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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS

Table of Contents
RULE 110
People v. Dimaano
SASOT vs. People
Lasoy v. Zenarosa
People v. Batin
People vs Cachapero
SALUDAGA v SANDIGANBAYAN
Pacoy vs. Cajigal
Bonifacio v. RTC
Cabo v. Sandiganbayan
Ramiscal v Sandiganbayan
Luis Panaguiton Jr. v DOJ
PEOPLE vs. ROMUALDEZ
PINOTE V. AYCO
Bureau of Customs v. Sherman
Flores vs Gonzales
Rule 111
Bun Tiong v. Balboa
Simon v. Chan
ASILO, JR. v. PEOPLE

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
PEOPLE v. BAYOT
PEOPLE v TIRSO VELASCO
Ching v. Nicdao
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION v. JANIOLA
Pimentel v. Pimentel

RULE 110

People v. Dimaano
Doctrines:

- What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged, these being mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited

- The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged

- . The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

Facts:

-On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with 2 counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape

- The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is quoted as follows:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of
the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by
reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [34]

-Edgardo Dimaano now questions the sufficiency of the information

Issue:

W/N the complaint for attempted rape is sufficient

Held: No

- For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

- What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited

- The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in
the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes

- The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts
that constitute the offense.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
- The above-cited complaint upon which the Dimaano was arraigned does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of
the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The
allegation therein that the Dimaanot 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a
complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents
the Court from rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise it would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against him.

- Edgardo Dimaano is therefore acquitted for the crime of attempted rape, as the complaint is insufficient

- He is convicted however, for the two counts of rape, as the information therein is sufficient.

SASOT vs. People


G.R. No. 143193. June 29, 2005Austria-Martinez

PETITIONER: Melbarose R. Sasot and Allandale R. Sasot

RESPONDENT: People of the Philippines, the honorable Court of Appeals, and Rebecca G. Salvador, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 1, Manila

Summary: An information was filed against Sasot for possible violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on unfair competition. Sasot filed for motion to
quash the information on the grounds that there was no offense as the NBA Properties Inc. is a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines and could therefore have no standing to sue. Sasot’s Motion to Quash Information was denied by RTC and CA, hence this certiorari.
SC held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.

FACTS:

In May 1997, the NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners for possible
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair competition. In the NBI Report it is stated that NBA Properties, Inc., is a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of the United States of America, and is the registered owner of NBA trademarks and names of NBA
basketball teams. The Report further stated that during the investigation, it was discovered that petitioners are engaged in the manufacture,

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit “NBA” garment products. Hence, it recommended petitioners’ prosecution for unfair competition
under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code.

In a SPA dated October 7, 1997, Rick Welts, as President of NBA Properties, Inc., constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro,
Odulio, Calma & Carbonell, as the company’s attorney-in-fact, and to act for and on behalf of the company, in the filing of criminal, civil and
administrative complaints, among others.

Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against petitioners for violation of Article 189
of the RPC, but before the arraignment Sasot filed a Motion to Quash the Information contending that the complainant is a foreign corporation
not doing business in the Philippines and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered pantentee. Sasot also averred
that they have been using the business name “ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC” since 1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be
similar to complainant’s, and they do not use complainant’s logo or design.

The motion to quash was dismissed by the RTC. Sasot then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but it was also dismissed,
as according to the CA it was not the proper remedy in assailing a denial of a motion to quash. Hence this special action for certiorari under Rule
45 of the ROC.

Issues:

Is a special civil action for certiorari the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information?

Held:

NO. The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information.

The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they
should have gone to trial and reiterate the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case such that immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari should be permitted.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were
committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, and nowhere is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed
before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.

A complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit
and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

Notes:

● Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure grounds for quashing an information:

a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;

c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses;

f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.

● Even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not
affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
● Also cited in this case is La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez which is similar to the present case where it was held that if prosecution
follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the
name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an
act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to
sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to
escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.

Lasoy v. Zenarosa
G.R. 129472 April 12, 2005

Memory Aid: Amending Information. Requirements of a valid Information. Double jeopardy.

Facts:

An Information was filed against the accused for unlawfully selling a total of 42.410 grams of marijuana. On arraignment, they entered a
plea of guilty and were subsequently convicted. They then applied for probation. The prosecutor’s office filed two separate motions: (1) To
admit the amended information and (2) to set aside the arraignment of the accused. The amended information changed the weight from grams
to kilos. The prosecutor avers that for failing to reflect the true quantity of the drugs caught in the possession of the accused, the first
information is invalid. The accused filed a motion to quash but the trial court denied the motion and scheduled arraignment under the amended
information

At the Trial Court level: The accused insisted on the validity of the first Information and invoke the defense of double jeopardy. The
prosecutor on the other hand maintained that the first Information was invalid because the accused “participated and acquiesced to the
tampering” and therefore the accused lacked one of the requisites to invoke double jeopardy (i.e. valid Information and valid prior proceedings).
On these grounds the trial court denied the motion to quash.

The SC disagrees with the TC.

Issue:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
1. Whether or not the first information is valid – YES
2. Whether or not double jeopardy attaches – YES

Held:

1. An Information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is
meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. The
first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. The Information also complies
with the requirements set down in Rule 110, section 6.1
2. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court
has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies procedural rules (see Rule 110, sec. 14)2, the
decision having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.

The Constitution, in Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In
this case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were
applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again
accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

1
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed.

2
Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when the accused
had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.

People v. Batin
G.R. No. 177223 November 28, 2007

Facts:

The Information2[2] against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 11 April 1995, alleging
as follows:

“That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery,
taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.”

Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty.

Castor prays that he be held liable for the crime of homicide only, arguing that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
sufficiently stated in the Information.

Issue:

W/N the allegation of treachery in the information was sufficient – Yes

Held:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Yes. Castor claims that this charge does not allege the specific treacherous acts of the accused. According to Castor, the allegation
therein that the accused “with treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence” is a mere conclusion of law by the one who drafted
the said Information.

Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate
facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.

People vs Cachapero
Gr 153008

Time is not an essential element of rape. An information that states the approximate rather than the precise time it was committed is
sufficient in form. Any perceived formal defect in the information must be raised before arraignment, either through a bill of particulars or a
motion to quash; otherwise, objection to such defect shall be considered waived.

Facts:

Petitioner:

Sometime in March 1998, Anna Toledo, 7 years old, went to play with Lorena and Dino Capachero at a nearby house in Tarlac. During
that occasion, Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her lie down and inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. Larry told her not
to tell her parents because he might be scolded. On September 2,1998, it was only then when witness, Teacher conchita Donato, was informed
by one of her students Jocelyn Meseses about abuse of “manong larry”. When Donato confronted Lorena, the latter admitted to the rape.

Defense:

He couldn’t have raped her because he was in their house together with his father and mother.

He was convicted by the RTC.

Affirmed by the CA.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Basis testimony coming from an innocent child like the victim was credible and sufficient to convict appellant of rape, more so because
the testimony was supported by medical findings.

Hence, this appeal

Issues:

1) Was the information sufficient?

2) Was Evidence Sufficient?

Held:

1) Yes

2) Yes

Ratio

1) Contending that time is a material ingredient of rape, appellant argues that the Information stating a mere approximation of “sometime in
March 1998" was fatally defective for failing to state the precise hour when the crime was committed. Such infirmity, he added, jeopardized his
right to be properly informed of the charge against him. This will not prosper.

The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. This being so, its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint
or information. Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:

"SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission."

Being reasonably definite and certain, the approximation sufficiently meets the requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 110
of the Rules of Court merely requires that the information must state, among others, the approximate time of the commission of the offense.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Also, this cannot be raised for the first time during appeal.

2) It is well-established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of
an innocent child whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public
trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in the
absence of proof of ill motive. While there are inconsistencies in her testimony, one cannot expect a child to hold up to the same standard as an
adult. Also, the trial court’s findings should be given great respect.

Final note:

Exemplary damages may be given only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during the
trial. In the present case, there are no such circumstances which is why it was removed by the SC.

SALUDAGA v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

The two accused were the Mayor and policeman of Samar, respectively. The information charged them for violating Section 3(e) of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by causing undue injury to the government for entering into a “pakyaw contract” for day care centers each
in the amount of P48,500 or a total amount of P97,000, w/o conducting a public bidding, and awarding the contracts to Olimpio Lengua, a non-
licensed contractor and non-accredited NGO.

The Sandiganbayan then dismissed the info cos it does not allege the amount of actual damages (it was deemed as an essential element
of the crime). The Ombudsman told the OSP to amend the info and refile it with the SB. The OSP refilled the info. The amended info now charged
them for violating Section 3(e) of the Anti Graft Corrupt Practices Act by giving unwarranted benefit or advantage to Olimpio Lengue, a non
licensed contractor and non accredited NGO by entering into a “pakyaw contract” for day care centers each in the amount of P48,500 or a total
amount of P97,000, w/o conducting a public bidding.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Accused said that the SB failed to conduct a new preliminary investigation. Law states that a new preliminary information is needed cos
nd
the 2 information charged a different offense. Accused said that there was a substitution of the first information. They also argued that even if
there was no substitution, there was a substantial amendment in the 2nd information that should have warranted a new preliminary
investigation before it was submitted (Essentially, sabi lang dito, since the 2nd info imputes a new offense, there should be a new preliminary
investigation before the 2nd info was filed).

