”) exists only for a person “who suffers actual damage or injury” as a result of
conduct prohibited by the Act. See Ark. Rev. Stat. § 4-88-113 (f) (emphasis added). A person
bringing a claim under this section may “recover actual damages, if appropriate.” Id. (emphasis
added); see also Gallion v. Cole, CA00-297, 2000 Ark. App. LEXIS 709, *5 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov.
8, 2000) (dismissing fraud claim because apparent from complaint plaintiff suffered no “actual
9
It also should be noted that class actions are not permitted under the ADTPA. See Ala. Code § 8-19-10(f)
(“A consumer or other person bringing an action under this chapter may not bring an action on behalf of a class”);
Ex parte Exxon Corp., 725 So.2d 930 (Ala. 1993). Thus, Clarke’s assertion of her claim on a class basis is
improper.

5
damages”). The only Arkansas named plaintiff, Deanna Connell, does not allege that she
suffered any actual damage or injury. She asserts only that she “has a 1999 Ford Ranger that
was equipped with Wilderness AT Tires.” (Compl. ¶ 35.) Therefore, she may not bring a cause
of action under the ADTPA.

Connell’s claim also fails because the Complaint alleges no facts demonstrating
the fiduciary relationship necessary for a claim of concealment. Plaintiffs do not allege that they
spoke to anyone at Firestone or Ford about their vehicles or tires, or that they dealt directly with
Firestone or Ford in any way. See Herring-Marathon Master Partnership B v. Boardwalk Fries,
Inc., 979 F.2d 1326, 1329 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no duty to disclose under Arkansas law for
typical commercial sales transaction); Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., v. Ryan, 250 F. Supp. 600,
605 (W.D. Ark. 1966) (“As a general rule there is no duty between vendor and purchaser to
disclose any information affecting the value of property in an arm’s length transaction.”);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 746 F.2d 200, 207 (3d Cir. 1984) (no
duty to disclose because parties were not engaged in a business transaction).

Connell’s claim also is deficient because the affirmative misrepresentations upon

which plaintiffs purport to rely cannot reasonably be construed to be statements of fact and
therefore cannot constitute actionable misrepresentation. The alleged misrepresentations
included in the Complaint involve representations regarding “exceptional control,” “high
quality,” and “excellent products” and other similar statements. (Compl. ¶¶ 123-127.) These
allegations are not actionable. See, e.g., Grendell v. Kiehl, 723 S.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Ark. 1987)
(holding mere sales puffery not actionable as misrepresentation); R.S. Miskimins v. The City
Nat’l Bank, 456 S.W.2d 673, 680 (Ark. 1970) (holding that statements of opinion cannot furnish
the basis for a cause of action of fraud); In re Anti-Lock Brake, 966 F. Supp. 1525, 1534 (E.D.
Mo. 1997) (“It is appropriate for a court to determine ‘whether an alleged misrepresentation is a
statement of fact or mere puffery’ on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”)(citation omitted).

4. California.

For several reasons, the sole California plaintiff, Beth Simon, cannot state a claim
under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.
First, Simon has failed to allege that she purchased her vehicle and tires for “personal, family, or
household purposes.” (Compl. ¶ 21.) There is no cause of action under the CLRA for an
individual who is not a “consumer,” which is defined by the CLRA as meaning an “individual
who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or
household purposes.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d); see California Grocers Ass’n, Inc. v. Bank of
Am., Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 404 (App. 1994).

Second, Simon has failed to allege that she suffered any damages as a result of
defendants’ alleged conduct. Section 1780 of the California Civil Code provides that “[a]ny
consumer who suffers any damages as a result of the use or employment by any person of a
method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 [listing proscribed practices]
may bring an action against that person to obtain . . . actual damages.” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
plaintiff Simon cannot state a claim under the CLRA.

6
 Finally, a plaintiff must give defendants written notice thirty days before filing a
CLRA lawsuit if plaintiff is seeking damages under Section 1780 of the California Civil Code.
Simon has not alleged that she gave Firestone or Ford written notice of her consumer protection
claim. Her CLRA claim is thus “patently deficient.” See In re Anti Lock Brake, 966 F. Supp. at
1536-1537; Cal. Civ. Code. § 1782.10

5. Connecticut.

The sole Connecticut named plaintiff, Neal Zimmerman, does not state a valid
claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a
et seq., for several reasons. As an initial matter, he cannot maintain a cause of action against
Ford because he has not alleged any connection to Ford. Zimmerman alleges that he owns a
2000 Subaru Legacy Outback station wagon equipped with non-recalled tires. (Compl. ¶ 24.)

Zimmerman cannot state a claim under CUTPA against either Firestone or Ford
for the additional reason that he has failed to allege essential elements of a claim under the Act.
As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party seeking to recover under CUTPA must
satisfy two threshold requirements. First, Zimmerman must allege that the defendants’ conduct
constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice within the meaning of the Act. See A. Secondino
and Son Inc. v. LoRicco, 576 A.2d 464, 468 (Conn. 1990). Second, he must allege that he
suffered damages. Id.; see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(a) (“ascertainable loss of money or
property” required); Service Road Corp. v. Quinns, 698 A.2d 258, 259 (Conn. 1997)
(“ascertainable loss of money or property is required to maintain an action pursuant to
[CUTPA]”).

Zimmerman fails on both counts. He has not alleged that the defendants’ conduct
constituted an unfair or deceptive trade practice as defined by CUTPA. The vague, non-state
specific allegations contained in the Complaint under the Tenth Claim of Relief are insufficient
to satisfy this requirement. (Compl. ¶¶ 308-311.) Nor has Zimmerman alleged that he suffered
any “ascertainable loss of money or property” as a result of defendants’ alleged unfair trade
practice. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(a). He alleges only that Firestone declined his request
to replace his non-recalled tires. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Zimmerman’s claim under the Connecticut
Unfair Trade Practices Act must be dismissed.

6. Florida.

The Florida plaintiffs cannot state claims under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.204 (“FDUTPA”).11 Under the FDUTPA, a claimant must
allege actual damages. Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2) (recovery of “actual damages” for consumer who
has “suffered a loss”); see also Maroone Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nordstrom, 587 So.2d 514, 518 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (FDUTPA claim where plaintiff “suffered absolutely no damages as a result
of the alleged breach of warranty”); Briehl, 172 F.3d 623, 628-29 (dismissing, inter alia, claim

10
Even if Simon were able to state a claim under § 1780, she has failed to allege that the prerequisites for
bringing a class action under the CLRA have been satisfied. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1781 (class action provisions).
11
The Florida plaintiffs are Richard Glover, Clark Schaffer, Allan Simpson, Sue Pledger, James Stone,
Margaret Naylor, Diana Grant, and Jane Lill. (See Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20, 22, 40, 41, 42, 52, 53.)

7
under Florida’s consumer protection statute for failure to allege actual damages); Swindell v.
Crowson, 712 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (“Damages cannot be based on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork.”); Macias v. HBC of Florida, 694 So.2d 88, 90 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1997) (complaint correctly dismissed because “speculative losses as a result of missed
opportunities are not recoverable under FDUTPA”). Only named plaintiff Allan Simpson
alleges any event related to his tires or vehicle (i.e., a tread separation event). The other named
plaintiffs allege no manifestation of the purported defect or damage, and therefore cannot state a
claim under the FDUPTA.

Simpson, however, is unable to maintain a cause of action under the FDUTPA

because his claim is time barred. Simpson alleges that he bought a 1991 Ford Explorer with
Firestone ATX tires as original equipment.12 (Compl. ¶ 22.) He also alleges that the tire that
purportedly separated in April 2000, resulting in damage to his Explorer, was one of the original
equipment tires, purchased with his 1991 Ford Explorer. He had four years from the time of sale
to bring his FDUTPA claim. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f) (prescribing a four-year limitations
period for “an action founded on a statutory liability”). Under Florida law, there is no tolling of
this statute of limitations. See Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC, 175 F.3d 913, 914 (11th Cir.
1999); Federal Ins. Co. v. Southwest Fla. Retirement Ctr., Inc., 707 So.2d 1119, 1121-22 (Fla.
1998). For this same reason, the claims of plaintiffs Glover and Lill are also time barred.13

The claims of Florida plaintiffs Glover, Pledger, Stone, Naylor, and Grant must be
dismissed for an additional reason: They do not allege that they purchased or leased their
vehicles or tires. Instead, they allege only that they “have” or “own” the class tires or vehicles.
(Compl. ¶¶ 17, 40, 41, 42, 52.) Under the FDTUPA, only a “consumer” may sue for actual
damages suffered as a result of a violation of the Act. See Fla. Stat. § 501.211(2). Absent an
allegation that the plaintiff has engaged in a consumer transaction, he or she cannot plead a
violation of the Act. See Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1) (unfair and deceptive practices rendered
unlawful by the Act).

12
For the purposes of this motion, defendants assume that plaintiffs acquired their vehicles and tires new in
the year (if a year is identified) provided. Thus, defendants assume that plaintiff Simpson purchased his 1991 Ford
Explorer (and the original equipment Firestone tires) in 1991.
13
Plaintiff Glover alleges that he owns a 1993 Ford Explorer. (Compl. ¶ 17.)

8
 7. Illinois.

The claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(“ICFA”), 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., fail because Illinois plaintiffs have not alleged the essential
elements of their statutory claim with the “same particularity and specificity as that required
under common law fraud.” Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 675 N.E. 2d 584, 593 (Ill. 1996);
see also Elson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 691 N.E.2d 807, 816-817 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(affirming dismissal of Consumer Fraud Act claim on same grounds as common law fraud claim
because both must be pled with the same standard of specificity).14

Among the necessary elements of an ICFA claim is causation – the consumer

fraud must have proximately caused plaintiff’s injury. Connick, 675 N.E.2d at 594. The
Supreme Court of Illinois has held that plaintiffs can state a valid claim for consumer fraud “only
where premised upon statements made prior to their dates of purchase.” Id. Illinois plaintiffs
have not alleged which specific alleged representations supposedly provide the basis for their
ICFA claims and whether those statements were made before the date they purchased their
vehicle or tires. Because the Illinois named plaintiffs have not adequately alleged causation,
their claims must fail. See Connick, 675 N.E.2d at 594.

The Illinois plaintiffs (except William Wehking and Gary Gustafson) do not
allege any problems with the products at issue. Thus, those claims must be dismissed on the
ground that the ICFA provides a cause of action only for those persons who have incurred
“actual damage” as a result of the defendant’s alleged conduct. See 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (“Any
person who suffers actual damage as a result of a violation of this Act committed by any other
person may bring an action against such person”) (emphasis added); Smith v. Prime Cable, 658
N.E.2d 1325, 1337 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“The Consumer Fraud Act provides a private cause of
action only where a plaintiff can show that he suffered damage as a result of unlawful conduct
proscribed by the statute.”); see also Verb v. Motorola, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1287, 1296 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996) (plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action because plaintiffs’ claims are “all based upon mere
theoretical possibilities of injury and/or damages”).

To the extent that the Illinois named plaintiffs’ claims are based on fraudulent
concealment, the Complaint likewise fails because it does not allege any special or fiduciary
relationship between plaintiffs and Ford and/or Firestone giving rise to a duty to disclose. See
Lionel Trains, Inc. v. Alabano, 831 F. Supp. 647, 650-51 (N.D. Ill 1993), aff’d, 35 F.3d 568 (7th
Cir. 1994) (dismissing fraudulent concealment-based claim under ICFA for lack of allegation of
any special or fiduciary relationship between the parties giving rise to a duty to speak).

Named plaintiffs Wonacott and Siewert-Sitzmore also cannot state a claim under
ICFA for the additional reason that they have not alleged that they purchased or leased vehicles
or tires. They allege merely that they “have” a 1999 Mercury Mountaineer and a 1999
Expedition, respectively. (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 49.) Because one of the elements of an ICFA claim is
a deceptive act or practice that occurred in the course of conduct involving trade and commerce,

14
The Illinois named plaintiffs are Michael Huber, Dennis Mickunas, Esther Siewet-Sitzmore, Jeana
Wonnacot, Dawn Whorl, Kathleen Wehking, William Wehking, Susan Grayson, Sam Martin, Michael Devening,
Gary Gustafson, and William Moran. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 25, 27, 29, 38, 46, 48, 49.)

9
they cannot state a claim against Firestone and Ford for violating ICFA, and their claims must be
dismissed. See Connick, 675 N.E.2d at 593.

8. Louisiana.

The Louisiana named plaintiffs’ consumer protection claims fail for several
reasons.15 The Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“LUTPCPL”)
authorizes a cause of action to recover “actual damages,” for “any person who suffers any
ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use
or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act or practice . . .” See La.
R.S. 51:1409(A)(emphasis added). None of the Louisiana named plaintiffs has alleged,
however, such an “ascertainable loss of money or movable property.” Plaintiff Kellerman
alleges only that he resides in Baton Rouge and is a citizen of Louisiana. (Compl. ¶ 31.)
Plaintiff Heather Gaudet alleges only that she owns a 1997 Honda Civic that was equipped with
Firestone FR-680 tires. (Compl. ¶ 43.)16 Donita Qualey alleges only that she has a 2000 Ford
Explorer that “is or was” equipped with Wilderness tires. (Compl. ¶ 34.) Accordingly, the
claims of all three named Louisiana plaintiffs must be dismissed. See, e.g., Barbe v. A.A.
Harmon & Co., 705 So.2d 1210, 1221 (La. App. 1998) (holding that claim could not be
maintained under consumer protection statute when plaintiff suffered no “ascertainable loss” as
result of defendant’s conduct).17

9. Massachusetts.

The lone Massachusetts plaintiff, Thomas Kerner, cannot state a claim under the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”). First, the MCPA provides relief only for
actions that occurred “primarily and substantially within the commonwealth” of Massachusetts.
Mass. Gen. Law. ch. 93A § 9 (7). The only fact pleaded relating to Massachusetts is that Kerner
is a resident and citizen of that state. (Compl. ¶ 45.) Because plaintiff does not allege that any
event purportedly violative of the statute occurred within Massachusetts, he cannot bring a claim
under the Act. See, e.g., Boston Hides & Furs, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd., 870 F. Supp. 1153,
1167 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding that events did not occur “primarily and substantially” in
Massachusetts when all parties but plaintiff were foreign entities and the allegedly unfair conduct
occurred outside Massachusetts).

Second, Kerner’s bare-bones allegations fail to set forth the deceptive acts with
the particularity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and the Massachusetts Consumer Protection
Act. See, e.,g., Mead Corp. v. Stevens Cabinets, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 87, 90 (D. Mass. 1996)
(granting defendant’s summary judgment motion where plaintiff gave “no reference to specific
statements” in defendant’s advertising and not “even an allusion to the general character of the

15
The Louisiana named plaintiffs are Kurt Kellerman, Donita Qualey, and Heather Gaudet. (Compl. ¶¶ 31,
34, 43.)
16
Because Gaudet does not allege that she even owns a Ford vehicle, her claim must be dismissed as to Ford.
17
It should also be noted that the LUTPCPL does not permit class actions brought by private individuals. La.
R.S. 51:1409(A) (person “may bring an action individually but not in a representative capacity”); Green v.
Honeywell, Inc., No. 98-1470, 1998 WL 423416, *2 (E.D. La. July 27, 1998) (dismissing action because plaintiff,
without involvement of Louisiana attorney general, sought to bring class action under consumer protection statute).

10
alleged misrepresentations”); Abbott Chemicals v. Emco Engineering, Inc., 1994 WL 759232, *4
(D.P.R. 1994).

Finally, Kerner’s claim must be dismissed for the additional reason that he does
not allege that he provided defendants with written notice thirty days before filing a claim, as
required by the Act. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11; see also Clegg v. Butler, 676
N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 1997).

10. Mississippi.

The two Mississippi plaintiffs, James Powell and Allison Simmons, cannot state a
cause of action under the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(1)
et seq. (“MCPA”).18 Under the MCPA, plaintiffs are required to make “a reasonable attempt to
resolve any claim through an informal dispute settlement program approved by the Attorney
General” before commencing suit under the statute. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(2). The
Mississippi plaintiffs have not alleged that they satisfied this prerequisite, and their claims must
therefore be dismissed.

The Mississippi named plaintiffs’ claims also fail for the independent reason that
they have not alleged actual damages or injury. See Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-13 (referring to
proof of damages “in fact”); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(1) (limiting relief to “ascertainable
loss” and requiring causation); Briehl, 172 F.3d 623, 628-29 (construing Mississippi law);
Jarman v. United Indus Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 757, 768 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (“[U]nless there is
actually a failure in product performance, there is no basis at all for claiming that the plaintiff has
been damaged in any way. Mere suspicion of a lost bargain . . . will not support an award of
damages”). Moreover, neither plaintiff has alleged that he or she purchased or leased the
vehicles “primarily for personal, family or household purposes” as required by the Act. See
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15. (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 39.)

The Mississippi named plaintiffs’ consumer fraud claim must also be dismissed
because they fail to plead facts demonstrating the fiduciary relationship necessary for a claim of
concealment. See Baldwin v. Laurel Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 894, 898-900
(S.D. Miss. 1998) (construing Mississippi law and holding that an ordinary retail automobile sale
does not create a fiduciary relationship). Moreover, the affirmative misrepresentations upon
which plaintiffs purport to rely cannot reasonably be construed to be statements of fact and
therefore cannot constitute actionable misrepresentation. Thompson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
971 F. Supp. 242, 243 (N.D. Miss. 1997) (“Under Mississippi law the mere expression of an
opinion is not actionable”).19

18
Of course, Powell has no basis for asserting a MCPA claim against Ford because he does not allege any
connection with Ford. The Complaint alleges only that Powell is a resident and citizen of Mississippi and that he
“purchased Firestone ATX Tires in or about the summer of 1998.” (See Compl. ¶ 26.)
19
It also should be noted that the MCPA does not permit class action lawsuits. See Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-
15(4). Therefore, these named plaintiffs cannot bring their claims on behalf of a purported class. See In re Anti-
Lock Brake, 966 F. Supp. at 1536 (holding that Mississippi plaintiffs were barred from bringing their claim on
behalf of a purported class because the MCPA does not allow class action lawsuits).

11
 11. New York.

Named plaintiff Jennifer Hakker’s claim under the New York Deceptive Acts and
Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §349 et seq. (“NYDAPA”), must be dismissed. First, she has
failed to allege any deceptive acts or practices occurring within the state of New York – a fatal
omission under the Act. (Compl. ¶ 33.)20 The NYDAPA provides: “Deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of any service in this state
are hereby declared unlawful.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) (emphasis added). See Weaver v.
Chrysler Corp., 172 F.R.D. 96, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (dismissing NYDAPA claim because, inter
alia, plaintiff failed to allege any deceptive act that occurred within New York).

Hakker’s claim also fails because only persons who have been “injured” by a
violation of the Act may file suit. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h); Moses v. Citicorp Mortgage
Inc., 982 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., 252 A.D. 2d 1, 15,
679 N.Y.S.2d 593, 604 (App. Div. 1998); Briehl, 172 F.3d 623, 628-29 (affirming dismissal of
NYDAPA claim for failure to allege manifestation of alleged defect in product). Hakker alleges
no injury; thus, she cannot state a claim under the Act.

Nor has Hakker pleaded a NYDAPA violation with specificity. “In pleading a
claim under the Consumer Protection Act, a Plaintiff is required to set forth specific details
regarding the allegedly deceptive acts or practices.” See Weaver, 172 F.R.D. at 100 (dismissing
NYDAPA claim because, inter alia, claim was pleaded with inadequate specificity); see also
Tinlee Enter., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 834 F. Supp. 605, 609-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss because NYDAPA claim lacked specificity).

Plaintiff Hakker’s claim fails for the additional reason that the only alleged
misrepresentations contained in the Complaint cannot be construed to be statements of fact and,
therefore, cannot constitute actionable misrepresentation. See Chevy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Sal De
Enters., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 110, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (restaurant’s description of itself as the
“Original Chevy’s,” even if factually incorrect, was not the type of statement that rises to the
level of consumer deception under § 349); Cytyc Corp. v. Neuromedical Sys., Inc., 12 F. Supp.
2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (statements of opinion or puffing, and “‘[s]ubjective claims about
products, which cannot be proven either true or false’” cannot form the basis for a claim under
§§ 349 and 350); Hubbard v. General Motors Corp., No. 95 CV 4326, 1999 WL 274019, at * 7
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996)(dismissing with prejudice fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims for statements such as “like a rock,” “popular,” and “dependable” because constitute
puffery).

