Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Kant and the Question "Is Existence a Predicate?"

Author(s): J. William Forgie
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec., 1975), pp. 563-582
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume V, Number 4, December 1975

Kant And The Question

"Is Existence A Predicate?"

J. WILLIAM FORGIE, University of California, Santa Barbara

Kant gave a two-fold answer to the question, Is existence a

predicate?'. His view that existence is not a first-level predicate, i.e., a
predicate of objects like horses, stones, and you and me, is widely
known. What is not so well-known, however, is his claim that existence
is a second-level predicate, a predicate of concepts or of a collection
of predicates. In this paper I hope to show why his arguments for both
claims are unsuccessful.

Kant's arguments that existence is not a first-level predicate

antedate the first Critique. (Hereafter when the word 'predicate' is
used without qualification it will mean "first-level" predicate.) To my
knowledge the earliest such arguments appear in the following
passage from the 1763 essay, "Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu
einer Demonstration des Daseins Cottes" (hereafter "Beweisgrund").
Existence is not a predicate or determination of anything whatsoever. ... Take any
subject you like, for example Julius Caesar. Combine in it all its conceivable
predicates (not excepting those of time and place). You will then see that, with all
these determinations, it may or may not exist. The being which gave existence to the
world and to this hero was able to recognize all these predicates - not a single one
excluded - and could still regard him as a merely possible thing which, save for His
decree, did not exist. Who can deny that millions of things that really do not exist
are, with all the predicates they would contain if they existed, merely possible; that
in the conception which the highest being has of them, not one of these predicates
is lacking, although existence is not among them. For He knows them only as possi-
ble things. Therefore, it cannot occur that if they exist they contain one more
predicate; for in the possibility of a thing according to its complete determination,

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). William Forgie

no predicate whatsoever can be missing. And if it had so pleased God to create

another series of things, another world, then it would have existed with all the
determinations, and nothing more, which He discerned in it, although it is only
merely possible.1

Kant often speaks of some individual's concept of an individual

thing. Here, for example, he speaks of the concepts2 God has of
"millions" of individual things which do not exist. Kant speaks also of
the predicates that are "in" God's concept of a thing. He invites us to
"combine in [a thing]" various predicates. And in a passage we shall
consider shortly, he speaks of the predicates by which we "think" a
thing. I shall take these several ways of speaking to come to the same
thing. I shall assume that any one of these idioms can be used when we
want to talk about the predicates one conceives a thing to have. Sup-
pose that, prior to creation, God has a concept of Caesar and that he
conceives Caesar to be white and to be intelligent. That is, God's con-
cept of Caesar is a concept of a being having the predicates "being
white" and "being intelligent." We can then say that those two
predicates are "in" God's concept of Caesar, that they are two of the
predicates by which God "thinks" Caesar, or that they are two of the
predicates which God has "combined" in Caesar when conceiving
him.
While speaking of the "millions" of things of which God has con-
cepts, but which do not exist, Kant says that every predicate each such
individual would have if It were to exist is in God's concept of it. Let us
say that any such concept, whether God's or anyone else's, is

1 "Beweisgrund" can be found in Kant's Werke, ed. by E. Cassirer (Berlin, 1922),

vol. II, pp. 67-172. This particular passage occurs on p. 76. Translations from this
essay are mine.
2 In this paper all translations from Kant's writings render 'Vorstellung' as
'conception' and 'Begriff as 'concept'. In the body, however, I will make no dis-
tinction between the two, speaking at all times in terms of concepts. This will
avoid unnecessary complexity, for so far as I can see, when he discusses the
question whether existence is a predicate, Kant puts no special weight at all on
the word 'Vorstellung'. For example, one of the arguments to be found in this
passage from "Beweisgrund" is stated using 'Vorstellung'. Yet in the first Criti-
que, as we shall see, essentially the same sort of argument, involving the same
sort of considerations, is stated using 'Begriff'. Also see the second paragraph of
section III below. In the last passage quoted there, Kant apparently uses
'Vorstellung' and 'Begriff indifferently.

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 Kant and "Is Existence a Predicate?"

