T H E OX F ORD H A N D B O O K OF

INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

E d ite d b y

CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT
and

D U N C A N SNIDAL

OXFORD
U N IV E R S IT Y PR ESS
 OXFORD
U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford 0x2 6 d p
Oxford University Press is a department o f the University o f Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective o f excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Oxford is a registered trade mark o f Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries
Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York
© The several contributors 2008
The moral rights o f the authors have been asserted I
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)
First published 2008
First published in paperback 2010
All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing o f Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope o f the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above
You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
The Oxford handbook o f international relations / edited by
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal.
p. cm .-(O xford handbook o f political science)
ISB N -13:978-0-19-921932-2 (acid-free paper)
1. International relations. 2. World politics.
I. Reus-Snrit, Christian, 1961- II. Snidal, Duncan.
JZ1242.O94 2008
327-dc22 2008006027
Typeset by SPI Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India
Printed in Great Britain
on acid-free paper by
Ashford Colour Press Ltd., Gosport, Hants.
ISBN 978-0-19-921932-2 (hbk.)
ISBN 978-0-19-958558-8 (pbk.)
7 9 10 8
 A cknow ledgem ents

Editing a project o f this scale incurs m an y debts. The conversations w ith friends
and colleagues that have shaped the H andbook’s contou rs are too m an y to acknow l­
edge individually. However, several people stand ou t for their singu larly im portant
contributions. Robert G ood in is the m asterm ind beh ind the Oxford H andbooks
o f Political Science, and it is he w hom we m ust thank fo r brin gin g us together as
the editors o f this volum e. He has been a w on d erfu l source o f intellectual and
editorial advice, and the path he started u s u p o n has been im m ensely rewarding.
A project such as this could not have been realized in its present form were it not
for assistance provided by Lynn Savery and M ary-L o u ise Hickey. Lynn shouldered
the early adm inistrative burden, and her w o rk w as invaluable in getting the project
o ff the ground. It was M ary-Louise, however, w h o shouldered the H erculean task
o f subsequent organization and editing. It is n o exaggeration to say that w ithout
her efforts the Handbook would be a pale shadow o f this final version. Finally, ou r
contributors deserve special thanks. The b rie f we gave them w as challenging, and
in m ost cases we asked them for m ultiple iterations o f th eir chapters. T h ey rose
to the task w ith good h um or and energy, and the quality o f their contributions is
im pressive and gratifying.

Chris R eus-Sm it
D uncan Snidai
 C H A P T E R 4

THE POINT IS NOT

JU ST TO EX P L A IN
THE WORLD BUT
TO C H A N G E IT
I

R O B E R T W. C OX

O ver three decades ago I participated in a panel at the annual conference o f the
A m erican Political Science A ssociation, the tide o f which was the question: “ will
the future be like the past?” It concerned the scholarly attem pt to define a basic
structure o f w orld politics that w ould be valid everywhere and for all tim e as
a fram ew ork fo r the analysis o f w orld politics. Those w ho w ould answer “ yes”
to the question envisaged a w ay o f explaining international relations in a world
conceived as a bundle o f data open to the observation o f the analyst w ho stands
apart from the action— an approach since called neorealism . This virtual w orld is
invariably d ivided into a num ber o f hard entities (“ states” ) o f different levels of
m aterial capabilities whose relationships (peace or w ar or som ething in-between)
are governed by the “ balance o f power,” which has its own inherent rules o f practice.
This basic approach is devised to explain w hat happens am ong the state entities as
levels o f m ilitary and econom ic capability am ong them change. Change in material
capabilities takes place w ithin the system, but the nature or basic structure o f the
system never changes.
N eorealism proved popular, particularly am ong A m erican analysts, so long as
it seem ed to fit w ith the w orld into which it came. It proved to be adaptable to
 T H E P O I N T IS N O T J U S T T O E X P L A I N T H E W O R L D 85

the bipolarity o f the cold war. The question w hether the structure o f the system so
c o n c e iv e d was indeed applicable to other tim es and places seem ed at the time to
be rather academic. In any case, h istory was not h ighly regarded by “ neorealists.”
At best, history was a q u arry for m ining data to test the system. The point o f
“neorealism” was to explain shifting pow er relations in a w orld that did not change
in its basic character.