SB said there is no substitution or substantial amendment →The 2nd information did not change the offense – it only changed the
mode/manner by which the accused committed the offense.

ISSUE:

1. w/n there was substitution

2. w/n there was substantial amendment

HELD:

1. NO. SC said that the 2nd information did not change the offense – it only changed the mode/manner by which the accused committed the
offense. No new allegations were made. There were no new evidences. The essential elements of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act are the ff:

1 The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, OR giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions

The disjunctive term “OR” means that either act qualifies as a violation of Sec. 3(e) → there are TWO different modes of committing the
offense. The accused may be charged by either one or both modes.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
2. NO. The first and second information are both based on the same transaction (entering into a Pakyaw contract w/o Public Bidding). The
evidence for the prosecution and defense remain the same. The facts constituting the offense were not altered. Also, the first information was
already dismissed; thus, there was nothing more to amend.

NOTE: 1. The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the re-filing of the Information or by the filing of a new
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily included therein.

→ General Rule: No new preliminary investigation is needed for the refilling and filing.

EXCEPT:

1. After the provisional dismissal of the case, the witnesses recanted, died, or no longer available AND new witnesses have emerged

2. new/other persons are charged

3. original charge has been upgraded

4. the criminal liability of the accused has been upgraded from accessory to principal

Pacoy vs. Cajigal


Ssgt. Pacoy – Petitioner

Judge Cajigal - Respondent

FACTS:

- Petition Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the orders of Judge Cajigal of RTC Tarlac

- Pacoy was charged with Homicide in the RTC; Information read:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
o That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita
multiple gunshot wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death. With the aggravating circumstance of killing,
2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.

- September 12, 2002: PLEADED NOT GUILTY

o But, ON THE SAME DAY and after the arraignment, Judge Cajigal issued SEPTEMBER 12, 2002 Order directing the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
alleged in the Information which the Judge registered as having qualified the crime to Murder

- The prosecutor then entered his amendment by crossing out the word “Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the
caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information.

o The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the
spelling of the victim’s name from “Escuita” to “Escueta.”

- On the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder.

o Pacoy objected and said he would be placed in Double Jeopardy as the Homicide case had been terminated without his
express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case and amounting to his acquittal.

o As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of
not guilty.

- Pacoy thereafter filed a Motion to Quash (information charging him with murder) on the ground of double jeopardy.

- Judge denied Motion to Quash.

o Ruled that there was no conviction or acquittal since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before
trial commenced (no termination)

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
o The Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken thereon; and that
with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of “disregard of rank,” the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.

- Pacoy filed Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration

o Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was SUBSTANTIAL; and under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been
arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.

- Motion to inhibit denied; Motion for Reconsideration GRANTED and ordered the change (again) from Murder to Homicide

o Disregard of rank does not qualify homicide to murder

- Pacoy filed this Petition for Certiorari:

o Even after he entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the Judge ordered the amendment of the Information
from Homicide to Murder in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;

o Disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed and does not
qualify the offense into a more serious crime

o Even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is not
allowed after petitioner has entered his plea

o There was GAD when the Judge denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original
Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same
offense would place him in double jeopardy.

o Although the MR was granted, it wasn’t really granted since prayer was for the judge to grant the Motion to Quash the
Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy without reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the
dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double jeopardy

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
- Solicitor General argues that Pacoy confuses amendment with substitution of Information and that the Order dated September 12,
2002 mandated an amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 which do not entail dismissal or termination
of the previous case.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Judge acted with GADALEJ in AMENDING THE INFORMATION after the petitioner already pleaded not guilty to Homicide – NO

2. W/N Motion to Quash should be granted as Pacoy was “placed in double jeopardy” by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder and
then from Murder back to - NO

HELD: NO GADALEJ; Petition for Certiorari dismissed

1. NO GADALEJ in ordering the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder even after plea because it was purely a FORMAL
AMENDMENT (not substantial amendment) and it DID NOT adversely affect any substantial right

- While the information was amended to murder, it was merely a FORMAL AMENDMENT as the only change made was in the caption of
the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word “Homicide” and its replacement
by the word “Murder.”

o There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court.
The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for
Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
- Must differentiate between amendment and substitution under Sec 14 Rule 110

AMENDMENT OF SUBSTITUTION OF
INFORMATION/COMPLAINT INFORMATION/COMPLAINT

1. Refers to First Paragraph 1. Refers to Third


Paragraph

2. May be made before or 2. May be made before or


after the defendant after the defendant
pleas pleas

3. Either formal or 3. Necessarily involves a


substantial changes substantial change from
the original charges

4. Amendment before plea 4. Substitution of


has been entered CAN information must be
BE effected without with leave of court as
leave of court the original information
has to be dismissed

5. Where the amendment 5. Another preliminary


is only as to form, there investigation is entailed
is no need for another and the accused has to
preliminary plead anew to the new
investigation and the information
retaking of the plea of
the accused

6. Refers to the same 6. Requires or presupposes

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
offense charged in the that the new
original information or information involves a
to an offense which different offense which
necessarily includes or does not include or is
is necessarily included not necessarily included
in the original charge, in the original charge,
hence substantial hence the accused
amendments to the cannot claim double
information after the jeopardy
plea has been taken
cannot be made over
the objection of the
accused, for if the
original information
would be withdrawn,
the accused could
invoke double jeopardy

o To differentiate, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order

▪ There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is
an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in
the first information.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
▪ In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients
of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be
necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting
the latter.

- Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary
that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.

o The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information.

o Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original Information
for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to
the rights or defense of petitioner.

2. NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY because the first jeopardy DID NOT ATTACH (no conviction or acquittal or dismissal without the express consent);
Judge’s correction by reinstating the original Information for Homicide was proper.

- Double Jeopardy is among the grounds for a Motion to Quash (Sec 3 Rule 117)

o Elements:

▪ a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; attaches only when

● after a valid indictment

● before a competent court

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
● after arraignment

● when a valid plea has been entered

● when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent

▪ the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;

▪ a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.

o It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same
offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

- Judge’s ORDER was for the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but NOT TO DISMISS the same upon the filing of a new
Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 (Order was for AMENDMENT
NOT SUBSTITUTION)

o The judge only ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. Homicide is
necessarily included in murder; It was SAME original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word “Homicide”
and writing the word “Murder,” instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

▪ Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Sec 7 Rule 117 presupposes a definite or unconditional dismissal, which
terminates the case. And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal. (not
present in this case)

▪ The last paragraph (SUBSTITUTION) of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly different from
the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the
proper offense. (see No. 6 in table – in this case, homicide is not “wholly different” from murder)

▪ Section 14, Rule 110 does not apply to A SECOND INFORMATION, which involves the same offense or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information (only an AMENDMENT).

● The offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.

Bonifacio v. RTC
May 5, 2010

J. Carpio-Morales

Petitioners: Winona M. Bonifacio, Jocelyn Upano, Vicente Oruoste and Jovencio Pereche, Sr.

Respondents: Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, and Jessie John Gimenez

Note: We already discussed this before. Main issue now is amended information.

RECIT-READY VERSION:

Upon a complaint by Jessie John Gimenez, 13 Informations for libel were filed with the Makati RTC against officers, trustees, and a member of
the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc (PEPCI) and the administrator of www.pepcoalition.com. The Informations alleged that the accused
maliciously published (in a forum for planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc.) defamatory articles against the Yuchengco Family (owner of Pacific Plans)
and Malayan Insurance. The RTC allowed the prosecution to amend the Information to show that the website was “accessible in Makati City”
and the defamatory article “was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.” The Supreme Court held that the
Amended Information was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in Makati and the RTC gravely abused its discretion in admitting such. Also, since the
case involves pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel, the petitioners did not violate the rule on hierarchy of
courts by filing the petition directly with the Supreme Court.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
FACTS:

● On behalf of the Yuchengco Family (particularly former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee and of the Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc.), Jessie John Gimenez filed a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the RPC
against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI),
John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste,
Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member
of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com, before the Makati
City Prosecutor’s Office.

● The website www.pepcoalition.com provides a forum for planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. – owned by the Yuchengco Group of
Companies – to seek redress for being able to collect under their pre-need educational plans after PPI filed for corporate rehabilitation
with prayer for suspension of payments, due to liquidity concerns.

● The Informations alleged that the accused, holding legal title to the said website, maliciously published on August 25, 2005 the following
defamatory article against the Yuchengco Family and Malayan: “Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang
mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready
for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x”

● However, on appeal, the Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of the Informations for lack of probable cause, opining that the
crime of “internet libel” was not existent.

● On motion of the accused, the RTC, albeit finding probable cause, quashed the Informations for failure to allege that the offended
parties were actually residing in Makati at the time the offense was committed as in face they listed their address in Manila, or to allege
that the article was printed and first published in Makati.

