Buklod ng Kawani EIIB et al vs. Exec.

Secretary
[G.R. No. 142801-802. July 10, 2001]

Facts:
On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 127
establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural
organization of the Ministry of Finance. On 1989, President Aquino issued Memorandum Order
No. 225, providing, among others, that the EIIB shall be the agency of primary responsibility for
anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways outside the areas of
sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs.
Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 191 entitled Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau. Motivated by the fact that the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed
by the other existing agencies of the government and that there is a need to constantly monitor
the overlapping of functions among these agencies, former President Estrada ordered the
deactivation of EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National
Bureau of Investigation.
Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 creating the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force Aduana.
On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 223 providing that all EIIB
personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service
effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy,
merger, division, or consolidation of positions.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner’s contention:
1. Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 should be annulled as they are unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Philippine Constitution and/or for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. The abolition of the EIIB is a hoax. Similarly, if Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 are considered
to effect a reorganization of the EIIB, such reorganization was made in bad faith.
Held:
On the first issue:
To deactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or
reassigning personnel, while to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy
completely. In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the
office wholly and permanently, Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not
true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or
inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are both reorganization measures.
The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of
law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by
the same legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772
which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the
Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.
In addition to, under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office
and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the
President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices
or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The
EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.
 On the second issue;
Reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances
which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made
as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office
is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and
the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices,
and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the
creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB
employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task Force
Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the government.
Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an office or its salary.

Yap vs. Lagtapon

G.R. No. 196347 January 23, 2017

Facts:

On 1997, Lagtapon instituted a civil suit against Yap for a sum of money with the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Occidental. Summons was issued and was served by a process server of
the court in the person of Ray Precioso to Yap who, however, refused to acknowledge receipt
thereof, thus, compelling him to tender the same and left a copy thereof for her.As no answer
was filed, Lagtapon filed a motion to declare Yap in default. The said motion was granted by the
court. Lagtapon presented her evidence ex-parte. On the basis thereof, the court rendered
judgment in favor of Lagtapon.
On 2000, Yap found out that the property which is the subject matter of the civil case
instituted by Lagtapon was scheduled to be sold at auction.
Thereafter, Yap filed the a Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing the RTC Decision
on the ground that Summons was not validly served on her, which thus prevented the RTC from
acquiring jurisdiction over her person. In particular, Yap alleged that at the time Summons was
allegedly served she was not residing in either of the addresses supplied by Lagtapon in her
Complaint.
CA Denied the petition and upheld the RTC’s ruling.
Hence this petition.
Held:
It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge
of one's official duties and functions. Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice,
the service of Summons on Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid.
To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the
evidence against it must be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the
contrary, the presumption stands deserving of faith and credit. In this case, the burden of proof
to discharge such presumption lay with petitioner Yap.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is an aid to the
effective and unhampered administration of government functions. Without such benefit, every
official action could be negated with minimal effort from litigants, irrespective of merit or
sufficiency of evidence to support such challenge. To this end, our body of jurisprudence has been
consistent in requiring nothing short of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary to
overthrow such presumption.
Correspondingly, the Return of Service of Precioso as process server of the RTC
constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein.

TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA)

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
 G.R. No. 204869 March 11, 2014

