Rule 31 - Consolidation or Severance
1. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116463, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 403
Facts:
 Navotas Industrial Corporation (NIC)
is a corporation engaged in dredging
operations throughout the Philippines. It was
awarded a dredging, flood control and other
related projects by the DPWH. NIC proceeded
with the project pursuant to the specific work
schedule and plan approved by the DPWH. It
had accomplished 95.06% of the required total
volume of work or P184,847,970.00 worth of
services. However, DPWH paid only 79.22%
of the accomplished work. NIC filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money
against the Republic of the Philippines, thru
the DPWH. In defense, DPWH contended that
the contracts were awarded without any public
bidding and that the corporate officers of NIC
connived with some of the officials of DPWH in
falsifying certain public documents to make it
appear that NIC completed a major portion of
the projects, when no dredging work was
actually performed.
 A case for four counts of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and for
violation of RA No. 3019 was filed against NIC
and the DPWH officials. However, the
resolution of the office of the Special
Prosecutor finding probable cause was only
approved almost five (5) years from the filing
of the case.
 Petitioner filed for a motion to
consolidate civil cases and criminal cases.
They argued that the civil case for collection
and the criminal case arose from the same
incidents and involve the same facts.
Defendant, NIC, seeks to dismissed the
petition on the ground that it was not served
on time. The motion was denied by lower court
because jurisdiction over the cases is vested
with different tribunals.
Issues:
 Whether the petition was filed on
time?
 Whether the civil cases and criminal
cases be consolidated?
Held:
1st Issue
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, and
as applied in several cases, "where the last
day for doing any act required or permitted by
law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the
time shall not run until the next working day."
Petitioner filed the petition on 11 September
1994, which is a Sunday. Thus the petition
was filed on time on 12 September 1994, the
next working day, following the last day for
filing.
2nd Issue
Consolidation is a matter of discretion with the
court. Consolidation becomes a matter of right
only when the cases sought to be
consolidated involve similar questions of fact
and law, provided certain requirements are
met. The purpose of consolidation is to avoid
multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear
congested dockets, simplify the work of the
trial court, and save unnecessary expense.
The civil case, for collection of sum of money,
and with the criminal cases cannot be
consolidated for two reasons. First, the
Sandigan Bayan has no jurisdiction over the
collection case. Second, the Rules of Court do
not allow the filing of a counterclaim or a third-
party complaint in a criminal case.
2. Espinoza v. UOB, G.R. 175380, 22 March
2010, 616 SCRA 353
FACTS:
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession (an ex parte proceeding) and an
action questioning the validity of extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings (an ordinary action)
may not be consolidated after the lapse of the
one year redemption period.
 Firematic Philippines sought a loan from
United Overseas Bank. It was represented by
the spouses Espinoza who owned the
company. They mortgaged four parcels of land
as collateral for the loan. Firematic defaulted
on the loan and the properties were auctioned
off to the highest bidder. The highest bidder
was UOB. The certificate of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds along
with an affidavit of consolidation of ownership
of the property. UOB, respondent, then filed
an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession with the RTC. This was
opposed by the petitioners who moved for the
consolidation of the proceedings the issuance
of the writ of possession and an action for
nullification of the extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings and certificate of sale of the
property subject of this case. The RTC
granted the motion of the petitioners and
consolidated the cases. Respondent filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus at the
CA. This too was granted. RTC order was
reversed and set aside.
ISSUE: W/N a case for the issuance of a writ
of possession may be consolidated with
the proceedings for the nullification of extra-
judicial foreclosure.
HELD: No. The order for a writ of possession
issues as a matter of course upon the filing of
the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond if the redemption period
has not yet lapsed. If the redemption period
has expired, then the filing of the bond is no
longer necessary. Any and all questions
regarding the regularity and validity of the sale
is left to be determined in a subsequent
proceeding and such questions may not be
raised as a justification for opposing the
issuance of a writ of possession. In other
words, the proceeding in a petition for a writ of
possession is ex parte and summary in nature.
It is a judicial proceeding brought for the
benefit of one party only and without notice by
the court to any person adverse of interest. It
is a proceeding wherein relief is granted
without giving the person against whom the
relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. An
ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a
judicial proceeding for the enforcement of
one's right of possession as purchaser in a
foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed
in court, by which one party sues another for
the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. On the other hand, by its nature, a
petition for nullification or annulment of
foreclosure proceedings contests the
presumed right of ownership of the buyer in a
foreclosure sale and puts in issue such
presumed right of ownership. Thus, a party
scheming to defeat the right to a writ of
possession of a buyer in a foreclosure sale
who had already consolidated his ownership
over the property subject of the foreclosure
sale can simply resort to the subterfuge of
filing a petition for nullification of foreclosure
proceedings with motion for consolidation of
the petition for issuance of a writ of
possession. This is not allowed as it
will render nugatory the presumed right of
ownership, as well as the right of possession,
of a buyer in a foreclosure sale, rights which
are supposed to be implemented in an ex
parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession. The only exception would be if the
writ of possession were filed for before the
lapse of the 1 year redemption period. This
was not so in this case as the period had
already lapsed.
Rule 33 - Demurrer to Evidence
1. Radiowealth Finance Co v. Sps Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, 6 July 2000, 335
SCRA 288
FACTS:
• March 2, 1991: Spouses Vicente and Maria
Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally
executed, signed and delivered in favor of
Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory
Note for P138,948 without need of notice or
demand, in instalments of P11,579.00 payable
for 12 consecutive months leaving the period
for the instalments blank. Upon default, the
late payment, 2.5% penalty charge per month
shall be added to each unpaid installment from
due date thereof until fully paid.
• June 7, 1993: Radiowealth filed a
complaint for the collection of a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the
credit and collection officer of Radiowealth,
presented in evidence the Spouses’ check
payments, the demand letter dated July 12,
1991, Spouses’ customer’s ledger card,
another demand letter and Metropolitan Bank
dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did
not have personal knowledge of the
transaction or the execution of any of these
pieces of documentary evidence, which had
merely been endorsed to him.
• July 29, 1994: Spouses filed a Demurrer to
Evidence for alleged lack of cause of action
• RTC: Dismissed for Radiowealth’s failure
to substantiate the claims, the evidence it had
presented being merely hearsay
• CA: reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings. During the pretrial,
through judicial admissions or the spouses
admitted the genuineness of the Promissory
Note and demand letter dated July 12,
1991. Their only defense was the absence of
an agreement on when the installment
payments were to begin.
ISSUES: W/N the spouses can still present
evidence after the appellate court’s reversal of
the dismissal on demurer of evidence (Civil
Procedure)
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Appealed
Decision is MODIFIED. Ordered to PAY
P138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per
month beginning April 2, 1991 until fully paid,
and 10 percent of the amount due as
attorney’s fees.
NO. Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules.
 SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—
After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is
denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
 Defendants who present a demurrer to the
plaintiff’s evidence retain the right to present
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees
with them; if the trial court agrees with them,
but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees
with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present
their own evidence.
 The appellate court shall resolve the case
and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch
as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations
2. Casent Realty v. Philbanking, G.R.
No. 150731, 14 September 2007, 533 SCRA
390
FACTS: Casent Realty Developmet Corp.
executed two promissory notes in favor of
Rare Realty. These promissory notes were
used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan
that Rare Realty obtained from Philbanking
wherein a Deed of Assignment was executed.
When Rare Realty failed to pay its debt, the
bank went after the security of the loan. The
bank demanded payment based on the
promissory notes issued by Casent Realty
Corp to Rare Realty by virtue of the deed of
assignment. On a separate loan with
Philbanking, Casent Realty satisfied its
obligation by executing a Dacion en pago.
Philbanking filed for a complaint for the
collection of payment against Casent based
on the promissory notes. Casent Realty, in its
answer, raised that a Dacion en pago was
already executed which extinguished its
obligation. Respondent subsequently filed an
Opposition which alleged that: (1) the grounds
relied upon by petitioner in its demurrer
involved its defense and not insufficiency of
evidence; (2) the Dacion and Confirmation
Statement had yet to be offered in evidence
and evaluated; and (3) since respondent failed
to file a Reply, then all the new matters
alleged in the Answer were deemed
controverted.
 The trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner and dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, respondent alleged that the trial court
gravely erred because the promissory notes
were not covered by the Dacion, and that
respondent was able to prove its causes of
action and right to relief by overwhelming
preponderance of evidence. It explained that
at the time of execution of the Dacion, the
subject of the promissory notes was the
indebtedness of petitioner to Rare Realty and
not to the Bankthe party to the Dacion. It was
only in 1989 after Rare Realty defaulted in its
obligation to respondent when the latter
enforced the security provided under the Deed
of Assignment by trying to collect from
petitioner, because it was only then that
petitioner became directly liable to respondent.
 The appellate court ruled that under
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to
be resolved in a demurrer is whether the
plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the
facts presented and the law. Thus, it held that
the trial court erred when it considered the
Answer which alleged the Dacion, and that its
genuineness and due execution were not at
issue. It added that the court a quo should
have resolved whether the two promissory
notes were covered by the Dacion, and that
since petitioners demurrer was granted, it had
already lost its right to present its evidence.
ISSUE: Should judicial admissions be
considered in resolving a demurrer to
evidence? If yes, are the judicial admissions in
this case sufficient to warrant the dismissal of
the complaint?
HELD: Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure provides:
 Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After
the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence, the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is
granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.
 In Gutib v. Court of Appeals, we
defined a demurrer to evidence as an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue.[21]
 What should be resolved in a motion
to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is
whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
based on the facts and the law. The evidence
contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that
which pertains to the merits of the case,
excluding technical aspects such as capacity
to sue.[22] However, the plaintiffs evidence
should not be the only basis in resolving a
demurrer to evidence. The facts referred to in
Section 8 should include all the means
sanctioned by the Rules of Court in
ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings.
These include judicial admissions, matters of
judicial notice, stipulations made during the
pre-trial and trial, admissions, and
presumptions, the only exclusion being the
defendants evidence.
3. GMA v. Central CATV, G.R. No. 176694,
18 July 2014, 730 SCRA 85
FACTS:
 P together with the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, Audiovisual
Communicators, Incorporated, Filipinas
Broadcasting Network and Rajah
Broadcasting Network, Inc. filed with the NTC
a complaint against the respondent to stop it
from soliciting and showing advertisements in
its cable television (CATV)system pursuant to
Section 2 of Executive Order (EO) No. 205
 P alleged that the phrase "television
and broadcast markets" includes the
commercial or advertising market.
 R admitted the airing of commercial
advertisement on its CATV network but
alleged that Section 3 of EO No. 436, which
was issued by former President Fidel V.
Ramos on September 9, 1997, expressly
allowed CATV providers to carry
advertisements and other similar paid
segments provided there is consent from their
program providers
 R filed a motion to dismiss by
demurrer to evidence claiming that the
evidence presented by the complainants failed
to show how the respondent’s acts of soliciting
and/or showing advertisements infringed upon
the television and broadcast market
 NTC - granted the respondent’s
demurrer to evidence and dismissed the
complaint
 NTC - ruled that since EO No. 205
does not define "infringement," EO No. 436
merely clarified or filled-in the details of the
term to mean that the CATV operators may
show advertisements, provided that they
secure the consent of their program providers.
 NTC - consider the documents
attached to the respondent’s demurrer to
evidence showed that its program providers
have given such consent, still formed part of
the records and the NTC is not bound by the
strict application of technical rules
 NTC- the insertion of advertisements
under EO No. 436 would result in the
alteration or deletion of the broadcast signals
of the consenting television broadcast station,
its ruling necessarily results in the amendment
of these provisions
 NTC - require the CATV operators
within the Grade A or B contours of a
television broadcast station to carry the latter’s
television broadcast signals in full, without
alteration or deletion. This is known as the
"must-carry-rule.
 CA - upheld the NTC ruling, due to the
failure of EO No. 205 to define what
constitutes "infringement," EO No. 436 merely
filled-in the details without expanding,
modifying and/or repealing EO No. 205. The
NTC was also correct in modifying or
amending the must-carry rule under MC 4-08-
88 as the NTC merely implemented the
directive of EO No. 436.
 Hence, this present petition for review
on certiorari.
Issues: Whether the CA erred in affirming the
order of the NTC which granted the
respondent’s motion to dismiss by demurrer to
evidence.
Ruling: deny the petition for lack of merit.
 The remedy of a demurrer to evidence
is applicable in the proceedings before the
NTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9, Part 9 of
its Rules of Practice and Procedure which
provides for the suppletory application of the
Rules of Court.
 Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. —
After the plaintiff has completed the
presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied
he shall have the right to present evidence. If
the motion is granted but on appeal the order
of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to
have waived the right to present evidence.
 In other words, the issue to be
resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a
demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief prayed for based on the
facts and the law.
 The evidence contemplated by the
rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the
merits of the case, excluding technical aspects
such as capacity to sue. However, the
plaintiff’s evidence should not be the only
basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence.
 The "facts" referred to in Section 8
should include all the means sanctioned by
the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in
judicial proceedings. These include judicial
admissions, matters of judicial notice,
stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial,
admissions, and presumptions, the only
exclusion being the defendant’s evidence.
 NTC considered both the insufficiency
of the allegations in the complaint and the
insufficiency of the complainants’ evidence in
light of its interpretation of the provisions of
EO No. 205 and EO No. 436.
 In the present case, the NTC
proceeded against the very nature of the
remedy of demurrer to evidence when it
considered the respondent’s evidence,
specifically the certifications attached to the
respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Despite
the petitioner’s objections, the NTC
disregarded the rule on demurrer by allowing
the submission of the respondent’s evidence
while depriving the petitioner of the opportunity
to question, examine or refute the submitted
documents
 It should not have resolved the case
through the remedy of demurrer but instead
allowed the respondent to formally present its
evidence where the petitioner could properly
raise its objections. Clearly, there was a
violation of the petitioner’s due process right.
Rule 34 - Judgment on the Pleadings
1. Asian Construction v. Sanneadle, G.R.
No. 181676, 11 June 2014, 726 SCRA 226
FACTS: This case stemmed from a
Complaint for Sum of Money filed by
respondent against petitioner. The complaint
alleged that petitioner and respondent
executed a Memorandum of Agreement
wherein respondent was engaged to supply
and erect insulated panel systems at various
pavilions for an agreed amount of
US$3,745,287.94.
 Pursuant to the Memorandum of
Agreement, petitioner made various payments
amounting to US$3,129,667.32 leaving a
balance of US$615,620.33. Respondent
claims that it made several written demands
for petitioner to pay the said balance, but the
latter continuously refused to heed its plea.
Thereafter, petitioner filed its Answer with
Counterclaim.
 Respondent then moved for judgment
on the pleadings on the ground that the
Answer admitted all material allegations of the
Complaint and, therefore, failed to tender an
issue. Thus, respondent deems that
petitioner’s Answer, in effect, admitted the
existence of the Memorandum of Agreement
and its failure to pay the balance despite
repeated demands.
 In a Judgment dated October 6, 2000,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
rendered in favor of respondent.
 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration against said decision.
However, the same was denied.
Thus, petitioner filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the RTC decision.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the CA denied it in a Resolution.
ISSUE: W/N judgment on the pleadings is
proper.
HELD: YES. Judgment on the pleadings is
governed by Section 1, Rule 34 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which reads:
 Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings.
– Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party’s pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. However, in actions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
or for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
 Judgment on the pleadings is proper
when an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails
to tender an issue if it does not comply with
the requirements of a specific denial as set out
in Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission
of the material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleadings.
 Here, it is irrefutable that petitioner
acknowledged having entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with respondent
and that it still has an unpaid balance of
US$615,620.33.
 We note that respondent’s complaint
for a sum of money is based mainly on the
alleged failure of petitioner to pay the balance
of US$615,620.33 under the Memorandum of
Agreement. Quoting petitioner’s Answer, it is
obvious that it admitted the foregoing material
allegations of the complaint.
While petitioner allegedly raised affirmative
defenses, i.e., defect in the certification of non-
forum shopping, no legal capacity to sue and
fortuitous event, the same cannot still bar
respondent from seeking the collection of the
unpaid balance. Other than these affirmative
defenses, petitioner’s denial neither made a
specific denial that a Memorandum of
Agreement was perfected nor did it contest the
genuineness and due execution of said
agreement.
 The defenses raised by [petitioner]
cannot prevent the [respondent] from seeking
the collection of the amount
US$615,620.33. The express terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement, the genuineness
and due execution of which are not denied by
the [petitioner]. It cannot assert the said
defenses in order to resist the [respondent's]
claim for the aforesaid sum of money,
especially where it has been sufficiently shown
by the allegations of the Complaint and the
Answer that the [petitioner] is clearly liable for
the payment thereof.
2. Sunbanun v. Go, G.R. No. 163280, 2
February 2010, 611 SCRA 320
FACTS:
 Petitioner Doris U. Sunbanun is the
owner of a residential house located at No. 68-
F Junquera Street, Cebu City. On 7 July 1995,
respondent Aurora B. Go leased the entire
ground floor of petitioner's residential house
for one year which was to expire on 7 July
1996. As required under the lease contract,
respondent paid a deposit of P16,000 to
answer for damages and unpaid rent. To earn
extra income, respondent accepted lodgers,
mostly her relatives, from whom she received
a monthly income of P15,000. Respondent
paid the monthly rental until March 1996 when
petitioner drove away respondent's lodgers by
telling them that they could stay on the rented
premises only until 15 April 1996 since she
was terminating the lease. The lodgers left the
rented premises by 15 April 1996, and
petitioner then padlocked the rooms vacated
by respondent's lodgers.
 On 10 May 1996, respondent filed an
action for damages against petitioner.
Respondent alleged that she lost her income
from her lodgers for the months of April, May,
and June 1996 totaling P45,000. Respondent,
who worked in Hongkong, also incurred
expenses for plane fares and other travel
expenses in coming to the Philippines and
returning to Hongkong.
 On the other hand, petitioner argued
that respondent violated the lease contract
when she subleased the rented premises.
Besides, the lease contract was not renewed
after its expiration on 7 July 1996; thus,
respondent had no more right to stay in the
rented premises. Petitioner also moved to
dismiss the complaint in the trial court for
failure to comply with prior barangay
conciliation.
of
 During the pre-trial, petitioner moved
for the case to be submitted for judgment on
the pleadings considering that the only
disagreement between the parties was the
correct interpretation of the lease contract.
Respondent did not object to petitioner's
motion. The trial court then directed the parties
to submit their respective memoranda, after
which the case would be considered submitted
for decision.
 In its decision dated 28 March 2000,
the trial court held that the case is not covered
by the barangay conciliation process since
respondent is a resident of Hongkong. The
trial court noted that petitioner did not
controvert respondent's allegation that
petitioner ejected respondent's lodgers
sometime in March 1996 even if the contract
of lease would expire only on 7 July 1996. The
trial court found untenable petitioner's
contention that subleasing the rented
premises violated the lease contract. The trial
court held that respondent's act of accepting
lodgers was in accordance with the lease
contract which allows the lessee "to use the
premises as a dwelling or as lodging house."
Thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay
respondent actual damages of P45,000 for
respondent's lost income from her lodgers for
the months of April, May, and June 1996, and
attorney's fees of P8,000.
 Both parties appealed before the
Court of Appeals. On 30 September 2003, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor
of respondent and modified the trial court's
decision. Aside from actual damages and
attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals also
ordered petitioner to pay moral and exemplary
damages and the cost of the suit.
Issue:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the
award of actual damages by the Trial
Court
2. WON the CA erred in modifying the
judgment of the Trial Court and
awarding moral and exemplary
damages and costs of suit in favour of
respondent.
3. WON the CA erred in affirming the
award of attorney’s fees.
HELD: No. Petition is without merit.
In this case, the trial court rendered a
judgment on the pleadings. Section 1, Rule 34
of the Rules of Court reads: SECTION
1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
However, in actions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage or for legal separation,
the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.
 The trial court has the discretion to
grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings
filed by a party if there is no controverted
matter in the case after the answer is filed.[7] A
judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on
the facts as pleaded,[8] and is based
exclusively upon the allegations appearing in
the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes.
Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the
pleadings without offering proof as to the truth
of her own allegations and without giving
respondent the opportunity to introduce
evidence, is deemed to have admitted the
material and relevant averments of the
complaint, and to rest her motion for judgment
based on the pleadings of the parties.
3. GSIS v. Prudential, G.R. No. 165585, 20
November 2013, 710 SCRA 337
FACTS:
 Sometime in March 1999, the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement11 (MOA)
with GSIS insuring all real and personal
properties mortgaged to it by electrical
cooperatives under an Industrial All Risks
Policy (IAR policy).12 The total sum insured
under the IAR policy was ₱16,731,141,166.80,
out of which, 95% or ₱15,894,584,108.40 was
reinsured by GSIS with PGAI for a period of
one year or from March 5, 1999 to March 5,
2000.13 As reflected in Reinsurance Request
Note No. 99-15014(reinsurance cover) and the
Reinsurance Binder dated April 21, 1999
(reinsurance binder), GSIS agreed to pay
PGAI reinsurance premiums in the amount of
₱32,885,894.52 per quarter or a total of
₱131,543,578.08
 While GSIS remitted to PGAI the
reinsurance premiums for the first three
quarters, it, however, failed to pay the fourth
and last reinsurance premium due on
December 5, 1999 despite demands.
 On November 15, 2001 PGAI, filed a
Complaint for sum of money (complaint)
against GSIS before the RTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 01-1634.
 PGAI alleged, among others, that: (a)
after it had issued the IAR policy, it further
reinsured the risks covered under the said
reinsurance with reputable reinsurers
worldwide such as Lloyds of London,
Copenhagen Re, Cigna Singapore, CCR,
Generali, and Arig;18 (b) the first three
reinsurance premiums were paid to PGAI by
GSIS and, in the same vein, NEA paid the first
three reinsurance premiums due to GSIS;19 (c)
GSIS failed to pay PGAI the fourth and last
reinsurance premium due on December 5,
1999;20 (d) the IAR policy remained in full
force and effect for the entire insurable period
and, in fact, the losses/damages on various
risks reinsured by PGAI were paid and
accordingly settled by it; (e) PGAI is under
continuous pressure from its reinsurers in the
international market to settle the matter;22 and
(f) GSIS acknowledged its obligation to pay
the last reinsurance premium as it, in turn,
demanded from NEA the fourth and last
reinsurance premium.
 In its Answer, GSIS admitted, among
others, that: (a) its request for reinsurance
cover was accepted by PGAI in a reinsurance
binder; (b) it remitted to PGAI the first three
reinsurance premiums which were paid by
NEA; and (c) it failed to remit the fourth and
last reinsurance premium to PGAI.27 It,
however, denied, inter alia, that: (a) it had
acknowledged its obligation to pay the last
quarter’s reinsurance premium to PGAI;28 and
(b) the IAR policy remained in full force and
effect for the entire insurable period of March
5, 1999 to March 5, 2000.29 GSIS also
proffered the following affirmative defenses:
(a) the complaint states no cause of action
against GSIS because the non-payment of the
last reinsurance premium only renders the
reinsurance contract ineffective, and does not
give PGAI a right of action to collect;30 (b)
pursuant to the regulations issued by the
Commission on Audit, GSIS is prohibited from
advancing payments to PGAI occasioned by
the failure of the principal insured, NEA, to pay
the insurance premium; and (c) PGAI’s cause
of action lies against NEA since GSIS merely
acted as a conduit.32 By way of counterclaim,
GSIS prayed that PGAI be ordered to pay
exemplary damages, including litigation
expenses, and costs of suit.
 PGAI filed a Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings averring that GSIS essentially
admitted the material allegations of the
complaint, such as: (a) the existence of the
MOA between NEA and GSIS; (b) the
existence of the reinsurance binder between
GSIS and PGAI; (c) the remittance by GSIS to
PGAI of the first three quarterly reinsurance
premiums; and (d) the failure/refusal of GSIS
to remit the fourth and last reinsurance
premium. Hence, PGAI prayed that the RTC
render a judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court
(Rules). GSIS opposed the foregoing motion
by reiterating the allegations and defenses in
its Answer.
 RTC issued an Order (January 11,
2002 Order) granting PGAI’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings. It observed that
the admissions of GSIS that it paid the first
three quarterly reinsurance premiums to PGAI
affirmed the validity of the contract of
reinsurance between them. As such, GSIS
cannot now renege on its obligation to remit
the last and remaining quarterly reinsurance
premium.
 Dissatisfied, GSIS filed a notice of
appeal
 PGAI filed a Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal. RTC issued an Order
(February 14, 2002 Order) granting PGAI’s
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal,
conditioned on the posting of a bond. It further
held that only the GSIS Social Insurance Fund
is exempt from execution. Accordingly, PGAI
duly posted a surety bond which the RTC
approved through an Order dated February
19, 2002, resulting to the issuance of a writ of
execution and notices of garnishment
(February 19, 2002 issuances), all of even
date, against GSIS.
 GSIS – without first filing a motion for
reconsideration (from the said order of
execution) or a sufficient supersede as bond–
filed on February 26, 2002 a petition for
certiorari before the CA against the RTC and
PGAI.
 CA rendered a Decision dismissing
GSIS’ petition, upholding, among others, the
validity of the execution pending appeal
pursuant to the RTC’s February 14, 2002
Order as well as the February 19, 2002
issuances. It found that the impending
blacklisting of PGAI constitutes a good reason
for allowing the execution pending appeal
(also known as "discretionary execution")
considering that the imposition of international
sanctions on any single local insurance
company puts in grave and immediate
jeopardy not only the viability of that company
but also the integrity of the entire local
insurance system including that of the state
insurance agency. It pointed out that the
insurance business thrives on credibility which
is maintained by honoring financial
commitments.
 Separately, GSIS also assailed the
RTC’s January 11, 2002 Order which granted
PGAI’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
through an appeal.
 GSIS averred that the RTC gravely
erred in: (a) rendering judgment on the
pleadings since it specifically denied the
material allegations in PGAI’s complaint; (b)
ordering execution pending appeal since there
are no justifiable reasons for the same; and (c)
effecting execution against funds and assets
of GSIS given that RA 8291 exempts the
same from levy, execution and garnishment.
 CA ruled that judgment on the
pleadings was proper since GSIS did not
specifically deny the genuineness, due
execution, and perfection of its reinsurance
contract with PGAI. In fact, PGAI even settled
reinsurance claims during the covering period
rendering the reinsurance contract not only
perfected but partially executed as well.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in sustaining
the RTC’s January 11, 2002 Order rendering
judgment on the pleadings?
HELD: NO
 Judgment on the pleadings is
appropriate when an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.
The rule is stated in Section 1, Rule 34 of the
Rules which reads as follows: Sec. 1.
Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of
that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
 In this relation, jurisprudence dictates
that an answer fails to tender an issue if it
does not comply with the requirements of a
specific denial as set out in Sections 8 and 10,
Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting in the admission
of the material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleadings.
 As such, it is a form of judgment that
is exclusively based on the submitted
pleadings without the introduction of evidence
as the factual issues remain uncontroverted.
 In this case, records disclose that in
its Answer, GSIS admitted the material
allegations of PGAI’s complaint warranting the
grant of the relief prayed for. In particular,
GSIS admitted that: (a) it made a request for
reinsurance cover which PGAI accepted in a
reinsurance binder effective for one year; (b) it
remitted only the first three reinsurance
premium payments to PGAI; (c) it failed to pay
PGAI the fourth and final reinsurance premium
installment; and (d) it received demand letters
from PGAI. It also did not refute the allegation
of PGAI that it settled reinsurance claims
during the reinsured period. On the basis of
these admissions, the Court finds that the CA
did not err in affirming the propriety of a
judgment on the pleadings.
 GSIS’ affirmative defense that the
non-payment of the last reinsurance premium
merely rendered the contract ineffective
pursuant to Section 77 of PD 612 no longer
involves any factual issue, but stands solely as
a mere question of law in the light of the
foregoing admissions hence allowing for a
judgment on the pleadings. Besides, in the
case of Makati Tuscany, the Court already
ruled that the non-payment of subsequent
installment premiums would not prevent the
insurance contract from taking effect; that the
parties intended to make the insurance
contract valid and binding is evinced from the
fact that the insured paid – and the insurer
received – several reinsurance premiums due
thereon, although the former refused to pay
the remaining balance.
Rule 35 - Summary Judgments
1. Tan v. De La Vega, G.R. No. 168809, 10
March 2006, 484 SCRA 538
FACTS:
 Respondents filed a complaint for quieting
of title and for declaration of nullity of Free
Patent No. 495269, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 711 and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 186516, against the heirs of
Macario Mencias (defendant heirs), namely,
Aquilina Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M.
Cadete, Myrna M. Quirante; and the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Director of the Land
Management Bureau and the Register of
Deeds of Marikina. The complaint was later
amended to implead herein petitioner
purchasers of the disputed lot and to nullify
TCT No. 272191 issued in their name.
 Sometime in April 1992, respondents
learned that the defendant heirs are causing
the ejectment of the occupants of a 29,945
square meter portion of Lot 89; and that
Macario Mencias was able to obtain Free
Patent No. 495269 on July 31, 1971, and OCT
No. 711 on August 11, 1971, over said
portion. Upon Macario's death, OCT No. 711
was canceled and TCT No. 186516 was
issued to the defendant heirs on July 5, 1990.
By virtue of a Deed of Sale inscribed on
November 14, 1994, TCT No. 186516 was
further cancelled and TCT No. 271604 was
issued on the same date in favor of New
Atlantis Real Estate & Development, Inc.,
(Corporation) represented by its President,
Victor C. Salvador, Jr. The questioned lot was
thereafter sold by the Corporation to
petitioners. TCT No. 271604 was thus
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 272191
was issued to petitioners on November 17,
1994.
 In their Answer, the defendant heirs
contended that Lot 89 was never part of
respondents TCT No. 257152 which originated
from OCT No. 730. Respondents own exhibits,
i.e., the documents purportedly issued by the
Bureau of Lands (Exhibits E and F), show that
Lot 89 was covered by OCT No. 734 and not
OCT No. 730. Defendant heirs further stated
that respondents TCT No. 257152 was issued
in lieu of TCT No. 22395 which is a mere
reconstitution of TCT No. 45046. On the other
hand, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they
are purchasers in good faith and for value and
that they have no knowledge of any defect in
the title of the Corporation from whom they
purchased the controverted lot. The notice of
lis pendens alleged to have been inscribed in
TCT No. 186516 on August 4, 1992 does not
appear in the Corporations title, TCT No.
271604 nor in their title, TCT No. 272191.
Absent said notice, petitioners claim that they
cannot be charged with knowledge of any
defect in the Corporation's title.
 For failure to file their Answer, defendant
Aurora M. Gabat, public defendants Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Director of Land Management
Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina,
were declared in default. Therefore,
Respondents filed a motion for judgment on
the pleadings which was granted by the trial
court.
 Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the assailed order of
the trial court. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in a resolution
dated July 6, 2005. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether a judgment on the pleadings
is proper in the instant case.
HELD: Where a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is filed, the essential question is
whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on
the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at
all because of the failure of the defending
partys answer to raise an issue.[14]The
answer would fail to tender an issue, of
course, if it does not deny the material
allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse partys
pleadings by confessing the truthfulness
thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.
Now, if an answer does in fact specifically
deny the material averments of the complaint
and/or asserts affirmative defenses
(allegations of new matter which, while
admitting the material allegations of the
complaint expressly or impliedly, would
nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the
plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would
naturally be improper.
 In this case, we find that the trial court
erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings
because the pleadings filed by the parties
generated ostensible issues that necessitate
the presentation of evidence.
 In any case, a summary judgment is
likewise not warranted in this case as there
are genuine issues which call for a full blown
trial. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived
or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there
is no real or genuine issue or question as to
the facts, and summary judgment is called for.
The party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that
the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine
issue for trial. Trial courts have limited
authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no
genuine issue as to any material fact. When
the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for
summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial.
 In the instant case, presentation of
evidence is necessary to determine the validity
of TCT No. 22395 from which respondents title
(TCT No. 257152) was derived. As alleged by
defendant heirs, TCT No. 22395 was a mere
reconstitution of TCT No. 45046, which per
verification from the Register of Deeds of Rizal
pertain to a different piece of land measuring
only about 356 square meters and located in
San Juan, Rizal. These allegations were never
refuted by respondents, hence, they cannot be
simply brushed aside by the trial court.
2. Evangelista v. Mercator Finance, G.R.
No. 148864, 21 August 2003, 409 SCRA
410
FACTS:
 Petitioners filed a complaint for
annulment of titles against respondents.
 Petitioners claimed being the
registered owners of five (5) parcels of land
contained in the Real Estate Mortgage
executed by them and Embassy Farms
 They alleged that they executed the
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of "Mercator"
only as officers of Embassy Farms and they
did not receive any proceeds from the loan
evidenced by a PN.
 they contended that the mortgage was
without any consideration as to them since
they did not personally obtain any loan or
credit accommodations
 There being no principal obligation on
which the mortgage rests, the real estate
mortgage is void
 Mercator admitted that petitioners
were the owners of the subject parcels of land
 It contended that since P and
Embassy Farms signed the PN as co-makers,
aside from the Continuing Suretyship
Agreement, also executed to guarantee the
indebtedness of Embassy Farms, and the
succeeding promissory notes restructuring the
loan, then petitioners are jointly and severally
liable with Embassy Farms.
 Due to their failure to pay the
obligation, the foreclosure and subsequent
sale of the mortgaged properties are valid
 R asserted that they are innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith, relying
on the validity of the title of Mercator
 Both respondents likewise assailed
the long silence and inaction by petitioners as
it was only after a lapse of almost ten (10)
years from the foreclosure of the property and
the subsequent sales that they made their
claim.
 Mercator moved for summary
judgment on the ground that except as to the
amount of damages, there is no factual issue
to be litigated.
 Petitioners opposed the motion for
summary judgment claiming that because their
personal liability to Mercator is at issue, there
is a need for a full-blown trial.
 The RTC granted the motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the
complaint. It held:
 A reading of the promissory notes
show (sic) that the liability of the signatories
thereto are solidary in view of the phrase
jointly and severally. On the promissory note
appear (sic) the signatures of Eduardo B.
Evangelista, Epifania C. Evangelista and
another signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista
below the words Embassy Farms, Inc. It is
crystal clear then that the plaintiffs-spouses
signed the promissory note not only as officers
of Embassy Farms, Inc. but in their personal
capacity as well(.) Plaintiffs(,) by affixing their
signatures thereon in a dual capacity have
bound themselves as solidary debtor(s) with
Embassy Farms, Inc. to pay defendant
Mercator Finance Corporation the amount of
indebtedness. That the principal contract of
loan is void for lack of consideration, in the
light of the foregoing is untenable.
 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit. Thus, petitioners
went up to the Court of Appeals, but again
were unsuccessful.
Issue: W/N the court a quo erred and acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the
order of the trial court granting respondents
motion for summary judgment despite the
existence of genuine issues as to material
facts and its non-entitlement to a judgment as
a matter of law.
Ruling:
Summary judgment is a procedural
technique aimed at weeding out sham claims
or defenses at an early stage of the litigation.
The crucial question in a motion for summary
judgment is whether the issues raised in the
pleadings are genuine or fictitious, as shown
by affidavits, depositions or admissions
accompanying the motion. A genuine issue
means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished
from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so
as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
To forestall summary judgment, it is essential
for the non-moving party to confirm the
existence of genuine issues where he has
substantial, plausible and fairly arguable
defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the
presentation of evidence upon which a
reasonable finding of fact could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. The proper
inquiry would therefore be whether the
affirmative defenses offered by petitioners
constitute genuine issue of fact requiring a full-
blown trial.
In the case at bar, there are no genuine
issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not
deny that they obtained a loan from Mercator.
They merely claim that they got the loan as
officers of Embassy Farms without intending
to personally bind themselves or their
property. However, a simple perusal of the
promissory note and the continuing suretyship
agreement shows otherwise. This
documentary evidence proves that petitioners
are solidary obligors with Embassy Farms.
The petition is dismissed. Treble costs
against the petitioners.
3. BPI v. Sps. Yu, G.R. No. 184122, 20
January 2010, 610 SCRA 412
FACTS:
 Spouses Yu, doing business as
Tuanson Trading and Tuanson Builders
Corporation, borrowed various sums totaling
P75m from Far East Bank and Trust Company
(FEBTC). For collateral, they executed real
estate mortgages over several of their
properties including certain lands located in
Legazpi City owned by Tuanson Trading
 Unable to pay their loans, the Sps Yu
and Tuanson Builders requested a loan
restructuring, which the bank, now merged
BPI, granted. By this time, the Sps Yu loan
balance stood at P 33.4m The restructured
loan used the same collaterals with the
exception of TCT 40247 that secured a loan of
P1.6
 Despite the restructuring, however,
the Sps Yu still had difficulties paying their
loan. They asked BPI to release some of the
mortgaged lands since their total
appraised
 value far exceeded the amount of
the remaining debt. BPI ignored their request.
Sps Yu withheld payments on their
amortizations. Thus, BPI extra judicially
foreclosed the mortgaged properties in
Legazpi City and in Pili, Camarines Sur
 Sps Yu sought the annulment of
the foreclosure sale by court action against
BPI and the winning bidder Magnacraft
Development Corporation. In the course of the
proceedings, Sps Yu and Magnacraft entered
into a compromise agreement that affirmed
the latter’s ownership of 3 out of the 10
parcels of land auctioned. By virtue of this, the
court dismissed the complaint against
Magnacraft, without prejudice to the Yus filing
a new one against BPI.
 On October 2003, the Sps Yu filed
their new complaint before the RTC against
BPI for recovery of alleged excessive
penalty charges, attorney’s fees,
foreclosure expenses that the bank caused
to be incorporated in the price of the
auctioned properties.
 BPI essentially admitted the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for
P39m corresponded only to Sps Yu debt as of
date of filing of the petition. The notice of the
auction sale said that the total was inclusive of
interest, penalty charges, attorney’s fee and
expenses of this foreclosure.
 BPI further admitted its bid of P45m
for all the auctioned properties. BPI also
admitted that Magnacraft submitted the
highest and winning bid of P45.5m. The sheriff
turned over this amount to BPI. According to
BPI, it in turn remitted to the Clerk of Court the
P400k difference between its bid price and
that of Magnacrafts. Although the proceeds of
the sale exceeded the P39m stated in the
notice of sale by P6m, the bid amount
increased because it now included litigation
expenses and attorney’s fees as well as
interests and penalties as recomputed.