"complete."3 If the thing of which we have such a concept actually ex-

ists then, of course, every predicate that thing actually has is in our
concept of it.
Finally, let us employ the notion of the "object" of a concept. If
God has a concept of Caesar then the object of His concept is Caesar. If
God conceives Caesar to be white, i.e., if God's concept is a concept of
something white, then the object of God's concept, Caesar, has the
predicate "being white." If the object of one's concept could exist, let
us say that that object is a "possible" being. (I will assume throughout
that we are dealing with concepts of things which, if they do not exist,
at least could exist.) If one's concept is instantiated4 let us say that its
object is an "actual" being; if it is not instantiated, we will say that its
object is a "merely possible" being.
It seems possible to find two somewhat different arguments in this
passage from "Beweisgrund." The first can be developed as follows.
Kant tells us that God (the "highest being") has concepts of "millions
of things" which do not exist. Each of God's concepts is complete (". . .
in the conception which the highest being has of them, not one of
these predicates [i.e., those they would have if they existed] is lacking .
. ."). I take Kant's mention of God here to be a rhetorical device used to
make the point that it is possible to have a complete concept of
something which is merely possible. Now Kant tells us that, although
God's concepts are complete, existence is not one of the predicates in-
cluded in any of those concepts (". . . existence is not among them . .
."). The reason existence is not included is that God knows these things
only as possible things ("For He knows them only as possible things").
The suggestion appears to be that if existence were included in God's
concepts, the objects of those concepts would be actual things, and
God would know them as actual things. Thus Kant appears here to be
making the claim that existence cannot be in a concept of a merely
possible being. Now if God's concepts of these merely possible beings
are complete, and if existence cannot be in a concept of a merely
possible being, it follows that if one of those beings were later to exist,
existence would not be one of its predicates ("Therefore, it cannot oc-

3 In talking about God's pre-creation concept of Caesar, Kant indicates that

predicates "of time and place" may be in such a concept. Presumably, then, in a
complete concept of an individual we will find such predicates as "weighing 70
pounds at t|,""weighing180 pounds at t.3," and "living in Rome at t^"

4 I shall assume that concepts are instantiated only by things which exist.

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J. William Forgie

cur that if they exist they contain one more predicate . . ."). We can set
out this argument as follows:

Argument A:
(1) It is possible to have a complete concept of a merely possible
being, N;
(2) Existence cannot be included in a concept of a merely possible
being;
(3) Therefore, if N were to exist, existence would not be one of its
predicates.

It may be possible to extract a second argument from this passage.

If God has complete concepts of beings which do not exist, then the
objects of such concepts, although they are merely possible beings,
have every predicate they would have if they were actual beings.
("Who can deny that millions of things that really do not exist are, with
all the predicates they would contain if they existed, merely possible;
that in the conception which the highest being has of them, not one of
these predicates is lacking . . ."). If once again we take the mention of
God to be rhetorical, then we can see Kant as making the claim that
there can be concepts whose objects have every predicate they would
have if they were actual beings, but which are nevertheless merely
- i.e.,
possible beings they do not have existence.5 Now if the object
of such a concept were later to come into existence, existence would
not be one of its predicates ("Therefore, it cannot occur that if they ex-
ist they contain one more predicate; for in the possibility of a thing ac-
cording to its complete determination, no predicate whatsoever can
be missing"). Let us set out this argument as follows:

Argument B:
(1) It is possible to have a complete concept of a merely possible
being, N;

5 Some commentators have taken Kant's arguments that existence is not a

predicate to rest on the claim that a thing must exist in order to have any
predicates at all, i.e., that existence is a necessary condition for having
predicates. See, for example, Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological
Arguments/' in Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), p. 144; and
Jonathan Barnes, The Ontological Argument (London, 1972), p. 46. But Kant's
talk here of merely possible beings having predicates would indicate that that
interpretation is mistaken.

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 Kant and Is Existence a Predicate?

(2) If so, the object of such a concept, N, would have every

predicate it would have were it an actual being, but (since it is a
merely possible being) it would not have existence;
(3) Therefore, if N were to exist, existence would not be one of its
predicates.

Consider now the following two passages from the first Critique:
(A) ... the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real thalers do
not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter
signify the concept, and the former the object and the positing of the object, should
the former contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express
the whole object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My finan-
cial position is, however, affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is
by the mere concept of them (that is, of their possibility). For the object, as it actually
exists, is not analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept
(which is a determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred
thalers are not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence
outside my concept.6

-
(B) By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing even if we
-
completely determine it we do not make the least addition to the thing when we
further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing
that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept; and we could
not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists. (B628)

Since these passages are frequently cited as containing, or at least

suggesting, arguments that existence is not a property, it will be impor-
tant to understand them as clearly as we can. But I do not believe that
we will find here anything very different from what we have found in
"Beweisgrund." So far as I can see, if these passages suggest any argu-
ment at all, they suggest the very same argument, and one that is mere-
ly a more general version of argument A.
Consider passage A. Kant here contrasts one hundred real and one
hundred possible thalers. Suppose there are now one hundred thalers
lying in a pile on my desk. Let these serve as the hundred real thalers.
What will serve as the hundred possible thalers? Kant says of the hun-
dred possible thalers that they "signify the concept." And a bit later he
describes the contrast between one hundred real and one hundred
possible thalers as one between one hundred real thalers and "the
mere concept of them." Accordingly, I will take Kant's concern with
one hundred possible thalers and what they "contain" to be an in-

6 Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1958), B627.

