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feedback is introduced in the form of an infrared

light signal. A subminiature tungsten bulb acting


as an electro-optical transducer re-introduces into
the window of the photo transistor an optical signal
proportional to the electrical signal at the output
of the amplifier. Base bias for the photo transistor
is supplied by the DC component of the light from
the lamp, which is run at a steady 12-ma current.
The photofeed back version of the pyrometer
gives greater precision as well as greater calibra-
tion stability. The voltage calibration is reproduc-
ible to better than 0.1 %, giving a temperature
Recording pyrometer designed for use by the Flight
that is reproducible to better than ± 1°C at 1000° Research Group.
K and ±4 °C at 2000 0K. Even greater precision
could be achieved by redesigning for a larger surface temperature in a rocket motor. By mount-
amount of feedback, but stability of the feedback ing the pyrometer directly to the rocket-nozzle
lamp characteristics may impose a practical limit. wall (a capability made possible by its small
The threshold temperature of this version is size and weight), optical alignment errors due to
~8400K . thermal expansion can be avoided. An optical
The most important advantage of the feedback pyrometer is preferable to a thermocouple in this
version of the pyrometer, as previously noted, is application since it has no thermal lag or lead
that after an initial absolute calibration, it needs conduction loss.
no further optical calibration and is therefore Other groups in the Laboratory are finding
ready for field use under any conditions. Another uses for the transistorized pyrometer. A conven-
advantage is that feedback improves the linearity iently sized unit using the same basic optical and
of the photo transistor response. electronic design, which has been adapted by J.
An accompanying figure shows how the pyrome- M. Akridge for use by the Flight Research Group,
ter is being used currently to measure throat- is illustrated.

SURVIVAL
etropC)litan-~rea clear Attacks

On May 25, 1961, in his message to ing itself from the residual radioac- when quite remote from the actual
Congress on "Urgent National tivity ("fallout") that would result ground zero of a large-yield thermo-
Needs," the President called for a new from a nuclear attack. nuclear detonation. They can pro-
and revitalized · civil defense program It is agreed * that "fallout shelters" vide all the immediate protection that
to protect the civilian population of will provide useful protection only is required for a large segment of the
the United States from the hazards of population (20 million rural inhabi-
nuclear war. Since that time, many • The au t hor a cknowledges tha t the factua l
d a ta upon which this study is b ased were stitu te a specific set of r eco mme nd a tions.
pamphlets, books, and articles have derived from U . S. Government a nd other bu t a r e a n aggregation of facts fr o m which
appeared urging the population to publica tions lis ted at the conclusion of this the r eader m ay deter m ine his own course of
begih providing the means for shelter- paper. The sta tements herein do not con- action .

18 APL T ech n ical Digest


tants plus the residents of small cities sents a gamble that there will be no sheltered population and of expected
and towns) from nearly any form of nuclear war, that if cities are targets survivors among a sheltered popu-
nuclear attack, and for nearly all of in a nuclear war, adequate shelter is lation.
the population, urban and rural, impossible, or that if successful shelter
from some likely attacks (on SAC bases is possible in a target city during a Lethal Characteristics of Ther-
or missile launching sites, for exam- nuclear strike, the post-attack world Illonuclear Explosions
ple). However, the appeal of the will not be worth living in. The un- The explosion of a thermon uclear
fallout shelter alone understandably certainties in these conclusions are weapon near the surface of the earth
vanishes for the 40 million residents of huge and the stakes in the wager im- releases a tremendous amount of
our 60 largest cities when they con- mense : survival for the individual, his energy in a number of ways potentially
sider the cities themselves as potential family, his community, and his nation. lethal to a city and its inhabitants.
targets. Despite many seemingly This paper considers the feasibility The weapon explodes with a brilliant
persuasive arguments to the contrary, of providing adequate shelter within flash of light, and the air in the im-
there is little reassurance for city an urban area that is the scene of a mediate vicinity of the explosion is
dwellers in predictions that an enemy direct attack. An estimate is made of heated very rapidly to extremely high
may be bold enough to strike remote the immediate lethal effects of such temperatures. A "fireball," which may
parts of our country but will be too an attack. Shelter design criteria, as persist for more than a minute, is
timid to assault our cities. influenced by the environment thus formed. During the period of time
Neglect of adequate shelter prepara- created, are developed . Comparison w hen the major part of the thermal
tions by the urban population repre- is made of casualties among an un- energy is being emitted, the apparent

A MILES FROM GROUND ZERO AT WHICH VARIOUS STRUCTURES WILL BE DESTROY ED BY BLAST
o 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32

