Analysis
After Georgia: Turkey’s Looming Foreign
Summary: The Russian invasion
of Georgia is a stark reminder
of the unsettled nature of the
Turkish geopolitical scene. By all
indications, the crisis in Georgia
is unlikely to end anytime soon.
Even if Russian forces withdraw
to negotiated positions, there is
every prospect for a sustained
Russian political and security
presence in the country. Under
these conditions, Ankara will
once again face Russian power
directly on its borders. In the
near-term, Turkey will face dif-
ficult policy choices in reconciling
the country’s Russian and West-
ern interests. Even more difficult
dilemmas are on the horizon as
a more competitive relationship
with Russia looms, and NATO
is compelled to rethink its own
strategy and posture.
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Policy Dilemmas
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser*
WASHINGTON — Turks are fond of
saying that they live in a “dangerous
neighborhood.” The Russian invasion
of Georgia is a stark reminder of the
unsettled nature of the Turkish geopo-
litical scene. By all indications, the crisis
in Georgia is unlikely to end anytime
soon. Even if Russian forces withdraw
to negotiated positions, there is every
prospect for a sustained Russian politi-
cal and security presence in the country.
Under these conditions, Ankara will
once again face Russian power directly
on its borders. In the near-term, Turkey
will face difficult policy choices in
reconciling the country’s Russian and
Western interests. Even more difficult
dilemmas are on the horizon as a more
competitive relationship with Rus-
sia looms, and NATO is compelled to
rethink its own strategy and posture.
An Inconvenient Intervention
Turkey has lived for centuries with
the reality of Russian power. For late
Ottoman Turkey, the competition with
Russia was a defining strategic chal-
lenge, and a key factor shaping relations
with Europe. For Republican Turkey
after 1945, the containment of Soviet
power played an equally central role in
defining foreign policy priorities, not
least the core strategic partnerships
with NATO and the United States. Seen
in these terms, the rapid expansion of
Turkish-Russian economic and political
*
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
relations over the last decade seems a
striking departure from historic pat-
terns. Have burgeoning energy trade,
investment, and tourism replaced
geopolitics and the assertion of “hard
power” in Russian-Turkish relations?
After years of rapid economic growth
and weak security challenges from
across the Black Sea, many Turks have
been inclined to think along these post-
modern lines. As relations with Wash-
ington and Brussels have cooled, some
Turkish strategists have even begun to
consider the possibility of alternative
strategic alignments in Eurasia, and
above all with Russia. The Georgian
crisis will place this emerging Turkish
debate in starker relief.
The crisis has already posed difficult
choices for Ankara. After some initial
hesitation, Ankara agreed to the pas-
sage of American naval vessels through
the Turkish Straits for the purpose of
humanitarian relief. Washington is
inclined to chafe at Turkey’s cautious
and legalistic approach, but this is
very much in line with the country’s
traditional sovereignty concerns and a
commitment to strict interpretation of
the regime governing passage through
the Straits. The bigger concerns are
political and logistical. Against a back-
ground of mixed European reaction to
Russian behavior, Turkish ambivalence
could be a troubling harbinger of trans-
Analysis
atlantic disputes to come. In theory, Turkey’s proximity to the
crisis and desire to play a larger diplomatic role in the Black Sea
could make Turkey a lynchpin of NATO strategy in Georgia,
especially if rapprochement with Armenia is part of the equa-
tion. But Turkish willingness to place its territory at the service
of Western policy in Georgia is highly uncertain. The issue
could arise sooner rather than later. A large-scale economic
and humanitarian assistance program for Georgia is virtually
inevitable, and Turkey would be a natural partner for U.S. and
European efforts. The United States and at least some NATO
allies may go further and opt for significant military assistance
to bolster what remains of Georgian independence, increase
the country’s capacity for territorial defense, and raise the costs
of renewed Russian military operations. All of this will be
much more difficult without Turkish political and logistical
support.
Old Adversary, New Front Line
In the near-term, Turks are likely to take a dim view of more
assertive and confrontational strategies toward Moscow, and
Turkey has much to lose from a new Western strategy of
isolation and containment affecting relations with its largest
trading partner. Over the longer-term, Turkey could well find
itself at the center of a new Western strategic competition
with Russia, a competition that will go beyond the Caucasus
and the Black Sea to affect the strategic environment from
the Mediterranean to the Middle East. Within NATO, Turkey
is already most exposed to the proliferation of longer-range
missiles, potentially coupled with nuclear warheads. In this
context, Russian sales of military hardware to Syria, including
ballistic missiles and more capable air defense systems, will
not be welcomed by Turkish planners. A decade ago, Turkish
strategists worried about the sale of Russian S-300 surface-
to-air missiles to Cyprus. Today, they will need to consider
the far more troubling prospect of a renewed Russian naval
presence in the eastern Mediterranean, reportedly including
access to the naval base at Tarsus in Syria.
On Iran, Turkey has been among the “engagers,” and Turk-
ish-Iranian diplomacy has become more active under the
AKP government. The recent and highly controversial visit
of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to Istanbul is
the latest example of a Turkish policy that seeks to balance
Western ties with closer relations to Eurasia and the Middle
East. Turkish-Iranian relations may be stable, with some key
points of convergence on the Kurdish issue and other matters.
But Turkish security would be strongly affected by the emer-
2
gence of a nuclear-armed Iran or a military confrontation over
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Deeper Russian-Western friction
would further dim the prospects for a diplomatic solution to
a nuclear crisis with Tehran in which Ankara is a significant
stakeholder.
End of an “All-Azimuths” Foreign Policy?
Across a range of issues, Turkey’s ability to conduct a foreign
policy based on breadth rather than depth—engaging diverse
partners with conflicting interests simultaneously—would be
severely constrained by more overt competition between Russia
and the West. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has had the
luxury of not having to choose between the country’s West-
ern and Eurasian interests. The looming NATO debate over
its strategic concept and the future balance between Article V
commitments and new missions will be especially relevant, and
especially difficult for Ankara. Turkey’s NATO traditionalists
may be heartened by a return to the core business of the alli-
ance, the defense of members’ territory and the reaffirmation of
alliance security guarantees, both nuclear and conventional. But
the implementation of this strategy in Turkey’s neighborhood
would imply a more assertive posture vis-a-vis Moscow, closer
defense cooperation with Washington and Brussels, and possi-
bly more uncomfortable ties with Arab and Muslim neighbors.
None of these things will be popular with the Turkish public, or
with a Turkish government accustomed to greater freedom of
action in international affairs.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was a public policy scholar
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr. Lesser
is also president of Mediterranean Advisors, LLC, a consultancy
specializing in geopolitical risk.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpar-
tisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated
to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North
America and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on
the 25th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides
of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF
has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade,
Ankara, and Bucharest.