Facts:
Upon post audit, the TESDA audit team leader discovered that for the calendar years
2004-2007, TESDA paid Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME) twice each year to its
officials from two sources: (1) the General Fund for locally-funded projects, and (2) the Technical
Education and Skills Development Project (TESDP) Fund for the foreign-assisted projects. The
payment of EME was authorized under the General Provisions of the General Appropriations Acts
of 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 (2004-2007 GAAs), subject to certain conditions:
x x x Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses.– Appropriations authorized herein may be used
for extraordinary expenses of the following officials and those of equivalent rank as may be
authorized by the DBM, not exceeding:
(a)P180,000 for each Department Secretary;
(b)P65,000 for each Department Undersecretary;
(c)P35,000 for each Department Assistant Secretary;
(d)P30,000 for each head of bureau or organization of equal rank to a bureau and for each
Department Regional Director;
(e)P18,000 for each Bureau Regional Director; and
(f)P13,000 for each Municipal Trial Court Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, and
Shari’a Circuit Court Judge.
In addition, miscellaneous expenses not exceeding Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) for each of the
offices under the above named officials are authorized.
On 15 May 2008, the audit team issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing the payment
of EME amounting to P5,498,706.60 for being in excess of the amount allowed in the 2004-2007
GAAs. In addition, the EME were disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of
equivalent ranks as authorized by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), contrary
to the provisions of the 2004-2007 GAAs. Notice of Disallowance No. 08-002-101 (04-06)
indicated the persons liable for the excessive payment of EME: the approving officers, payees and
the accountants.
On 4 July 2008, TESDA, through its then Director-General Augusto Boboy Syjuco, Jr., filed
an Appeal Memorandum arguing that the 2004-2007 GAAs and the Government Accounting and
Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the General Fund and the TESDP Fund
provided the legal ceiling was not exceeded for each fund. According to TESDA, the General Fund
and the TESDP Fund are distinct from each other, and TESDA officials who were designated as
project officers concurrently with their regular functions were entitled to separate EME from both
funds.
COA denied the appeal on the following grounds:
On the first issue, the GAA provision on EME is very clear to the effect that payment of
EME may be taken from any authorized appropriation but shall not exceed the ceiling stated
therein. If the legislative intent is to grant officials EME of unlimited amount, no limit or ceiling
should have been included in the GAA. On the other hand, the Audit Team Leader stated that the
inclusion in TESDA budget for EME in TESDP Fund, which was actually found only in the GAA for
FY 2005 could not serve as basis for the grant of EME, should not be treated distinctly and
separately from EME provision under the General Provisions of the GAA as the officials who were
paid the EME from [TESDP Fund] are the same TESDA officials who were already paid EME out
[of the General Fund]. It should be emphasized that the designation of TESDA officials as Project
Managers in concurrent capacities to offices under TESDP, forms part only of their additional
functions without another appointment. The EME is covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office and not for every project handled.
On the second issue whether officials who are not of equivalent rank as authorized by the
DBM, the Audit Team Leader informed that the officials were designated for [positions] which are
not included in the Personnel Service Itemization (PSI) and the creation of said positions [was]
not supported with authority or approval from the DBM. Neither was there a DBM document
identifying the equivalent ranks of these positions as basis for ascertaining the amount of EME to
be paid.
On the third issue whether the Regional Directors who were not performing as head of
the Bureau or a regional office or organization unit of equal rank, because of their reassignment
to the Office of the Director[-]General, the same were not entitled to receive EME since the
Director[- ]General and its office are already claiming the said amount. There could be no two
officials entitled to receive EME although they are listed in the GAA as entitled to receive the same.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
A. THE [COA] GRAVELY ERRED IN DISALLOWING THE PAYMENTS MADE BY TESDA TO ITS
OFFICIALS OF THEIR [EME] FROM BOTH [GENERAL FUND] AND [TESDP FUND];
B.THE [COA] LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THE OFFICERS OF TESDA INDIVIDUALLY
LIABLE FOR THE TOTAL DISALLOWANCE IN THE AMOUNT OF P5,498,706.60 EVEN IF THEY
MAY BE RIGHTFULLY CONSIDERED AS DE FACTO OFFICERS IN GOOD FAITH WHO ARE
ENTITLED TO EME FOR ACTUAL SERVICES RENDERED;
C.THE [COA] LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONSIDERING THE CEILING SET
FORTH BY SECTIONS 23[, 25] AND 26 OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE [2004-2007 GAAS],