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/. William Forgie

stance of the concern, which we have already noted, with one's con-
- in this
cept of a thing and the predicates included "in" that concept
case a concern with my concept of the hundred real thalers on my
desk and the predicates7 included in that concept.
Passage A appears to contain a reductio. A certain supposition, viz.,
that the thalers on my desk "contain more" than my concept of them,
is rejected because it leads to an absurdity, viz., that my concept would
not "express the whole object" and so would not be an "adequate"
concept of it. Presumably an "adequate" concept is one which "ex-
presses" the "whole" object. Now I do not know what it wou Id be for a
concept to express the whole object unless that means that that con-
cept is a complete one. In the present case, my concept of the hundred
real thalers would express the whole hundred real thalers if, and only
if, every predicate of the hundred real thalers were included in my
concept of them.
But here there is a problem in interpreting Kant. For he appears to
be arguing as follows:

(1) If the hundred real thalers have more predicates than are in-
cluded in my concept of them, then my concept of them will fail to
"express the whole" hundred real thalers, i.e., my concept will not
be complete;

(2) But this is absurd;

(3) Therefore, the hundred real thalers do not have more

predicates than are included in my concept of them.

7 Kant's claim that the hundred real thalers "do not contain the least coin more"
than the hundred possible thalers may misleadingly suggest that he is interested
only in comparing the number of coins of the real and the possible thalers. But I
take him merely to be mentioning an example of a respect in which one hun-
dred real and one hundred possible thalers are alike. For passage II begins with
the claim that "the real contains no more than the merely possible." And this
seems to commit Kant not just to the view that one hundred real and one hun-
dred possible thalers contain the same number of coins (or that they each have
the predicate "containing one hundred coins" or "being one hundred in
number"). It seems to commit him also to the view that any predicate "con-
tained" by the real thalers is also contained by the possible thalers. Of course,
just how this enters into his argument remains to be seen.

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 Kant and "Is Existence a Predicate?"

Yet the argument will be most implausible if we hear (1) as:

(1a) If the hundred real thalers have more predicates than are, as
a matter of fact, included in my concept of them then my concept
of them will, as a matter of fact, not be complete.

For then (2) will be false: there is nothing absurd in the suggestion that
my concept of the hundred real thalers happens, as a matter of fact,
not to be complete. Probably all my concepts of individuals (or sets of
individuals) fail to be complete. In order to give Kant's argument more
plausibility we should not hear (1) in the sense of (1a). Perhaps the
most plausible argument emerges when we take (1) as :

(1b) If the hundred real thalers contain more predicates than

could, as a matter of principle, be included in my concept of them,
then my concept of them must, in principle, fail to be complete.

Now (2) may not be so implausible. It amounts to the claim, not that
any concept of the hundred real thalers is a complete one, but only
that it is possible to have a complete concept of the hundred real
thalers.
But even if we take (1) in the sense of (1b), the reductio argument
allows us to conclude only that the hundred real thalers do not have
any predicate that could not be included in a concept of them. Such a
conclusion would be an instance of the general claim that no real ob-
ject has any predicate that could not be included in a concept of it. But
that claim could be used to show that existence is not a predicate of
any real object only if we make the additional assumption that ex-
istence cannot be included in any concept of a thing. Perhaps Kant is
expressing this additional assumption when he says that "the object, as
it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept/' But
however we understand those words, it is clear that this additional
assumption must be made. The reductio argument, by itself, will not
show that existence is not a predicate.
In passage B we have another reductio argument. We are asked to
form a concept of a thing, N. Now suppose we say "N is" or"N exists."
Are we claiming that N has some predicate (presumably existence) ad-
ditional to those predicates included in our concept? Kant's answer is
"no." Existence is not a predicate of the actual N additional to those
predicates included in our concept. To suppose otherwise leads to an
absurdity. For if existence were a predicate of the actual N additional

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J. William Forgie

to those predicates included in our concept, then the thing that exists,
N itself, would have a predicate not included in our concept, and we
could not truly say that the actual N has just exactly those predicates -
and no more - included in our concept. Kant evidently regards this
consequence as absurd. We must therefore reject the supposition that
led to it, viz., that existence is a predicate of the actual N additional to
those predicates included in our concept.
Now there is a problem of interpretation here, just like the one in
the "thalers" passage. For Kant appears to be arguing as follows:

(1) If existence were a predicate of the actual N additional to

those predicates included in our concept of N, then we could not
- and no
truly say that the actual N has just exactly those predicates
more - included in our concept;

(2) But this is absurd;

(3) Therefore, existence is not a predicate of the actual N ad-
ditional to those predicates included in our concept of N.

This argument will be implausible if we hear (1) as:

(la) If existence were a predicate of the actual N additional to

those predicates which are, as a matter of fact, included in our con-
cept of N, then we could not truly say that the actual N has just ex-
actly those predicates - and no more - which happen, as a matter
of fact, to be included in our concept.

If (1) is heard as (1a) then (2) seems false. There is nothing absurd in the
supposition that our concept of N is, as a matter of fact, incomplete,
i.e., that the actual N has more predicates than are included in our
concept of it. Kant's argument will be more plausible if we hear (1) as:

(1b) If existence were a predicate of the actual N additional to

those predicates which could, in principle, be included in our con-
cept of N, then we could in principle never truly say that the actual
N has just exactly those predicates - and no more - which are in-
cluded in our concept.