150 PSI
100 PSI-ALL ABOV E-GROUND STRUCTURES
20 PSI-MASSIV E MULTISTORIED OFFIC E BUILDINGS-95 ,,/o HUMAN MORTALITY
5 PSI-A PARTM ENT BUILDINGS- 15,,/o HUMAN MORTALITY
V) 3 PSI-WOOD OR BRICK HOUSES-THRESHOLD OF HUMAN MORTALITY
f-
U 1 1 1.8 PSI- MODERATE DAMAGE TO HOUSES
W ~......,r----'r--;
l.L
l.L
W
MT

tn 10 MT
«
;i 50 MT

~ 50 MT
U
t±: 10 MT
l.L
W
I MT
....J
« 1' 8 ca l/cm2 - CRUMPL ED NEWSPAPERS- 2nd-D EG REE BURN S (HUM AN )
L
~ 10 ca l/cm 2 -D RY ROTTED WOOD-GRASS-3rd-DEGREE BURNS (HUMAN)
I 15 cal/cm 2 -TREE LEAVES
f-
20 ca l/cm 2 -CARDBOARD BOXES-BURLAP
25 cal/cm 2- W EATHERED WOOD SIDING
35 ca l/cm 2- UPHOLSTERY-WOOL RUGS
cal/cm 2 -ALL CO MBUSTIBLES

o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
MILES FROM GROUND ZERO AT WHICH VARIOUS MATERIALS WILL BE IGNITED BY THERMAL RADIATION

C
10 5 r-------r--r-.~-.----r----------r--------~ 100 r-------~~--~~~--------~

V)
V)_

~ ] 80 t----------r
....JW ~ u
~O 104 ~--------~----~--~~--------~--------_1 u Qi
~o Vi -E= 60 t-----------,
Z
-z O~
<Q U~ 40 t--------..,
O~ 103 ~---------+--~----~~--~~---+--------~
f-O 3J0
«
0<: 3~ 20
10 2 ~ ______ ~~ ______ ~ ____ ~ __ ~~ ______ ~
z
o I~ 2~ 3~ 200 400 600 800
DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (miles) ACUTE RADIATION DOSE (r)

Fig. I-Lethal effects of nuclear weapons: (A) thermal and blast effects on structures and materials at various radii; (B) radii of radiation
effects for 1-, 10-, and 50-MT yields; (C) physiological effects of radiation for increasing doses.

}v/ay - J une 1963 19


surface temperature of the fireball TABLE I

reaches a maximum of about NUCLEAR ATTACK PATTERNS STUDIED FOR THE WASHINGTON, D. C. AREA

15,000°F. The almost instantaneous


Case Number and Total Yield oj
burst of nuclear radiation issuing from Aim Point
Number Yield oj Bombs Attack (megato ns)
the detonation point is followed by
an intense blast wave that generates
I I at 50 MT City center 50
a violent wind. I a t 10 MT City center 10
II
When the burst is close to the sur- III 3 at 10 MT Chosen to m a ximize area of 5-psi 30
face of the earth, a crater is formed. coverage
IV I at 10 MT Chosen to maximize area of 5-psi 15
The soil and / or rock structure adja-
a nd coverage
cent to the crater is ruptured or per- 5 at I MT
manently deformed by the intense
blast. The shock transmitted through
shelter must be immediately available iently available and were not included
the earth beyond this deformed area
for most of those who will survive. t in the analysis.) They are indicative
is relatively weak, so damage by the
of the nighttime or residence popula-
direct ground shock to buried struc-
The Dhnensions of Destruction tion and do not reflect the work-day
tures outside this zone will be small.
in an Urban Area distribution. However, they are the
The vaporized mixture of radioactive
In order to maintain a perspective appropriate figures since they refer to
debris from the bomb and the surface
in this grim assessment, it is important population distribution under the
material from the crater is lifted high
to understand that the destruction will only conditions in which passive
into the sky by the vertical winds
not be as uniformly distributed as the d efense will be effective. We presume
generated by the explosion. Upon
following generalized discussion por- that the preparation of shelters will
cooling, this mixture solidifies in small
trays. In particular, the enemy tactics have predisposed their owners to be
particles, thereby trapping some of
of attack, and the ensuing location, in a position to use them should
the radioactive debris. The contami-
yield, and number of bomb detona- desperate need arise. Reconsideration
nated material may return rapidly to
tions, while reasonable in terms of of the lethality of the weapons should
earth in the form of heavy particles
future capability, are completely be sufficient encouragement to re-
with much radioactive contamina-
speculative. However, it is clear that main in or very near the shelters if
tion. The smaller and lighter particles
some areas remote from ground zero nuclear attack appears imminent.
descend more slowly and thus their
will be substantially unaffected, in the As a basis for study, the bomb pat-
activity will have had more time in
immediate sense, by weapon detona- terns in Table I were superimposed
which to decay before they reach the
tions; some others closer to the burst upon the Washington area (guidance
earth's surface.
will be physically untouched but will accuracy equivalent to a 1.0 nautical
The regions over which the immedi-
be threatened by fallout; closer to mile C.E.P.-circular error probable
ately hazardous radioactive material
ground zero, fallout, fire, and blast -is assumed as realistic).
from a surface burst may be deposited
damage will increase; very near The aim points for these sample
depend almost entirely upon the un-
ground zero there will be complete attacks were selected arbitrarily. t For
predictable wind currents through
devastation. It should be noted that single bomb strikes, the Washington
which such material will pass during
much of the evidence concerning Monument waS chosen because it is
its rise and fall. Patterns observed in
overall effects of nuclear detonations centrally located to the White House,
tests undertaken to date indicate a
has been drawn directly from con- Capitol, and Pentagon, and is at about
wide variation of activity as a func-
trolled situations during actual tests of the center of the population distribu-
tion of distance from the detonation.
nuclear devices. tion of the m etropolitan Washington
Hot spots of severe activity have been
Discussion of the environment where area. For multiple bomb strikes, aim
noted at points moderately distant
shelters must function will clarify points were generally selected so as to
from ground zero.
shelter design requirements and pro- maximize the area of the city over
The thermal radiation, the initial
vide some guidance for the utility of which there would be a high (0.9)
nuclear radiation, the air shock (and
shelters. The metropolitan Washing- probability of seriously damaging all
associated induced ground shock), and
ton, D. c., area is used as a basis for except reinforced concrete or equiva-
the "residual" radioactive contamina-
discussion because it is a likely target lent structures.
tion ("fallout") are the effects of most
if urban centers come under attack. The extent of the blast destruction
concern in the design of protective
The population and population den- caused by the attack of Case IV in
shelters (see Fig. IA and B).
sity of the District of Columbia and Table I is shown on the Washington-
The shock wave will travel at great
its Maryland suburbs were derived area map, Fig. 2. Here we see the
speed and will reach distances as
from 1960 census data. (Data for the region within which there is a high
great as 15 miles in less than a minute.
Virginia suburbs were not conven- probability (0.9) that residential
This is probably the upper limit of
structures would be d estroyed. In the
time available for effective action by
t For those interested in a much more de- vicinity of the aim points, even blast-
those whose survival depends on the
tailed discussion of nuclea r weapon effects,
action taken. This emphasizes the
"The Effects of Nuclear Wea pons," avail- t Aim points are selected for purposes of
fact that, over the entire area of able from the U. S. Government Printing controlled studies and do not necessarily
interest in any direct city attack, Office, is highly recommended. represent actual deton ation poin ts .