THE CONCERNED TESDA OFFICIALS’CLAIMS FOR EME ARE UNAUTHORIZED AND EXCESSIVE;
D.FINALLY, THE [COA] GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONCERNED TESDA OFFICIALS
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS DE FACTO OFFICERS IN GOOD FAITH AND IN DISREGARDING THE
RELEVANT RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CA[N]TILLO VS. ARRIETA.
Held:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The COA is generally accorded complete
discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and the Court generally sustains its decisions
in recognition of its expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce.
In the case at bar, the GAA provisions are clear that the EME shall not exceed the amounts
fixed in the GAA. The GAA provisions are also clear that only the officials named in the GAA, the
officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, and the offices under them are
entitled to claim EME not exceeding the amount provided in the GAA. The COA faithfully
implemented the GAA provisions. The COA merely complied with its mandate when it disallowed
the EME that were reimbursed to officers who were not entitled to the EME, or who received EME
in excess of the allowable amount.
However, TESDA insists on its interpretation justifying its payment of EME out of the
TESDP Fund. It argues that the 2004-2007 GAAs did not prohibit its officials from receiving
additional EME chargeable against an authorized funding, the TESDP Fund in this case, for another
office to which they have been designated. But this argument is unmeritorious.
The TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under Republic Act No. 7796 or
the TESDA Act of 1994. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act is included in the annual GAA; hence, the TESDP Fund, being sourced
from the Treasury, are funds belonging to the government, or any of its departments, in the hands
of public officials. The Constitution provides, "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The State Audit Code, which prescribes the
guidelines in disbursing public funds, reiterates this important Constitutional provision that there
should be an appropriation law or other statutes specifically authorizing payment out of any
public funds. In this case, TESDA failed to point out the law specifically authorizing it to grant
additional reimbursement for EME from the TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicit requirement in
the Constitution and the law. There is nothing in the 2004-2007 GAAs which allows TESDA to
grant its officials another set of EME from another source of fund like the TESDP Fund. The 2005
GAA provided for a ceiling on EME that TESDA still had to comply despite the grant of EME in the
2005 GAA for foreign-assisted projects.
The position of project officer is not among those listed or authorized to be entitled to
EME, namely, the officials named in the GAA, the officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized
by the DBM, and the offices under them. The underlying principle behind the EME is to enable
those occupying key positions in the government to meet various financial demands. As pointed
out by COA, the position of project officer is not even included in the Personnel Service Itemization
or created with authority from the DBM. Thus, the TESDA officials were, in fact, merely designated
with additional duties, which designation did not entitle them to additional EME. In Dimaandal v.
COA, we held that designation is a mere imposition of additional duties, which does not entail
payment of additional benefits.
Having settled that COA properly disallowed the payment of excessive EME by TESDA, we
proceed to determine whether the TESDA officials should refund the excess EME granted to them.
In Blaquera v. Alcala, the Court no longer required the officials and employees of different
government departments and agencies to refund the productivity incentive bonus they received
because there was no indicia of bad faith and the disbursement was made in the honest belief that
the recipients deserved the amounts. We, however, qualified this Blaquera ruling in Casal v. COA,
where we held the approving officials liable for the refund of the incentive award due to their
patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the directives of COA. In Casal, we ruled
that the officials’ failure to observe the issuances amounted to gross negligence, which is
inconsistent with the presumption of good faith.
Applying by analogy the Blaquera, Casal and Velasco rulings, as well as Section 16 of the 2009
Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, we hold the approving officers of TESDA liable
for the excess EME received by them.
Accordingly, the Director-General's blatant violation of the clear provisions of the
Constitution, the 2004-2007 GAAs and the COA circulars is equivalent to gross negligence
amounting to bad faith. He is required to refund the EME he received from the TESDP Fund for
himself. As for the TESDA officials who had no participation in the approval of the excessive EME,
they acted in good faith since they had no hand in the approval of the unauthorized EME. They
also honestly believed that the additional EME were reimbursement for their designation as
project officers by the Director-General. Being in good faith, they need not refund the excess EME
they received.