Finally, to the extent plaintiff Hakker’s claim under the NYDAPA is based on
fraudulent concealment, it must be dismissed for the failure to plead facts demonstrating the
existence of a fiduciary relationship necessary for a claim of concealment. See Mobil Oil v.
Joshi, 609 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (1994).

20
Hakker alleges only that she is a resident and citizen of New York and that she “has a 1998 Ford Explorer
that was equipped with Wilderness AT Tires.” (Compl. ¶ 33.)

12
 12. Ohio.

The two Ohio plaintiffs, Leroy Eberly and John Dovich, fail to state a claim under
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 1345.01 et seq. (“OCSPA”).
(Compl. ¶¶ 16, 44.) As in other jurisdictions, it is well established in Ohio that general
statements about product quality – such as those plaintiffs recite in the Complaint and that are
typically found in automobile advertisements – are not actionable and “cannot form the basis of a
claim under the OCSPA.” Abele v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 955, 963-64 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (no action lies against dealer who describes automobile as “a good little car,” “the
pride or our line,” “the best in the American market,” or “rock-solid”); Dent v. Ford Motor Co.,
614 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (Ohio App. 1992) (holding that Ford cannot be held liable for breach of
express warranties based on advertising of vehicle as “Built Fun Tough”). Their claims therefore
must be rejected.

The Ohio named plaintiffs’ claims also fail because an action may be instituted
under the OCSPA only “for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household.” Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01(A). Because plaintiffs do not allege that they purchased their
vehicles or tires for these purposes, their claims must be dismissed.

The Ohio plaintiffs have also failed to plead facts demonstrating the statutorily
required element of reliance. See, e.g., Amato v. General Motors Corp., 463 N.E.2d 625, 629-
631 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982); Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority, 629 N.E.2d
28, 33 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (elements of fraud claim include “justifiable reliance upon the
representation or concealment”). Plaintiffs have failed to identify a specific statement of fact
that they relied on in purchasing their vehicles or tires.

Dovich’s claim is also time barred. An OCSPA claim “may not be brought more
than two years after the occurrence of the violation which is the subject of suit.” Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 1345.10(c). The discovery rule does not apply to a consumer’s action for damages. See
Sproles v. Simpson Fence Co., 649 N.E.2d 1297, 1302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (cause of action
arose when allegedly defective product installed and not when plaintiff sustained his injuries).
Dovich alleges that he “has a 1993 Ford Explorer that was equipped with ATX Tires.” (Compl. ¶
44) (emphasis added). His claim is therefore time barred.21

13. Oklahoma.

The sole Oklahoma plaintiff, Joyce Wilson, cannot state a claim under the
Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 751 et seq. (“OCPA”). ( See Compl. ¶
23.) The OCPA provides that one who violates the Act shall be liable to the “aggrieved
consumer for the payment of actual damages.” Okla. Stat. § 15-761.1 (emphasis added).

21
The OCSPA bars class litigation of claims brought under the Act. See Ohio. Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.09(A)
(authorizing “individual action[s]”). A consumer may bring a class action only when the violation of the Act was
declared to be deceptive or unconscionable by a previous Ohio regulation or a judicial decision. See Ohio. Rev.
Code Ann. § 1345.09(B) (limiting the right to bring “class actions” and cases for treble damages to instances where
the violation at issue was declared to be deceptive or unconscionable by rule or court decision). The Ohio plaintiffs
do not allege that defendants’ conduct has been the subject of a previous Ohio regulation or court decision. Thus,
they are precluded from proceeding here on a class basis.

13
Wilson alleges that she “owns” a Ford Expedition with Firestone tires, one of which “failed”
while she was driving. She does not allege that she purchased any tires or vehicle, so there is no
allegation of a “consumer transaction” under OCPA. Further, there is no allegation that she is
“aggrieved” by any action of defendants. Wilson makes no allegation that her tire “failure”
involved the purported tread separation defect at issue in plaintiffs’ Complaint. (See Compl. ¶
23.) Tires can, of course, fail for many reasons (such as a puncture).

Wilson’s OCPA claim fails for the additional reason that she has not alleged a
causal connection between any alleged misrepresentation or concealment (or other violation of
the OCPA) and any purported actual damage as required by the Act. See Walls v. American
Tobacco Co., 11 P.3d 626, 629-30 (Okla. 2000) (denying cause of action under OCPA because
plaintiff failed to plead actual injury or damage and causation); Patterson v. Beall, No. 92,399,
2000 Okla. LEXIS 94, *30-*31 (Nov. 14, 2000) (requiring “injury in fact” and causation for a
claim under the OCPA). Wilson alleges only that one of her tires “failed” and that she replaced
it at her own expense. She has pleaded no connection between any unfair or deceptive trade
practice under OCPA and the cost she incurred to replace her tire.

To the extent Wilson’s claim is predicated on fraudulent concealment, it must be

dismissed for the additional reason that she has failed to plead facts demonstrating the existence
of the necessary fiduciary relationship. See Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 760 P.2d 174, 179
(Okla. 1988) (finding no fiduciary duty in arms-length business transaction and no duty to
disclose absent “peculiar circumstances”).

14. Oregon.

Oregon plaintiff Barbara Jackson fails to state a claim under the Oregon Unlawful
Trade Practices Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605 et seq. (“OUTPA”). Jackson’s claim fails because
she has not alleged any “ascertainable loss of money or property” – a requirement under the Act.
See Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638(1); see also Denson v. Ron Tomkin Gran Turismo, Inc., 566 P.2d
1177, 1191 (Or. 1977) (“ascertainable loss is necessary under statute to bring an individual
action for recovery of damages”). Moreover, to the extent her claim is based on an affirmative
misrepresentation, she is required to plead reliance in fact. See Feitler v. Animation Celection,
Inc., 13 P.3d 1044, 1047 (Or. 2000). Jackson alleges only that she is a resident and citizen of
Oregon and that she “owns a 1999 Ford Ranger equipped with both 15-inch and 16-inch
Firestone Wilderness Tires.” (Compl. ¶ 18.) Because Jackson has failed to allege “ascertainable
loss” or reliance, her OUTPA claim must be dismissed.

15. Pennsylvania.

The Pennsylvania plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-1 et seq.
(“PUTPCPL”).22 Claimants under the PUTPCPL must demonstrate some “ascertainable loss of
money or property.” See 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2 (a) (emphasis added). None of the

22
The Pennsylvania named plaintiffs are Carol Kusturris, Robert Rudeck, Michael Louridas , and Arlene
Romano. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 47, 50, 54). Plaintiff Louridas is the only Pennsylvania named plaintiff who alleges a
“loss.” (Compl. ¶ 50.) His so-called “loss” is that he replaced his nonrecalled tires at his own expense.

14
Pennsylvania plaintiffs has alleged any “ascertainable loss of money or property,” therefore their
claims must be dismissed.

The Pennsylvania plaintiffs also fail to allege causation, another requirement

under the Act. Under the PUTPCPL, a plaintiff must plead and prove the existence of a causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and an injury. See 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2(a);
Weinberg v. Sun Co., 740 A.2d 1152, 1168-69 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“[I]n order to proceed with
their claims under the [PUTPCPL], [plaintiffs] must be able to establish that the alleged
representations by [defendant] caused their loss.”); DiLucido v. Terminix Int’l, 676 A.2d 1237,
1241 (Pa. Super. 1996) (requiring proof of causation under PUTPCPL for claims of deceptive
practices involving misrepresentation and false statements). The Pennsylvania named plaintiffs’
claims fail on this ground as well.

In addition, none of the named plaintiffs has adequately alleged that he or she is a
member of the class of persons the PUTPCPL is intended to protect; that is, a purchaser of
goods or services as consumers. See Gemini Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation, Inc. v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1994) (the protected class of the PUTPCPL is
only those who have purchased goods or services, not all those who receive benefits from the
purchase of goods or service); see also 73 Pa. C.S. § 201-9.2(a) (authorizing private action to
recover actual damages to “any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for
personal, family or household purposes.”)(emphasis added). 23 Rudeck, Kusturris, and Louridas
“own” Ford vehicles equipped with Firestone tires, and Romano “owns” a Ford vehicle equipped
with Goodyear tires. None of the Pennsylvania plaintiffs alleges a purchase of vehicles or tires;
therefore, their PUTPCPL claims must be dismissed. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 47, 50, 54.)

The alleged representations about the quality of the vehicles and tires are also
non-actionable statements of opinion that cannot support a PUTPCPL claim. See, e.g., Hoffman
v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (“The general representation that a
product ‘offered unprecedented safety’ is a statement of opinion and is in the nature of seller’s
‘puffing.’); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 903 (Penn. 1975) (holding that
manufacturer’s statement that “you are assured of a safe, dependable helicopter” could not
constitute a misrepresentation of material fact); Tucker v. Whitaker Travel, Ltd., 620 F. Supp.
578, 585 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding no liability for alleged misrepresentations contained in
advertisements which were statements of opinion only).

To the extent plaintiffs are grounding their PUTPCPL claim on fraudulent

concealment, they fail to state a claim because the applicable section of the Act – section 201-
2(4)(xxi) – requires proof of all the elements of common law fraud.24 See Prime Meats, Inc. v.
Yochim, 422 Pa. Super. 460, 469, 619 A.2d 769, 773 (1993). To state a common law fraud claim
for non-disclosure in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must allege a duty to disclose. See, e.g., Sevin v.

23
Nor do plaintiffs allege that their vehicles or tires were purchased “primarily for personal, family or
household purposes.” Their PUTPCPL claim must be dismissed for this reason as well. See, e.g., DiLucido, 676
A.2d at 1242; Mara v. Burgdor Relators, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561
F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Merv Swing Agency, Inc. v. Graham Co., 579 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
24
Section 201-2(4)(xxi) makes unlawful under the Act “the engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.”

15
Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa. Super. 1992) (“Mere silence in the absence of a duty to
speak, however, cannot suffice to prove fraudulent concealment.”). Such a duty to disclose
arises only from “a fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence between the parties,”
Gibbs v. Ernst, 538 Pa. 193, 215, 647 A.2d 882, 893 (1994) (internal quotations omitted), or a
specific inquiry regarding the material fact at issue, see S. Bend Woolen Co. v. Jacob Reed’s
Sons, Inc., 116 A. 805, 806 (Penn. 1922). Such a duty does not arise from a mere arm’s length
sale of goods. See Gibbs, 538 Pa. at 215, 647 A.2d at 893; Taylor v. Wachtler, 825 F. Supp. 95,
104 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (the buyer and seller of jewelry are not in a fiduciary relationship giving rise
to a duty to disclose). Here, plaintiffs do not – and cannot – allege that they had a fiduciary
relationship with the defendants. On this distinct ground, plaintiffs’ PUTPCPL claims must be
dismissed.

16. Texas.

Greyson Knapp, the only Texas named plaintiff, has failed to allege any
relationship with Ford. The Complaint alleges only that Knapp is a resident and citizen of Texas
and that he “owned, and has replaced, Wilderness AT Tires.” (Compl. ¶ 37.) Therefore, Knapp
cannot state a claim against Ford for violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.41 et seq. (“TDTPA”).

Knapp cannot state a claim under the TDTPA against either Firestone or Ford for
other reasons as well. The TDTPA provides that a consumer may maintain an action where one
of a number of listed types of conduct is a “producing cause of economic [or other] damages.”
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(a)(emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit has held that under
the Texas DTPA, “the allegedly deceptive trade practices must cause the plaintiff to be actually
damaged before he can recover.” City of Marshall v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 650 F.2d
724, 726 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (emphasis added). See also Martin v. Ford, 914 F. Supp. 1449,
1452, 1455 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on TDTPA
claim because plaintiffs failed to show that they suffered any palpable injury).

Moreover, plaintiff Knapp has not alleged that he gave Firestone and Ford written
notice before filing his TDTPA claim, as required by the statute. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Ann. § 17.505(a). Section 17.505(a) requires, as a “prerequisite to filing a suit seeking damages”
under the TDTPA, that a consumer “shall give written notice to the person [the consumer intends
to sue] 60 days before filing suit.” (Emphasis added.) Because plaintiff Knapp failed to satisfy
the mandatory statutory prerequisites before filing a TDTPA claim against defendants, his claim
is not properly before this Court. See In re Anti-Lock Brake, 966 F. Supp. at 1536 (holding that
Texas plaintiffs’ claim under the TDTPA was “patently deficient” because plaintiffs failed to
allege that they had given defendants written notice as required under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Ann. § 17.505(a)).

17. West Virginia.

Cheryl Stuart, the lone West Virginia named plaintiff, has failed to state a claim
under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. First, Stuart fails to plead that she
is a consumer. West Virginia provides a cause of action only to someone who has purchased or
leased a good “for a personal, family, household or agricultural purpose.” W. Va. Code § 46A-

16
6-102(b). Stuart does not plead a purchase or lease; she pleads only that she “owns a 1998 Ford
Explorer that was equipped with Wilderness AT tires.” (Compl. ¶ 28.)

Second, Stuart has not alleged that she suffered any “ascertainable loss of money
or property.” W. Va. Code § 46A-6-106(1) (emphasis added). Because plaintiff does not claim
that the alleged latent defect has caused her damage, she has not pleaded an “ascertainable loss”
within the meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Orlando v. Finance One of West Virginia, Inc., 369
S.E.2d 882, 888 (W. Va. 1988) (finding no “ascertainable loss of money or property” when
unlawful loan clause was not enforced by defendant). Thus, the West Virginia consumer fraud
claim must be dismissed.

B. Plaintiffs Who Fail To Allege That They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot
Maintain Claims Against Ford For Violation Of Their Respective State
Consumer Protection Statutes.

Plaintiffs’ consumer protection statute claims are aimed at defendants’ allegedly

unfair trade practices with respect to certain Firestone tires and Ford Explorers. For example,
plaintiffs allege that defendants violated state consumer protection statutes when they, inter alia,
“advertised the Tires and Explorers with the intent not to sell them as advertised,” and that
defendants’ allegedly deceptive practices “were specifically designed to induce Plaintiffs and the
Classes to buy the Tires and Explorers.” (Compl. ¶¶ 308, 309 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs
make no allegations that Ford violated the state consumer protection statutes with respect to any
other Ford model vehicle. The following named plaintiffs have made no Explorer-related
allegations: William Wehking, Barbara Jackson, Joyce Wilson, Neal Zimmerman, James Powell,
Carol Kusturris, Kurt Kellerman, Deanna Connell, Florence Bruemmer, Greyson Knapp, Jeanna
Wonnacott, Allison Simmons, Heather Gaudet, and Michael Huber. (See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18, 23,
24, 26, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 46.) Accordingly, their claims against Ford for violation of
their respective state’s consumer protection statute must be dismissed. In light of the states of
residency of these non-Explorer plaintiffs, no claims under the Texas, Connecticut, Oregon,
Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Arizona state consumer protection statutes can be maintained against
Ford.25 Conversely, those plaintiffs, such as Arlene Romano, who have Explorers that are not
equipped with Firestone tires, may not state a claim against Firestone for violation of their state
consumer protection statutes. (Compl. ¶ 54.)

25
The following additional plaintiffs listed in Exhibit A have made no Ford Explorer-related allegations:
Marc Albanese, Robert Blank, Marc Boutwell, Gloria Arnold, Jim Barrentine, Debbie Bramlett, Laurie Bridewell,
Charles Brooks, Terry Brown, Jennifer Burge, Robert Bridewell, A.R. Brown, George Burkes, Marvin Burnett,
Randal Cauley, Jr., Billy Cain, William Chandler, Peter Choe, Ronny Clay, John Connell, Brian Davis, Pam Cooper,
Kevin Craig, Tom Drumright, Dan Edwards, George Elliott, Kathe Dietzler, Conrad Encarnacion, Frank Fietz,
Robert Gaiennie, Harold Facemyer, Jane Fitzharris, Robert Fretina, Jimmy Gamble, Tim Gossett, John Grantham,
Lynn Harkness, Rodger Glover, Sheila Griffin, Arthur C. Harding, David Hays, Sammy Hinson, Shelly Hotchkiss,
Wayne Henson, Ronald D. Johnson, Walt Johnson, Billy Keller, Deborah Kean, Ida Lamb, Jason Lamb, Fred Lester,
Karen Lewis, Roy Majors, Judy Lenoir Day, Charlie Leuenberger, Charles Mize, Matthew Martelli, Mabry
McBride, Gene McWilliams, Winston Milonski, Richard Moulton, Lawrence Peterson, Stephen Morris, Richard
Olson, Howard M.Peregoy, Cheryl Porter, Michael Raim, Edward Rupp, Paul Sharpe, Bryone Sharpe, Jr., Vernon
Sikes, Ervin Smith, Sarah Swanson, Timothy Trouy, Joe Southern, David Swafford, Acey Swearingen, Jerry
Tucker, Dennis Wallace, Joseph D. Ward, Lawrence J. Weis, Bill Williams, Allen Vestal, Ryan Wallace, Larry
Williams, and Thomas S. Williams. (See Compl. Ex. A.)

17
 C. “Exhibit A” Plaintiffs’ Consumer Protection Claims Fail As Well.

The Master Complaint includes as Exhibit A a list of purported additional

plaintiffs. In some instances, only a name and address is provided. The typical entry includes a
name, address, the name of a make and model of a vehicle, and the name of a model of tire. The
most that is pled about any “Exhibit A” plaintiff is that he or she has a Ford vehicle equipped
with subject tires. There is no allegation of tire failure, replacement costs, or any other actual
damages or loss. For those plaintiffs who reside in the states discussed above, their claims fail
for the same reasons as the named plaintiffs. The remaining “Exhibit A” plaintiffs reside in the
following ten states: Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, Utah, Tennessee, and Virginia. All of their claims fail as well, because they have
not pled any actual damage or loss. A brief state-by-state summary follows:

1. Colorado.

The lone plaintiff listed in “Exhibit A” from Colorado, Terry Etl, cannot state a
claim under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101 et seq.
The sole allegations relating to Etl’s vehicle and tires are the words “Ford Explorer” and “ATX.”
(Compl. Ex. A, at 6.) Under Colorado law, Etl lacks standing to bring a claim under the CCPA
because he does not allege damages or injury in fact. See Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 230-231
(Colo. 1998). In Hall, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that it would be unconstitutional to
interpret the CCPA as permitting a private cause of action “regardless of whether the plaintiff
had suffered injury in fact.” Id. at 231.

2. Georgia.

The Georgia plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Georgia’s Fair Business
Practices Act (“GFBPA”), Ga. Code Ann. §10-1-390 et seq., because they have not alleged
recoverable damages and causation.26 See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(a) (providing a private
right of action for a person “who suffers injury or damages as a result of a violation . . .”and
allowing recovery of “damages sustained”)(emphasis added); Zeeman v. Black, 273 S.E.2d 910,
916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (construing language as requiring “three elements: a violation of the
Act, causation, and injury”). Moreover, the GFBPA expressly contains a reliance requirement
that plaintiffs fail to plead. See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(b); Zeeman, 273 S.E.2d at 916
(construing “relied upon” language contained in notice provision as creating a reliance
requirement). In addition, because the GFBPA’s scope is limited to “the sale, purchase, lease, or
rental of goods . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,” Ga. Code Ann. § 10-
1-392(a)(3), plaintiffs’ failure to allege that they purchased or leased a vehicle for personal
purposes provides another basis for dismissal. See Kason Indus., Inc. v. Component Hardware
Group, Inc., 120 F.3d 1199, 1203-04 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting the GFBPA’s “focus on the
consumer (as opposed to the commercial) marketplace”). Furthermore, plaintiffs did not provide

26
The Georgia plaintiffs are Jim Barrentine, Debra Hicks, Judy Latonis, Charlie Leuenberger, and Florence
Montanez. (See Compl., Ex. A.)