Now (2) can be heard as a way of saying that it is possible to have a com-
plete concept of N, a concept such that the actual N has just exactly
those predicates - and no more - which are included in our concept.

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 Kant and "/s Existence a Predicate?''

But even if we hear (1) in the sense of (1b), the argument we are
considering will be as inconclusive as the reductio argument in the
"thalers" passage. For the conclusion of this present argument will
only be that existence is not a predicate of any being additional to
those predicates which could in principle be included in a concept of
that being. But from this it follows only that if existence is a predicate of
some being it could in principle be included in a concept of it. And
that claim cannot be used to show that existence is not a predicate of
any being unless we make the additional assumption that existence
cannot be included in any concept of a thing.
Kant's famous claim, "the real contains no more than the merely
possible/' his suggestion that we can say that the exact object of our
concept exists, and his rejection of the idea that perhaps my concept
of a thing fails to "express the whole object/' will all seem wrong if we
hear them as various ways of claiming that all our concepts are, as a
matter of fact, complete ones. I have been suggesting that we perhaps
hear them instead as ways of claiming that it is possible to have a com-
plete concept of any being. But even this claim, by itself, will not entail
that existence is not a predicate. To get that conclusion we must make
the additional assumption that existence cannot be in any concept of a
thing.
Thus if we interpret the reductio arguments in the two passages
from the first Critique as charitably as possible, and if we conjoin the
conclusions of those arguments with the assumption that existence
cannot be in any concept of a thing, we can perhaps attribute to Kant
the following argument that existence is not a predicate:

Argument C:
(1) It is possible to have a complete concept of a thing, N;
(2) Existence cannot be in any concept of a thing;
(3) Therefore, if N exists, existence is not one of its predicates.

It will be seen that argument C is merely a more general version of

argument A (or, put differently, that argument A is a special instance of
argument C).
We have outlined three arguments for the claim that existence is
not a predicate. Each of those arguments seems to proceed from what
we may call the "Doctrine of Isomorphism" (Dl). This is the view that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between: (a) the predicates of
an actual being, N; (b) the predicates that could be included in a con-
cept of N (when N is actual, or at a time when N is merely possible);

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). William Forgie

and (c) the predicates that could be possessed by the object of a con-
cept of N when that object is a merely possible being. The supposition
that existence is a predicate is rejected because it ultimately leads to
conflict with Dl. To show that there is such a conflict, Kant employs
certain assumptions about existence, viz., (1) that existence cannot be
included in the concept of a merely possible being; (2) that existence
cannot be possessed by the merely possible object of a concept; and
(3) that existence cannot be included in any concept of a thing. In
argument A the conclusion that existence is not a predicate follows
from (1) together with parts (a) and (b) of Dl. In argument B that con-
clusion follows from (2) together with parts (a) and (c) of Dl. And in
argument C the same conclusion is entailed by (3) together with parts
(a) and (b) of Dl.
Let us take an example of something we would unquestionably
regard as a predicate of a thing, say "being white." If Kant's arguments
are to succeed, we ought not to be able to use the same sorts of
arguments to show that "being white" is not a predicate. But we will be
able to use them in this way unless at least one of the three assump-
tions just mentioned serves to distinguish existence from "being
white." Thus it seems clear, for example, that argument A will not be
successful unless it is true that:

(P1) "being white" can, but existence cannot, be in a concept of a

merely possible being.

And argument B will succeed only if:

(P2) "being white" can, while existence cannot, belong to the ob-
ject of a concept when that object is a merely possible being.

Finally, argument C will not be successful unless:

(P3) "being white" can, but existence cannot, be included in a

concept of a thing (whether that thing be actual or merely possi-
ble).

It should be stressed that, although there may well be significant

differences between existence and "being white," not just any such
difference will be helpful to Kant. Since his arguments depend essen-
tially on Dl, only the differences claimed in (P1), (P2), and (P3) are rele-
vant. If those three claims are false it is hard to see how Dl could serve

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 Kant and "Is Existence a Predicate?"

as the ground of an argument that existence (unlike "being white") is

not a predicate.