Pablico vs. Villapando

G.R. No. 147870 July 31,2002
Facts:
On 1999, Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan an administrative complaint against Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente,
Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution. Complainants alleged
that Villapondo, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement with Orlando
M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections. They argue that the
consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a government position within the
prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
In his answer, Villapondo countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired
him. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992,
stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a
consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited
by the Constitution.
On February 1, 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found Villapondo guilty
of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from service. Villapondo
appealed to the Office of the President which, affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan.
Pending Villapondo’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Office of the President,
Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal
Mayor. Consequently, Villapondo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining
order, the petition, seeks to annul, inter alia, the oath administered to petitioner. Pablico resumed
his assumption of the functions of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
Thereafter, Villapondo instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals seeking to annul the decision of the Office of the President and the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
Court of Appeals declared void the assailed decisions of the Office of the President and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered Pablico to vacate the Office of Mayor of
San Vicente, Palawan. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal, validly impose
the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Held:
No.
Under Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: xxx An elective local official
may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Hence, the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be
decreed only by a court of law.
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, however, adds that (b) An elective local official may be removed from office on
the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60,
Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority
whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. The disciplining authority
referred to pertains to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the
President.
As held in Salalima case, this grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared
the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of
law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the
law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the
statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991, expressed doubt as to the validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the
implementing rules.
Therefore, the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority
to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal
of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such
power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is
involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise
of their constitutional right of suffrage.
The Provincial Government of Camarines Norte, represented by Gov. Jesus Typoco Jr
vs.
Beatrice Gonzales
G.R. No. 185740 July 23, 2013
Facts:
Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines
Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. On 1999,
Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why
no administrative charges should be filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy
in the course of official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of
the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held
administratively liable. Thereafter, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation
Committee’s recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.
Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC modified Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and
suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC
denied.
After serving the suspension, Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial
administrator but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a
letter to the CSC about Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee
The CSC directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified that
while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial
administrator position coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot
operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as
administrators prior to the new law’s effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a
vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue
holding this office despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position. The conversion
of the provincial administrator position from a career to a non-career service should not
jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. As a permanent
appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of trust
and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline
under existing laws.
However, Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Norte’s incumbent governor, refused to
reinstate her. Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA, seeking to nullify the
CSC’s Resolutions.
CA affirmed CSC’s decision
Hence, this petition.
Issue;
1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career
service to a primarily confidential, non-career service position; and
 2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator
of the Province of Camarines Norte.
Held;
On the first issue;
Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily
confidential, non-career position through RA 7160.
First, prior to RA 7160, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the old Local Government Code (LGC), did not
include a provincial administrator position among the listing of mandatory provincial
officials, but empowered the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to create such other offices as might then
be necessary to carry out the purposes of the provincial government. RA 7160 made the position
mandatory for every province. Thus, the creation of the provincial administrator position under
the old LGC used to be a prerogative of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Second, in introducing the mandatory provincial administrator position, RA 7160 also amended
the qualifications for the provincial administrator position. While Section 480 27 of RA 7160
retained the requirement of civil service eligibility for a provincial administrator, together with
the educational requirements, it shortened the six-year work experience requirement to five
years. It also mandated the additional requirements of residence in the local government
concerned, and imposed a good moral character requirement.
Third, RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing
authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is primarily confidential.
To emphasize the close relations that the provincial administrators’ functions have with the office
of the governor, RA 7160 even made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its
appointing authority. This provision, along with the interrelations between the provincial
administrator and governor under Section 480, renders clear the intent of Congress to make the
provincial administrator position primarily confidential under the non-career service category of
the civil service.
Hence, Congress’ reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid
exercise of legislative power that does not violate Gonzales’ security of tenure
On the second issue;
The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress. The
right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory
guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the position.
Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee
To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of
tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they
belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be
removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The
concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential
employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the
confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office
expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the
confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office; his term merely "expires" and
the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that results in the termination
of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded,
we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no
longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not
be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot
be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held. In
other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the violated Gonzales’
right to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position,
but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but
her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the time of the
termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of
the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’ termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could
no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other
comparable position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to
retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.

Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan

[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]
Facts:
 Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son,
Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong
Silang, Municipality of Santa Cruz, and concurrently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays.
In the 1985 election for the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won as KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Parenthetically, Lenlie Lecaroz did not run as candidate in this electoral
exercise as he was no longer qualified for the position after having already passed the age limit
fixed by law.
Sometime in November 1985 Red was appointed by then President Ferdinand Marcos as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc, then the National Chairperson of the organization, sent a telegram to Red
confirming his appointment and advising him further that copies of his appointment papers
would be sent to him in due time through the KB Regional Office. Red received the telegram on
1986 and showed it immediately to Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz.
Armed with the telegram and intent on assuming the position of sectoral representative of
the KBs to the SB, Red attended the meeting of the Sanggunian upon the invitation of one of its
members, Kagawad Rogato Lumawig. In that meeting, Mayor Francisco M. Lecaroz informed Red
that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until his appointment had been
cleared by the Governor of Marinduque. Nonetheless, the telegram was included in the agenda as
one of the subjects discussed in the meeting.
Red finally received his appointment papers sometime in January 1986. But it was only on
April 1986, when then President Corazon C. Aquino was already in power that he forwarded these
documents to Mayor Lecaroz. This notwithstanding, Red was still not allowed by the mayor to sit
as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian.
Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie
Lecaroz of twenty-six (26) sets of payrolls for the twenty-six (26) quincenas covering the period
16 January 1986 to 30 January 1987. Lenlie Lecaroz signed the payroll for 1-15 January 1986 and
then authorized someone else to sign all the other payrolls for the succeeding quincenas and claim
the corresponding salaries in his behalf.
On 1989 Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino Administration a confirmation of his
appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz.
Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints
against Mayor Francisco Lecaroz and Lenlie Lecaroz arising from the refusal of the two officials
to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the
Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) Informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents Lecaroz, and one (1) Information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e),
of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against Mayor Lecaroz alone.
On 1994 the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two (2) accused guilty on all
counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. However, with respect to the charge of
violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3.019, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Francisco Lecaroz. It
found that Red was neither authorized to sit as member of the SB because he was not properly
appointed thereto nor had he shown to the mayor sufficient basis for his alleged right to a seat in
the municipal council. On this basis, the court a quo concluded that Mayor Lecaroz was legally
justified in not allowing Red to assume the position of Kagawad.
Petitioner’s Contention: Lenlie is in holdover capcity since Red has not yet duly appointed in
the position.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that
officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until
their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does
not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified
to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified,
even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue
to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not
also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be
clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to
assume that the law-making body favors the same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in the strong
presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an
executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied
by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of
public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience
from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government
functions.
The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman
Reyes in 1985 Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of
Lenlie Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code
then in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were
not authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 6733on 25 July 1989
and its subsequent publication in a newspaper of general circulation that members of both Houses
of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly,
under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang
Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all.
To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to
the full investiture with the office. Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of
oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has
none at all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It
is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie
Lecaroz remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in
every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officerentitled to receive the salaries and all the
emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and
liable for encroachment of public office.