18
defendants with the written demand of relief required to be delivered to a prospective respondent
30 days before filing an action. See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(b).27

3. Maryland.

The Maryland plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Maryland Consumer
Protection Act (“MCPA”).28 First, they fail to allege the “actual injury” and causation necessary
to maintain a claim under the MCPA. See Md. Com. Law Code § 13-408(a) (allowing cause of
action for “injury or loss sustained . . . as the result of” a prohibited practice); Morris v. Osmose
Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 634 n.10 (Md. 1995) (requiring establishment of “actual injury
or loss”); Hallowell v. Citaramanis, 594 A.2d 591, 594-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), aff’d 613
A.2d 964 (Md. 1992) (construing statute as requiring “actual damages” and causation for a
private action). Second, they do not allege that they are covered “consumer[s]” who purchased
an allegedly defective vehicle as a “consumer good[].” Md. Com. Law Code § 13-101(c) & (d).
A “consumer” is a “purchaser . . . of consumer goods.” Md. Com. Law Code § 13-101(c).
“Consumer goods,” in turn, are “goods . . . which are primarily for personal, household, family,
or agricultural purposes.” Id. § 13-101(d); see Penn-Plax, Inc. v. L. Schultz, Inc., 988 F. Supp.
906, 909-10 (D. Md. 1997) (granting motion to dismiss MCPA claim for failure to satisfy
“consumer” requirement); Morris, 667 A.2d at 634-36 (affirming dismissal of MCPA claim on
same grounds); Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., 958 F.2d 594, 597 n.9 (4th Cir.
1992) (rejecting MCPA claim because plaintiff was not a consumer); Layton v. AAMCO
Transmissions, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 368, 371 (D. Md. 1989) (same). Accordingly, the Maryland
plaintiffs’ MCPA claim must be dismissed.

4. Missouri.

The Missouri plaintiffs cannot state a claim under the Missouri Merchandising
Practices Act (“MMPA”), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 et seq.29 The MMPA provides a remedy
only for “ascertainable loss . . . as a result of” a prohibited practice and authorizes the recovery
of “actual damages.” See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.025 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have failed to
allege “ascertainable loss” or “actual damages,” and therefore their MMPA claims must be
dismissed. Briehl, 172 F.3d at 626, 627-29 (construing Missouri law and affirming dismissal of
various claims, including consumer protection claim, for failure to allege damages); Jackson v.
Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that plaintiff
lacked standing to sue under MMPA because no ascertainable damages incurred). In addition,
the MMPA allows actions only for the “purchase[]” or “lease[]” of goods for “personal, family
or household purposes.” Id. The Missouri plaintiffs have not pleaded this statutory requirement.
See State ex rel. Nixon v. Telco Directory Publ’g, 863 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)
(noting that purchase for personal or household use is a condition precedent for a private right of
action under the MMPA); Jackson, 664 S.W.2d at 676 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
plaintiff lacked standing to sue under the MMPA where no purchase involved). Accordingly, the
Missouri plaintiffs’ claims under the MMPA must be dismissed.

27
Moreover, class action suits are expressly forbidden under the GFBPA. See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(a).
28
The Maryland plaintiffs are “Matthew, et al Sibley” and Steven Wilkerson. (See Compl., Ex. A.)
29
The Missouri plaintiffs are James Hartman and Kevin Stafford. (See Compl. Ex. A.)

19
 5. New Jersey.

The New Jersey plaintiffs cannot assert a claim under the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act (“NJCFA”) because the statute limits a private remedy under the NJCFA to “[a]ny
person who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property . . . . as a result of” a violation
of the statute.30 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19 (emphasis added); Carroll v. Cellco Partnership, 713
A.2d 509, 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (focusing on acertainability of loss and requiring
a causal connection); Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 369 (N.J. 1997)
(interpreting NJFCA to require ascertainable loss). Because the New Jersey plaintiffs do not
allege loss or damage, their NJCFA claims must be dismissed.

6. North Carolina.

Sole North Carolina plaintiff, Joe Southern, cannot state a claim under the North
Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“NCUDTPA”). First, Southern has failed to
allege actual injury and causation as required by the Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16 (“If any
person shall be injured [by a prohibited act], such person … shall have a right of action on
account of such injury done….” (emphasis added)); Furr v. Fonville Morisey Realty, Inc., 503
S.E.2d 401, 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (“[E]lements of a claim for unfair and deceptive practices
in violation of [the NCUDTPA include] an unfair or deceptive act or practice . . . which
proximately caused actual injury to the plaintiff”); First Atlantic Mgmt., Corp. v. Dunlea Realty,
Co., 507 S.E.2d 56, 63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (same). Second, the North Carolina plaintiff’s
claim must be dismissed because the “general statements” of quality identified in the Complaint
are mere opinions that, as a matter of North Carolina law, are not actionable as
misrepresentation. See Performance Motors Inc. v. Allen, 186 S.E.2d 161, 166 (N.C. 1972)
(holding seller’s statement that a mobile home “was supposed to last a lifetime and be in perfect
condition” to be “an expression of opinion,” not an actionable representation).

7. Rhode Island.

The lone Rhode Island plaintiff, Eric Gasbarro, cannot state a claim under the
Rhode Island Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (the “Act”), R.I. Gen. Laws §
6-13.1.1 et seq. Plaintiff Gasbarro alleges nothing more than his address and the words “Ford
Explorer” and “Wilderness AT.” (See Compl. Ex. A at 6.) The Act, however, authorizes a
cause of action to recover actual damages only for persons who have suffered “ascertainable
loss of money or property” as a result of a violation of the Act. R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-5.2
(a)(emphasis added). In addition, the Act authorizes a right of action only for persons who have
purchased or leased goods or services “primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”
Id. Because Gasbarro has pleaded nothing, he has failed to allege either that he suffered an
“ascertainable loss of money or property” or that he purchased his vehicle or tires for one of the
covered purposes. His claim must therefore be dismissed.

30
There are two New Jersey plaintiffs, Roberta Greenberg and Beth Leahy. (See Compl. Ex. A.)

20
 8. Tennessee.

The Tennessee plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act (“TCPA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq.31 The TCPA authorizes a
private right of action to recover “actual damages” to “any person who suffers an ascertainable
loss of money or property . . . as a result of . . . an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared to
be unlawful by this part.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also
Haverlah v. Memphis Aviation, 674 S.W.2d 297, 304-305 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (the TCPA
“confers a private right of action on an individual who suffers an ascertainable loss as a result
of an unlawful practice under the Act”)(emphasis added). The Tennessee plaintiffs listed in
Exhibit A have obviously not alleged that they suffered an ascertainable loss as a result of a
practice prohibited by the Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104 (proscribing 32 unfair or
deceptive acts). Accordingly, the claims of the plaintiffs from Tennessee must be dismissed.

9. Utah.

The sole Utah plaintiff, Racheal DeMill, fails to state a claim under the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act (“UCSPA”), Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. Besides her name
and address, the only allegations as to DeMill are “Ford Explorer” and “ATX P235/75R 15.”
(Compl. Ex. A, at 5.) The UCSPA authorizes a consumer “who suffers loss as a result of a
violation of this chapter” to file suit to recover actual damages or $2000, whichever is greater.
Utah Code. Ann. § 13-11-19(2) (emphasis added). DeMill has not alleged that she has suffered
any loss or damage as a result of a violation of the UCSPA, and thus may not maintain a suit
under the Act. 32

10. Virginia.

The sole Virginia plaintiff, George Burkes, Jr., fails to state a claim under the
Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-196 et seq. The only allegation with
respect to Burkes is that he lives in Alexandria, Virginia. (Compl. Ex. A, at 2.) The Act
provides that “[a]ny person who suffers loss as the result of a violation of this chapter shall be
entitled to initiate an action to recover actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater.” Va.
Code Ann. § 59.1-204(A) (emphasis added). Because Burkes has failed to plead any relationship
with the defendants, let alone that he suffered any loss as a result of a practice made unlawful by
the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, he cannot state a claim under the Act.

II. THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF

EXPRESS WARRANTY (COUNT ELEVEN).

In their Eleventh Claim for Relief, the named plaintiffs allege that Firestone,
Bridgestone, and Ford “expressly warrant the Tires and Explorers to be free of defects at the time
of delivery, which warranties are express warranties within the meaning of § 2-313 of the
31
The Tennessee plaintiffs are Tom Drumright, Robert Dawson, and Kevin Milkgan. (See Compl. Ex. A.)
32
Class actions for actual damages are authorized only under specific circumstances, which plaintiff has not
alleged are present here. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19(4)(a) (a consumer who has suffered loss as a result of a
violation of the Act may bring a class action for actual damages only if the challenged act or practice has been
declared to be a violation of the Act by regulation or by a final court judgment.)

21
Uniform Commercial Code.” (Compl. ¶ 314.) Plaintiffs contend that defendants breached these
purported express warranties by “offering for sale, and selling as safe, Tires and Explorers that
are, by design, defective in that they are unreasonably dangerous and likely to cause serious
injury or death to Plaintiffs and members of the Classes.” (Compl. ¶ 315.)

Plaintiffs have failed, however, to allege a breach of an express warranty under

the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313 (1) (“UCC”). Section 2-313(1) provides that express
warranties by the seller are created by, inter alia, “(a) [a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made
by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain.
. . ., [or] (b) [a]ny description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain.” An
express warranty may take the form of an explicit written promise concerning how the risks of
post-purchase defects will be allocated (i.e., a limited written warranty), or an express warranty
may be created by a statement or advertisement that makes certain representations of fact (rather
than opinion), which forms part of the basis of the bargain. See, e.g., In re Anti-Lock Brake, 966
F. Supp. 1525, 1531-32 (E.D. Mo. 1997) (applying laws of Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, New
York and Texas); Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Smith, 523 So. 2d 324, 326-27 (Miss.
1998) (applying Mississippi law). Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for breach of express
warranty under either theory.

First, none of the named plaintiffs alleges that defendants took any actions (or
engaged in any omissions) that violated the terms of the limited written warranties that came
with their vehicles and tires. Further, none alleges that defendants breached any warranty terms
during the warranty coverage period – an omission fatal to their claims. Second, plaintiffs have
also failed to identify any other specific representation or affirmation of fact that formed the
basis of their respective bargains.33 Third, plaintiffs fail to allege that they provided notice of the
alleged breach as required by U.C.C. § 2-607. Finally, some of the named plaintiffs fail to state
a claim for a variety of other reasons, which include failure to allege actual malfunction or injury
and the running of the statutes of limitations. Accordingly, the breach of express warranty claim
must be dismissed as to all named plaintiffs.

A. The Complaint Does Not Allege Any Breach of the Limited Written
Warranty That Came With The Plaintiffs’ Vehicles Or Tires.

Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that Firestone and Ford “expressly warrant the Tires
and Explorers to be free of defects at the time of delivery.” (Compl. ¶ 314.) Contrary to
plaintiffs’ assertion, Ford’s limited written warranty – a “repair and replace” warranty – does not
promise a perfect, defect-free, maintenance-free vehicle. Ford’s limited written warranty instead
provides that authorized Ford dealers “will repair, replace, or adjust all parts (except tires) . . .
that are defective in factory-supplied materials or workmanship for 3 years or 36,000 miles,

33
See, e.g., Lujan v. Tampo Mfg. Co., 825 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. App. 1992)(there can be no express
warranty under Texas law unless an affirmation or promise is made by the manufacturer/seller directly to the buyer);
Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. 523 So. 2d at 326 (under the Mississippi Code, an express warranty requires a
verbal or written statement of fact or promise); Friedman v. Medtronic, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 185, 190 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973) (“for an express warranty to exist, there must be an affirmation of fact or promise by the seller” which has the
tendency to induce the buyer to purchase); Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 S.E.2d 539, 546 (W. Va. 1992)
(under the West Virginia Code, express warranties are created “only when the affirmation of fact, promise or
description of the goods is part of the basis of the bargain”).

22
(whichever occurs first).” (See Warranty Information Booklet for 1995-Model Ford and
Mercury Cars and Light Trucks, at 5 (attached at Tab 9).) 34 The limited written warranty simply
provides that during the warranty period, Ford will service parts (other than tires) that
malfunction due to a defect. See, e.g., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F. Supp. 1513, 1536
(D.D.C. 1984) (Ford’s limited written warranty covers only defects discovered during the
warranty period, thus, “plaintiffs who fail to allege . . . malfunctions within the warranty period
may not assert written warranty claims”) opinion amended on other grounds, 592 F. Supp. 1359
(D.D.C 1984), order amended on other grounds, 612 F. Supp. 983 (D.D.C. 1985).

Thus, under that warranty, a claim may arise only if (a) there was a malfunction
or failure of the vehicle due to a defect and (b) Ford declined to repair the vehicle. See Walsh,
id. at 1537 (holding that failure to allege compliance with “presentment requirements constitutes
a failure to state a claim for breach of . . . warranty”); Arnold v. Ford Motor Co., 566 P.2d 98, 99
(N.M. 1977) (providing that to recover for breach of Ford’s limited written warranty, plaintiff
must allege that he “presented the vehicle to the automobile dealer with a request that the defect
be repaired, and . . . that the dealer failed or refused to repair or replace the defective parts”);
Broe v. Oneonta Sales Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1978).

Plaintiffs have attached to the Complaint two Firestone written limited warranties
(dated April 1991 and May 1998), and they allege that these documents were delivered to
consumers in the glove box of “[n]ew Ford Explorers.” (Compl. ¶ 110 and Ex. C.) Those
warranties provide that, if “before wearing down to 2/32nds of an inch of tread depth . . . , any
tire covered by this warranty becomes unusable for any reason within the manufacturer’s control,
such tire will be replaced with an equivalent" Firestone tire in accordance with the terms set forth
in the balance of the warranties.35 The 1998 limited written warranty adds to this language the
requirement that the tire returned must have been purchased within six years of its return (or
manufactured within this six-year period if the purchase date is unknown).36 These limited
warranties then expressly list events that are not within the manufacturer's control, including
"road hazards," "overloading," "improper inflation pressure," and "failure to observe any of the
safety and maintenance precautions contained in this manual." Id. Thus, the Firestone written
warranty can be breached only if (a) a covered tire with more than the specified tread depth
became “unusable for any reason within the manufacturer’s control,” as defined, and (b)
Firestone refused to replace the tire as specified in the warranty.

34
Where plaintiffs have failed to attach pertinent documents to their complaint, defendants may attach such
documents to its Rule 12 motion to dismiss, without transforming the motion into a Rule 56 motion. See, e.g.,
Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993); Parrino v. FHP, Inc. 146 F.3d
699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv 5819. Ford has attached a copy of its limited
written warranty for Ford Explorers and other light trucks for model years 1995 and 1998. The relevant language is
the same for all Ford models represented among plaintiffs’ vehicles. For example, the 1998 limited written warranty
provides: “During this coverage period [3 years or 36,000 miles, whichever occurs first], authorized Ford Motor
Company dealers will repair, replace, or adjust all parts on your vehicle (except tires) that are defective in factory-
supplied materials or workmanship.” See Ford & Mercury Cars & Light Trucks 1998-Model Warranty Guide, at 6.
(Attached at Tab 10.)
35
See Compl. Ex. C., Firestone Tire Maintenance and Safety Manual, at 1.
36
See Compl. Ex. C., Firestone Passenger and Light Truck Limited Warranty, at 1.

23
 The named plaintiffs’ allegations are wholly insufficient to state a claim for
breach of either the Ford or Firestone limited written warranty. With respect to the Ford
warranty, no named plaintiff alleges any problem with the non-tire aspects of their Ford Explorer
within the warranty period. Further, no named plaintiff alleges that he or she ever presented a
covered vehicle to an authorized Ford dealer for warranty repair within the warranty period and
was denied service. See Walsh, 588 F. Supp. at 1536 (“[P]laintiffs who fail to allege . . .
malfunctions within the warranty period may not assert written warranty claims.”); Taterka v.
Ford Motor Co., 271 N.W. 2d 653, 657 (Wis. 1978) (Ford’s limited written warranty “only
covers those [defects] discover[ed] within 12 months or 12, 000 miles. The buyer is to bear the
risk of repairs beyond that point”); Tokar v. Crestwood Imports, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 382, 388 (Ill.
App. 1988) (relying on Taterka v. Ford and Walsh v. Ford, supra, and holding that plaintiff
could not recover for allegedly latent defects in his automobile which manifested themselves
after the automobile manufacturer’s warranty period). Thus, no named plaintiff asserts a valid
claim for breach of the Ford warranty.

As to the Firestone warranty, only three of the plaintiffs named in the body of the
Complaint alleges that his or her tires manifested the alleged defect.37 And none of the named
plaintiffs allege that he or she satisfied the minimum preconditions for obtaining a replacement
tire under Firestone’s warranty: first, that the tire’s tread depth is greater than 2/32nds of an
inch; second, that the tire is unusable for a reason within the manufacturer’s control (and not for
a reason listed in the warranty's list of excluded conditions); and third, that the plaintiff presented
the tire to Firestone under the terms of the limited written warranty for replacement. None of
the named plaintiffs alleges that he or she experienced any problems within the warranty
coverage period. Finally, no plaintiff alleges that Firestone refused to provide any replacements
to which they were entitled. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-54.) Under the cases noted above, these omissions
are fatal to plaintiffs’ claims against Firestone for breach of express warranty based on a breach
of limited written warranty theory. 38 See, e.g., Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 973
F.2d 988, 993 (1st Cir. 1992) (collecting cases upholding limited written warranties and holding
that “time limited warranties do not protect buyers against hidden defects”). Accordingly, no
named plaintiff can state a claim for breach of express warranty based on Firestone or Ford’s
limited written warranty.

37
Gary Gustafson, William Wehking, and Allan Simpson. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 22.)
38
Although the Complaint alleges that named plaintiff Leroy Eberly (Compl. ¶16) bought non-Firestone tires
at his own expense after the Ford dealership from whom he leased his Explorer refused to replace his nonrecalled
Firestone tires, he cannot state a claim for breach of express warranty for several reasons. As an initial matter, he
has no claim against Ford because tires are excluded from Ford’s limited written waranty. Even if tires were
covered by Ford’s warranty, he failed to allege that a defect manifested itself within the warranty coverage period.
Nor has he alleged that his tire tread was deeper than 2/32nds of an inch or that his tires were unusable for a reason
within the manufacturer’s control, as is required for Firestone’s warranty. For similar reasons, plaintiff Beth Simon
fails to state a claim for breach of express warranty predicated on a limited written warranty when her Ford dealer
alleged did not replace her nonrecalled tires. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Neal Zimmerman cannot state a claim against Ford
because he does not allege that the tires were installed on a Ford; instead, he has a Subaru. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Nor can
he state a claim against Firestone for breach of the limited written warranty when Firestone allegedly did not replace
his nonrecalled tires because he has not alleged the necessary prerequisites for breach of Firestone’s limited
warranty.

24
 The Eleventh Claim for Relief must be dismissed because no plaintiff has alleged
the necessary elements for that claim.

B. The Complaint Fails To Allege Any Specific Statement Or Affirmation That

Could Support An Express Warranty Claim.

Besides failing to allege facts constituting a breach of the applicable limited

written warranties, the plaintiffs do not allege facts indicating the creation of any other express
warranty (let alone any breach thereof). Plaintiffs may contend that they intended to assert
breach of an “express warranty by advertisement,” but such a theory would fail for at least three
reasons. First, plaintiffs have failed to specifically identify the promotional or advertising
materials alleged by each plaintiff to have been an affirmation of fact or promise that could
create an express warranty. In other words, the complaint must identify, separately as to each
owner of the subject vehicle or tires, the specific advertisement that particular owner saw and
construed as an affirmation of fact (rather than as a non-actionable opinion). See, e.g., Falcon
Equip. Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 536 F.2d 806, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1976) (express
warranty is not created unless the seller has made a specific representation about product at
issue); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W. 2d 136, 146 (Ark. 1992) (“An affirmation of the
seller’s opinion or commendation does not create an express warranty.”) .

Second, to state a claim for breach of express warranty by advertising or

statements, plaintiffs must allege that a specific representation or advertisement formed part of
the basis of the bargain. See, e.g., Ciba-Giegy Corp., 834 S.W.2d at 147 (“An affirmation of fact
must be part of the basis of the parties bargain to be an express warranty.”); Reed v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., Inc., 426 S.E. 2d 539, 546 (W. Va. 1992)(same). The Complaint is silent,
however, with respect to which specific advertisement or representation purportedly formed the
basis of each particular bargain defendants allegedly breached. Indeed, none of the generic tire
advertisements identified in the Complaint even mention the tires owned by these particular
plaintiffs.

Third, although plaintiffs refer to numerous advertisements in their Complaint,

they do not – and cannot – allege that such advertisements created express warranties. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 124-128.) These advertisements describe the Explorer, for example, as “The Best the
World Has to Offer,” (Compl. ¶ 124(f)), or state that “Bridgestone’s Tire Performance Standards
Are Going Up All The Time.” (Compl. ¶ 127(c).) As is detailed in Brief II, Part B.1, these
advertisements, however, are classic examples of unactionable opinion. See, e.g., Haskell v.
Time, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (“Advertising that amounts to ‘mere’
puffery is not actionable because no reasonable consumer relies on puffery. The distinguishing
characteristics of puffery are vague, highly subjective claims as opposed to specific, detailed
factual assertions.”); Anderson v. Bungee Int’l. Mfg. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)(statements “Premium Quality” and “Made in the USA” which appeared on package were
mere puffery under New York law and thus did not constitute express warranties). The
advertisements alleged in the Complaint are unactionable opinions and cannot support a claim
for breach of express warranty.