20 APL T echnical Digest


resistant, reinforced-concrete build- about and from impact against hard bilities of survival for even moderate-
ings will have a high probability of objects, and the injuries to be ex- strength shelters, no matter which
being completely destroyed. The total pected from blast-accelerated glass reasonable combination of bomb
devastated area would extend to and other debris, assume importance aim points, yields, and numbers is
about 11 miles from the Washington at much lower overpressure levels. employed.
Monument and would include such When added to the hazards of en- The effectiveness of shelters of
suburban communities as Bethesda, trapment, injury, and death occa- various degrees of hardness (expressed
Silver Spring. Wheaton, College sioned by collapsing buildings, high in terms of the limiting overpressure
Park, Cheverly, and the environs of casualty rates can be expected in which they are designed to with-
Andrews Air Force Base. Individuals urban areas exposed to 5-psi over- stand) is also illustrated in Fig. 2. The
within the devastated area would have pressure. circular areas represent the limits of
a 9 out of 10 chance of being exposed It is clear that shelters cannot pro- the regions about the arbitrarily
to blast effects of at least 5 psi, and, vide complete assurance of survival at chosen aim points of Attack Case IV
without adequate protection, the any particular location within the within which there is 0.1 probability
casualty rate would be very high. The metropolitan area; the laws of chance that the indicated overpressures will
human body is surprisingly resistant prevailing in such circumstances pre- be exceeded. Anywhere beyond these
to direct damage from blast, being clude efforts to predict actual locations circular regions there is a 9 out of 10
able to withstand up to 35-psi over- of bomb detonation points (or the chance that a shelter possessing the
pressure before a significant number number or yield of bombs that might strength shown will withstand the
of fatalities occur. However, blast- fall) . However, there are very large blast. While the probability of sur-
induced injuries from being thrown areas where there exist high proba- vival for a given shelter hardness does
decrease within these circles as one
I -MT WEAPON approaches the aim point, there is
still a better-than-even chance
10- MT WEAPON
throughout the entire area that any
particular 35-psi shelter will survive a
burst of several megatons (MT).
The extent of the blast damage that
........ , would result from the other attack
cases listed may be inferred from a
\ transfer of the appropriate blast
\ damage distances to the map of the