Sambarani vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 160427. September 15, 2004]
Facts:
In the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections
(elections), Polala Sambarani (Sambarani), Jamal Miraato (Miraato), Samera Abubacar
(Abubacar), Macabigung Mascara (Mascara) and Aliasgar Dayondong (Dayondong) ran for re-
election as punong barangay in their respective barangays, namely: Occidental Linuk,
Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingud, and Tatayawan South (five
barangays), all in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur.
Due to a failure of elections in eleven barangays in Lanao del Sur, the COMELEC issued a
resolution setting special elections on 13 August 2002 in the affected barangays in Lanao del Sur
including the five barangays. On 14 August 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael Maulay (EO
Maulay) issued a certification that there were no special elections held on 13 August 2002.
Consequently, Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong filed a Joint Petition
seeking to declare a failure of elections in the five barangays and the holding of another special
election. The Joint Petition attributed the failure of the special elections to EO Maulays non-
compliance with COMELEC Commissioner Mehol K. Sadains (Commissioner Sadain) directive.
Commissioner Sadain had directed EO Maulay to use the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) 2001 computerized Voters List and the Voters Registration Records of the Provincial
Election Officer during the December 2001 registration of new voters.
On a resolution issued by COMELEC it directed the Department of Interior and Local
Government is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the appointment of Barangay Captains and
Barangay Kagawads as well as SK Chairmen and SK Kagawads in Barangays Occidental
Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, Tatayawan South, and New Lumbacaingud, all of
Tamparan, Lanao del Sur, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, and other related laws on the matter.
Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar and Mascara (petitioners) filed the instant petition
Issues:
1. WON to call another special election.
2. WON DILG may appoint Baranggay and SK officials
Held:
 The petition is meritorious.
On the first issue;
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall. Indisputably, the text and intent of this constitutional provision
is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve its primordial
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature. It is elementary in administrative law that courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies. The authority given to COMELEC to declare a failure of elections and to call for special
elections falls under its administrative function.
In the case at bar, neither the candidates nor the voters of the affected barangays caused the
failure of the special elections. The COMELECs own acting election officer, EO Maulay, readily
admitted that there were no special elections in these barangays. The COMELEC also found that
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Sur and the Regional Election Director of Region
XII did not contest the fact that there were no special elections in these barangays.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. The
right of suffrage is enshrined in the Constitution because through suffrage the people exercise
their sovereign authority to choose their representatives in the governance of the State. The fact
that the elections involved in this case pertain to the lowest level of our political organization is
not a justification to disenfranchise voters.
COMELEC anchored its refusal to call another special election on the last portion of Section
6 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:
SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or
other analogous cases the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or
had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting
and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis
of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such
postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
The Court construed Section 6 in Pangandaman v. COMELEC, as follows
In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that: 1.] it should
not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or
suspension of the election or the failure to elect; and, 2.] it should be reasonably close to the date
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect. The first involves a
question of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a
case. Thus, the holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause
of the postponement, suspension or failure to elect may still be considered reasonably close to
the date of the election not held.
The prohibition on conducting special elections after thirty days from the cessation of the
cause of the failure of elections is not absolute. It is directory, not mandatory, and the COMELEC
possesses residual power to conduct special elections even beyond the deadline prescribed by
law. The deadline in Section 6 cannot defeat the right of suffrage of the people as guaranteed by
the Constitution. The COMELEC erroneously perceived that the deadline in Section 6 is
absolute. The COMELEC has broad power or authority to fix other dates for special elections to
enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC may fix other dates for the
conduct of special elections when the same cannot be reasonably held within the period
prescribed by law. Unlike Section 6, Section 45 does not state that special elections should be held
on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held. Instead, Section 45 states that
special elections should be held within thirty days from the cessation of the causes for
postponement. Logically, special elections could be held anytime, provided the date of the special
elections is within thirty days from the time the cause of postponement has ceased.
Hence, COMELEC’s reasons for refusing to hold another special election are void.
On the second issue:
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9164 (RA 9164) provides:
Sec. 5. Hold Over. All incumbent barangay officials and sangguniang kabataan officials
shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause until their successors shall
have been elected and qualified. The provisions of the Omnibus Election Code relative to failure
of elections and special elections are hereby reiterated in this Act.