Even if these advertisements were not obviously mere opinions that could give
rise to an express warranty, plaintiffs’ express warranty claim nonetheless fails because, as

25
explained above, plaintiffs have failed to identify separately, as to each named plaintiff, the
specific advertisement that he or she supposedly saw and construed as an “affirmation of fact,”
which formed part of the basis of each plaintiff’s respective bargain. Plaintiffs’ conclusory
assertion that whatever alleged warranties were made were “express warranties within the
meaning of § 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code” is legally insufficient and cannot survive
a motion to dismiss. (Compl. ¶ 314.) See Briehl v. General Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623 (8th
Cir. 1999) (“Complaint must contain facts which state a claim as a matter of law and must not be
conclusory.”).

C. The Complaint Fails To Allege That Plaintiffs Provided Notice Of Breach As

Required By U.C.C. § 2-607.

Plaintiffs have also failed to meet their obligation under U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a),
which requires that the buyer notify the seller that there has been a breach “within a reasonable
time after he discovers the breach or should have discovered any breach” or the buyer will “be
barred from any remedy.” All the relevant jurisdictions have adopted this notice requirement.39
Notice of breach “opens the way for settlement” and gives the seller “ample opportunity” to cure
any alleged breach before a lawsuit is filed. See Parker v. Bell Ford, 425 So. 2d 1101, 1103
(Ala. 1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

As the Illinois Supreme Court recently explained, the notice requirement of § 2-

607 is satisfied “where the manufacturer is somehow apprised of the trouble with the particular
product purchased by a particular buyer.” See Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584,

39
See, e.g., Aqualon Co. v. MAC Equip., Inc., 149 F.3d 262, 265-67 (4th Cir. 1998) (interpreting UCC law
and holding that court must distinguish between the seller’s knowledge of facts “of the breach” and knowledge of
buyer’s claim that those facts constitute a breach; the notice must be sufficient to alert the seller to the possibility of
a claim by the buyer); Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 675 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ill. 1996) (holding that “even if a
manufacturer is aware of problems with a particular product line . . . it is essential that the seller be notified that this
particular transaction is ‘troublesome and must be watched.’’)(emphasis in original); Goldwater v. Ollie’s Garage,
No. CV94 0357372, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1687, at *8-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 5, 1995) (striking breach of
warranty claim for failure to allege notice); Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co., 888 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Ark.
1994) (giving of reasonable notice required and must be alleged in complaint in order to state a cause of action for
breach of warranty); Industria de Calcados Martini LFLA v. Maxwell Shoe Co. Inc., 630 N.E. 2d 299, 303 n. 1
(Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (buyer must “notify the seller of any breach of warranty or be barred from a remedy”)
(Massachusetts law); Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs., Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1474 (11th Cir. 1986)(“notice of breach
is a condition precedent to bringing a breach of warranty action”) (Alabama law); Royal Typewriter Co. v.
Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (11th Cir. 1983) (notice of breach is required before bringing a
breach of warranty action)(Florida law); Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1159-60 (D. Or. 1989)
(Oregon law); Gen. Matters Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co., 382 So. 2d 1262, 1263-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(notice requirement is a “precondition of imposing liability on a seller of goods”); Fieldstone Co. v. Briggs
Plumbing Prods. Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 701, 708-09 ( Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant on breach of warranty claim because plaintiff failed to give manufacturers notice of breach of warranty)
(California law); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-607(3); 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2607(c)(1); Ala. Code § 7-2-607(3)(a);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-2607(C)(1); Ark. Code § 4-2-607(3)(a); Cal. Com. Code § 2607(3); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
672.607(3)(a); 810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-607(3)(a); Mass. Gen. Law ch. 106 § 2-607(3)(a); Miss.Code Ann. § 75-2-
607(3)(a); N.Y.U.C.C. Law § 2-607(3)(a); Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.65(C)(1); 12A Okl. St. Ann. § 2-607(3)(a); Or.
Rev. Stat.§ 72.6070(3)(a); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 2.607(c)(1); W.Va. Code § 46-2-607 (3)(a). As explained
infra, because the Louisiana plaintiffs assert a claim under Louisiana’s redhibition statute, they are barred from also
bringing warranty claims.

26
590 (Ill. 1996). Because plaintiffs have not alleged that they provided the requisite notice under
§ 2-607, their breach of express warranty claims must be dismissed.40

D. Some Of The Named Plaintiffs’ Express Warranty Claims Are Time Barred
And Therefore Must Be Dismissed.

UCC section 2-725 provides that breach of warranty claims are time barred four
years after the product is tendered for delivery. While most states have adopted the UCC’s four-
year limitations period, there is some variation among jurisdictions. Six named plaintiffs’ breach
of express warranty claims are time barred under the relevant statute of limitations in Florida,
Illinois, and Ohio.

1. Certain Florida Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Time Barred.

Florida plaintiffs Richard Glover, Allan Simpson, and Jane Lill’s breach of
express warranty claims are time barred under Florida law.41 Florida has adopted a five-year
statute of limitations period for breach of warranty claims. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(2)(b).
Florida plaintiff Richard Glover “owns a 1993 Ford Explorer” (Compl. ¶ 17), but did not file his
suit until 2000.42 Allan Simpson “bought a 1991 Ford Explorer.” (See Compl. ¶ 22.) In April
2000, one of his front tires separated, (id.) but that tire was original equipment that came with his
1991 Ford Explorer. (Id.) Like Richard Glover, Allan Simpson did not file suit until 2000. Jane
Lill owned a 1994 Ford Explorer. (See Compl. ¶ 53.) She, too, did not file suit until 2000.

2. The Limitations Period Has Run On Certain Illinois Plaintiffs’

Claims.

Illinois plaintiffs Susan Grayson and Dawn Whorl’s breach of express warranty
claims are time barred under Illinois law. The statute of limitations for breach of warranty
claims in Illinois is four years. See 810 ILCS 5/2-725. Illinois plaintiff Susan Grayson “owns a
1995 Ford Explorer.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) Dawn Whorl “owns a 1993 Ford Explorer.” (Compl. ¶
27.) Neither Grayson nor Whorl filed suit until 2000; thus, their breach of express warranty
claims are time barred under Illinois law.

3. One Ohio Plaintiff’s Claim Is Untimely.

Ohio plaintiff John Dovich’s breach of express warranty claim is time barred
under Ohio Law. Ohio has adopted the U.C.C.’s four-year statute of limitations period for

40
See also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-607(3)(a); Md. Code Ann. Com. Law § 2-607(3)(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
12A:2-607(3)(a); R.I. Gen. Laws. § 6A-2-607(3)(a); Va. Code Ann. § 8.2-607(3)(a); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-
607(3)(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-607(3)(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-607 (3)(a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-607(3)(a);
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-607(3)(a).
41
Allan Simpson is one of three named plaintiffs who alleged manifestation of the purported tire defect. (See
Compl ¶ 22.)
42
The Complaint does not state when Plaintiff Glover purchased his vehicle. Defendants will assume for the
purpose of this motion that he, as well as the other plaintiffs - unless otherwise specified - purchased or leased their
vehicles new during the year provided. Thus, because Glover alleges he “owns” a 1993 Ford Explorer, it is assumed
that he purchased the vehicle in 1993. (Compl. ¶ 17.)

27
warranty claims. Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.98. Ohio plaintiff John Dovich “has a 1993 Ford
Explorer.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Dovich’s breach of express warranty claim is thus time barred under
Ohio law.

4. Plaintiffs’ Tolling Claim Fails.

Although plaintiffs vaguely allege that “any applicable statutes of limitations”

have been tolled because of defendants alleged “fraudulent concealment,” plaintiffs’ claim fails.
(See Compl. ¶¶ 200-201.) Where, as here, state law supplies the statutes of limitations, the
relevant state law of fraudulent concealment applies. See Hemenway v. Peabody Coal Co., 159
F.3d 255, 256 (7th Cir. 1998). None of the relevant states – Florida, Illinois or Ohio –
recognizes the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to toll a statute of limitations for a breach of
warranty action. See Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC, 175 F.3d 913, 914 (11th Cir. 1999)
(Florida law) (citing Fed. Ins. Co. v. Southwest Fl. Retirement Center, Inc., 707 So. 2d 1119,
1122 (Fla. 1998)); In re Receivership of Armor Ins. Co., v. ADP TotalSource, Inc., 2000 WL
1506192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2000); see Dohra v. Alcon, No. 92 C 2624, 1994 WL
395000 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1994) (Illinois law) (holding that fraudulent concealment does not
provide a tolling exception to the breach of warranty statute of limitations period); Moorman
Mfrg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 454 (Ill. 1982). Although Ohio recognizes a few
exceptions to its general rule that the statute of limitations governing breach of warranty may not
be tolled, none is applicable here. See Shover v. Cordis Co., 574 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ohio 1991).43
Accordingly, plaintiffs are wrong to suggest that all applicable statute of limitations have been
tolled.44

E. The Louisiana Plaintiffs’ Express Warranty Claims Are Preempted By The

Louisiana Redhibition Statute.

To the extent that the Louisiana named plaintiffs intended to assert breach of
express warranty claims, those claims are preempted by the Louisiana redhibition statute. Under
Louisiana law, “actions based on a breach of warranty against defects are to be brought in
redhibition instead of as a breach of contract.” See Molbert Bros. Poultry & Egg Co. v.
Montgomery, 261 So. 2d 311, 314 (La. Ct. App. 1972). La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2520, 2532.
Donita Qualey, Kurt Kellerman, and Heather Gaudet allege that the tires and Explorers have
hidden, or redhibitory defects. Thus, any breach of contract-type claim for purported hidden
defects the Louisiana plaintiffs may have is a claim for redhibition under Louisiana law. See
PPG Indus. v. Indus. Laminates Inc., 664 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1982) (“the presence of an
express warranty does not convert an action for redhibition into an action for breach of
contract”). In sum, the Louisiana named plaintiffs’ warranty claims must be dismissed because

43
The limitation period may be tolled if a defendant is out of state, or if he has absconded or concealed
himself, or if he suffers from some type of disability. See Ohio Rev. Code. §§ 2305.15; 2305.16. None of these
exceptions applies. Firestone is an Ohio corporation (Compl. ¶ 55), and a corporation such as Ford, which has a
registered agent for service of process in Ohio, is not “out of state,” and thus not subject to the tolling statute. See
Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 686 F.2d 642, 649 n. 12 (8th Cir. 1982).
44
Because state law supplies the statute of limitations for plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss claims, see DelCostello
v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), the Magnuson-Moss Act claims of Richard Glover, Allan Simpson,
Jane Lill, Dawn Whorl, Susan Grayson, Heather Gaudet and John Dovich are also time barred.

28
they cannot maintain both an action for redhibition under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2520 and a
separate action for breach of express warranty.45

F. Plaintiffs Who Do Not Allege That They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot State
A Claim Against Ford For Breach Of Express Warranty.

Plaintiffs’ breach of express warranty claim applies to certain Firestone tires and
Ford Explorers. For example, plaintiffs allege that defendants “expressly warrant the Tires and
Explorers to be free of defects at the time of delivery” and that defendants allegedly breached
those warranties by selling as safe allegedly defective “Tires and Explorers.” (Compl. ¶¶ 314,
315 (emphasis added).) The following named plaintiffs have made no Explorer-related
allegations: William Wehking, Barbara Jackson, Joyce Wilson, Neal Zimmerman, James Powell,
Carol Kusturris, Kurt Kellerman, Deanna Connell, Florence Bruemmer, Greyson Knapp, Jeanna
Wonnacott, Allison Simmons, Heather Gaudet, and Michael Huber. (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18, 23, 24,
26, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 46.) Accordingly, these plaintiffs’ claims against Ford must be
dismissed. In light of the states of residency of these non-Explorer plaintiffs, no breach of
express warranty claims arising under the laws of Texas, Connecticut, Oregon, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, or Arizona can be maintained against Ford.46 Conversely, those plaintiffs, such as
Arlene Romano, who have Explorers that are not equipped with Firestone tires, may not state a
claim against Firestone for breach of express warranty. (Compl. ¶ 54.)

* * * * *

In sum, none of the named plaintiffs can state a claim for breach of express
warranty, and therefore the claim must be dismissed as to all plaintiffs.

III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED

WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY (COUNT TWELVE).

In their Twelfth Claim for Relief, plaintiffs contend that defendants impliedly
warranted that the Tires and Explorers were “fit and merchantable for their ordinary use.”
(Compl. ¶ 320.) Plaintiffs allege that defendants breached the implied warranty of
merchantability because the Tires purportedly suffer from an alleged “undisclosed unreasonably
dangerous propensity” to separate, and the Explorers purportedly suffer from an alleged
“undisclosed unreasonably dangerous propensity” to roll over. (Compl. ¶¶ 321-322.)

Plaintiffs’ implied warranty of merchantability claims fail because they have not
alleged facts that satisfy the elements of the claim. To state a claim for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, plaintiffs must allege “that (1) a merchant sold goods, (2) which
were not ‘merchantable’ at the time of sale, (3) injury and damages to the plaintiff or its
property (4) which were caused proximately and in fact by the defective nature of the goods, and
45
It is unclear what Kurt Kellerman is even doing in this suit. He alleges only that he is a resident and citizen
of Louisiana. (See Compl. ¶ 31.) He does not allege, for example, that he owns or has a Ford vehicle or Firestone
tires. Heather Gaudet similarly cannot maintain a cause of action against Ford or Firestone. She alleges that she
owns a Honda Civic, not a Ford, and that her Honda came equipped with Firestone FR-680 tires – a model of tires
about which there is no complaint, and which is not even subject to the NHTSA investigation. (See Compl. ¶ 43.)
46
See supra note 25 for names of “Exhibit A” plaintiffs who have not made any Explorer allegations.

29
(5) notice to seller of injury.” 1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-7, at 510-11 (4th ed. 1995) (emphasis added).

A. The Vast Majority Of Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Breach Of

Implied Warranty Of Merchantability Because They Fail To Allege Actual
Injury Or Damages.

The vast majority of the named plaintiffs fail to state a claim for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability because they have not alleged any manifestation of the alleged
defect in their tires or vehicles. As noted previously, none has alleged any problem with a Ford
Explorer, and only three allege any property damage arising from the alleged tire defect.
(Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 22.) When plaintiffs fail to allege each element of such a claim, courts
dismiss the claim. See Carlson v. General Motors Corp. 883 F.2d 287, 296-98 (4th Cir. 1989)
(claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability dismissed when claim was for
diminished resale value not failure of the product); Briehl, 172 F.3d at 628 (dismissing implied
warranty claim because no cause of action lies where product performs satisfactorily and the
alleged defect never manifested itself); In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 792, 803
(E.D. La. 1998) (plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the product functioned improperly under normal
use barred recovery under theory of implied warranty of merchantability).

It is well settled that a vehicle that has provided safe and reliable transportation is

considered merchantable. See Hornberger v. Gen. Motors Corp., 929 F. Supp. 884, 888 (E.D.

Pa. 1996) (the implied warranty of merchantability is “simply a guarantee that [the car] will

operate in a ‘safe condition’ and ‘substantially free of defects.’”); Carlson, 883 F.2d at 297 (the

purpose of “cars . . . [is to] provide transportation”); In re Air Bags Prod. Liab. Litig., 7 F. Supp.

2d at 806 (ordinary purpose of an automobile is to provide transportation).

Likewise, a vehicle that performs the ordinary function of providing

transportation adequately “does not breach the implied warranty of merchantability merely

because it does not function as well as the buyer would like or even as well as it could.” Id. at

803; Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Philips ECG, Inc., 835 F.2d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 1987)

(“’merchantable’ is not a synonym for perfect”)(citation omitted); Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

500 F. Supp. 1181, 1191 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“The implied warranty of merchantability does not

impose a general requirement that goods precisely fulfill the expectations of the buyer.”), rev’d

on other grounds, 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981).

30
 As with vehicles, tires that perform the ordinary purpose for which they are

intended are merchantable as a matter of law. See Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 535

F. Supp. 595, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Tires which lived full, productive lives were, by

demonstration and definition, ‘fit for the ordinary purposes’ for which they were used; hence

they were “merchantable” under U.C.C. § 2-314, and no cause of action for breach of an implied

warranty can arise.” ).

Therefore, as to Ford, all of the named plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims should

be dismissed for this reason alone. 47 And with respect to Firestone, the claims of all but the

three named plaintiffs who allege they experienced a tire failure as a result of the purported tire

defect should be dismissed on this ground as well. But those three plaintiffs – Gary Gustafson,

William Wehking, and Allan Simpson – cannot state a breach of implied warranty of

merchantability claim against Firestone for other reasons. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 22.) As

discussed below, the implied warranty claims of these three plaintiffs are barred because under

the laws of their home states, vertical privity (which is absent here) is required for implied

warranty claims. Moreover, Allan Simpson’s claim is time barred under Florida law.

Accordingly, all named plaintiffs’ claims for breach of implied warranty of merchantability

against Ford and Firestone should be dismissed.

B. Many Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claims Are Barred

For Lack Of Vertical Privity With Defendants.

Plaintiffs do not – and cannot – allege that they purchased or leased their vehicles
or tires directly from defendants Ford, Firestone, or Bridgestone. This omission is fatal to the
claims of 30 of the 42 named plaintiffs. In many jurisdictions, a buyer is barred from suing a
defendant for breach of implied warranty unless the buyer purchased the product directly from
the defendant. This requirement – known as “vertical privity” – “demands that a consumer, in
order to bring warranty claims against the manufacturer, must have purchased the product in
question directly from that manufacturer.” See Walsh, 588 F. Supp. at 1524. In short, “[i]f state
47
Because none of the “Exhibit A” plaintiffs has pleaded manifestation of the alleged defect, all of their
claims for breach of implied warranty of mechantability necessarily fail.

31
law requires vertical privity to enforce an implied warranty and there is none, then, like the
yeastless souffle, the warranty does not ‘arise.’” Feinstein, 535 F. Supp. at 605 n.13.

The lack of vertical privity here bars the implied warranty claims of all named
plaintiffs from the following states: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, New York,
Ohio, and Oregon.48 The lack of vertical privity also bars the implied warranty claims of the
“Exhibit A” plaintiffs who reside in the following states: Georgia, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, and Virginia.

1. Alabama.

It is well settled in Alabama that there is no right of action on an implied warranty

theory against a manufacturer for property damage [or for direct economic loss] without privity
of contract. Johnson v. Anderson Ford, Inc., 686 So. 2d 224, 227-28 (Ala. 1996); Wellcraft
Marine v. Zarzour, 577 So. 2d 414, 419 (Ala. 1990).

2. Arizona.

Vertical privity is required when only economic loss is involved. Flory v.

Silvercrest Indus. Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 386-88 (Ariz. 1981) (plaintiff unable to recover for
damages for economic loss against manufacturer for breach of implied and express warranties in
the absence of privity).

3. Connecticut.

Connecticut imposes the vertical privity requirement when only economic loss is
involved. See Koellmer v. Chrysler Motor Corps., 276 A.2d 807, 812 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1970). See
also Delgatti v. Cosmos, No. CV 950127798, 1997 WL 193195, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. April
14, 1997) (privity required in Connecticut for both express and implied warranties); see also
Walsh, 588 F. Supp. at 1528.

4. Florida.

Privity is required to state a claim for breach of implied warranty of

merchantability in Florida. See Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1203,
1206 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“[p]rivity of contract between plaintiff and defendant is an essential
element of the breach of implied warranty cause of action” in claim for economic loss), aff’d, 67
F.3d 901 (11th Cir.1995); Am. Universal Ins. Group v. Gen. Motors Corp., 578 So. 2d 451, 454-
55 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991). See also T.W.M. & S.N. v. American Med. Sys. Inc., 886 F. Supp. 842,
844 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (“The law of Florida is that to recover for the breach of a warranty, either
express or implied, the plaintiff must be in privity of contract with the defendant.”).49

48
Privity is also required for a breach of implied warranty action in Lousiana. See Tillman v. Davidson, 501
So. 2d 1067, 1070 (La. Ct. App. 1987). But as noted earlier, where, as here, Louisiana plaintiffs bring a claim under
the Louisiana redhibition statute, they may not also assert claims for breach of warranty.
49
Allan Simpson, one of the three named plaintiffs who has alleged manifestation of the purported tire defect,
resides in Florida. (See Compl. ¶ 22.) Not only is Simpson’s claim for breach of implied warranty of

32
 5. Illinois.