● The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that even assuming the Information was deficient, it merely needed a formal
amendment.

● The RTC granted the motion and ordered the prosecution to amend the Information to cure the defect of improper venue.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
● The prosecution amended the Information to show that the website was “accessible in Makati City” and the defamatory article “was
first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.”

● After the RTC admitted the Amended Information, several of the accused (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Supreme Court faulting the RTC.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the Amended Information - YES

RULING:

(1) The Amended Information was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in Makati.

For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise
accessed or capable of being accessed. To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners’ website
in Makati with “printing and first publication” would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and
prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or
anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly
accessed the offending website.

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended Information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and
DISMISS the case.

Cabo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. 169509 16 June 2006 J. Ynares-Santiago

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
JOCELYN E. CABO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FOURTH DIVISION, THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGION
XIII, Respondents.

SUMMARY/MEMORY AID:

- Conditional arraignment of Cabo, amendment of information after conditional arraignment, charged with offense under Section 3(b) of
RA 3019

FACTS:

Balahay was Municipal Mayor of Barobo Surigao Del Sur and charged with violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. Information was filed
with Sandiganbayan, where Cabo was likewise impleaded for having given the money in controversy / for being the person who benefited from
the advantage given by Balahay. Cabo was Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDCI).

Cabo filed Motion for Reinvestigation claiming that notice was not given notice or opportunity to file counter-affidavits with regard to
offenses brought against her. Cabo sought Sandiganbayan’s permission to travel abroad and was allowed – she was conditionally arraigned
before departing and pleaded ‘not guilty.

Upon her return it was found that probable cause existed to charge her with violation of offense under RA 3019. Arraignment was
scheduled. Cabo filed Urgent Manifestation with Motion praying that she just be allowed to reiterate her plea of ‘not guilty’ made during
conditional arraignment so she would no longer have to attend scheduled arraignment. SB did not act on it. Balahay did not appear for
arraignment. Warrant was issued then recalled upon Balahay’s motion for recon. ‘Balahay, through counsel, filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense. In other words, the information failed to allege that Balahay had to
intervene in the said contract under the law, in his official capacity as municipal mayor.’ SB did not grant motion to quash; instead, information
should be amended under Sec. 4, Rule 117 of ROC.

New info reads: ‘That on or about 08 August 2000, in the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused BONIFACIO C. BALAHAY, then Mayor of the Municipality of Barobo, Surigao Del Sur, a high

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
ranking public official, in the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave abuse of authority, and
committing the offense in relation to his office, conspiring and confederating with JOCELYN CABO, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously receive and accept the amount of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO PESOS AND 31/100 (P104,162.31) for
his own benefit or use from said JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. (OIDC), a consultancy
group charged with conducting a feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource Management Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with
accused Cabo giving and granting said amount to accused Balahay in consideration of the contract for said feasibility study, which contract
accused Balahay in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.’ (Original text)

Cabo claimed that she can no longer be re-arraigned bec info did not include her. SB denied Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment.
‘[T]he arraignment of accused Cabo on the original information was only conditional in nature and that the same was resorted to as a mere
accommodation in her favor to enable her to travel abroad without this Court losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in the event she
decides to abscond. However, as clearly stated in the Court’s Order of May 14, 2004, accused Cabo agreed with the condition that should there
be a need to amend the information, she would thereby waive, not only her right to object to the amended information, but also her
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.’

ISSUE/S:

W/N double jeopardy would attach on the basis of the "not guilty" plea entered by petitioner on the original information.

HELD:

NO. Conditional arraignment not even provided for in Rules of Procedure. Sb did not rule on her manifestation to reiterate her plea in
conditional arraignment; under Sec 1(b) of Rule 116, "(t)he accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea."
Original info to which Cabo was cond. Arraigned was neither valid nor effective bec. certain elements of the crime were not present in
information. When info was amended, however, nature of crime was not changed. It only became more effective because it correctly alleged
that Balahay took money from Cabo for his own use and that such was for Cabo’s advantage.

The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when petitioner’s co-accused filed a motion to quash the original
information on the ground that the same does not charge an offense. Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the original information can be cured
by amendment even after she had pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters of form and not
of substance. The amendment ordered by the Sandiganbayan did not violate the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which provides:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.’

Likewise, it is not necessary, as petitioner suggests, to dismiss the original complaint under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110,
which states: If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

The afore-cited rule is inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple reason that there was no mistake in charging the proper offense in
the original information. ‘

SB did not commit GAD. Cabo’s rights against double jeopardy not violated. Requisites 1 & 4 are missing.

Note: 4 Requisites of Double Jeopardy (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the
accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.

Ramiscal v Sandiganbayan
GR 140576 J. Calleja Sr.

Petitioner: Jose Ramiscal Jr.

Repsondent: Sandiganbayan, Albano and Associates and Association of Generals and Flag Officers

Facts:

AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFPRSB) is a GOCC created under PD 361. It is established to guarantee continuous
financial support for AFP Retirement System. Its funds are in the nature of PUBLIC FUNDS.

Cong. Antonino filed a complaint-affidavit with Office of the OMBUDSMAN for Mindanao. She alleged that there were anomalous
transactions involving the AFPRSB regarding the Magsaysay Park in General Santos City. She requested the Ombudsman to investigate Retired

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Brig. Gen. Ramsical then President of the AFP-RSBS together with 27 others for conspiracy in misappropriating AFPRSBS funds and in
DEFRAUDING the GOVERNMENT in CAPITAL GAINS and STAMP TAXES.

24 informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan by the Special Prosecutor as approved by the Ombudsman. 24 informations were filed.
The first twelve involved the act of using a FALSIFIED DEED of SALE as basis for Payment of CAPITAL GAINS and DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAXES
(Instead of P524,000 and P157,000 paid respectively, it was only P299,700 and P89,910) amounting to violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The 2nd set involved the act of falsifying public documents--making it appear that the land was sold at only P3k per
square meter when the actual price was P10.5k per square meter.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the informations and to defer issuance of warrant of arrest for want of jurisdiction. While pending
resolution of the motions, Albano and Associates filed a NOTICE of APPEARANCE as private prosecutors in all cases for the Association of
Generals and Flag Officers. It was made by a letter request of Commodore Aparri and Gen. Navarro. Petitioner opposed the appearance of the
law firm contending that the charges were public in character and do not involve any damage or injury to any private party. In the comment of
the law firm, Commodore Aparri and Navarro were members of the AFGOI and contributors of the AFPRSBS. As scuh, they have been
disadvantaged or deprived of their investments. They allege that they have the right pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

The Sandiganbayan in a resolution denied Ramiscal’s plea for the denial of the appearance of the law firm. It ruled that the two flag
officers as members of the AFP RSBS may be affected by resolution of the case. Moreover, their appearance is subject to the DIRECT
SUPERVISION of the PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.

Issue/s:

W/N the subject criminal indictments give rise to civil liability in favor of a private party? W/N AGFOI represented by ALBANO and ASSOC are
private injured parties entitled to intervene as private prosecutors in subject cases?

Ruling: No. It cannot be allowed.

The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private prosecutors upon the request of Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro.
The law firm was not engaged by the AFGOI itself. Nor it was engaged on behalf of the other retired generals and other star ranked officers.
Moreover, there is no showing of any board resolution by the AFGOI engaging the services of the law firm.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Petitioner states that it can intervene as provided according to Rule 110, Sec. 16 of Crim Pro which states: “Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense”. However, the court ruled that the AGFOI and even Commodore Aparri are not the offended parties as contemplated by the law.
As provided in Section 5 of Rule 110 of Crim Pro, “All criminal actions covered by a complaint of information shall be prosecuted under the direct
supervision and control of the public prosecutor”. Thus, the civil action for recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts are impliedly
instituted and the offended party has not waived the civil action—the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the
control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. A separate action will only prove to be costly
and burdensome for both parties and may delay the final disposition of the case.

The sole purpose of the civil action is for the indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the felonious act. Assertion of the right to intervene is not a matter of tolerance. The government or GOCCs can be the offended party
entitled for restitution of properties or indemnification. In case of a private party, the offended party must be actually or directly injured by the
acts imputed. It must not be a mere expectancy or inconsequential.

In this case, the nature of funds is public. The funds belong to the AFP-RSBS. Any interest of the members is merely inchoate and
incidental. AFP-RSBS has a separate juridical personality separate and independent of its members. With this it is proven that the offended party
is the government. The informations filed prove that acts allegedly deprived the government of the CAPITAL GAINS and DOCUMENTARY STAMP
taxes. The AFGOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes charged. As to the 12 information of falsification of public
document, the subject of the felony is public document. The existence of any prejudice caused to the third person or the intent to cause
damage at the very least is immaterial. The government is the offended party in the first act and subject to indemnification. In the second act,
there can be no civil liability.

Luis Panaguiton Jr. v DOJ


GR 167571 J. Tinga

Petitioner: Luis Panaguiton Jr.