 BPI admitted that it also pushed
through with the second auction for the sale of
a lot in Pili, Camarines Sur that secured a
remaining debt of P5.5m BPI made the lone
bid of P1.7M
 The Yu’s had three causes of action
against BPI
 First. The bank imposed excessive
penalty charges and interests: over P5 million
in penalty charges computed at 36% per
annum compared to the 12% per annum that
the Court fixed in jurisprudence. In addition,
BPI collected a 14% yearly interest on the
principal, bringing the combined penalty
charges and interest to 50% of the principal
per annum.
 Second. BPI also imposed a charge of
P4m in attorney’s fees, the equivalent of 10%
of the principal, interest, and penalty charges.
 Third. BPI did not provide documents
to support its claim for foreclosure expenses of
P446k and cost of publication of P518k.
 As an alternative to their three causes
of action, the Yu’s claimed that BPI was in
estoppel to claim more than the amount stated
in its published notices. Consequently, it must
turn over the excess bid of P6m
 After pretrial, the Yu’s moved for
summary judgment, pointing out that based
on the answer, the common exhibits of the
parties, and the answer to the written
interrogatories to the sheriff, no genuine
issues of fact exist in the case. The Yu’s
waived their claim for moral damages so the
RTC can dispose of the case through a
summary judgment
 Initially, the RTC granted only a
partial summary judgment. It reduced the
penalty charge to 12% per annum until the
debt would have been fully paid but
maintained the attorney’s fees since BPI
already waived the amount that formed part of
the attorney’s fee and reduced the rate of
attorney’s fee to 10%. The RTC ruled that
facts necessary to resolve the issues on
penalties and fees had been admitted by
the parties thus dispensing with the need
to receive evidence. BPI appealed to CA
which affirmed RTC’s decision.
 Still, the RTC held that it needed to
receive evidence for the resolution of the
issues of (1) whether or not the foreclosure
and publication expenses were justified; (2)
whether or not the foreclosure of the lot in Pili,
Camarines Sur, was valid given that the
proceeds of the foreclosure of the properties in
Legazpi City sufficiently covered the debt; and
(3) whether or not BPI was entitled to its
counterclaim for attorney’s fees, moral
damages, and exemplary damages.
 The Yu’s moved for partial
reconsideration. They argued that, since BPI
did not mark in evidence any document in
support of the foreclosure expenses it claimed,
it may be assumed that the bank had no
evidence to prove such expenses. The Yu’s
also pointed out that BPI did not dispute the
fact that the proceeds of the sale of the
properties in Legazpi City fully satisfied the
debt. Thus, the court could already resolve
without trial the issue of whether or not the
foreclosure of the Pili property was valid.
 Further, the Yu’s sought
reconsideration of the reduction of penalty
charges and the allowance of the attorney’s
fees. They claimed that the penalty charges
should be deleted for violation of R.A. 3765 or
the Truth in Lending Act. BPIs disclosure did
not state the rate of penalties on late
amortizations. Also, the Yus asked the court to
reduce the attorney’s fees from 10% to 1% of
the amount due. RTC reconsidered its earlier
decision and rendered a summary judgment:
1. Deleting the penalty charges imposed by
BPI for noncompliance with the Truth in
Lending Act;
2. Reducing the attorney’s fees to 1% of the
principal and interest;
3. Upholding the reasonableness of the
foreclosure expenses and cost of publication,
both with interests;
4. Reiterating the turnover by the Clerk of
Court to the Yus of the excess in the bid price;
5. Deleting the Yu’s claim for moral damages
they having waived it;
 6. Denying the Yus claim
for attorney’s fees for lack of basis; and
 7.
Dismissing BPIs counterclaim for moral and
exemplary damages and for attorney’s fees for
lack of merit considering that summary
judgment has been rendered in favor of the
Yu’s.
BPI appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the case presented no
genuine issues of fact such as to warrant a
summary judgment by the RTC – Yes
2) Where summary judgment is proper,
whether or not the RTC and the CA a)
correctly deleted the penalty charges because
of BPIs alleged failure to comply with the Truth
in Lending Act; b) correctly reduced the
attorney’s fees to 1% of the judgment debt;
and c) properly dismissed BPIs counterclaims
for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, and litigation expenses.
HELD:
 A summary judgment is apt when the
essential facts of the case are uncontested or
the parties do not raise any genuine issue of
fact
 In this case, the Court explained
that to resolve the issue of the excessive
charges allegedly incorporated into the
auction bid price, the RTC simply had to look
at a) the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan
agreements, the promissory note, and the real
estate mortgages between them; c) the
foreclosure and bidding documents; and d)
the admissions and other disclosures
between the parties during pre-trial. Since
the parties admitted not only the existence,
authenticity, and genuine execution of
these documents but also what they
stated, the trial court did not need to hold a
trial for the reception of the evidence of the
parties.
 BPI contends that a summary
judgment was not proper given the following
issues that the parties raised: 1) whether or
not the loan agreements between them were
valid and enforceable; 2) whether or not the
Yus have a cause of action against BPI; 3)
whether or not the Yus are proper parties in
interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are
estopped from questioning the foreclosure
proceeding after entering into a compromise
agreement with Magnacraft; 5) whether or not
the penalty charges and fees and expenses of
litigation and publication are excessive; and 6)
whether or not BPI violated the Truth in
Lending Act.
 But, the Supreme Court held that
these are issues that could be readily
resolved based on the facts established by
the pleadings and the admissions of the
parties. Indeed, BPI has failed to name any
document or item of fact that it would have
wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A
trial would have been such a great waste of
time and resources.
 Although BPI failed to state the
penalty charges in the disclosure statement,
the promissory note that the Yus signed, on
the same date as the disclosure statement,
contained a penalty clause. The Court has
affirmed that financial charges are amply
disclosed if stated in the promissory note. In
this case, the promissory notes signed by the
Yus’ contained data, including penalty
charges, required by the Truth in Lending Act.
 As for the penalty charges, the court
finds the ruling of the RTC in its original
decision reasonable and fair. Thus, the
penalty charge of 12% per annum or 1% per
month is imposed.
 The award of attorneys fee may
likewise be equitably reduced. The CA
correctly affirmed the RTC Order to reduce it
to 1% based on the following reasons: (1)
attorneys fee is not essential to the cost of
borrowing, but a mere incident of collection;
(2) 1% is just and adequate because BPI had
already charged foreclosure expenses; (3)
attorneys fee of 10% of the total amount due is
onerous considering the rote effort that goes
into extrajudicial foreclosures.
3. Olivarez Realty v. Castillo, G.R. No.
196251, 9 July 2014, 729 SCRA 544
FACTS:
 Benjamin Castillo was the registered
owner of a parcel of land located in Laurel,
Batangas, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-19972. The Philippine Tourism
Authority allegedly claimed ownership of the
same parcel of land based on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18493. On April 5,
2000, Castillo and Olivarez Realty
Corporation, represented by Dr. Pablo R.
Olivarez, entered into a contract of conditional
sale over the property. Under the deed of
conditional sale, Castillo agreed to sell his
property to Olivarez Realty Corporation
for P19,080,490.00 and Olivarez Realty
Corporation assumes the responsibility of
taking necessary legal action thru Court to
have the claim/title TCT T-18493 of Philippine
Tourism Authority over the above-described
property be nullified and voided with the full
assistance of Castillo.
 On September 2, 2004, Castillo filed a
complaint for action for rescission against
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez
with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan City,
Batangas. Castillo alleged that Dr. Olivarez
convinced him into selling his property to
Olivarez Realty Corporation on the
representation that the corporation shall be
responsible in clearing the property of the
tenants and in paying them disturbance
compensation. However, the corporation only
paid 2,500,000.00 of the purchase price and
failed to comply the terms of the conditional
sale. Despite demand, Olivarez Realty
Corporation refused to fully pay the purchase
price.
 In their answer, Olivarez Realty
Corporation and Dr. Olivarez admitted that the
corporation only paid P2,500,000.00 of the
purchase price. In their defense, defendants
alleged that Castillo failed to "fully assist" the
corporation in filing an action against the
Philippine Tourism Authority. Neither did
Castillo clear the property of the tenants within
six months from the signing of the deed of
conditional sale.
 On March 8, 2006, Castillo filed a
motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings. He argued that
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez
"substantially admitted the material allegations
of his complaint." Should judgment on the
pleadings be improper, Castillo argued that
summary judgment may still be rendered as
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact.
 The trial court found that Olivarez
Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer
"substantially admitted the material allegations
of Castillo’s complaint and did not raise any
genuine issue as to any material fact."
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez
appealed to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Is summary judgment rendered
the Regional Trial Court correct?
RULING:
 The summary judgment is correct. An
issue of material fact exists if the answer or
responsive pleading filed specifically denies
the material allegations of fact set forth in the
complaint or pleading. If the issue of fact
"requires the presentation of evidence, it is a
genuine issue of fact." However, if the issue
"could be resolved judiciously by plain resort"
to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and
other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is
sham, and the trial court may resolve the
action through summary judgment.
 A summary judgment is usually
distinguished from a judgment on the
pleadings. Under Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, trial may likewise be
dispensed with and a case decided through
judgment on the pleadings if the answer filed
fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the claimant’s pleading.
 Judgment on the pleadings is proper
when the answer filed fails to tender any
issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations in the complaint. On the other
hand, in a summary judgment, the answer
filed tenders issues as specific denials and
affirmative defenses are pleaded, but the
issues raised are sham, fictitious, or otherwise
not genuine.
 In this case, Olivarez Realty
Corporation admitted that it did not fully pay
the purchase price as agreed upon in the
deed of conditional sale. As to why it withheld
payments from Castillo, it set up the following
affirmative defenses: First, Castillo did not file
a case to void the Philippine Tourism
Authority’s title to the property; second,
Castillo did not clear the land of the tenants;
third, Castillo allegedly sold the property to a
third person, and the subsequent sale is
currently being litigated beforea Quezon
City court.
 Considering that Olivarez Realty
Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s answer
tendered an issue, Castillo properly availed
himself of a motion for summary
judgment. However, the issues tendered by
Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez’s
answer are not genuine issues of material fact.
These are issues that can be resolved
judiciously by plain resort to the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
papers on file; otherwise, these issues are
sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.
 Castillo’s alleged failure to
"fully assist" the corporation in filing the case
is not a defense. As the trial court said, "how
can Castillo assist the corporation when the
latter did not file the action in the first place?"
 Neither can Olivarez Realty
Corporation argue that it refused to fully pay
the purchase price due to the Philippine
Tourism Authority’s adverse claim on the
property. The corporation knew of this adverse
claim when it entered into a contract of
conditional sale. It even obligated itself under
the deed of conditional sale to sue the
Philippine Tourism Authority. This defense,
therefore, is sham.
 As demonstrated, there are no
genuine issues of material fact in this case.
These are issues that can be resolved
judiciously by plain resort to the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other
papers on file. As the trial court found,
Olivarez Realty Corporation illegally withheld
payments of the purchase price. The
trial court did not err in rendering summary
judgment.
Rule 36 - Judgments, Final Orders and
Entry Thereof
1. Shimizu Phils. Contractors v. Magsalin,
G.R. No. 170026, 20 June 2012, 674 SCRA
65
Summary: Shimizu filed a complaint against
both Magsalin and FGU Insurance. The
complaint sought Php 2,329,124.60 as actual
damages for the breach of contract.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of
Dismissal for the case without citing neither
the basis nor the reasons. The court held that
when a complaint is dismissed for failure to
prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the
dismissal has the effect of adjudication on the
merits. A trial court should always specify the
reasons for a complaints dismissal so that on
appeal, the reviewing court can readily
determine the prima facie justification for the
dismissal. The dismissal order clearly violates
this rule for its failure to disclose how and why
Shimizu failed to prosecute its complaint.
Where the reasons are absent, a decision
(such as the dismissal order) has absolutely
nothing to support it and is thus a nullity.
Facts:
 Shimizu claims that Leticia Magsalin,
doing business as Karens Trading, had
breached their subcontract agreement for the
supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of
parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioners
Makati City condominium project called The
Regency at Salcedo. The breach triggered the
agreements termination. When Magsalin also
refused to return the petitioners unliquidated
advance payment and to account for other
monetary liabilities despite demand, the
petitioner sent a notice to respondent FGU
Insurance Corporation demanding damages
pursuant to the surety and performance bonds
the former had issued for the subcontract.
 Shimizu filed a complaint against both
Magsalin and FGU Insurance at the RTC of
Makati. The complaint sought P2,329,124.60
as actual damages for the breach of contract.
FGU Insurance was duly served with
summons. With respect to Magsalin, however,
the corresponding officers return declared that
both she and Karens Trading could not be
located at their given addresses, and that
despite further efforts, their new addresses
could not be determined.
 FGU Insurance filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint. The Shimizu filed its
opposition to the motion. The motion to
dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing
motion for reconsideration, and FGU
Insurance was obliged to file an answer. To
assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction over
Magsalin, Shimizu filed a motion for leave to
serve summons on respondent Magsalin by
way of publication. Shimizu then filed its reply
to FGU Insurances answer
 FGU Insurance filed a motion for
leave of court to file a third-party complaint.
Attached to the motion was the subject
complaint, with Reynaldo Baetiong, Godofredo
Garcia and Concordia Garcia named as third-
party defendants. FGU Insurance claims that
the three had executed counter-guaranties
over the surety and performance bonds it
executed for the subcontract with Magsalin
and, hence, should be held jointly and
severally liable in the event it is held liable in
Civil Case No. 02-488.
 RTC admitted the third-party
complaint and denied the motion to serve
summons by publication on the ground that
the action against respondent Magsalin was in
personam.
 The TC issued a notice setting the
case for hearing on June 20, 2003. FGU
Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing
on the ground that the third-party defendants
had not yet filed their answer. The motion was
granted.
 Baetiong filed his answer to the third-
party complaint. He denied any personal
knowledge about the surety and performance
bonds for the subcontract with Magsalin. Of
the (3) persons named as third-party
defendants, only Baetiong filed an answer to
the third-party complaint; the officers returns
on the summons to the Garcias state that both
could not be located at their given addresses.
 Incidentally, Shimizu claims, and
Baetiong does not dispute, that it was not
served with a copy of Baetiongs answer.
 Shimizu now argues before us that
FGU Insurance, which is the plaintiff in the
third-party complaint, had failed to exert efforts
to serve summons on the Garcias. It suggests
that a motion to serve summons by publication
should have been filed for this purpose. The
petitioner also asserts that the RTC should
have scheduled a hearing to determine the
status of the summons to the third-party
defendants
 On Dec 16, 2003, the RTC issued a
worded Order of Dismissal, dismissing Civil
Case No. 02-488: “For failure of [petitioner] to
prosecute, the case is hereby DISMISSED”
 The RTC denied Shimizu’s motion for
reconsideration prompting the latter to elevate
its case to the CA via a Rule 41 petition for
review
 FGU Insurance moved for the
dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. It argued that the appeal raised
a pure question of law as it did not dispute the
proceedings before the issuance of the
December 16, 2003 dismissal order
 Shimizu, on the other hand, insisted
that it had raised questions of fact in the
appeal stating that “While, the instant appeal
does not involve the merits of the case, the
same involves questions of fact based on the
records of the case. It must be emphasized
that the lower court’s dismissal of the case
based on alleged failure to prosecute on the
part of plaintiff-appellant was too sudden and
precipitate.”
 The CA agreed with FGU Insurance
and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well
the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner thus filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the dismissal order is
proper?
2. Whether the dismissal order conforms
to Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
1. YES. The nullity of the dismissal order is
patent on its face. It simply states its
conclusion that the case should be dismissed
for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but
does not state the facts on which this
conclusion is based.
Dismissals of actions for failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A
plain examination of the December 16, 2003
dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified
order and, as such, is deemed to be a
dismissal with prejudice. “Dismissals of
actions (under Section 3) which do not
expressly state whether they are with or
without prejudice are held to be with
prejudice.” As a prejudicial dismissal, the
dismissal order is also deemed to be a
judgment on the merits so that the petitioner’s
complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488 can no
longer be refiled on the principle of res
judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is
dismissed for failure to prosecute and the
dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the
effect of adjudication on the merits.
2. NO. As adjudication on the merits, it is
imperative that the dismissal order conform
with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court
on the writing of valid judgments and final
orders. A trial court should always specify the
reasons for a complaints dismissal so that on
appeal, the reviewing court can readily
determine the prima facie justification for the
dismissal. The dismissal order clearly violates
this rule for its failure to disclose how and why
Shimizu failed to prosecute its complaint.
Thus, neither Shimizu nor the reviewing court
is able to know the particular facts that had
prompted the prejudicial dismissal.
A void decision, however, is open to
collateral attack. While we note that the
validity of the dismissal order with respect to
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court was
never raised by the petitioner as an issue in
the present petition, the Supreme Court is
vested with ample authority to review an
unassigned error if it finds that consideration
and resolution are indispensable or necessary
in arriving at a just decision in an appeal. In
this case, the interests of substantial justice
warrant the review of an obviously void
dismissal order.
2. Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27
April 2005, 457 SCRA 400
FACTS:
 The funding for the Agno Rover Flood
Control Project, a public works project, was to
be derived primarily through a loan from the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC). DPWH constituted a Bid and Awards
Committee (BAC) for the purpose of
conducting international competitive bidding
for the procurement of the contract. Among
the 6 pre-qualified bidders are present
intervenors Daewoo and China International.
Nolasco, invoking his right as a taxpayer,
prayed that the DPWH and BAC be restrained
from awarding the contract to Daewoo and
have Daewoo disqualified as a bidder. He
alleged having obtained copies of
"Confidential Reports from an Unnamed
DPWH Consultant". He said that based on the
reports, Daewoo's bid was unacceptable and
the putative award to Daewoo illegal, immoral,
and prejudicial to the government and the
Filipino taxpayers.
 March 27, 2002: the RTC of Manila
dismissed Nolasco's petition. According to the
RTC, it was a suit against the State, which had
been sued without its consent. Meanwhile,
BAC resolved to recommend the award of the
contract to Daewoo as it has the lowers bid;
DPWH Secretary Datumanong approved (i.e
signed) the recommendation.
ISSUE: W/N the petition was a suit against the
State without its consent.
HELD:
 Yes. An unincorporated government
agency such as the DPWH is without any
separate juridical personality of its own and
hence enjoys immunity from suit.
 It cannot be said that the DPWH was
deemed to have given its consent to be sued
by entering into a contract, for at the time the
petition was filed by Nolasco, the DPWH had
not yet entered into a contract with respect to
the project. The presumption is that the State
and its elements act correctly unless otherwise
proven.
 An obiter dictum is a nonessential,
welcome and sublime like a poem of love in a
last will or unwanted and asinine as in
brickbats in a funeral oration. It is neither
enforceable as a relief nor the source of a
judicially actionable claim. However, by reason
of its non-binding nature, the pronouncement
does not generally constitute error of law or
grave abuse of discretion, even if it proves
revelatory of the erroneous thinking on the
part of the judge. It is chiefly for that reason
that this petition is being denied, albeit with all
clarifications necessary to leave no doubt as
to the status and legal effect of the
controvertible Order dated 6 September 2002
issued by Judge Juan C. Nabong, Jr.
(Petitioner) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 32.
3. Obra v. Badua, et al., G.R. No. 149125, 9
August 2007, 529 SCRA 621
FACTS:
 The case arose from a Complaint for
Easement of Right-of-Way filed by
respondents against Anacleto and
Resurreccion Obra, Donato and Lucena
Bucasas, and Paulino and Crisanta Badua
 R alleged that their residential houses,
erected on a lot commonly owned Bacnotan,
La Union, were located west of the properties
of the Obras, Bucasases, and Baduas.
 Their only access to the national
highway was a pathway traversing the
northern portion of petitioners property and the
southern portion of the properties of the
Bucasases and Baduas.
 Obra constructed a fence on the
northern boundary of their property; thus,
blocking respondents access to the national
highway. Respondents demanded the
demolition of the fence, but petitioner refused
 P averred that R failed to satisfy the
requisites provided in Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code in order to establish an
easement of right-of-way
 P alleged that respondents had
another access as ingress and egress to the
public road other than the one traversing her
property.
 The spouses Badua and Bucasas
failed to file an answer; consequently, they
were declared in default.
 On July 7, 2000, after trial, the RTC
rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint.
 It held that respondents were not able
to satisfy all the requisites needed for their
claim of an easement of right of way
 the applied easement of right-of-way
on the northern portion of petitioners property
was not allowed. The said Decision became
final and executory
 Sometime in 2001, petitioner
constructed a fence on this portion of her lot,
which again restricted the use of respondents’
new pathway. Aggrieved and prejudiced by
petitioner’s action, respondents filed on March
6, 2001 a Motion to Enforce
 They alleged that the Decision of the
RTC dismissing the case was based on the
existence of a new pathway which they had
been using since 1995.
 RTC granted the said
motion. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was rejected in the trial
courts
 TC held that the dismissal of the
complaint depended on petitioners’
representation that she was allowing
respondents to use the southern portion of her
property as an alternative pathway. Since the
southern portion was an agreed pathway,
petitioner could not reduce its width; thus, the
trial court ordered petitioner to remove the
fence blocking the passage.
Issue: W/N the Court can motu
proprio declare a compulsory right of way on a
property not the subject of a pending case
(particularly Civil Case No. 5033)
Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.
 The resolution of the court in a given
issue embodied in the fallo or dispositive part
of a decision or order is the controlling factor
as to settlement of rights of the parties.Thus,
where there is a conflict between the fallo and
the ratio decidendi or body of the decision,
the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory
that the fallo is the final order while the opinion
in the body is merely a statement ordering
nothing. The rule applies when the dispositive
part of a final decision or order is definite,
clear, and unequivocal, and can wholly be
given effect without need of interpretation or
construction.
 When a court rules that the case or
complaint is dismissed, then it is concluded
that the cause of action embodied in the
allegations of the initiatory pleading has no
merit or basis, and the prayer is consequently
denied.
 Apparently, no pronouncement was
ever made regarding the nature and legality of
this new pathway; therefore, no easement was
established by the Court on petitioners
property in Civil Case No. 5033. Thus, their
claim for a right-of-way on the southern portion
had no basis.
 More importantly, the case was
dismissed by the RTC, meaning no relief was
granted by the court to
respondents. Granting arguendo that the issue
on the entitlement to respondents of a right-of-
way over the southern portion was likewise
raised and was implicit from the pleadings;
nevertheless, respondents, by the dismissal of
the case, were not granted any affirmative
relief by the trial court. As such, the trial court
clearly erred in issuing the March 20,
2001 Order which granted a relief not found in
the fallo of the decision.
 It is plain to see that such act of
constructing the fence was subsequent to the
Decision and could not have been covered by
said judgment.
 In the new case, respondents are
obliged to prove all the essential elements of
the easement of right-of-way a requirement
which they failed to satisfy in Civil Case No.
5033.
 The trial court, seemingly aware that it
did not determine the legality of an easement
of right-of-way over the pathway located south
of petitioners property, nevertheless,
concluded that the said passage was an
agreed or voluntary easement of right-of-way
which petitioner should respect.
 The trial court was in error.
 It is a settled doctrine that a decision,
after it becomes final, becomes immutable and
unalterable. Thus, the court loses jurisdiction
to amend, modify, or alter a final judgment and
is left only with the jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it. Any amendment or alteration which
substantially affects a final and executory
judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings
held for that purpose.
 More so, since a right-of-way is an
interest in the land, any agreement creating it
should be drawn and executed with the same
formalities as a deed to a real estate, and
ordinarily must be in writing. No written
instrument on this agreement was adduced by
respondents.
 In the light of the foregoing
considerations, the assailed March 20,
2001 and June 20, 2001 Orders are null, void,
an
Rule 39 - Execution, Satisfaction and Effect
of Judgments
1. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres
v. Heirs of Abella, G.R. No. 143510, 23
November 2005, 476 SCRA 1
FACTS:
 The property in dispute is a parcel of
land covered by tax declaration in the name of
herein respondents, the heirs of Don Manuel I.
Abella. According to herein petitioner said
parcel of land had been donated to him by
respondents sometime in 1981, in exchange
for masses to be offered once a month in
perpetuity for the eternal repose of the soul of
Don Manuel I. Abella. Respondents, on the
other hand, deny such allegation and counter
that petitioner encroached and fenced off the
subject parcel of land without their consent.
 Hence, the Heirs of Abella filed a
forcible entry case before the MTC of Naga
against the petitioner.
 The judgment was rendered in favor
of the petitioner. On appeal, the MTC’S
Decision was affirmed by the RTC (Branch
22). Thus, the Decision was appealed by the
respondent to CA. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC (Branch 22) by denying
Abella’s petition for review.
 While the case was pending before
the CA, ABELLA filed another case before
RTC (Branch 24) against the petitioner, for
Quieting of Title involving the same property
subject matter of MTC (Forcible Entry). RTC
branch 24 rendered decision in favor of Heirs
of Abella declaring them as the rightful owner
of the subject property and that the herein
defendant has no rightful claim of ownership
over the same.
 The Decision was appealed by
petitioner to CA, which later affirmed the
RTC’s decision. Thus, the petitioner appealed
the CA’s decision before the Supreme Court,
said appeal was dismissed holding that there
was no reversible error committed by the
appellate court.
 Both Decisions in the Forcible Entry
case and in the Quieting of Title case are now
final and executory
 The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute
the Decision in the Forcible Entry case, MTC
denied the motion for execution.
ISSUE: WON the decision in Quieting of Title
case was supervening event in the Forcible
Entry case?
HELD: YES. The finding in the case for
quieting of title that respondents never
agreed to donate the property or to allow
petitioner to occupy the subject land prevails
over the ruling in the forcible entry case.
 The foregoing findings totally
foreclose petitioners belated claim that even if
title over the property remained with
respondents, he is nevertheless entitled to
possession thereof. Since respondents never
made the alleged donation, there is absolutely
no legal and factual basis for petitioner to
claim the right of possession over it.
 Hence, there can be no other
conclusion but that the finality of the decision
of the quieting of title constitutes a
supervening event that justifies the non-
enforcement of the judgment in the forcible
entry.
 In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, Court explained thus: ... The
jurisdiction of the court to amend, modify or
alter its judgment terminates when the
judgment becomes final. This is the principle
of immutability of final judgment that is subject
to only few exceptions, none of which is
present in this case. On the other hand, the
jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment
continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement
of judgment.
 One of the exceptions to the principle
of immutability of final judgments is the
existence of supervening events. Supervening
events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and
executory or to new circumstances which
developed after the judgment has acquired
finality, including matters which the parties
were not aware of prior to or during the trial as
they were not yet in existence at that time.
 In the case at bar, the new
circumstance which developed after the finality
of the judgment in the forcible entry is the fact
that the decision in the case for quieting of title
had also attained finality and conclusively
resolved the issue of ownership over the
subject land, and the concomitant right of
possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution
of the judgment in the forcible entry case
would work injustice on respondents who had
been conclusively declared the owners and
rightful possessors of the disputed land.
2. Lu v. Siapno, A.M. MTJ-99-1199, 6 July
2000, 335 SCRA 181
Facts: Francisco Lu is the defendant in a civil
case for ejectment raffled to respondent Judge
Orlando Ana F. Siapno of the Municipal Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan and docketed
as Civil Case No. 4112. In his administrative
complaint, Francisco Lu alleges that he filed
an Answer with Counterclaim to the Amended
Complaint for ejectment which was later
amended. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to
Dismiss the ejectment case on the ground that
plaintiffs therein were no longer the owners of
the land in question, the same having been
sold to the Shahanis on February 7, 1995 and
later transferred in the names of the latter
under TCT No. 202393. On September 7,
1995, respondent Judge Siapno rendered
judgment against Lu which decision was
allegedly received by Lu's counsel on
September 13, 1995.[4] A notice of appeal was
filed on the same day. On September 11,
1995, MTC-Clerk of Court Celestina Corpuz
issued a Writ of Execution[6] which was
allegedly implemented by Sheriff Domingo S.
Lopez of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, Branch 45 who forcibly ejected
Lu from the premises.
 While on appeal, the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 47
issued a preliminary mandatory injunction and
declared the writ of execution earlier issued by
the MTC-Urdaneta, Pangasinan to be null and
void.[7] On February 5, 1996, RTC-Branch 47
rendered judgment modifying the MTC-
judgment by deleting the paragraph "(I)n
accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of
Execution be issued."[8] Hence, Lu filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals on
February 21, 1996 which was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 39875.[9] Meanwhile,
plaintiff's counsel filed on February 19, 1996 a
Motion for Execution ]with MTC which was
granted by respondent Judge Siapno granted
in the Order dated February 22, 1996
allegedly without notice and hearing. The writ
of execution was issued by Clerk of Court
Corpuz on the same day.
 On April 2, 1996, Atty. Joselino Viray,
plaintiff's counsel, filed an Ex-parte Motion to
Withdraw deposit praying that the amount
deposited in the municipal treasurer be
withdrawn in order to satisfy the judgment.
Said motion was granted in the Order dated
April 2, 1996. On April 23, 1996, Atty. Viray
filed a Motion for Special Demolition which
was likewise granted by respondent Judge
Siapno, allegedly without notice and hearing,
in his Order of May 20, 1996 which order was
later amended on May 21, 1996 as the first
order directed the plaintiff therein, instead of
the sheriff, to demolish the structure on the
subject property. On the same date, May 21,
1991, Sheriff Lopez immediately implemented
the order of demolition by serving a copy of
the said order upon complainant's wife and
proceeding to demolish the structure, building
and other improvements on the land in
question. The order of demolition was
allegedly received by complainant's counsel
on May 28, 1996.
 Hence, this complaint for gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and
abdication of official function and gross
misconduct
 Respondent Siapno denied all the
accusations against him. He filed his
Comment and Answer to the complaint
against him. On the charge of gross
incompetence in the performance of his duties
for not dismissing Civil Case No. 4112,
respondent Judge argues that complainant Lu
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the
ground that the land subject of the controversy
was already sold to the Shahanis but since the
said case is governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, the court did not take
action on Lu's motion to dismiss being a
prohibited pleading.
 As regards the charge of gross
ignorance of the law for rendering a decision
providing in its dispositive portion the issuance
of a writ of execution without notice and
hearing, respondent Judge contends that he
did not issue a writ of execution implementing
the decision since it was his Clerk of Court
Celestina Corpuz who signed the writ of
execution without his authority. Respondent
Judge further denies the charge of partiality
and bias in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendant (herein complainant) in the
subject case. He denied having committed a
mistake in allowing the motion to withdraw
deposit since his decision has been affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court and under the
rules, the decision of the latter is immediately
executory. The motion for demolition was
likewise granted in view of the affirmance of
his decision ordering the defendant to
immediately vacate the premises. Hence,
respondent Judge prays for the dismissal of
the instant case for lack of merit.
 In the Counter-Affidavit (Answer) of
respondent Sheriff Lopez, he alleges that the
writ of execution dated September 11, 1995
was not implemented because of the appeal
of the MTC-decision to the Regional Trial
Court which nullified the writ; that he was not
the one who implemented the writ of execution
but a certain Eduardo Ramos, the Deputy
Sheriff of RTC-Branch 47 since Lopez was
detailed as sheriff of the office of the Clerk of
Court from October 1989 up to April 1997; that
per Sheriff's Return dated February 23, 1996,
it was Sheriff Ramos who implemented the
writ of execution, a copy of the writ and the
order having been served upon Lu who
voluntarily vacated the premises; that he
(respondent Lopez) implemented the order of
demolition since there was no restraining
order issued by the Court of Appeals while the
case was pending appeal and that
complainant Lu already voluntarily vacated the
premises; and that a copy of the order of
demolition was served upon Lu's wife, Elvie,
who allegedly refused to sign therein.
Respondent Sheriff Lopez claims that he
performed what he believed to be his
ministerial duty.
 Respondent Sheriff Lopez filed a
Manifestation stating that he applied for
optional retirement to take effect May 9, 1998
and requesting that the amount of P20,000.00
be retained to answer for any penalty that may
be meted out to him. His request was denied
in this Court's Resolution dated March 24,
1999.
 The case was referred to Judge
Modesto C. Juanson of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta City, Branch 46 for
investigation, report and recommendation. He
made the following findings: (1) on the charge
of gross incompetence in the performance of
his duties against respondent Judge, the
same is belied by the RTC-decision dismissing
the appeal which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals; (2) on gross ignorance of the law, the
investigating judge opined that it was Clerk of
Court Corpuz who prepared, signed and
issued the writ of execution without consulting
the respondent Judge thereby absolving the
latter from any responsibility; (3) on the charge
of abdication of his official function, the
investigating judge was of the view that
respondent Judge should not be faulted by the
unauthorized action of her clerk of court.
 As regards respondent Sheriff Lopez,
the investigating Judge found him guilty for
violating the rights of complainant Lu without
giving the latter five (5) days notice to remove
his personal belongings.
 Hence, the Investigating Judge made
the following recommendation:
"1. Respondent Siapno is exonerated in all the
charges;
2. Respondent Lopez is meted a penalty
of P10,000.00 with warning that repetition of
the same shall be dealt with severely;
3. Celestina Corpuz, not being charged, but
on the principle of res ipsa loquitor be meted a
fine of P10,000.00 with the warning that
repetition of the same shall be dealt with
severely."
 In the Memorandum dated February
10, 2000, the Court Administrator
recommended, inter alia, that the: (1)
respondent Judge likewise fined in the amount
of P10,000.00 each. The Court Administrator
opined that the respondent Judge erred in
including in the dispositive portion of his
decision the directive that "(I)n accordance
with the Rules, let the Writ of Execution be
issued" and by doing so, respondent Judge
had no other intention but to see to it that the
decision is "immediately executed" without any
further action on the part of the plaintiffs
therein.
 In the Resolution dated February 28,
2000, this Court forwarded the charge against
Atty. Joselino A. Viray to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, for appropriate action, the latter
having exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
 We agree with the Court Administrator
that respondent Judge Siapno is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law when he rendered
judgment providing, in the dispositive portion,
for its immediate execution. It should be noted
that the Regional Trial Court, while affirming
the judgment of the respondent Judge,
nevertheless deleted that portion of the
decision providing for immediate execution.
Basic is the rule that a judge may not order
execution of judgment in the decision
itself.[17] Section 21 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure likewise provides that the decision
of the regional trial court is immediately
executory. Even if immediately executory,
there must first be a motion to that effect and a
hearing called for that purpose. In an
ejectment case, the adverse party is entitled to
notice before execution can be ordered. [18] In
disregarding the rules and settled
jurisprudence, respondent Judge showed
gross ignorance, albeit without any malice or
corrupt motive. The lack of malicious intent,
however, cannot completely free respondent
Judge from liability. When the law is
elementary, so elementary not to know it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
 As regards the charge of partiality and
bias in favor of the plaintiffs, we find the same
to be unsubstantiated. Mere suspicion that the
judge is partial to a party is not enough; there
should be adequate evidence to prove the
charge.
 Clerk of Court Corpuz admitted that
she issued and signed the writ of execution
without consulting the respondent judge.
Sheriff Lopez likewise admitted that the writ of
execution dated September 11, 1995 was not
implemented because of the appeal to the
RTC which nullified the writ. He claims,
however, that he was not the one who
implemented the second writ of execution but
it was Mr. Eduardo Ramos of the RTC-Branch
47. In the Sheriff's Return dated February 23,
1996 submitted by Ramos, it appears that Lu
vacated the subject premises voluntarily.
 As regards the writ of demolition,
Sheriff Lopez argues that although the RTC-
decision was appealed to the Court of
Appeals, the latter did not issue any
restraining order, thus the implementation of
the order of demolition following the return of
the writ issued on February 22, 1996.
 The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff
must be held responsible. The issuance of the
writ of execution and its subsequent
implementation without motion and hearing
and at the time the copy of the judgment has
not yet been received by defendant's counsel,
was precipitate and against all sense of fair
play. Lu's counsel received the MTC-decision
on September 13, 1995 and filed a notice of
appeal on the same day. However, the writ of
execution was issued by Clerk of Court
Corpuz on September 11, 1995 and was
implemented by Sheriff Lopez on said date.
Clearly, there was a violation of the rules of
procedure. Even in the Rule on Summary
Procedure, a judgment must first be given to
the losing party before it can be executed.[21]
Moreover, as found by Investigating Judge
Juanson, Sheriff Lopez removed the personal
belongings of Lu without giving the latter five
(5) days’ notice to remove the same or to
obtain remedies somewhere. Under the Rules
of Court, the immediate enforcement of a writ
of execution in ejectment cases is carried out
by giving the defendant notice of such writ,
and making a demand that defendant comply
therewith within a reasonable period, normally
from three (3) to five (5) days, and it is only
after such period that the sheriff enforces the
writ by the bodily removal of the defendant
and his personal belongings. And if demolition
is involved, there must first be a hearing on
motion and due notice for the issuance of a
special order under Section 14, Rule 39.
 While we agree with the
recommendation of both the Court
Administrator and the Investigating Judge
imposing a fine upon respondent Sheriff
Lopez in the amount of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), we find the same to be too
harsh. So too is the fine imposed upon
respondent Judge as recommended by the
Court Administrator. Accordingly, the amount
of fine is reduced to five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) in both cases.
 As regards Clerk of Court Corpuz, she
was not impleaded in the instant
administrative complaint and should be given
her day in court. The Court Administrator is
directed to institute a separate administrative
case against her.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
respondent Judge Orlando Ana F. Siapno of
the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan is hereby found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and is FINED in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
For gross abuse of authority, respondent
Sheriff Domingo S. Lopez, Sheriff IV of the
Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 45 is FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
They are likewise warned that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely by this Court.
The Court Administrator is further directed to
institute the appropriate administrative case
against Clerk of Court Celestina Corpuz.
SO ORDERED.
3. RCPI v. Lantin, No. L-59311, 31 January
1985, 134 SCRA 395
FACTS:
 On September 8, 1978, Rufus B.
Rodriguez, as President of the World
Association of Law Students (WALS), sent two
cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one
addressed to Mohammed Elsir Taha in
Khartoum, Sudan Socialist Union, and the
other to Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia,
United States.