1 C h a n g e a s a L a t e n t F o r c e in H ist o r y

“ Neorealism” confronted another approach that did envisage basic change in the
structure o f w orld power. In its contem porary form this was M arxism , but M arxism
had evolved out o f a deeply rooted d isposition o f the hum an m ind to posit a happy
ending to the hum an story. It probably began w ith m onotheism . I f the w orld and
all that has been and will be in it has been created b y an all-pow erful G od, it was
natural to assume that there was som e ultim ate purpose in it and that that purpose
was ultimately good. The idea o f an inherent purpose— a subjective notion— in
the unfolding o f hum an h istory is, o f course, foreign to positive science and hence
to neorealism. Historical actors, individual or collective (that is, states), can have
purposes, but for the positivist observer, there can be no cosm ic purpose inherent
in the process o f interaction itself.
Religious consciousness injects such a purpose. Its prim itive form is what the­
ologians call eschatology— the doctrine o f final things, the individual’s finality in
heaven or hell, and history’s end in the kingdom o f G od. The Jewish anticipation
of the com ing o f the M essiah w ho w ould open the w ay tow ard the earthly paradise
was taken over, adapted, and em bellished by Christianity.
Civilizations untouched by m onotheism saw h istory m ore naturally as a cyclical
process by analogy to the spring, sum m er, autum n, and w inter o f the seasons
and the biological cycle o f birth , developm ent, m aturity, decline, and death. St
Augustine, w ho had to debate with the assum ptions o f classical civilization in
order to defend Christianity against the charge o f und erm ining the im perial state,
denounced Plato’s teaching o f the cyclical process. T he m om ent in history when
God had descended into the w orld in the Incarnation o f Jesus Christ, Augustine
argued, changed all that. T henceforw ard h istory had a goal: the C ity o f G od. A
twelfth-century m onk from C alabria, Joach im o f Floris, elaborated St Augustine’s
vision into a three-part historical process: the Age o f the Father, in which G od ’s
law for hum ankind was laid dow n in the O ld Testam ent; the Age o f the Son, in
which the revelation o f Jesus C h rist enabled m en (note the patriarchal gender im ­
plication) to overcom e the obstacle o f sin through obedience to and guidance from
86 R O B E R T W. C OX

the institutions o f C hurch and state; and, ultimately, the Age o f the H oly S p i r i t -
heralded b y som e Franciscans reacting against the worldliness o f the Church—
in which m en w ould live in m ystical h arm o n y w ith ou t the need fo r coercive or
directing institutions.
W hen Europe entered the Age o f Enlightenm ent in the eighteenth century, the
grip o f religion loosened, bu t the three-stage vision o f h istory rem ained entrenched
in the European consciousness, taking on secularized form s. G eorg Hegel spoke
o f h istory as a three-stage rational progress o f freedom . Karl M a rx ’s subsequent
vision o f history, inverting H egel’s idealism into m aterialism , appears as a m irror
im age o f Joach im o f Floris’s vision. Class struggle, rather than religious revelation
or Spirit and Reason, w as his version o f the dynam ic o f history. Social conflict,
he explained, has transform ed feudalism into capitalism and w o uld proceed to
transform capitalism into h isto ry’s final form , the com m unist society, in which
conflict is resolved into h arm o n y as the coercive institution o f the state “withers
away.”
Religious and secular visions o f h isto ry are all about change, but change that
is on ly indirectly the consequence o f hum an endeavor. Change in these linear
“ progressive” theories com es from a latent nonhu m an force: Providence fo r St
Augustine and his follow ers; the “ cunning o f reason” for H egel (to which we m ay
associate A d am Sm ith’s “ hidden han d” ); an d the m aterialist logic o f history in the
M arxian version. The explanation o f change lies w ith in the process itself; hum an
activity is guided b y the dialectic o f the process toward an ultim ate h appy ending.
It is well to recall that the m odernist notion that h istory is governed b y natural
laws is the creation o f three centuries o f European h istory du ring w hich European
ideas spread around the w orld. A n older perspective sees the w orld as a realm o f
continuous and chaotic change with no ultim ate final state— no “end o f history.”
C o n trary to m odernism , w hich posits a separation between the subject as observer
and the object as observed, the ancient perspective sees bo th observer and observed
as reciprocally interacting in an unpredictable process o f change. Purpose and fact
cannot be separated.