,I Washington area. The need for


making provision for survival of the
~ immediate blast effects is not grossly
I affected by changes in the attack
\ pattern. Even the smaller bombs
\ would be vastly damaging to an un-
acceptably large fraction of an un-
\ protected population.
\ Increasing the yield and / or the
\ number of bombs dropped does not
\ produce a proportionate increase in
I the percentage of the population af-
I fected. As an example, the area for a
MILES FRO M A IM PO INT BEYOND /
W HI C H PROBABILITY IS 0.9 THAT / high probability of destruction for the
SH ELTER DESIGN OVERP RESS URE / lO-MT single air burst extends to a
WILL NOT BE EXCEEDED.
radius of about 8>i miles from the
DESIGN O VE RPRESSUR E
YI ELD 35 PSI 100 PSI 150 PSI Washington Monument and includes
I 2. 1 1.4 1. 1 more than 70 % of the metropolitan
10 3.5 2.4 2. 2 area population. Increasir.g the yield
50 5.4 3.6 3.2
five times to a 50-MT air burst in-
creases the radius to about 15 miles
MI LES FRO M AIM PO INT WITH IN
WH IC H PROBAB ILI TY IS 0.9 OF but increases the population included
OVERPRESS URE ;;; 5 PSI. by only an additional 20 % .
SU RFACE
YI ELD AI R BURST BUR ST Figure 3 gives the proportion of the
I 3.0 1.6 Washington area population that is
10 8.3 5.2 vulnerable when unsheltered. Con-
50 15.0 9.8
sidering, for the time being, the over-
Fig. 2-Dimensions of destruction for Attack Case IV in the Washington, D. C. area. pressure criteria only, well over half
Inside the entire area shown, there is an 0.9 probability that overpressures will exceed of those vulnerable would have a very
5 psi. Outside the circled areas, there is an 0.9 probability that overpressures will not
exceed those shown on the circles. high probability of survival if they

M ay - June 1963 21
It is evident that the regions within
14 which there is a high probability of
having incident thermal energy
12
sufficient to cause ignitions (termed
primary ignitions) in common materials
i extend to about the same or greater
~ 10 distances as those associated with
~ blast damage. Conditions suitable to
'-+-
0 widespread secondary ignitions (those
-DQ)
resulting from blast damage to heating
~:J
elements, fuel lines, etc. ) are also to be
.L expected throughout the zones heavily
6
Vl
cY
damaged by blast, although these may
0 be less widespread than the primary
>
:>
cY
4 ignitions.
::::J
Vl
NO MORE THAN THIS MAN Y
Detonation of even a few megatons
SURVIVORS IF PO PULATI ON IS UN SHELTERED in the Washington area is capable of
2
initiating fires over a great area while
at the same time destroying or
0 severely disrupting most ordinary
0 10 20 30 40 50 means of fire fighting. The post-
YI ELD (megatons)
attack spread of fires may be expected
Fig. 3-Estimates of probable (0.9) nuclear-burst survivors among sheltered and un- to follow an expanding trend from
sheltered populations in Washington, D. C. (single- burst; aim point, Washington
the massive destruction and the great
Monument; 1.0-nautical-mile C. E. P.).
number of fires in the central area.
were protected by even a minimum- the Washington area resulting from If uncontrolled, ignitions even in the
strength (35-psi) blast shelter, and these arbitrary strikes is heavily areas remote from ground zero might
stronger shelters would reduce the dependent upon a number of factors develop into building fires, block
casualties even more. It has become that cannot be predicted satisfac- fires, or area fires. With the hazard
clear from examination of the various torily. Such physical factors as of early fallout in the downwind
attacks, that no one combination of moisture content and reflectivity of direction, it does not appear possible
aim points and weapon yields is exposed materials, transmittance of to prevent widespread enlargement of
overwhelmingly more destructive to the atmosphere, presence or absence the fire area. Surface winds would
the city than any of the others. of clouds and snow cover, shadowing continue to drive the fires until a
Throughout all of the District of effect of foliage, structures, and natural or artificial firebreak (a park,
Columbia and well into the Maryland topographic features, etc., all will river, wide street, reservoir, etc.),
suburbs, there is clear indication substantially affect the radius of where there is insufficient fuel to
that the stronger the shelter, the ignition of primary fires. However, propagate the flames, is reached.
higher the assurance of survival. the potential destruction under con- Even their efficiency as firebreaks
However, since any protection will ditions favorable to the attacker may may be severely dependent upon the
improve the chances of survival, the be estimated. season, weather conditions, orienta-
standards should not be set so high Figure IA includes the approxi- tion with respect to the direction of
that shelter efforts are, in fact, dis- mate radiant exposure required for fire travel, etc. It seems clear that
couraged. ignition of household materials and destruction by fire of a very large
Attack Case IV probably represents dry vegetation. Almost any thin, part of the metropolitan area must
an upper limit to the number of flammable , household material will be anticipated. No section can expect
weapons that would be expended on ignite if exposed to thermal radiation immunity.
a single city. (It should be assumed of about 10-20 cal/cm2• Dry vegeta-
that the Virginia suburbs, being as tion will ignite at about the same A fire resulting from a nuclear ex-
thickly populated as the Maryland exposure. The distances from the aim plosion over a major metropolitan
areas, will receive equal attention from points at which these thermal radi- area will reach its peak and begin to
the attacker.) Thus, beyond about 15 ation levels would probably be die down after three hours. Generally,
miles from the city center, it appears reached are indicated below. (These individual buildings will be destroyed
that expected blast forces would be figures presume a reasonably clear in about one hour; collapsed buildings
reduced to an extent that would atmosphere. ) may continue to smolder and burn for
permit survival in fallout-type shelters. days. Where fires develop into fire -
However, the fires that result from Distance jrom storms or conflagrations, they will
the attack may necessitate much more Aim Point jor 0.9 continue to burn with great intensity
Yield (single Probability oj at Least until all the fuel has been consumed.
elaborate precautions than are pro-
surface bursts) 10-20 cal/cm 2 (miles)
vided for in some of the designs The lethal capacity of these massive
1 MT 2.0-3.3
described in the available literature. 10 MT 8 . 6-12.2 fires is emphasized by data from cities
The extent of thermal damage to 50 MT 19.0-27.2 burned by firebomb attacks during