 The cablegrams were, in turn, relayed to
GLOBE for transmission to their foreign
destinations. The telegram to Taha advised
him of Rodriguez's pending arrival in
Khartoum on September 18, 1978, while the
telegram to Merger advised her of the
scheduled WALS conference in Khartoum.
Rodriguez left the Philippines on September
15, 1978. On September 18, 1978, he arrived
in Khartoum, Sudan at 9:30 in the evening.
Nobody was at the airport to meet him.
 Due to the lateness of the hour, he was
forced to sleep at the airport. He lined up five
(5) chairs together and lay down with his
luggages near him. Because of the non-
receipt of the cablegram, Taha was not able to
meet him. Worse all preparations for the
international conference had to be cancelled.
 Furthermore, Fernando Barros, the Vice-
President, arrived the next day from Chile,
followed by the other officers from other
countries except Diane Merger, the
organization's secretary. It turned out that the
wire sent by Rodriguez to Merger was
delivered to the address on the message but
the person who delivered it was told that the
addressee was no longer staying there. This
fact was not accordingly reported to Rodriguez
in Metro Manila. The undelivered cablegram
was not returned by the correspondent abroad
to Globe for disposition in the Philippines,
 On December 8, 1978, Rodriguez filed a
complaint for compensatory damages in the
amount of P45,147.00, moral damages in the
amount of P250,000.00,' and exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 against
RCPI and GLOBE.
 TC – ruled in favor of the petitioners and
ordered the defendants to jointly and severally
to pay the plaintiff the total sum of Two
Hundred Thirteen Thousand One Hundred
Forty Eight Pesos (P213,148.00) by way of
damages and to pay the costs of this suit.
 On May 26, 1980, Rodriguez filed a "Motion
for Execution Before Expiration of Time to
Appeal" relying on Rule 39, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court alleging that the
appeal is clearly dilatory and that the lapse of
time would make the ultimate judgment
illusory and ineffective. An opposition to the
motion was filed by RCPI on June 3, 1980 and
by GLOBE on November 18,1980.
 Respondent court of first instance granted
the said motion.
Upon consideration of the Motion for execution
pending appeal, the opposition thereto and the
arguments in open court by the parties, and
finding that:
a) the appeal was for the purpose of delay,
there being breach of contract, and
defendants' evidence being weak or feeble;
b) plaintiff is willing to put up a bond in the
amount of P213,148.00 to answer for
damages if the decision is reversed on appeal
The Court grants the motion. Let writ of
execution pending appeal be issued upon the
filing of a bond by plaintiff in the sum of
P213,148.00. Said bond should be filed within
ten (10) days from receipt of this order.
 On February 5, 1981, the same court
issued another order which reads as follows:
The bond pursuant to the order of January 21,
1981, is approved. Let writ of execution of
judgment pending appeal be issued forthwith.
 On February 10, 1981, GLOBE filed a
motion for reconsideration of the above order
and expressed its desire to put up a
supersedeas bond to stay immediate
execution. This motion was denied in an order
dated February 17, 1981. Even before the
issuance of this order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, the respondent
Sheriff, on February 13, 1981, insisted on
levying on the funds and assets of petitioners
RCPI and GLOBE, prompting them to file an
"Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution.
This urgent motion was likewise denied.
 On February 17, 1981, RCPI and
GLOBE filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. On February 20,
1981, the Court of Appeals issued a
restraining order enjoining the lower court from
further proceeding with the civil case and from
enforcing the writ of execution until further
orders.
 CA - .dismissed the petition for lack of
merit and upheld the validity of the question
orders
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it declined to disturb
the judgment of the trial court on the issuance
of the writ of execution pending appeal?
HELD: NO. Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides: On motion
of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party the court may, in its discretion,
order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. If a
record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion
and the special order shall be included
therein.
 The rule specifically vests the court
with the exercise of discretionary power. The
requisites for the court's valid exercise of the
discretion to order execution pending appeal
are: (1) there must be a motion by the
prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party; (2) there must be good reasons for
issuing the execution, and (3) the good
reasons must be stated in a special order.
 In its questioned decision, the Court of
Appeals acknowledged the nature of
execution pending appeal as an exceptional
remedy which must be interpreted restrictively,
citing the many ruling cases on this point. At
the same time, what was before the appellate
court was not the application of a general rule
but the exception thereto, the special reasons
or circumstances warranting execution
pending appeal.
 The court likewise noted that the
questioned order made reference to the
reasons averred in the motion which appeared
to it to be good and which it found to be
sufficient compliance with the law (Joven v.
Boncan, 67 Phil. 252). It noted the finding of
the trial court that the appeal interposed by the
petitioners was not based on strong grounds,
which finding is again a good reason for
execution pending appeal. (Presbitero v.
Rodas, 73 Phil. 300; Iloilo Trading Center and
Exchange v. Rodas, 78 Phil. 789)
 The petitioners pit their arguments
against the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals and the Court of First Instance on the
special nature of the circumstances warranting
the exercise of discretionary power, the weak
defenses at trial and weak reasons on appeal,
and the nature of the evidence upon which the
decision is based. Insofar as actual and
compensatory damages are concerned, we
find insufficient cause to restrain the exercise
of discretionary power.
 The merits of the main case are not to
be determined in a petition questioning
execution pending appeal (City of Manila v.
Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 98). However, the
facts and circumstances clearly brought out
during trial cannot help but influence whether
or not an appeal appears to be dilatory and
whether or not there are sufficient reasons
including considerations of justice and equity
to justify a departure from the regular
procedures regarding execution.
1. Stronghold Ins. v. Felix, G.R. No. 148090,
28 November 2006, 508 SCRA 357
FACTS:
 Respondent Gloria Dee Chong is the
owner of the Fuso truck with Plate No. PWH
512. The vehicle was insured by petitioner
Stronghold Insurance Company under
Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 279675.3 The
comprehensive motor car insurance policy for
P15,306.45 undertook to indemnify the
insured against loss or damage to the car and
death or injury caused to third persons by
reason of accident.
 While the policy was in effect, the
vehicle figured in an accident along National
Highway in Brgy. Palihan, Hermosa, Bataan
resulting in the death of four (4) persons while
seriously injuring three (3) others. Two (2)
vehicles were also heavily damaged as a
result of the accident. Pursuant to the
provisions of the insurance contract,
respondent Chong filed a claim for the
recovery of the proceeds of her policy in the
amount of P550,000.00.
 The claim was, however, denied by
the insurance company on the ground that at
the time the accident took place the driver of
the insured vehicle was heavily drunk as
shown in the Pagpapatunay issued by
Barangay Chairman Rafael Torres and the
Medico Legal Certificate which was signed by
a certain Dr. Ferdinand Bautista.
 The denial of the claim prompted
respondents to initiate an action for the
recovery of sum of money against petitioner
before the RTC of Caloocan City. Respondent
alleged that their claim was unjustly denied by
the insurance company. They argued that
there was no sufficient proof to support the
claim of the petitioner that the driver was
drunk at the time of the incident underscoring
the lack of mention of such crucial fact in the
police blotter report documenting the incident.
For lack of justifiable reasons to avoid the
policy, respondents insisted that petitioner is
liable to deliver their claim pursuant to the
terms of the insurance contract.
 In refuting the allegations in the
complaint, petitioner averred that the
intoxication of the driver of the insured vehicle
legally avoided the liability of the insurance
company under the policy. Petitioner further
claimed that the insured violated Section 53 of
Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation
and Traffic Code) which prohibits driving of
motor vehicles under the influence of alcohol.
 After the pre-trial conference, trial on
the merits ensued. During the hearing, both
parties adduced testimonial and documentary
evidence to support their respective positions.
 On 7 October 2003, the RTC rendered
a Decision7 in favor of the respondents
thereby ordering the petitioner to deliver the
amount of P550,000.00 representing the
proceeds of the insurance contract. According
to the court a quo, petitioner failed to prove by
prima facie evidence that the driver of the
insured vehicle was indeed under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the accident
thereby making the avoidance of the policy
unjustified under the circumstances.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the findings of the RTC that there was
no violation of the contract of insurance but
deleted the award for exemplary damages.
Resonating the ruling of the trial court, the
appellate court dismissed the pieces of
evidence presented by the petitioner as mere
hearsay without evidentiary value.
ISSUE: W/N it was proven during the trial that
the driver of the insured vehicle was
intoxicated at the time of the accident thereby
precluding the respondents from claiming the
proceeds of the insurance policy.
HELD: Contrary to the claim of the petitioner,
it miserably failed to prove the fact of
intoxication during the trial. Aside from the
Medico Legal Certificate and the
Pagpapatunay, which were stripped of
evidentiary value because of the dubious
circumstances under which they were
obtained, the petitioner did not adduce other
proof to justify the avoidance of the policy. It
must be emphasized that the RTC doubted
the authenticity of the Medico Legal Certificate
because of the attendant alteration and
tampering on the face of the document. In
adopting the findings of the trial court, the
appellate court reiterated the evidentiary rule
that the party alleging violation of the provision
of the contract bears the burden of proof to
prove the same.
 Notably, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff.
Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with
plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the defendant's. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to
evidence which is of greater weight or more
convincing, than that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability
of truth.
 In this case, the lack of statement to
the effect that the driver was under the
influence of alcohol in the said report is too
significant to escape the attention of this
Court.
 This case involves a contract of
insurance, the authenticity and validity of
which was uncontested. In exempting insurers
from liability under the contract, proof thereof
must be clear, credible and convincing.
Fundamental is the rule that the contract is the
law between the parties and, that absent any
showing that its provisions are wholly or in part
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy, it shall be enforced to
the letter by the courts.
5. Heirs of Sangkay v. National Power
Corporation, G.R. No. 141447, 4 May 2006,
489 SCRA 401
FACTS:
 Macabangkit Sangkay was the owner
of a 227,065-square-meter parcel of land
located in Iligan City. When he died intestate,
the property was subdivided into nine parcels
and subsequently titled to his heirs.
 Said Heirs declared their properties
for taxation purposes in their respective
names.
 In 1979, NAPOCOR constructed an
underground three-kilometer long tunnel
traversing the properties of the Heirs, about
100 meters beneath the surface and wasd
used for the operation of NAPOCOR’s Hydro-
Electric Project
 The Heirs were not informed that such
underground tunnel had been constructed;
neither did NAPOCOR compensate them for
the use of their property
 The Heirs filed a complaint for
damages and recovery of possession of the
property with alternative prayer for just
compensation against NAPOCOR
 They prayed that judgment be
rendered in their favor after due proceedings,
to wit:
 1. Directing defendants to remove and
dismantle its underground tunnel
 2. To pay plaintiffs a monthly rental
from 1979 up to the time the
defendant vacates the sub terrain of
the land of plaintiffs
 3. Either by the removal of the tunnel
or by paying just compensation to
plaintiffs;
 4. To pay moral damages and
exemplary damages
 5. Pay attorney’s fees
 6. Such other relief deemed just and
equitable under the circumstance
 The RTC declared that
construction of the underground tunnel
affected the entire area of the Heirs’ property.
Consequently, plaintiffs lost the agricultural,
industrial, commercial and residential value of
the land.
 Before NAPOCOR was served with a
copy of said Decision, the Heirs filed an
Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment
Pending Appeal, alleging that execution
pending appeal was justified, considering the
trial court’s finding that it (NAPOCOR) had
acted in bad faith in constructing the tunnel.
 NAPOCOR opposed the motion, It
contended that the Heirs failed to prove that it
acted in bad faith when it constructed the
tunnel
 D claimed that heirs were never
deprived of the beneficial use of their land
 The trial court issued the Special
Order granting the motion for execution
pending appeal and awarded 70% of the
money judgment, or P79,472,750.00, upon the
filing of a P1,000,000.00 bond
 Monthly rentals, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fee and cost are
excluded from the execution pending appeal
 NAPOCOR before the CA via petition
for review on certiorari claiming that
respondent Judge acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion in granting the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal
 The CA rendered judgment granting
the petition and set aside the assailed orders
of the trial court.
 According to the CA, under Section
3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, the act revising
the charter of NAPOCOR, any action by any
person claiming compensation and/or
damages shall be filed within five (5) years
after the right-of-way, transmission lines,
substations, plants or other facilities shall have
been established; after the said period, no suit
can be brought to question the same
 The Heirs filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the trial court denied
for lack of merit on January 13, 2000
 Petitioners allege that the CA erred in
granting the writ of certiorari in favor of
respondent NAPOCOR on its finding that the
trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing the Special Order
Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding that
the trial court committed grave abuse of its
the
discretion in granting petitioners’ motion for
execution pending appeal of its decision and
supplemental decision in the amount
of P79,472,750.00
Ruling:
 The rule is that execution shall issue
as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action
or proceedings upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has
been perfected. However, the trial court may
grant execution before the expiration of the
period to appeal upon motion of the prevailing
party provided that it has jurisdiction over the
case and is in possession of either the original
record or the record on appeal, as the case
may be, and there are good reasons for such
execution to be stated in a special order after
due hearing.
 As provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court, execution of the
judgment or final order pending appeal is
discretionary. It is the exception to the rule that
only a final judgment may be executed, hence,
must be strictly construed. Execution pending
appeal should not be granted routinely but
only in extraordinary circumstances
 The CA ruled correctly when it held
that the trial court acted with grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it granted private
respondents’ motion for execution pending
appeal in the absence of good reasons to
justify the grant of said motion.
 The Rules of Court do not enumerate
the circumstances which would justify the
execution of the judgment or decision pending
appeal.
 The existence of good reasons is what
confers discretionary power on a court to issue
a writ of execution pending appeal.
 The mere posting of a bond will not
justify execution pending appeal.
 The well-established rule is that it is
not for the trial court to determine the merits of
the decision it rendered and use the same as
basis for its order allowing execution pending
appeal.
 In light of all the foregoing, the petition
is DENIED
 For lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.
6. Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, 14
March 2007, 518 SCRA 334
FACTS:
 In a decision in 1976, CFI granted the
application filed by the Lirio spouses for
registration of title to a certain lot
 The said decision become final and
executor in 1977
 In 1982, the judge of CFI directed the
Land Registration Commission to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and the
certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
 On February 12, 1997, Petitioner Ting
filed an application to register title to the same
lot with the RTC of Cebu
 The respondents, heirs of Lirio, filed
their Answer calling attention to the 1976
decision which had become final and executor
in 1977 and which, they argued, barred the
filing of Ting’s application on the ground of res
judicata
 The RTC dismissed petitioner’s
application on the ground of res judicata
 Petitioner argues that although the
1976 decision had become final and executor
in 1977, no decree of registration has been
issued by the Land Registration Authority.
 Petitioner contends that the LRA has
not issued the decree of registration and that a
certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza claimed that the
survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is
erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu
Cadastral extension must first be approved by
the Land Management Services of the DENR,
Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may
be used in court.
 Petitioners insist that the duty of the
respondent land registration officials to issue
the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial
in the sense that they act under the orders of
the court and the decree must be in conformity
with the decision of the court and with the data
found in the record, and they have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they are
in doubt upon any point in relation to the
preparation and issuance of the decree, it
is their duty to refer the matter to the court.
They act, in this respect, as officials of the
court and not as administrative officials,
and their act is the act of the court. They
are specifically called upon to "extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings.
 As for petitioner’s claim that under
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by
independent action. – A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion
within five (5) years from the date of its entry
and thereafter by action before it is barred by
the statute of limitations.
ISSUE: WON Section 6 of Rule 39 of Rules of
Court is applicable in the Land Registration
Proceedings?
HELD: NO.
 This provision of the Rules refers to
civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case.
This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his
failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules
makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is
sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.
 Furthermore, there is no provision in
the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6,
Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession
by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision
in a land registration case, unless the adverse
or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration
of the period for perfecting an appeal.
7. Infante v. Aran Builders, G.R. No.
156596, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 123
Facts: Before the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City (or "Muntinlupa RTC"; Branch
276), presided over by Hon. Norma C. Perello
(or "respondent judge"), was an action for
revival of judgment filed on June 6, 2001 by
Aran Builders, Inc. (or "private respondent")
against Adelaida Infante (or "petitioner").
 The judgment sought to be revived
was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City (or "Makati RTC"; Branch 60) in an
action for specific performance and damages
which became final and executory on
November 16, 1994. The dispositive portion
read:
26. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
renders judgment as follows:
26.1 The defendant ADELAIDA B.
INFANTE is ordered to do the following within
thirty (30) days from finality hereof:
26.1.1. To deliver to the plaintiff ARAN
BUILDERS, INC. the following: (a) the
complete plans (lot plan, location map and
vicinity map); (b) Irrevocable Power of
Attorney; (c ) Real Estate Tax clearance; (d)
tax receipts; (e) proof of up to date payment of
Subdivision Association dues referred to in the
"CONTRACT TO SELL" dated November 10,
1986 (Exh. A or Exh. 1);
26.1.2. To execute the deed of sale of
Lot No. 11, Block 9, Phase 3-A1, Ayala
Alabang Subdivision covered by TCT No.
114015 for P500,000.00 in favor of the
plaintiff;
26.1.3. To pay the capital gains tax,
documentary stamp taxes and other taxes
which the Bureau of Internal Revenue may
assess in connection with the sale mentioned
in the preceding paragraph and to submit to
the plaintiff proof of such payment;
26.1.4. To secure the written
conformity of AYALA CORPORATION to the
said sale and to give such written conformity
to the plaintiff;
26.1.5. To register the deed of sale
with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to
AYALA CORPORATION the certificate of title
issued in the name of plaintiff pursuant to such
registration;
26.2 Upon the compliance of the
defendant with the preceding directives, the
plaintiff must immediately pay to the defendant
the sum of P321,918.25;
26.3 The defendant is ordered to pay
plaintiff P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
26.4 The Complaint for moral and
exemplary damages is DISMISSED;
26.5 The COUNTERCLAIM is
DISMISSED
 Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
action (for revival of judgment) on the grounds
that the Muntinlupa RTC has no jurisdiction
over the persons of the parties and that venue
was improperly laid. Private respondent
opposed the motion.
 On September 4, 2001, the
Muntinlupa RTC issued an order which reads:
 The MOTION TO DISMISS is denied.
 Admittedly, the Decision was rendered
by the Makati Regional Trial Court, but it must
be emphasized that at that time there was still
no Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City,
then under the territorial jurisdiction of the
Makati Courts, so that cases from this City
were tried and heard at Makati City. With the
creation of the Regional Trial Courts of
Muntinlupa City, matters involving properties
located in this City, and cases involving
Muntinlupa City residents were all ordered to
be litigated before these Courts.
 The case at bar is a revival of a
judgment which declared the plaintiff as the
owner of a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa
City. It is this judgment which is sought to be
enforced thru this action which necessarily
involves the interest, possession, title, and
ownership of the parcel of land located in
Muntinlupa city and adjudged to Plaintiff. It
goes without saying that the complaint should
be filed in the latter City where the property is
located, as there are now Regional Trial
Courts.
 Defendant may answer the complaint
within the remaining period, but no less than
five (5) days, otherwise a default judgment
might be taken against her.
 It is SO ORDERED.
 Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent judge for
"erroneously holding that Civil Case No. 01-
164 is a revival of judgment which declared
private respondent as the owner of a parcel of
land located in Muntinlupa City and (that) the
judgment rendered by the (Makati RTC) in
Civil Case No. 15563 sought to be enforced
necessarily involves the interest, possession,
title and ownership of the parcel of land
located in Muntinlupa City."
 Petitioner asserts that the complaint
for specific performance and damages before
the Makati RTC is a personal action and,
therefore, the suit to revive the judgment
therein is also personal in nature; and that,
consequently, the venue of the action for
revival of judgment is either Makati City or
Parañaque City where private respondent and
petitioner respectively reside, at the election of
private respondent.
 On the other hand, private respondent
maintains that the subject action for revival
judgment is "quasi in rem because it involves
and affects vested or adjudged right on a real
property"; and that, consequently, venue lies
in Muntinlupa City where the property is
situated.
 On August 12, 2002, the CA
promulgated its Decision ruling in favor of
herein private respondent. The CA held that
since the judgment sought to be revived was
rendered in an action involving title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein,
the action for revival of judgment is then an
action in rem which should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the place where the
real property is located.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding
that the complaint for revival of judgment is an
action in rem which was correctly filed with the
RTC of the place where the disputed real
property is located.
Held: No. Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after the
lapse of five (5) years from entry of judgment
and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a final and executory judgment or
order may be enforced by action. The Rule
does not specify in which court the action for
revival of judgment should be filed.
In Aldeguer v. Gemelo, the Court held
that:
x x x an action upon a judgment must
be brought either in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where
the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
other place designated by the statutes
which treat of the venue of actions in
general.
Under the present Rules of Court,
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 4 provide:
Section 1. Venue of real actions. -
Actions affecting title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions.
- All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
Thus, the proper venue depends on
the determination of whether the present
action for revival of judgment is a real action or
a personal action. Applying the afore-quoted
rules on venue, if the action for revival of
judgment affects title to or possession of real
property, or interest therein, then it is a real
action that must be filed with the court of the
place where the real property is located. If
such action does not fall under the category of
real actions, it is then a personal action that
may be filed with the court of the place where
the plaintiff or defendant resides.
 The allegations in the complaint for
revival of judgment determine whether it is a
real action or a personal action.
 The complaint for revival of judgment
alleges that a final and executory judgment
has ordered herein petitioner to execute a
deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala
Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private
respondent; pay all pertinent taxes in
connection with said sale; register the deed of
sale with the Registry of Deeds and deliver to
Ayala Corporation the certificate of title issued
in the name of private respondent. The same
judgment ordered private respondent to pay
petitioner the sum of P321,918.25 upon
petitioner's compliance with the
aforementioned order. It is further alleged that
petitioner refused to comply with her judgment
obligations despite private respondent's
repeated requests and demands, and that the
latter was compelled to file the action for
revival of judgment. Private respondent then
prayed that the judgment be revived and a writ
of execution be issued to enforce said
judgment.
 The previous judgment has
conclusively declared private respondent's
right to have the title over the disputed
property conveyed to it. It is, therefore,
undeniable that private respondent has an
established interest over the lot in question;
and to protect such right or interest, private
respondent brought suit to revive the previous
judgment. The sole reason for the present
action to revive is the enforcement of private
respondent's adjudged rights over a piece of
realty. Verily, the action falls under the
category of a real action, for it affects private
respondent's interest over real property.
 The present case for revival of
judgment being a real action, the complaint
should indeed be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the place where the realty is located.
8. Cardinal v. Asset, G.R. No. 149696, 14
July 2006, 495 SCRA 103
Doctrine: Judgments; Writs of Execution; An
execution must conform to and be warranted
by the judgment on which it was issued; A
money judgment does not authorize the
issuance of a writ of possession.
Summary: Marual owns condominium units of
Cardinal. Cardinal, due to Marual’s failure to
pay assessment dues, went to the RTC and
was able to get a writ of possession of the said
units. However, it appeared that Marual
already sold his condominium units to herein
respondent Asset and the deed of sale was
registered in the RD of Manila. The issue is
whether or not the issuance of the writ of
possession was valid. The court held that The
Decision rendered by the RTC based on the
compromise agreement by the parties is
a money judgment, the enforcement of which
is provided in Section 9, Rule 39. Nothing in
the above provisions authorizes the RTC to
issue a writ of possession over the two
condominium units in favor of Cardinal. CA
rendered a decision in favor of Asset.
Facts: Cardinal Building Owners
Association, Inc., petitioner, is a corporation
organized and existing under R.A. No. 4726
(Condominium Act). Benjamin Marual is a
member of petitioner association being the
owner of two condominium units (1st floor and
2nd floor) at the Cardinal Office Condominium.
Due to Marual’s failure to pay assessment
dues in the amount of P530k, Cardinal filed
with the RTC Manila a complaint for sum of
money against him.
 During the course of the proceedings,
Cardinal and Marual filed with the RTC a
Compromise Agreement, declaring that they
have amicably settled their controversy under
the following terms and conditions:
1. Marual binds himself to settle all his
outstanding dues and/or assessments to
Cardinal totaling the sum of P381,152.52 in
the following manner:
a) P75k upon signing of this
agreement as and by way of initial settlement
of dues and/or assessments in the amount of
P25k, and attorney’s fees: P50k;
b) P21k every 5th day of each month
until his account is fully paid.
2. The parties hereby waive their
respective claims and counterclaims;
3. Should defendant fail to make good
any of the postdated checks, the plaintiff shall
be entitled to execute the judgment of this
court, for the full amount of plaintiffs claim of
P381,152.52, plus accruing amounts due in
months subsequent and interest and charges.
Should the foregoing be not complied with, the
parties further agree that plaintiff may proceed
with the extrajudicial enforcement of its lien
under the provisions of the Condominium
Act and the condominiums master deed,
and pertinent provisions of documents
covering defendants condominium units at
Stanisco Towers (Cardinal Bldg. Condo).
 The RTC rendered a Decision
approving the Compromise Agreement and
enjoining the parties to strictly comply with its
terms. However, Marual failed to comply
with his obligation, prompting Cardinal to file
with the RTC a motion for the execution of
the compromise judgment. Accordingly, the
RTC issued a writ of execution. The court
sheriff served a Notice of Levy/Attachment
upon Realty on the RD of Manila. It was only
at this time when Cardinal learned that there
were prior annotations on the same titles,
thus:
a) On October 7, 1993, Marual
mortgaged his two condominium units to
Planters Development Bank, was foreclosed
and the said units were sold to the bank at a
public auction. On March 27, 1996, the
certificate of sale was annotated of the 2 TCTs
(b) Before the expiration of the period
for redemption of the foreclosed realties,
Marual sold the same units to Asset
Recovery and Management Corporation,
herein respondent. On February 26, 1997,
the deed of sale was registered in the RD of
Manila
(c) On March 4, 1997, Asset filed with
the RTC Manila, an action for mandamus to
redeem the condominium units against the
bank. The RTC then issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the bank from
consolidating in its name the titles or taking
possession of the units, or otherwise disposing
of them until further orders from the court.
Because of this, petitioner filed with the RTC,
in the same case for sum of money, a Motion
for Possession of the units. The RTC issued
an Order granting the motion and directing
the issuance of the writ of possession.
 The Order Accordingly States that:
Cardinal is allowed to repossess subject
condo units for (4) years to enable it to recover
the aforesaid account of Marual plus
reasonable interest. Cardinal is allowed to
lease but not mortgage or sell the condo units
to achieve the objective. Asset is enjoined
from interfering in any manner the aforesaid
possession by Cardinal until the foregoing
objective is achieved. Further, upon the filing
of an indemnity bond of P2 million, let a writ of
possession issue directing a sheriff of the RTC
of Manila or his authorized representative to
place Cardinal herein in actual, physical
possession of the 2 condo units and to eject
Marual and other people claiming rights under
him therefrom.
 Upon Cardinal’s filing of the
required bond, a writ of possession was
issued.
 Aggrieved, Asset filed with the CA a
Petition for Certiorari, alleging that the RTC
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the Order and the writ of
possession which are in variance with the
compromise judgment and the
corresponding writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 95-74919.
 CA Granted this and nullified the
RTC Order:
 There are four instances when a
writ of possession may be issued,
1) in a land registration proceeding
(in rem);
2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of
a realty mortgage;
3) in a judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, (quasi in rem), provided that the
mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged
realty and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened; and
4) in execution sales (last par. Of
Sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court).
Since the case at bar does not fall under any
of these four instances and, in any event,
since it is not claimed that the judgment based
on a compromise contemplated the issuance
of a writ of possession to Asset of the
condominium units in case Marual, from whom
Cardinal claims to have purchased the same,
failed to comply with his obligation under said
judgment based on a compromise, then public
respondent's assailed Order directing the
issuance of a writ of possession was issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
 Hence, this review on certiorari.
Cardinal contends that the CA decision is not
based upon the Condominium Act.
Issues:
1. Who has a better lien over the condominium
units? - Respondent
2. W/N the issuance of the writ of
possession was valid – No (CIVPRO
ISSUE)
Held:
1. Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726); Liens; In
order to have a notice of assessment to be
considered a lien on a condominium unit, the
same must be registered in the Registry of
Deeds- The respondent has a superior lien
pursuant to the Condominium Act. Section 20
of R.A. No. 4726 (Condominium Act),
provides: (LONG CODAL)
 Sec. 20. An assessment upon any
condominium made in accordance with a
duly registered declaration of restrictions
shall be an obligation of the owner thereof at
the time the assessment is made. The amount
of any such assessment plus any other
charges thereon, such as interest, costs
(including attorney's fees) and penalties, as
such may be provided for in the declaration of
restrictions, shall be and become a lien
upon the condominium assessed when the
management body causes a notice of
assessment to be registered with the
Register of Deeds of the city or province
where such condominium project is located.
The notice shall state the amount of such
assessment and such other charges thereon
as may be authorized by the declaration of
restrictions, a description of the condominium
unit against which the same has been
assessed, and the name of the registered
owner thereof. Such notice shall be signed by
an authorized representative of the
management body or as otherwise provided in
the declaration of restrictions. Upon payment
of said assessment and charges or other
satisfaction thereof, the management body
shall cause to be registering a release of the
lien.
 Such lien shall be superior to all
other liens registered subsequent to the
registration of said notice of assessment
except real property tax liens and except that
the declaration of restrictions may provide for
the subordination thereof to any other liens
and encumbrances. Such liens may be
enforced in the same manner provided for by
law for the judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure
of mortgage or real property. Unless otherwise
provided for in the declaration of restrictions,
the management body shall have power to bid
at foreclosure sale. The condominium owner
shall have the right of redemption as in cases
of judicial or extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgages. (Underscoring supplied)
Records do not show that petitioner had its
notice of assessment registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Manila in order that the
amount of such assessment could
be considered a lien upon Marual’s two
condominium units. Petitioner’s claim can not
be considered superior to that of respondent.
As mentioned earlier, the deed of sale wherein
Marual conveyed to respondent his two
condominium units, was registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Manila.
2. The Decision rendered by the RTC based
on the compromise agreement by the parties
is a money judgment, the enforcement of
which is provided in Section 9, Rule 39.
Section 9. Execution of judgments for money,
how enforced. (See codal for full long text)
(a) Immediate Payment on Demand
(b) Satisfaction by levy
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits
 There is nothing in the above
provisions which authorizes the RTC of Manila
to issue a writ of possession over the two
condominium units in favor of petitioner.
 Judgments; Writs of Execution; An
execution must conform to and be
warranted by the judgment on which it was
issued; A money judgment does not
authorize the issuance of a writ of
possession.
 The Decision rendered by the RTC
based on the compromise agreement by the
parties is a money judgment, the
enforcement of which is provided in Section 9,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
There is nothing in the above provisions
which authorizes the RTC, Branch 4,
Manila to issue a writ of possession over
the two condominium units in favor of
petitioner.
 As we held in Abinujar v. Court of
Appeals: A judgment is the foundation of a
writ of execution which draws its vitality.
An officer issuing a writ of execution is
required to look to the judgment for his
immediate authority. An execution must
conform to and be warranted by the
judgment on which it was issued. There
should not be a substantial variance between
the judgment and the writ of execution.
Thus, an execution is fatally defective if the
judgment was for sum of money and the writ
of execution was for the sale of the mortgaged
property As petitioners’ obligation under the
compromise agreement as approved by the
court was monetary in nature, private
respondents can avail only of the writ of
execution provided in Section 15 (now Section
9), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, and
not that provided in Section 13 (now Section
10 [c]).
9. Villasi v. Garcia, G.R. No. 190106, 15
January 2014, 713 SCRA 629
Facts: Villasi engaged the services of
respondent Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc.
(FGCI) to construct a seven-storey
condominium building located Cubao, Quezon
City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the
contract price despite several demands, FGCI
initiated a suit for collection of sum of money.
Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the
material allegations of the complaint.
Contending that FGCI has no cause of action
against her, Villasi averred that she delivered
the total amount of P7,490,325.10 to FGCI but
the latter accomplished only 28% of the
project.To enforce her right as prevailing party,
Villasi filed a Motion for Execution. To satisfy
the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building
located Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City. While
the building was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in
which it was erected were registered in the
names of the Spouses Garcia. The Spouses
Garcia argued that the building covered by the
levy was mistakenly assessed by the City
Assessor in the name of FGCI and that it
could not be levied upon not being owned by
the judgment debtor.
Issue: Whether the general rule on
accession can be applied in the case at bar
Ruling: While it is a horn-book doctrine that
the accessory follows the principal, that is, the
ownership of the property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially, such rule
is not without exception. In cases where there
is a clear and convincing evidence to prove
that the principal and the accessory are not
owned by one and the same person or entity,
the presumption shall not be applied and the
actual ownership shall be upheld.
When there are factual and evidentiary
evidence to prove that the building and the lot
on which it stands are owned by different
persons, they shall be treated separately. As
such, the building or the lot, as the case may
be, can be made liable to answer for the
obligation of its respective owner.
10. Fermin v. Esteves, G.R. No. 147977, 26
March 2008, 549 SCRA 424
FACTS:
 Mariano Tanenglian (respondent) filed
an action for quieting of title and damages
against petitioners
 In a Decision[4] dated 28 June 1991,
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 5 (trial court) ruled:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
 (a) Ordering the defendants to respect
and recognize plaintiffs ownership of
the two (2) parcels of land in
question;
 (b) Ordering the defendants to remove
their houses/ structures/
constructions/ improvements from the
subject parcels of land and surrender
the possession of the premises they
are respectively occupying to the
plaintiff; and
 (c) Ordering the defendants to pay,
jointly and severally, the plaintiff the
amount of P10,000.00 for and as
attorney’s fees plus the costs of the
suit.
 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling in its Decision dated 18 February
1994
 P filed a petition for review before this
Court, but it was denied in a Resolution
 The Court denied Arizo, et al.s first
and second motions for reconsideration in its
Resolutions dated 15 January 1996 and 4
March 1996, respectively. An Entry of
Judgment was issued on 8 April 1996.
 On December 16, 1996, the trial court
granted respondents motion for execution.
 The trial court issued an Alias Writ of
Execution
 P filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals
 Petitioners alleged that they were
deprived of their right to due process because
they were never made defendants
 P alleged that they entered into the
possession and occupancy of the lands as
members of an indigenous cultural community
in the honest perception and belief that the
lands formed part of their ancestral
lands. Petitioners further alleged that their
occupancy of the lands was not pursuant to
any agreement entered into with anyone of the
defendants
 CA - RULED that respondents right to
the subject parcels of land had already been
settled with finality, petitioners been in good
faith regarding their possession of the land,
they could have intervened in Civil Case No.
925-R, RULED that had petitioners been really
unaware of the proceedings or aggrieved
because of the damage posed by the Special
Order of Demolition, they could just have
apprised the trial court of their adverse claim
and move for the issuance of the
necessary terceria under Section 43, Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, RULED
that since petitioners failed to avail of these
remedies or any other possible remedies in
law, they could no longer prevent respondents
exercise of his rights of ownership by belatedly
complaining about their supposed property
rights
 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration.
 The Court of Appeals denied the
motion
Issue: Whether the Special Order of
Demolition may be enforced against
petitioners who were not party-defendants in
Civil Case No. 925-R
Ruling:
 The generally accepted principle is
that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by a
judgment rendered by the court.
 Execution of a judgment can only be
issued against one who is a party to the
action, and not against one who, not being a
party in the case, did not have his day in court.
Due process requires that a court decision can
only bind a party to the litigation and not
against one who did not have his day in court.
 The remedy of terceria is available to
a third person other than the judgment obligor
or his agent who claims a property levied
on. In this case, the property was not levied on
and put on auction. The implementation of the
Special Order of Demolition would result in the
destruction of petitioner’s property.
 Further, terceria is not a speedy and
adequate remedy insofar as petitioners are
concerned considering that the Special Order
of Demolition ordered the Deputy Sheriff to
cause the demolition of all the improvements
immediately after the expiration of the 15-day
period granted upon the defendants, their
agents, assigns, representatives, or
successors-in-interest to remove their
improvements on the premises.
 The Court recognizes the finality of
the trial court’s Decision in Civil Case No. 925-
R. However, petitioners are contesting
whether their residential structures are within
the area subject of Civil Case No. 925-
R. Since petitioners are not parties to Civil
Case No. 925-R, respondent has to file the
proper action against petitioners to enforce his
property rights within the bounds of the law
and our rules. Petitioners right to possession,
if any, should be threshed out in a proper court
proceeding.
 When the Court of Appeals referred to
the remedy of terceria, it must be referring to
Section 16, Rule 39, not Section 43, Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where
property claimed by third person. - If the
property levied on is claimed by any person
other than the judgment obligor or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title
thereto or right to the possession thereof,
stating the grounds of such right or title, and
serves the same upon the officer making the
levy and a copy thereof upon the
judgment obligee, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property, unless such
judgment obligee, on demand of the officer,
files a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not
less than the value of the property levied
on. In case of disagreement as to such value,
the same shall be determined by the court
issuing the writ of execution. No claim for
damages for the taking or keeping of the
property may be enforced against the bond
unless the action therefor is filed within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
the filing of the bond.
 The officer shall not be liable for
damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such
bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall
prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property in a
separate action, or prevent the
judgment obligee from claiming damages in
the same or separate action against a third-
party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly
spurious claim.
11. Cabling v. Lumapas, G.R. No. 196950,
18 June 2014, 726 SCRA 628
FACTS: The petitioner was the highest bidder
in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a
property situated in Olongapo City. The Final
Deed of Sale was issued by the Sheriff and
the title to the property was duly transferred
and was issued to the petitioner on March 23,
2009.
 On May 6, 2009, the petitioner filed an
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession with the RTC.
 The RTC issued an order granting the
petitioner’s application, and subsequently
issued a Writ of Possession and Notice to
Vacate.
 Respondent Joselin Tan Lumapas,
filed a Motion for Leave of Court for
Intervention as Party Defendant (with Urgent
Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation of
Writ of Possession) and an Answer in
Intervention, as a third party in actual
possession of the foreclosed property. She
claimed that the property had previously been
sold to her by Aida Ibabao, the property’s
registered owner and the judgment
debtor/mortgagor in the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, pursuant to a Deed of
Conditional Sale.