2 C hange through C haos and

S e l f -ORGANIZATION

In the Greece o f the sixth cen tury bce , the pre-Socratic philosopher H eraclitus o f
Ephesus contem plated such a w o rld o f perpetu al change, o f eternal becoming. A ll
change, he taught, comes from the dynam ic and cyclical interplay o f opposites. In
China, about the sam e time, Lao Tzu, the legen dary founder o f Taoism , taught that
 T H E P O I N T IS N O T J U S T TO E X P L A I N T H E W O R L D 87

transformation and change are the essential features o f nature; and that change,
re s u ltin g from the interplay o f polar opposites, y in and yang, w hich are irrevocably
bound together, is the ultimate reality— the Tao or the path.
Heraclitus and Lao Tzu, who, o f course, k n ew n othing o f each oth er’s teaching,
went further to say that the hum an intellect can never com prehend this ultim ate
reality, that concepts form ed by the hum an m ind to express the inner m eaning o f
the world are illusions. Closer to ou r time, the French philosoph er H enri Bergson,
who had thought deeply about evolution, spoke about homo fab er, the hum an
being defined in its capacity to m ake and do things, rather than homo sapiens, w ho
purports to understand the m eaning o f the universe (Bergson 19 4 4 ,15 3 -4 ).
When we think now o f “ change” in w orld p olitics and society we th ink o f w hat
has to be done to ensure the survival o f the hu m an race and to m oderate conflict
among peoples. The prim ary task o f the stud y o f international relations along
with the other departments o f knowledge about hu m an affairs is to help people
to organize so as to achieve this.
To serve this purpose, social science should set aside the approaches o f the past
that sought to define persisting structures and laws and sh ould adopt the less d e­
terministic approach o f the new physics and b io lo g y b y being sensitive to em erging
and declining historical structures and m ovem ents o f self-organization in social
and political relations. It should set aside illusions about “ the end o f h istory” and
concentrate upon purposive change in a chaotic w orld.

3 Pu rpo sive C h an ge

The study o f international relations should focus first on the k ey issues affecting
the biological survival o f the hum an race; and then on the p u rsu it o f justice in the
condition o f peoples, which is essential to m ain tain ing their supp ort for a survivable
world order.
A short list o f the priorities w ould include:

• survival o f the biosphere;

• avoidance o f nuclear war;
• m oderating the rich/poor gap;
• assuring protection for the m ost vulnerable people; and
• effective arrangem ents for negotiating conflict resolution.

The point for us now is to try to understand the w orld as people are m aking it so
as to gain som e control over where we are going; and to forgo speculation about an
im m anent logic o f history that w ill tu rn out to be an illusion.
88 R O B E R T W. C O X

The m odernist faith in universal laws began to fade in physics and biology during
the past century, underm ining the model that had been emulated in the social
sciences. The basic theoretical challenges came in physics from relativity theory
and quantum theory. These concerned the infinitely large (astrophysics) and the
infinitely small (particle physics) and they showed that the apparent certainties of
classical mechanics did not apply in these areas (Prigogine 1996).
Further challenges came in physics from the second principle o f therm odynam ­
ics, or tendency toward entropy, in which loss o f energy leads toward disorganiza­
tion; and in biology when it showed how a movem ent toward disorganization in
the neurons o f the brain could be countered b y autonom ous movem ents o f “ self­
organization.” The French biologist Jacques M onod (1970) popularized the discov­
e ry o f indeterm inism , disorder, and chance in his book, Le Hasard et la nécessité.
These discoveries opened a new approach in the physical and biological sci­
ences called “com plexity” (Waldrop 1993). It departs from a mechanical conception
o f causality by envisaging vast interacting networks— an approach facilitated by
advances in cybernetics. The French philosopher Edgar M orin (1973) has spec­
ulated about what he calls hyper-complexity: a system that reduces constraints
while increasing its capacity for self-organization, in other words its capacity for
autonom ous change.
These developm ents in scientific thinking have im plications for thinking about
change in hum an affairs. Implications for the social sciences are:

• a shift from being to becoming, from emphasis on innate structures to em pha­

sis on processes, and from causality (in a billiard-ball sense) to com plexity (in
the sense o f interactive networks);
• to renounce searching for basic causes; change takes place through interactions
in a com plex network in which no single force is determining;
• that processes are irreversible, that is, tendencies toward entropy and disorga­
nization m ay be countered by self-organization, which m eans that the future
w ill not predictably reproduce the past;
• that the search for absolute certainty o f scientific propositions is abandoned in
favor o f determ ining their “dom ain o f validity,” which converts such proposi­
tions into exploratory hypotheses rather than universal laws;
• that observer and observed are equally involved in change, which means dis­
carding the subject/object dichotom y o f so-called objective science in favor o f
an “ epistem ic” science that pursues findings w ithin a particular and transitory
paradigm .

