Macasiano vs.

Diokno 212 SCRA 464 , August 10, 1992

Facts: On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the closure of
some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market
thereon. By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a contract to any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea market and/or
vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent Palanyag entered into an agreement with the
municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury. Consequently, market stalls
were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.

On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic
Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were later returned to
Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to discontinue the flea market
otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents filed with the court a joint petition
for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the
petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The
court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the
hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and use of
public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

Held: Invalid. The streets are local roads used for public service and are considered public properties of
the municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Local governments have no authority whatsoever
to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by
Congress. Properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general
are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to
private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing
a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary
for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes
patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent
municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed."
Balacuit vs. CFI ofAgusan del Norte 163 SCRA 182 , June 30, 1988
Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing any person , group of
persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of
age to pay full payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters
assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition
for review. Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust,
confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 – prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to children 7-12 y/o at full price is
constitutional or not?

Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed ordinance be held constitutional it must
pass the test of police power. To invoke the exercise the police power, it must be for the interest of the public without interfering with
private rights and adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is,
the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with
the business or calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a
theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own
advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
Tan vs. Commission on Elections 142 SCRA 727 , July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code

Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of
Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to
belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing
a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government
Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros
del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than
the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3.
No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.

Held: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent
province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros
Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area
subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of
Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be
divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent
province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
Padilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections 214 SCRA 735 , October 19, 1992
FACTS: Pursuant to RA 7155, creating the Municipality of Tulay na Lupa in the province of Camarines Norte to be composed of
Barangays Tulay-naLupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Bayan-bayn, Mataulang, Pag-asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the
Municipalty of Labo, some province, COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite was conducted throughout the municipality of Labo and
majority voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa. Petitioner prayed that the plebiscite conducted to set aside
with the contention that such plebiscite was a complete failure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay na Lupa and the
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.

RULING: COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion and the result of the plebiscite rejecting the creation of the new
municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa is valid.
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted “in the political units directly affected,” it means
that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote
in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase “political units directly affected” is the plurality of the political units
which would participate in the plebiscite.
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac 207 SCRA 157 , March 11, 1992
Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena,Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the
municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioner’s warehouse. A
committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within
the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29
was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New
Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioner’s warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13,
series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without
maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection
clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the respondent. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code
(2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioner’s warehouse is anuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code.
At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. Municipal
Corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government an as such are endowed with
the police powers in order to accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2)
must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable.
Basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored. The
purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of
government. The lower court did not err in its decision.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority. 204 SCRA 837 , December 11, 1991
Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of
the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles
obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not
directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged
that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of driver’s licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P.
Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked
vehicles.
Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued
a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction
between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the
power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the
ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure
was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license
plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the
alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.

Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC

Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that
the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2)
the presence of a sufficient standard.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the
acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now
before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must
not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they
do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of
the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition
of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators
only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of
license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof
expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality
of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are
merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would
be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus,
ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter
imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be
valid, would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions
the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially
repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an
exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of
traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees that
the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective
reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic
violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such
sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory
authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such
action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. 234 SCRA 255 , July 20, 1994
Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869. Petitioners
contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for
the general welfare.

Issue: Whether the Ordinances are valid.

Ruling: No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare
Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.
General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted
by law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to
the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by
P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353
prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore
ultra vires and void.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
Binay vs. Domingo 201 SCRA 508 , September 11, 1991
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial assistance to
bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken out of the
unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on
Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the
resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds
must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues: 1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held: 1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized
government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex. Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state
but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such
power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. Municipal governments exercise this power
under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all
comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to
provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the
municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions
which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity,
and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to
attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. Public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
"the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the
general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized
as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common
good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the
urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing
program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The
loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to embark on a
philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
Villacorta vs. Bernardo 143 SCRA 480 , August 19, 1986

FACTS:

Ordinance 22 entitled AN ORDINANCE REGULATING SUBDIVISION PLANS OVER PARCELS OF LAND IN THE
CITY OFDAGUPAN was enacted by the municipal board of Dagupan City. The said ordinance was
imposing additional requirements to that of thenational law Act 496. Ordinance 22 was annulled by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals whosedecision reads as
follows:Section 1 of said ordinance clearly conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law
does not require subdivision plans to besubmitted to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for
approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office or by theDirector of Lands as
provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions
of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of PO.03 per square meter of every
lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of theordinance in question also conflicts with
Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the
CityEngineer before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last
section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not
impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivisionowner
additional conditions.