II

I wish to suggest that insofar as it is plausible to say that "being

white" can be in the concept of a merely possible being, it is also
plausible to say that existence can. If so, then (P1) and (P3) are both
false and arguments A and C are unsuccessful. I will also suggest that
insofar as it is plausible to suppose that "being white" can belong to the
merely possible object of a concept, it is also plausible to suppose that
existence can. Thus (P2) is false, and argument B is unsuccessful. If I am
right, then the attempt to show that existence is not a predicate by
appealing to the Doctrine of Isomorphism is misguided.
So far we have been understanding the notion of a predicate's be-
ing "in" a concept in this sense (let us call it the "weak" sense): to say
that "being white," for example, is in God's pre-creation concept of
Caesar is to say that God conceives Caesar to be white. Let us say that
there exists an instance of one's concept of N if, and only if, there exists
something having each of the predicates one conceives N to have.
Then if "being white" is in God's concept of Caesar, being white is a
necessary condition anything must meet if it is to be an instance of
God's concept. Now there is no problem in supposing that "being
white" can, in this sense, be in a concept of a merely possible being.
For to suppose that being white is a necessary condition for anything's
being an instance of God's concept of Caesar is not to suppose that
there is an instance of that concept. For it might be that there exists
nothing meeting that necessary condition. And even if there do exist
things satisfying that condition, it might be that none of them satisfies
all of the other necessary conditions for being an instance of God's
concept.
But in the sense we are currently considering there is also no
problem in supposing that existence can be in a concept of a merely
possible being. Suppose that in God's concept of Caesar are the
predicates P-|,P2> ...Pnandexistence.Thiscommitsusonlytosupposing
that there are several necessary conditions any being must meet in
order to be an instance of that concept - it must exist and it must have
properties Pi,P2> ... Pn- Now although existence is in God's concept it
might be that nothing which meets that condition meets all the other
conditions necessary for being an instance of that concept. It might be,

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]. William Forgie

in other words, that nothing which exists has the predicates P-pP2> -
Pn, i.e., that God's concept has no instance.8
It is implausible, however, to suppose that, for Kant, the question
of whether existence canbe"in"thisorthatsortofconcept,orwhether
it can be in any concept at all, is to be understood in the sense just dis-
cussed. I believe he understands these matters in quite a different way.
Kant many times makes a claim that we might put as follows: no matter
how rich our concept of a thing, no matter what predicates are, in the
weak sense, included in that concept, nothing so included can insure
or guarantee that its object exists or is an actual being:
In whatever manner the understanding may have arrived at a concept, the ex-
istence of its object is never, by any process of analysis, discoverable within it; for
the knowledge of the existence of the object consists precisely in the fact that the
object is posited in itself, beyond the [mere] thought of it. (B667)

Whatever, therefore, and however much our concept of an object may contain,
we must go outside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object. (B629)

Even when the concept of a thing is quite complete, I can still inquire whether
this object is merely possible, or is also actual .... (B266)9

Kant puts this claim in other ways. He says that no "mark" of the ex-
istence of the object can be found in the concept of it:
In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its existence is to be found. For though
it may be so complete that nothing which is required for thinking the thing with all
its inner determinations is lacking to it, yet existence has nothing to do with all this,
but only with the question whether such a thing be so given us that the perception
of it can, if need be, precede the concept. (B272)

And he also puts the claim by saying that existence is never one of the
predicates included in a concept of a thing. In "Beweisgrund," for ex-
ample, he warns that one should not:
... attempt to derive existence from merely possible concepts, as one is ac-
customed to doing when attempting to prove absolutely necessary existence. For
one would then be looking in vain among the predicates of such a possible being -
existence cannot be found among them. (p. 76)

8 This kind of argument was used by Aquinas and by Caterus in attacking versions
of the ontological argument. It has recently been given forceful expression by
Jerome Shaffer in "Existence, Predication and the Ontological Argument,"
Mind, vol. LXXI(1962), pp. 307-325.

9 "
Perhaps we can also include here the remark in the "thalers" passage: ... the
object as it actually exists, is not analytically contained in my concept... ."

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 Kant and Is Existence a Predicate?

Let us say that <t>is in a concept in the "strong" sense just in case
something which is in that concept, in the weak sense, insures that its
object has <i>. I am going to assume that Kant holds that existence can
never be included in the concept of a thing and that he means this in
the strong sense. He means that nothing which is weakly included in
the concept of a thing can insure that its object exists, that it is an actual
being.10 It will then be trivially true that existence cannot be in the con-
cept of a merely possible being. If, for example, something weakly in-
cluded in God's concept of Caesar insured that Caesar was an actual
being, then God's concept would not be a concept of a merely possi-
ble being.
But now what about the claim that "being white" can, but ex-
istence cannot, be in a concept of a merely possible being? If this claim
is to reveal a difference between "being white" and existence, then
the sense in which "being white" can be in such a concept should be
the same as that in which existence cannot. So far, however, it seems
that, in the weak sense, both "being white" and existence can be in a
concept of a merely possible being. But in the strong sense existence
cannot be in such a concept. Can it be shown that "being white"
differs from existence precisely in this, that it, unlike existence, can in
the strong sense, be in a concept of a merely possible being?
I do not believe this can be shown. So far as I can see, the following
is the most likely way in which one might be led to think that it can:
"Suppose that prior to creation God has a concept of Caesar. The ob-
- it is a
ject of this concept is not yet an actual being merely possible
being. Obviously then, nothing which God weakly includes in His
concept of Caesar insures that the object of that concept actually ex-
ists. God can even weakly include existence in that concept and Caesar
will still be a merely possible being. So existence cannot, in the strong
sense, be in God's concept. But "being white" can. For suppose God
conceives Caesar to be white. Then something which is weakly includ-
ed in God's concept, namely the predicate "being white," insures that

10 Here I am taking issue with an assumption shared by Plantinga and Coburn in

their recent exchange on Kant. (See Alvin Plantinga, "Kant's Objection to the
Ontological Argument/' The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXIII(1966), pp. 537-
546; and Robert C. Coburn, "Animadversions on Plantinga's Kant/' Ratio, vol.
XIII(1971), pp. 19-29.) Plantinga interprets Kant as holding that existence can be
included in a concept of a thing. Coburn, after suggesting that this is precisely
what Kant denies, goes on to argue that Kant was wrong to deny it. Both com-
mentators assume - I believe wrongly - that Kant understands the expression
'existence is in such-and-such concept' in what I have called the weak sense.