The terms chaos, complexity, and uncertainty are characteristic o f the new sci­
entific approach, whereas order, simplicity, and certainty characterized modernist
science. The natural sciences are m oving away from the notion that their purpose
is to facilitate hum ans’ dom ination and control over nature, toward understanding
hum anity as a part o f nature through an emerging theory o f living, self-organizing
 T H E P O I N T IS N O T J U S T TO E X P L A I N T H E WORLD 89

systems. The impact o f these changes on social science— which has heretofore been
constructed on the m odel o f Enlightenm ent physics— is bound to be resisted and
delayed by professional conservatism; but new paradigm s are emerging here too in
more holistic, m ore relativistic, and m ore historically oriented approaches.
This means looking for the recurrent “ self-organizing” o f the human species so
as to discern the patterns o f reorganization that have been created collectively in
response to the sequence o f challenges to hum an society. The structures that emerge
in this process are hum an creations, neither som ething innate within a supposed
invariant “ hum an nature” and “ natural order,” nor som ething inherent within a
cosmic historical process. W hat we have here are historical structures, the form s o f
collective organization, and the m entalities that fit them, both reacting from and
adapted to the material conditions o f existence o f hum an groups.1
The distinction between data and facts is im portant here. It is clearer in the Latin
languages than in English. The w ord “data” derives from the verb “ to give” (dare,
datum); and the word “ fact” derives from the verb “ to make” (facere, factum ): a
given is ju st there; a fact presupposes a maker and the m aker’s purpose. Positivist
science deals with givens. H istory deals with facts; or, as R. G. Collingwood (1946)
said, with the inside as well as the outside o f an event, not just that which can be
observed but also the intentions and purposes o f the action that went into making
the fact. With facts and history the ethical and the observable are one.

4 C h a n g e in H is t o r ic a l S t r u c t u r e s

Action begins with an assessment o f prevailing conditions. I f the purpose o f action

is to rem edy some anom aly or dysfunction, then the prevailing conditions are taken
as given; but if the goal is change in som e fundam ental w ay— that is, in the structure
o f society, whether local or global— then action must also aim at changing the
prevailing conditions. These conditions can no longer be taken as givens. They
have to be viewed critically as products o f history. Only thus can we understand
how they came to be and how we m ay w ork to change them. Fundamental change
means change in the historical structures that create the fram ework for everyday
activities.
Hegel (1967,13) wrote: “ The owl o f M inerva spreads its wings only with the falling
o f dusk.” The world is not shaped b y theory. T h eory comes from reflection on what
happens in the world; and there has been m uch to reflect upon recently as a spur to
thinking about emerging and persisting historical structures:

1 T he French Annales school o f history has developed this approach. See Braudel (1980).
90 R O B E R T W. C OX

• the collapse o f the Soviet U nion, and with it o f the bipolar world, and the
emergence o f what French diplom acy calls the hyper-power o f the USA;
• growing concern about ecological instability and its im pact on the biosphere;
• the persistent tendency o f capitalism to widen the gap between the rich and the
poor;
• a resurgent affirm ation o f identities o f an ethnic, national, religious, or cultural
kind;
• a new salience o f irregular or extralegal activities like “ terrorism ” and orga­
nized crime;
• increasing skepticism o f people toward all form s o f established authority.

I would suggest that in the context o f these changes at the beginning o f the twenty-
first century there are three configurations o f power, three interacting historical
structures that circum scribe the problem s o f international politics and world order.