22 APL Technical Digest


World War II. A series of Allied
attacks on Hamburg in 1943 de-
stroyed 55 to 60 % of the city, with
damage extending to an area of 30
square miles; 12.5 square miles were
completely burned out. Estimates of
deaths ranged from 60,000 to 100,000,
and 300,000 dwellings were destroyed.
During the second of the series of
raids, within 90 minutes after the
bombs had dropped, a full-grown
firestorm developed. Availabk shelters
proved inadequate, and they became
death traps for their occupants.
Carbon monoxide from the incomplete
combustion of rubble became recog-
nized as a major cause of death; in
Hamburg, it was estimated that 70%
of all deaths were caused by carbon
monoxide poisoning.
Other cities, too, suffered the
destruction of mass fires. Tokyo was
attacked on March 9-10, 1945, and
16 square miles were destroyed by a
moving conflagration, with a loss
of over 130,000 people. Dresden was
burned on February 13-14, 1945, and
estimates of the dead reached 300,000.
The lessons that were learned from
these facts are:
1. Effective control of large area
fires in cities was not possible.
2. In some circumstances, heroic 90
efforts preserved some sections. SHELTER DESIGN OVERPRESSURE (psi)

3. Masses of hot rubble and debris Fig. 4-(A) A representative family shelter that meets the minimum standards for austere
from destroyed structures choked accommodations and that will survive 65-psi overpressures; (B) thickness of combined
concrete and earth cover required to attenuate the initial radiation of 100 r inside the shelter
all passageways in the more densely and to withstand the crushing forces associated with the indicated blast overpressures.
built-up sections of the cities.
4. Communications within the stem directly from the provision of computations since estimates of sur-
cities, necessary for any coordinated "hard" shelters-and the harder the vival should be based as nearly as
attempt to fight fires, were completely better. The minimum standards for possible on the true ultimate strength
destroyed. such shelters are discussed in the of the shelter) :
5. Existing shelters were inadequate sections that follow. Details of con- Overpressure Wall and Ceiling
from the standpoint of resistance to struction, cost, equipment, etc., are (psi) Thickness (in.)
high temperature and noxious gases. not included since meaningful defini- 35 8.0
Many persons, who might have left tion is not possible in a study as 100 13.0
the area before the fires spread, were broad in scope as this. 150 16.0
trapped in the shelters. These are preliminary figures in
THE SHELTER MUST BE STRUCTURALLY
which only the gross strength of the
Shelter Design Requirmnents STRONG ENOUGH TO ~AND
structure has been estimated. It is
ANTICIPATED BLAST LOADS
Hypothetical attacks against the to be expected that detailed design
Washington area have been examined, A schematic example of an under- (see "Design of Structures to Resist
and the lethal nature of the resulting ground shelter is shown in Fig. 4. the Effects of Atomic Weapons,"
environment has been described. An estimate of the wall and ceiling for example) for a particular shelter
From such information, criteria for thickness required to withstand the will be based upon the individual
shelter designs may now be developed. blast load, together with adequate needs of the builder.
Admittedly, while no advance prepa- earth cover for attenuation of the
THE SHELTER IIlJST BE THEJUfALLY
rations can guarantee survival, it initial radiation, is also shown.
INSULATED AND SEALED FROM THE
seems possible for a very large number For the shelter design overpressures
EFFECTS OF FIRES RESULTING FROM
of the metropolitan-area residents to illustrated in Fig. 2, the following
THE BURST
improve vastly their probabilities of figures are appropriate (no factors of
survival. This improvement will safety have been included in these I t will be necessary to seal the