Respondent: Department of Justice, Ramon Tongson and Rodrigo Cawili

Facts:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Cawili borrowedP1.9 M from Panaguiton Jr. On January 8, 1993, Cawili and Tongson issued three checks in payment of the said loans.
Upon presentment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored. On August 24 1995, petitioner filed a complaint and Tongson and Cawili
before the QC Prosecutor’s office. During the preliminary investigation, Tongson said that he had been unjustly included as party respondent. In
fact, he himself had filed several claims against Cawili for violation of BP 22. Panaguiton, to counter, presented documents showing Tongson’s
signatures which looked similar to those on the checks.

In a resolution, the prosecutor found probable cause against Cawili but dismissed those against Tongson. Panaguiton appealed before
the DOJ regarding the dismissal of the charges. In 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to sign the checks the Chief State
Prosecutor directed the prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation.

On 15 March 1999, Asst Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson as the case had already prescribed pursuant to
Act No. 3326 which provides that violations of BP22 shall prescribe after 4 years. According to her, the 4 year period started on the date the
checks were dishonored 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the prescriptive
period.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ through Undersecretary Teehankee who affirmed the decision of the prosecutor. Upon a motion for
reconsideration filed on April 2003, Undersecretary Gutierrez reversed the decision and said that the offense had not prescribed. However, in a
resolution in August 2004, the DOJ reversed itself again and said that the offense had already prescribed. It stated that BP 22 as a special act
does not provide for a prescriptive period. Hence, Act No. 3326 applies to it. Since the information was not filed in the court, the prescriptive
period had not prescribed.

Petitioner appealed to the CA but to no avail. Hence this petition.

Issue:

W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition and ruled that the offense had already prescribed

Ruling: Petition is meritorious. The offense had not prescribed.

Petitioner assails the DOJ’s reliance on Zaldivia v Reyes which involved a violation of a municipal ordinance and declaring that the
prescriptive period is TOLLED ONLY upon FILING THE INFORMATION in COURT. Petitioner asserts that Ingco v Sandiganbayan should be applied
which ruled that the FILING of the COMPLAINT in the FISCAL’s office suspends that running of the PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Court ruled that ACT no. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.
Since BP 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine, it prescribes in 4 years from the
commission of the offense.

A closer look in the history of the law states that when the law was passed, preliminary investigation was conducted by JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE thus the phrase “investigation of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment”. The prevailing rule at that time is that once
the complaint is filed with the justice for the peace for PI, the prescription of the offense is halted. Once a complaint is filed with the justices of the
peace, it signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.

As stated in Incgo, the prescription period in violations involving the Anti Graft law and Intellectual property code are halted by the
institution of proceedings for PI against the accused. In the case of SEC v Interport, the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act is equivalent to a PI and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period. To rule
otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.

In this case, the petitioner went through the proper channels. From the time he filed his complaint with the prosecutor in 1995 to the
DOJ resolution aggregated to a period of 9 years. The flip flopping resolutions of the DOJ and misapplication of Act 3326 were not under his
control. Hence he should not suffer. It was proven that he did not sleep on his rights and actively pursued his cause.

The court rules that petitioner’s filing of the complaint affidavit before the Office of the Prosecutor in August 24, 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and effectively interrupted the prescriptive period.

PEOPLE vs. ROMUALDEZ


GR No. 166510/ April 29, 2009

Petitioner: Republic

Respondent: Kokoy Romualdez (Provincial Governor of Leyte)

Memory Aid:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
● Anti-graft and corruption practices – dual compensation

● Prescription of criminal cases under R.A 3019 (Anti Graft and Corruption)

● Prescription period is not tolled if cases are investigated or filed by the PCGG. It should be the Office of the OMB.

● Second Motion for Reconsideration

Facts:

The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corruption Practices Act) on November 2001. It was alleged that on or about and during the period of 1976 to Feb 1986, Romualdez as a
Provincial Governor of Leyte, injured the government by unlawfully using his influence with his brother-in-law, Pres. Marcos, to get appointed or
assigned as an Ambassador to China, Saudi Arabia and USA, without abandoning his seat as a Governor. As such, he was able to collect dual
compensation from the DFA and the Provincial Government of Leyte.

(Please take note that Romualdez left the country)

Motion to Quash the Information at the Sandiganbayan

Romualdez moved to quash the information because of the ff:

1. Facts alleged in the information do not constitute the offense charged; and

2. Criminal action has been extinguished by prescription.

As for no. 1, Romualdez contended that Sec 3(e) only applies to public officers charged with the grant of licenses, permits, or other
concessions, and the receipt of dual compensation is absolutely irrelevant and unrelated to the granting of licenses, permits, or other
concessions. He also contended that there could be no damage to the government because he actually rendered services for dual positions.

As for no. 2 (prescription), Romualdez reasoned that the 15yr prescription period under Sec 11 of the Act had lapsed since the preliminary
investigation of the case for an offense committed on the abovementioned period commenced only in May 2001, after the Division of the
Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the OMB (note: more or less more than 15 years). Romualdez argued that there was no interruption

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
because the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the PCGG were null and void. Also, he argued that the RPC’s provision
that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines should not apply to his case because the offense charged was
not covered by the RPC, but of a special law (Anti-Graft and Corruption). This special law does not contain any rule similar to that found in the
RPC.

The People opposed the motion to quash stating that public officers who include elective and appointive officials and employees who
receive compensation from the government may commit corrupt practices. With regard to the issue on prescription, the People argued that the
Constitution gives the State the right to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees notwithstanding prescription,
laches or estoppel.

The Sandiganbayan granted Romualdez’s motion to quash for the first contention on the ground that bad faith was not evident. The
information was not sufficient in establishing injury to the government by receiving dual compensation. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on prescription.

The People moved to reconsider. On the other hand, Romualdez opposed such motion and moved for a partial reconsideration on
Sandiganbayan’s ruling on prescription. Both motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Petition at the Supreme Court

The People filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 653, imputing the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in
quashing the information. Romualdez, on the other hand, responded with a Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam, arguing that the

3
Rule 65 (Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus) - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
proper remedy to an order granting a motion to quash a criminal information is by way of appeal under Rule 454 since such order is final. In
addition, Romualdez also argued that the criminal action had already been extinguished by prescription.

The SC granted the petition of the People but acknowledging that the mode for review of a final ruling of the Sandiganbayan should be
Rule 45. Nevertheless, it allowed the Rule 65 petition because the claim that there was a grave abuse of discretion (GAD) amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction was properly and substantially alleged. The SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan had committed GAD by premising the quashal
of the information on considerations that were inappropriate in evaluating a motion to quash.

Romualdez filed a Motion for Reconsideration, placing renewed focus on his argument that the criminal charge against him had been
extinguished on account of prescription. The SC denied such motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan’s ruling on prescription was not
the subject of the People’s petition.

Romualdez then filed a second Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:

W/N the criminal action has been extinguished due to prescription.

Held/Ratio:

Yes, the criminal action has already prescribed.

Romualdez was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corruption committed on or about and during the period from 1976 to
February 1986. However, the criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November 5, 2001, following a preliminary investigation that
commenced only on June 4, 2001 (this is beyond the 15 yr prescriptive period under Anti Graft and Corruption Act). Though the PCGG

4
Rule 45 (Appeal by Certiorari to the SC) - a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
attempted to file the same criminal cases on Feb 1989, such cases were quashed because it was only the Office of OMB who had the authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and consequently file the cases. As such, the initial filing of the PCGG could not have interrupted the 15-yr
prescriptive period. The prescriptive period for criminal violations of R.A 3019 could only be tolled when the Office of the OMB receives a
complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation.

Also, it would be false for Romualdez to challenge the Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement on prescription because the latter quashed the
information against the former (This was the very same relief Romualdez sought).

Dissenting Opinions

Carpio, J.

Romualdez cannot claim prescription. A person who flee from this jurisdiction could not just come back to move for dismissal of the
charge against him. Article 91 of the RPC clearly states that “the term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago”. Though Sec 11 of RA 3019 does not specifically provide for a procedure for computing the prescriptive period, RPC
should supplement, unless it should specially provide the contrary. Also, Romualdez should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own
prosecution by the simple expedient of fleeing from the State’s jurisdiction. To Allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving
this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of the State’s ability to investigate and
prosecute crimes.

Brion, J:

Court’s Certiorari Jurisdiction

The Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prescription because it was not an issue raised in the Rule 65 petition for certiorari
and the Sandiganbayan ruling on prescription issue is an interlocutory order.

The majority’s permission to rule on the petition raised under Rule 65 instead of Rule 45 constituted a grave abuse of discretion, which is
a fatal defect that should render the ruling void. No Sandiganbayan ruling on the quashal of information, therefore, lapsed to finality.

Limits of the Certiorari Jurisdiction

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Rule 65 is a very narrow and focused remedy that solely addresses cases involving lack or want of jurisdiction. In the present case, the
lack of jurisdiction is based on GAD. The petition the Court ruled was not a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari-an APPEAL that would have
opened up the whole case for review. Because of such, ONLY THE GAD that attended the Sandiganbayan’s ruling should be addressed.

In the present case, only the quashal of information on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense manifested GAD. If
the Court had ruled on the issue of prescription, then it would be rendered void for lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution and by law, not by mere acquiescence of this Court.