 The RTC issued an order holding in
abeyance the implementation of the
petitioner’s writ of possession until after the
resolution of the respondent’s motion. The
following day, the RTC denied the
respondent’s motion for intervention. The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
Before the CA, the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
orders of RTC. The CA dismissed the petition
and affirmed the RTC’s orders.
The petitioner argues that the present case is
not an exception to the ministerial issuance of
a writ of possession.
While recognizing the respondent’s actual
possession of the subject property, the
petitioner contends that such possession is
not adverse to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor. Neither is possession in the
concept of an owner because in a conditional
sale, ownership is retained by the seller until
the fulfillment of a positive suspensive
condition, that is, the full payment of the
purchase price.
ISSUE: WON in the extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage and the issuance of a
writ of possession is ministerial upon the court
after the foreclosure sale.
HELD: The well-settled rule is that in the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages under Act No. 3135 (as amended),
the issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure
sale and during the redemption period when
the court may issue the order for a writ of
possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte
motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond.
 There is, however, an exception to the
rule.
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which is made applicable to
extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages, the possession of the property
shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually
holding the property in a capacity adverse to
the judgment obligor. Thus, the court’s
obligation to issue an ex parte writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be
ministerial when there is a third party in
possession of the property claiming a right
adverse to that of the judgment
debtor/mortgagor.
 In the present case, the respondent
cannot be said to possess the subject property
by adverse title or right as her possession is
merely premised on the alleged conditional
sale of the property to her by the judgment
debtor/mortgagor.
 The execution of a contract of
conditional sale does not immediately transfer
title to the property to be sold from seller to
buyer.1âwphi1In such contract, ownership or
title to the property is retained by the seller
until the fulfillment of a positive suspensive
condition which is normally the payment of the
purchase price in the manner agreed upon.
Under these circumstances, the general rule,
and not the exception, applies.
12. Hi-Yield Realty v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 138978, 12 September 2002, 388
SCRA 655
Facts: Respondents entered into a loan
contract amounting to PHP100,000 with
Petitioner thereby mortgaging a parcel of land
located in Lumang Dayap, Cainta, Rizal. Upon
respondent's failure to pay the loan upon
demand petitioner, thereafter moved for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the said property
and a new TCT was transferred in its name.
 Respondent claims that he made an
offer to pay twice during the redemption period
but was refused by petitioner hence, on the
last day of redemption period he filed an
action to the court. When all the interest and
other charges were fixed. The court asks
respondent to pay the redemption price to
petitioner on a specified date (On or before
April 8, 1994) but petitioner instead thereafter
seeks the extension of 45days for it has no
sufficient money. At first the court denied the
extension but in another order contradicting its
previous order it allowed respondent the
extension to pay within 45 days.
 Frustrated, petitioner seeks this court
to review the decision of the trial court.
Issue: W/N the extension of the redemptive
period by the trial court was well within private
respondent’s preserved right to redeem?
Held: It was serious error to make the final
redemption of the foreclosed property
dependent on the financial condition of private
respondent. It may have been difficult for
private respondent to raise the money to
redeem the property but financial hardship is
not a ground to extend the period of
redemption. The opportunity to redeem the
subject property was never denied to private
respondent. His timely formal offer through
judicial action to redeem was likewise
recognized. But that is where it ends. The
court cannot sanction and grant every
succeeding motion or petition — especially if
frivolous or unreasonable — filed by him
because this would manifestly and
unreasonably delay the final resolution of
ownership of the subject property.
 As a result of the trial court’s grant of
a 45-day extended period to redeem, almost
nine (9) years have elapsed with both parties’
claims over the property dangling in limbo, to
the serious impairment of petitioner’s rights.
This court calls the trial court’s attention to the
prejudice it has wittingly or unwittingly caused
the petitioner. It was really all too simple. The
trial court should have seen, as in fact it had
already initially seen, that the 45-day
extension sought by private respondent on
April 8, 1994 was just a play to cover up his
lack of funds to redeem the foreclosed
property.
 The right of redemption should be
exercised within the specified time limit, which
is one year from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale. Moreover, the redemptioner
should make an actual tender in good faith of
the full amount of the purchase price as
provided above, which means the auction
price of the property plus the creditor’s other
legitimate expenses like taxes, registration
fees, etc.
 Redemptioner’s option when the
redemption period is about to expire and the
redemption cannot take place on account of
disagreement over the redemption price: may
preserve his right of redemption
through judicial action which in every case
must be filed within the one-year period of
redemption. The filing of the court action to
enforce redemption, being equivalent to a
formal offer to redeem, would have the effect
of preserving his redemptive rights and
“freezing” the expiration of the one-year period
provided the action is filed on time and in good
faith, the redemption price is finally determined
and paid within a reasonable time, and the
rights of the parties are respected.
Three critical dimensions:
(1) timely redemption or redemption by
expiration date (or, as what happened
in this case, the redemptioner was
forced to resort to judicial action to
“freeze” the expiration of the
 redemption period);
(2) good faith as always, meaning, the
filing of the private respondent’s action
on August 13, 1993 must have been
for the sole purpose of determining
the redemption price and not to
stretch the redemptive period
indefinitely; and
(3) once the redemption price is
determined within a reasonable time,
the redemptioner must make prompt
payment in full.
13. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571,
11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266
FACTS: Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a
former Filipino citizen who became a
Canadian citizen through naturalization.
Subsequently, the petitioner married the
respondent (Daisylyn Sto. Tomas), a Filipina,
in Pasig City. After the wedding, petitioner
went back to Canada due to work
commitments; however, when he came back
he was shocked to discover that the
respondent is having an affair with another
man. Thus, petitioner went back to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted the petitioner’s petition for divorce.
The divorce decree took effect a month later,
January 8, 2006.
 Two years later, the petitioner has
already moved on and found another woman
that he wants to marry. Thus, for his love to
his fiancée; the petitioner went to the Pasig
Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and the
respondent’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistic’s Office (NSO) informed
the petitioner that the marriage between him
and the respondent still subsists under the
Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of
1982.
 Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition
for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with
the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence
this recourse by the petitioner.
Issue: W/N the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING: NO. Even though the trial court is
correct in its conclusion that the alien spouse
can claim no right under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse due to the given the rationale
and intent behind the enactment, and as such
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code limits its applicability for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse.
 However, we qualify the above
conclusion made by the trial court because in
our jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that clothes
the party with legal interest to petitions for its
recognition. Even though, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens- with the
complementary statement that his conclusion
is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition
filed by Corpuz before the RTC. the
unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence
of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
 This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign
judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order
upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing;
and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order
against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title.
 In either case, the judgment or final whether the divorce decree is consistent with
order may be repelled by evidence of a want the Canadian divorce law.
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, We deem it more appropriate to take this latter
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. course of action, given the Article 26 interests
 To our mind, direct involvement or that will be served and the Filipina wife’s
being the subject of the foreign judgment is (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
interest to institute an action before our courts other interested parties to oppose the foreign
for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In judgment and overcome a petitioner’s
a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, presumptive evidence of a right by proving
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
the divorce is valid according to his or her Needless to state, every precaution must be
national law. taken to ensure conformity with our laws
 The starting point in any recognition of before a recognition is made, as the foreign
a foreign divorce judgment is the judgment, once recognized, shall have the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take effect of res judicata between the parties, as
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no Court.
sovereign is bound to give effect within its In fact, more than the principle of comity that is
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal served by the practice of reciprocal recognition
of another country.” This means that the of foreign judgments between nations, the res
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be judicata effect of the foreign judgments of
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, divorce serves as the deeper basis for
together with the alien’s applicable national extending judicial recognition and for
law to show the effect of the judgment on the considering the alien spouse bound by its
alien himself or herself. The recognition may terms. This same effect, as discussed above,
be made in an action instituted specifically for will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it
the purpose or in another action where a party not for the substantive rule that the second
invokes the foreign decree as an integral paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
aspect of his claim or defense. provides.
 In Gerbert’s case, since both the  Considerations beyond the recognition
foreign divorce decree and the national law of of the foreign divorce decree.
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to
obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents.
If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its
authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation,
we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine
RES JUDICATA
1. Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164797, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 379
FACTS:
There are four (4) cases involved in
this controversy. The first case that was filed
between the parties is Civil Case No. 4365 for
Unlawful Detainer litigated before the
Municipal Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija
entitled Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M.
Concepcion, plaintiffs, vs. Mariano `Boy
Bunag, Rolando Bunag, Remedios Bunag, et
al., Defendants.
The second case is Civil Case No.
1600 for Quieting of Title, filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija,
Branch 36 with Carlos L. Bunag, Elias Bunag
Natividad, Mariano Bunag, Salud Bunag
Clanaoc and Juliana Bunag Arevalo, as
Plaintiffs and Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina
M. Concepcion as Heirs of Sps. Carlos
Maniquis and Marina Bunag, as Defendants.
This case was dismissed for failure to
prosecute as evidenced by the Regional Trial
Court Order dated 10 March 2000.
The third case is Civil Case No. 2573-
02 for Injunction, with Mariano `Boy Bunag
and Rolando Bunag as Petitioners against
Carlos Bunag, Elias Bunag Natividad, Mariano
Bunag, Salud Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana
Bunag Arevalo as Defendants. This case,
which was filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Gapan City, Branch 35, was dismissed on
ground of res judicata. The 6 November 2002
Order, in effect, ruled that there is a
substantial identity of parties in this case and
in Civil Case No. 1600, a Petition for Quieting
of Title.
The fourth case is the instant
controversy for Annulment of Title With
Damages. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2583-
02, it was lodged by herein private
respondents Mariano Bo[y] Bunag and
Rolando Bunag against herein petitioners
Josefina M. Cruz and Ernestina M.
Concepcion before the sala of Branch 35,
Regional Trial Court of Gapan City.
After a careful study of the arguments
of both parties, the Court has found that
herein case (2583) involve the same parties,
subject matter and issue as that in Civil Case
No. 1600 which has become final and
executory and Civil Case No. 2573-02 which
was already dismissed by this Court on the
ground of res judicata. In all three cases,
Mariano Bunag was included as party-plaintiff
and Ernestina Concepcion as party-defendant.
The subject matter involves a parcel
of land located in San Nicolas, Gapan City
with an area of 1,160 square meters, more or
less, and the issue is who between the two
parties has the lawful title over the same.
Clearly, not only res judicata but also accion
pendente lite is present in herein case which
the plaintiffs and their counsel should have
revealed in the Certificate/Verification of their
complaint. The allegation that it is only now
that they have learned of the existence of Civil
Case No. 1600 is without merit considering
that in the Motion for the Outright Dismissal of
Civil Case No. 2573, dated September 19,
2002, its existence was already disclosed and
even became the ground for the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 2573 on the ground of res
judicata.
Moreover, the Certification against
forum shopping does not only refer to final and
executory actions but also to pending
controversies. Considering that plaintiffs have
been represented by the same counsel in Civil
Case No. 2573 and herein case (Civil Case
No. 2583-02), it is very clear that plaintiffs
counsel is appraised (sic) of the existence of
Civil Case No. 1600 and Civil Case No. 2573.
Via petition for review, petitioners
went to the Court of Appeals. The latter
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled
that one of the elements of res judicata, i.e.,
that there must be, between the first and the
second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action, is lacking.
ISSUE: Does res judicata apply in the case at
bar?
HELD: Under the rule of res judicata, also
known as bar by prior judgment, a final
judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a
Court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the parties, is conclusive in a
subsequent case between the same parties
and their successor-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity.
The requisites essential for the
application of the principle are: (1) there must
be a final judgment or order; (2) said judgment
or order must be on the merits; (3) the Court
rendering the same must have jurisdiction on
the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
there must be between the two cases identity
of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of causes of action.[10]
Petitioners claim res judicata applies
in this case because all the elements thereof
are present. On the other hand, private
respondents argue the contrary alleging that
the second and fourth elements are lacking.
There being no dispute as to the
presence of the first and third elements, we
now determine if the second and fourth
elements are attendant in the case.
On the second element, private
respondents argue that the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 1600 (for Quieting of Title) was not a
dismissal on the merits. The dismissal of this
case, they claim, will not bar the filing of the
instant case (Civil Case No. 2583-02 for
Annulment of Title) because there was neither
litigious consideration of the evidence nor any
stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial. In fact, there was no pre-trial conference
and that after four years of court inactivity, the
case was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
2. Republic v. Yu, G.R. No. 157557, 10
March 2006, 484 SCRA 416
FACTS:
 In Yu v. Republic (1986), the Court of
Appeals annulled the subsequent sale of the
lot by Francisca Valdehueza, et al., to herein
respondents, Ramon Yu, et al., and held that
the latter were not purchasers in good
faith. The parties did not appeal the decision
and so, judgment became final and executory.
 The Court of Appeals decision states
reversed. A new one is entered dismissing the
complaint. The land in question is owned by
the Republic of the Philippines.
 On October 1, 1992, respondents filed a
complaint for reversion of the expropriated
property. Herein petitioner, the Republic of
the Philippines, denied respondents right to
reacquire title and ownership over the lot on the
ground of res judicata, lack of cause of action
and forum-shopping.
 On November 16, 1995, the Court
dismisses the complaint filed in this case on
the ground of res judicata or bar by prior or
final judgment.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled
that there was no res judicata and remanded
the case to the trial court.
 The foregoing, the decision dated
November 16, 1995 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
Issue: Whether the trial court properly
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res
judicata
Ruling:
 Res judicata literally means a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.
Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final
judgment or decree rendered on the merits,
and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within
its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or
suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal
of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.
 The elements of res judicata are: (1)
the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be as between
the first and second action, identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action.
 In the present case, the first three
elements are present. Only the presence of
the identity of causes of action is at issue.
 At this juncture, we need to stress
that res judicata has two concepts: (1) bar by
prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39,
Section 47 (b) ]of the Rules of Civil Procedure;
and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule
39, Section 47 (c)
 There is bar by prior judgment when,
as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered, and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action. But
where there is identity of parties and subject
matter in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment
is conclusive only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and
not as to matters merely involved therein. This
is conclusiveness of judgment.
 Under the doctrine of conclusiveness
of judgment, facts and issues actually and
directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the
same parties, even if the latter suit may
involve a different claim or cause of action.
The identity of causes of action is not required
but merely identity of issues.
 The doctrine of res judicata provides
that a final judgment on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive
as to the rights of the parties and their privies
and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Considering that the sale on
which respondents based their right to
reversion has long been nullified, they have
not an iota of right over the property and thus,
have no legal personality to bring forth the
action for reversion of expropriated property.
 Lack of legal personality to sue means
that the respondents are not the real parties-
in-interest. This is a ground for the dismissal of
the case, related to the ground that the
complaint evidently states no cause of action
 The second issue is now mooted and
made academic by our determination
of res judicata in this case. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated December 2, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 53712 is SET
ASIDE and the Decision dated November 16,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 11 in Civil Case No. CEB-12968
is AFFIRMED.
3. Degayo v. Dinglasan, G. R. No. 173148, 6
April 2015, 755 SCRA 1
Facts: The present case involves a property
dispute, which gave rise to two civil cases for
ownership and damages between conflicting
claimants over a parcel of land located on the
northeastern bank of Jalaud River. The
respondents initiated a second civil case
which eventually reached the Supreme Court.
Records show that Lot No. 861 isa 36,864
sqm. parcel in the Cadastral Survey of Dingle,
Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2804, registered in the name of
Degayo’s deceased parents, spouses Marcelo
Olmo and Rosalia Labana. Lot No. 861 used
to be bounded on the southwest by the Jalaud
River that serves to separate Dingle from
Pototan Iloilo.
On the other side of Jalaud River,
opposite Lot No. 861, lies a 153,028 sqm
parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 7328 of
the Cadastre of Pototan, Iloilo, collectively
owned by the respondents, covered under
TCT No. T-84829. The Jalaud River, which
separates these parcels of land, thus flows
along the northeast side of Lot 861 and the
southwest side of Lot No. 7328. Sometime in
the 1970’s the Jalauad River steadily changed
its course and moved southwards towards the
banks of Pototan, where Lot No. 7328 lies,
leaving its old riverbed dry. Eventually, the
course of the Jalaud River encroached on Lot
No. 7328. As a result, Lot No. 7328
progressively decreased in size while the
banks adjacent to Lot No. 861 gradually
increased in land area.
Degayo and the tenants believed that
the area was an accretion to Lot No. 861. As a
result, her tenants, commenced cultivating and
tilling that disputed area with corn and
tobacco. The area allegedly added to Lot No.
861 contains 52,528 sqm.
The respondents, on the other hand,
argued that the disputed property was an
abandoned riverbed, which should rightfully
belong to them to compensate for the
erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328, over which
the Jalaud River presently runs.
On October 2, 1984, the respondents
filed a complaint for ownership and damages
against the tenants, with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 27, entitled
Cecilia Magbanua Dinglasan, et al. v. Nicolas
Jarencio, et al., docketed as Civil Case No.
16047. Degayo sought to intervene in Civil
Case No. 16047 but her motion was denied.
Notably, Degayo never bothered to question
the interlocutory order denying her motion for
intervention by filing a petition for certiorari.
Instead, Degayo initiated the present suit
against the respondents for declaration of
ownership with damages, also with the RTC of
Iloilo, Branch 22, docketed as Civil Case No.
18328, involving the disputed parcel of land.
Issue: W/N No.16047 is a res judicata.
Held: The Decision in Civil Case No. 16047
constitutes res judicata.
Res judicata literally means "a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment." It also refers to the "rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies in all later
suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit. It rests on the principle that parties
should not to be permitted to litigate the same
issue more than once; that, when a right or
fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate.
This judicially created doctrine exists
as an obvious rule of reason, justice, fairness,
expediency, practical necessity, and public
tranquility. Moreover, public policy, judicial
orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the
interest of litigants, as well as the peace and
order of society, all require that stability should
be accorded judgments, that controversies
once decided on their merits shall remain in
repose, that inconsistent judicial decision shall
not be made on the same set of facts, and that
there be an end to litigation which, without the
doctrine of res judicata, would be endless.
In the present case, it is beyond dispute that
the judgment in Civil Case No. 16047 has
attained finality in view of the tenant’s
abandonment of their appeal to the CA.
Moreover, records show that that
decision was adjudicated on the merits, i.e., it
was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the
parties at the trial of the case by a court which
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties.
We likewise find that there is an
identity of parties in Civil Case No. 16047 and
the present case. There is identity of parties
where the parties in both actions are the
same, or there is privity between them, or they
are "successors-in-interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title
and in the same capacity. Absolute identity of
parties is not required, shared identity of
interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of
this principle. Thus, it is enough that there is a
community of interest between a party in the
first case and a party in the second case even
if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.
4. Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, 31
October 2006, 506 SCRA 336
Facts: Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Editha Alcantara
due to psychological incapacity. The RTC
denied the petition.
As the decision attained finality,
Mallion filed another petition for a declaration
of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his
marriage was null and void due to the fact that
it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license.
Issue: Does a previous final judgment
denying a petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of psychological incapacity bar a
subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on
the ground of lack of marriage license?
Held: Res judicata applies.
 Mallion is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action which is
the nullity of marriage. When the second case
was filed based on another ground, there is a
splitting of a cause of action which is
prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that
the first marriage had no marriage license
because in the first case he impliedly admitted
the same when he did not question the
absence of a marriage license.
 Res judicata – a matter adjudged; a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment
Rule 57 - Preliminary Attachment
1. PCL Industries v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 147970, 31 March 2006, 486 SCRA 214
Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint
with the RTC for Sum of Money with
Preliminary Attachment against herein
petitioner for the latter's failure to comply with
the terms of the sale of various ink materials,
and to pay its obligations despite repeated
verbal and written demands.
Apparently thereafter, petitioner was
served with summons together with the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment which propriety of its
issuance attachment stood as it was as the
motion to discharge the writ was denied.
In the meantime, petitioner filed its
Answer with Counterclaim claiming that the
various printing ink materials delivered to it by
private respondent were defective but nothing
was done to solve the matter.
After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered its Decision favoring herein appellee,
which judgment was appealed to the CA. The
appellate court affirmed the RTC judgment,
holding that there was sufficient evidence to
prove that herein petitioner had the intention
of defrauding private respondent when it
contracted the obligation because it agreed to
pay within 30 days from the date of purchase
but once the merchandise was in its
possession, it refused to pay.
Issue: Whether the mere failure to pay an
obligation upon falling due and despite several
demands is enough to warrant the issuance of
the harsh provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment under Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court.
Ruling: The issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment was improper. To
sustain an attachment on Section 1(d), Rule
57, it must be shown that the debtor in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud
must relate to the execution of the agreement
and must have been the reason which
induced the other party into giving consent
which he would not have otherwise given. To
constitute a ground for attachment in Section 1
(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud
should be committed upon contracting the
obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently
contracted if at the time of contracting it the
debtor has a preconceived plan or intention
not to pay. Fraud is a state of mind and need
not be proved by direct evidence but may be
inferred from the circumstances attendant in
each case.
Fraudulent intent not to honor the
admitted obligation cannot be inferred from the
debtor's inability to pay or to comply with the
obligations.
Petition partly GRANTED. Writ of
Preliminary Attachment is ordered LIFTED. In
all other respects, the CA Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED.
2. Professional Video v. TESDA, G.R. No.
155504, 26 June 2009, 591 SCRA 83
Facts: In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of
the government established under R.A. No.
7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to
the DOLE to develop and establish a national
system of skills standardization, testing, and
certification in the country.
To fulfill this mandate, it sought to
issue security-printed certification and/or
identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees
who have passed the certification process.
Professional Video Inc. (PROVI)
signed and executed the “Contract Agreement
Project PVC ID Card issuance” for the
provision of goods and services in the printing
and encoding of the PVC cards. PROVI was to
provide TESDA with the system and
equipment compliant with the specifications
defined in the proposal. In return, TESDA
would pay PROVI a specified sum of money
after TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted
goods and services. PPOVI alleged that
TESDA has still an outstanding balance and
still remains unpaid.
TESDA claims that it entered the
Contract Agreement and Addendum in the
performance of its governmental function to
develop and establish a national system of
skills standardization, testing, and certification;
in the performance of this governmental
function, TESDA is immune from suit.
Issue: Can TESDA be sued without its
consent?
Held: TESDA, as an agency of the State,
cannot be sued without its consent. The rule
that a state may not be sued without its
consent is embodied in Section 3, Article XVI
of the 1987 Constitution and has been an
established principle that antedates this
Constitution. It is as well a universally
recognized principle of international law that
exempts a state and its organs from the
jurisdiction of another state.
The principle is based on the very
essence of sovereignty, and on the practical
ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends. It also rests on
reasons of public policy. That public service
would be hindered, and the public
endangered, if the sovereign authority could
be subjected to law suits at the instance of
every citizen and, consequently, controlled in
the uses and dispositions of the means
required for the proper administration of the
government.
The proscribed suit that the state
immunity principle covers takes on various
forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by
name; a suit against an unincorporated
government agency; a suit against a
government agency covered by a charter with
respect to the agencys performance of
governmental functions; and a suit that on its
face is against a government officer, but
where the ultimate liability will fall on the
government. In the present case, the writ of
attachment was issued against a government
agency covered by its own charter.
As discussed above, TESDA performs
governmental functions, and the issuance of
certifications is a task within its function of
developing and establishing a system of skills
standardization, testing, and certification in the
country. From the perspective of this function,
the core reason for the existence of state
immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason
that the performance of governmental function
cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor
can these suits control the use and disposition
of the means for the performance of
governmental functions.
3. Metro Inc. et al v. Lara’s Gifts, G.R. No.
171741, 27 November 2009, 606 SCRA
175
FACTS: Laras Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD)
and Metro, Inc. are corporations engaged in
the business of handicrafts. Luis and Lara
Maria R. Villafuerte are the president and vice-
president of LGD. Frederick Juan and Liza
Juan are the principal officers of Metro, Inc.
 Petitioners and respondents agreed
that respondents would endorse to petitioners
purchase orders received by respondents from
their buyers in the United States of America in
exchange for a 15% commission, to be shared
equally by respondents and James R. Paddon
(JRP), LGDs agent.
 R filed a complaint against petitioners
for sum of money and damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.
 R filed an amended complaint alleging
that petitioners defrauded them in the amount
of $521,841.62.
 R also prayed for P1,000,000 as
moral damages, P1,000,000 as exemplary
damages and 10% of the judgment award as
attorney’s fees. Respondents also prayed for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment
 The TC granted R prayer and issued
the writ of attachment against the properties
and assets of petitioners
 P filed a motion to discharge the writ
of attachment
 P argued that the writ of attachment
should be discharged on the following
grounds: (1) that the 2001 agreement was not
a valid contract because it did not show that
there was a meeting of the minds between the
parties; (2) assuming that the 2001 agreement
was a valid contract, the same was
inadmissible because R failed to authenticate
it in accordance with the Rules on Electronic
Evidence; (3) that R failed to substantiate their
allegations of fraud with specific acts or deeds
showing how petitioners defrauded them; and
(4) that respondents failed to establish that the
unpaid commissions were already due and
demandable.
 TC granted P motion and lifted the writ
of attachment.
 R filed a motion for reconsideration,
however denied by TC.
 R filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals
 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its 2 March 2006
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
 TC respondents failed to sufficiently
show that petitioners were guilty of fraud either
in incurring the obligation upon which the
action was brought, or in the performance,
found no proof that petitioners were motivated
by malice in entering into the 2001 agreement
 CA - the trial court gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered the discharge of the
writ of attachment without requiring petitioners
to post a counter-bond
Issue: Whether the writ of attachment issued
by the trial court was improperly issued such
that it may be discharged without the filing of a
counter-bond
Ruling: No merit.
 The writ of attachment was improperly
issued because respondent’s amended
complaint failed to allege specific acts or
circumstances constitutive of fraud.
 To sustain an attachment on this
ground, it must be shown that the debtor in
contracting the debt or incurring the obligation
intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud
must relate to the execution of the agreement
and must have been the reason which
induced the other party into giving consent
which he would not have otherwise given. To
constitute a ground for attachment
in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court,
fraud should be committed upon contracting
the obligation sued upon. A debt is
fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived
plan or intention not to pay, as it is in this case
 The applicant for a writ of preliminary
attachment must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because
fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
debtor’s mere non-payment of the debt or
failure to comply with his obligation.
 The rule that when the writ of
attachment is issued upon a ground which is
at the same time the applicants cause of
action, the only other way the writ can be lifted
or dissolved is by a counter-bond[21] is
applicable in this case. It is clear that in
respondents amended complaint of fraud is
not only alleged as a ground for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary attachment, but it is
also the core of respondent’s complaint. The
fear of the Court of Appeals that petitioners
could force a trial on the merits of the case on
the strength of a mere motion to dissolve the
attachment has a basis.
4. Torres v. Satsatin, G.R. No. 166759, 25
November 2009, 605 SCRA 453
Facts: Siblings Torres (petitioners) each
owned adjacent 20,000 square meters track of
land in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Nicanor Satsatin,
through petitioners’ mother Agripina Aledia,
was able to convince the siblings to sell their
property and authorize him via SPA, to
negotiate for its sale. Nicanor offered to sell
the properties to Solar Resources, to which
Solar allegedly agreed to buy the three parcels
of land plus the property of one Rustica Aledia
for P35,000,000. Petitioners claimed that Solar
has already paid the entire purchase price,
however Nicanor only remitted P9, 000,000
out of the P28, 000,000 sum they are entitled
to and that Nicanor had acquired a house and
lot and a car (which he registered in the
names of his children). Despite the repeated
verbal and written demands, Nicanor failed to
remit the balance prompting the petitioners to
file a complaint for sum of money against the
family Satsatin.
Petitioners filed an Ex Parte Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging
among other things, that respondent was
about to depart the country and that they are
willing to post a bond fixed by court. After filing
a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff, which the
RTC granted, it issued a Writ of Attachment
(WOA) on November 15. On November 19,
after serving a copy of the WOA upon the
Satsatins, the sheriff levied their real and
personal properties. On November 21, the
summons and copy of complaint was served
upon the respondents. Respondents filed their
answer and a Motion to Discharge Writ of
Attachment, claiming, among others, that: the
bond was issued before the issuance of WOA,
the WOA was issued before the summons
was received. Respondents posted a counter-
bond for the lifting of WOA, which was denied
along with MR. Aggrieved, they filed with CA a
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and
TRO under Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of
respondents and denied petitioners’ MR
hence the petition for review on certiorari with
the SC.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding that
RTC was guilty of GADALEJ in the issuance
and implementation of the WOA
Held: No. A writ of preliminary attachment is
defined as a provisional remedy issued upon
order of the court where an action is pending
to be levied upon the property or properties of
the defendant therein, the same to be held
thereafter by the sheriff as security for the
satisfaction of whatever judgment that might
be secured in the said action by the attaching
creditor against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that
there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court in approving the
bond posted by petitioners despite the fact
that not all the requisites for its approval were
complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is
necessary that all the requisites for its
approval are met; otherwise, the bond should
be rejected.
Moreover, in provisional remedies,
particularly that of preliminary attachment, the
distinction between the issuance and the
implementation of the writ of attachment is of
utmost importance to the validity of the writ.
The distinction is indispensably necessary to
determine when jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant should be acquired in order to
validly implement the writ of attachment upon
his person.
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that the grant of the provisional
remedy of attachment involves three stages:
first, the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment
issues pursuant to the order granting the writ;
and third, the writ is implemented. For the
initial two stages, it is not necessary that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the
court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the
court has no power and authority to act in any
manner against the defendant. Any order
issuing from the Court will not bind the
defendant.
At the time the trial court issued the
writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it
can validly to do so since the motion for its
issuance can be filed “at the commencement
of the action or at any time before entry of
judgment.” However, at the time the writ was
implemented, the trial court has not acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent
since no summons was yet served upon them.
The proper officer should have previously or
simultaneously with the implementation of the
writ of attachment, served a copy of the
summons upon the respondents in order for
the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction
upon them and for the writ to have binding
effect. Consequently, even if the writ of
attachment was validly issued, it was
improperly or irregularly enforced and,
therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.
Moreover, again assuming arguendo
that the writ of attachment was validly issued,
although the trial court later acquired
jurisdiction over the respondents by service of
the summons upon them, such belated
service of summons on respondents
cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The
trial court cannot enforce such a coercive
process on respondents without first
obtaining jurisdiction over their person.
The preliminary writ of attachment must be
served after or simultaneous with the
service of summons on the defendant
whether by personal service, substituted
service or by publication as warranted by
the circumstances of the case. The
subsequent service of summons does not
confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction
5. Lim v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, 3 July
2013, 700 SCRA 547
FACTS: Petitioner Lim Jr filed a complaint for
a sum of money with a prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
respondent Sps Lazaro. The RTC granted the
writ of preliminary attachment application and
upon the posting of the required bond issued
the corresponding writ on October 14, 2005. 3
parcels of land owned by the respondent
spouses were levied upon.
 The parties later entered into a
Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro
agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of
P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis,
following a schedule of payments covering the
period from September 2006 until October
2013. The RTC rendered a decision on the
basis of the compromise.
 Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus
Motion, seeking to lift the writ of preliminary
attachment annotated on the subject TCTs.
In granting the Motion, the RTC ruled that a
writ of preliminary attachment is a mere
provisional or ancillary remedy, resorted to by
a litigant to protect and preserve certain rights
and interests pending final judgment.
Considering that the case had already been
considered closed and terminated by the
rendition of the decision based on the
compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary
attachment should be lifted and quashed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary
attachment was properly lifted.
HELD: NO. By its nature, preliminary
attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied
for not for its own sake but to enable the
attaching party to realize upon the relief
sought and expected to be granted in the main
or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or
incidental to the main action. As such, it is
available during its pendency which may be
resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests during the interim,
awaiting the ultimate effects of a final
judgment in the case. In addition, attachment
is also availed of in order to acquire
jurisdiction over the action by actual or
constructive seizure of the property in those
instances where personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant cannot
be effected.
 In this relation, while the provisions of
Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within
which an attachment lien shall continue to
subsist after the rendition of a final judgment,
jurisprudence dictates that the said lien
continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is
had under execution issued on the judgment
or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same
manner provided by law.
 Applying these principles, the Court
finds that the discharge of the writ of
preliminary attachment against the properties
of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
Records indicate that while the parties have
entered into a compromise agreement which
had already been approved by the RTC in its
January 5, 2007 Amended Decision, the
obligations thereunder have yet to be fully
complied with – particularly, the payment of
the total compromise amount of
P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the
foregoing debt remains unpaid, the
attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties should
have continued to subsist.
In the earlier case of Chemphil Export &
Import Corporation v. CA, the Court ruled that
a writ of attachment is not extinguished by the
execution of a compromise agreement
between the parties. In that case the Court
held thus:
The case at bench admits of peculiar
character in the sense that it involves a
compromise agreement. The parties to the
compromise agreement should not be
deprived of the protection provided by an
attachment lien especially in an instance
where one reneges on his obligations under
the agreement, as in the case at bench, where
Antonio Garcia failed to hold up his own end
of the deal, so to speak.
 If we were to rule otherwise, we would
in effect create a back door by which a debtor
can easily escape his creditors. Consequently,
we would be faced with an anomalous
situation where a debtor, in order to buy time
to dispose of his properties, would enter into a
compromise agreement he has no intention of
honoring in the first place. The purpose of the
provisional remedy of attachment would thus
be lost. It would become, in analogy, a
declawed and toothless tiger. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
 In fine, the Court holds that the writ of
preliminary attachment subject of this case
should be restored and its annotation revived
in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr.
his preferential lien over the properties
covered by the same as it were before the
cancellation of the said writ. Lest it be
misunderstood, the lien or security obtained by
an attachment even before judgment, is in the
nature of a vested interest which affords
specific security for the satisfaction of the debt
put in suit.30 Verily, the lifting of the
attachment lien would be tantamount to an
abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps.
Lazaro’s properties which the Court, absent
any justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.
6. Olib v. Pastoral, G.R. No. 81120, 20
August 1990, 188 SCRA 692
Facts: On November 13, 1981, Corazon M.
Navia sued Petitioners, for dissolution of their
partnership and other reliefs, with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
attachment. The petition was granted
resulting in the attachment of 6 parcels of land
belonging to the petitioners, along with stocks
of merchandise in their bodega. The writ was
amended excluding the merchandise.
On May 16, 1985, the petitioners filed
a motion to discharge the preliminary
attachment on the ground that the attachment
bond executed for one year from November
1983 had already lapsed. Judge Miguel S.
Rallos of the RTC of Agusan del Norte and
Butuan City ruled in favor of Petitioners.
On July 20, 1987, the petitioners moved for
the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment. Navia filed an opposition,
contending that as she had perfected her
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial court
no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
On August 24, 1987, Judge Edelwina C.
Pastoral, who had succeeded Judge Rallos
denied the motion on the ground invoked in
the opposition.
The petitioners moved for
reconsideration however it was denied.
Petitioners filed another MFR insisting that (a)
the attachment had been automatically
discharged under Rule 57, Section 19; and (b)
the attachment bond had already lapsed for
non-payment of the premiums. They were
rebuffed again. They then came before this
Court, contending that the respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying their motion.
Issues:
1. WON the attachment bond had already
lapsed for non-payment of the premiums.
2. WON the attachment had been
automatically discharged under Rule 57
Section 19
Held:
First Issue: No
Attachment is defined as a provisional
remedy by which the property of an adverse
party is taken into legal custody, either at the
commencement of an action or at any time
thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of
any judgment that may be recovered by the
plaintiff or any proper party. 8
It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot
have an independent existence apart from the
main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff
against the defendant. 9 Being merely ancillary
to a principal proceeding, the attachment must
fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as
the purpose of the writ can no longer be
justified.
The consequence is that where the
main action is appealed, the attachment which
may have been issued as an incident of that
action is also considered appealed and so
also removed from the jurisdiction of the court
a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the
subject of a separate case independent of the
principal action because the attachment was
only an incident of such action.
Coming now to the argument that the
attachment was automatically lifted because of
the non-payment of the premium on the
attachment bond, the Court feels it is time
again to correct a common misimpression.
The rule is that the bond is not deemed
Second Issue: No
The order of attachment is considered
discharged only where the judgment has
already become final and executory and not
when it is still on appeal. The obvious reason
is that, except in a few specified cases,
execution pending appeal is not allowed.
7. Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, L-66321, 31
October 1984, 133 SCRA 141
Facts: Sometime on March 18, 1983 herein
petitioner Traders Royal Bank instituted a suit
against the Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc.
REMCO before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, for recovery of the sum of
P2,382,258.71 obtaining therein a writ of pre
attachment directed against the assets and
properties of Remco Alcohol Distillery, Inc.
On May 12, 1982, private respondent
La Tondeña, Inc. filed a complaint-in-
intervention in said Civil Case No. 9894,
alleging among others, that 'it had made
advances to Remco Distillery Inc. which
totalled P3M and which remains outstanding
as of date' and that the 'attached properties
are owned by La Tondeña, Inc.
Subsequently, private respondent La
Tondeña, Inc., without the foregoing
complaint-in- intervention having been passed
upon by the Regional Trial Court, Branch CX,
(Pasay City), filed in Civil Case No. 9894-P a
"Motion to Withdraw" dated October 8, 1983,
praying that it be allowed to withdraw alcohol
and molasses from the Remco Distillery Plant
and which motion was granted per order of the
Pasay Court dated January 27, 1983,
authorizing respondent La Tondeña, Inc. to
withdraw alcohol and molasses from the
Remco Distillery Plant at Calumpit, Bulacan.
On July 19, 1983, private respondent
La Tondeña Inc. instituted before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch IX, Malolos, Bulacan
presided over by Respondent Judge, Civil
Case No. 7003-M, in which it asserted its
claim of ownership over the properties
attached in Civil Case No. 9894-P, and
likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction.
A Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition
to the application for a writ of Preliminary
Injunction by herein respondent La Tondeña
Inc. was filed by petitioner on July 27, 1983.

Thereafter, petitioner Traders Royal
Bank filed with the Intermediate Appellate
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, to annul and set aside the Order
dated September 28, 1983 of the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch IX, issued in Civil Case No. 7003-M; to
dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction dated
October 6, 1983 issued pursuant to said order;
to prohibit respondent Judge from taking
cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 7003-M, and to compel private
respondent La Tondeña, Inc., and Ex- Oficio
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to return the
disputed alcohol to their original location at
Remco's ageing warehouse at Calumpit,
Bulacan.