Under Illinois law, if a purchaser seeks only economic damages, that purchaser
can bring a claim for breach of an implied warranty only against the immediate seller of the
goods. See Tokar v. Crestwood Imports, Inc., 532 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ill. App. 1998) (affirming
dismissal of implied warranty claim because there was no vertical privity between automobile
purchaser and manufacturer) (Ill. App. 1988); see also Walsh, 588 F. Supp. at 1529.50

6. New York.

New York requires vertical privity for implied warranty claims seeking economic
damages. See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Plaza Petroleum, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1335, 1341
(E.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 845 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. N.Y. 1993); Dragon
v. Monahan Ford Corp., 538 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1989) (dismissing a consumer’s
implied warranty claim against an automobile manufacturer on the grounds that the “implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for use do not extend to a remote purchaser, not in
privity with the manufacturer.” (citations omitted)). See also Abraham v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 103 F.R.D. 358, 362 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing on Rule 12 motion breach-of-implied
warranty claims against automobile manufacturer for lack of privity); Miller v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 471 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (affirming dismissal of implied warranty
claims against automobile manufacturer, noting that “it has consistently been held that a cause of
action does not lie against a remote manufacturer for the breach of an implied warranty”), aff’d
489 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1985).

7. Ohio.

Ohio has traditionally required vertical privity to bring an implied warranty

action. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. R.V. World, Inc., 577 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989); Vidensek v. Ford Motor Co., 1992 WL 393171, *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1992) (absent
privity plaintiff cannot bring a contract action for breach of implied warranty); Walsh, 588 F.
Supp. at 1533 (analyzing Ohio law on vertical privity.)

8. Oregon.

Oregon requires vertical privity, at least where only economic loss is involved.
See State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217-18 (Or.1968).

merchantability against Firestone and Ford time barred, but his claim also fails because he has not alleged – nor can
he – that privity exists between himself and Ford and/or Firestone, as Florida law requires.
50
Like Allan Simpson, the two Illinois plaintiffs who have alleged manifestation of the purported tire defect
cannot state a claim against Firestone or Ford for breach of implied warranty of merchantability because they lack
vertical privity with the defendants, as required under Illinois law. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12,14.)

33
 C. The Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claims of “Exhibit A”
Plaintiffs From Georgia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Virginia Also Fail For Lack of Vertical Privity.

The implied warranty claims of the “Exhibit A” plaintiffs who reside in Georgia,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia, are also barred by the vertical privity
requirement.

1. Georgia.

Vertical privity is required in Georgia in order to recover for breach of implied warranty of

merchantability, at least where only economic loss is involved. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc.,

185 S.E.2d 619, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971).

2. North Carolina.

In North Carolina, “the general rule is that privity is required to assert a claim for
breach of implied warranty involving only economic loss.” Sharrard, McGee & Co., Suz’s
Software, Inc., 396 S.E.2d 815, 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); see also AT &T Corp. v. Medkcal
Review of North Carolina, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 91, 95 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (“[w]ithout privity, [a
plaintiff] cannot maintain [a] breach of implied warranty claim” where only economic loss
alleged); Gregory v. Atrium Door & Window Co., 415 S.E.2d 574, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing implied warranty verdict for plaintiff where only damage was economic and there was
no privity between plaintiff and defendant).

3. Rhode Island.

Where economic injury is involved, Rhode Island requires privity. See Henry v.
John W. Eshelman & Sons, 209 A.2d 46, 47 (R.I. 1965).

4. Tennessee.

Tennessee requires vertical privity for implied warranty claims where no damage
to property other than the allegedly deficient product itself is alleged. See, e.g., Curtis v.
Murphy Elevator Co., 407 F. Supp. 940, 949 n. 9 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (reading Tennessee Code’s
explicit exemption of “personal injury or property damage” as requiring privity for other breach
of warranty actions); Walker Truck Contractors, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 405 F. Supp. 911,
916 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (“[Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-34-104] does not contemplate abolishment of
privity [for] purely economic losses (i.e., costs of repair, replacement of parts, or loss of
profits.”); McCrary v. Kelly Technical Coatings, Inc. 1985 WL 75663, *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985)
(refusing to hold defendant liable for economic loss because of lack of privity).

5. Virginia.

In response to a question recently certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia by

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that in circumstances where injury to persons or property is not involved, privity of contract is

34
required to maintain a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. See Beard
Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Thompson Plastics, Inc., 491 S.E.2d 731, 734 (Va. 1997); Beard
Plumbing and Heating Inc. v. Thompson Plastics, Inc., 152 F.3d 313, 319-20 (4th Cir. 1998)
(affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant because privity was required for plaintiff’s
implied warranty of merchantability claim and privity was absent).

* * * * *

In sum, those plaintiffs who reside in states that require vertical privity cannot
state a claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability.

D. The Louisiana Redhibition Statute Preempts The Louisiana Named

Plaintiffs’ Breach Of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claim.

Because the Louisiana named plaintiffs have asserted a claim under the Louisiana
redhibition statute, they cannot also assert a claim for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability. (See Part II.E above.) See also Gaston v. Bobby Johnson Equip. Co., Inc., 771
So.2d 848, 852 (La. App. 2000) (discussing the implied warranty against redhibitory defects);
Melancon v. Cont. Oil. Co., 420 So.2d 1251, 1253 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (redhibition statute
provides a statutory cause of action for claims akin to ordinary breach of express and implied
warranty claims).

E. Some Of the Named Plaintiffs’ Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claims

Are Time Barred And Therefore Must Be Dismissed.

For the reasons explained above in the discussion of plaintiffs’ express warranty
claims, the implied warranty of merchantability claims of named plaintiffs’ Richard Glover,
Allan Simpson, Jane Lill, Susan Grayson, Dawn Whorl, and John Dovich are time barred. See
Part II.D above. The statutes of limitations bar applies equally to plaintiffs’ implied and express
warranty claims.

F. The Durational Limitations Of Firestone’s And Ford’s Implied Warranty

Obligations Is Enforceable.

In accordance with UCC § 2-316, Ford and Firestone have limited their liability
for breach of implied warranty of merchantability to vehicle and tire malfunctions that occur
during the warranty coverage period established by the limited written warranties that come with
the vehicles and tires.

Plaintiffs contend that the durational limitation of Firestone’s and Ford’s implied
warranties, as set forth in their limited written warranties, is unconscionable under § 2-302 of the
U.C.C. (and therefore unenforceable) because Firestone and Ford allegedly knew at the time of
sale that the tires and Explorers contained “latent defects.” (Compl. ¶ 205.) Although § 2-302
offers no standard for determining unconscionability, it is well settled that § 2-316, which covers
exclusion or modification of warranties, “could easily be construed as an explicit and statutory
definition of unconscionability in the [warranty] disclaimer area.” See White & Summer, supra,
at 227. The authors of the noted treatise on U.C.C. law observe: “[We] have found no cases that

35
find a disclaimer conforming to 2-316 to be unconscionable.” Id. at 675. Section 2-316 has been
adopted by all of the states whose laws apply to the named plaintiffs’ claims.51

Section § 2-316 requires that the text of a partial disclaimer modifying the implied
warranty of merchantability be conspicuous and mention “merchantability.” See U.C.C. § 2-316
(2). As shown by the Firestone warranties attached to the Complaint and the Ford warranties
attached to this submission, their written partial disclaimers fully conform to § 2-316. See
Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 296 (5th Cir. 1993). (collecting cases). Consequently,
Firestone’s and Ford’s limitation of their implied warranties is valid, and plaintiffs’ claim that
the limitations are unconscionable must fail.

G. The Breach Of Implied Warranty Of Merchantability Claims Must Be

Dismissed As To All Plaintiffs Because Plaintiffs Fail To Allege That They
Gave Timely Notice Of Breach As Required By U.C.C. § 2-607.

The breach of implied warranty of merchantability claims must be dismissed as to

all named plaintiffs for yet another reason. Just as with an express warranty claim, notice of
breach is an essential element of a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
See White & Summers, supra, at 511; U.C.C. § 2-607. Plaintiffs have not alleged that they
provided defendants with timely notice of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.
Thus, for the reasons discussed in Part II.C above, plaintiffs cannot state a claim for breach of
implied warranty.

H. Plaintiffs Who Have Failed To Allege They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot
State A Claim Against Ford For Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability.

Plaintiffs’ breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim applies to certain

Firestone tires and Ford Explorers. Therefore, those plaintiffs who do not allege any connection
to a Ford Explorer cannot state a cause of action against Ford for breach of the implied warranty
of merchantability. For example, plaintiffs allege that defendants “impliedly warrant that the
Tires and Explorers . . . are fit and merchantable for their ordinary use,” and that because of the
alleged roll over defect “the Explorers cannot pass without objection in the trade.” (Compl. ¶¶
320-322 (emphasis added).) There is no mention of any other model of Ford possessed by some
of the named plaintiffs, such as the Expedition or Ranger. The following named plaintiffs have
made no Explorer-related allegations: William Wehking, Barbara Jackson, Joyce Wilson, Neal
Zimmerman, James Powell, Carol Kusturris, Kurt Kellerman, Deanna Connell, Florence

51
See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 85-2-316; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.29; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 2-316;
Or. Rev. Stat. § 72.3160; 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2316; Tex. Bus & Com. Code Ann. § 2.316; W. Va. Code § 46-
2-316; Ala. Code § 7-2-316(2); A.R.S. § 47-2316(2)(B); Cal. U. Com. Code § 2316; Conn. Gen. Stat. 42a-2-316(2);
810 ILCS 5/2-316; Fla. Stat. § 672.316; Mass. Ann. Law ch. 106, § 2-316; Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-315.1; N.Y.
U.C.C. § 2-316. The Louisiana named plaintiffs’ warranty claims are preempted by the Louisiana redhibition
statute. See Part II.E above.
The additional states represented by the “Exhibit A” plaintiffs have also adopted section 316. See Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 4-2-316; Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-316; Md. Code Ann. Com. Law §2-316.1; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-316;
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-316; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-316; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-316; Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
316; Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-316; Va. Code Ann. § 8.2-316.

36
Bruemmer, Greyson Knapp, Jeanna Wonnacott, Allison Simmons, Heather Gaudet, and Michael
Huber. (See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18, 23, 24, 26, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 46.) Accordingly, their
claims against Ford for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability must be dismissed. In
light of the states of residency of these non-Explorer plaintiffs, no breach of implied warranty of
merchantability claims arising under the laws of Texas, Connecticut, Oregon, Oklahoma,
Arkansas, or Arizona can be maintained against Ford.52 Conversely, those plaintiffs, such as
Arlene Romano, who have Explorers that are not equipped with Firestone tires, may not state a
claim against Firestone for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. (See Compl. ¶ 54.)

IV. T H E L O U I S I A N A N A M E D P L A I N T I F F S ’ RED H I B I T I O N C L A I M S M U S T B E
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (COUNT FOURTEEN).

The three named plaintiffs from Louisiana cannot state a claim under Louisiana’s

redhibition statute for “breach of warranty against redhibitory defects.” Therefore, plaintiffs’

Fourteenth Claim for Relief must be dismissed.53 (Compl. ¶¶ 331-338.)

A defect is considered “redhibitory” only when it renders the product useless

(thus establishing a claim for rescission), or when it diminishes the product’s usefulness or value

to such a great extent that it must be presumed that a buyer would have paid a lesser price for the

product (thus establishing a claim for damages). See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2520 (West 1998).

The redhibition statute is designed to compensate consumers who buy products that fail to

perform properly in the manner they were intended under conditions of normal use, such that the

consumer is deprived of all, or a substantial part, of the benefit of her bargain. See, e.g., Smith v.

Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc., No. CIV.A. 87-5612, 1989 WL 1780 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 1989)

(finding redhibitory defects when vehicle had repeated problems with 14 enumerated parts of the

car, including engine failure); Chalmers v. Stephens Chevrolet, Inc., 461 So. 2d 395, 398 (La. Ct.

App. 1984) (awarding reduction in sales price under redhibition law for car that was “functional

about 50% of the time, at best”); Neck v. Coleman Oldsmobile, Inc., 356 So. 2d 532, 534 (La. Ct.

52
In addition, more than 80 “Exhibit A” plaintiffs have not made any allegations relating to Explorers. See
supra note 25.
53
The three named Louisiana plaintiffs are Kurt Kellerman, Donita Qualey, and Heather Gaudet. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 31, 34, 43.)

37
App. 1977) (awarding damages in redhibition for repeated engine failure). Thus, if a plaintiff

purchases a vehicle that does not run, or that runs only with excessive repairs early in its useful

life, a plaintiff may have a claim in redhibition.

The facts alleged by the three Louisiana named plaintiffs fall woefully short of the
requirements for stating a redhibition claim. First, Kurt Kellerman alleges only that he is a
resident and citizen of Louisiana. He alleges no facts with respect to any vehicle or tires. (See
Compl. ¶ 31.) Second, Heather Gaudet alleges that she owns a Honda Civic, not a Ford, that
was equipped with FR-680 tires – a model of tires not at issue in this litigation. (See Compl. ¶
43.) Finally, Donita Qualey alleges only that she has a Ford Explorer that “is or was” equipped
with Wilderness tires. (Compl. ¶¶ 34.)

There are no allegations from the Louisiana named plaintiffs that they ever
experienced any actual problem with their tires or vehicles. Given their allegations (or lack
thereof), the alleged, unmanifested defect on these tires and vehicles has not rendered them
“useless” and the performance of the tires or vehicles has not reduced their value. See, e.g.,
Family Drug Store of New Iberia, Inc. v. Gulf States Computer Servs., Inc., 563 So. 2d 1324,
1327 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (“[The allegedly defective product] functioned as intended. Hence, a
remedy in redhibition must be denied.”); Drosdal v. Hurstell, 540 So. 2d 606, 608 (La. Ct. App.
1989) (finding no redhibitory defect when vehicle could be driven over 1,000 miles a month);
Robinett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 485 So. 2d 953, 955 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (“no allegation that
the sander failed in its intended use”); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ryland Dodge & Chrysler,
Inc., 457 So. 2d 255, 257 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding dismissal of redhibition claim for want
of proof of an existing, manifested defect). Because plaintiffs do not allege that their tires or
vehicles did not function as intended, they cannot state a claim for redhibition.

V. THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED (COUNT ONE).

The First Claim for Relief contends that defendants violated the federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act – Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (“Magnuson-
Moss Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. Plaintiffs’ contention that Ford and Firestone breached
express and implied warranties in violation of Magnuson-Moss Act fails for the same reasons
their state-law warranty claims fail.54 (See Compl. ¶¶ 202-208.)

A. The Magnuson-Moss Claims Must Be Dismissed Because They Are

Derivative Of Plaintiffs’ State Law-Based Warranty Claims, Which Are
Invalid.

Plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss Act claims are predicated on their state law claims for
breach of implied warranty of merchantability and breach of express warranty. (Compl. ¶ ¶ 203,
204.) If those claims are not viable (which they are not, for the reasons explained above in Parts
II and III), then plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss Act claims must also fail. Although Congress
provided a federal cause of action for breach of express and implied warranties, it did not change

54
As to Ford, plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the putative Explorer subclass only. (Compl. ¶ 202.)

38
the underlying substantive state warranty law that governs plaintiffs’ claims. See Mendelson v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 432 N.Y.S.2d 132, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (the Magnuson-Moss Act does
not change state law rules of vertical privity), aff’d, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132; Walsh, 588 F. Supp. at
1525; Feinstein, 535 F. Supp. at 605; see also Senate Comm. on Commerce, S. Rep. No. 151,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973) (in enacting the Magnuson-Moss Act, the “Committee does not
intend to alter existing state law” on the subject of implied warranties).

Firestone and Ford have demonstrated above that plaintiffs do not state a valid
claim for breach of express or implied warranty. Failure to allege that the purported defect
manifested itself in plaintiffs’ tires or vehicles is fatal to the majority of plaintiffs’ breach of
express and implied warranty claims. The remainder fail for other reasons, such as failure to
give statutory notice or because they are time barred. See Perona v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
684 N.E.2d 859, 869 (Ill. App. 1997) (class Magnuson-Moss claim dismissed for failure to allege
§ 2-607 notice, holding that Act incorporates relevant state law); Walsh, 807 F.2d at 1012
(same); Ruffin v. Fleetwood Motor Homes of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1997 WL 752000 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 3, 1997). Absence of vertical privity also bars many plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims.
See Larry J. Soldinger Assocs. v. Aston Martin Lagonda, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14765 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 10, 1999) (Magnuson-Moss Act does not eliminate vertical privity requirements);
Feinstein, 535 F. Supp. at 605. Thus, plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss claims must also be dismissed.

B. The Majority Of Plaintiffs Cannot State A Claim Under the Act Because
They Have Failed To Allege Actual Injury or Damages.

Plaintiffs’ failure to allege actual damages is also fatal to their Magnuson-Moss

Act claim. The Act permits suit by a consumer who has been “damaged by the failure” of a
warrantor to comply with its warranty. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1); see also Coghlan v.
Aquasport Marine Corp., 73 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that damages is an
essential element of a Magnuson-Moss claim because the Act protects a consumer who is
“damaged” by failure of defendant to comply with, inter alia, any implied warranties, citing 15
U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)); Verb v. Motorola, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1287, 1295 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(allegation of present personal injury and/or damages required under the Magnuson-Moss Act);
Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028, 1033, 1035-1036 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same);
Feinstein, 535 F. Supp. at 602 (dismissing Magnuson-Moss claim predicated on alleged breach
of implied warranty of merchantability where plaintiffs failed to plead legally cognizable
damages); Barbarin v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. Civ. 84-0888, 1993 WL 765821, at * 2 (D.D.C.
Sept. 22, 1993) (dismissing Magnuson-Moss claim where plaintiffs pleaded potential economic
loss but no actual personal injury or property damage). Here, the Complaint contains allegations
from only three named plaintiffs that any alleged defect manifested itself. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12,
14, 22.) For the vast majority of plaintiffs, there have been no such allegations and, therefore, no
Magnuson-Moss Act claim has been properly pled.

VI. N A M E D P L A I N T I F F S ’ NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED

(COUNT THIRTEEN).

In their Thirteenth Claim for Relief, plaintiffs allege that defendants breached
their duty to plaintiffs by, inter alia, designing and manufacturing certain tires that have “an
unreasonably dangerous propensity” to experience tread separation and Explorers that have “an

39
unreasonably dangerous propensity to roll over.” (Compl. ¶ 327.) Plaintiffs further allege that
they “suffered actual damages [and] are threatened with irreparable harm by undue risk of
physical injuries or death.” (Compl. ¶¶ 325-330.) All of plaintiffs’ negligence claims must be
dismissed for two reasons. First, most plaintiffs have alleged no injury, thus failing to plead an
essential element of a negligence cause of action. Second, those few plaintiffs who have pleaded
injury have alleged that the only damage allegedly suffered was to the tires or vehicles
themselves; the “economic loss rule” bars negligence claims seeking to recover for damages
when the only damage alleged is to the product at issue itself.

A. The Negligence Claims Of The Vast Majority of Plaintiffs Must Be

Dismissed Because They Have Failed to Allege Injury.

No named plaintiff pleads a manifestation of the alleged defect on the Ford

Explorer, and only a handful plead manifestation of the alleged tire defect. For the reasons
discussed in Brief I, these named plaintiffs generally cannot state a claim for negligence, which
requires injury or loss. See, e.g., Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1136
(5th Cir. 1985) (“[w]hile the sale of a defective product creates a potential for liability, the law
grants no cause of action for inchoate wrongs. However, egregious the legal fault, there is no
cause of action for negligence or products liability until there is ‘actual loss or damage resulting
to the interests of another.’”); In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig., 7 F. Supp. 2d 792, 806 (E.D. La.
1998) (dismissing all tort and implied warranty claims because plaintiffs failed to allege manifest
injury or defect). Thus, the claims of most of the named plaintiffs must be dismissed on this
ground.

B. The Negligence Claims Of The Handful Of Plaintiffs Who Have Alleged

Injury Are Barred By The Economic Loss Rule.