5 Existin g H isto rical Stru ctu res

The first is what has been called the “A m erican empire,” or now often simply
“ Empire.” “ Em pire” penetrates across borders o f form ally sovereign states to con­
trol their actions from within through com pliant elites in both public and private
spheres. It penetrates first into the principal allies o f the United States but also into
m any other countries where US interests w ield influence. Transnational corpora­
tions influence dom estic policy in countries where they operate; and economic
ties influence local business elites. M ilitary cooperation am ong allies facilitates
integration o f m ilitary forces under leadership o f the core o f “ Empire.” Cooperation
am ong intelligence services gives prim acy to the security concerns o f the imperial
leadership. The m edia generalize an ideology that propagates im perial values and
ju stify the expansion o f “ Em pire” as beneficial to the world. Econom ic systems o f
the com ponent territories o f “ Em pire” are restructured into one vast market for
capital, goods, and services. In the im agined future o f “ Empire,” the “ hard power”
o f m ilitary dom inance and econom ic coercion is both m aintained and transcended
by the “ soft power” o f attraction and em ulation.2 “ Em pire” constitutes a movem ent
tending to absorb the whole w orld into one civilization. Its governing principle is
unity and homogeneity.
The second configuration o f power is the Westphalian inter-state system that was
inaugurated in Europe in the seventeenth century and spread throughout the world
during the era o f European dom inance. The sovereign state, though weakened by

2 The concept o f “ soft power” com es from Nye (1990, 32).

 T H E P O I N T IS NOT J U S T TO E X P L A I N T H E W O R L D 91

“ Empire,” remains a hardy structure. Sovereignty has a dual aspect. One aspect is
the autonom y o f each sovereign state in the society o f nations. The other is the
authority o f each state within its own territory and population. Both aspects are
protected by respect for the principle o f nonintervention in the internal affairs
o f other states. Both external and internal sovereignty rem ain a defense against
absorption into “ Empire.” . . . -
The two fronts on which the residue o f the W estphalian w orld structure con­
fronts the impact o f “Em pire” are, first, the defense o f the inter-state system and its
creations, international law and the United Nations; and, second, the strengthening
of the bonds linking citizens to political authorities. These protect national auton­
omy in economic and social organization, and thereby sustain a plural w orld o f
coexisting cultures and civilizations. M ultilateralism w ithin the inter-state system
is the realpolitik o f middle powers. The governing principles o f the W estphalian
world are pluralist diversity and a continuing search fo r consensus.
The third configuration is what is often called “civil society.” This exists within
states and within “ Empire” and it also takes a transnational form . T his configu­
ration o f forces has defended the environm ent and w om en’s rights. It has m o­
bilized for peace and to combat poverty. It has been especially active in recent
decades initially as a movement for an alternative to the econom ic globalization
of transnational corporate power and then as a direct confrontation o f “Em pire” in
the popular mobilization against the A nglo-A m erican invasion o f Iraq.
It has also, in the form o f so-called people power, provoked “ regime change”
in some countries, most recently in Serbia, G eorgia, and U kraine. In these cases,
external ideological influence and finance from “ E m pire” m erged w ith internal
discontent to create a form ula for nonviolent revolution. Civil society was, in a
measure, co-opted to become an instrum ent for the penetration o f “ E m pire” into
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
“ Civil society” differs from both “ Em pire” and the state system in that it func­
tions as a decentred network rather than as a disciplined hierarchical structure.
Modern information technology in the form o f the Internet and the cell phone
has helped it to develop and to mobilize for action. T his loose flexible character is
an asset in being able to bring together a diversity o f groups around som e central
issue. It is also a weakness by m aking it difficult to articulate a clear program o f
action because o f this very diversity; and also b y leaving the m ovem ent open to
disruption by agents provocateurs or to being co-opted b y well-financed and well-
organized state or ideological interests either dom estic or foreign. Civil society is
inherently opposed to the centralizing and hom ogenizing force o f “ Em pire” but is
always vulnerable to being subverted or m anipulated.
Behind and below these three rival configurations o f power lies a covert w orld
including organized crime, so-called terrorist networks, illegal financial circuits,
intelligence operatives, arms dealers, the drug trade and the sex trade, and sundry
religious cults, all o f which are transnational in reach. This covert w orld functions
92 R O B E R T W. C O X

in the interstices o f the three overt configurations o f power. Som e o f its component
elements, like “ terrorist” networks, conspire to subvert and destroy established
powers. O ther com ponents, like organized crime, are parasitical upon established
power and live in sym biosis with it. The covert w orld is always present in some
measure. Its expansion signals trouble for the established order— a loosening of
confidence in the security that order is supposed to ensure for people in general.
The three configurations o f power in the w orld today overlap geographically.
T h ey are not confined by territorial boundaries. T h ey have points o f geographical
concentration but are in contest everywhere asserting rival claims to legitimacy,
while the expansion o f the covert world, in both its subversive and parasitical
aspects, underm ines legitim acy everywhere.