In its decision, the Intermediate
Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack
of legal and factual basis, holding that the
respondent Judge did not abuse his discretion
in issuing the Order of September 28, 1983
and the writ of preliminary injunction dated
October 3, 1983. citing the decision in
Detective and Protective Bureau vs. Cloribel
(26 SCRA 255). Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the respondent court
denied the same in its resolution dated
February 2, 1984.
Issue: Whether the respondent judge acted
without jurisdiction in authorizing the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction, which enjoined the
sheriff of Pasay City from interferring with La
Tondeña's right to enter and withdraw the
barrels of alcohol and molasses from Remco's
ageing warehouse and from conducting the
sale thereof.
Held: There is no question that the action
filed by private respondent La Tondeña, Inc.,
as third-party claimant, before the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan wherein it claimed
ownership over the property levied upon by
Pasay City Deputy Sheriff Edilberto Santiago
is sanctioned by Section 14, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court. Thus —
If property taken be claimed by any person
other than the party against whom
attachment had been issued or his agent,
and such person makes an affidavit of his
title thereto or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or
title, and serves such affidavit upon the
officer while the latter has possession of
the property, and a copy thereof upon the
attaching creditor, the officer shall not be
bound to keep the property under the
attachment, unless the attaching creditor or
his agent, on demand of said officer,
secures aim against such claim by a bond
in a sum not greater than the value of the
property attached. In case of disagreement
as to such value, the same shall be
decided by the court issuing the writ of
attachment. The officer shall not be liable
for damages, for the taking or keeping of
such property, to any such third-party
claimant, unless such a claim is so made
and the action upon the bond brought
within one hundred and twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of said bond. But
nothing herein contained shall prevent such
third person from vindicating his claim to
the property by proper action ...
The foregoing rule explicitly sets forth
the remedy that may be availed of by a person
who claims to be the owner of property levied
upon by attachment, viz: to lodge a third- party
claim with the sheriff, and if the attaching
creditor posts an indemnity bond in favor of
the sheriff, to file a separate and independent
action to vindicate his claim (Abiera vs. Court
of Appeals, 45 SCRA 314). And this precisely
was the remedy resorted to by private
respondent La Tondeña when it filed the
vindicatory action before the Bulacan Court.
Generally, the rule that no court has
the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of a concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to
grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction,
is applied in cases where no third-party
claimant is involved, in order to prevent one
court from nullifying the judgment or process
of another court of the same rank or category,
a power which devolves upon the proper
appellate court . 2 The purpose of the rule is to
avoid conflict of power between different
courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring
about a harmonious and smooth functioning of
their proceedings.
It is further argued that since private
respondent La Tondeña, Inc., had voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Pasay
Court by filing a motion to intervene in Civil
Case No. 9894-P, the denial or dismissal
thereof constitutes a bar to the present action
filed before the Bulacan Court.
8. Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan,
G.R. No. 203530, 13 April 2015, 755
SCRA 358
FACTS:
 Petitioners Luzon Development Bank,
Tomas Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez are the
respondents in the complaint for Collection of
Sum of Money and Damages filed by
respondent Erlinda Khrishnan
 Erlinda claimed that she is a client of
respondent bank wherein she maintained
several accounts including time deposits.
 Erlinda presented her Time Deposits
Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for
payment because they have become due,
petitioners refused to honor them for the
reason that they were fraudulent.
 Respondent Erlinda likewise applied
for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the
RTC granted
 By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's
accounts in BPI Family Bank, Calamba,
Laguna and in the Central Bank were
garnished.
 P filed an urgent ex-parte Motion to
Recall Quash and/or Lift Attachment or
Garnishment (in excess of amounts in the
writ).
 R opposed the motion.
 P filed an Omnibus Motion seeking
the substitution of their garnished account
 RTC resolved the pending incidents
and required the petitioners to justify their
motion to discharge the attachment
 During pre-trial, respondents
requested additional time to file a
supplemental motion to justify their earlier
motions which was granted and gave
petitioners ten (10) days from receipt within
which to comment or opposed it
 RTC issued an order lifting the
attachment to which respondent Erlinda filed a
motion for reconsideration
 Petition for certiorari is granted
 P subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied.
 R judge issued an Order directing
respondent Erlinda to file a new attachment
bond in the amount of P35,000,000.00 and
petitioners to file a counterbond within ten
days from notice of the filing and approval of
the bond of respondent Erlinda. Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration of the said
Order which respondent judge denied and
granted a period of fifteen days for respondent
Erlinda to file an attachment bond
 Erlinda filed her attachment bond on
June 25, 2009 in the amount of
P35,000,000.00
 P filed a motion for extension of time
to comply and/or file the appropriate pleading
and to hold in abeyance the reinstatement of
the writ of attachment
 P filed a motion to admit bank
property in lieu of counterbond which was
opposed by respondent Erlinda
 R judge denied petitioners' motion in
the assailed Order, issued an Order
reinstating the Writ of Attachment dated March
1, 2001 for failure of petitioners to file the
required counterbond, and issued an
amended Reinstated Writ of Attachment
directing respondent Sheriff Oscar L. Rojas
(hereafter respondent Sheriff) to attach the
real estate or personal properties of petitioners
in the amount of P28,597,472.70. On June 30,
2011, the sheriff served the Notice of
Garnishment and the Amended Reinstated
Writ of Attachment
 P filed an urgent motion to recall,
suspend or hold in abeyance and re-
examination of the amended reinstated writ of
preliminary attachment
 P filed this petition for certiorari
 CA–dismissed petitioners' certiorari
petition and affirmed the Orders of the RTC
reinstating the Writ of Attachment for failure of
petitioners to file the required counter-bond.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the
RTC's decision which denied petitioners'
motion praying that bank property be
deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-bond
Ruling: We rule in the negative. Section 2,
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states
that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued
either ex parte or upon motion with notice and
hearing by the court in which the action is
pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of
the court to attach so much of the property in
the Philippines of the party against whom it is
issued, not exempt from execution, as may be
sufficient to satisfy the applicant's
demand, unless such party makes deposit
or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in
an amount equal to that fixed in the order,
which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy
the applicant's demand or the value of the
property to be attached as stated by the
applicant, exclusive of costs." it is evidently
clear that once the writ of attachment has
been issued, the only remedy of the
petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash
deposit or the filing of the counter-bond.
Rule 58 - Preliminary Injunction
1. Filipino Metals v. Secretary of Trade and
Industry, G.R. No. 157498, 15 July 2005,
463 SCRA 616
Facts: EO 156 issued by President Arroyo on
December 12, 2002, imposes a partial ban on
the importation of used motor vehicles. The
ban is part of several measures EO 156
adopts to "accelerate the sound development
of the motor vehicle industry in the
Philippines." In Executive Secretary v.
Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two
related petitions, we found EO 156 a valid
executive issuance enforceable throughout
the Philippine customs territory, except in the
Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone in
Zambales by virtue of its status as a "separate
customs territory" under Republic Act No.
7227.
Respondent Forerunner Multi
Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation
engaged in the importation of used motor
vehicles via the ports of Aparri, Cagayan and
San Fernando, La Union, sued the
government in the RTC of Appari, to declare
invalid EO 156, impleading petitioner public
officials as respondents. Respondent attacked
EO 156 for (1) having been issued by
President Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Constitution; and (3) having been
superseded by Executive Order No. 418 (EO
418), issued by President Arroyo on 4 April
2005, modifying the tariff rates of imported
used motor vehicles. Respondent sought a
preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis
pendentia, the enforcement of EO 156.
RTC: Acting on respondent’s
application for preliminary injunctive remedy,
the trial court granted relief, initially by issuing
a TRO followed by a writ of preliminary
injunction granted in its Order of 27 November
2008. On petitioners’ motion, however, the trial
court reconsidered its Order and lifted the
injunctive writ on 7 July 2010. The trial court
grounded its ruling on Southwing which it
considered as negating any "clear and
the Court of Appeals erred in granting
preliminary injunctive relief to respondent to
enjoin enforcement of EO 156.
Held: Yes
It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in
Philippine remedial law that a preliminary
injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon
a showing of the applicant’s "clear legal
right" being violated or under threat of violation
by the defendant. "Clear legal right," within the
meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right
"clearly founded in or granted by law." Any
hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal
right precludes the grant of preliminary
injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity
of laws or issuances with the force and effect
of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary
injunctive relief bears the added burden of
overcoming the presumption of validity
inhering in such laws or issuances. These
procedural barriers to the issuance of a
preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the
equitable nature of such relief, preserving the
status quo while, at the same time, restricting
the course of unmistakable legal right" on the
part of respondent to receive the "protection of
a writ of preliminary injunction."
Respondent elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals in a certiorari petition.
CA: Granted the certiorari and set
aside the RTC’s order reinstated its Order of
27 November 2008.
Petitioners are now before the CA with
having committed an error of law in reinstating
the preliminary injunctive writ for respondent.
They argue that Southwing controls the case,
precluding the CA from recognizing a clear
legal right of respondent to import used motor
vehicles.
Respondent counters that the
doctrinal import of Southwing was weakened
by the subsequent issuance of EO 418,
allegedly repealing EO 156. Respondent
invokes our minute Resolution of 15
November 2010 denying the petition as
judicial confirmation of the supposed repeal.

Issue: The question is whether action of the
defendants even before adverse judgment is
rendered against them.
Respondent sought preliminary
injunctive relief as ancillary to its principal
cause of action to invalidate EO 156.
Respondent’s attack on EO 156, however,
comes on the heels of Southwing where we
passed upon and found EO 156 legally sound,
albeit overextended in application. We found
EO 156 a valid police power measure
addressing an "urgent national concern":
There is no doubt that the issuance of
the ban to protect the domestic industry is a
reasonable exercise of police power. The
deterioration of the local motor manufacturing
firms due to the influx of imported used motor
vehicles is an urgent national concern that
needs to be swiftly addressed by the
President. In the exercise of delegated police
power, the executive can therefore validly
proscribe the importation of these vehicles
2. Power Sites v. United Neon, G.R. No.
163406, 24 November 2009, 605 SCRA 196
In Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United
Neon, the Supreme Court stated that there is
no “irreparable injury” as understood in
law. Rather, the damages alleged by the
petitioner, namely, “immense loss in profit and
possible damage claims from clients” and the
cost of the billboard which is “a considerable
amount of money” is easily quantifiable, and
certainly does not fall within the concept of
irreparable damage or injury as described
in Social Security Commission v. Bayona, 115
Phil. 105, 110 (1962)
3. Hernandez v. NAPOCOR, G.R. No.
145328, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 166
Sometime in 1996, Respondent
National Power Corporation began the
construction of 29 steel poles in
connection with its 230 kilo-volt Sucat-
Araneta-Balintawak Power Transmission
Project. These poles, each of which was 53.4
meters high, were to support overhead
tension cables that would pass through
Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, where
petitioners’ homes were located.
Trouble ensued when petitioners
discovered some scientific studies, finding
that electromagnetic fields created by high-
voltage power lines could cause a range
of illnesses from cancer to leukemia. In a
privilege speech, Representative Francis
Joseph G. Escudero denounced the cavalier
manner in which Napocor had ignored safety
and consultation requirements. An
explanation was demanded by
Representative Arnulfo Fuentebella,
chairperson of the House Committee on
Energy. Respondent admitted that it was still
negotiating with petitioners, and that it had
come up with four options to address the
problem: transfer the line, maintain a 12-
meter distance from the village, construct
an underground line, or reroute along C-5
and South Luzon Expressway. These
negotiations resulted in an impasse.
On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against Napocor. Judge
Francisco B. Ibay issued an Order
temporarily restraining it from energizing
and transmitting high-voltage electric
current through the project. This Order was
extended from 2 days to 18 days.
Respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for TRO and Preliminary
Injunction and sought the dismissal of
the Complaint, on the ground that the trial
court had no jurisdiction. It cited Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1818, which states:
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute,
or controversy involving an infrastructure
project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other
natural resource development project of the
government, or any public utility operated
by the government, including among other
public utilities for transport of the
goods or commodities, stevedoring and
arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
persons, entity or government official from
proceeding with or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project, or the
operation of such public utility or pursuing
any lawful activity necessary for such
execution, implementation or operation.
While the Petition was pending
before the CA, the trial court ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to stop Napocor from installing high-
voltage cables and from energizing and
transmitting high-voltage electric current
through those cables.
On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the
trial court’s Order on the ground that Section
1 of Presidential Decree 1818 clearly
proscribed injunctions against infrastructure
projects. It further cited Supreme Court
Circulars 2-91 and 13-93 dated March 15,
1991, and March 5, 1993, respectively.
Petitioners filed the instant Petition,
contending that the proscription in PD 1818
should not be applied to cases of extreme
urgency, such as when the right to health and
safety was hanging on the balance.
Issue: Whether the trial court may temporarily
restrain or preliminarily enjoin Napocor from
constructing and operating the 29 steel
poles or towers, notwithstanding Presidential
Decree 1818
Ruling:
The Court granted the petition. It held that
the prohibition contained in Presidential
Decree 1818 extended only to the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders against
administrative acts, in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion
in technical cases. It did not cover
controversies involving questions of law,
as those involved in the instant case.
What Presidential Decree 1818 aimed
to avert was the untimely frustration of
government infrastructure projects,
particularly by provisional remedies.
Otherwise, the greater good would suffer
from the disruption of the pursuit of
essential government projects or the
frustration of the economic development
effort of the nation. PD No. 1818, however,
was not meant to be a blanket prohibition that
would disregard the fundamental right to the
health, safety and well-being of a community,
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Indeed, the prohibition was not
absolute. It only prohibited the courts
from issuing injunctions against
administrative acts involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases.
Outside this dimension, the Supreme Court
declared that courts could not be prevented
from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts in cases involving
questions of law.
The instant controversy involved
questions of law. Petitioners raised the issues
of whether there was a violation of their
constitutionally protected right to health, and
whether respondent had indeed violated the
Local Government Code provision on prior
consultation with affected communities.
These questions of law removed the case
from the protective mantle of Presidential
Decree 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial
court of a preliminary injunction found legal
support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, which merely required a
probable violation of the applicant’s
rights and a tendency to render the
judgment ineffectual. In the case at bar,
there was adequate evidence on record to
justify the conclusion that the NAPOCOR
project would probably imperil the health
and safety of petitioners.
First, petitioners presented copies
of studies linking the incidence of illnesses,
such as cancer and leukemia, to exposure
to electromagnetic fields.
Second, the Napocor brochure on
its Quezon power project had a provision that
power lines should be located within safe
distances from residences because of the
danger concomitant with high-voltage power.
Third, documents on record
showed that respondent had made
representations that it was looking into the
possibility of relocating the project, and that it
had even undertaken a series of negotiations
and meetings with petitioners. These
documents and negotiations suggested that
their health concerns were far from
imaginary. If there was indeed no cause for
concern, it would not have come up with
options to address their woes. Neither would
Representative Escudero have fired away
strong words of censure in his privileged
speech.
While it was true that the issue of
whether the transmission lines were safe
was essentially evidentiary in nature and
pertained to the very merits of the action
below, the Court found that the possibility of
health risks from exposure to
electromagnetic radiation was within the
realm of a scientific scale of probability. It
held that there was sufficient basis on
record engendering a cloud of doubt over
the danger posed by the project upon the
lives of petitioners. Indeed, probability was
 enough for injunction to issue as a
provisional remedy. In contrast, injunction
as a main action was resorted to when one
needed to establish absolute certainty as
basis for a final and permanent
injunction. Pending the final determination
of the trial court on the main case, it was
prudent to preserve the status quo.
4. G.G. Sportswear v. BDO, G.R. No.
184434, 8 February 2010, 612 SCRA 47
Facts: On April 22, 1994 petitioners G.G.
Sportswear Manufacturing Corp. (G.G.
Sportswear) and Naresh Gidwani mortgaged a
lot in Aranda, Makati, and a house and lot in
Bel-Air Village, also in Makati, to Equitable-
PCI Bank, now the respondent Banco de Oro
Unibank, Inc. (BDO), to secure
P20,357,000.00 loan to G.G. Sportswear. On
April 25, 1996, to secure an additional
P11,643,000.00 loan that BDO gave G.G.
Sportswear, the parties amended the real
estate mortgages to include such loan.
Petitioner G.G. Sportswear was unable to pay
its loans.
On March 15, 2005 respondent BDO
told G.G. Sportswear in a letter that the bank
transferred on that date its past due loan
obligation with the bank, totaling
US$12,257,581.31 as of December 31, 2004,
to Philippine Investment One (SPV-AMC), Inc.
(PIO), including all interest, fees, charges,
penalties, and securities/collaterals, if any.
This was followed by BDO Certification[2]
dated April 21, 2005 that it has assigned,
conveyed, transferred and sold to PIO, on a
without recourse basis, all its rights, title,
benefits and interest to the Loan Receivables
of G.G. Sportswear.
Subsequently, however, respondent
BDO applied with the Ex Officio Sheriff of
Makati for the foreclosure of the properties
that petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani
mortgaged with the bank. The notice of
sheriffs sale scheduled the auction of the
properties on May 31, 2007 but this was
subsequently rescheduled to July 18, 2007. At
any rate, the sheriff auctioned off the Aranda
property to BDO on June 21, 2007.
On July 16, 2007, two days before the
rescheduled auction of the Bel-Air property,
petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani filed
an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, in Civil Case 07-631,[4] to annul the
foreclosure, hold respondent BDO in indirect
contempt, award damages, and enjoin further
foreclosure by TRO and preliminary injunction.
They alleged that, as a result of BDOs transfer
of G.G. Sportswears loan receivables to PIO
in 2005, BDO lost the right to foreclose.
In its answer, respondent BDO denied
transferring petitioner G.G. Sportswears loan
receivables to PIO, stating that the April 21,
2005 Certification it issued was a mere
general certification that did not specify which
of several loan receivables were sold to PIO.
BDO in fact transferred to Philippine Asset
Investment, which entity was subsequently
taken over by respondent PIO, only
P290,820.00 out of G.G. Sportswears total
loan.[6] BDO attached Certifications from itself
and from PIO to the effect that the credits
secured by the Aranda and Bel-Air properties
a had not been transferred to PIO. The latter
filed an answer of the same tenor.
On August 7, 2007 the RTC issued an
order,[9] denying petitioners G.G. Sportswear
and Gidwanis applications for TRO and
preliminary injunction. They filed a motion for
reconsideration and a motion to inhibit the
presiding judge, but on October 11, 2007 the
RTC denied both motions. This prompted G.G.
Sportswear and Gidwani to file a special civil
action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP 101799, assailing the
RTC orders mainly based on the proposition
that respondent BDO had lost its right to
foreclose the mortgages when it assigned its
rights to PIO.
On June 26, 2008 the CA rendered
judgment, dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. It denied on August 29, 2008 petitioners
G.G. Sportswear and Gidwanis subsequent
motion for reconsideration, prompting them to
file the present petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding
that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it denied petitioners G.G.
Sportswear and Gidwanis application for TRO
and preliminary injunction despite the banks
apparent assignment of its credit to another
entity.
Held: Petitioners G.G. Sportswear and
Gidwani point out that BDOs March 15, 2005
letter and its April 21, 2005 certification show
that the bank already transferred to PIO all its
rights to the loan receivables of G.G.
Sportswear. Thus, BDO lost its right to
foreclose the mortgages on the properties that
secured the unpaid loans, thus, entitling
petitioners to an order enjoining the
foreclosures. Further, petitioners claim that
BDO bloated G.G. Sportswears outstanding
obligation such that it was being made to pay
more through the foreclosure than was
actually due.
The test for issuing a TRO or an
injunction is whether the facts show a need for
equity to intervene in order to protect
perceived rights in equity.[14] In general, a
higher court will not set aside the trial courts
grant or denial of an application for preliminary
injunction unless it gravely abused its
discretion as when it lacks jurisdiction over the
action, ignores relevant considerations that
stick out of the parties pleadings, sees the
facts with a blurred lens, ignores what is
relevant, draws illogical conclusions, or simply
acts in random fashion.
Injunction may be issued only when
the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the main
relief he asks in his complaint. This means
that the plaintiffs allegations should show
clearly that he has a cause of action. This
means that he enjoys some right and that the
defendant has violated it. And, where the
defendant is heard on the application for
injunction, the trial court must consider, too,
the weight of his opposition.
Did the allegations of the parties and
the documents they attached to their
pleadings give ample justification for the
issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction
order to stop the foreclosure sale of the Bel-Air
property? Two considerations militate against
it:
First. The mortgaged properties were
due for foreclosure. Admittedly, petitioner G.G.
Sportswear had defaulted on the loans
secured by the subject mortgages. Petitioners
had, therefore, no right to complain about
losing their properties to foreclosure.
Second. The issue of which party
owns the loan receivables and, consequently,
had the right to foreclose the mortgages is
essentially an issue between BDO and PIO.
This issue is the concern of petitioners G.G.
Sportswear and Gidwani but only to the extent
that they are entitled to ensure that the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale were paid to
the right party.
For the above reasons, it cannot be
said that petitioners G.G. Sportswear and
Gidwani have established a right to the main
relief they want, namely, the arrest of the
foreclosure sale of their mortgaged properties
after they had admitted not paying their loans.
As for their claim that BDO had bloated G.G.
Sportswears outstanding obligation, the
remedy if this turns out to be true is to direct
BDO to return the excess proceeds with
damages as the circumstances may warrant.
What is more, the provisional remedy
of preliminary injunction may only be resorted
to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any standard of
compensation. Here, since there is a valid
cause to foreclose on the mortgages,
petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani
cannot claim that the irreparable damage they
wanted to prevent by their application for
preliminary injunction is the loss of their
properties to auction sale. Their real injury, if it
turns out that the right to foreclose belongs to
PIO rather than to BDO, is payment of the
proceeds of the auction sale to the wrong
party rather than to their creditor. But this kind
of injury is purely monetary and is
compensable by an appropriate judgment
against BDO. It is not in any sense an
irreparable injury.
5. Borja v. Salcedo, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-
03-1746 (formerly OCA IPI No. 10-
1225-RTJ), 26 September 2003, 412 SCRA
110
FACTS:
 In a Complaint, Roger F. Borja
accuses Presiding Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo
of the RTC (Br 32) of San Pablo City of gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
discretion in issuing a temporary restraining
order (TRO) in Civil Case No. SP-5775 (01),
without complying with the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
 Complainant claims that the
procedure followed by respondent Judge
violated Rule 58 Section 4 [b-c-d], 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure on the following grounds:
(a) Being a multi-sala court, it is the
Executive Judge that may issue an ex-parte
TRO good for 72 hours
(b) The notice of raffle was not
preceded or contemporaneously
accompanied, by service of summons, with
the complaint or initiatory pleading and the
applicants affidavit and bond.
 (c) Respondent Judge who was
assigned to the case did not conduct the
required summary hearing with notice and in
the presence of the parties within 24
hours after the Sheriffs return of service and/or
the records are received by the branch
selected by raffle.
(d) The TRO was issued ex-parte
without the required bond and without alleging
that the matter is of extreme urgency and
applicant would suffer grave or irreparable
injury.
(e) Complainant did not ask for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction on
January 4, 2001 in the morning.
 Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo,
informed complainant that the subject matter
of his complaint is judicial in nature hence it
shall be denied due course as there are
judicial remedies available under the Rules of
Court yet to be exhausted.
 Complainant argues that when the law
transgressed is elementary, as in the instant
case, the failure to know or observe it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law
 respondent judge submitted her
comment and apologized for the delay in its
submission explaining that she, as well as her
husband, underwent cataract operation
 She likewise emphasized her denial of
partiality, ignorance of the law, bias and so
forth being attributed to her by complainant for
the reverse is true as it has been (her) desire
to always observe impartiality, fairness, and
dedication in the administration of justice
 Judge Salcedo issued a Temporary
Restraining Order
 Defendant Borja filed a Motion to
Inhibit Judge Herradura [Salcedo] from the
case and which the latter granted
 Defendant Brion filed a Motion to
Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order
anchored on the ground that the TRO was
issued in violation of Rule 58, Section 4(d) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and is
therefore a patent nullity
 The undersigned resolved the Motion
to Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order; The
undersigned dissolved the TRO because it
was issued in violation of Supreme Court
 The undersigned humbly submits that
as aforestated, Judge Salcedo inhibited
herself from the case which was thereafter re-
raffled to the sala of the undersigned. The
motion to Dissolve TRO had to be resolved.
 this Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation
 R judge failed to comply with
Administrative Circular No. 20-95. No order
setting a summary hearing on the application
for temporary restraining order was furnished
the defendants
 A TRO may however be issued ex-
parte if the matter is of such extreme urgency
that grave injustice and irreparable injury will
arise unless it is issued immediately. Under
such circumstances, the executive judge shall
issue the TRO effective only for seventy-two
(72) hours from its issuance. But such a
procedure is not applicable to respondent
judge because she is not the executive
judge of RTC, San Pablo City
 Recommendation of OCA
(1) OCA IPI No. 01-1225-RTJ be RE-
DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter;
(2) Respondent Judge Zorayda H. Salcedo,
RTC, Branch 32, San Pablo City be fined for
her failure to comply with Administrative
Circular No. 20-95, with a warning that a
repetition of similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely; and
(3) The explanation of Judge Marivic T. Balisi-
Umali, then RTC Judge, Branch 30, San Pablo
City be ACCEPTED for being meritorious
Issue: Whether the TRO can be extended for
another period until a hearing in the pending
application for preliminary injunction can be
conducted
Ruling:
 The application for a TRO shall be
acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing conducted within twenty-four
(24) hours after the records are transmitted to
the branch selected by raffle. The records
shall be transmitted immediately after raffle.
 A TRO can be issued ex parte if the
matter is of such extreme urgency that grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise unless
it is issued immediately. Under such
circumstance, the executive judge shall issue
the TRO effective only for seventy-two (72)
hours from its issuance. The executive judge
is then required to summon the parties to a
conference, during which the case should be
raffled in their presence. Before the expiry of
the seventy-two hours, the presiding judge to
whom the case was raffled shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the
TRO can be extended for another period until
a hearing on the pending application for
preliminary injunction can be held
 In the present case, there is neither
allegation nor proof that respondent judge was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or any other ill-motive.
 Where this Court pronounced that the
failure of respondent therein, as an Executive
Judge, to abide by Administrative Circular No.
20-95 in issuing the TRO constituted grave
abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the proper administration of
justice for which reason, a fine of P5,000.00
was imposed on respondent judge
there is neither allegation nor proof that
respondent judge was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty, corruption or any other ill-
motive
 Respondent judge had earlier been
apprised of the provisions of Administrative
Circular No. 20-95 and therefore, it cannot be
said that she is ignorant of the law. For her
conscious disregard of a a basic rule on the
issuance of a TRO, Judge Salcedo must be
held administratively liable not for gross
ignorance of the law but for grave abuse of
authority and conduct prejudicial to the proper
administration of justice
6. Solid Builders, Inc. v. China Banking
Corp., G.R. No. 179665, 3 April 2013, 695
SCRA 101
Facts: China Banking Corporation (CBC)
granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc.
(SBI). To secure the loans, Medina Foods
Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor
several surety agreements and contracts of
real estate mortgage over parcels of land in
the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and
New Cubao Central in Cainta, Rizal.
Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a
scheme through which SBI would sell the
mortgaged properties and share the proceeds
with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time that
the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI
also proposed that there be partial releases of
the certificates of title of the mortgaged
properties without the burden of updating
interests on all loans.
In a letter dated March 20, 2000
addressed to CBC, SBI requested the
restructuring of its loans, a reduction of
interests and penalties.
In response, CBC sent SBI a letter
dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had
been completely restructured effective March
1, 1999 when SBI signed a new promissory
note. Since interest payment has not been
made, no re-pricing is possible.
Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18,
2000, CBC demanded SBI to settle its
outstanding account within ten days from
receipt thereof.
On October 5, 2000, claiming that the
interests, penalties and charges imposed by
CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable and
to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure
proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint
“To Compel Execution of Contract and for
Performance and Damages, With Prayer for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte
Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was
granted.
Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a
right to have their mortgaged properties
shielded from a possible foreclosure by CBC
on the ground that the interest rate and
penalty charges imposed by CBC on the loans
availed of by SBI are iniquitous and
unconscionable.
ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiffs have the right
to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent
defendant bank from taking over their
properties.
Held: NO. This Court has recently reiterated
the general principles in issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction in Palm Tree Estates,
Inc. v. Philippine National Bank:
At times referred to as the “Strong
Arm of Equity,” we have consistently ruled that
there is no power the exercise of which is
more delicate and which calls for greater
circumspection than the issuance of an
injunction. It should only be extended in cases
of great injury where courts of law cannot
afford an adequate or commensurate remedy
in damages; “in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where
considerations of relative inconvenience bear
strongly in complainant’s favor; where there is
a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff’s right
against his protest and remonstrance, the
injury being a continuing one, and where the
effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to
reestablish and maintain a preexisting
continuing relation between the parties,
recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the
defendant, than to establish a new relation.”
A writ of preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary event which must be granted
only in the face of actual and existing
substantial rights. The duty of the court taking
cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction is to determine whether the
requisites necessary for the grant of an
injunction are present in the case before it. In
this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction
is issued to preserve the status quo ante,
upon the applicant’s showing of two important
requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be
protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts
sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injury.
The basis of the right claimed by SBI
and MFII remains to be controversial or
disputable as there is still a need to determine
whether or not, upon consideration of the
various circumstances surrounding the
agreement of the parties, the interest rates
and penalty charges are unconscionable.
Therefore, such claimed right cannot be
considered clear, actual and subsisting. In the
absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of
the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII
to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies
them from availing of the equitable relief that is
the injunctive writ. SBI’s default or failure to
settle its obligation is a breach of contractual
obligation which tainted its hands and
disqualified it from availing of the equitable
remedy of preliminary injunction.
As SBI is not entitled to the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII.
The accessory follows the principal. The
accessory obligation of MFII as
accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied
to SBI’s principal obligation to CBC and arises
only in the event of SBI’s default.
Rule 60 – Replevin
1. Rivera v. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, 5
June 2009, 588 SCRA 529
FACTS: Petitioner avers that the writ of
replevin was served upon and signed by the
security guard on duty where the rock-
crushing plant to be seized was located
contrary to the sheriff’s return stating that both
the writ and the summons was served upon
petitioner. Nine (9) days after the writ was
served on the security guard, petitioner filed
an answer to the complaint accompanied by a
prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond.
The RTC, however, denied the redelivery
bond for having been filed beyond the five-day
mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and
6 of Rule 60.
 Petitioner argues in the case at bar via
the petition on Rule 45 that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying her counterbond on the ground that it
was filed out of time. She contends that the
mandatory five-day period did not even begin
to run in this case due to the improper service
of the writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of
Rule 60.
Issue: WON the denial of counterbond filed
beyond the 5 day mandatory period is
erroneous considering the writ was improperly
served.
Held: Yes. Before a final judgment, property
cannot be seized unless by virtue of some
provision of law. The Rules of Court, under
Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of
replevin. However, a person seeking a remedy
in an action for replevin must follow the course
laid down in the statute, since the remedy is
penal in nature. When no attempt is made to
comply with the provisions of the law relating
to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or
order allowing the seizure is erroneous and
may be set aside on motion by the adverse
party.
 The process regarding the execution
of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the
writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
property, must serve a copy thereof to the
adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together
with the application, the affidavit of merit, and
the replevin bond. The reasons are
simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the
adverse party that his property is being seized
in accordance with the court’s order upon
application by the other party, and ultimately to
allow the adverse party to take the proper
remedy consequent thereto.
 Service of the writ upon the adverse
party is mandatory in line with the
constitutional guaranty on procedural due
process and as safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
 In the case at bar since the writ was
invalidly served, petitioner is correct in
contending that there is no reckoning point
from which the mandatory five-day period shall
commence to run.
 The writ must satisfy proper service in
order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be
directed to the officer who is authorized to
serve it; and it should be served upon the
person who not only has the possession or
custody of the property involved but who is
also a party or agent of a party to the action.
Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if
it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis
of a writ that was improperly served, such as
what happened in this case.
Petitioner’s proper remedy should have been
to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin or
a motion to vacate the order of seizure.
Nevertheless, petitioner’s filing of an
application for a redelivery bond, while not
necessary, did not thereby waive her right to
question the improper service.
The trial for the main action shall continue.
Respondent may, however, file a new
application for replevin should he choose to do
so.
Rule 61 - Support Pendente Lite
1. Lam v. Chua, G.R. No. 131286, 18 March
2004, 426 SCRA 29
Facts: The case commenced on March 11,
1994 upon the filing of a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage by Adriana
Chua against Jose Lam in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City (Branch 109). Adriana
alleged in the petition that: she and Jose were
married on January 13, 1984; out of said
marriage, they begot one son, John Paul
Chua Lam; Jose was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage but said
incapacity was not then apparent; such
psychological incapacity of Jose became
manifest only after the celebration of the
marriage when he frequently failed to go
home, indulged in womanizing and
irresponsible activities, such as, mismanaging
the conjugal partnership of gains; in order to
save what was left of the conjugal properties,
she was forced to agree with Jose on the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains and the separation of present and future
properties; said agreement was approved by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch
149) in a Decision dated February 28, 1994;
they had long been separated in bed and
board; they have agreed that the custody of
their child will be with her, subject to visitation
rights of Jose. Adriana prayed that the
marriage between her and Jose be declared
null and void but she failed to claim and pray
for the support of their child, John Paul.
Summons was duly served on Jose
Lam on March 22, 1994. Despite the lapse of
fifteen days after service of summons, no
responsive pleading was filed by him. Hence,
the trial court issued an Order dated April 13,
1994, directing Asst. City Prosecutor Bonifacio
Barrera to conduct an investigation for
determination whether or not there was
collusion between the parties and to submit
his report thereon. On April 28, 1994, Asst.
City Prosecutor Barrera filed his Report stating
that there seems to be no collusion between
the parties.
The trial court then set the case for
hearing. The lone witness was Adriana
herself. She testified that her marriage with
Jose was arranged by her parents in the
traditional Chinese way; that her married life
was abnormal because Jose very seldom
came home, never worked for a living and
instead kept asking for money from her to buy
his sports cars; that she was also the one
spending for all the expenses of their only
child, John Paul. After her testimony, counsel
for Adriana formally offered the documentary
evidence. No evidence was presented
regarding the amount of support needed by
John Paul or the capacity of Jose to give
support.
On June 23, 1994, Adriana filed an
Urgent Motion to Re-Open on the ground that
she was able to secure additional new
evidence which were significant, material and
indispensable. On July 6, 1994, the trial court
granted the motion to re-open the case and
held a hearing for the reception of additional
evidence. The Pasay RTC admitted into
evidence the Marriage Contract dated May 25,
1977 between Jose and one Celia Santiago,
and another Marriage Contract dated May 6,
1982 between Jose and one Evan
Lock, showing that Jose had been married
twice before he married Adriana in 1984.
RTC- declares the marriage between
petitioner Adriana Chua and respondent Jose
Lam null and void for being bigamous by
nature.
On November 3, 1994, Jose filed a
Motion for Reconsideration thereof but only
insofar as the decision awarded monthly
support to his son in the amount
of P20,000.00. He argued that there was
already a provision for support of the child as
embodied in the decision dated February 28,
1994 of the Makati RTC wherein he and
Adriana agreed to contribute P250,000.00
each to a common fund for the benefit of the
child, to wit:
Nothing herein shall diminish the
rights and obligations of both parties with
respect to their son. In the best interest of the
child, the Second Party shall retain care and
custody, subject to visitation rights by the First
Party to be exercised through mutual
arrangements.
It is hereby agreed by the First Party
and the Second Party that the First Party and
the Second Party shall initially
contribute P250,000.00 each to a common
fund, to be increased as required, to be used
solely and exclusively for the benefit of their
son. Said common fund shall be managed and
administered by the Second Party, subject to
periodic accounting, until the son reaches
majority age.
Jose further alleged in his motion that
his contribution to the common fund had even
amounted to P500,000.00.
On August 22, 1995, the Pasay RTC
issued an Order denying Jose Lams motion
for reconsideration ruling that the compromise
agreement entered into by the parties and
approved by the Makati RTC before the
marriage was declared null and void ab
initio by the Pasay RTC, is of no moment and
cannot limit and/or affect the support ordered
by the latter court.
CA- On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC’s decision in all respect.
Issue: Whether the compromise agreement
between petitioner and Adriana is a bar to any
further award of support in favor of their child
John Paul?
Held: Thus, there is no merit to the claim of
Jose that the compromise agreement between
him and Adriana, as approved by the Makati
RTC and embodied in its decision dated
February 28, 1994 in the case for voluntary
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, is
a bar to any further award of support in favor
of their child John Paul. The provision for a
common fund for the benefit of their child John
Paul, as embodied in the compromise
agreement between herein parties which had
been approved by the Makati RTC, cannot be
considered final and res judicata since any
judgment for support is always subject to
modification, depending upon the needs of the
child and the capabilities of the parents to give
support.
Having settled the issue on the
authority of the trial court to award support for
the child in an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage of the childs parents, this Court
will now discuss the propriety of the
proceedings conducted by the Pasay RTC and
the decision it rendered, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
The Court notes four circumstances
that taint the regularity of the proceedings and
the decision rendered by the trial court.
First, the only ground alleged in the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
Adriana with the Pasay RTC is the
psychological incapacity of Jose without any
prayer for the support of her child. Adriana
presented, formally offered her evidence in
support of the petition and submitted the case
for decision as of May 12, 1994.[14] But on a
motion to re-open filed by her on June 23,
1994, the trial court set the case for reception
of evidence on July 6, 1994 and subsequently
allowed Adriana to present evidence of two
previous marriages contracted by Jose with
other women to prove that the marriage
between Adriana and Jose was null and void
for being bigamous. It is only at the July 6,
1994 hearing that respondent Adriana first
claimed support for John Paul when she
testified in open court.