Romualdez failed to invoke Court’s certiorari jurisdiction

Even if the majority stated that it would be false for the respondent to challenge the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of information for
practicality, the legal reality is that for jurisdictional purposes, the issue on prescription should have been questioned before the Court.

Second Motion for Reconsideration is Prohibited

Also, the second motion of reconsideration is prohibited as stated in Sec 2, Rule 56. The majority ruling has not shown valid reason for
admitting a prohibited second motion for reconsideration, much less any compelling reason explaining how and why it ruled on an issue not
legitimately encompassed by the petition for certiorari. The principle of this prohibition is to ensure that all litigation must cease – a party is
given one and only one chance to ask for reconsideration. But, the majority’s ruling “gnawed” at this principle without fully explaining the
reason. Because of this, one cannot be blamed to question why Romualdez was given an exceptional treatment.

PINOTE V. AYCO
AM NO. RTJ-05-1944 Dec. 13, 2005

J. Carpio-Morales

Petitioner: State Prosecutor Ringcar Pinote

Respondent: Judge Roberto Ayco (RTC judge of South Cotabato)

Memory Aid: Absent prosecutor

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Doctrine: All criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.

FACTS:

In a criminal case being handled by Pinote, Judge Ayco allowed the defense to present the testimony of 2 witnesses despite the absence
of Pinote. He was absent because he was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center. During the subsequent hearings, he
refused to cross-examine the witnesses contending that the proceedings conducted during his absence were void. He then filed a Manifestation
praying that he should not be coerced by the judge to cross-examine the 2 defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the
record. However, Judge Ayco merely glossed over the Manifestation and considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine.
Hence, an administrative case was filed by Pinote against Judge Ayco for “gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and serious
misconduct.”

ISSUE:

W/N Judge Ayco should be held administratively liable - YES

HELD/RATIO:

Judge Ayco is administratively liable for violating Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may
be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the
approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to
the end of the trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he
being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to
protect vital state interests. In this case, allowing the defense to present the witnesses without Pinote or a private prosecutor designated for the
purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the
witnesses.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a
breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Bureau of Customs v. Sherman


GR 190487. April 13, 2011.

Carpio-Morales.

Petitioner: Bureau of Customs

Respondents: Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. and Court of Tax Appeals

Memory Aid: PCSO, Bureau of Customs, public prosecutor

Facts:

Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MSPI) caused the importation of 255,870,000 pieces of bet slips and 205,200 rolls of thermal paper from
Australia. It facilitated the release of the shipment from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) and brought it to PCSO for its lotto operations in
Luzon. MSPI did not pay duties or taxes, thus the Bureau of Customs filed a criminal complaint before the Department of Justice against it under
its Run After The Smugglers (RATS) Program. They were charged for a violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Republic Act 7916.

State Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano found probable cause against respondents and recommended the filing of Information against
them. Respondents filed a petition before the Secretary of Justice during the pendency of which the Information was filed before the Court of
Tax Appeals.

The Secretary of Justice reversed the State Prosecutor’s Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Information. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied, thus it filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw Information with Leave of Court, to
which petitioner filed an opposition. The CTA, through a resolution, granted the withdrawal and dismissed the Information.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was Noted Without Action by the CTA. Pertinent portions of the resolution read:

Considering that an Entry of Judgment was already issued in this case on September 23, 2009, no Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated Sepetember 3 having been filed by the State Prosecutor of the DOJ; the motion for reconsideration dated September 3 but
filed on September 22 by Atty. Christopher Bolastig of the Bureau of Customs is NOTED, without action.

Issue

W/N the CTA acted with grave abuse of discretion in merely noting without action petitioner’s motion for reconsideration

Held

NO. It is well settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors.

In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors
from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having
control and supervision over the cases.

The participation in the case of a complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspects of the
case. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) did not represent petitioner in instituting the petition. This is in contravention to the established
doctrine that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines in any proceeding requiring the service of lawyers.

As petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA Resolution did not bear the imprimatur of the public prosecutor to
which the control of the prosecution of the case belongs, the present petition fails.

Flores vs Gonzales
G.R. No. 188197 || August 3, 2010

Ponente: Nachura

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Summary:

Flores filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Lim before the City Prosecutor of Cebu. The Sec of Justice flip-flopped his decision
several times and finally ordered the withdrawal of the information AFTER it has already been filed. MTCC denied the withdrawal by stating that
it has already acquired jurisdiction and was in the best position to dispose of the case. Flores also filed a petition with the CA regarding GADALEJ
on the Sec of Justice. This cause the MTCC to suspend the arraignment and wait for the decision of the CA. CA said that there was no GADALEJ.
Flores claims that the decision of the MTCC to deny the withdrawal of the information should have made the decision of the CA moot and
academic. SC ageed with Flores and applied the Crespo ruling which stated that when an information has been filed with the trial court, it is the
one in best position to dispose of the case and the Sec of Justice cannot impose its will upon the court.

Facts:

Flores filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Lim before the City Prosecutor of Cebu. After some exchange of pleadings, the case
was submitted for resolution and the City Prosecutor dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. This was raised in a petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice which was dismissed BUT upon reconsideration, it was reversed and set aside and that the city prosecutor was directed
to filed the corresponding informations. Lim filed a motion for reconsideration and the Secretary of Justice REVERSED AGAIN, ordering the City
Prosecutor to withdraw the information that was filed before the MTCC with finality. MTCC then issued a resolution DENYING the motion to
withdraw the information. Rationalizing the decision the Court has conformably adhered to the doctrine laid down in Crespo and other cases
and made its own independent assessment of the evidence thus far submitted and is convinced that there exists probable cause to hold accused
to trial where the parties can better ventilate their respective claims and defenses.

Flores filed a petition for certiorari with the CA BEFORE the MTCC issued its Resolution herein above mentioned. After the MTCC
Resolution was issued, Flores filed a Manifestation before the CA attaching said Resolution of the MTCC. OSG then filed its comment saying that
the Sec. of Justice graved abused its discretion.

Then, MTCC issued an Order holding in abeyance the proceedings before it. They said that because petitioner has already filed a petition
with the CA, it ought to defer to the CA and observe judicial courtesy. They say that the pending case before the CA will determine the merit of
the Resolution that the MTCC issued.

After this, the CA issued the questioned Decision finding no grave abuse of discretion in the actions of the Secretary of Justice. A motion
for reconsideration was filed and subsequently denied. It is contended by the petitioner that the ruling of the MTCC finding probable cause in

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
the information that was filed by the City Prosecutor and by subsequently denying the motion to withdraw made the petition before the CA
moot and academic. It is also contended that this follows the Crespo ruling that once the complaint or information is filed in the court, any
disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court. Lastly, it is also claimed by Flores that the Sec of Justice, overstepped his
jurisdiction in the determination of probable cause when he ruled during the preliminary investigation on the validity, weight, admissibility and
merits of the parties’ evidence (matters which should be properly ventilated in the courts).

Issue:

W/N the decision earlier issued by the MTCC made this resolution by the CA academic.

Held:

Yes. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. Jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC and the decision
whether to dismiss the case or not rests on the sound discretion of the trial court where the Information was filed. The trial court is not bound to
adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts, since it is mandated to independently evaluate
or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

Rule 111

Bun Tiong v. Balboa


G.R. 158177 // Austria-Martinez, J.

Memory Aid: separation of civil/criminal case for violation of BP 22/forum shopping

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Facts:

This is a petition where the spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng charged respondent Balboa with forum
shopping.

The antecedent facts of the case:

Respondent Balboa filed a Civil Case for Collection of Sum of Money in the RTC of Manila (Branch 34) against the petitioner spouses
Benito Lo Bun Tiong (“Benito”) and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (“Caroline”). Balboa wanted to recover the amounts from 3 bounced checks
amounting to over P5m issued by petitioner Caroline. Balboa also filed separate criminal complaints against Caroline for violation of B.P. 22 with
the MTC of Manila (Branch 10).

In the civil case, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Balboa, finding the petitioner spouses liable and awarded Balboa the sum of the
bounced checks of P5m and 6% interest per annum until full payment. On the other hand, in the criminal case, the MTC acquitted Caroline of
the charges for violation of BP 22 since the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the MTC also found her to
be civilly liable to the amounts of the subject checks.

▪ Caroline sought for partial reconsideration of the MTC decision praying for the deletion of the award of civil
indemnity, but it was however DENIED. Hence, Caroline appealed to the RTC.
The petitioner spouses then appealed the civil case to the CA, however, the CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the
RTC. Petitioners also moved for reconsideration but were also denied by the CA. The RTC, in the criminal case, rendered a decision modifying
the MTC decision by deleting the award of civil damages.