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y. William Forgie

the object of that concept is white. For if God conceives Caesar to be

white it follows that God's concept is a concept of something white,
i.e., that the object of that concept is white. So, in general, if N is a
merely possible being, we can weakly include in our concept of N
something which insures that its object is white (that our concept is a
concept of something white), but nothing which insures that its object
actually exists (that our concept is a concept of an actual being)/'
There is surely a confusion here, one which comes from running
together two quite different ways of talking about the object of a con-
cept, about what a concept is a concept of. Suppose I have a concept of
N. If I say 'N is <t>'and my saying so is grounded in the fact that I con-
ceive N to have <t>,let us say that I am making an intentional claim
about the object of my concept. I can make these intentional claims
even if my concept has no instance. But if my concept does have an in-
stance, I might point to, or in some other way single out, that instance
and say "That's N; That's what my concept is a concept of" Now if I say
'N is <j>, and I do so, not because I conceive N to have <I> , but because
by normal empirical investigation (or by whatever method is ap-
propriate for making claims about the instance of that concept) I note
that N actually does have <t> , let us say that I am making an extensional
claim about the object of my concept.
If "being white" is weakly included in God's pre-creation concept
of Caesar it does indeed follow - and so we can say that it is insured in,
or guaranteed in, the concept - that its object is white. That is, it
follows that 'Caesar is white' is a true intentional statement. This is
what is right about the claim that "being white" can, in the strong
sense, be in God's concept of the merely possible Caesar. But the claim
that existence cannot be in God's concept, in the strong sense, is the
claim that nothing weakly included in that concept can insure that
'Caesar exists' is a true extensional statement.
So to suggest that, in the strong sense, "being white" can, but ex-
istence cannot, be in a concept of a merely possible being is at best a
misleading way of pointing out that if N is merely possible then
something weakly included in a concept of N can insure that the inten-
tional claim 'N is white' is true but nothing so included in that concept
can insure that the extensional claim 'N exists' is true. It is misleading
because it suggests that there is a significant ontological difference
between "being white" and existence. But no such difference has
been revealed. If N is a merely possible being, then nothing weakly in-
cluded in a concept of N can insure the truth either of the extensional
claim 'N exists' or, a fortiori, of the extensional claim 'N is white'. And

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 Kant and "Is Existence a Predicate?"

since both "being white" and existence can be weakly included in a

concept of a merely possible being, their being so included in a con-
cept of N would insure that the intentional claim 'N is white' and the
intentional claim 'N exists7 are both true. (Of course, to suppose that
the intentional claim 'N exists' is true does not conflict with the
assumption that N is. a merely possible being. That assumption only
precludes the possibility that 'N exists' is a true extensional claim.)
I am unable to find a univocal sense for the expression 'in a con-
cept' in which it is true that "being white" can, but existence cannot,
be in a concept of a merely possible being. In what we have been call-
ing the weak sense of that expression, both "being white" and ex-
istence can be in such a concept. And only if one confuses intentional
and extensional claims about the object of a concept will it seem that
"being white" can, while existence cannot, be in such a concept in
what we have called the strong sense. It seems to me, then, that (P1),
and therefore (P3), are both false. Consequently arguments A and C
are both unsuccessful.
It must be stressed that arguments A and C depend on the claim
that existence cannot be in this or that concept at all. Thus the follow-
ing kind of consideration will not provide a relevant defense of those
arguments. "Suppose that predicates P-] ... Pn are weakly included in
concept C and that P-| ... Pn and existence are weakly included in con-
cept C. Now a thing must exist in order to be an instance of any con-
cept. So although existence is included in C, it is included only
vacuously. That is, a thing must qneet no more conditions to be an in-
stance of C than it must meet to be an instance of C. But if P-\ ... Pn and
"being white" are weakly included in concept C2, a thing must meet
one more condition to be an instance of C2 than it must meet to be an
instance of C." This argument may point to a significant difference
between existence and "being white." (It is this difference that is
reflected in the claim - assumed two paragraphs back - that if 'N ex-
ists' is not a true extensional claim then, a fortiori, neither is 'N is
white'.) But it is of no help to Kant. For at best it shows that existence,
unlike "being white," cannot be weakly and non-vacuously included
in a concept, not that it cannot be weakly included at all.11

11 Of course one might try to argue that: (a) it is possible to have a concept of N
such that every predicate N would have were it to exist is weakly and non-
vacuously included in that concept; (b) existence cannot be weakly and non-
vacuously included in any concept; (c) therefore, if N exists, existence is not one
of its predicates. Leaving aside the question of how (a) might be defended, I can-
not find this kind of argument in Kant.