ISSUE: Were the decisions of the CFI and CA to annul the said ordinance was correct?

HELD:

Yes. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
violating national laws in the guiseof implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing
additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to preventbigamy; the registration of
vehicles, to minimize carnaping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of
passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on.This
advice is especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of
a valid delegation from thenational legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case,
Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating thisauthority for legislation in
contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements.
De la Cruz vs. Paras 123 SCRA 569 , July 25, 1983
DELA CRUZ v. PARAS (G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983)
Ordinance against operations of night clubs; invalid exercise of police power by LGU when the method is unreasonable as
to deprive persons of their rights; LGU are empowered to regulate, not prohibit.

FACTS: The Local Government of Bocaue, Bulacan enacted Ordinace No. 82 which sought to prohibit the operation of night clubs
and the employment of hostesses in such night clubs. The Petitioners filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injuction alleging that (1) the ordinance is null and void as the municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful
business, (2) it violated the petitioners’ right to due process and equal protection of the law as their permits were withdrawn without
judicial hearing, and (3) that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented
business including night clubs has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.
In answer, the municipality responded that (1) it has been authorized by law to prohibit the establishment and operation of night clubs
under Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) it was not violative of their rights as property rights are subordinate to
public interests because night clubs has been the principal cause of decadence of morality and has adverse effects to the community,
and (3) Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive municipal councils to regulate or prohibit night clubs.
The Court of First Instance upheld the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 84 as enacted is a valid exercise of police power by the local government unit.

RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. According to the Court, police power is granted to municipal corporations, which
may enact such ordinances and make regulations as may be necessary to carry out its powers and duties to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order and convenience of the municipality. However, citing
Justice Moreland, an ordinance is valid unless contravenes the fundamental law of the land, an act of national legislature, or unless it
is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Hence, an ordinance passed
must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid. The general rule found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the law of the State.
In the present case, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business. All the petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night
clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta 122 SCRA 759 , June 24, 1983
City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the
said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the
taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the
properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would
amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the
power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.
Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co. 94 SCRA 533 , December 14, 1979
Facts: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y
Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed
was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was
annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and
Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking
purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending
that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area
along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid
considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held: Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a
Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that
implied power of the municipality should be “liberally construed in it’s favour”, “to give more power to the local government in
promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community”. This is found in the General Welfare
Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health,
safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area
considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.
Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes 125 SCRA 220 , October 26, 1983

Facts:

The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation of 282 ha of rolling land situated
in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined
geographic areas with potential tourism value. The PTA will construct a sports complex, club house, golf course, playground and
picnic area on said land. An electric power grid will also be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system.
Complimentary support facilities (malls, coffee shops, etc) will also be created. The defendants alleged that the taking is allegedly not
impressed with public use under the Constitution. Also, assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount
to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally
repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First
Instance, that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the PNB, an
amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to PD1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA
to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The petitioners who are occupants of
the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered
by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts.

Issue: WON the public use requirement has been complied with

Held: No.

Petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.

Eminent power domain is inherent in all states as an element of sovereignty. The bill of rights does
not confer a right to the citizens but merely provides for the limits of the powers of the state. When
the term “tourism” has not been found in the constitution like “agriculture” of “general welfare”,
it does not mean that it is not included. As said, eminent domain is inherent, subject only to the
limitations as set by the constitution.
Petitioner wanted the court to believe that "public use" means literally use by the public and that
"public use" is not synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and
much less "public convenience.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads,
bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power
plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood
control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to
traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases
of "use by the public" has been discarded.
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private
concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores,
etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets,
roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets end highways do not
diminish in the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and streets.
Petitioners likewise contend that the area in issue cannot be subject to an expropriation since it is
subject for distribution. They argued that as a form of social justice, it takes precedence over other
constitutional guarantees. The Petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area being
developed is indeed a land reform area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents
and certificates of land transfer. Among the total land area, only a little is subject to land reform
and only two among the petitioners were given emancipation certificates. It appearing that the
petitioners are not tenants of the parcels of land in question and therefore do not fall within the
purview of the Land Reform Code, the petition should be dismissed.
The invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. The non-impairment clause has never been a
barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. The parties by entering into
contracts may not stop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good.