Issue(s):

1. W/N Balboa’s filing of separate civil and criminal cases against respondent constitute forum shopping.
Ratio/Held:

NO, the Civil and Criminal cases were filed Feb. 24, 1997 and July 21, 1997, prior to the adoption of SC Circular no. 57-97 which took
effect on September 16, 1997. The governing rule when the case was filed was Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court (1985 RoC) which
provides that when a criminal case is file, the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless, like the instant case the civil

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
action is filed PRIOR to the criminal action. Therefore, there was no forum shopping to speak of. (Note: the aforementioned is only one of the
exceptions, there are two other exceptions namely, (a)offended party waives the civil action and (b) reserves his right to institute it separately)

However, SC circular 57-97 which disallowed the filing of separate Criminal and Civil actions for violation of BP 22, was later adopted in
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal under Rule 111 (b,) which now provides that:

“(b) The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed.”

The present rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with BP 22 cases because creditors are using the courts as collectors.
The SC stressed that the policy laid down by the new Rule is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action and the multiplicity of suits.
Therefore, the PETITION is DISMISSED and the decisions of the CA are AFFIRMED.

Other things in the Case:

1. The court defined forum shopping as the institution of two or more actions grounded on the same cause, the supposition
that one court or the other would render a favorable decision.
a. The elements of forum shopping are:
i. Identity of the parties
ii. Identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for and is founded on the same set of facts.
iii. Judgment rendered in one action would amount to res judicata on the other action.

Simon v. Chan
G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011

Heirs of Simon, Petitioners

v.

Elvin Chan and CA, Respondents

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Summary / Memory Aid:

General Rule: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense is deemed
instituted.

Exception: when the offended party:

(1) waives the civil action,

(2) reserves the right to institute it separately

● Exception to this exception: No reservation to file a civil action separately shall be allowed for cases of violations of BP 22.

or

(3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action

Facts:

On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) an information
charging the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) with a violation of BP 22 because he issued a check worth P336,000 to Elvin Chan (Chan) which
bounced. This case is People v. Simon.

More than three years later, or on August 3, 2000, respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the
collection of the principal amount of P336,000.00 based on Art. 33 of the Civil Code, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment.

On August 9, 2000, the MeTC in Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented on August 17, 2000 through
the sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon.

Simon’s Argument:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, pertinently averring that
since there is another action between the instant parties for the same cause before the MTC of Manila (People v. Simon), the instant action is
dismissable under Section 1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He also alleges that it is well settled that, when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Chan’s Argument:

Chan counters by saying that, indeed, under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the filing of the criminal action, the
civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action which the plaintiff does
not contest; however, an implied reservation of the right to file a civil action has already been made, first, by the fact that the information for
violation of B.P. 22 in People v. Simon does not at all make any allegation of damages suffered by the plaintiff nor is there any claim for recovery
of damages; and second, as private complainant in the criminal case, during the presentation of the prosecution evidence was not represented
at all by a private prosecutor such that no evidence has been adduced by the prosecution on the criminal case to prove damages; all of these we
respectfully submit demonstrate an effective implied reservation of the right of the plaintiff to file a separate civil action for damages;

Also, Chan contends that, Simon’s reliance on Section 3 sub-paragraph (a) Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court – which mandates that
after a criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action –
is misplaced because Section 2, Rule 111 which provides that for cases falling under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code, “an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
criminal case provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”

Finally, Chan contends that assuming arguendo that there is no reservation at all of the right to file a separate civil action, he can still file
an independent civil action because he seeks to enforce an obligation which the defendant owes to the plaintiff by virtue of the negotiable
instruments law.

MeTC Pasay City’s Ruling:

The MeTC in Pasay City granted Simon’s urgent motion to dismiss with application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages,
dismissing the complaint of Chan because:

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
For "litis pendentia" to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties or at least
such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
acts; and (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be such that the judgment, which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. These are all satisfied.

Also, Chan’s claim that there is an effective implied waiver of his right to pursue this civil case owing to the fact that there was no
allegation of damages in BP Blg. 22 case and that there was no private prosecutor during the presentation of prosecution evidence is
unmeritorious. It is basic that when a complaint or criminal Information is filed, even without any allegation of damages and the intention to
prove and claim them, the offended party has the right to prove and claim for them, unless a waiver or reservation is made or unless in the
meantime, the offended party has instituted a separate civil action. The over-all import of the said provision conveys that the waiver which
includes indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages arising under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code must be both clear and
express.

Continuation of Facts:

RTC affirmed. CA reversed saying that, since the complaint was also brought on allegation of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code,
then, under Rule 111 Sec. 3, the civil action may be instituted independently, hence, this Petition. (finally!)

ISSUE:

W/N Chan can institute a civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check – No.

Held:

Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be
independently maintained under both Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the
allegations of fraud and deceit.

According to Rule 111, Sec. 1 (b):

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to
file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the
check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance
with section 2 of the Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Also, Supreme Court Circular 57-97 states:

“1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.”

Reason for the Rule:

This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to
collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. It is also
expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single
suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The
Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court.

The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the
Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Rules of Crim Pro retroact

The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case on August 3, 2000, are
nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise
from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party
to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or
require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity
would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.

Case should be dismissed also because of litis pendencia

MeTC properly dismissed the case based on litis pendencia (just check their ruling above).

ASILO, JR. v. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 159017-18 / 159059 March 9, 2011
FACTS:
On March 15, 1978, private respondent Vicitacion's late mother, Marciana Vda. de Coronado and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna
entered into a lease contract where the municipality allowed the use and enjoyment of a property in favor of Marciana for 20 years, extendible
for another 20 years. Vicitacion took over the store when her mother died in 1984. As a consequence, she secured the yearly Mayor's permits
until 1993.
A fire razed the public market in 1986. Upon request of Vicitacion, DPWH District Engineer Gorospe inspected and found that the store
of Vicitacion remained intact and stood strong, thus Vicitacion continued to operate after the fire. This was contested by the municipality. On
September 1993, Nagcarlan Mayor Comendador sent a letter, with copy of Sangguniang Bayan (SB) resolution, to Vicitacion directing her to
demolish her store within 5 days. The resolution contained the authority granted to Mayor Comendador to enforce and order the demolition of
said building, and should there be resistance or delay, to file an Unlawful Detainer case with damages. In her reply letter, Vicitacion said that the
lease contract was still existing and legally binding; that she was willing to vacate provided the same place and area be given to her in the new
public market; and in case her proposals are not acceptable, for the Mayor to just file the case pursuant to the attached resolution.
On October 1993, the SB issued another resolution authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store using legal means. Few days
after, the store was demolished. Thus, spouses Bombasi filed with the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna a civil case for damages against the

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
municipality, Mayor Comendador, Municipal Administrator Asilo and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator Angeles. Thereafter, the
spouses filed a criminal complaint against the same respondents in the civil case for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 before the Ombudsman.
Upon order of the Sandiganbayan, the civil and criminal cases were consolidated pursuant to Sec. 4 of P.D. 1606.
Upon motion of Angeles' counsel, cases against Angeles were dismissed on the ground of his death. The death of Mayor Comendador
followed, and his counsel filed a manifestation of the fact of this death.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting Comendador and Asilo, Jr. guilty of the offense charged. The said court also held
Comendador and Asilo solidarily liable to pay Vicitacion damages. Counsel for the late mayor filed an MR alleging that the death of Mayor
Comendador totally extinguished his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the MR as to extinction of criminal liability, but not
the civil liability because the civil action is an independent action.
ISSUE:
W/N the civil liability of late mayor Comendador was extinguished due to his death
HELD:
No. The civil liability of Mayor Comendador survived his death.
It must be noted that when Angeles died, a motion to drop him as an accused was filed by his counsel with no objection from the
prosection. On the other hand, when Mayor Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him which resulted in the filing of
the MR, the prosecution opposed on the ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict, which was
upheld by the Sandiganbayan. Had it not been for the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that Angeles' death extinguished the civil
liability, which was not questioned and lapsed into finality, Angeles' civil liability could have likewise survived.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as his civil liability based solely thereon.
This means that the civil liabilities that are extinguished in such cases are those which arising from and based solely on the offense committed.
However, claim for civil liability survives if the same be may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
According to Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery may be pursed but only by way of filing a separate civil action.
It must be noted that the complaint for civil liability in this case was filed way ahead of the information on Anti-Graft Law. And, the
complaint for damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor Comendador's violation of plaintiff's (Vicitacion) right to due process.
The civil liability in this case is based on another source of obligation, which is the law on human relations under the Civil Code,
specifically Articles 31 and 32(6). There is a violation of the right to private property of the Spouses Bombasi when the accused public officials
ordered the demolition of their store without a court order. The said officials did not even file a case in court, but ordered the demolition relying
only on the SB resolution.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Note: Even if there is already a writ of execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued by the court
before the officer can destroy, demolish or remove improvements over a contested property. This special need for a court order, even if an
ejectment case has been successfully been litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil liability.

PEOPLE v. BAYOT
GR # 200030, April 18, 2012; J. Perez

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Nelson Bayot y Satina

Memory Aid: rape case, death of the accused during pendency of appeal with CA; judgement despite death of accused

FACTS

This is an appeal from the decision of CA affirming with modification the decision of RTC Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, finding the
accused Bayot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with indemnity and moral
damages.