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/. William Forgie

What about (P2), the claim that "being white" can, but existence
cannot, belong to an object of a concept when that object is a merely
possible being? Again, this claim will appear plausible only if we con-
fuse intentional and extensional claims about the object of a concept.
If, prior to creation, God has a concept of Caesar, then the object of
God's concept, namely Caesar, is a merely possible being. (P2) says that
this merely possible being can have the predicate "being white," but
cannot have existence. Now it is trivially true that if the object of God's
concept is a merely possible being the extensional claim 'Caesar exists'
is false. But then, a fortiori, the extensional claim 'Caesar is white' is
also false. So if we are speaking extensionally, the merely possible ob-
ject of God's concept neither exists nor is white. On the other hand, if
we speak intentionally, there seems no problem in allowing that the
object of God's concept can both exist and be white. For since "being
white" and existence can be weakly included in God's concept of
Caesar, the intentional claims 'Caesar is white' and 'Caesar exists'
could both be true. Since I am unable to see any univocal way in which
"being white" can, while existence cannot, belong to the merely
possible object of a concept, it seems to me that (P2) is false and argu-
ment B therefore unsuccessful.
Summary of sections I and II. Kant's arguments that existence is not
a predicate are grounded in the Doctrine of Isomorphism. Those
arguments will be successful only if existence differs from "being
white" in one of the ways claimed in (P1), (P2), or (P3). But if we
are careful to distinguish intentional and extensional claims about the
object of a concept, we will see that (P1), (P2) and (P3) are false. It
would appear, then, that even if the Doctrine of Isomorphism is
sound, the attempt to use that doctrine to show that existence is not a
predicate is misguided.

Ill

If one denies that existence is a (first-level) predicate he will of

course also deny that when we make (extensional) assertions of the
form 'N exists' we are asserting that some entity, N, has a first-level
predicate of existence. He may then feel obliged to say what it is we are
doing in making such assertions. One tempting type of answer is that
we are ascribing a second-level predicate to our concept of N or to the
predicates included (in the weak sense) in that concept; we are saying
that our concept of N is instantiated, or that the predicates in that con-

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 Kant and "Is Existence a Predicate?"

cept collectively belong to something in the world. And if one thinks

that assertions of existence are really assertions in which we ascribe a
second-level predicate to something, it might seem plausible to con-
clude that existence is therefore a second-level predicate.
Consider now the following two passages from "Beweisgrund":

If I say, 'God is an existing thing', it appears that I express the relation of a

predicate to a subject. But there is an incorrectness in this expression. Expressed ex-
actly, it should say: something existing is God, that is, those predicates that we
designate collectively by the expression 'God' belong to an existing thing, (p. 78-79)

... [existence] appears in common usage as a predicate, not so much as a

predicate of the thing itself, as it is of the thought one has of it. E.g. existence
belongs to the sea-unicorn but not to the land-unicorn. This is to say nothing more
than: the conception of the sea-unicorn is a concept of experience, that is, the con-
ception of an existing thing . . . Not: regular hexagons exist in nature, but: the
predicates which are thought together in a hexagon belong to certain things in
nature, (p. 76-77).

In the first of these passages Kant is claiming that when we say 'God is
an existing thing' or just 'God exists', the grammatical structure of the
sentences we utter makes it look as though we are ascribing the
predicate, "being an existing thing/' or the predicate of existence, to
God. But this, he claims, is not correct. What we are actually doing is
ascribing the predicate, "belonging to an existing thing," to the
predicates of divinity; we are saying, that is, not that God has a
predicate of existence, but that the predicates of onmipotence, on-
miscience, etc., belong to an existing thing. In short, we are not ascrib-
ing a first-level predicate to God, but rather ascribing the second-level
predicate, "belonging to an existing thing," to some predicates.
This general theme is repeated in the second of the two passages
just quoted. Thus with his hexagon example Kant seems to be making
the claim that when we say "regular hexagons exist in nature" or just
"regular hexagons exist," we are not ascribing a predicate of ex-
istence, or the predicate "existing in nature" to hexagons, but instead
are ascribing a second-level predicate to those predicates weakly in-
cluded in our concept of a hexagon. We are saying that those
predicates "belong to certain things in nature." With the sea-unicorn
example Kant appears to be making a slightly different claim. When
we say "sea-unicorns exist" we are not ascribing a predicate of ex-
istence to sea-unicorns, but are instead ascribing the second-level
predicate, "being a concept of experience," or "being a concept
which applies to an existing thing," to the concept of a sea-unicorn.