The three named plaintiffs who have pleaded injury have alleged only economic
injury resulting from alleged damage to the purportedly defective product itself. (Compl. ¶¶ 12,
14, 22.) These plaintiffs’ negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule, which
precludes tort recovery for economic damages in the absence of damage to persons or things
other than the product itself. 55 See, e.g., East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
476 U.S. 858, 868 (1986) (noting that the majority approach among state laws precludes

55
Only plaintiff Simpson (Florida) expressly alleges that his Ford Explorer was damaged after a purported
failure of one of his Firestone tires. The alleged damage to Mr. Simpson's Explorer does not constitute damage to
"other property," and he is therefore barred from bringing a negligence claim by Florida's economic loss rule. Tires
are an "integral part" of a single product, the automobile, for purposes of the economic loss rule. See Casa Clara
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993) (rejecting claim that
damage allegedly caused to home by defective concrete used in constructing home was "other property," because
"[t]he concrete [was] an integral part of the finished product"). See also Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood
Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 741 (11th Cir. 1995) (applying Florida law and holding that damage caused to entire
roof by plywood used to construct portion of roof was not damage to "other property"). Courts in other states have
confronted the precise question of whether component parts of an automobile constitute "other property;" these
courts have concluded that they do not. (See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 736 So.
2d 384, 388 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (granting summary judgment to Ford on plaintiff's negligence claim based on
alleged damage to car caused by defective oil seal on ground that "[a]n oil seal is an integral component part of a
car" and not “other property”) (citing Virginia Transformer Corp. v. P.D. George Co., 932 F. Supp. 156, 162 (W.D.
Va. 1996)).

40
imposing tort liability if a defective product causes damage only to itself). The plaintiffs who
have alleged injury reside in Florida, Illinois and Oklahoma. (See Compl. ¶ ¶ 12, 14, 22.) These
jurisdictions have all adopted the economic loss rule. 56 In addition, the additional states
represented by the “Exhibit A” plaintiffs also bar negligence claims seeking to recover only
economic losses.57

56
Florida and Illinois – the two states where the three plaintiffs who allege tire defect manifestation reside –
have adopted the economic loss rule. See Florida: Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So.2d 628,
630 (Fla. 1995) (answering certified question from federal court and concluding that "contract principles [are] more
appropriate than tort principles for recovering economic loss without an accompanying physical injury or property
damage") (citations omitted); Illinois: Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 450-52 (1982)
(barring recovery of economic damages – defined as inadequate value, and costs of repair and replacement – under
negligence theory).
Moreover, with the exception of Arkansas and Louisiana where the law is unclear, the other states
represented by the named plaintiffs have also adopted the economic loss rule. See Alabama: Lloyd Wood Coal Co.
v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So.2d 671, 673 (Ala. 1989) ("[A] manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty
under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.") (quotation
omitted); Wellcraft Marine, Div. of Genmar Indus., Inc. v. Zarzour, 577 So.2d 414, 418 (Ala. 1990) ("The rule
remains the same, regardless of the nature of the customer. . . ."); Arizona: Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins
Arizona Diesel, Inc., 666 P.2d 544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) ("We are of the opinion that the damages sought by
Arrow are solely for economic losses and are not recoverable pursuant to theories of strict tort liability or
negligence."); California: Aas v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.4th 627, 636, 101 Cal. Rptr.2d 718, 724 (Cal. 2000) ("In
actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries; no recovery is allowed
for economic loss alone.") (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. 1965));
Connecticut: Amity Regional School Dist. #5 v. Atlas Const. Co., No. X06CV 970153388S, 2000 WL 1198163, at
*4 (Conn. Super., Aug. 04, 2000) ("[T]his court recognizes the economic loss rule, barring claims for liability in
tort when, as in this case, the loss is merely economic and does not involve physical harm or injury to property.");
Massachusetts: Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 93 (1993) ("[Plaintiff's] claims are thwarted
by the economic damage rule limiting recovery for economic losses in tort-based strict liability or negligence cases
absent personal injury or physical damage to one's property.") (citations omitted); Mississippi: State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 736 So.2d 384, 387 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ("We hold that State Farm and Penton's
strict liability and negligence claims [against Ford] are barred under the economic loss doctrine as the only damage
sustained was to the product itself."); New York: Suffolk Laundry Servs., Inc. v. Redux Corp., 656 N.Y.S.2d 372,
374 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997) ("As a general rule, where a product fails to perform as promised due to negligence in
either the manufacturing or installation process, a plaintiff is precluded from recovering tort damages for its
economic loss .") (citations omitted); Ohio: Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 537 N.E.2d 624,
630 (Ohio 1989) ("The well-established general rule is that a plaintiff who has suffered only economic loss due to
another's negligence has not been injured in a manner which is legally cognizable or compensable."); Oklahoma:
Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, 808 P.2d 649, 653 (Okla. 1990) ("We . . . hold that in Oklahoma no
action lies in manufacturers' products liability for injury only to the product itself resulting in purely economic
loss."); Oregon: Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson, 843 P.2d 890, 896 (Or. 1992) ("Our precedents
establish that a negligence claim for the recovery of economic losses caused by another must be predicated on some
duty of the negligent actor to the injured party beyond the common law duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent
foreseeable harm.") (citations omitted); Pennsylvania: Lower Lake Dock Co. v. Messinger Bearing Corp., 577
A.2d 631, 635 (Pa. 1990) ("When the product fails to conform and only economic losses result, the parties' recovery
one against the other for economic losses should be limited to an action on that contract and no additional recovery
in negligence or strict liability is permitted."); Texas: American Eagle Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 48
F.3d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Texas does not permit recovery under a negligence theory for economic loss
resulting from damage to a defective product.") (citations omitted); West Virginia: Basham v. General Shale, 377
S.E.2d 830, 834 n.4 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that recovery for purely economic losses is prohibited under strict
liability claim and suggesting that same rule would be applied to a negligence claim).
57
Colorado: Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1269 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) ("[O]ur formulation of
the economic loss rule is that a party suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied

41
 As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, the alleged failure of the product to
function properly “is the essence of a warranty action, through which a contracting party can
seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain.” East River, 476 U.S. at 871. “When a product injures
only itself the reasons for imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its
contractual remedies are strong.” Id. Because no plaintiff alleges any property damage other
than damage to his or her tires or vehicle, plaintiffs’ negligence claims are barred by the
economic loss rule. Accordingly, all of the named plaintiffs’ negligence claims must be
dismissed.

C. Plaintiffs Who Have Failed To Allege They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot
State A Claim Against Ford For Negligence.

Plaintiffs’ negligence claims apply to certain Firestone tires and Ford Explorers.
Therefore, those plaintiffs who do not allege any connection to a Ford Explorer cannot state a
cause of action against Ford for negligence. For example, plaintiffs allege that defendants
breached their duty to plaintiffs by, inter alia, manufacturing and selling allegedly defective
“Tires . . . and Explorers that have an unreasonably dangerous propensity to roll over.” (Compl.
¶ 327 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs make no allegation with respect to any other Ford model
possessed by some of the named plaintiffs, such as the Expedition or Ranger. The following
named plaintiffs have made no Explorer-related allegations: William Wehking, Barbara Jackson,
Joyce Wilson, Neal Zimmerman, James Powell, Carol Kusturris, Kurt Kellerman, Deanna
Connell, Florence Bruemmer, Greyson Knapp, Jeanna Wonnacott, Allison Simmons, Heather
Gaudet, and Michael and Michael Huber. (See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18, 23, 24, 26, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37,
38, 39, 43, 46.) Accordingly, their claims against Ford for negligence must be dismissed. In
light of the states of residency of these non-Explorer plaintiffs, no negligence claims arising
under the laws of Texas, Connecticut, Oregon, Oklahoma, Arkansas, or Arizona can be

contractual duty may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under tort law.");
Georgia: Bates & Assoc., Inc. v. Romei, 426 S.E.2d 919, 921 (Ga. 1993) ("The Georgia 'economic loss rule' in
essence prevents recovery in tort when a defective product has resulted in the loss of the value or use of the thing
sold, or the cost of repairing it."); Maryland: Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 631 (Md. 1995)
(affirming dismissal of negligence and strict liability claims because plaintiffs generally “cannot recover in tort for .
. . purely economic losses”); Missouri: Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d
901, 903 (Mo. 1986) (denying recovery "on a theory of strict liability in tort, as a matter of policy, where the only
damage is to the product sold."); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 714 S.W.2d 919,
922 (Mo. Ct. App.1986) (extending economic loss doctrine to negligence claims); New Jersey: Naporano Iron &
Metal Co. v. American Crane Corp., 79 F. Supp.2d 494, 503 (D.N.J. 1999) (applying New Jersey's economic loss
rule to dismiss plaintiff's tort claims and refusing to recognize a "sudden and calamitous" exception to the rule);
North Carolina: Moore v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 499 S.E.2d 772, 780) ("North Carolina has adopted the
economic loss rule, which prohibits recovery for economic loss in tort. Instead, such claims are governed by
contract law – in this case, the UCC. The courts have construed the term 'economic losses' to include damages to
the product itself."); Rhode Island: Gail Frances, Inc. v. Alaska Diesel Elec., Inc., 62 F. Supp.2d 511, 517 (D.R.I.
1999) (holding that Rhode Island law would prohibit a plaintiff from recovering purely economic losses for
negligence); Tennessee: United Textile Workers of America v. Lear Siegler Seating Corp., 825 S.W.2d 83, 85
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that plaintiff cannot recover on negligence claim absent personal injury or damage to
other property); Utah: Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 n. 3 (Utah 1984) (refusing to
"blend" tort and contract concepts to allow recovery of purely economic injuries under product liability tort
theories); Virginia: Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628, 633 (Va. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff cannot recover
economic loss or diminution of value under tort claim).

42
maintained against Ford. 58 Conversely, those plaintiffs, such as Arlene Romano, who have
Explorers that are not equipped with Firestone tires, may not state a claim against Firestone for
negligence. (Compl. ¶ 54.)

VII. P L A I N T I F F S ’ CLAIMS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT MUST BE DISMISSED

(COUNT NINE).

In their Ninth Claim for Relief, plaintiffs allege that, as a result of defendants'
"fraud and other conscious and intentional wrongdoing," the plaintiffs did not receive products of
the quality represented by the defendants or expected by the plaintiffs, thereby unjustly enriching
the defendants. ( See Compl., ¶¶ 305, 306.) These claims must be dismissed for several reasons.

A. With Respect To The Vast Majority Of Named Plaintiffs Who Fail To Allege
That A Defect Manifested Itself, Neither Firestone Nor Ford Has Been
Unjustly Enriched At Plaintiffs' Expense.

As explained elsewhere, with respect to most of the named plaintiffs, there is no

allegation that an alleged defect ever manifested itself. Plaintiffs received tires and vehicles that
have functioned and continue to function properly. Any enrichment of Ford and Firestone from
the sale of these products therefore cannot be "unjust."

B. Because Plaintiffs Plead The Existence Of Express Contracts, The Quasi-

Contractual Claim Of Unjust Enrichment Is Not Available.

Although the elements of a claim for unjust enrichment vary among states, the
laws of the 17 states implicated by the named plaintiffs are uniform in one respect. Unjust
enrichment is a quasi-contract claim, which, as the Ninth Circuit has explained, “does not lie
when an enforceable, binding agreement exists defining the rights of the parties.” Paracor
Finance v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, plaintiffs’ unjust
enrichment claims cannot stand where, as here, an express agreement already exists between the
parties.59 Nor can the “Exhibit A” plaintiffs’ claims stand.60

58
Moreover, as discussed earlier, more than 80 “Exhibit A” plaintiffs fail to make any Explorer allegations.
59
Alabama: Vardaman v. Florence City Bd. of Educ., 544 So. 2d 962, 965 (Ala. 1989) ("It has long been
recognized in Alabama that the existence of an express contract generally excludes an implied agreement relative to
the same subject matter."); Arizona: Brooks v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 548 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Ariz. 1976) (affirming
dismissal of unjust enrichment claim because "where there is a specific contract which governs the relationship of
the parties, the doctrine of unjust enrichment has no application"); Arkansas: Coleman's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 935 S.W.2d 289, 302 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) ("the concept of unjust enrichment has no application
when an express written contract exists"); California: Paracor Fin., Inc. v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 96 F.3d
1151, 1167 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Under . . . California . . . law, unjust enrichment is an action in quasi-contract, which
does not lie when an enforceable, binding agreement exists defining the rights of the parties."); Connecticut:
Lazaros v. City of W. Haven, 697 A.2d 724, 731 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) ("the plaintiffs have alleged an express
contract, and this fact precludes the application of the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment"); Florida: Bowleg v.
Bowe, 502 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (no unjust enrichment claim where a valid contract exists);
Illinois: People v. E & E Hauling, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 165, 177 (Ill. 1992) (affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment
claim because plaintiff alleged existence of express contract between plaintiff and defendant); Louisiana: Wilkins v.
Hogan Drilling Co., 471 So. 2d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim for
failure to state a claim because "plaintiff's allegations here . . . clearly establish that his position is that there was a

43
 The named plaintiffs plead that all new Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone
tires were sold with a "Firestone Tire Maintenance Warranty and Safety Manual," attached as
Exhibit C to the Complaint. (Compl. ¶ 110 & Exhibit C.) This written warranty agreement
defines the rights and obligations of the plaintiffs and Firestone regarding defective or non-
conforming tires. (See Exhibit C to Compl. at 1-2, 8-10.) Plaintiffs have also alleged that Ford
provided them with express written warranties at the time of sale. (See Compl. ¶ 205.) Plaintiffs
also claim that Firestone, Bridgestone, and Ford made other express warranty contracts with the
plaintiffs. (See Compl., ¶¶ 203, 205, 314, 333.) Because those express warranties allegedly

contract between the parties"); Massachusetts: Aggarwal v. Nexabit Networks, Inc., No. CV-99-6174, 2000 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 205, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2000) (granting motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim
because written contract governed relationship of parties); Mississippi: MIC Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, No. 1998-CA-
01217-COA, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *33 (Miss. Ct. App. June 23, 2000) ("Unjust enrichment is a cause of
action only in quasi or implied-in-law contracts, not when there is an express contract between the parties."); New
York: Doo v. Berger, 642 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (reversing order denying motion to dismiss unjust
enrichment claim where "the plaintiff has alleged the existence of a valid, enforceable contract"); Ohio: Caras v.
Green & Green, Nos. 14943 & 15089, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3162, at *9-*10 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 1996) ("It is
clearly the law in Ohio that an equitable action in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment will not lie when the subject
matter of that claim is covered by an express contract or a contract implied in fact.") (internal quotations omitted);
Oklahoma: Jones v. University of Cent. Okla., 910 P.2d 987, 990 (Okla. 1995) ("An express contract excludes the
possibility of an implied contract of a different or contradictory nature."); Oregon: Prestige Homes Real Estate Co.
v. Hanson, 951 P.2d 193, 195 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) ("Quantum meruit presupposes that no enforceable contract
exists.") (internal quotations omitted); Pennsylvania: Birchwood Lakes Community Ass'n v. Comis, 442 A.2d 304,
309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) ("Unjust enrichment is not applicable where the relationship among the parties is based on
an express agreement"); Texas: Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex. 1976) ("If
a valid express contract covering the subject matter exists there can be no recovery upon a contract implied by
law."), rev'd on other grounds by Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989); West Virginia: Bright
v. QSP, Inc., 20 F.3d 1300, 1306 (4th Cir. 1994) ("It is a well-rooted principle of contract law that '[a]n express
contract and an implied contract, relating to the same subject matter, can not co-exist.'") (quoting Case v. Shepherd,
84 S.E.2d 140, 144 (W. Va. 1954)).
60
Colorado: R.N. Robinson & Son, Inc. v. Ground Improvement Techniques, 31 F. Supp. 2d 881, 889 (D.
Colo. 1998) ("Colorado law provides that where there is both an express and an implied contract that cover the same
subject matter, the provisions of the express contract govern."); Georgia: Mabry v. Pelton, 432 S.E.2d 588, 591
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993) ("the theory of unjust enrichment does not apply because there is a legal written contract
between the parties"); Maryland: County Comm'rs v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 747 A.2d 600, 610 (Md.
2000) ("There was an express contract between the parties that controlled this subject matter; therefore, respondent
cannot seek relief through the quasi-contractual remedy of unjust enrichment."); Missouri: Justus v. Webb, 634
S.W.2d 567, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("An action on an implied promise will not lie where there is a valid express
promise."); New Jersey: Suburban Transfer Serv., Inc. v. Beech Holdings, Inc., 716 F.2d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir.
1983) (holding that quasi-contract liability cannot be imposed under New Jersey law when the relationship between
the parties is governed by an express contract); North Carolina: Delta Envtl. Consultants v. Wysong & Miles Co.,
510 S.E.2d 690, 694 (N.C. Ct. App.) ("It is well established that if there is a contract between the parties, the
contract governs the claim, and the law will not imply a contract.") (internal quotations and alterations omitted),
review denied, 536 S.E.2d 70 (N.C. 1999); Rhode Island: Mehan v. Gershkoff, 230 A.2d 867, 870 (R.I. 1967) ("It
is well settled that where there is an express contract between the parties referring to a subject matter, there can be
no implied contract arising by implication of law governing that same subject matter."); Tennessee: Scandlyn v.
McDill Columbus Corp., 895 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) ("In this state, no right exists in law or equity
which allows a party to abandon an express contract and seek recovery in quantum meruit or under an implied
contract theory."); Utah: Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in
quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject matter of the litigation.");
Virginia: Webb v. Webb, No. HC-970-4, 1995 Va. Cir. LEXIS 1088, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 1995) ("Unjust
enrichment is a judicially-created rationale for implying a contract where no express contract exists. It does not
apply where an express contract does exist.") (citation omitted).

44
govern plaintiffs' remedies for purportedly defective products, plaintiffs are precluded from
recovering in quasi-contract, and therefore all of their unjust enrichment claims must be
dismissed. (See supra notes 59 and 60.)

C. Plaintiffs In Certain States Failed To Plead The Required Element Of “No

Adequate Remedy At Law.”

For a separate (but related) reason, plaintiffs bringing their claims under the laws
of Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and Ohio have failed to allege a necessary element of
their unjust enrichment claims.61 Because unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy, those states'
laws require plaintiffs to plead specifically that they have no remedy at law.62 Here, plaintiffs
failed to plead this element. Indeed, they have affirmatively pled that they have remedies under
state statutes, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and the legal theories of breach of warranty
and negligence.63 Plaintiffs from Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and Ohio have therefore
failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment.

D. Plaintiffs Who Own Or Lease Recalled Tires Have Not Pleaded That
Defendants Retained Any Alleged Enrichment Received At Plaintiffs’
Expense.