Here are the pertinent facts: (please take note of the dates since they are crucial in this case)

1997 December – AAA, a 44 year old woman, charged Bayot with rape.

2000 July – RTC found him guilty. The court dismissed the sweet heart defense and did not give any weight to the testimony of his daughter. She
gave only one instance where her father and the victim were together, holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta. They also
dismissed her claim that she saw her father and AAA in the act of sexual intercourse.

2000 September – accused appealed the RTC decision

2004 October – the case was transferred to CA for immediate review as per SC’s pronouncement in People vs Mateo

2004 December – accused died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
2006 May 9 – CA affirmed RTC’s decision with modification on the award for indemnity and damages

2006 May 29 – The penal superintendent of New Bilibid Prison informed CA about the accused’s death last December 2004

2006 May 31 – Despite death of the accused, Public Attorney’s Office still appealed on behalf of Bayot

2007 January – CA took cognizance of the appeal and ordered the entire records of the case to the SC for review

ISSUE:

1. W/N the death of Bayot extinguished not only his criminal liability, but also his civil liability?

HELD: YES.

● Article 89(1) of RPC provides the effect of death on his criminal and civil liability

“Criminal Liability is totally extinguished… By death of the convict as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment”

● The rationale is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
case.

● Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant
did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death

● Hence, SC found appeal of the CA decision finding Bayot guilty INEFFECTUAL. The CA decision is set aside and dismissed.

Good to know facts:

● Claim for civil liability survives if it is predicated on a source other than delict.

● Art 1157 of the Civil Code (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, quasi-delict)

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
● If it does survive, action for recovery needs filing of separate civil action subject to Sec 1, Rule 111 of 1985 rules on civil procedure

o Private offended party need not fear forfeiture of his right (during prosecution of action before extinction, offended party
instituted therewith the civil action) thru prescription because statute of limitations is deemed interrupted during pendency of
criminal case.

PEOPLE v TIRSO VELASCO


GR NO. 127444 Sept. 13, 2000 Bellosillo J.

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondent: Hon. Tirso Velasco in his capacity as the presiding judge and Honorato Galvez

Summary:

The RTC acquitted Mayor Galvez from a case of murder, 2 cases of frustrated murder and a case for illegal possession of firearms. The
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari on the ground that the RTC deliberately and wrongfully interpreted certain facts and evidence. The SC
held that on the ground of double jeopardy, an acquittal is final and unappealable. The prosecution cannot accomplish through a writ of
certiorari what it could not do so by appeal.

FACTS

A shooting incident occurred in Bulacan, 1 person died while 2 others were injured. 3 criminal information were filed (1 for homicide and
2 for frustrated homicide) with the RTC Malolos against Mayor Galvez and his bodyguard, Diego. Later these charges were withdrawn and a new
set was filed containing 4 complaints (1 for murder, 2 for frustrated murder and 1 for illegal possession of firearms).

After a series of legal maneuverings by the parties, the venue of the case was transferred to the RTC QC. The case was raffled to Judge
Salazar who inhibited himself and later on the case was re-raffled to respondent Tirso Velasco.

The RTC found Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder and frustrated murder and acquitted Mayor Galvez of the same
charges due to insufficiency of evidence and also absolved him for illegal possession of firearms.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
The acquittal is being challenged by the government through a petition for certiorari claiming that Judge Velasco committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by deliberately disregarding certain facts and evidence which would have led to a finding of guilt.
The government contends that the review of the criminal culpability of the accused should be considered and should not constitute a violation
of his constitutional rights against double jeopardy because it is now a settled doctrine in the US that the Double Jeopardy clause permits a
review of acquittals decreed by US magistrates where no retrial is required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double
jeopardy have been sourced from US constitutional principles and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an
acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same course. Petitioner also resists the applicability of the
finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the Philippine adjudicative process on the ground that the principle is endemic to the American justice system as
it has specific application only to jury verdicts of acquittal which is a special feature of American constitutional law, and has no parallel/analogy
in the Philippine legal system.

ISSUE

Is the petition for certiorari proper?

RULING

No. In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari
cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment. In
legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. The prosecution representing the sovereign people in the
criminal case was denied due process.

The purpose of the writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in
order that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not
proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings
from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.

Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides to the court in determining the standing of the
prosecution to secure by certiorari a review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In most instances,
provisions setting forth the scope and function of certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of the state to appeal or bring
error in criminal matters.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and
not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of
discretion.

The requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same
is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent. It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it
occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in our
jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the
ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

The attempt by the government to close the door on the applicability of the finality rule to our legal system fails when one considers
that, universally, the principal object of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried for the second time, whether by jury or judge. Despite
"emerging American consensus on jury acquittals" our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be
appealed by government rests on solid constitutional bedrock. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy have been clearly
defined by both constitution and statute.

A reading of the questioned decision in this case shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial (testimonies, the
trajectory, location and nature of gunshot wounds and expert opinion of the prosecution). The evidence was considered and passed upon. This
consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of
and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. Errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.

Note: During all of this, Galvez was assassinated. The Court said that the case has now become moot and academic. However it shall decide due
to the issue’s paramount nature. Please see original case for a long and tedious narrative of the history and jurisprudence of double jeopardy in
the US.

Ching v. Nicdao
G.R. No. 141181 April 27, 2007

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
SAMSON CHING, Petitioner,
vs.
CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents

Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J.

Petitioner: Samson Ching, a Chinese national who likes to loan money.

A Chinese national, who claimed he is a salesman of La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory. (Case’s description petitioner)

Respondent: Nicdao, spouses who own a grocery store, and who like to borrow money and not pay.

Specifically, CLARITA NICDAO a middle-aged mother and housekeeper who only finished high school, has a daughter, Janette Boyd, who is
married to a wealthy expatriate (Case’s description of respondent)

Other Important People:

Janette Boyd: Daughter of Nicdao, married to a rich foreigner.

Nuguid: Common Law wife of Ching, served as a loan collector, and was the intermediary between the two.

Ching’s live-in partner, is a CPA and formerly connected with Sycip, Gorres and Velayo. Nuguid used to own a grocery store now known as the
Vignette Superstore. She sold this grocery store, which was about to be foreclosed, to petitioner’s daughter, Janette Boyd. Since then, petitioner
began managing said store.

Type of Action: Special Civil Action for Certiorari, assailing the Acquittal of Nicdao for 11 Counts of BP 22 violations. Seeks to Recover
P22,950,000.

Facts:

October 21, 1997, Ching files 11 separate complaints for bouncing checks at the MCTC of Bataan. He alleges that on October 6, Nicdao issued a
check from Hermosa Savings and Loan bank in the amount of P20,000,000, while knowing that there were insufficient funds from the
corresponding account. In addition to this, 10 checks of smaller denominations with an aggregate value of P950,000 were also issued.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Concurrently, the common law spouse of Ching, Nuguid, also filed 14 complaints for bouncing checks against Nicdao, for an amount totalling
P1,150,000, and the two cases were subsequently consolidated.

The Version of Ching:

According to Ching, he began his dealings with Nicdao in 1995, when Nicdao and her husband approached him in order to loan money for a
supermarket business (the Vignette Superstore), and to help settle their financial obligations. As securities for this loan, Nicdao left undated
checks with Ching, with the agreement that the loans would be repaid after a year. When Ching came to collect, the Nicdaos were unable to pay,
so Ching came back later, with the Nicdaos still unable to pay, and this continued for two years of insistent demands. He also stated that the
Nicdaos wanted to hide the total amount of their indebtedness from their daughter, because it might result in family disunity and she might get
angry. Eventually, Nicdao got irritated and angry at the constant demands, and just challenged Ching to meet him in court. On the last visit of
Ching to Nicdao, Nicdao stated that they were only willing to pay back P5,000,000, the amount of the loan that pertains to Nicdao’s daughter
Janette. Ching, who already had enough of this arrangement, then decided to deposit the checks earlier given as securities on October 6, 1997,
and obviously they were dishonoured for being Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) because it turns out Nicdao’s checking account only had
a balance of P300 (lol). The account was closed the very next day. Ching, very aggrieved, proceeded to commence the instant suit.

Note however, that the checks given as securities were blank. There was no date, and no amount (refer to Nego for what are the effects of this).
Ching decided to place the date on which he deposited the check, and as for the amount, he basically ESTIMATED that Nicdao roughly owes him
P20,000,000, so that was the amount he decided to write down.

He states that he regularly loaned Nicdao a million pesos from 1995-1997, but had no written evidence to prove this. Nicdao allegedly also said
that she was confident given her blank checks because of the mutual trust they placed in each other, that Ching would not just write any amount
in the checks.

The Version of Nicdao

According to Nicdao, yes she was indebted to Ching, but no way could it have possibly reached P22,000,000. She admitted having loans and
obligations to Ching in the amount of 2,100,000 principal, with interest at 12% PER DAY (isn’t this usurious?), and so Nuguid came every day to
collect the interest on the loan. The computation of the interest was allegedly done on cigarette wrappers, which were presented into evidence.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
She did indeed confirm that she signed the Checks given to Ching, but Denied ever placing the value of P20,000,000 while Ching admitted to
putting that amount. She stated that she left the checks undated because she only wanted to issue them when she knew she had enough
money. She said that when she went to Ching, ready to pay the P2.1m, she asked for the checks back. Ching refused, because she allegedly still
owed them money, but refused to show the checks so Nicdao could determine exactly how much. This was when she challenged Ching just to go
to court.