1\tlay - Jun e 1963 23


shelter to prevent ingress of carbon initial radiation dose to less than The shelter dimensions may be
monoxide gas for the period that 100 r in even the worst (l50-psi, established so that the sealed shelter
fires persist. This means sealing the 1-MT) design case, and 3 ft of earth will contain sufficient air to sustain
shelter for as long as a day after the is sufficient to attenuate to doses of the life of the inhabitants during the
fire begins in the vicinity of the shelter. less than 100 r at design overpressures required dwell time, thus eliminating
External air (filtered) may be usable of 35 psi or less. the need for storing air in high-
after this time and can then be 2. Fallout or Residual Radiation- pressure containers.
pumped into the shelter. If smoke Residual radiation dose rates greater The amount of absolutely essential
and other noxious products remain than several thousand r / hr (at 1 hr air space in the sealed shelter can be
in the atmosphere, the "sealed time" after burst time) may exist at con- estimated by considering that one
may need to be extended. siderable distances (tens of miles) resting adult requires about 7 ft3/ hr
In a test that simulated the burning downwind from a multimegaton of air and that the minimum air
of a densely populated area of single- burst. At isolated points in the vicinity requirement of one adult performing
story buildings, a shelter buried under of ground zero, this one-hour reference light tasks without discomfort is
3 ft of earth was instrumented to dose rate may exceed 10,000 r / hr. about 25 ft 3/ hr.
determine how much heat would These values seem to be reasonable A number of measures may be
register inside. The test indicated design limits for estimating maximum taken to extend the safe dwell time
that negligible changes in environ- attenuation requirements. within the sealed shelter. Auxiliary
ment occurred inside the shelter, Utilizing the concept of an average oxygen may be stored in tanks and
showing the feasibility of satisfactory wind speed to determine the rate of released into the shelter as necessary.
thermal insulation of the shelter with travel of the contaminated debris, The use of individual oxygen masks
moderate depths of earth. Particular it is possible to develop the factor for permits the most efficient use of the
attention will have to be paid to the converting the one-hour reference oxygen. Excess CO2 must be removed
design of intake and exhaust ducts, dose rate to the total dose that would if habitation is prolonged; several
antennas, and other projections. be accumulated at various downwind methods of doing this are discussed
distances for various dwell times. This in detail in "Shelter Habitability
THE SHELTER MUST ATTENUATE THE
factor represents the integral of the Studies-The Effect of Oxygen De-
EXPECTED RADIATION TO AN AC -
product of the dose rate and exposure pletion and Fire Gases on Occupants
CEPTABLE LEVEL
time from the time of arrival of the of the Shelters."
1. Direct Radiation-The direct radi- radioactive material until some time
THE SHELTER MUST CONTAIN ESSENTIALS
ation of concern in shelter design that might represent possible de-
FOR SUPPORTING LIFE PROCESSES OF
consists of neutrons and the immediate parture from the radiation field.
INHABITANTS DURING REQUIRED DWELL
(less than a minute after detonation) For the distances from the burst that
TIME
gamma rays. Most of the dose re- are of interest to this study, say 2 to
ceived at a shelter will come from the 20 miles, factors of from 3 to 6 are Many sources list items considered
direction of the detonation point, appropriate. When multiplied by the essential for life in a shelter. The
but due to scattering in the design-dose-rate limits, total doses in quantities of items that must be
atmosphere, much will arrive from the order of 10,000 to 60,000 r could stored or available are dependent
other directions. result at unsheltered locations in upon the number of inhabitants and
From Fig. IA and B, the estimated the metropolitan area. Such doses, the required dwell time.
total initial radiation dose (neutrons of course, are fatal (see Fig. IC). It would appear that there are at
plus gamma rays, unsheltered) at Slabs designed to withstand 35-psi least two important time intervals
distances associated with various overpressure or more can secure an to be considered for survival:
overpressure levels may be deter- attenuation factor of 10,000 to residual 1. The time during which the
mined. Close to the burst points, at radiation gamma rays with about 3 shelter is sealed against intolerable
distances corresponding to the 150-psi ft of earth cover. The depths of earth combustion products;
overpressure, unsheltered initial radi- cover shown in Fig. 4 would reduce 2. The time during which the
ation doses in the order of 10 5 roent- the total dose accumulated in the residual radiation environment in
gens (r) would be experienced . Much shelter by the end of the third week the shelter neighborhood presents a
of the direct dose would be attenuated to only a few roentgens. lethal barrier to exit from the shelter.
by the intervening earth; however, From Fig. IC it can be seen that
THE SHELTER MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH
because of the uncertainty of the the tolerable dose for essentially no
FOR THE EXPECTED INHABITANTS
actual height at which the burst would impairment of activities may be as
occur, and of the great amount of While the dimensions of the shelter high as 200 r. Assuming the dose
scattered radiation, it is a conserva- are subject to adjustment to suit the accumulated while within a shelter
tive procedure to provide sufficient desires and needs of the owner, there to be no more than approximately
earth cover over the shelter to with- are certain factors that can be used to 100 r, then a like dose may still be
stand the total radiation associated determine the required shelter size, endured during immediate post-
with the design overpressure. Figure besides the obvious fact that price shelter activities. This does not mean
4 shows that about 6 ft of earth cover increases with increasing dimensions. that 200 r may be accumulated with
over the shelter provides sufficient As we have discussed, the shelter complete impunity; the lo~g-term
attenuation to reduce the expected must be sealed during a firestorm. effect of such doses of ionizing radi-