The petition of Adriana was, in effect,
substantially changed by the admission of the
additional evidence. The ground relied on for
nullity of the marriage was changed from the
psychological incapacity of Jose to that of
existence of previous marriages of Jose with
two different women with an additional claim
for support of the child. Such substantial
changes were not reflected in the petition filed
with the trial court, as no formal amendment
was ever made by Adriana except the
insertion of the handwritten phrase And for
respondent to support the child of petitioner in
an amount this Honorable Court may deem
just and reasonable found at the ultimate
paragraph of the petition, as allowed by the
Pasay RTC. There is nothing on record to
show that petitioner Jose was notified of the
substantial changes in the petition of Adriana.
Second, the Pasay RTC did not give Jose an
opportunity to be present on July 6, 1994 for
the presentation of evidence by Adriana and
to refute the same. Although copy of the
motion filed on June 23, 1994 with a notice of
hearing on June 27, 1994 was sent to Jose,
the record does not show that he received the
notice in due time; neither does the record
show that he was notified of the subsequent
hearing held on July 6, 1994 where Adriana
presented the marriage certificates and
claimed for the support of their child sans the
presence of Jose.
Third, the records do not show that
petitioner was sent a copy of the Order
dated July 6, 1994 wherein the trial court
granted the Urgent Motion to Re-Open of
respondent Adriana and forthwith allowed her
to present her evidence to prove that petitioner
herein contracted previous marriages with
different women.
Fourth, the evidence presented by
respondent regarding her claim for support for
John Paul is glaringly insufficient and cannot
be made a valid basis upon which the Pasay
RTC could have determined the monthly
amount of P20,000.00 for the support to be
given to John Paul by petitioner Jose.
A party who has been declared in
default is entitled to service of substantially
amended or supplemental pleadings.
Considering that in cases of declaration of
nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage,
there can be no default pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Article 48 of the Family Code, it is
with more reason that petitioner should
likewise be entitled to notice of all
proceedings.
Furthermore, the lower courts are reminded of
the ruling of the Court in Asian Transmission
Corporation vs. Canlubang Sugar Estates, to
wit:
It is a general principle of law that a
court cannot set itself in motion, nor has it
power to decide questions except as
presented by the parties in their
pleadings. Anything that is decided beyond
them is coram non-judice and void. Therefore
where a court enters a judgment or awards
relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or the
scope of its allegations the excessive relief is
not merely irregular but is void for want of
jurisdiction, and is open to collateral attack.
The appellate court also ruled that a
judgment of a court upon a subject within its
general jurisdiction, but which is not brought
before it by any statement or claim of the
parties, and is foreign to the issues submitted
for its determination, is a nullity. (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing principle, it
is a serious error for the trial court to have
rendered judgment on issues not presented in
the pleadings as it was beyond its jurisdiction
to do so. The amendment of the petition to
reflect the new issues and claims against Jose
was, therefore, indispensable so as to
authorize the court to act on the issue of
whether the marriage of Jose and Adriana was
bigamous and the determination of the
amount that should have been awarded for
the support of John Paul. When the trial court
rendered judgment beyond the allegations
contained in the copy of the petition served
upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and deprived
petitioner Lam of due process.
Insofar as the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between Adriana and Jose for
being bigamous is concerned, the decision
rendered by the Pasay RTC could be declared
as invalid for having been issued beyond its
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, considering that
Jose, did not assail the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Adriana in his motion for
reconsideration which he filed with the Pasay
RTC. In the petitions he filed in the Court of
Appeals and with us, he likewise did not raise
the issue of jurisdiction of the Pasay RTC to
receive evidence and render judgment on his
previous marriages with other woman which
were not alleged in the petition filed by
Adriana. Petitioner Jose is estopped from
questioning the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court
will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC
declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose
null and void for being bigamous. It is an
axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional
question may be raised at any time, this,
however, admits of an exception where
estoppel has supervened.
Consequently, the Court will only
resolve the lone issue raised by Jose in the
present petition for review on certiorari which
is the award of support for his child, John
Paul.
The matter of support is a question
that may be raised and threshed out before
the Makati RTC as it was the court that
approved the Compromise Agreement, or
before the Pasay RTC where the petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is filed. In the interest of orderly administration
of justice, the Court deems it proper that the
issue on support should be resolved by the
Pasay RTC where the claim for support of the
child was initiated by Adriana.
The trial courts action of merely
ordering in open court during the July 6,
1994 hearing that a prayer for support be
written and inserted in the petition filed by
respondent Adriana does not constitute proper
amendment and notice upon petitioner Jose.
Consequently, herein petitioner Jose was
deprived of due process when the trial court
proceeded to hear the case on a motion to re-
open and render judgment without giving Jose
the requisite notice and the opportunity to
refute the new claim against him.
Verily, the manner by which the trial
court arrived at the amount of support
awarded to John Paul was whimsical, arbitrary
and without any basis.
Such being the case, the Court has no
other recourse but to reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and Pasay RTC insofar
as the award of support is concerned and
order the remand of the case to Pasay RTC
for further proceedings as to the issue
regarding support.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV. No. 51107, dated June 11, 1997 and
October 27, 1997, dismissing the appeal
and denying the motion for reconsideration,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE but only
insofar as the award of support in favor of
John Paul Chua Lam is concerned. The
Decision dated August 4, 1994 and the Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City
(Branch 109), dated August 22, 1995,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for being null
and void, likewise only insofar as the matter
on support is concerned.
Let the records of Civil Case No. 94-
0331 be remanded to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City (Branch 109) which is
DIRECTED to reopen the trial of Civil Case
No. 94-0331 with respect to the claim of
Adriana Chua against Jose Lam for the
support of John Paul Chua Lam and conduct
hearings for further reception of evidence for
the proper determination of the proper amount
of support to be awarded to the child John
Paul Chua Lam.
Rule 62 – Interpleader
1. Makati Dev’t. Corp. v. Tanjuatco, G.R. L-
26443, 25 March 1969, 27 SCRA 401
Facts: On February 21, 1963, said plaintiff
and defendant Pedro C. Tanjuatco entered
into a contract whereby the latter bound
himself to construct a reinforced concrete
covered water reservoir, office and pump
house and water main at Forbes Park, Makati,
Rizal, furnishing, inter alia, the materials
necessary therefor. Before making the final
payment of the consideration agreed upon,
plaintiff inquired from the suppliers of
materials, who had called its attention to
unpaid bills therefor of Tanjuatco, whether the
latter had settled his accounts with them. In
response to this inquiry, Concrete Aggregates,
Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the Supplier
— made a claim in the sum of P5,198.75,
representing the cost of transit-mixed concrete
allegedly delivered to Tanjuatco. With his
consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from
the final payment made to him and, in view of
his subsequent failure to settle the issue
thereon with the Supplier, on September 16,
1955, plaintiff instituted the present action, in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against
Tanjuatco and the Supplier, to compel them
"to interplead their conflicting claims."
On October 4, 1965, Tanjuatco moved
to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the litigation, the amount involved
therein being less than P10,000.00. 1 Finding
this motion "to be well-taken", the lower court
granted the same, over plaintiffs opposition
thereto, and, accordingly, issued an order,
dated November 16, 1965, dismissing the
case, without costs. Hence, this appeal, in
which plaintiff maintains that the subject-
matter of this litigation is not the
aforementioned sum of P5,198.75, but the
right to compel the defendants "to litigate
among themselves" in order to protect the
plaintiff "against a double vexation in respect
to one liability."
Held: We find no merit in this contention.
There is no question in this case that plaintiff
may compel the defendants to interplead
among themselves, concerning the
aforementioned sum of P5,198.75. The only
issue is who among the defendants is entitled
to collect the same. This is the object of the
action, which is not within the jurisdiction of
the lower court. As a matter of fact, on May
25, 1966 the Supplier sued Tanjuatco, in Civil
Case No. 149173 of the Municipal Court of
Manila, for the recovery of said amount of
P5,198.75, and the decision therein will settle
the question as to who has a right to the sum
withheld by plaintiff herein.
The latter relies upon Rule 63 of the
present Rules of Court, prescribing the
procedure in cases of interpleading, and
section 19 of Rule 5 of said Rules of Court,
which, unlike section 19 of Rule 4 of the Old
Rules, omits the Rules on Interpleading
among those made applicable to inferior
courts. This fact does not warrant, however,
the conclusion drawn therefrom by plaintiff
herein. To begin with, the jurisdiction of our
courts over the subject-matter of justiciable
controversies is governed by Rep. Act No.
296, as amended, pursuant to which 2
municipal courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of
the property in controversy", amounts to not
more than "ten thousand pesos." Secondly,
"the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs
to Congress 3 and is beyond the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court, which is limited
to matters concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law. 4 Thirdly, the failure of said
section 19 of Rule 5 of the present Rules of
Court to make its Rule 63, on interpleading,
applicable to inferior courts, merely implies
that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63
in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may
apply thereto the general rules on procedure
applicable to ordinary civil action in said
courts.
2. Lui Enterprises v. Zuellig Pharma, G.R.
No. 193494, 12 March 2014, 719 SCRA
88
FACTS:
 On March 9, 1995, Lui Enterprises,
Inc. and Zuellig Pharma Corporation entered
into a 10-year contract of lease4over a parcel
of land located in Barrio Tigatto, Buhangin,
Davao City.
 Zuellig Pharma received a letter from
the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Claiming to be the new owner of the leased
property, the bank asked Zuellig Pharma to
pay rent directly
 Due to the conflicting claims of Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications over the rental payments,
Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for
interpleader
 Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be
allowed to consign in court its succeeding
monthly rental payments and that Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of
Communications be ordered to litigate their
conflicting claims
 Philippine Bank of Communications
filed its answer
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma’s
alleged representative did not have authority
to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf
of the corporation
 Atty. Ana L.A. Peralta was only
authorized to "initiate and represent [Zuellig
Pharma] in the civil proceedings for
consignation of rental payments to be filed
against Lui Enterprises, Inc. and/or [the
Philippine Bank of Communications
 Lui Enterprises filed nullification case
against the Philippine Bank of
Communications with respect to several
properties it dationed to the bank in payment
of its obligations
 The property leased by Zuellig
Pharma was among those allegedly dationed
to the Philippine Bank of Communications
 Lui Enterprises cited a writ of
preliminary injunction
 By virtue of the writ of preliminary
injunction, Lui Enterprises argued that it
should continue collecting the rental payments
from its lessees until the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case was resolved
 Judge orders, the Philippine Bank of
Communications and all its attorneys,
representatives, agents and any other persons
assisting the bank, are directed to restrain
from conducting auction sale on the Properties
of Lui Enterprises
 Zuellig Pharma filed its opposition to
the motion to dismiss. It argued that the
motion to dismiss should be denied for having
been filed late
 Under Rule 16, Section 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss
should be filed within the required time given
to file an answer to the complaint, which is 15
days from service of summons on the
defendant
 Lui Enterprises’ claim that the
interpleader case was filed without authority,
Zuellig Pharma argued that an action
interpleader "is a necessary consequence of
the action for consignation
 With respect to the nullification of
deed of dation in payment case, Zuellig
Pharma argued that its pendency did not bar
the filing of the interpleader case.
 Under the writ of preliminary
injunction, auction sale of Lui Enterprises’
properties, the proceeds of which were
supposed to satisfy its obligations to the
Philippine Bank of Communications
 The Regional Trial Court of Makati
found that Lui Enterprises failed to file its
motion to dismiss within the reglementary
period
 Lui Enterprises did not move for the
reconsideration thus heard the interpleader
case without Lui Enterprises’ participation
 Despite having been declared in
default, Lui Enterprises filed the manifestation
with prayer
 Plaintiffs move for execution or
implementation of the Order
 status quo order was a necessary
implement of the writ of preliminary injunction
follows the plaintiff's right to collect and
receive rental payments which he enjoyed
prior to the filing of this case, must be
respected and protected and maintained until
the case is resolved
 Status quo simply means the last
actual peaceable uncontested status that
preceded the actual controversy
 Lui Enterprises appealed to the Court
of Appeals, however found insufficient
 As to the denial of Lui Enterprises’
motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court. The Court of Appeals
found that Lui Enterprises filed its motion to
dismiss four days late
 With respect to Lui Enterprises’
motion to set aside order of default, the Court
of Appeals found that Lui Enterprises failed to
show the excusable negligence that prevented
it from filing its motion to dismiss on time
 the Court of Appeals sustained the
trial court since "Zuellig Pharma x x x was
constrained to file the action for interpleader
with consignation in order to protect its
interests
 Lui Enterprises filed a motion for
reconsideration
Issue: Whether the annulment of deed of
dation in payment pending in the Regional
Trial Court of Davao barred the subsequent
filing of the interpleader case in the Regional
Trial Court of Makati
Ruling: The nullification of deed in dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the
interpleader case. Litis pendentia is not
present in this case.
 Lui Enterprises allegedly filed for
nullification of deed of dation in payment with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao. It sought to
nullify the deed of dation in payment through
which the Philippine Bank of Communications
acquired title over the leased property. Lui
Enterprises argued that this pending
nullification case barred the Regional Trial
Court of Makati from hearing the interpleader
case. Since the interpleader case was filed
subsequently to the nullification case, the
interpleader case should be dismissed.
Under Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (e) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to
dismiss may be filed on the ground of litis
pendentia:
Section 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but
before filing the answer to the complaint or
pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss
may be made on any of the following grounds:
(e)That there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause;
Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending suit.” It
exists when "another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause
of actionx x x.” The subsequent action is
"unnecessary and vexatious"142 and is
instituted to "harass the respondent [in the
subsequent action]."
The requisites of litis pendentia are:
(1)Identity of parties or at least such
as represent the same interest in both
actions;
(2)Identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and
(3)The identity in the two cases should
be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other.144
All of the requisites must be present.145 Absent
one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146
In this case, there is no litis pendentia since
there is no identity of parties in the nullification
of deed of dation in payment case and the
interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a
party to the nullification case filed in the Davao
trial court.
 There is also no identity of rights
asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui
Enterprises filed the first case to nullify the
deed of dation in payment it executed in favor
of the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the
interpleader case to consign in court the rental
payments and extinguish its obligation as
lessee. The interpleader case was necessary
and was not instituted to harass either Lui
Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of
Communications.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar
the filing of the interpleader case.
 Lui Enterprises cited Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals147 as authority to set aside the
subsequently filed interpleader case. In this
cited case, petitioner Progressive
Development Corporation, Inc. entered into a
lease contract with Westin Seafood Market,
Inc. The latter failed to pay rent. Thus,
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc.
repossessed the leased premises, inventoried
the movable properties inside the leased
premises, and scheduled the public sale of the
inventoried properties as they agreed upon in
their lease contract.
 In this case, the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case was filed by Lui
Enterprises against the Philippine Bank of
Communications. The interpleader case was
filed by Zuellig Pharma against Lui Enterprises
and the Philippine Bank of Communications. A
different plaintiff filed the interpleader case
against Lui Enterprises and the Philippine
Bank of Communications. Thus, there is no
identity of parties, and the first requisite of litis
pendentia is absent.
Since two requisites of litis pendentia are
absent, the nullification of deed of dation in
payment case did not bar the filing of the
interpleader case.
Rule 63 - Declaratory Relief and Similar
Remedies
1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356,
29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145
FACTS: Petitioner is the president and chief
executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West
Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company
applied for a zoning compliance with the
municipal government of Malay, Aklan. While
the company was already operating a resort in
the area, and the application sought the
issuance of a building permit covering the
construction of a three-storey hotel over a
parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in
Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a
Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated
January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application
on the ground that the proposed construction
site was within the “no build zone” demarcated
in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action
to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow
up, no action was ever taken by the
respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order
was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on
June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and
executed with grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The
hotel cannot summarily be abated because it
is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred
million peso-worth of capital infused in the
venture. And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan
should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The
demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under
the Local Government Code (LGC) to order
the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
CA RULING: The CA dismissed the
petition and ruled that the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance
of EO 10 was done in the exercise of
executive functions, and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner,
according to the CA, is to file a petition for
declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this was
denied by the CA through the challenged
Resolution.
Issue:
a. Whether or not declaratory relief is still
available to petitioner;
b. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that
the respondent mayor was performing neither
a judicial nor quasi-judicial function when he
ordered the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel;
Held:
a. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect of the
case, We find merit in petitioner’s contention
that the special writ of certiorari, and not
declaratory relief, is the proper remedy for
assailing EO 10. As provided under Sec. 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. –
Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
An action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of the
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of
an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith,
and not to settle issues arising from an alleged
breach thereof, it may be entertained before
the breach or violation of the statute, deed or
contract to which it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for
ending controversies that have not reached
the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before
they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of
wrongs.
In the case at bar, the petition for
declaratory relief became unavailable by EO
10’s enforcement and implementation. The
closure and demolition of the hotel rendered
futile any possible guidelines that may be
issued by the trial court for carrying outthe
directives in the challenged EO 10.
Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that
declaratory relief is the proper remedy given
such a situation.
2. Monetary Board v. Philippine Veterans
Bank, G.R. No. 189571, 21 January 2015,
746 SCRA 508
FACTS:
The Philippine Veterans Bank,
pursuant to its mandate to provide financial
assistance to veterans and teachers under
Republic Acts 3518 and 7169, established
pension loans for bona fide veterans and
beneficiaries, as well as salary loan products
for teachers. As these clientele do not have
security other than their continuing good
health or employment, to secure their loans,
the PVB devised a program by charging a
premium, a higher fee known as Credit
Redemption Fund (CRF) from the borrowers.
Special Trust Funds were established by PVB
for the loans of its clientele and in case of
death of the borrower, the fees charged from
him and credited to the trust funds will be used
to fully pay the loan.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas found that
PVB’s collection of the CRF violated Section
54 of Republic Act No. 8791 which prohibited
banks from directly engaging in insurance
business as insurer. Thus, it wrote the PVB to
inform it that CRF is a form of insurance,
based on opinion by the Insurance
Commission and should be discontinued. PVB
then stopped collecting the fees.
The Monetary Board issued MB
Resolution No. 1139 directing the PVB’s Trust
and Investment Department to return to the
borrowers all the balances of the CRF; and to
preserve the records of borrowers who were
deducted CRF pending resolution of ruling of
the Office of the General Counsel of the BSP.
The BSP denied PVB’s request for
reconsideration, hence it filed a petition for
declamatory relief before the RTC of Makati
City.
The Monetary Board moved to
dismiss the petition, citing that the petition
should not prosper because of the prior
breach of PVB by Section 54 of RA 8791. The
RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory
relief, ruling that the issue of whether or not
PVB violated Section 54 of Republic Act 8791
should be resolved in an ordinary civil action,
not a declaratory relief.
Almost year later, it filed a Motion to
Admit Motion for Reconsideration, stating that
it did not receive a copy of the order until
September 3, 2008, which the Monetary Board
opposed, alleging that per certification by the
Philippine Postal Corporation, the order was
served on respondent on October 17, 2007.
The RTC ruling on the motion for
reconsideration, reversed itself and ruled that
the collection of the CRF by PVB did not
constitute engaging in the issuance business
as an insurer, hence not a violation of Section
54 of RA 8791. Accordingly, it declared MB
Resolution No. 1189 null and void. Its motion
for reconsideration denied, it filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari to contest the RTC decision, on the
issue of whether or not the petition for
declaratory relief is proper.
ISSUE: Was the petition for declaratory relief
proper?
HELD:
 Declaratory relief is an action by any
person interested in a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, executive order or
resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the
instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that may be
raised in such a petition is the question of
construction or validity of provisions in an
instrument or statute
 In CJH Development Corporation v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue, the SC that in the
same manner that court decisions cannot
be the proper subjects of a petition for
declaratory relief, decisions of quasi-
judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a
petition for declaratory relief for the simple
reason that if a party is not agreeable to a
decision either on questions of law or of
fact, it may avail of the various remedies
provided by the Rules of Court.
 In this case, the decision of the BSP
Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject
matter for a petition for declaratory relief. The
BSP Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial
agency and the MB resolution it issued was in
its exercise of quasi-judicial powers or
functions.
o The authority of the petitioners to
issue the questioned MB Resolution
emanated from its powers under Section
37 of RA No. 7653 and Section 66 of RA
No. 8791 to impose, at its discretion,
administrative sanctions, upon any bank for
violation of any banking law.
o The nature of the BSP Monetary
Board as a quasi-judicial agency, and the
character of its determination of whether or
not appropriate sanctions may be imposed
upon erring banks, as an exercise of quasi-
judicial function
 A quasi-judicial agency or body is an
organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature, which affects the
rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making. The very definition
of an administrative agency includes its being
vested with quasi-judicial powers.
o It recognizes the need for the active
intervention of administrative agencies in
matters calling for technical knowledge and
speed in countless controversies, which
cannot possibly be handled by regular
courts.
 A “quasi-judicial function” is a term
which applies to the action, discretion,
etc. of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
 Lastly, also worth noting is the fact
that the court a quo’s Order dated
September 24, 2007, which dismissed
respondent’s petition for declaratory
relief, had long become final and
executory.
o To recall, said Order was duly
served on and received by respondent
on October 17, 2007, as evidenced by
the Certification issued by the
Philippine Postal Corporation. Almost
a year later, however, or on October
15, 2008, respondent moved for
reconsideration of the court a quo’s
Order of dismissal, claiming it
received a copy of said Order only on
September 3, 2008.
o Thus, respondent’s self-
serving claim should not have
prevailed over the Certification issued
by the Philippine Postal Corporation. It
was error for the trial court to entertain
it for the second time despite the
lapse of almost a year before
respondent filed its motion for
reconsideration against said Order.
3. SJS v. Lina, G.R. No. 160031, 18
December 2008, 574 SCRA 462
Facts:
 Petitioner, a registered political party,
filed a petition for declaratory relief against
Sec Lina (later on impleaded other
respondents; look at the title) for the proper
construction of Section 90(a) of LGC which
provides:
o “All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in
any other occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.”
 The DILG, thru OSG, moved for the
dismissal arguing that (1) petitioner had no
legal standing, (2) there is no judicial
controversy, (2) declaratory relief is not the
proper remedy.
 RTC dismissed the petition for
declaratory relief. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: WON the petition for declaratory relief
will prosper – NO. Petition denied.
In the petition filed with the trial court,
petitioner failed to allege the ultimate facts
which satisfy these requisites. Not only that,
as admitted by the petitioner, the provision the
interpretation of which is being sought has
already been breached by the respondents.
Declaratory relief cannot thus be availed of.
Ruling:
1. The Court agrees that petitioner has
locus standing; however, the action for
declaratory relief is an inappropriate remedy
to enforce compliance with Section 90 of LGC.
2. The appearance of incumbent city or
municipal mayors and provincial governors,
who are actors in movies and TV programs
enhances their income but reduces
considerably the time they should devote their
constituents. This in violation of Section 90
of LGC and Sec 7 of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standars for Public Officials
and Employees. Their appearance further
gives them undue advantage in future eletions
over their opponents who are not actors. (take
note that there is nothing in the dispositive
portion ordering the respondents to
desists from being actors. Kasi mali
remedy)
3. Indeed, an action for declaratory relief
should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to
interpret or to determine the validity of the
written instrument and to seek a judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties
thereunder
For the action to prosper, it must be
shown that (1) there is a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy is between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.
Rule 64 - Review of Judgments and Final
Orders and Resolutions of the Commission
on Elections and the Commission on Audit
1. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 205728, 21 January 2015, 747 SCRA 1
Facts: On February 21, 2013, petitioners
posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in
size. They were posted on the front walls of
the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH
Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law
of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The
second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading
"Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as
either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check
mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X"
mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of
Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as
the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing
of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising "Team Patay," while those who
voted against it form "Team Buhay".
During oral arguments, respondents
conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in
the passage of the RH Law but were not
candidates for that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent
Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as
Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a
Notice to Remove Campaign Materials
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop
Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer
ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3)
days from receipt for being oversized.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for
the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three
feet (3’)
On February 25, 2013, petitioners
replied10 requesting, among others, that (1)
petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the
tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the
availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be
allowed to remain.
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC
Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise,
it will be constrained to file an election offense
against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC
Law Department was silenton the remedies
available to petitioners.
Issue: Whether petitioners violated the
hierarchy of courts doctrine and jurisprudential
rules governing appeals from COMELEC
decisions.
Held: Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for
all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is
applicable especially to raise objections
relating to a grave abuse of discretion
resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.22 As a
special civil action, there must also be a
showing that there be no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.
Respondents contend that the
assailed notice and letter are not subject to
review by this court, whose power to review is
"limited only to final decisions, rulings and
orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power." Instead, respondents claim that the
assailed notice and letter are reviewable only
by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C,
Section 2(3) of the Constitution24 on
COMELEC’s power to decide all questions
affecting elections.
In the present case, petitioners are not
candidates seeking for public office. Their
petition is filed to assert their fundamental right
to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by
respondents pertained to COMELEC’s
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
power. This case pertains to acts of
COMELEC in the implementation of its
regulatory powers. When it issued the notice
and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly
enforcingelection laws.
Rule 65 – Certiorari
1. Aquino v. Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356,
29 September 2014, 737 SCRA 145
DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence,
the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial
powers to order the closing and demolition of
establishments. This power granted by the
LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is not
the same power devolved in favor of the LGU
under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted,
which is subject to review by the DENR. The
fact that the building to be demolished is
located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment,
for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is
not an issue on environmental protection,
conservation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the
legality or illegality of the structure. Rather
than treating this as an environmental issue
then, focus should not be diverted from the
root cause of this debacle compliance.
Facts: Petitioner is the president and chief
executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove
Management Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West
Cove) in which applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of
Malay, Aklan.
While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, and the
application sought the issuance of a building
permit covering the construction of a three-
storey hotel over a parcel of land located in
Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a
Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated
January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioner’s application
on the ground that the proposed construction
site was within the “no build zone” demarcated
in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Petitioner appealed the denial action
to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow
up, no action was ever taken by the
respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order
was issued by the municipal government,
enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on
June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Cove’s hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and
executed with grave abuse of discretion.
However, the CA dismissed the petition solely
on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance
of EO 10 was done in the exercise of
executive functions, and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner,
according to the CA, is to file a petition for
declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this was denied by the CA. on February 3,
2014 through the challenged Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition raising arguments
on both procedure and substance.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel
cannot summarily be abated because it is not
a nuisance per se, given the hundred million
peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan should
have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The
demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under
the Local Government Code (LGC) to order
the removal of illegally constructed buildings.
Issue:
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings are
conducted first before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in
question.
2. Whether or not declaratory relief is still
available to petitioner;
Ruling:
1. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare
a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se.
 Despite the hotel’s classification as a
nuisance per accidens, however, we still find
in this case that the LGU may nevertheless
properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is
because, in the exercise of police power and
the general welfare clause, property rights of
individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal
constructions are concerned, the mayor can,
after satisfying the requirement of due notice
and hearing, order their closure and
demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the
LGC, which authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. Under
existing laws, the office of the mayor is given
powers not only relative to its function as the
executive official of the town; it has also been
endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to
come out with an effective order or resolution
thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3)
(vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor
to order the closure and removal of illegally
constructed establishments for failing to
secure the necessary permits.
2. Declaratory relief no longer viable
Resolving first the procedural aspect
of the case, We find merit in petitioner's
contention that the special writ of certiorari,
and not declaratory relief, is the proper
remedy for assailing EO 10. As provided
under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach
or... violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder. x x x (emphasis added)
An action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of the
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose
of an action for declaratory relief is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of... the parties under a statute,
deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith,
and not to settle issues arising from an alleged
breach thereof, it may be entertained before
the breach or violation of the statute, deed or
contract to which... it refers. A petition for
declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for
ending controversies that have not reached
the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of
action that will set controversies at rest before
they lead to... a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of
wrongs.
In the case at bar, the petition for
declaratory relief became unavailable by EO
10's enforcement and implementation. The
closure and demolition of the hotel rendered
futile any possible guidelines that may be
issued by the trial court for carrying out the
directives in the... challenged EO 10.
Indubitably, the CA erred when it ruled that
declaratory relief is the proper remedy given
such a situation.
Petitioner could have filed, as an
alternative, a petition for mandamus to compel
the respondent mayor to exercise discretion
and resolve the controversy pending before
his office. There is indeed an exception to the
rule that... matters involving judgment and
discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of
mandamus, for such writ may be issued to
compel action in those matters, when refused.
Whether or not the decision would be for or
against petitioner would be for the respondent
mayor to decide,... for while mandamus may
be invoked to compel the exercise of
discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to
be exercised in a particular way.[21] What
would have been important was for the
respondent mayor to immediately resolve the
case for petitioner to... be able to go through
the motions that the zoning clearance
application process entailed
2. Villanueva v. Judicial & Bar Council, G.R.
No. 211833, 7 April 2015, 755 SCRA
182
Facts: The petitioner was appointed on
September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-
New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley
Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for
the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the
following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs):
Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao
City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del
Sur In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013,
JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he
was not included in the list of candidates for
the said stations. On the same date, the
petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail,
seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in
the list of considered applicants and protesting
the inclusion of applicants who did not pass
the prejudicature examination. The petitioner
was informed by the JBC Executive Officer,
through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that
his protest and reconsideration was duly noted
by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not
to include his name in the list of applicants
was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing
policy of opening the chance for promotion to
second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their
current position for at least five years, and
since the petitioner has been a judge only for
more than a year, he was excluded from the
list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse
to this Court
ISSUE: WON the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC
from performing its principal function under the
Constitution to recommend appointees to the
Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function
Held: The remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of
Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
In this case, it is clear that the JBC
does not fall within the scope of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. In the process of selecting
and screening applicants, the JBC neither
acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity
nor assumed unto itself any performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However,
since the formulation of guidelines and criteria,
including the policy that the petitioner now
assails, is necessary and incidental to the
exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate,
a determination must be made on whether the
JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately
take cognizance of this case by virtue of the
Court's power of supervision over the JBC.
Jurisprudence provides that the power of
supervision is the power of oversight, or the
authority to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties.
Following this definition, the
supervisory authority of the Court over the
JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies with
its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the
policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority
over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the
matter and ensure that the JBC complies with
its own rules
The remedy of mandamus cannot be
availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's
policy. It is essential to the issuance of a writ
of mandamus that the applicant should have a
clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the respondent
to perform the act required. The remedy of
mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only
to compel an officer to perform a ministerial
duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the
use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly,
to be included as an applicant to second-level
judge is not properly compellable by
mandamus inasmuch as it involves the
exercise of sound discretion by the JBC
The petition for declaratory relief is
improper. "An action for declaratory relief
should be filed by a person interested under a
deed, a will, a contract or other written
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a
statute, an executive order, a regulation or an
ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy
includes the interpretation and determination
of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or
duties thereunder."
In this case, the petition for
declaratory relief did not involve an unsound
policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought
a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the
right to be included in the list of applicants
although he failed to meet JBC's five-year
requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates
that no person possesses a legal right under
the Constitution to be included in the list of
nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is
a mere privilege, and not a judicially
enforceable right that may be properly claimed
by any person
Furthermore, the instant petition must
necessarily fail because this Court does not
have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law
are involved.18 The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A.No. 7691
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's
supervisory duty over the JBC and in the
exercise of its expanded judicial power, the
Court assumes jurisdiction over the present
petition. But in any event, even if the Court will
set aside procedural infirmities
3. Clark Investors and Locators
Association, Inc. v. Secretary of Finance,
G.R. No. 200670, 6 July 2015, 761 SCRA
586
Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted
RA No. 7227 which mandated the accelerated
conversion of the Clark and Subic military
reservations into special economic zones.
Based on Section 12 (c) of the said law, in lieu
of national and local taxes, all businesses and
enterprises operating within the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall pay a preferential gross
income tax rate of five percent (5%). In
addition, Section 12 (b) also provides that
such businesses and enterprises shall be
exempt from the payment of all taxes and
duties on the importation of raw materials,
capital, and equipment into the Subic Special
Economic Zone. This tax and fiscal
incentives under RA No. 7227was further
extended to the Clark Freeport Zone upon
enactment of RA No. 9400 on March 20, 2007.
This made the businesses and enterprises
within the Clark Freeport Zone exempt from
the payment of all taxes and duties on the
importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment.
On February 17, 2012, the Dept. of
Finance, upon recommendation of the BIR,
issued RR 2-2012 which imposed VAT and
excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad and into the
Freeport or Economic Zones.
Herein petitioner, which represents
the businesses and enterprises within the
Clark Freeport Zone, filed the instant petition
alleging that respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing RR 2-2012. It
argues that by imposing the VAT and excise
tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad and into the
Freeport or Economic Zones, RR 2-2012
unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted
by RA No. 7227 and RA No. 9400 to the
businesses and enterprises operating within
the Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark
Freeport Zone.
This petition for certiorari prays for the
issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to annul and set aside RR 2-2012
issued by the Department of Finance upon
recommendation of the BIR.
Issue: W/N the Secretary of Finance acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing RR 2-
2012 that imposes VAT and excise tax on the
importation of petroleum and petroleum
products from abroad and into Freeport or
Economic Zones, as it is claimed to have
unilaterally revoked tax exemption granted by
RA 7227 and RA 9400.
Held: The SC denied the petition for being
an improper remedy.
FIRSTLY, a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, is a special civil
action that may be invoked ONLY against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Before a tribunal,
board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought
before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed
with power and authority to determine the
law and adjudicate the respective rights of
the contending parties.
In determining whether a Revenue
Regulation is quasi-legislative in nature, the
legal basis of the Secretary of Finance in the
issuance thereof must be examined. RR 2-
2012 was issued by the Secretary of Finance
based on Section 244 of the NIRC. Section
244 is an express grant of authority to the
Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful
rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC.
And since RR 2-2012 was issued by the
Secretary of Finance based on Section 244
of the NIRC, such administrative issuance
is therefore quasi-legislative in nature
which is outside the scope of a petition for
certiorari.
SECONDLY, Supreme Court
explained that it could not be denied that even
if the petition is filed as a certiorari, in real
essence, it seeks the declaration by the
High Court of the unconstitutionality and
illegality of the questioned rule, thus
partaking the nature, in reality, of one for
declaratory relief over which the SC has
only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
LASTLY, although the SC, the CA and the
RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give
the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum, as hierarchy of courts
must be respected. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs.
A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court's docket.
4. Tagle v. Equitable PCI, G.R. No. 172299,
22 April 2008, 552 SCRA 424
Facts:This Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court was filed by
petitioner Alfredo Tagle (petitioner Alfredo).
 Petitioner Alfredo urges the Court to
set aside, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, which denied petitioner
Alfredos Motion to Stop Writ of
Possession. He prays that this Court certify for
review with prayer for preliminary injunction to
stop the writ of possession of the property
located at Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag,
Bulacan and embraced in Transfer Certificate
of Title
 According to petitioner Alfredo, the
subject property is registered in his name and
was constituted as a Family Home in
accordance with the provisions of the Family
Code. He and his wife Arsenia Bautista Tagle
(Arsenia) never mortgaged the subject
property to respondent Equitable PCI Bank
whether before or after the subject property
was constituted as their Family Home.
 It was Josefino Tagle (Josefino), who
was not the owner of the subject property, who
mortgaged the same with respondent E-
PCI. Josefino was religiously paying the
installments on his mortgage obligation and
had paid more than half. Josefino, however,
passed away. Petitioner Alfredo was then
forced to assume Josefinos outstanding
mortgage obligation. Even as petitioner
Alfredo was already paying Josefinos
mortgage obligation in installments,
respondent E-PCI still foreclosed the
mortgage on the subject property.
 On the other hand, respondent E-PCI
recounts that the subject property was
formerly registered in the name of petitioner
Alfredo. It was mortgaged, pursuant to a
Special Power of Attorney executed by
petitioner Alfredo, to secure the obligation of
the spouses Josefino and Emma Tagle with
respondent E-PCI. Respondent E-PCI
foreclosed the mortgage on the subject
property upon default in payment by spouses
Josefino and Emma, and upon the expiration
of the period of redemption, caused the
consolidation and transfer of the title to the
subject property in its name. Consequently,
respondent E-PCI filed with the RTC a Petition
for Issuance of Writ of Possession of the
subject property, which was docketed as LRC
Case No. P-71-2004. Petitioner Alfredo,
however, filed a Motion to Stop Writ of
Possession on the ground that the subject
property is a Family Home which is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment.
 RTC issued the
assailed Order denying petitioner Alfredos
Motion
 RTC held that: In the case at bar, the
mortgage transaction happened on May 9,
1997 (Exhibit D), after the effectivity of the
Family Code.
 Petitioner Alfredo and his spouse
Arsenia filed with the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration; again denied by the RTC.
 Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals on a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing and
seeking the nullification and the setting aside
of the denial of his Motion to Stop Writ of
Possession.
 Appellate court resolved to dismiss
the petition, stating thus: The instant petition is
not accompanied by (i) the order denying
petitioners motion to exempt from foreclosure
of mortgage; and (ii) a relevant and pertinent
document, i.e., motion to exempt from
foreclosure of mortgage (Sec. 1, Rule 65, in
relation to Sec. 3, Rule 46, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
 Alfredo moved for the reconsideration,
however denied for lack of merit.
 Petitioner once more filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the appellate courts
 Court of Appeals promulgated the last
of its Resolutions, denying, as expected,
petitioner Alfredos Second Motion for
Reconsideration stating that: “Appellant has
not cured the formal defects of the petition
noted in Our resolution dated September 6,
2005. And, more importantly, a second motion
for reconsideration of a final order is not
allowed”
 The subject motion for reconsideration
is DENIED
 Petitioner filed the instant petition
designating it in both the caption and the body
as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
RRC. He anchors the present petition on the
sole issue whether or not the subject property
subject of the mortgage being a family home is
exempt from foreclosure of mortgage
 Respondent E-PCI counters that the
petition at bar must be dismissed on the
following grounds:
First, petitioner Alfredos Petition
for Certiorari with this Court failed to comply
with the technical requirements of the Rules of
Court for petitions for certiorari in that (a) the
present petition was filed out of time
considering that the 60-day period within
which to file the same was reckoned from
receipt of the 11 April 2006
Resolution denying petitioner Alfredos second
Motion for Reconsideration, instead of the 16
February 2006 Resolution denying his first
Motion for Reconsideration; (b) petitioner
Alfredo did not allege in the present petition
that the Court of Appeals acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for failure to
attach thereto certified true copies of the 4
April 2005 RTC Order denying his Motion to
Stop Writ of Possession, as well as the very
motion subject of the assailed order; (c) the
present petition lacks the proper verification
and is considered an unsigned pleading which
produces no effect whatsoever; and (d) the
present petition requested for the issuance of
an injunction without stating the grounds
therefor.