RA 9164 is now the law that fixes the date of barangay and SK elections, prescribes the
term of office of barangay and SK officials, and provides for the qualifications of candidates and
voters for the SK elections.
Since there was a failure of elections in the 15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13
August 2002 special elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay chairmen of
their respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. They shall continue to discharge their powers
and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and privileges pertaining to the office. True,
Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the term of elective barangay officials to three
years. However, Section 5 of RA 9164 explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may
continue in office in a hold over capacity until their successors are elected and qualified.
Section 5 of RA 9164 reiterates Section 4 of RA 6679 which provides that [A]ll incumbent
barangay officials xxx shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause xxx
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. Section 8 of the same RA 6679 also
states that incumbent elective barangay officials running for the same office shall continue to hold
office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.
The application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity in the transaction of official
business and prevents a hiatus in government pending the assumption of a successor into office.
As held in Topacio Nueno v. Angeles,cases of extreme necessity justify the application of the hold-
over principle.

Mario Jose Sereno, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PETROCHEMICAL

MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (APMP)
vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters (CTRM)
G.R. No. 175210 Feb. 01, 2016
Facts:
On May 23, 2005, the CTRM, an office under the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals
and certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
rates on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July
2005.
On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of
Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the
petrochemical sector, wrote to the CTRM Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza
(Director Mendoza), to request a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005 which
was denied by the latter. (The request for information was motivated by his desire to understand
the basis for the CTRM's recommendation that allegedly caused tremendous losses to the
petrochemical industry through the issuance of E.O. No. 486.)
The attitude of the CTRM prompted the Sereno and the APMP to bring the petition
for mandamus in the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and to grant
access to the minutes.
The RTC declared that the CTRM is an advisory body composed of various department
heads or secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and inter-agency communications and
that the record of the communications of such body "falls under the category of privileged
information because of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect public interest.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CTRM may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with
a copy of the minutes of the May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure.
Held:

The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed.

The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern
enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State's policy of
full public disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article
II of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-making
as well as in the operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the exercise by the people of
the freedom of expression. In a democratic society like ours, the free exchange of information is
necessary, and can be possible only if the people are provided the proper information on matters
that affect them. But the people's right to information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, the constitutional guarantee to information "does not open every door to any
and all information." It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State's policy of full public disclosure is restricted to
transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law.
Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ
of mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or
public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern or public interest. Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that
the public may want to be familiar with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or
because the issues "naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen." As such, whether or not
the information sought is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination
of the courts on a case to case basis.
In his capacity as a citizen and as the Executive Director of the APMP, Sereno has sought
to obtain official information dealing with the policy recommendation of the CTRM with respect
to the reduction of tariffs on petrochemical resins and plastic products. He has asserted that the
recommendation, which would be effected through E.O. No. 486, not only brought significant
losses to the petrochemical industry that undermined the industry's long-term viability and
survival, but also conflicted with official government pronouncements, policy directives, and
enactments designed to support and develop an integrated petrochemical industry. He has
claimed that the implementation of E.O. No. 486 effectively deprived the industry of tariff support
and market share, thereby jeopardizing large investments without due process of law.
The second requisite is that the information requested must not be excluded by law from
the constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional
guarantee of the people's right to information does not cover national security matters and
intelligence information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters. Equally
excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-
door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court has ruled that
the right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information
under the separation of powers," which include "Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings." Likewise exempted from the right to
information are "information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national
security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused."
The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was
classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee's composition and the
nature of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert
that the information withheld was within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the
CTRM meetings were directly related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President
as the Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in
Section 3 (a) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.
The respondents are correct. It is always necessary, given the highly important and
complex powers to fix tariff rates vested in the President, that the recommendations submitted
for the President's consideration be well-thought out and well-deliberated.
Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the
people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality.
However, the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose
information must be clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption. 35 In case of
denial of access to the information, it is the government agency concerned that has the burden of
showing that the information sought to be obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the
same is exempted from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC

 vs.
FRANCISCO SANTIAGO and ENRIQUE MEDINA, as Commissioner, Public Service
Commission,
G.R. No. L-29236 August 21, 1974
Facts:
On 1966, a telegram was filed with RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Radio Communications) and the amount of P1.50 was paid for the transmission of said telegram
to Zamboanga City. The telegram, however, was never transmitted until now. The Radio
Communications not only did not give any valid explanation, but did not present any evidence to
explain why the said telegram was not forwarded to the addressee until now. Hence, a case was
filed against Radio Communications. Another similar case was filed against Radio
Communications for not sending telegram after receiving payment thereof. The Public Service
Commission imposed a fine against Radio Communications.
Issue:
WON the imposition of fines made by the Public Service Commission against Radio
Communications is proper
Held:
NO.
Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the
fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power
before he can exercise it. It need not be express. It may be implied from the wording of the law.
Absent such a requisite, however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority. The act
performed, if properly challenged, cannot meet the test of validity. It must be set aside. So it must
be in these two petitions. In the case of Bautista v. Angeles, the court held that, it devolves upon
the judicial power to convince the private individual, the party governed, that he has no right to
do what he did in violating orders of the administrative authorities issued by them in the exercise
of their rights. Once he is convinced, the administrative authorities, by virtue of their own powers,
impose the weight of their authority upon him. If they, the administrative authorities of public
officials, exceed lawful limits in the exercise of their power of execution, the law provides what
shall be done before the judicial power can step in and repair the damage to the private interest,
or apply the law by declaring what was properly or improperly done in exercising public power.
Moreover, nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights.
The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and
enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There
must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant,
they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the
high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Such
a fundamental postulate applies to the Executive itself. So it has been attested by a number of
cases involving the President of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, The Public Service Commission having been abolished by virtue of a
Presidential Decree, as set forth at the outset, and a new Board of Communications having been
created to take its place, nothing said in this decision has reference to whatever powers are now
lodged in the latter body. It is to be understood, likewise, that insofar as the complainants are
concerned, this decision goes no further than to rule adversely on the exercise of authority by the
Public Service Commission when it took disciplinary action against petitioner.
Hence, there can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission imposing the
fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power it possessed over radio
companies, as noted was the fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence
or misfeasance. It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested with such authority.

Simon Aldovino vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 184836 Dec. 23, 2009
Facts:
Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms.
In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. However, Supreme
Court subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing
the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position. The Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N.
Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel
it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a
fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. COMELEC ruled in favor of Asilo. It reasoned out that
the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-
2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUES:
1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-
term limit rule; and

2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in

Section 43(b) of RA 7160
Held:
On the first issue;
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits
an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first
branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a term as
a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word
term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an
office may be held. Upon expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to
holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of
public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such
is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.
The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. This formulation no more than
three consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule.
The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any
circumvention of the limitation through voluntary severance of ties with the public office; it
expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This declaration
complements the term limitation mandated by the first branch. Voluntary renunciation is not the
only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of service for a full term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent
reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term. Neither does the
Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is
a consecutive fourth term.
From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title
to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however
short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article
X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in
office to no more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder,
while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason
provided by law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions
for reasons established by law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be used once the right
to office is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that
none is really lost.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure
and substance fixes an elective officials term of office and limits his stay in office to three
consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation
as an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of
term, not in the context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the
elective position. The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective officials
voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary
cessation of the exercise of power or authority that may occur for various reasons, with
preventive suspension being only one of them.
On the second issue;
Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, or the Ombudsman Act is an interim remedial measure to address the
situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the evidence
preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.
Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the evidence
of guilt is strong and given the gravity of the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in
office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the records and other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed
after a valid information (that requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while
under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the Ombudsman, the evidence
of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service;
or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs
after there has been a break in the term.
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive
suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office
beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the
suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions
and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended
officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the
authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term
is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term
that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or
involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily
prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that
preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the
enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an
office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to
office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a
time within a term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine
effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion
in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be
interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of
the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an
effective interruption is.
Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a
voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have
voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this
perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary
renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office
as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office
demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary
renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not
the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-
comparable.
 But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important
consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render
service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not
allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat,
however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it
be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it
does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension
has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of
a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
Hence, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed
preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials
term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth
term. By so refusing, the COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a positive duty required by no
less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.