To state a claim for unjust enrichment against defendants, plaintiffs must allege
that defendants accepted and retained a benefit from them.64 Plaintiffs who own or lease tires
61
As noted elsewhere, we are assuming for the purposes of this motion that the applicable law is the law of
the state in which each named plaintiff resides.
62
Arizona: Community Guardian Bank v. Hamlin, 898 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
the absence of a remedy at law is a necessary element of an unjust enrichment claim); Florida: Martinez v.
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Co., 959 F. Supp. 1511, 1518-19 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim
because plaintiffs "fail[ed] to allege that an adequate remedy at law does not exist, and the Court [was] not
convinced that this [was] clear from the face of the [complaint]"); Illinois: Season Comfort Corp. v. Ben A.
Borenstein Co., 655 N.E.2d 1065, 1071 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) ("It is axiomatic that an unjust enrichment claim is
viable only when there is no adequate remedy at law."); Louisiana: La. Civ. Code art. 2298 (Lexis 2000) (unjust
enrichment "is subsidiary and shall not be available if the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment");
Slocum v. Daigre, 424 So. 2d 1074, 1077 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("there must be no other remedy at law available to
the plaintiffs in order to plead recovery under unjust enrichment"); Ohio: Banks v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
No. 99-AP-1413, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5504, at *14 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2000) ("where damages are
available for breach of contract or in tort, the [plaintiff] cannot also invoke the equitable remedy for unjust
enrichment").
63
While plaintiffs do plead in their count seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that they have no adequate
remedy at law (Compl. ¶ 299), they also have expressly incorporated allegations purporting to state claims at law
into their unjust enrichment claim, and vice versa. (Compl., ¶¶ 303, 307, 313, 318, 325, 331.)
64
See, e.g., Alabama: Hancock-Hazlett Gen. Constr. Co. v. Trane Co., 499 So. 2d 1385 (Ala. 1986) (holding
that plaintiff must be able to prove "that defendant holds money which, in equity and good conscience, belongs to
plaintiff" to state a claim for unjust enrichment); Connecticut: Conduah v. Herb Chambers, Inc., No. CV-
9805809S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1454, at *10-*11 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 2000) (holding that one element
of unjust enrichment claim is that defendant improperly retains benefit at expense of plaintiff); Florida: N.G.L.
Travel Assocs. v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 764 So. 2d 672, 675 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that one
element of unjust enrichment claim is that defendant "accepts and retains the conferred benefit"); Mississippi: Hans
v. Hans, 482 So. 2d 1117, 1122 (Miss. 1986) (holding that unjust enrichment applies only when defendant is "in
possession of money or property which in good conscience and justice he should not retain but should deliver to
another"); New York: Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 F.2d 949, 959 (7th Cir. 1986) ("In order to recover for unjust

45
recalled by Firestone have not pled, and cannot prove, this element, because defendants have not
retained the alleged benefit. (See Compl. ¶ 100.) Instead, plaintiffs have been offered, at
considerable expense to defendants, free replacement tires. (See id.) Because defendants have
not retained the alleged benefit conferred by these plaintiffs, they cannot state an unjust
enrichment claim against defendants. See, e.g., Hancock-Hazlett Gen. Constr. Co. v. Trane Co.,
499 So. 2d 1385, 1387 (Ala. 1986) (affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim alleging
overpayment by plaintiff to defendant when defendant did not retain overpayment).65

enrichment under New York law, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was enriched at the expense of the
plaintiff under circumstances requiring that in equity and good conscience the defendant should make restitution.");
Ohio: Cominsky v. Malner, No. 98-L-242, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 6205, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2000)
("The elements of unjust enrichment [include the] . . . retention of the benefit by the defendant under circumstances
where it would be unjust to do so without payment ('unjust enrichment').") (internal quotations omitted); Oklahoma:
County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Under Oklahoma law, a party may only
recover under [the unjust enrichment] theory by showing enrichment to another coupled with a resulting injustice.");
Oregon: Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Mishler, 983 P.2d 1086, 1101 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that elements of
unjust enrichment claim include "retention of the benefit" by defendant); Pennsylvania: Wiernik v. PHH U.S.
Mortgage Corp., 736 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that one element of unjust enrichment is the
"acceptance and retention" by defendant of benefits allegedly conferred by plaintiff).
65
Finally, the unjust enrichment claims of three Florida named plaintiffs (Richard Glover, Allan Simpson and
Jane Lill) and one Ohio named plaintiff (John Dovich) are time barred. Florida has a four-year limitations period on
quasi-contract claims. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(k). The statute begins to run when the cause of action accrues, which
happens “when the last element constituting the cause of action occurs.” Fla. Stat. § 95.031. Thus, any alleged
unjust enrichment would have occurred (if at all) when plaintiffs purchased their vehicles and tires. As explained in
Part II.E.1., Florida plaintiffs acquired their vehicles and tires more than four years before they filed their complaint.
Accordingly, their claims are time barred.
Similarly, Ohio plaintiff John Dovich’s unjust enrichment claim is time barred. Dovich acquired a Ford
Explorer equipped with Firestone tires in 1993. (See Compl. ¶44.) The statute of limitations for an unjust
enrichment claim in Ohio is six years. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.07. Because his complaint was filed six years
after he purchased his vehicle and tires, see Part II.E.3 supra, Dovich’s unjust enrichment claim is time barred.

46
 CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should dismiss all claims for violation of state
consumer protection statutes, breach of warranty, redhibition, violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Act, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

Dated: January 29, 2001 Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
_______________________________
Hugh R. Whiting

John H. Beisner
Mark Herrmann

Stephen J. Harburg
JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
North Point

555 13th Street, N.W., Suite 500 West

901 Lakeside Avenue

Washington, DC 20004-1109
Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(202) 383-5370
(216) 586-3939

_____________________________
_______________________________
Mark J.R. Merkle

Randall R. Riggs

47
KREIG DEVAULT ALEXANDER
LOCKE REYNOLDS LLP
& CAPEHART, LLP

1000 Capital Center South

One Indiana Square

201 N. Illinois Street

Suite 2800

Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-2017
(317) 237-3814
(317) 636-4341

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE, INC.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY

48
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR VIOLATION OF STATE CONSUMER

PROTECTION STATUTES MUST BE DISMISSED (COUNT TEN)...........................1

A. Each Named Plaintiffs’ Consumer Protection Act Claim Fails. ...........................4

1. Alabama..................................................................................................5

2. Arizona. ..................................................................................................6

3. Arkansas. ................................................................................................7

4. California. ...............................................................................................8

5. Connecticut. ............................................................................................9

6. Florida...................................................................................................10

7. Illinois...................................................................................................12

8. Louisiana...............................................................................................13

9. Massachusetts. ......................................................................................14

10. Mississippi. ...........................................................................................15

11. New York. ............................................................................................17

12. Ohio. .....................................................................................................18

13. Oklahoma..............................................................................................20

14. Oregon. .................................................................................................21

15. Pennsylvania. ........................................................................................21

16. Texas.....................................................................................................24

17. West Virginia. .......................................................................................25

B. Plaintiffs Who Fail To Allege That They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot
Maintain Claims Against Ford For Violation Of Their Respective State
Consumer Protection Statutes. ..........................................................................26
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page

C. “Exhibit A” Plaintiffs’ Consumer Protection Claims Fail As Well. ...................27

1. Colorado. ..............................................................................................27

2. Georgia. ................................................................................................28

3. Maryland...............................................................................................28

4. Missouri. ...............................................................................................29

5. New Jersey............................................................................................30

6. North Carolina.......................................................................................30

7. Rhode Island. ........................................................................................31

8. Tennessee..............................................................................................32

9. Utah. .....................................................................................................32

10. Virginia.................................................................................................33

II. THE NAMED PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF

EXPRESS WARRANTY (COUNT ELEVEN). ...........................................................33

A. The Complaint Does Not Allege Any Breach of the Limited Written
Warranty That Came With The Plaintiffs’ Vehicles Or Tires.............................35

B. The Complaint Fails To Allege Any Specific Statement Or Affirmation

That Could Support An Express Warranty Claim. .............................................38

C. The Complaint Fails To Allege That Plaintiffs Provided Notice Of Breach

As Required By U.C.C. § 2-607........................................................................40

D. Some Of The Named Plaintiffs’ Express Warranty Claims Are Time

Barred And Therefore Must Be Dismissed. .......................................................42

1. Certain Florida Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Time Barred...............................42

2. The Limitations Period Has Run On Certain Illinois Plaintiffs’

Claims...................................................................................................42

3. One Ohio Plaintiff’s Claim Is Untimely.................................................43

4. Plaintiffs’ Tolling Claim Fails. ..............................................................43

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page

E. The Louisiana Plaintiffs’ Express Warranty Claims Are Preempted By

The Louisiana Redhibition Statute. ...................................................................44

F. Plaintiffs Who Do Not Allege That They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot
State A Claim Against Ford For Breach Of Express Warranty...........................45

III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED

WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY (COUNT TWELVE). ...............................45

A. The Vast Majority Of Plaintiffs Fail To State A Claim For Breach Of

Implied Warranty Of Merchantability Because They Fail To Allege Actual
Injury Or Damages............................................................................................46

B. Many Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claims Are Barred

For Lack Of Vertical Privity With Defendants. .................................................48

1. Alabama................................................................................................49

2. Arizona. ................................................................................................49

3. Connecticut. ..........................................................................................49

4. Florida...................................................................................................49

5. Illinois...................................................................................................50

6. New York. ............................................................................................50

7. Ohio. .....................................................................................................51

8. Oregon. .................................................................................................51

C. The Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claims of “Exhibit

A” Plaintiffs From Georgia, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Virginia Also Fail For Lack of Vertical Privity. ................................................51

1. Georgia. ................................................................................................52

2. North Carolina.......................................................................................52

3. Rhode Island. ........................................................................................52

4. Tennessee..............................................................................................52

5. Virginia.................................................................................................53

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page

D. The Louisiana Redhibition Statute Preempts The Louisiana Named

Plaintiffs’ Breach Of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Claim.....................53

E. Some Of the Named Plaintiffs’ Implied Warranty of Merchantability

Claims Are Time Barred And Therefore Must Be Dismissed. ...........................54

F. The Durational Limitations Of Firestone’s And Ford’s Implied Warranty

Obligations Is Enforceable. ...............................................................................54

G. The Breach Of Implied Warranty Of Merchantability Claims Must Be

Dismissed As To All Plaintiffs Because Plaintiffs Fail To Allege That
They Gave Timely Notice Of Breach As Required By U.C.C. § 2-607.............55

H. Plaintiffs Who Have Failed To Allege They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot
State A Claim Against Ford For Breach of Implied Warranty of
Merchantability.................................................................................................55

IV. THE LOUISIANA NAMED PLAINTIFFS’ REDHIBITION CLAIMS MUST BE

DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM (COUNT FOURTEEN)............57

V. THE MAGNUSON-MOSS ACT CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED (COUNT

ONE). ..........................................................................................................................58

A. The Magnuson-Moss Claims Must Be Dismissed Because They Are

Derivative Of Plaintiffs’ State Law-Based Warranty Claims, Which Are
Invalid. .............................................................................................................59

B. The Majority Of Plaintiffs Cannot State A Claim Under the Act Because
They Have Failed To Allege Actual Injury or Damages. ...................................60

VI. NAMED PLAINTIFFS’ NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED

(COUNT THIRTEEN). ................................................................................................61

A. The Negligence Claims Of The Vast Majority of Plaintiffs Must Be

Dismissed Because They Have Failed to Allege Injury. ....................................61

B. The Negligence Claims Of The Handful Of Plaintiffs Who Have Alleged

Injury Are Barred By The Economic Loss Rule. ...............................................62

C. Plaintiffs Who Have Failed To Allege They Have A Ford Explorer Cannot
State A Claim Against Ford For Negligence......................................................64

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page

VII. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT MUST BE DISMISSED

(COUNT NINE)...........................................................................................................65

A. With Respect To The Vast Majority Of Named Plaintiffs Who Fail To

Allege That A Defect Manifested Itself, Neither Firestone Nor Ford Has
Been Unjustly Enriched At Plaintiffs' Expense..................................................66

B. Because Plaintiffs Plead The Existence Of Express Contracts, The Quasi-

Contractual Claim Of Unjust Enrichment Is Not Available. ..............................66

C. Plaintiffs In Certain States Failed To Plead The Required Element Of “No

Adequate Remedy At Law.” .............................................................................68

D. Plaintiffs Who Own Or Lease Recalled Tires Have Not Pleaded That
Defendants Retained Any Alleged Enrichment Received At Plaintiffs’
Expense. ...........................................................................................................69

v
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES
A. Secondino and Son Inc. v. LoRicco,
576 A.2d 464 (Conn. 1990)..................................................................................................9
Aas v. Superior Court,
24 Cal.4th 627, 101 Cal. Rptr.2d 718 (Cal. 2000)...............................................................63
Abbott Chemicals v. Emco Engineering, Inc.,
1994 WL 759232 (D.P.R. 1994).........................................................................................15
Abele v. Bayliner Marine Corp.,
11 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Ohio 1997).................................................................................19
Abraham v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
103 F.R.D. 358 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).......................................................................................51
Aggarwal v. Nexabit Networks, Inc.,
No. CV-99-6174, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 205 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 24,
2000) .................................................................................................................................66
Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc.,
660 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1995) ..................................................................................................62
Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc.,
788 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D. Fla. 1992), aff’d, 67 F.3d 901 (11th Cir.1995)..............................50
Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989) ........................................................................................41
Am. Dredging Co. v. Plaza Petroleum, Inc.,
799 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 845 F.
Supp. 91 (E.D. N.Y. 1993) .................................................................................................50
Am. Universal Ins. Group v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
578 So. 2d 451 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991)...................................................................................50
Amato v. General Motors Corp.,
463 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) ................................................................................19
American Eagle Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,
48 F.3d 142 (5th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................63
Amity Regional School Dist. #5 v. Atlas Const. Co.,
No. X06CV 970153388S, 2000 WL 1198163 (Conn. Super., Aug. 04, 2000)....................63
Anderson v. Bungee Int’l. Mfg. Corp.,
44 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)..................................................................................40
Aqualon Co. v. MAC Equip., Inc.,
149 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1998) ..............................................................................................41
Arnold v. Ford Motor Co.,
566 P.2d 98 (N.M. 1977)....................................................................................................36
Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Arizona Diesel, Inc.,
666 P.2d 544 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)....................................................................................63

vi
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)

AT &T Corp. v. Medkcal Review of North Carolina, Inc.,

876 F. Supp. 91 (E.D.N.C. 1995) .......................................................................................52
Baldwin v. Laurel Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,
32 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Miss. 1998).................................................................................16
Banks v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
No. 99-AP-1413, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5504 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 28,
2000) .................................................................................................................................68
Barbarin v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. Civ. 84-0888, 1993 WL 765821 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1993).............................................60
Barbe v. A.A. Harmon & Co.,
705 So.2d 1210 (La. App. 1998) ........................................................................................14
Basham v. General Shale,
377 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1988) ...........................................................................................63
Bates & Assoc., Inc. v. Romei,
426 S.E.2d 919 (Ga. 1993) .................................................................................................63
Beard Plumbing and Heating Inc. v. Thompson Plastics, Inc.; NIBCO,
152 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 1998) ..............................................................................................53
Beard Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Thompson Plastics, Inc.,
491 S.E.2d 731 (Va. 1997) .................................................................................................53
Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC,
175 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 1999) ......................................................................................11, 43
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,
337 A.2d 893, 903 (Penn. 1975).........................................................................................23
Billions v. White and Stafford Furniture Co., Inc.,
528 So.2d 878 (Ala. Ct. App. 1988) .....................................................................................5
Birchwood Lakes Community Ass'n v. Comis,
442 A.2d 304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)....................................................................................67
Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co.,
538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds by Sterner v. Marathon
Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989) .................................................................................66
Boston Hides & Furs, Ltd. v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd.,
870 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Mass. 1994) ....................................................................................15
Bowleg v. Bowe,
502 So. 2d 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).............................................................................66
Briehl v. General Motors Corp.,
172 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1999) ............................................................. 3, 10, 16, 17, 30, 40, 46
Bright v. QSP, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1300 (4th Cir. 1994) ..............................................................................................67

vii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)

Broe v. Oneonta Sales Co.,

420 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 1978)......................................................................................36
Brooks v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
548 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. 1976) ................................................................................................66
California Grocers Ass’n, Inc. v. Bank of Am., Nat. Trust and Sav. Ass’n,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396 (App. 1994) .........................................................................................8
Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
973 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1992)...............................................................................................38
Caras v. Green & Green,
Nos. 14943 & 15089, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 3162 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28,
1996) .................................................................................................................................67
Carlson v. General Motors Corp.
883 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1989) ........................................................................................46, 47
Carroll v. Cellco Partnership,
713 A.2d 509 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) ..................................................................30
Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.,
620 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 1993) ................................................................................................62
Chalmers v. Stephens Chevrolet, Inc.,
461 So. 2d 395 (La. Ct. App. 1984)....................................................................................57
Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,
537 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio 1989) ..............................................................................................63
Chevy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Sal De Enters., Inc.,
697 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) .....................................................................................18
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,
746 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................7
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter,
834 S.W. 2d 136 (Ark. 1992) .............................................................................................39
City of Marshall v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co.,
650 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981)...................................................................................24
Clegg v. Butler,
676 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 1997)...........................................................................................15
Coghlan v. Aquasport Marine Corp.,
73 F. Supp. 2d 769 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ..................................................................................60
Coleman's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
935 S.W.2d 289 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) ................................................................................66
Cominsky v. Malner,
No. 98-L-242, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 6205 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2000) ......................69
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ryland Dodge & Chrysler, Inc.,
457 So. 2d 255 (La. Ct. App. 1984)....................................................................................58

viii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
Page(s)

Community Guardian Bank v. Hamlin,

898 P.2d 1005 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ..................................................................................68
Conduah v. Herb Chambers, Inc.,
No. CV-9805809S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1454 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
28, 2000)............................................................................................................................69
Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.,
675 N.E. 2d 584 (Ill. 1996)..................................................................................... 12, 13, 41
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., v. Ryan,
250 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Ark. 1966)......................................................................................7
County Comm'rs v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc.,
747 A.2d 600 (Md. 2000)...................................................................................................67
County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney,
933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991) ..........................................................................................69
Curtis v. Murphy Elevator Co.,
407 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) ...................................................................................52
Cytyc Corp. v. Neuromedical Sys., Inc.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)...................................................................................18
Deerman v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,
955 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ala. 1997) .....................................................................................5
DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151 (1983)...........................................................................................................44
Delgatti v. Cosmos,
No. CV 950127798, 1997 WL 193195 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 14, 1997) ..........................49
Delta Envtl. Consultants v. Wysong & Miles Co.,
510 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. Ct. App.), review denied, 536 S.E.2d 70 (N.C. 1999) .......................67
Denson v. Ron Tomkin Gran Turismo, Inc.,
566 P.2d 1177 (Or. 1977)...................................................................................................21
Dent v. Ford Motor Co.,
614 N.E.2d 1074 (Ohio App. 1992)....................................................................................19
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young,
901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................................3
DiLucido v. Terminix Int’l,
676 A.2d 1237 (Pa. Super. 1996)........................................................................................23
Dohra v. Alcon,
No. 92 C 2624, 1994 WL 395000 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1994).................................................43
Doo v. Berger,
642 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)...........................................................................67
Dragon v. Monahan Ford Corp.,
538 N.Y.S.2d 142 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1989)..............................................................................50

ix
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Page(s)

Drosdal v. Hurstell,
540 So. 2d 606 (La. Ct. App. 1989)....................................................................................58
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
476 U.S. 858 (1986).....................................................................................................62, 64
Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Mishler,
983 P.2d 1086 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).....................................................................................69
Elson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
691 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ...................................................................................12
Ex parte Exxon Corp.,
725 So.2d 930 (Ala. 1993) ...................................................................................................6
Falcon Equip. Corp. v. Courtesy Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,
536 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1976) ..............................................................................................39
Family Drug Store of New Iberia, Inc. v. Gulf States Computer Servs., Inc.,
563 So. 2d 1324 (La. Ct. App. 1990)..................................................................................58
FDIC v. Bathgate,
27 F.3d 850(3d Cir. 1994) ....................................................................................................1
Federal Ins. Co. v. Southwest Fla. Retirement Ctr., Inc.,
707 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1998) ................................................................................................11
Feinstein v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
535 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).................................................................... 47, 48, 59, 60
Feitler v. Animation Celection, Inc.,
13 P.3d 1044 (Or. 2000).....................................................................................................21
Fieldstone Co. v. Briggs Plumbing Prods. Inc.,
62 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 701 ( Cal. Ct. App. 1997) ........................................................................41
First Atlantic Mgmt. Corp. v. Dunlea Realty Co.,
507 S.E.2d 56 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) ...................................................................................31
Fitzner Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac, Inc. v. Smith,
523 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1998)...............................................................................................34
Flory v. Silvercrest Indus. Inc.,
633 P.2d 383 (Ariz. 1981) ..................................................................................................49
Ford Motor Co. v. Rice,
726 So.2d 626 (Ala. 1998) ...................................................................................................5
Ford Motor Co., Inc.,
736 So.2d at 388, citing Virginia Transformer Corp. v. P.D. George Co., 932
F. Supp. 156 (W.D. Va. 1996)............................................................................................62
Friedman v. Medtronic, Inc.,
42 A.D.2d 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973)................................................................................34
Furr v. Fonville Morisey Realty, Inc.,
503 S.E.2d 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) .................................................................................31

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Page(s)

Gail Frances, Inc. v. Alaska Diesel Elec., Inc.,

62 F. Supp.2d 511(D.R.I. 1999) .........................................................................................64
Gallion v. Cole,
CA00-297, 2000 Ark. App. LEXIS 709, (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2000).................................7
Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co.,
613 N.E.2d 92 (1993).........................................................................................................63
Gaston v. Bobby Johnson Equip. Co., Inc.,
771 So.2d 848 (La. App. 2000) ..........................................................................................53
Gemini Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co.,
40 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1994) ...................................................................................................22
Gen. Matters Inc. v. Paramount Canning Co.,
382 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).........................................................................41
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc.,
185 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971) ..................................................................................52
General Elec. Capital v. Lease Resolution,
128 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 1997) ..........................................................................................2, 3
Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors,
691 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1997) ...................................................................................................30
Gibbs v. Ernst,
538 Pa. 193, 647 A.2d 882 (1994)......................................................................................24
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................61
Givens v. Rent-a-Center, Inc.,
720 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ala. 1988), aff’d, 885 F.2d 879 (11th Cir. 1989) ..............................6
Goldwater v. Ollie’s Garage,
No. CV94 0357372, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1687 (Conn. Super. Ct. June
5, 1995)..............................................................................................................................41
Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.,
542 A.2d 1200 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1988).......................................................................................2
Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc.,
513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ill. 1981) .....................................................................................60
Green v. Honeywell, Inc.,
No. 98-1470, 1998 WL 423416 (E.D. La. July 27, 1998)....................................................14
Gregory v. Atrium Door & Window Co.,
415 S.E.2d 574 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) .................................................................................52
Grendell v. Kiehl,
723 S.W.2d 830 (Ark. 1987) ................................................................................................8

xi
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Page(s)

Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc.,

10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000) .................................................................................................63
Hall v. Walter,
969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998) .................................................................................................27
Hallowell v. Citaramanis,
594 A.2d 591 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), aff’d 613 A.2d 964 (Md. 1992)..........................29
Hancock-Hazlett Gen. Constr. Co. v. Trane Co.,
499 So. 2d 1385 (Ala. 1986)...............................................................................................69
Hans v. Hans,
482 So. 2d 1117 (Miss. 1986).............................................................................................69
Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs., Inc.,
787 F.2d 1468 (11th Cir. 1986) ..........................................................................................41
Haskell v. Time, Inc.,
857 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Cal. 1994)....................................................................................39
Haverlah v. Memphis Aviation,
674 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) ..............................................................................32
Hemenway v. Peabody Coal Co.,
159 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 1998) ..............................................................................................43
Henry v. John W. Eshelman & Sons,
209 A.2d 46 (R.I. 1965) .....................................................................................................52
Herring-Marathon Master Partnership B v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc.,
979 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1992) ..............................................................................................7
Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co.,
339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972) ....................................................................................23
Hornberger v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
929 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Pa. 1996) .......................................................................................47
Hubbard v. General Motors Corp.,
No. 95 CV 4326, 1999 WL 274019 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996)............................................18
In re Air Bag Prods. Liab. Litig.,
7 F. Supp. 2d 792 (E.D. La. 1998)......................................................................... 46, 47, 61
In re General Motors Corp. Anti-Lock Brake Prod. Liab. Litig.,
966 F. Supp. 1525 (E.D. Mo. 1997).............................................................1, 8, 9, 17, 25, 34
In re Receivership of Armor Ins. Co. v. ADP TotalSource, Inc.,
2000 WL 1506192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2000)........................................................43
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,
51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................................1
Industria de Calcados Martini LFLA v. Maxwell Shoe Co. Inc.,
630 N.E. 2d 299 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)..............................................................................41

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Page(s)

Jackson v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc.,

664 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).................................................................................30
Jarman v. United Indus Corp.,
98 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Miss. 2000).................................................................................16
Johnson v. Anderson Ford, Inc.,
686 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1996) ................................................................................................49
Jones v. University of Cent. Okla.,
910 P.2d 987 (Okla. 1995) .................................................................................................67
Justus v. Webb,
634 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)................................................................................67
Kason Indus., Inc. v. Component Hardware Group, Inc.,
120 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 1997) ...........................................................................................28
Koellmer v. Chrysler Motor Corps.,
276 A.2d 807 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1970) ...................................................................................49
Kolentus v. Avco Corp.,
798 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1986) ..............................................................................................69
Lachmund v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc.,
191 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................2
Lancaster Glass Corp. v. Philips ECG, Inc.,
835 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1987) ..............................................................................................47
Larry J. Soldinger Assocs. v. Aston Martin Lagonda,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14765 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1999).....................................................60
Layton v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.,
717 F. Supp. 368 (D. Md. 1989).........................................................................................29
Lazaros v. City of W. Haven,
697 A.2d 724 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) ...............................................................................66
Lionel Trains, Inc. v. Alabano,
831 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill 1993), aff’d, 35 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 1994) ..................................13
Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co.,
543 So.2d 671 (Ala. 1989) .................................................................................................62
Lower Lake Dock Co. v. Messinger Bearing Corp.,
577 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1990) ....................................................................................................63
Lujan v. Tampo Mfg. Co.,
825 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App. 1992)......................................................................................34
Mabry v. Pelton,
432 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)...................................................................................67
Macias v. HBC of Florida,
694 So.2d 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) .............................................................................10

xiii
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Page(s)

Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co.,

586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978) ..................................................................................................67
Mara v. Burgdor Relators, Inc.,
726 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1989) .....................................................................................23
Maroone Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nordstrom,
587 So.2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)............................................................................10
Martin v. Ford,
914 F. Supp. 1449 (S.D. Tex. 1996) ...................................................................................24
Martinez v. Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Co.,
959 F. Supp. 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ....................................................................................68
McCrary v. Kelly Technical Coatings, Inc.
1985 WL 75663 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ..............................................................................53
Mead Corp. v. Stevens Cabinets, Inc.,
938 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1996) ........................................................................................15
Mehan v. Gershkoff,
230 A.2d 867 (R.I. 1967) ...................................................................................................67
Melancon v. Cont. Oil. Co.,
420 So.2d 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1982)...................................................................................53
Mendelson v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
432 N.Y.S.2d 132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980), aff’d, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132 ......................................59
Merv Swing Agency, Inc. v. Graham Co.,
579 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1983) .......................................................................................23
MIC Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks,
No. 1998-CA-01217-COA, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 299 (Miss. Ct. App. June
23, 2000)............................................................................................................................66
Miller v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
471 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), aff’d 489 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1985) .........................51
Mobil Oil v. Joshi,
609 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1994) ...................................................................................................18
Molbert Bros. Poultry & Egg Co. v. Montgomery,
261 So. 2d 311 (La. Ct. App. 1972)....................................................................................44
Moore v. Coachmen Indus., Inc.,
499 S.E.2d 772...................................................................................................................64
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Tank Co.,
435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982)............................................................................................43, 62
Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving,
667 A.2d 624 (Md. 1995)............................................................................................ 29, 63
Moses v. Citicorp Mortgage Inc.,
982 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) .....................................................................................17

xiv
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Page(s)

N.G.L. Travel Assocs. v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.,

764 So. 2d 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)...........................................................................69
Naporano Iron & Metal Co. v. American Crane Corp.,
79 F. Supp.2d 494 (D.N.J. 1999) .......................................................................................63
Nataros v. Fine Arts Gallery of Scotsdale, Inc.,
612 P.2d 500 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)......................................................................................6
Neck v. Coleman Oldsmobile, Inc.,
356 So. 2d 532 (La. Ct. App. 1977)....................................................................................57
Onita Pacific Corp. v. Trustees of Bronson,
843 P.2d 890 (Or. 1992).....................................................................................................63
Orlando v. Finance One of West Virginia, Inc.,
369 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1988) ...........................................................................................25
Paracor Finance v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.,
96 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 1996) ..............................................................................................66
Parker v. Bell Ford,
425 So. 2d 1101 (Ala. 1983)...............................................................................................41
Parrino v. FHP, Inc.
146 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1998), amended by, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv 5819............................35
Patterson v. Beall,
No. 92,399, 2000 Okla. LEXIS 94 (Nov. 14, 2000) ............................................................20
Peery v. Hansen,
585 P.2d 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978)......................................................................................6
Penn-Plax, Inc. v. L. Schultz, Inc.,
988 F. Supp. 906 (D. Md. 1997).........................................................................................29
People v. E & E Hauling, Inc.,
607 N.E.2d 165 (Ill. 1992)..................................................................................................66
Performance Motors Inc. v. Allen,
186 S.E.2d 161 (N.C. 1972) ...............................................................................................31
Perona v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
684 N.E.2d 859 (Ill. App. 1997) .........................................................................................59
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.,
681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984) ..................................................................................................64
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797 (1985).............................................................................................................2
PPG Indus. V. Indus Laminates, Inc.
664 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1982)........................................................................................................................ 44
Prestige Homes Real Estate Co. v. Hanson,
951 P.2d 193 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).......................................................................................67

xv
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Page(s)

Prime Meats, Inc. v. Yochim,

422 Pa. Super. 460, 619 A.2d 769 (1993) ...........................................................................23
Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc.,
60 F.3d 734 (11th Cir. 1995) ..............................................................................................62
R.N. Robinson & Son, Inc. v. Ground Improvement Techniques,
31 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D. Colo. 1998)....................................................................................67
R.S. Miskimins v. The City Nat’l Bank,
456 S.W.2d 673 (Ark. 1970) ................................................................................................8
Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
426 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1992) .....................................................................................34, 39
Renfroe v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
686 F.2d 642, (8th Cir. 1982) .............................................................................................44
Robinett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
485 So. 2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 1986)....................................................................................58
Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp.,
719 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983) ..........................................................................................41
Ruffin v. Fleetwood Motor Homes of Pennsylvania, Inc.,
1997 WL 752000 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1997) ..........................................................................59
S. Bend Woolen Co. v. Jacob Reed’s Sons, Inc.,
116 A. 805 (Penn. 1922) ....................................................................................................24
Scandlyn v. McDill Columbus Corp.,
895 S.W.2d 342 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) ..............................................................................67
Scotch Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co.,
958 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1992) ..............................................................................................29
Season Comfort Corp. v. Ben A. Borenstein Co.,
655 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) .................................................................................68
Seely v. White Motor Co.,
403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. 1965).........................................................................63
Service Road Corp. v. Quinns,
698 A.2d 258 (Conn. 1997)..................................................................................................9
Sevin v. Kelshaw,
611 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Super. 1992)........................................................................................23
Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986)...............................................................................................63
Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
714 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App.1986)..................................................................................63
Sharrard, McGee & Co., Suz’s Software, Inc.,
396 S.E.2d 815 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) .................................................................................52

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Page(s)

Shover v. Cordis Co.,

574 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio 1991) ..............................................................................................44
Silk v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
760 P.2d 174 (Okla. 1988) .................................................................................................21
Skelton v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
500 F. Supp. 1181 (N.D. Ill. 1980) , rev’d on other grounds, 660 F.2d 311
(7th Cir. 1981) ...................................................................................................................47
Slocum v. Daigre,
424 So. 2d 1074 (La. Ct. App. 1982)..................................................................................68
Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc.,
252 A.D. 2d 1, 679 N.Y.S.2d 593(App. Div. 1998) ............................................................17
Smith v. Porsche Cars of N. Am., Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 87-5612, 1989 WL 1780 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 1989) ...........................................57
Smith v. Prime Cable,
658 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) .................................................................................13
Sproles v. Simpson Fence Co.,
649 N.E.2d 1297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) ..............................................................................19
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. R.V. World, Inc.,
577 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) ..................................................................................51
State ex rel. Nixon v. Telco Directory Publ’g,
863 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1993)...............................................................................................30
State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell,
442 P.2d 215 (Or.1968)......................................................................................................51
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
736 So.2d 384 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ...........................................................................62, 63
Stevenson v. TRW Inc.,
987 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1993) ..............................................................................................55
Suburban Transfer Serv., Inc. v. Beech Holdings, Inc.,
716 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1983) ...............................................................................................67
Suffolk Laundry Servs., Inc. v. Redux Corp.,
656 N.Y.S.2d 372 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).............................................................................63
Swindell v. Crowson,
712 So.2d 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)..........................................................................10
T.W.M. & S.N. v. American Med. Sys. Inc.,
886 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Fla. 1995)......................................................................................50
Taterka v. Ford Motor Co.,
271 N.W. 2d 653 (Wis. 1978).............................................................................................37
Taylor v. Wachtler,
825 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Pa. 1993).........................................................................................24

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Thompson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,

971 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Miss. 1997) ...................................................................................16
Tillman v. Davidson,
501 So. 2d 1067 (La. Ct. App. 1987)..................................................................................49
Tinlee Enter., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
834 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) .....................................................................................18
Tokar v. Crestwood Imports, Inc.,
532 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. 1988) ...................................................................................37, 50
Tucker v. Whitaker Travel, Ltd.,
620 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1985) .......................................................................................23
Tylka v. Gerber Prods.,
182 F.R.D. 573, 576-78 (N.D. Ill. 1998)...............................................................................2
Unique Coupons, Inc. v. Northfield Corp.,
No. 99 C 7445, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6767 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2000).................................2
United Textile Workers of America v. Lear Siegler Seating Corp.,
825 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) ................................................................................64
Universal Coach, Inc. v. New York City Transit Authority,
629 N.E.2d 28 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) ..................................................................................19
Vardaman v. Florence City Bd. of Educ.,
544 So. 2d 962 (Ala. 1989) ................................................................................................66
Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp.,
987 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1993) ..............................................................................................35
Verb v. Motorola, Inc.,
672 N.E.2d 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) ...........................................................................13, 60
Vidensek v. Ford Motor Co.,
1992 WL 393171 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1992) ...............................................................51
Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes,
808 P.2d 649 (Okla. 1990) .................................................................................................63
Walker Truck Contractors, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co.,
405 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) ...................................................................................52
Walls v. American Tobacco Co.,
11 P.3d 626 (Okla. 2000) ...................................................................................................20
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.,
588 F. Supp. 1513 (D.D.C. 1984), opinion amended on other grounds, 592 F.
Supp. 1359 (D.D.C 1984), order amended on other grounds, 612 F. Supp. 983
(D.D.C. 1985) ........................................................................... 35, 36, 37, 48, 49, 50, 51, 59
Walsh, 807 F.2d at 1012...........................................................................................................59
Ward v. Ernst & Young,
435 S.E.2d 628 (Va. 1993) .................................................................................................65

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Weaver v. Chrysler Corp.,

172 F.R.D. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ..........................................................................................17
Webb v. Webb,
No. HC-970-4, 1995 Va. Cir. LEXIS 1088 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 1995) ...............................67
Weinberg v. Sun Co.,
740 A.2d 1152 (Pa. Super. 1999)........................................................................................22
Wellcraft Marine Div. Of Genmar Indus., Inc. v. Zarzour,
577 So. 2d 414 (Ala. 1990) ..........................................................................................49, 63
Wiernik v. PHH U.S. Mortgage Corp.,
736 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)....................................................................................69
Wilkins v. Hogan Drilling Co.,
471 So. 2d 863 (La. Ct. App. 1985)....................................................................................66
Williams v. Mozark Fire Extinguisher Co.,
888 S.W.2d 303 (Ark. 1994) ..............................................................................................41
Zeeman v. Black,
273 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).................................................................................. 28
Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp.,
561 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1983) .......................................................................................23

STATUTES
12A Okl. St. Ann. § 2-607(3)(a)...............................................................................................41
13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2316.................................................................................................54
13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2607(c)(1) ........................................................................................41
15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq............................................................................................................58
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). ...........................................................................................................60
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-1 et seq. .............................................................................................21
73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2 .................................................................................................3, 22
810 ILCS 5/2-316 ....................................................................................................................55
810 ILCS 5/2-725 ....................................................................................................................42
810 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-607(3)(a) ............................................................................................41
815 ILCS 505/1 .......................................................................................................................12
815 ILCS 505/10 .....................................................................................................................12
A.R.S. § 47-2316(2)(B)............................................................................................................55
Ala. Code § 7-2-316(2) ............................................................................................................55
Ala. Code § 7-2-607(3)(a)........................................................................................................41
Ala. Code § 8-19-3 ....................................................................................................................5

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Ala. Code § 8-19-10...........................................................................................................3, 5, 6

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 47-2607(C)(1) ..............................................................................................41
Ark. Code § 4-2-607(3)(a) .......................................................................................................41
Ark. Code Ann. § 85-2-316......................................................................................................54
Ark. Rev. Stat. § 4-88-113 .........................................................................................................7
Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. .....................................................................................................8
Cal. Civ. Code § 1761................................................................................................................8
Cal. Civ. Code § 1770................................................................................................................4
Cal. Civ. Code § 1780........................................................................................................4, 8, 9
Cal. Civ. Code § 1781................................................................................................................9
Cal. Civ. Code. § 1782...............................................................................................................9
Cal. Com. Code § 2607(3) .......................................................................................................41
Cal. U. Com. Code § 2316 .......................................................................................................55
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-316........................................................................................................55
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-2-607(3)(a)...............................................................................................41
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101 et seq..............................................................................................27
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110 et seq. .........................................................................................9, 10
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-316(2) et seq...............................................................................41, 55
Fla. Stat. § 95.031....................................................................................................................69
Fla. Stat. § 95.11.......................................................................................................... 11, 41, 68
Fla. Stat. § 501.204 ............................................................................................................10, 11
Fla. Stat. § 501.211 ............................................................................................................10, 11
Fla. Stat. § 672.316 ..................................................................................................................55
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(2)(b) ....................................................................................................42
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 672.607(3)(a).................................................................................................41
Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-316 .......................................................................................................55
Ga. Code Ann. § 11-2-607 (3)(a) .............................................................................................41
Ga. Code Ann. §10-1-390 et seq. .............................................................................................28
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2520, 2532....................................................................................44, 57
La. Civ. Code art. 2298 (Lexis 2000) .......................................................................................68
La. R.S. 51:1409 ......................................................................................................................14
Mass. Ann. Law ch. 106 § 2-316..............................................................................................55
Mass. Gen. Law ch. 106 § 2-607(3)(a) .....................................................................................41

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Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93A § 9 ....................................................................................................14

Mass. Gen. Law ch. 93A, §§ 9, 11 ...........................................................................................15
Md. Code Ann. Com. Law § 2-607(3)(a) .................................................................................41
Md. Code Ann. Com. Law §2-316.1 ........................................................................................55
Md. Com. Law Code § 13-408.................................................................................................29
Md. Com. Law Code § 13-101.................................................................................................29
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-315.1 .................................................................................................55
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-13 ....................................................................................................16
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-24-15(1) et seq. ......................................................................... 15, 16, 17
Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-607(3)(a) ...........................................................................................41
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-316 ......................................................................................................55
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-607(3)(a)..............................................................................................41
Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 et seq..............................................................................................29
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-316......................................................................................................55
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-2-607(3)(a)..............................................................................................41
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16............................................................................................................31
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-316 .....................................................................................................55
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-607(3)(a) ............................................................................................41
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19..........................................................................................................30
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349, 350 ...............................................................................................4
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 et seq. ................................................................................ 16, 17, 18
N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-316 .................................................................................................................55
N.Y.U.C.C. Law § 2-607(3)(a).................................................................................................41
Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.65(C)(1) .............................................................................................41
Ohio Rev. Code § 1302.98.......................................................................................................43
Ohio Rev. Code § 1345........................................................................................................4, 19
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2305.15; 2305.16 ......................................................................................44
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1302.29 ..............................................................................................54
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01 et seq......................................................................... 18, 19, 20
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.07 ..............................................................................................70
Okla. Stat. § 15-761 .................................................................................................................20
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 2-316.............................................................................................54
Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 751 et seq..................................................................................................20

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Or. Rev. Stat. § 72.3160...........................................................................................................54

Or. Rev. Stat. 72.6070(3)(a).....................................................................................................41
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605 et seq. ................................................................................................21
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638...........................................................................................................21
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-316 ......................................................................................................55
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1.1 et seq. .............................................................................................31
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-607(3)(a) .............................................................................................41
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-34-104..................................................................................................52
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-316....................................................................................................55
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-607(3)(a) ...........................................................................................41
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101 et seq. .......................................................................................32
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 2.607(c)(1)......................................................................................41
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §17.50 ..................................................................................... 3, 24, 25
Tex. Bus & Com. Code Ann. § 2.316.......................................................................................54
Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.41 et seq. .....................................................................24, 25
U.C.C. § 2-302.........................................................................................................................54
U.C.C. § 2-313...................................................................................................................33, 40
U.C.C. § 2-314.........................................................................................................................47
U.C.C. § 2-316...................................................................................................................54, 55
U.C.C. § 2-607....................................................................................................... 34, 40, 41, 55
U.C.C. § 2-725.........................................................................................................................42
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-1 et seq. ............................................................................................33
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-316 ..................................................................................................55
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-607(3)(a)..........................................................................................41
Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-196 et seq..............................................................................................33
Va. Code Ann. § 8.2-316 .........................................................................................................55
Va. Code Ann. § 8.2-607(3)(a).................................................................................................41
W. Va. Code § 46-2-316; ........................................................................................................54
W. Va. Code § 46A-6-102 .......................................................................................................25
W. Va. Code § 46A-6-106 .......................................................................................................25
W.Va. Code § 46-2-607 (3)(a) .................................................................................................41

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OTHER AUTHORITIES
1 James J. White & Robert S. Summers, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7 (4th
ed. 1995)................................................................................................................ 46, 54, 55
Senate Comm. on Commerce, S. Rep. No. 151, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973)......................59

RULES
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) .......................................................................................................... 1, 2, 15
Rule 56 ....................................................................................................................................35
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