A short while later, she was informed by Hermosa Savings and Loan Bank that some recently tried to encash a check worth P20,000,000. She
then said that she remembered how, in 1995 (the year she started business with Ching) she found that one check was missing from her
checkbook. She further clarified that she has never dealt with Ching in person before, and that all their transactions was between her and
Nuguid, who did the collecting. She also admitted allowing her employees to give the 10 checks worth 950,000 to Ching, but had no idea how
the 11th check worth P20,000,000 came into his possession. The loss of a check in 1995 was corroborated by testimony.

THE TRIAL: RTC

Nicdao was convicted of 11 counts of BP 22 violation, and was sentenced to pay 20,950,000 and imprisonment of 1 year for every check issued.
The RTC did not believe her story of the missing check. Following the lements of a BP 22 violation, the court said:

(a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; - They said this was the case because they presumed Ching
to be a Holder in Due Course.

(b) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; - The RTC believed that Nicdao new at the time of issue there were not enough funds
in her account.

(c) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment –The stamp saying DAIF was proof of subsequent dishonour.

Nicdao was also convicted in the separate case for 14 bouncing checks. She appealed both to the RTC, but they were affirmed in toto.

On appeal to the CA, she was acquitted on all counts.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
The CA believed that Nuguid was the one who acquired the check, because after selling Janette the store, she befriended her and told her that,
as the former owner of the store, she knew she would need loans. This put her in a position to get the check of Nicdao.

Also, the CA did not believe that Ching could actually loan the amount of money he said he did.

With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, the CA was not convinced by petitioner Ching’s claim that he delivered P1,000,000.00 every month
to respondent Nicdao until the amount reached P20,000,000.00 and, when she refused to pay the same, he filled up the check, which she earlier
delivered to him as security for the loans, by writing thereon the said amount. In disbelieving petitioner Ching, the CA pointed out that, contrary
to his assertion, he was never employed by the La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing per the letter of Susan Resurreccion, Vice-
President and Legal Counsel of the said company. Moreover, as admitted by petitioner Ching, he did not own the house where he and Nuguid
lived.

Also, Important: THE CHECK WAS NOT YET A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT BECAUSE:

SEC. 15. Incomplete instrument not delivered. – Where an incomplete instrument has not been delivered, it will not, if completed and
negotiated without authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed thereon before
delivery.

The check was stolen, so there was no valid delivery of the incomplete check.

The acquittal was allowed to continue until it reached the final and executor stage, and so it was entered into the Book of Judgements.

The ISSUE: (The only one that actually matters to CrimPro).

W/N, after the Nicdao’s acquittal in the Criminal Case, Ching may still file and recover by a Civil Action.

Specifically, Ching still wants the P20,950,000 and 12% interest per annum at the legal rate.

Held: YES!

W/N Ching based on the facts of the case, can recover.

Held: No.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Issue 1:

According to the Supreme Court:

Section 1,35 Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, quoted earlier, provided in part:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

The rule is: an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused

The exception to this rule is

“…unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.”

Also, It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed
to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

So, the three situations where acquittal does not extinguish liability are:

1) Where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;

2) Where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature;

3) Where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted

Thus: If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution
cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended
party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
So, an acquittal in a criminal case on grounds of reasonable doubt allows appeal on the civil liability aspect of the case.

Issue 2:

HOWEVER, in this instant case, CHING will not recover anything:

Because the acquittal of Nicdao not only acquitted her, but stated that the fact which is the basis of the claim of Ching for recovery (the issuance
of the P20 million peso check) DID NOT HAPPEN.

“Inasmuch as check no. 002524 was incomplete and undelivered in the hands of complainant Ching, he did not acquire any right or interest
therein and cannot, therefore, assert any cause of action founded on said stolen check”

Because of the absence of any other evidence to prove the existence of P20,950,000 debt, there can be no basis for this case.

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION v. JANIOLA


G.R. No. 184861: June 30, 2009

Petitioner: Dreamwork Construction Inc.


Respondent: Cleofe Janiola and Hon. Arthur Famini
Ponente: Velasco, Jr.,J

Memory Aid:

Dreamwork sued Janiola for BP 22 violation since the latter issued checks which were dishonored for lack of funds. Janiola filed a civil
case for rescission of contract then filed suspension of the criminal proceeding, which was granted. SC ruled there is no prejudicial question to
warrant the suspension of the criminal proceeding because both elements are absent since the civil case was instituted AFTER the criminal case
and the rescission of the contract is immaterial to BP 22 which is a malum prohibitum.

Facts:

Dreamwork Construction Inc. through its President, and Vice-President for Finance and Marketing, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated
October 5, 2004 for violation of BP 22 against Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. On February 2005,
petitioner then filed criminal information for violation of BP 22 against Janiola with the MTC. On September 2006, Janiola, joined by her

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
husband, instituted a civil complaint for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties by filing a Complaint dated
August 2006. The cheks subject to BP 22 violation were issued by Janiola for the said construction agreement. On July 2007, Janiola filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases. On the other hand,
petitioner filed an Opposition to accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question on the grounds that: (1) there is no
prejudicial question because the rescission of the contract is a distinct issue from whether Janiola violated BP 22; and (2) the criminal case have
preceded the civil case, so one of the elements of a prejudicial question is missing.

MTC granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings because motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests despite the belated filing of the civil case (Section 6, Rule 111, and Revised Rules of Court).

RTC denied the petitioner's appeal against the MTC’s decision and ruled that there was a prejudicial question. RTC argued that the requirement
of a "previously" filed civil case is merely intended to remove delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. In this case the criminal
proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted and there is no clear evidence of any intent to delay on Janiola's
part.

Issue:

WON there is a prejudicial question despite the belated filing of the civil case?

Held:

No! No prejudicial question exists because both of its elements are not present in this case. According to the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the 2 essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. However on
December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure became effective. Now Sec. 7 of Rule 111 provides that the elements of a prejudicial
question are: (1) the PREVIOUSLY instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the SUBSEQUENT
criminal action, and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Here, the civil case was filed 2 years after Dreamwork instituted the criminal complaint and from the time Dreamwork allegedly
withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, the civil case was instituted more than 2 ½ years from the time that Dreamwork allegedly

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case for the rescission of the construction
agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than 3 years from the execution of the construction agreement.

So the first element is missing because the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. Dreamwork argues that the
requirement specifically guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action
in order to delay the proceedings in the latter. Also, the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.

On the other hand, Janiola cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides: Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the SC shall promulgate and which shall not be
in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Janiola argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal
action. Janiola concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules on CrimPro and the Civil Code in that the latter
considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.

Janiola's argument is untenable because a change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the
meaning of the provision from that it originally had." In the 2000 Rules on CrimPro the phrase, "subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action and "previously instituted," were inserted to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede
the criminal action. Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which
requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action.

The 2nd element is also missing because the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution
for violation of BP 22. The intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. The lack of
valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds would not affect the prosecution of
Janiola in the criminal case.

SC ordered the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
Note: A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office
of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Pimentel v. Pimentel
Memory Aid: Nullity of Marriage/Parricide/Prejudicial Question

Facts

Maria Chrysantine Pimentel files a case for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel in RTC QC. Feb 7, 2005, Joselito received
summons that he should appear in RTC Antipolo for pre-trial of case for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity. Feb 11, Joselito
filed urgent motion to suspend frustrated parricide (FP) proceedings, claiming that the case of nullity is a prejudicial question to the case of FP
because the relationship between offended party and offender is a key element in parricide. RTC QC ruled on may 13, 2005 that the nullity case
is not a prejudicial question. Joselito filed MR, RTC denied again. CA dismissed as well. it held that the issue in FP is whether the offender
commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In nullity, it is WON joselito is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill essential
marital obligations. They also held that even if null and void, the acts constituting FP still was committed

Issue

WON the resolution of action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question to FP

Held

No

● Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DIGESTS
o Civil action must first be instituted before criminal action. In this case, the criminal action was filed first.

● Not a prejudicial question

o Prejudicial question is when both criminal and civil cases are pending and in the civil action, there is an issue which must first be
resolved in civil action which would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the party in the criminal case.

▪ “ne that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]”

o Issue in annulment not necessarily connected with FP. Relationship is not determinative of guilt.

o During commission of crime, they were married.

o Tenebro v. CA not applicable

▪ Bigamy

▪ No prejudicial question

▪ Even if applicable it states that “a declaration of nullity of 2nd marriage on ground of psych incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the state’s penal laws are concerned.”

Altavas, Arandia, Avila, Bantug, Bautista, Catacutan-Estabillo, Cayetano, Cocabo, Dantes, Diego, Ducepec, Flores, Garcia, Geraldez, Guiyab,
Henares, Lee, Matias, Morales, Ong, Santos, Sarmiento, Tantoco