Second, petitioner Alfredos second
Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Court
of Appeals is prohibited by law, as a second
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or
final resolution is clearly disallowed by Sec. 2,
Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
And third, granting arguendo that the
petition at bar was properly filed by petitioner
Alfredo with this Court, the Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 for
failure of petitioner Alfredo to submit the
required documents
 Respondent E-PCI then concludes
that the present Petition for Certiorari was filed
not to question the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals but as a vain hope of appealing the
Order dated April 4, 2005 issued by the RTC
Issue: W/N the present Petition
for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court is the proper remedy
for petitioner Alfredo to avail of in seeking the
reversal of the three Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals
Ruling: The instant Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 The three Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 6 September 2005, 16
February 2006 and 11 April 2006,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461, are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against
petitioner Alfredo Tagle.
 A petition for certiorari is governed by
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
reads:
Section 1-Petition for certiorari. When
any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by
a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
A writ of certiorari may be issued only
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such cannot be used for
any other purpose, as its function is limited to
keeping the inferior court within the bounds of
its jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, the
assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dismissing petitioner Alfredos petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 were final orders.
They were not interlocutory because the
proceedings were terminated; and left nothing
more to be done by the appellate court. There
were no remaining issues to be resolved in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90461. Consequently, the
proper remedy available to petitioner Alfredo
then was to file before this Court a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the
assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
and not a special civil action for certiorari.
From the foregoing discussion, it is
fairly obvious that the third requisite for a
petition for certiorari is wanting, that is, there
must be no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The availability to petitioner Alfredo of the
remedy of a petition for review
on certiorari from the assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals effectively barred his
right to resort to a petition for certiorari. Basic
is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue
where the remedy of appeal is available to an
aggrieved party. A remedy is considered
"plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects
of the judgment and the acts of the lower court
or agency. In this case, appeal was not only
available but also a speedy and adequate
remedy. Moreover, petitioner Alfredo failed to
show circumstances that would justify a
deviation from the general rule as to make
available to him a petition for certiorari in lieu
of making an appeal.
Petitioner failed to show any valid
reason why the issue raised in his petition
for certiorari could not have been raised on
ordinary appeal by certiorari. He simply
argued that the appellate court gravely abuse
its discretion which amounted to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90461 and not finding that
the subject property covered by the Writ of
Possession was a Family Home, hence,
exempt from execution or forced sale. He did
not give a single explanation as to why the
errors committed by the Court of Appeals
cannot possibly be cured by ordinary appeal
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The remedies of appeal in the
ordinary course of law and that
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative.
To be sure, once again, we take this
opportunity to distinguish between a Petition
for Review on Certiorari (an appeal
by certiorari) and a Petition for Certiorari (a
special civil action/an original action
for Certiorari), under Rules 45 and 65,
respectively, of the Revised Rules of
Court. Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation,[43] summarizes the
distinctions between these two remedies, to
wit:
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a
remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an
appeal, the CA exercises its appellate
jurisdiction and power of review. Over a
certiorari, the higher court uses its original
jurisdiction in accordance with its power of
control and supervision over the proceedings
of lower courts. An appeal is thus a
continuation of the original suit, while a petition
for certiorari is an original and independent
action that was not part of the trial that had
resulted in the rendition of the judgment or
order complained of. The parties to an appeal
are the original parties to the action. In
contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari
are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes
the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-
judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the
public and the private respondents,
respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only
judgments or final orders and those that the
Rules of Court so declared are appealable.
Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original
action for certiorari may be directed against an
interlocutory order of the lower court prior to
an appeal from the judgment; or where there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary
appeals should be filed within fifteen days
from the notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant must file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
days from the said notice of judgment or final
order. A petition for review should be filed and
served within fifteen days from the notice of
denial of the decision, or of the petitioners
timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days
from the notice of judgment or final order, or of
the denial of the petitioners motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for
certiorari should be filed not later than sixty
days from the notice of judgment, order, or
resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration was timely filed, the period
shall be counted from the denial of the
motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for
Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration
is generally required prior to the filing of a
petition for certiorari, in order to afford the
tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged
errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and
adequate remedy expressly available under
the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.
5. Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
166755, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA
562
Facts: On December 6, 1995, petitioner filed a
petition for annulment of marriage and custody
of minor children before the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276,
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-194. The trial
court resolved to grant the annulment of the
marriage based on private respondents
psychological incapacity, award to petitioner
the custody of the minor children, and order
the liquidation of the conjugal properties.
Private respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/New Trial and to Admit
Answer which the trial court granted in an
order dated February 12, 1997. In addition,
private respondent was awarded visitation
rights over the minor children.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the
February 12, 1997 Order which was granted
by the trial court in the Order of October 10,
1997. The trial court set aside the February
12, 1997 Order and affirmed the December
13, 1996 Resolution granting the annulment of
the marriage and directed the parties to submit
an inventory of their conjugal assets.
Thereafter, private respondent
submitted an inventory of conjugal assets
which included their Ayala Alabang Village
house and lot. Petitioner manifested that the
conjugal abode be adjudicated in his favor
considering that he was awarded the custody
of the children while private respondent was
adjudged to be the party in bad faith.
The trial court ordered that the
conjugal properties which include the conjugal
abode, certificate of stock and motor vehicle,
should be sold and the proceeds thereof be
divided equally between the parties.
Respondent filed a motion for execution of the
August 4, 1999 resolution,while on November
18, 1999, petitioner prayed for its
reconsideration. On March 15, 2000, the trial
court declared that the August 4, 1999
resolution has become final. A writ of
execution was accordingly issued on March
17, 2000.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking
to annul the August 4, 1999 Resolution and
the March 17, 2000 Writ of Execution.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and held that the August 4, 1999
Resolution of the trial court had long become
final and executory for failure of petitioner to
file a timely motion for reconsideration or
appeal. It also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner then elevated the case to
the Supreme Court. Thereafter, petitioner filed
a Manifestation and Motion clarifying that what
he filed on September 22, 2003 was a motion
to forfeit the share of the private respondent in
the net profits of the conjugal properties and
not a motion to amend an order, and praying
that the same motion be resolved by the trial
court. Petitioner contends that filing a motion
for reconsideration before recourse to the
special civil action of certiorari would be futile
because the trial court had already ordered
the execution of the judgment, citing the case
of Guevarra v. Court of Appeals. He claims
that the trial court was amply given opportunity
to correct itself when he filed the Manifestation
and Motion clarifying the August 2, 2004
Order.
Issue: Whether Rule 65 applies in the case at
bar.
Held: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
provides: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by
a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
As held in Flores v. Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Pampanga, the plain and
adequate remedy referred to in the foregoing
Rule is a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed Order or Resolution, the filing of
which is an indispensable condition to the
filing of a special civil action for certiorari,
subject to certain exceptions, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex
parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or public interest is involved.
An examination of the records,
specifically the petition for certiorari filed with
the Court of Appeals, reveals that petitioner
not only failed to explain his failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the August 27,
2004 Order of the trial court; he also failed to
show sufficient justification for dispensing with
the requirement. Neither did he show that the
case falls under any of the above exceptions.
It was only in the motion for reconsideration of
the November 22, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals and in the instant petition
that he explained why he dispensed with the
filing of prior motion for reconsideration.
It must be emphasized that a writ of
certiorari is a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, never issued
except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must
apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and
the Rules.[24] Petitioner may not arrogate to
himself the determination of whether a motion
for reconsideration is necessary or not. To
dispense with the requirement of filing a
motion for reconsideration, petitioner must
show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason
for doing so,[25] which petitioner failed to do.
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
the petition.
Moreover, petitioners reliance in the
case of Guevarra v. Court of Appeals[26] to
justify the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration is misplaced. Although we
held in Guevarra that a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with in
cases of urgency like when the trial court had
ordered the execution of the judgment, this
circumstance must be clearly shown by the
petitioner as a concrete, compelling and valid
reason, and not just leave it for the courts to
ascertain.
6. Concepcion v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
178624, 30 June 2009, 591 SCRA 420
Facts: A petition for certiorari filed by Jose
Concepcion, Jr. (petitioner) seeking to set
aside the En Banc Resolution dated 02 April
2007 and Order dated 8 May 2007 of
respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC)
The petition cites and quotes the
assailed rulings, then recites that on January
5, 2007, the National Citizens Movement for
Free Elections (NAMFREL) filed a Petition for
Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick
Count with the COMELEC. The present
petitioner then the incumbent Punong
Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park,
Makati City was one of the signatories of the
NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the
National Chairman of NAMFREL.
Records of past political exercises
show that on election day, the Commission on
Elections usually receive numerous
complaints against barangay officials entering
polling places and interfering in proceedings of
the BEIs thereby causing not only delay in the
proceedings, but also political tension among
the BEIs, the voters and the watchers in the
polling place.
Thus, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
7798 that provides the following:
Section 3 of EO No. 94 -
No barangay official shall be appointed as
member of the Board of Election Inspectors or
as official watcher of each duly registered
major political party or any socio-civic,
religious, professional or any similar
organization of which they may be members.
…and then prohibiting:
1. The appointment
of barangay officials which includes the
Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad,
Barangay Secretary, Barangay Treasurer, and
Barangay Tanod, as Chairman/person and/or
Member of the BEIs or as official watcher of
any candidate, duly registered major political
party, or any similar organization, or any
socio-civic, religious, professional [sic], in the
May 14, 2007 National and Local
Elections. The prohibition extends
to barangay officials, employees and tanods,
who are members of accredited citizen’s arms.
2. The barangay officials, employees
and tanods from staying inside any polling
place, except to cast their vote. Accordingly,
they should leave the polling place
immediately after casting their vote.
The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs
petition for accreditation and find it
meritorious. There is, however, one important
condition that must be fulfilled by the petitioner
before its accreditation as citizens’ arm could
legally take effect. Accordingly, Mr. Jose S.
Concepcion, Jr., the National Chairman of
NAMFREL, must first be removed both as a
member and overall Chairman of said
organization. As correctly pointed out by the
oppositor, Mr. Concepcion, being the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park,
Makati City, cannot be a member much more
the overall chairman of the citizens arm such
as NAMFREL. This is explicitly provided for in
COMELEC Resolution No. 7798
NAMFREL filed a Manifestation and
Request for Re-Examination that: (1) contains
information regarding NAMFRELs
reorganization and its new set of officers
showing that the petitioner had stepped down
as National Chair and had been replaced by a
new Chair; (2) manifests NAMFRELs
acceptance of the conditional grant of its
petition for accreditation; and (3) includes
NAMFRELs request for a re-examination
without further arguments of the April 2, 2007
Resolution as it specifically affected the
petitioners membership with NAMFREL. In
this Manifestation and Request for Re-
examination, NAMFREL outlined its various
objections and concerns on the legality or
validity of Resolution 7798.
 The COMELEC, in its Order noted the
information relating to NAMFRELs current
officers, and denied the request to examine its
(COMELECs) interpretation. The COMELEC
reasoned out that Resolution is clear, and
NAMFREL had not presented any convincing
argument to warrant the requested
examination.
Instead of a direct reaction from
NAMFREL, the petitioner filed the present
petition, ostensibly questioning the
COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution, but
actually raising issues with respect to
Resolution 7798.
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) defends the validity of Resolution 7798.
The courts dismiss the petition for
blatant misuse of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The petition mentions three legal
instruments related with the case, namely:
(1) EO No. 94, (2) COMELECs Resolution
(3) COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued
pursuant to EO No. 94 and which in turn is the
basis of the COMELEC’s Resolution.
The petitioner now seeks to assail, in
his individual capacity, a floodgates to numerous and endless litigations
COMELEC adjudicatory resolution (i.e., the
April 2, 2007 Resolution) for its adverse
effects on him when he was not a party to that
case. NAMFREL is not a party to the present
petition. Thus, the present petition is clearly
the petitioners own initiative, and NAMFREL,
the direct party in the COMELECs April 2,
2007 Resolution, has absolutely no
participation.
Issue: Whether the petitioner misuse Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
Ruling: The above features of the petition
render it fatally defective. The first defect lies
in the petitioner’s personality to file a petition
for certiorari to address an adjudicatory
resolution of the COMELEC in which he was
not a party to, and where the direct party,
NAMFREL, does not even question the
assailed resolution. It would have been
another matter if NAMFREL had filed the
present petition with the petitioner as
intervenor because of his personal interest in
the COMELEC ruling. He could have
intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an
affected party in NAMFRELs Manifestation
and Request for Examination. As a last
recourse, the petitioner could have expressly
stated before this Court the procedural
problems he faced and asked that we
suspend the rules based on the unusual
circumstances he could have pointed
out. None of these actions, however, took
place. Instead, the petitioner simply
questioned the COMELECs April 2, 2007
Resolution without explaining to this Court his
reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and
from there, proceeded to attack the validity of
COMELEC Resolution 7798. Under these
questionable circumstances, we cannot now
recognize the petitioner as a party-in-interest
who can directly assail the COMELECs April
2, 2007 Resolution in an original Rule 65
petition before this Court.
Although Section 1 of Rule 65
provides that the special civil action
of certiorari may be availed of by a "person
aggrieved" by the orders or decisions of a
tribunal, the term "person aggrieved" is not to
be construed to mean that any person who
feels injured by the lower courts order or
decision can question the said courts
disposition via certiorari. To sanction a
contrary interpretation would open the
which would undeniably lead to the clogging of
court dockets and, more importantly, the
harassment of the party who prevailed in the
lower court.
The petition for certiorari under Rule
65, however, is not available to any person
who feels injured by the decision of a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. The person aggrieved under
Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the
special civil action of certiorari pertains only to
one who was a party in the proceedings
before the court a quo.
The real party in interest who stands
to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the
suit must prosecute or defend an action. We
have held that interest means material
interest, an interest in issue that the decision
will affect, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.
The second fatal defect lies in the
petitions thrust; it opened with and professed
to be an express challenge to the COMELECs
adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but in its
arguments solely attacks and prays for the
partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798
issued in the exercise of the COMELECs rule
making power. This approach is fatally
defective because the petition thereby
converts an express challenge of an
adjudicatory resolution made without the
requisite standing into a challenge for the
nullity of a regulation through an original Rule
65 petition for certiorari.
What is significant in appreciating this
defect in the petition is the legal reality that the
petitioner was not without any viable remedy
to directly challenge Resolution 7798. A stand-
alone challenge to the regulation could have
been made through appropriate mediums,
particularly through a petition for declaratory
relief with the appropriate Regional Trial Court
under the terms of Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court, or through a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65 to prevent the implementation
of the regulation, as the petitioner might have
found appropriate to his situation. As already
mentioned, a challenge can likewise be made
in the course of validly contesting an
adjudicatory order of the COMELEC. Such
challenge, however, cannot be made in
an original petition for certiorari under Rule 65
dissociated from any COMELEC action made
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
7. Worldwide Web Corporation v. People,
G.R. Nos. 161106 and 161266, 13
January 2014, 713 SCRA 18
Facts: Petitioners filed the present Petitions
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the Decision and the Resolution of the
CA reversing the quashal of the search
warrants previously issued by the RTC.
The applications for warrants to
search the office premises of petitioner WWC,
and of petitioner Planet Internet, alleged to be
conducting illegal toll bypass operations,
which amounted to theft and violation of PD
No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized
Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or
Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the
damage and prejudice of PLDT.
Petitioners also committed theft,
because through their misuse of PLDT phone
lines/numbers and equipment and with clear
intent to gain, they illegally stole business and
revenues that rightly belong to PLDT.
Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and
intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925,
because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they
evaded the payment of access and bypass
charges in its favor while “piggy-backing” on
its multi-million dollar facilities and
infrastructure, thus stealing its business
revenues from international long distance
calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross
violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92
of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of
customs premises equipment (CPE) without
first securing type approval license from the
latter.
The RTC granted the application for
search warrants. Accordingly, the warrants
were issued against the office premises of
petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize
various items.
Over a hundred items were seized,
including 15 central processing units (CPUs),
10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.
Planet Internet notes that even personal
diskettes of its employees were confiscated;
and areas not devoted to the transmission of
international calls, such as the President’s
Office and the Information Desk, were
searched. Voltage regulators, as well as
reserve and broken computers, were also
seized.
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and
Planet Internet filed their respective motions to
quash the search warrants.
The RTC granted the motions to
quash on the ground that the warrants issued
were in the nature of general warrants. Thus,
the properties seized under the said warrants
were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration, but
its motion was denied on the ground that it
had failed to get the conformity of the City
Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as
required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners separately moved for
reconsideration of the CA ruling which was
subsequently denied.
Issue: PLDT assailed the quashal orders via
an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: An order quashing a search warrant,
which was issued independently prior to the
filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final
order that can be the proper subject of an
appeal.
Petitioners also claim that since the
RTC ruling on the motions to quash was
interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should
have filed a Rule 65 petition instead.
Petitioners cite, as authority for their position,
Marcelo v. de Guzman. The Court held therein
as follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman
denying the motion to quash the search
warrant and to return the properties seized
thereunder final in character, or is it merely
interlocutory?
In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court,
citing American jurisprudence, resolved this
issue thus:
Where accused in criminal proceeding
has petitioned for the return of goods seized,
the order of restoration by an inferior court is
interlocutory and hence, not appealable;
likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of
defendant’s petition for the return of the
articles seized under a warrant is such an
interlocutory order.
A final order is defined as one which
disposes of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined; on the
other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does
not dispose of a case completely, but leaves
something more to be done upon its merits.
Tested against this criterion, the
search warrant issued xxx is indisputably of
interlocutory character because it leaves
something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the
guilt of the accused therein.
Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is
misplaced.
An application for a search warrant is
a judicial process conducted either as an
incident in a main criminal case already filed in
court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.
Whether the criminal case (of which the
search warrant is an incident) has already
been filed before the trial court is significant for
the purpose of determining the proper remedy
from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a
search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as
an incident in a pending criminal case, as it
was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search
warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still
“something more to be done in the said
criminal case, i.e., the determination of the
guilt of the accused therein.”
In contrast, where a search warrant is
applied for and issued in anticipation of a
criminal case yet to be filed, the order
quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion
for reconsideration of the grant) ends the
judicial process. There is nothing more to be
done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that
Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the
applications for search warrants were
instituted as principal proceedings and not as
incidents to pending criminal actions. When
the search warrants issued were subsequently
quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to
be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of
the search warrants were final orders, not
interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly
taken therefrom.
8. Kalipunan v. Robredo, G.R. No. 200903,
22 July 2014, 730 SCRA 322
PETITIONER: Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap, Inc. represented by its VP, Carlito
Badion, et al
RESPONDENTS: Jessie Robredo in his
capacity as Secretary of DILG, et al
SUMMARY: Petitioners reside in the cites of
San Juan, Navotas and Quezon. LGU has a
infrasture project that requires the eviction and
demolition of illegally occupied areas by the
petitioners. Petitioners filed a case which
argues that respondents must first secure an
eviction and/or demolition order from the court
prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 and argued that the said
RA was unconstitutional.
DOCTRINE: To justify judicial review to be
conducted by the Judicial department,
the petitioners must establish facts
that are necessarily linked to the
jurisdictional problem they presented
in this case.
Facts:
 The members of petitioners were/are
occupying parcels of land owned by and
located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and
Quezon.
 These LGUs sent the petitioners
notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to
give way to the implementation and
construction of infrastructure projects in the
areas illegally occupied by the petitioners
 Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
authorize evictions and demolitions without
any court order when:
o persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places suchas
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;
and
o persons or entities occupy areas
where government infrastructure projects
with available funding are about to be
implemented.
 On March 23, 2012, the petitioners
directly filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus before the Court, seeking to
compel the respondents to first secure an
eviction and/or demolition order from the court
prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279.
 Petitioners argue that they have:
o No plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
o the respondents gravely abused their
discretion in implementing Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently
unconstitutional for warranting demolition
without any court order. (Section 6, Article
3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly
prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode
unless there is a court order.)
o Violate their right to adequate
housing, a universal right recognized in
Article 25 of Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA
7279.
o Insist that they stand to be directly
injured by the respondents’ threats of
evictions and demolitions had previously
conducted evictions and demolitions in a
violent manner, contrary to Section 10,
Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
o Also contend that the transcendental
public importance of the issues raised in
this case clothes them with legal standing.
 Respondent’s case: Respondents
prays for the outright dismissal of the petition
for its serious procedural defects:
 Petitioners Ignored the hierarchy of
courts
 Petitioners incorrectly availed
themselves of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279
o For a writ of prohibition is merely to
prevent the public respondent’s usurpation
of power or improper assumption of
jurisdiction, on the other hand, a writ of
mandamus only commands the public
respondent to perform his ministerial
functions.
 The petitioners failed to particularly
state the grave abuse of discretion that the
Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed.
 The petition does not present any
justiciable controversy since the City of
Navotas had already successfully evicted the
petitioners in San Roque, Navotas
 Petition was filed out of time since the
petitioners were personally notified of the
intended eviction and demolition on
September 23, 2011
 He further asserts that his faithful
implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279, which are presumed to be constitutional,
cannotbe equated to grave abuse of
discretion.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed
for serious procedural defects – YES
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6,
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution - NO
(3) Whether or not the petion may be subject
to Judicial Review –NO
Ruling: Petition is dismissed
RATIO:
(1).
 The petitioners violated the principle
of hierarchy of courts when they directly filed
the petition before the Court.
 The petitioners appear to have
forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of
last resort, not a court offirst instance.
 The petitioners wrongly availed
themselves of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus. For a writ of prohibition is merely
to prevent the public respondent’s usurpation
of power or improper assumption of
jurisdiction, on the other hand, a writ of
mandamus only commands the public
respondent to perform his ministerial
functions.
 The use of the permissive word "may"
implies that the public respondents have
discretion when their duty to execute evictions
and/or demolitions shall be performed. Where
the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
(2).
 The resolution of the constitutionality
of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the
lis mota (the cuase of the suit or action) of the
case.
(3).
 The petition fails show the essential
requisites that would warrant the Court’s
exercise of judicial review which are:
(1) the existence of an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) the existence of personal and
substantial interest on the part ofthe party
raising the constitutional question;
(3) recourse to judicial review is made
at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the
decision of the case.
 The petitioner who claims the
unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of
showing first that the case cannot be resolved
unless the disposition of the constitutional
question that he raised is unavoidable.
 Petitioners fail to show the necessity
of examining the constitutionality of Section 28
(a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections
1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution. In
the case of Magkalas v. NHA, this Court had
already ruled on the validity of evictions and
demolitions without any court order.
 The petitioners failed to substantiate
their allegations that the public respondents
gravely abused their discretion in
implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279. Instead, they merely imputed
jurisdictional abuse to the public respondents
through general averments in their pleading,
but without any basis to support their claim.
Mandamus
1. Calim v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 156527,
5March 2007, 517 SCRA 412
Facts:
Petitioner Nemesio M. Calim operates
Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services
in Siniloan, Laguna. Private respondent
Roberto J. Acoba was the Vice-Mayor
of Siniloan, Laguna. On the other hand,
private respondents Paul Simon Z Go Homer
R. Serrano, Felipe A. Em, Eligio R. de Leon,
Felipe V. Castro, Gaudencio C. Salay, Andres
V. Quintero, Hector A. Maneja,
and Sedfrey B. Realeza were councilors of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna.
On 23 November 2001, petitioner filed
a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against private
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Section 5 (a) of Republic
Act No. 6713. The case was docketed as
OMB-1-01-1121-K.
Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that on or
about 22 July 2001, he was given a mayors
permit from the municipal government
of Siniloan, Laguna, for his tours and tourist
services business. On 31 July 2001, he
applied for the registration of his business
name with the Regional Office of the
Department of Trade and Industry in San
Pablo City, initially indicating therein as first
priority the name, Mabuhay Tours and Tourist
Services for his business. He was, however,
advised by the aforesaid office to change the
name to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist
Services, and thereafter, was issued a
Certification of Registration thereon on 29
August 2001. He informed Municipal Mayor
Guillermo L. Acero, through the Municipal
Business License Office, of the fact of change
of the name Mabuhay Tours and Tourist
Services to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist
Services.
On 1 February 2002, six of the eleven
private respondents, namely, Felipe A. Em,
Noel Laberinto, Homer Serrano, Eligio de
Leon, Hector A. Maneja, and Sedfrey Realeza
filed a joint Counter Affidavit.
Meanwhile, private respondents Vice-
Mayor Roberto J. Acoba, Paul Simon Go,
Gaudencio Salay and Andres Quintero filed a
Rejoinder, averring similar arguments as
raised in the Counter-Affidavit previously filed
by their co-private respondents. Reiterating
their prayer that the Complaint against them
be dismissed for utter lack of merit, they
maintained that their action taken as members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan,
Laguna, in recommending the cancellation of
the mayor’s permit granted to petitioner was a
product of due deliberation and investigation.
They insisted that petitioner failed to
prove that he was authorized to engage as a
common carrier to offer daily tours to Metro
Manila and Baguio from Siniloan, Laguna.
Hence, in openly engaging in the business of
transport services, petitioner violated the
terms and conditions of the mayors permit.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, recommended the dismissal of
petitioners Complaint for lack of probable
cause.
Petitioner filed the instant Petition
for Mandamus, seeking to compel the public
respondents to file the appropriate information
for violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act
No. 6713, against private
respondents Sangguniang Bayan members
of Siniloan, Laguna.
Sol-Gen dismissed for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether the public respondents
unlawfully neglected to perform an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office?
Held: NO.
It is elementary that mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioners
right is founded clearly on law and not when it
is doubtful. In varying language, the principle
echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may
be enforced by mandamus only if those rights
are well-defined, clear and certain. A writ
of mandamus can be issued only when
petitioner’s legal right to the performance of a
particular act which is sought to be compelled
is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a
right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. Mandamus,
therefore, is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its chief use and not a
discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon said public
officer the right and duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any matter in which
he is required to act. It is his judgment that is
to be exercised and not that of the court.
Essentially, what petitioner attacks in
the instant Petition for Mandamus is the order
of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon, in admonishing the private
respondents. The case partakes of an
administrative disciplinary nature.
Herein, petitioner was not able to
establish his entitlement to a writ
of mandamus. Petitioner fails to demonstrate
that he has a clear legal right to compel the
public respondents to file criminal information
against the private respondents. Settled is the
rule that the Supreme Court will not interfere
with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers without
good and compelling reasons to indicate
otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based
upon his constitutional mandate and the
courts will not interfere in its exercise. Courts
have upheld the wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutorial powers that the
Ombudsman enjoys; and such powers are
virtually free from executive, legislative or
judicial intervention. The rationale of this rule
is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers that the
Office of the Ombudsman is granted under the
present Constitution, but upon practicality as
well; otherwise, the functions of the courts
would be perilously bound by numerous
petitions assailing the result of the
investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office, in much the same way that the courts
would be saturated if compelled to review the
prosecutors exercise of discretion each time
they decide to file an information or dismiss a
complaint. The discretion to prosecute or
dismiss a complaint filed before it is lodged in
the Office of the Ombudsman itself. To compel
the Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal
case against the private respondents, as
petitioner would have it, is outside the ambit of
the courts.
Corollary, Section 2, Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman which runs:
SEC. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating
the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be:
a) Dismissed outright for want of
palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for
comment;
c) Indorsed to the proper government
office or agency this has jurisdiction over the
case
d) forwarded to the appropriate office
or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) Referred for administrative
adjudication; or
f) Subjected to a preliminary
investigation.
And is reinforced by Section 3, Rule III
of the same Rules, hereby quoted:
SEC. 3. How initiated. An
administrative case may be initiated by a
written complaint under oath accompanied by
affidavits of witnesses and other evidences in
support of the charge. An administrative
proceeding may also be ordered by the
Ombudsman or the respective Deputy
Ombudsman on his initiative or on the basis of
a complaint originally filed as a criminal action
or a grievance complaint or request for
assistance.
Clearly provides the Office of the
Ombudsman with wide latitude of discretion in
determining what and which acts to prosecute
criminally and/or administratively. In the
instant case, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman opted, based on the evidence on
hand, to only administratively admonish the
private respondents, a penalty which is in fine
tune with the mandate of Rule IV, Section 52
(C) (13) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,
which provides:
SEC. 52. Classification of Offenses.
Administrative offenses with corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less grave
or light, depending on their gravity or depravity
and effects on the government service.
C. The following are light
offenses with corresponding penalties:
13. Failure to act promptly on letters
and requests within fifteen (15) days from
receipt, except as otherwise provided in the
rules implementing the code of conduct and
ethical standards for public officials and
employees: 1st Offense > Reprimand; 2nd
Offense > Suspension for one (1) to thirty (30)
days; 3rd Offense > Dismissal.
A graver reason that impels this court
to reject petitioner’s plea is the mode taken by
petitioner in elevating the case to this court. In
the case of Fabian v. Desierto, this court ruled
that appeals, if availing, from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be brought to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43[ of the Rules of Court. In Lanting v.
Ombudsman, we underscored the catena of
cases subsequent to the Fabian ruling, thus:
In Fabian v. Desierto, we held that
only appeals from the decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court
of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 (of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).
We reiterated this ruling in Namuhe vs.
Ombudsman and recently in Barata vs.
Abalos, Jr. and Coronel vs Aniano Desierto,
as Ombudsman, and Pedro Sausal, Jr.
There is, verily, a limited applicability
of this courts pronouncement in Fabian.
The Fabian ruling does not extend to orders or
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases. Kuizon v. Ombudsman and Mendoza-
Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),
instructed that petitions for certiorari
questioning the Ombudsman’s orders or
decisions in criminal cases should be filed in
the Supreme Court and not the Court of
Appeals. This is the prevailing rule. The Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman, in admonishing
the private respondents, deemed the matter to
be one in the nature of an administrative
disciplinary case. The petitioner, in filing the
instant Petition for Mandamus before this
Court, took a route that is antagonistic to
prevailing rules and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises,
the instant Petition for Mandamus is
DISMISSED.
2. Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, G.R. No. 176831, 15
January 2010, 610 SCRA 211
Facts: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition
for mandamus with damages against his
mother Uy Kiao Eng, herein petitioner, before
the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner to
produce the holographic will of his father so
that probate proceedings for the allowance
thereof could be instituted. Respondent had
already requested his mother to settle and
liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to
the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but
petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason. Petitioner denied that she
was in custody of the original holographic will
and that she knew of its whereabouts. The
RTC heard the case. After the presentation
and formal offer of respondent’s evidence,
petitioner demurred, contending that her son
failed to prove that she had in her custody the
original holographic will. The RTC, at first,
denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it
granted the same on petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration of this latter order was denied.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review
from the appellate court. The CA initially
denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Respondent moved for reconsideration. The
appellate court granted the motion, set aside
its earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered
the production of the will and the payment of
attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that
respondent was able to show by testimonial
evidence that his mother had in her
possession the holographic will. Dissatisfied
with this turn of events, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. The appellate court
denied this motion. Left with no other
recourse, petitioner brought the matter before
this Court, contending in the main that the
petition for mandamus is not the proper
remedy and that the testimonial evidence used
by the appellate court as basis for its ruling is
inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not mandamus is the
proper remedy of the respondent.
Held: The Court cannot sustain the CA’s
issuance of the writ.
Mandamus is a command issuing
from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or
board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed or from operation of law. This
definition recognizes the public character of
the remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that
it may be resorted to for the purpose of
enforcing the performance of duties in which
the public has no interest. The writ is a proper
recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a
public right and to compel the performance of
a public duty, most especially when the public
right involved is mandated by the Constitution.
As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus
will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board,
officer, or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station.
The writ of mandamus, however, will
not issue to compel an official to do anything
which is not his duty to do or which it is his
duty not to do, or to give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor
will mandamus issue to enforce a right which
is in substantial dispute or as to which a
substantial doubt exists, although objection
raising a mere technical question will be
disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in
the absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person
against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such
court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully
excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled. On the part of the relator, it is
essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that he should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the
act required.
 Recognized further in this jurisdiction
is the principle that mandamus cannot be used
to enforce contractual obligations. Generally,
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private
contract rights, and will not lie against an
individual unless some obligation in the nature
of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.
The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private
right against an individual.] The writ of
mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an
act, when, otherwise, justice would be
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in
cases relating to the public and to the
government; hence, it is called a prerogative
writ. To preserve its prerogative character,
mandamus is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to
the public.
Moreover, an important principle
followed in the issuance of the writ is that
there should be no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
other than the remedy of mandamus being
invoked. In other words, mandamus can be
issued only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless
to afford relief. Although classified as a legal
remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature
and its issuance is generally controlled by
equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the
writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion
of the court.
In the instant case, the Court, without
unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the
original holographic will—is in the nature of a
public or a private duty, rules that the remedy
of mandamus cannot be availed of by
respondent Lee because there lies another
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that
respondent has a photocopy of the will and
that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court,
however, does not prevent him from instituting
probate proceedings for the allowance of the
will whether the same is in his possession or
not.
There being a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
for the production of the subject wills, the
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a
cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court
grants the demurrer.
Rule 67 – Expropriation
1. National Housing v. Heirs Guivelondo,
G.R. No. 154411, 19 June 2003, 404 SCRA
389
Facts:
Ø NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a
complaint as amended regarding the eminent
domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed
as civil case.
Ø The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs
et. al were the rightful private owners of the
land which the petitioner intends to develop a
socialized housing project.
Ø The respondent heirs filed a manifestation
of waiving their objections to petitioners power
to expropriate their properties, thereafter trial
court declares plaintiff has a right to
expropriate the properties of the defendant
heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who
ascertain the just compensation of the said
properties be fixed at PHP 11, 200.00 per
square meter.
Ø Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for
reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots
12, 13 and 19 as well as the amount of just
compensation, however the respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts
partial judgment but the trial court issued an
omnibus order to deny the motion of
respondent granting the petitioner’s motion
and of just compensation.
Ø Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a
motion for execution since the trial court move
for the entry of the partial judgment as
modified by the omnibus order.
Ø The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of
the petition for certiorari on the ground of
partial judgment and omnibus order became a
final and executory when petitioner failed to
appeal.
Ø The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but then it was denied by the
court. The courts of appeals serve on
petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ
of Execution and a Notice of third garnishment
from the Land bank of the Philippines.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the state can be
compelled and coerced by the courts to
continue with its inherent power of eminent
domain.
2. Whether or not judgment has become
final and executory and if estoppel or laches
applies to government.
3. Whether or not writs of execution and
garnishment may be issued against the state
in an expropriation where in the exercise of
power of eminent domain will not serve public
use or purpose
Ruling:
Ø The state as represented by the NHA for
housing project can continue its inherent
power of eminent domain provided that the
just compensation for the property sought is
taken. After the rendition of such order the
plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue such proceedings except on such
terms of the court be equitable.
Ø The order was final after the non-appealing
of the petitioner as the lawful right to
expropriate the properties of respondent heirs
of Guivelondo.
Ø Petitioner NHA are not exempt from
garnishment or execution, although it is public
in character since it is arbitrary and capricious
for a government entity to initiate expropriation
proceedings that seize a private owner’s
property.
Ø Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s
decision denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its
injunctive relief against the levy and
garnishment of its funds and personal
properties was also DENIED. The temporary
Restraining Order was LIFTED
Ø In order to resolve the issue of the
propriety of the garnishment against
petitioners’ funds and personal properties,
there is a need to first determine its true
character as a government entity. Generally,
funds and properties of the government
cannot be the object of garnishment
proceedings even if the consent to be sued
had been previously granted and the state
liability adjudged
Ø The universal rule that where the State
gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit
claimants action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution
and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since government
funds and properties may not be seized under
writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.
Ø However, if the funds belong to a public
corporation or a government-owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a
personality of its own, separate and distinct
from that of the government, then its funds are
not exempt from garnishment
2. Masikip v. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 136349,
23 January 2006, 479 SCRA 391
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is
the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an area of 4,521 square meters located at
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the
then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention
to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of
her property to be used for the "sports
development and recreational activities" of the
residents... of Barangay Caniogan.
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a
reply to respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is
unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as
the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor
suitable to "provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our... community."
In its letter of December 20, 1994,
respondent reiterated that the purpose of the
expropriation of petitioner's property is "to
provide sports and recreational facilities to its
poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995,
respondent filed with the trial court a complaint
for expropriation.
On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a
Motion to dismiss the complaint.
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued
an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, on
the ground that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate the property for the sports and
recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.
Issues: Whether there is indeed a genuine
necessity for the taking of the property
Ruling: The right to take private property for
public purposes necessarily originates from
"the necessity" and the taking must be limited
to such necessity the very foundation of... the
right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Moreover, the ascertainment
of the necessity must precede or accompany
and not follow the taking of the land.
Necessity within the rule that the
particular property to be expropriated must be
necessary, does not mean an absolute but
only a reasonable or practical necessity, such
as would combine the greatest benefit to the
public with the least inconvenience and
expense to the condemning party and the
property owner consistent with such benefit.
Applying this standard, we hold that
respondent City of Pasig has failed to
establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner's property.
Our scrutiny of the records shows that
the Certification issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council, indicates that the intended
beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit
organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It
can be gleaned that the members of the said
Association are desirous of having their own
private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space
available. The purpose is, therefore, not
clearly and categorically public. The necessity
has not... been shown, especially considering
that there exists an alternative facility for
sports development and community recreation
in the area, which is the Rainforest Park,
available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review
is GRANTED.
Principles: Where the taking by the State of
private property is done for the benefit of a
small community which seeks to have its own
sports and recreational facility,
notwithstanding that there is such a
recreational facility only a short distance away,
such taking cannot be considered to be for
public use. Its expropriation is not valid.
3. Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Ltd.
Partnership, G.R. No. 171496, 3 March
2014, 717 SCRA 601
Rule 68 - Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage
1. BPI Family v. Coscolluela, G.R. No.
167724, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 472
Facts
 Respondent and her late husband
Oscar obtained an agricultural sugar
crop loan from Far East Bank & Trust
Co. (later merged with BPI) for crop
years 1997 and 1998. In the book of Far
East, the loan account was treated as a
single account, and evidenced by 67
promissory notes.