6 Leg itim acy and C h ange

W hen we think o f the world in dynamic terms as being open to change, the legit­
im acy o f authority becomes the condition for effective action. Legitim acy enables
authority to act with sustained support and public acquiescence. A revolutionary
act or an im perial incursion m ay precipitate change, but the change becomes
durable only to the extent that legitim acy comes to prevail. Governm ent is legit­
imate w hen people accept the institutions and procedures o f authority and the
decisions that emerge, even if they do not like them. When that general acceptance
becom es eroded, when there is no general acceptance that decisions have been
properly arrived at, the relationship becomes illegitimate.
Fear is a critical factor— fear on the part o f the rulers as well as am ong those
subject to authority. The tyrant is in constant fear o f being overthrown; and those
over w h om the tyrant rules are kept in obedience through fear. Legitim acy calms
fear on both sides— for the governors and for the governed. When the public is
gripped b y a fear that authority seems impotent to calm, the scene is set for arbitrary
power— for the “ m an o f destiny.” When governments provoke fears am ong the
public, as is now a com m on aspect o f the “war on terror,” they are preparing for
oppressive m easures. The inverse relationship between fear and legitim acy is the
key to the problem o f public and social order today as always. This is perhaps the
one durable transhistorical truth. The establishment o f legitim acy is the p rim ary
condition for the ethical pursuit o f change.
Legitim acy in global governance thus becomes the central problem o f world
order. “ Em pire” aspires to global legitim acy by claim ing to know the one best way
o f organizing society— what the agents o f “ Em pire” call “dem ocracy” and “capi­
talism.” The overwhelm ing m ilitary power o f “ Empire,” its capacity for econom ic
 T H E P O I N T IS N O T J U S T TO E X P L A I N T H E W O R L D 93

coercion, and its com m unications and ideological resources have not, however,
been able to gain support or acquiescence from a broad sector o f humanity. The
claim s o f “ Em pire” remain illegitimate on a global scale. Indeed, the overwhelming
“ hard power” o f “ Em pire” has generated “ terror” as the response o f those who
utterly reject “ Empire.”
The alternative concept o f global governance— a continuing process o f negoti­
ation among states under recurrent pressure from the m anifold manifestations o f
civil society— has been faltering in its ability to establish confidence in its efficacy.
Civil society is the ultimate anchor o f legitimacy. This is the m ajor dilemma o f
international relations today.
One civilization versus a plural world o f coexisting civilizations: H ow this basic
issue o f global governance is decided will affect the way in which the m ajor issues
confronting the future o f hum anity can be dealt with. These issues are all global
in scope: protecting the biosphere; m oderating the extreme inequalities between
rich and poor; protecting the vulnerable; and m inim izing violence within and
among peoples. To deal effectively w ith these issues requires broad consensus with
legitimate power behind it. The challenge to world politics and to the study o f
international relations is to build that consensus. The conditions in which this
can be done are shaped by the ongoing contest for legitim acy among the rival
configurations o f power: “ Empire,” state system, and civil society. The outcome is
uncertain— the historically transitory product o f ethical conviction, will, skill, and
chance. Such is life in a H eraditan world.

References

B erg so n , H. 1944. Creative Evolution, trans. A. Mitchell. New York: Modern Library.
Br a u d el, F. 1980. History and the social sciences: the longue durée. Pp. 2 5 -5 4 in On History,
F. Braudel, trans. S. Matthews. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; originally published
(in French) 1958.
C o l l i n g w o o d , R. G. 1946. The Idea of History. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
H e g e l , G. W. F. 1967. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford Univer­
sity Press; originally published (in German) 1821.
M o n o d , J. 1970. Le Hasard et la nécessité: Essai sur la philosophie naturelle de la biologie
moderne. Paris: Seuil.
M o r i n , E. 1973. Le Paradigme perdu: La Nature humaine. Paris: Seuil.
N y e , J. S. 1990. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f American Power. New York: Basic
Books.
P r i g o g i n e , I. 1996. The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature. New
York: Free Press.
W a l d r o p , M. 1993. Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos. New
York: Touchstone.