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/. William Forgie

These three examples differ in detail. At one time Kant says we

ascribe the predicate, "belonging to certain things in nature/' to a
collection of predicates. At another time he claims we ascribe the
predicate "belong to an existing thing/' to certain predicates. And at
still another time he says we ascribe a different predicate, the
predicate, "being a concept of experience/' not to a collection of
predicates, but to a concept. Nevertheless, despite the difference in
detail, Kant's examples appear to illustrate the same general point,
namely, that in claiming that something exists we are not ascribing a
first-level predicate of existence to some thing but are rather ascribing
a second-level predicate to something, whether it be a concept or a
collection of predicates.
Notice, however, that the second passage begins with a remark in-
dicating that Kant believes existence is a second-level, not a first-level
- it is, he not a of but rather of the
predicate says, predicate things
thoughts we have of things. The structure of that passage indicates it is
this view Kant tries to support when he goes on to claim that in saying
that something exists we are not ascribing a first-level predicate to a
thing but are rather ascribing a second-level predicate to something.
It is interesting that Kant would try to support the claim that ex-
istence is a second-level, not a first-level, predicate, in this way. For this
is essentially the way Frege attempted to support the very same claim.
In the Foundations of Arithmetic Frege claimed that when we say that
something exists we are ascribing the second-level property, "not be-
ing empty," to a concept. He inferred from this that existence is the
second-level property, "not being empty."12 Kant appears to be doing
essentially the same thing. His claim that existence is not a predicate of
- his
things, but of thoughts examples indicate he could say, instead
of "thoughts," "concepts" or "a collection of predicates" - is sup-
ported by the claim that when we say that something exists we are
ascribing a second-level predicate to something (e.g. to a concept or
to a collection of predicates).
The supposition that Kant makes an inference like Frege's may help
explain why he makes the following famous remark:
"Being" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something
which could be added to the concept of a thing. (B626)

12 See Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (New York, 1960), pp. 64-65.
For a discussion of Frege's argument see my "Frege's Objection to the On-
tological Argument/' Nous, vol. VI (1972), pp. 251-265.

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 Kant and "/s Existence a Predicate?"

Kant evidently means here to claim that the concept of existence can-
not be added to the concept of a thing. Yet in supporting this claim,
Kant goes on to make remarks which it is perhaps not altogether im-
plausible to regard as variations of his now familiar theme that when
we say that something exists we are saying of certain predicates that
they belong to some existing thing (i.e., we are ascribing a second-
level predicate to some predicates):
It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in
themselves. ... If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among
which is omnipotence) and say "God is," or "there is a God," we only posit the sub-
ject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands
in relation to my concept. (B626-627)

Why would Kant support the claim that the concept of existence
cannot be added to the concept of a thing by maintaining that in mak-
ing assertions of existence we are ascribing a second-level predicate to
some predicates? We can perhaps provide a plausible answer to this
question by taking our clue from the passages just cited from
"
Beweisgrund" and suggesting that Kant believed it follows from his
account of what we are doing when making assertions of existence
that existence is a second-level predicate. But if the predicate of ex-
istence is of second-level then the concept of existence is a second-
level concept. Since only first-level concepts can be added to the con-
cept of a thing, the concept of existence cannot be added to the con-
cept of a thing.13
I have been suggesting that Kant holds both the following claims:

(a) in making existence assertions we are ascribing a second-level

predicate to a concept or to a collection of predicates;
(b) existence is a second-level predicate.

And I have been suggesting further that Kant appears to take (a) as sup-
porting (b). Now perhaps much of the incentive to hold (a) will be

13 If existence is really a second-level predicate, than it cannot be weakly included

in a concept of a thing. Only first-level predicates can be so included. We will
then have a univocal sense - the weak sense - in which "being white" can,
while existence cannot, be included in a concept of a merely possible being or
of any being at all. The arguments discussed in sections I and II might then be
more plausible than they otherwise appear to be. But if those arguments depend
for their plausibility on the claim that existence is a second-level predicate, then
they are superfluous. For it presumably follows from that claim alone that ex-
istence is not a first-level predicate.

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removed when we see the shortcomings in Kant's arguments that ex-

istence is not a first-level predicate. For if those arguments fail then
perhaps existence is a first-level predicate after all. And if it is, then in
making existence assertions perhaps we are ascribing that first-level
predicate to things. But let us suppose that (a) is true. It is important to
see that it does not follow that existence is anything but a first-level
predicate. One could agree that:

(1) when we assert 'Xs exist' (or N exists) we ascribe to the concept
of an X (or of N), or to the predicates which are included in that
concept, the second-level predicate "being a concept of ex-
perience/' or "belonging to an existing thing."

But he could go on to add:

(2) a concept is a "concept of experience" if, and only if, some

object which has the first-level predicate of existence has all the
predicates which are in that concept (or: the predicates which are
in a concept "belong to an existing thing" if, and only if, some ob-
ject which has the first-level predicate of existence also has all the
predicates in that concept).

Now I know of no reason to suppose that (1) and (2) are inconsistent. If
they are not, Kant has not shown that existence is a second-level
predicate. One can agree with Kant's claim about what we are doing
when we make existence assertions and still maintain that existence is
a first-level predicate.

January 1975

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