 Sps. Coscolluela executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of FEBTC over their
parcel of land as security of loans on
credit accommodation obtained and
those that may be obtained.
 Under the terms and conditions of the
real estate mortgage, in the event of
 failure to pay the mortgage obligation or
any portion thereof, the entire principal,
interest, penalties, and other charges
shall be immediately due; and Far East
mat foreclose the same extra judicially.
 For failure to settle outstanding
obligation on the maturity dates, Far
East sent a final demand letter to
respondent demanding payment.
 Since respondent failed to settle her
obligation, Far East filed a petition for
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgaged property, but only only for 31
of the promissory notes.
 During pendency of said case, Far East
filed a complaint for collection of money
representing the amounts for the 36
other promissory notes.
 In respondent’s answer, she alleged that
the complaint was barred by litis
pendentia for the pending petition for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM.
 Petitioner presented a loan officer as
sole witness, who testified that
respondent were granted a loan, which
was a “single loan account.”
 Respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence contending that the loan
officer’s admission, that there is only
one loan account secured by the REM
thus barred the personal action for
collection. She insisted that the filing of
said complaint should be dismissed.
 Petitioner opposed the demurrer, stating
that each promissory note constituted a
separate contract.
 The trial court denied the demurrer on
the ground that each note covered a
loan distinct from the others.
 Respondent filed MR but denied,
prompting her to file a certiorari petition
under Rule 65 with CA.
 CA granted the petitioner, stating that
the remedies sought are alternative and
not cumulative. Thus, in denying the
demurrer, RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion.
 Petitioner filed MR but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issues & Ratio.
1. WON collection suit should be
dismissed – YES
Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that a party may not
institute one suit for a single cause of action,
and, if two or more suits are instituted on the
basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one on a judgment upon the merits in any one
is available as a ground for the dismissal of
others. The law does not permit the owner of a
single of entire cause of action or an entire or
indivisible demand to divide and split the
cause to make it the subject of several
actions.
The true rule which determined
whether a party has only a single and entire
cause of action is whether the entire amount
arises from one and the same act or contract
or the several parts arise from distinct and
different acts. As gleaned from the plain terms
of the REM, the real estate of respondent
served as a continuing security liable for
obligations already obtainer and obligations
obtained thereafter. In this case, the action of
petitioner is anchored on one and the same
cause: the nonpayment of respondent.
Though the debt may be covered by several
promissory notes and is covered by a real
estate mortgage, the latter is subsidiary to the
former and both refer to one and the same
obligation. A mortgage creditor may institute
two alternative remedies against the debtor,
either to collect debt or to foreclose mortgage,
but not both.
DECISION.
WHEREFORE instant petition is dismissed for
lack of merit.
2. Monzon v. Sps. Relova, G.R. No. 171827,
17 September 2008, 565 SCRA 514
Facts: On 18 October 2000, the spouses
James and Maria Rosa Nieves Relova and the
spouses Bienvenido and Eufracia Perez,
respondents before this Court, filed against
Atty. Ana Liza Luna, Clerk of Court of Branch
18 of the RTC of Tagaytay City, and herein
petitioner Teresita Monzon an initiatory
pleading captioned as a Petition for Injunction.
The case, which was filed before the same
Branch 18 of the RTC of Tagaytay City, was
docketed as Civil Case No. TG-2069.
In their Petition for Injunction,
respondents alleged that Monzon executed a
promissory note in favor of the spouses Perez
for the amount of P600,000.00, with interest of
five percent per month, payable on or before
28 December 1999. This was secured by a
300-square meter lot in Barangay Kaybagal,
Tagaytay City. Denominated as Lot No. 2A,
this lot is a portion of Psu-232001, covered by
Tax Declaration No. 98-008-1793. On 31
December 1998, Monzon executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in
favor of the spouses Perez.
On 23 October 1999, the Coastal
Lending Corporation extrajudicially foreclosed
the entire 9,967-square meter property
covered by Psu-232001, including the portions
mortgaged and subsequently sold to
respondents. According to the Petition for
Injunction, Monzon was indebted to the
Coastal Lending Corporation in the total
amount of P3,398,832.35. The winning bidder
in the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio
Properties Inc., paid the amount of
P5,001,127.00, thus leaving a P1,602,393.65
residue. According to respondents, this
residue amount, which is in the custody of
Atty. Luna as Branch Clerk of Court, should be
turned over to them pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Decision also mentioned that the
Order allowing the ex parte presentation of
evidence by respondents was due to the
continuous and incessant absences of
petitioner and counsel.
On 25 April 2002, Monzon filed a
Notice of Appeal, which was approved by the
trial court. Monzon claims that the RTC
gravely erred in rendering its Decision
immediately after respondents presented their
evidence ex parte without giving her a chance
to present her evidence, thereby violating her
right to due process of law.
Issue: Whether respondents Petition for
Injunction had failed to state a cause of action.
Held: Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court,
which is the basis of respondents alleged
cause of action entitling them to the residue of
the amount paid in the foreclosure sale,
provides as follows:
SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of
sale.The amount realized from the foreclosure
sale of the mortgaged property shall, after
deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the
person foreclosing the mortgage, and when
there shall be any balance or residue, after
paying off the mortgage debt due, the
same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their
priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if
there be no such encumbrancers or there be a
balance or residue after payment to them,
then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized
agent, or to the person entitled to it.
However, Rule 68 governs the judicial
foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgages, which was what
transpired in the case at bar, is governed by
Act No. 3135,[11] as amended by Act No.
4118, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7353,
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 7906, and
Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No.
99-10-05-0, issued on 14 December 1999,
provides for the procedure to be observed in
the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale. Thus, we clarified the different types of
sales in Supena v. Dela Rosa, to wit:
Any judge, worthy of the robe he
dons, or any lawyer, for that matter, worth his
salt, ought to know that different laws apply to
different kinds of sales under our jurisdiction.
We have three different types of sales,
namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial
foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. An ordinary execution sale is
governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court on Execution,
Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments. Rule 68
of the Rules, captioned Foreclosure of
Mortgage, governs judicial foreclosure sales.
On the other hand, Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118, otherwise known as "An Act
to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special
Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate
Mortgages," applies in cases of extrajudicial
foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages.
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial
foreclosure sales, neither Act No. 3135 as
amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to
junior encumbrancers the right to receive the
balance of the purchase price. The only right
given to second mortgagees in said issuances
is the right to redeem the foreclosed property
pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, which provides:
Sec. 6. Redemption. In all cases in
which an extrajudicial sale is made under the
special power hereinbefore referred to, the
debtor, his successors in interest or any
judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said
debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or
deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time
within the term of one year from and after
the date of the sale; and such redemption
shall be governed by the provisions of
sections four hundred and sixty-four to four
hundred and sixty- six, inclusive, of the Code
of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not
inconsistent with this Act.
Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule
68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgages, such right can only be given to
second mortgagees who are made parties to
the (judicial) foreclosure. While a second
mortgagee is a proper and in a sense even a
necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a
first mortgage on real property, he is not an
indispensable party, because a valid decree
may be made, as between the mortgagor and
the first mortgagee, without regard to the
second mortgage; but the consequence of a
failure to make the second mortgagee a party
to the proceeding is that the lien of the second
mortgagee on the equity of redemption is not
affected by the decree of foreclosure.
A cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates the right of
another. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)
an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.[17] In view of the foregoing
discussions, we find that respondents do not
have a cause of action against Atty. Ana Liza
Luna for the delivery of the subject amounts
on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules
of Court, for the reason that the foregoing Rule
does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages.
Rule 69 – Partition
1. Balo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
129704, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 227
Facts: A complaint for Judicial Partition of
Real Properties and Accounting with Damages
was filed by private respondent Josefina
Garrido against petitioners before the RTC.
She alleged in her COMPLAINT that: Private
respondent and petitioners are the co-owners
of undivided parcels of land located at
Mayorga, Leyte.
The described parcels of lands were
originally owned by the spouses Eugenio
Balo, Sr. and Ma. Pasagui-Balo and they were
survived by their 2 children: Ulpiano, Sr. and
Maximino (deceased)
The lands were inherited into two (2)
equal shares by their 2 children;
Plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino
Balo and Salvacion Sabulao, who after her
father’s death, had inherited her father’s share
of the inheritance;
Ulpiano Balo, Sr. aside from being the son of
Eugenio Balo, Sr., is married to Felicidad
Superio, and is the father of all the other
defendants in this case;
Immediately upon the death of
Eugenio Sr., petitioners took possession of the
properties without her knowledge and consent.
She requested for the properties’ fair
and equal partition, but petitioners refused her
proposal.
In lieu of an Answer, petitioners filed a
MTD on the following grounds:(1)Failure to
state a COA for failing to allege that she is a
legitimate child and to allow her to inherit from
the estate in representation of her father would
be to permit intestate succession by an
illegitimate child.(2)The complaint does not
show that the estate of the spouses Eugenio
and Maria Balo have been settled and its
obligations have been paid.(3)The
properties enumerated in the
Complaint were proceeded against by way
of execution to satisfy a judgment against
Eugenio and Maria Balo. Subsequently,
defendant Ulpiano repurchased the said
properties and has been, together with his
children, openly, exclusively and adversely in
possession of the real estate properties in
question.
The RTC denied the MTD for lack of
merit.
No evidence may be alleged or
considered to test the sufficiency of the
complaint except the very facts pleaded
therein. It would be improper to inject into the
allegation, facts not alleged and use them as
basis for the decision on the motion.
 The Court is not permitted to go
beyond and outside of the allegations in the
complaint for data or facts.
Therefore, the allegation of
illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership
are modifications and unreasonable
inferences. If there is doubt to the truth of the
facts averred in the complaint, the Court does
not dismiss thecomplaint but requires an
answer and proceeds to hear the case on the
merit.
COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING
(PetCert): CA accordingly dismissed the same
because: An order denying a MTD is
basically interlocutory in character and
cannot be the proper subject of a
petition for certiorari. The proper procedure is
to proceed with the trial and if the decision be
adverse to the movant, the remedy is to take
an appeal from said decision, assigning as
one of the errors therefore the denial of
the motion to dismiss.
CA denied the MR. Hence this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the ROC.
Issue: Whether or not the action for judicial
partition and accounting has prescribed, was
waived, or was otherwise abandoned.
Ruling:
No. It is noteworthy that the motion to
dismiss filed by the petitioners, did, not Ipso
facto establish prescription. Dismissal prior to
answer is premature. An action for partition is
at once an action for declaration of co-
ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determine portion of the
properties involved. If the defendant asserts
exclusive title over the property, the action for
partition should not be dismissed. Rather, the
court should resolve the case and if the
plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status
as a co-owner, the court should dismiss the
action, not because the wrong remedy was
availed of, but because no basis for requiring
the defendant to submit to partition. If, on the
other hand, the court after trial should find the
existence of co-ownership among the parties,
the court may and should order the partition of
the properties in the same action.
2. Quintos v. Nicolas, G.R. No. 201252, 16
June 2014, 726 SCRA 482
Facts:
Petitioners and respondents are
siblings. In 1999, both their parents passed
away, leaving to their 10 children ownership
over the subject property. An action for
partition was subsequently brought before the
RTC. However, for failure of the parties and
their counsels to appear despite due notice,
the case was dismissed.
Thereafter, the respondent siblings
executed a Deed of Adjudication to transfer
the property in favor of the 10 siblings. As a
result, the old TCT was cancelled and the
Registry of Deeds issued a new one. The
respondents subsequently sold their 7/10
undivided share in favor of the spouses
Candelario.
The petitioners filed a complaint for
Quieting of Title and Damages against the
respondents.
Respondents countered that
petitioners’ cause of action was already barred
by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of
petitioners offered to buy the 7/10 undivided
share of the respondent siblings. They point
out that this is an admission on the part of
petitioners that the property is not entirely
theirs. In addition, they claimed that
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged
the property but because of financial
constraints, respondent spouses Candelario
had to redeem the property in their behalf. Not
having been repaid by Bienvenido and
Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from
their co-respondents their share in the subject
property as payment. Lastly, respondents
sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of
the property.
The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s
complaint, ruling that the respondent siblings
were entitled to their respective shares and
that the subsequent transfer of interest in favor
of the respondent spouses Candelario was
upheld. Likewise, the court ordered the
partition of the subject lots between the herein
plaintiffs and the defendants-spouses
Candelarios.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to
prove ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents’
counterclaim for partition is already barred by
laches or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in
approving the subdivision agreement as basis
for the partition of the property.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious in part.
1. Petitioners were not able to prove
equitable title or ownership over the property
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on the title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or efficacy. In the
case at bar, the CA correctly observed that
petitioners’ cause of action must necessarily
fail mainly in view of the absence of the first
requisite.
Their alleged open, continuous,
exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of the
subject property is belied by the fact that
respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a
Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending
Investor Co. over the subject lot without any
objection from the petitioners.
The cardinal rule is that bare
allegation of title does not suffice. The burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his or her
case by preponderance of evidence
2. The counterclaim for partition is not
barred by prior judgment.
Dismissal with prejudice under Rule
17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat
the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at
any time, provided that there is no actual
adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil
Code.
Between dismissal with prejudice
under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to
co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code,
the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise
would diminish the substantive right of a co-
owner through the promulgation of procedural
rules. Substantive law cannot be amended by
a procedural rule. This further finds support in
Art. 496 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent
with statutory provisions, We hold that Art.
494, as cited, is an exception to Rule 17, Sec.
3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if
the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute
is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it
shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
In the case at bar, the co-ownership,
as determined by the trial court, is still
subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent
spouses Candelario. Consequently, there is
no legal bar preventing herein respondents
from praying for the partition of the property
through counterclaim.
3. The CA erred in approving the
Agreement for Subdivision
Agreement of Subdivision allegedly
executed by respondent spouses Candelario
and petitioners cannot serve as basis for
partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order,
herein respondents admitted that the
agreement was a falsity and that petitioners
never took part in preparing the same. It,
therefore, lacked the essential requisite of
consent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919
dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in
Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning
the subject property in accordance with Rule
69 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 70 - Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer
1. Acaylar v. Harayo, G.R. No. 176995, 30
July 2008, 560 SCRA 624
Facts: Danilo Harayo filed a complaint with
the MTCC against Pablo Acaylar, son of the
spouses Acaylar for forcible entry. He alleged
that he acquired the property from the
spouses Acaylar by virtue of a Deed of Sale
executed on September 14 2004 and took
possession of the property at the same day.
Pablo countered that the subject
property is a portion of the entire property
owned by his parents. He is in possession the
entire property since 1979 and he built his
house on the property and farmed the land.
Harayo cannot definitely claim which portion of
the entire property he was able to buy from the
spouses since the same was not clearly
delineated. He presented an Affidavit of Zoila
Acaylar attesting that she sold the subject
property to him for consideration and she did
not give Pablo authority to either administer or
remain on the subject property.
MTCC rendered a Decision awarding
to Danilo the possession of the property,
giving credence to Danilo's claim that he took
immediate possession after the execution of
the Deed of Sale. On appeal, RTC affirmed
the award of possession in favor of Harayo
and declared that the sale of the subject
property by spouses Acaylar vested ownership
and possession of said property in Harayo,
thus Acaylar's acts of entering of subject
property constitute forcible entry. CA denied
Acaylar's motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not there is forcible entry
or unlawful detainer.
Ruling No. We had long settled that the only
question that the courts must resolve in
ejectment proceedings is - who is entitled to
the physical or material possession of the
property; and they should not involve the
question of ownership or of possession de
jure, which is to be settled in the proper court
and in a proper action. Hence the Deed of
Sale conferring ownership of the subject
property upon Harayo is irrelevant in the case
presented. The Deed of Sale did not
automatically place him in physical possession
of the property.
In Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, we find
that Pablo was in peaceful possession of the
subject property prior to its sale to Harayo.
Even if Pablo was not authorized by Zoila as
administrator, his possession was not
opposed and was, thus, tolerated by his
parents.
In Arcal v. Court of Appeals, The rule
is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but
such possession becomes unlawful upon
demand to vacate made by the owner and the
possessor by torelance refuses to comply with
such demand.
In this case, there is no showing that
either Zoila or Harayo made an express
demand upon Pablo to vacate the property. In
the absence of an oral or written demand,
Pablo’s possession of the subject property has
yet to become unlawful. The absence of
demand to vacate precludes us from treating
this case, originally instituted as one for
forcible entry, as one of unlawful detainer,
since demand to vacate is jurisdictional in an
action for unlawful detainer.
2. Ross-Rica v. Sps Ong, G.R. No. 132197,
16 August 2005, 467 SCRA 35
Facts: The spouses Ong are the original
owners of 3 parcels of land which they occupy.
They sold it to Mandaue Prime Estate Realty,
which then sold it to Ross Rica Sales Center,
Inc. The spouses Ong filed an action to annul
the sale and transfer of property to Mandaue
Prime Estate Realty and at present, the case
is still pending. In the meantime, an ejectment
case was filed against spouses Ong in the
MTC, which ruled against the latter. On appeal
to the RTC, the judgment was affirmed by a
decision dated March 1, 1997. The spouses
Ong received a copy of the decision on April
28, 1997.
The spouses Ong first filed a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC (May 8, 1997) but on the
very next day filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied on June
23, 1997. The spouses Ong received a copy
of the order on July 9, 1997. On July 24, 1997
respondents filed with the CA a motion for an
additional 10 days to file their Petition for
Review, which they would eventually file on
July 30, 1997.
The CA gave their petition for review
due course and reversed the decision of the
RTC on the finding that the action filed was
not one for unlawful detainer based on two
grounds: that the allegations fail to show that
petitioners were deprived of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and that there is no contract, express or
implied, between the parties that would qualify
the case as one of unlawful detainer.
Issues: 1. Whether the complaint satisfies the
jurisdictional requirements for a case of
unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the
MTC
Held: YES. Well-settled is the rule that what
determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought. In Javelosa vs. Court of
the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in
the complaint that there was unlawful
withholding of possession is sufficient to make
out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally
settled that in an action for unlawful detainer,
an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient, without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law. Hence,
the phrase “unlawful withholding” has been
held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning,
having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, and which later expired as
a right and is being withheld by defendant. In
Rosanna B. Barba vs. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from plaintiff is sufficient. Based
on this premise, the allegation in the
Complaint that: “despite demand to vacate,
the defendants have refused and still refuse to
vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding
possession of said lots from plaintiffs and
depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;” is
already sufficient to constitute an unlawful
detainer case.
Likewise, the case of Co Tiamco vs.
Diaz provides for a liberal approach in
considering the sufficiency of a complaint for
unlawful detainer, thus:
“The principle underlying the brevity
and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases rests upon
considerations of public policy. Cases of
forcible entry and detainer are summary in
nature, for they involve perturbation of social
order which must be restored as promptly as
possible and, accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure should be carefully
avoided.”
2. Whether the case should be considered as
one for accion reivindicatoria, and thus the
jurisdiction would lie with the RTC:
NO. The issue involved in accion
reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of
real property.
This differs from accion publiciana
where the issue is the better right of
possession or possession de jure and accion
interdictal where the issue is material
possession or possession de facto. In an
action for unlawful detainer, the question of
possession is primordial, while the issue of
ownership is generally unessential.
Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought
to recover physical possession of the subject
property. The mere fact that they claim
ownership over the parcels of land as well did
not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the
ejectment case. Even if respondents claim
ownership as a defense to the complaint for
ejectment, the conclusion would be the same,
for mere assertion of ownership by the
defendant in an ejectment case will not oust
the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction.
This Court in Ganadin vs. Ramos stated that if
what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of
possession, it does not matter if ownership is
claimed by either party. Therefore, the
pending actions for Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title
and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-
2356 will not abate the ejectment case.
In Drilon vs. Gaurana, this Court ruled
that the filing of an action for reconveyance of
title over the same property or for annulment
of the deed of sale over the land does not
divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the
forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before
it, the rationale being that, while there may be
identity of parties and subject matter in the
forcible entry case and the suit for annulment
of title and/or reconveyance, the rights
asserted and the relief prayed for are not the
same.
The long settled rule is that the issue
of ownership cannot be the subject of a
collateral attack.
In Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court had the occasion to clarify this: “. . .
Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance
with law. The issue of the validity of the title of
the respondents can only be assailed in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose.
Whether or not the petitioners have the right to
claim ownership over the property is beyond
the power of the court a quo to determine in
an action for unlawful detainer.”
3. Zacarias v. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, 24
September 2014, 736 SCRA 508
Facts: The present controversy stemmed from
a complaint for Ejectment with
Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on
December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada
Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact,
Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named
respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of
her household. Said respondents are the
occupants of a parcel of land with an area of
seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters,
situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang,
Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration No.
18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and
issuedby Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L.
Bayot on August 31, 2007.
The parties were ordered to proceed
to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to
Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was
unsuccessful and thus the case was returned
to the court.
The MCTC held that the allegations of
the complaint failed to state the essential
elements of an action for unlawful detainer as
the claim that petitioner had permitted or
tolerated respondents’ occupation of the
subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted
that the averments in the demand letter sent
by petitioner’s counsel that respondents
entered the property through stealth and
strategy, and in petitioner’s own "Sinumpaang
Salaysay", are more consistent withan action
for forcible entry which should have been filed
within one year from the discovery of the
alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of
the physical possession of her property
through illegal means and the complaint was
filed after the lapse of one year from her
discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has
no jurisdiction over the case.
On appeal to the RTC, petitioner
argued that unlawful detainer was the proper
remedy considering that she merely tolerated
respondents’ stay in the premises after
demand to vacate was made upon them, and
they had in fact entered into an agreement
and she was only forced to take legal action
when respondents reneged on their promise to
vacate the property after the lapse of the
period agreed upon.
In reversing the MCTC, the RTC
pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did
not state that respondents entered her
property through stealth and strategy but that
petitioner was in lawful possession and
acceded to the request of respondents to stay
in the premises until May 2008 but
respondents’ reneged on their promise to
vacate the property by that time. It held that
the suit is one for unlawful detainer because
the respondents unlawfully withheld the
property from petitioner after she allowed them
to stay there for one year.
The MCTC and CA both ruled that the
allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out
a case for forcible entry but not for unlawful
detainer.
ISSUE: Whether the MTCT and CA was
correct?
Held: In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held
that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:
(1) initially, possession of property by
the defendant was by contract with or by
toleranceof the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession
became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination ofthe latter’s right
of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained
in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.16
In this case, the Complaint alleged the
following: 3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel
of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st,
Silang, Cavite with an area of SEVEN
HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE
METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration No.
18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal
Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax
declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B"; 4.
Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control
over the subject property. She had it planted
to Bananas and other fruit bearing trees.
However, sometime in May, 2007, she
discovered that the defendants have entered
the subject property and occupied the same;
5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they
leave the premises. The defendants requested
for time toleave and she acceded to said
request. The defendants committed to vacate
the subject property by the end of May, 2008;
6. Inspite of several repeateddemands,
defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the
subject premises prompting the Plaintiff to
seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote
them a FORMAL and FINAL DEMAND to
vacate the premises and to pay reasonable
compensation for their illegal use and
occupancy of the subject property. A copy of
the DEMAND LETTER is hereto attached as
Annex "C"; 7. Plaintiff also referred this matter
to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Lalaan 1st for possible conciliation but to no
avail as the defendants still refused to vacate
the subject property. Thus, the said Barangay
issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION,
as evidenced by a copy thereto attached as
Annex "D";
The above complaint failed to allegea
cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does
not describe possession by the respondents
being initially legal or tolerated by the
petitioner and which became illegal upon
termination by the petitioner of suchlawful
possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she
actually tolerated respondents’ continued
occupation after her discovery of their entry
into the subject premises is incorrect. As she
had averred, she discovered
respondents’occupation in May 2007.
Suchpossession could not have been legal
from the start as it was without her knowledge
or consent, much less was it based on any
contract, express or implied. We stress that
the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal
due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess.
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that where the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful
detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s
supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered.
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer
would be an improper remedy. As explained in
Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding
the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still,
distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiencydefendant’s
possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we
do not doubt that the latter may require him to
vacate the premises and sue before the
inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70,
within one year from the date of the demand to
vacate.
In the instant case, the allegations in
the complaint do not contain any averment of
fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim
that they permitted or tolerated the occupation
of the property by respondents. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that
"respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by
building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof."
Nothing has been said on how
respondents’ entry was effected or how and
when dispossession started. Admittedly, no
express contract existed between the parties.
This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful
detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in
this light that this Court finds that the Court of
Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the complaint.
The complaint in this case is similarly
defective as it failed to allege how and when
entry was effected. The bare allegation of
petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she
discovered that the defendants have enterep
the subject property and occupied the same",
as correctly found by the MCTC and CA,
would show that respondents entered the land
and built their houses thereon clandestinely
and without petitioner's consent, which facts
are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful
detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly
erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and
granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner's argument that the
CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and
executory judgment of the RTC deserves
scant consideration.
 It is well-settled that a court's
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is
that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of
it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action.20 Indeed, a void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be
the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void.
4. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres
v. Heirs of Abella, G.R. No. 143510, 23
November 2005, 476 SCRA 1
Facts: The property in dispute is a parcel of
land with an area of one hectare located
beside the Peñafrancia Basilica in Naga City.It
is covered by Tax Declaration No. 004.1152 in
the name of herein respondents, the heirs of
Don Manuel I. Abella. According to herein
petitioner Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Caceres (petitioner) said parcel of land had
been donated to him by respondents
sometime in 1981, in exchange for masses to
be offered once a month in perpetuity for the
eternal repose of the soul of Don Manuel I.
Abella. Respondents, on the other hand,
vehemently deny such allegation and counter
that petitioner encroached and fenced off the
subject parcel of land without their consent.
In the action for forcible entry
instituted by the Heirs of Manuel Abella
(ABELLA, for short) against the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Nueva Caceres
(ARCHBISHOP, for short) before the
Municipal Trial Court of Naga City.
The complaint is ordered dismissed
for lack of merit and the petition for preliminary
mandatory injunction is denied for being
already moot and academic.
The RTC affirmed the court’s decision.
Abella appealed its decision to the CA. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of this
Court (Branch 22) by denying Abella’s petition
for review.
ABELLA filed another case against
the ARCHBISHOP, for "Quieting of Title"
involving the same property subject matter of
MTC Civil Case No. 8479 (Forcible Entry). The
Court (Branch 24) rendered judgment in Civil
Case No. 89-1802 in favor of ABELLA.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 89-
1802 was appealed by the ARCHBISHOP to
the Court of Appeals and was affirmed.
The ARCHBISHOP appealed the
Decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed in
a minute resolution holding that there was "no
reversible error committed by the appellate
court."
The ARCHBISHOP moved to execute
the Decision in the Forcible Entry case, but the
respondent MTC denied the motion for
execution. Upon denial by the MTC of
petitioner’s motion for execution, he filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Herein petitioner again elevated the
case straight to CA via a petition for review
on certiorari. The CA held that the decision for
Forcible Entry has become final and executory
earlier than in Civil Case for Quieting of Title.
The finality of the decision in the quieting of
title, declaring the respondents as the true
owner of the subject property is a supervening
event that renders the judgment in the forcible
entry, awarding possession to petitioner,
notwithstanding its finality, unenforceable by
execution. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Decision but, a
Resolution was issued denying the same.
Issue: Whether or not the final and executory
judgment in the case for quieting of title
wherein respondents were adjudged to be the
owners of the subject property is a
supervening event that justifies the
suspension or non-enforcement of the final
judgment in the previous case for forcible
entry.
Ruling: The Court finds the petition
unmeritorious.
The theory advanced by petitioner
from the very beginning is that he is entitled to
possession of the disputed property as the
owner thereof because the property was
transferred to him by virtue of an onerous
donation made by respondents. Thus,
petitioner’s alleged right of possession is
premised on his claim of ownership. He
cannot change his theory when the case is on
review, by presenting another theory that is
inconsistent with his allegations during the
proceedings below. Petitioner cannot
contradict himself by saying first that
respondents had agreed to transfer to him the
ownership over the property, only to say later
that what respondents granted to him was the
right to possess the property. Petitioner is
bound by the statements he made while the
case was being heard in the lower courts.
The rule is well-settled that points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the trial
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be
considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal
because this would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process.
Disquisition on the issue of ownership
in ejectment cases, as in the case at bar, is
only provisional to determine who between the
parties has the better right of possession. It is,
therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership, which is the subject matter of a
separate case of annulment of title filed by
respondent.
One of the exceptions to the principle
of immutability of final judgments is the
existence of supervening events. Supervening
events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and
executory or to new circumstances which
developed after the judgment has acquired
finality, including matters which the parties
were not aware of prior to or during the trial as
they were not yet in existence at that time.
In the case at bar, the new
circumstance which developed after the finality
of the judgment in the forcible entry is the fact
that the decision in the case for quieting of title
had also attained finality and conclusively
resolved the issue of ownership over the
subject land, and the concomitant right of
possession thereof. Verily, to grant execution
of the judgment in the forcible entry case
would work injustice on respondents who had
been conclusively declared the owners and
rightful possessors of the disputed land.
5. Sunflower Neighborhood Association v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136274, 3
September 2003, 410 SCRA 318
Facts: Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-
Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the
testate estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed on
March 16, 1993 a complaint for unlawful
detainer (Civil Case No. 8550) against Alfredo
Mogar and 46 other persons who were
occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B,
C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United
Paraaque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These
parcels of land are covered by individual
transfer certificates of title registered in the
name of Macaria Maglaqui, private
respondents’ mother.
The MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch
78, eventually decided in favor of private
respondent. On appeal, the decision of the
MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66. Mogar
et al. elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals but their petition was dismissed by
the appellate court on December 12, 1994.
After the dismissal became final, a writ
of demolition was issued by the MeTC of
Paraaque City, Branch 78. The writ, however,
was not immediately implemented because
the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the
same court. On February 6, 1997, Mogar et al.
filed a petition with the RTC of Paraaque City,
Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando
G. How to enjoin the implementation of the
writ of demolition. However, this petition was
denied and subsequently, an alias writ of
demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G.
Lirio of MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin.
The alias writ of demolition was,
again, not executed, this time due to the ex
parte issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in
connection with the expropriation case (Civil
Case No. 96-0253) filed by the Municipality of
Paraaque against the Testate Estate of
Macaria Maglaqui.
Meanwhile, another group of persons
occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots
I-F and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer
case organized themselves into the Sunflower
Neighborhood Association (Sunflower), the
petitioner herein. On November 18, 1996,
Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan,
filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction with
preliminary injunction against private
respondent also with the RTC of Parañaque
City, Branch 257. Sunflower argued that its
members should be excluded from the
demolition order as they were not parties to
the original unlawful detainer case. To include
their houses in the demolition would be to
deprive them of due process. This time Judge
How granted the injunction and ordered the
exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner
from demolition.
 Thus, private respondent filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA GR
SP No. 46861) assailing both the injunction
orders issued by Judge Tolentino in the
expropriation case and by Judge How in the
prohibition case.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
private respondent holding that, as the
judgment in the unlawful detainer case had
already become final, the execution could not
be enjoined. Consequently, the MeTC of
Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias
writ of demolition on September 14, 1998.
In order to stay the execution of the
writ of demolition, Sunflower filed on January
7, 1999 an urgent motion in this Court for the
issuance of a status quo order. This we
granted in a resolution dated January 20,
1999. Prior to the issuance of our resolution,
however, the writ of demolition was
implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner
thus filed a motion to allow its members to
return to the premises, which we granted in
another resolution dated April 28, 1999.
Thereafter, we required both parties to submit
their memoranda.
Sometime in November 1998, the
group of Mogar et al. filed in this Court a
petition for review of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA GR SP No. 46861. However,
we dismissed the same on January 18, 1999
for failure of said petitioners to comply with
certain procedural requirements, including
their failure to submit a certification of non-
forum shopping.
For its part, petitioner Sunflower
likewise assailed the same decision of the
Court of Appeals in this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ members, who
were not parties to the unlawful detainer case,
may be ejected from the land subject of this
case.
Held: YES. It is well-settled that, although an
ejectment suit is an action in personam
wherein the judgment is binding only upon the
parties properly impleaded and given an
opportunity to be heard, the judgment
becomes binding on anyone who has not
been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a
trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate
the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the
premises with the permission of the defendant;
(c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) a sublessee;
(e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the family,
relative or privy of the defendant.
In the case at bar, the records show
that petitioners members are trespassers or
squatters who do not have any right to occupy
the property of respondent. Petitioner does not
dispute the ownership of the parcels of land in
question. In fact, it even admitted that the
subject property is owned by Macaria
Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.
Petitioner failed to establish any right which
would entitle its members to occupy the land
in any capacity, whether as lessees, tenants
and the like. Petitioners only defense against
the eviction and demolition orders is their
supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer
case. This defense, however, has no legal
support since its members are trespassers or
squatters who are bound by the judgment.
Petitioners’ argument that the parcels
of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and
I-G) were not included in the original ejectment
complaint has no basis. The complaint private
respondent filed with the MeTC of Paraaque
City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and
I-G as part of the subject matter under
litigation in the unlawful detainer case. Thus,
petitioners’ members, together with all the
parties in the unlawful detainer case, must
vacate the disputed land.
The Court commiserates with
respondent, already in her twilight years, who
has been unlawfully deprived of her land for a
good number of years. Thus, we exhort the
court of origin to execute this decision with
reasonable dispatch, consistent with the
requirements of Section 28 of RA 7279 and
EO 152, on eviction and demolition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED
and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED.
Rule 71 - Contempt
1. Inonog v. Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, 28
July 2009, 594 SCRA 168
Facts: This administrative complaint came
about when Judge Francisco B. Ibay cited
complainant in contempt of court simply
because the latter parked his vehicle at the
parking space served for him. In the exercise
of his contempt power, not only did
respondent deny the complainant his right to
be heard but also convicted him in contempt of
court based on a very loose and flimsy reason.
Respondent judge initiated the
proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an
order dated March 18, 2005 in Criminal Case
Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-
392-393, entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez,
et al., directing the complainant to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt.
The said order read:
For intentionally parking car with plate no.
WDH 804 at the parking space reserved for
the undersigned Presiding Judge, thereby
causing the delay in the promulgation of the
Decisions in the above-entitled cases driver
Butch Inonog, c/o Permit Division, this City, is
hereby ordered to appear before this Court at
10:30 A.M., March 18, 2005 and show cause
why he should not be cited for Contempt for
delaying the administration of justice.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion?
Ruling: The phrase “improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice” is so broad and general that it
encompasses wide spectrum of acts that
could constitute indirect contempt. However,
the act of complainant in parking his car in a
slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge
does not fall under this category. There was
no showing that he acted with malice and/or
bad faith or that he was improperly motivated
to delay the proceedings of the court by
making use of the parking slot supposedly
reserved for respondent judge. We cannot
also say that the said act of complainant
constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the
court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and
inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect
contempt proceeding.
2. Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, 6
February 2007, 514 SCRA 616
Facts: The present controversy stemmed
from the complaint of illegal dismissal filed
before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent
Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems,
Inc. (EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and
General Manager Jose E. Barin. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that respondent Go was illegally
dismissed from employment. The NLRC
rendered a Decision reversing the Labor
Arbiter’s decision and declaring that
respondent Go’s separation from employment
was legal for it was attended by a just cause
and was validly effected by EHSI, Kunack and
Barin. Aggrieved, respondent Go elevated the
adverse decision to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals promulgated a
Decision setting aside the ruling of the NLRC
and reinstating the decision of the Labor
Arbiter adjudging EHSI, Kunack and Barin
guilty of illegal dismissal.
 EHSI, Kunack and Barin were able to
receive a copy of the decision through
registered mail on 17 July 2003 while
respondent Go received his copy on 21 July
2003.
 On 16 July 2003, after the
promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision
but prior to the receipt of the parties of their
respective copies, the parties decided to settle
the case and signed a Release Waiver and
Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor
Arbiter.
 In view of the amicable settlement, the
Labor Arbiter, on the same day, issued an
Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case
with prejudice. After the receipt of a copy of
the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go,
through counsel, filed a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud,
mistake or undue influence. Acting on the
motions, the appellate court issued a
Resolution annulling the Order of the Labor
Arbiter dated 16 July 2003 for lack of
jurisdiction.
Held: Indirect contempt proceedings may be
initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by
the court; or (2) through a verified petition and
upon compliance with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements
as outlined must be complied with.
 In the instant case, the indirect
contempt proceedings was initiated by
respondent Go through a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion. It was based on the
aforesaid Motion that the appellate court
issued a Resolution dated 19 November 2003,
requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show
because why she should not be cited for
contempt.
 Clearly, respondent Go’s
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the
catalyst which set everything in motion and led
to the eventual conviction of Atty. Regalado. It
was respondent Go who brought to the
attention of the appellate court the alleged
misbehavior committed by petitioner Atty.
Regalado. Without such positive act on the
part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt
charge could have been initiated at all.
 We cannot, therefore, argue that the
Court of Appeals on its own initiated the
indirect contempt charge without contradicting
the factual findings made by the very same
court which rendered the questioned
resolution.
 In the present case, the appellate
court could not have acquired knowledge of
petitioner Atty. Regalado’s misbehavior
without respondent Go’s Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion reiterating the alleged
deceitful conduct committed by the former.
Thus, the instant case was not initiated by the
court motu proprio.
 The manner upon which the case at
bar was commenced is clearly in
contravention with the categorical mandate of
the Rules (a verified petition which has
complied with the requirements of initiatory
pleadings must be filed). Respondent Go filed
a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion, which
was unverified and without any supporting
particulars and documents. Such procedural
flaw notwithstanding, the appellate court
granted the motion and directed petitioner
Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should
not be cited for contempt. Upon petitioner Atty.
Regalado’s compliance with the appellate
court’s directive, the tribunal proceeded in
adjudging her guilty of indirect contempt and
imposing a penalty of fine, completely ignoring
the procedural infirmities in the
commencement of the indirect contempt
action.
 Evidently, the proceedings attendant
to the conviction of petitioner Atty. Regalado
for indirect contempt suffered a serious
procedural defect to which this Court cannot
close its eyes without offending the
fundamental principles enunciated in the
Rules that we, ourselves, had promulgated.