24 APL Technical Digest


ation is very incompletely understood. falls in the realm of long-range sur- cussion of shelter food requirements
However, it may be necessary to vival planning and is beyond the is not included in this paper.
leave the shelter, at least for a time, scope of this paper. The shelters
in the face of other and more im- within the area can be expected to SANITATION
mediate threats to survival. Thus, it provide no more than the immediate Provision must be made for the
is essential to estimate the relation- necessary protection, with a margin disposal of human waste, which can
ship between required shelter dwell of fitness sufficient to enable the spread such diseases as typhoid,
time and the time available for inhabitants to enter the long-range dysentery, and diarrhea. The sim-
evacuation or other activities in the survival and recovery phase without plest device is a tightly covered metal
reduced but still-dangerous radiation undue physical handicaps. pail, together with a supply of plastic
environment. For design purposes, a shelter dwell bags. Household bleach may be used
Assuming, for design purposes, time of 21 days should be assumed, (following the shelter-sealed condition)
the 10,000 r / hr reference dose rate, with the expectation that for at least to decrease odors and prevent insect
Table II shows the limit of exposure the first day of this time the shelter breeding. A larger can with a tight
time for various exit times and ac- may need to be thermally sealed. cover should be available to store the
cumulated exposure doses. During the remainder of the time, plastic bags after use. When the
ventilation with filtered air will be radiation field has decayed suffi-
TABLE II
required. The following list indicates ciently to permit very brief exposure,
HOURS OF POST-SHELTER TIME TO AC-
CUMULATE SELECTED RADIATION DOSES
the minimum supplies and equipment this storage container may be placed
necessary for the occupants of the outside the shelter.
Accumulation (r) shelter.
LIGHT
Shelter Exit AIR SUPPLY
Time (days 150 100 50 A continuous dim light can be
after attack) I I Sealed Condition - equivalent of about provided, using a 4-cell hot-shot
Period (hr) 10 ft 3/ hr of air per occupant. This is battery connected to a flashlight bulb.
near the limit of endurance for a Other methods of illumination can
4 4 2X IX resting adult, with a small margin of be used, of course, at the discretion
7 7 4H 2H safety. More space or an auxiliary of the occupants. Three or four fresh
14 17 11 5H supply of oxygen, and provisions for batteries should be on hand, together
21 28 18 9
removing CO2 from the air, would be with spare bulbs. Simple hand gen-
28 40 26 13
highly desirable. erators might be utilized to supply
Note : It must be emphasized that, while Unsealed Condition-A manually electrical power for short intervals.
predictions of the radiation field are useful operated ventilating system must be Flashlights should also be available.
for estima ting the required shelter dwell time included, which is capable of pro- A conventional electrical outlet should
for desi gn purposes, ac tual emergence from a
shelter must be b ased on measurements of the
viding at least 5 ft 3/ min of filtered be installed in the shelter since it is
radiation activity at exit time. air. This amount will provide for possible that regular electrical service
comfortable occupany of the shelter will not be interrupted by an attack.
Table II indicates that one who for an indefinite period, and will
leaves the shelter after 21 days may permit more nearly normal physical THE SHELTER SHOULD CONTAIN MINI-

expect to accumulate a dose of 100 r activity. MUM ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO ASSURE


SAFE EMERGENCE FROM THE SHELTER
within 18 hr if he remains unsheltered
WATER AND EVACUATION OF THE SHELTER AREA
in the area where the dose rate was
10,000 r/hr at one hour after detona- One gallon per day per person is Instruments to detect and measure
tion. It is evident that the radiation recommended, one-half gallon being gamma rays are essential to determine
environment may still be severe, and for drinking, and one half for other activity of the radiation field in the
only limited time will be available purposes. area outside the shelter, and to de-
to evacuate to a more tolerable area. termine the total dose accumulated
FOOD
However, it is not expected that such by the shelter occupants during and
severe "hot spots" of radiation as were While most healthy people can after shelter. A rate meter will
assumed for design purposes will cover survive with no food for two weeks measure the intensity of the radiation
a very extensive area. It might be or more, their health and vitality will and provide a basis for making esti-
expected that relatively safe areas sufler and their morale can be seriously mates of the dose that will be ex-
of much lower dose rates may be undermined. An adequate supply of perienced during excursions outside
found, a few weeks after the explosion palatable foods should be provided the shelter. A dosimeter will record
of a single bomb, within 10 to 20 within the shelter to maintain the the total amount of radiation (dose)
miles up-wind or cross-wind of the will and vigor essential for survival to which it has been exposed. As
shelter area. Distances of this order in the hostile post-shelter environ- we have said, pre-attack predictions
could be traveled on foot in a day or ment. Since detailed recommenda- of dose rate and dose cannot be relied
less. While even in these areas of tions concerning family food stock- upon to gauge exposure accurately
relatively low dose rates some pro- piles for shelters are readily avail- in any specific instance. These in-
tection from radiation will be neces- able in such publications as "Family struments must be available to permit
sary, this phase most appropriately Food Stockpile for Survival," dis- determination of the safe time of

Ma y - Jun e 1963 25
exit from the shelter and to guide equipment; clothing and bedding; transportation equipment, portable
the evacuation to safe areas. An sanitation supplies, disinfectant and radio with spare batteries, complete
externally mounted instrument that insecticide; infant care supplies; camping equipment, materials for
can be read without exposure of the first aid kit, medical information, and water purification, weapons and
shelter occupants would be most special medicines that may be re- ammunition, etc.
desirable for monitoring external quired for particular cases; such Preparations for evacuation of the
radiation. recreational equipment as books, shelter area and long-range survival
It is possible that debris in some games, toys, etc. for children and planning should be done with the
form may block the exit from the adults; tools that might be required constant realization that familiar
shelter. Therefore, such tools as a for repair of equipment within sources of power, heat, light, water,
shovel, crowbar, hack saw, wood saw, the shelter; sources of information transportation, food -in short, most
sledge hammer, chisel, hand ax, etc., (books, magazines, maps, etc.) perti- of the things depended upon for the
should be provided within the shelter. nent to survival in the post-attack customary way of life-will have been
Instructions for evacuation, which environment; and spiritual or re- destroyed or at least severely curtailed
may be received by radio from Civil ligious articles. This list of supple- and will probably remain so for a
Defense or other Government agencies, mentary supplies should include considerable period of time. For the
will most probably designate safe whatever will best maintain the well- absolute necessities of life, one can
passageways and safe areas with being and morale of the individuals. depend upon only those things which he
reference to local area maps. For this Outside the shelter, but close to it has prepared in advance, which can be
reason it is essential to have detailed and well protected, should be stored transported, if need be, under his
maps covering the area within at those items judged necessary and own power, defended by his own
least 50 miles of the city so that this useful for evacuation from the shelter strength, and maintained through
vital information can be charted. area and for long-range survival plans. his own resourcefulness. Since in-
For guidance in unfamiliar areas, These might include a larger and dividual capabilities are limited, the
or where familiar landmarks have more elaborate supply of the items advance preparations must be
been destroyed, a reliable compass listed for the shelter, plus fuel for thorough.
will be useful.

THE SHELTER SHOULD CONTAIN A Bibliography·


MEANS OF RECEIVING COMMUNICATIONS
"AEC Group Shelter," CEX-58.7 (U. S. Atomic Energy Commission), Office of Tcchnical
FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES OF INFORMA- Service'S, Dept. of Commerce, June 22, 1960.
TION AND CONTROL "Annual Report of the Office of Civil Defense for Fiscal Year 1962," Department of Defense,
U . S . Government Printing Office, 1962.
An operating battery radio is "Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclea r War," Hearings before the Special Sub-
essential to receive CONELRAD committee on R adiation of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, U. S . Govern-
broadcasts (640 kc and 1240 kc on the ment Printing Office, June 1959.
"Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete," report of ACI Committee 318, J.
AM radio dial). Sufficient fresh spare
Am. Concrete Inst ., May 1956,913-986.
batteries should be included to insure "Civil Defense : Part I, Shelter Policy ; Part II, Post Attack Planning," Hearings before a
long-term operation. CONELRAD Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U . S. Government Printing Office,
will probably be the only means for Mar. 1960.
"Civil Defense 1961," H earings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
communication between Government
Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Aug. 1961.
sources and shelter occupants, and "Design of Structures to Resist the Effects of Atomic Weapons," Manuals numbered EM-
it will be the only effective channel 1110·345-413 through 421, U . S. Army Corps of Engineers.
for disseminating instructions per- "Fallout Protection. What to Know and Do about Nuclear Attack," Department of Defense,
taining to activities for post-shelter Office of Civil Defense, Dec. 1961.
"Family Blast Shelters," OCDM Interim Technical Bulletin (draft), Office of Civil and
survival planning. Defense Mobilization, May 1958.
Since the materials used in the "Family Food Stockpile for Survival ," U . S. Department of Agriculture, Home and Garden
shelter construction may attenuate Bull. 77, U . S . Government Printing Office, Aug. 1961.
the radio signals, an adequate an- "Family Shelter Designs," Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Jan. 1962.
"Fire Effects of Big Nuclear Bombs," OCDM Information Bull . 273, Office of Civil and
tenna for the radio (for example, Defense Mobilization, Feb. 28, 1961.
see Fig. 4) should be a part of the "Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks," OCDM Technical Manual TM-9-2 (rev.), Sept. 1955.
shelter. Pre-attack testing of reception "New Civil Defcnse Program," Ninth Report by the Committee on Government Operations,
is recommended, to insure receiving U. S. Government Printing Office, Sept. 21, 1961.
"Operation Plumbbob-Shelters and Associated Tests," Federal Civil Defense Administra-
vital information.
tion, July 1957.
"Recommended OCDM Specifications for Blast Resistant Structural Design (Method "A"),"
SUPPLEMENTARY SUPPLIES
TR-5-I, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, Nov. 1958.
Because the shelter is to be "home" "Reinforced Concrete Design Handbook of the American Concrete Institute," (2nd ed.)
American Concrete Institute, Detroit, 1955.
to its occupants for the required dwell "Shelter Habita bility Studies-The Effect of Oxygen Depletion and Fire G ases on Occupants
time, a number of items not generally of the Shelters," Technical Report 144, U. S. Naval Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme,
included as mandatory on most sur- Calif., June 18, 1961.
vival lists, but which may be nearly S . Glasstone (ed .), "The Effects of Nuclear Wea pons" (rev.), U. S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission, U. S. Government Printing Office, Apr. 1962.
so for many, should be stocked. These
• Unless otherwise indicated, all publications listed were published in Washington, D . C.
include: food preparation and serving

26 APL Technical Digest