LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.

G.R. No. 148339 || February 23, 2005 || CARPIO-MORALES, J.

(Substantive due process:exclusive franchise)
FACTS:
● Petition assailing the Decision of the CA, affirming the RTC ruling which declared Ordinance No. 1778 as VOID, and
Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 as illegal.
● The Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod issued two Ordinances with the aim of localizing the source of traffic
congestion in the city to a single location
○ Ordinance No. 1631: Granting the Lucena Grand Central Terminal (LGCT) an exclusive franchise for a
period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years and stipulates that City Gov’t of Lucena “shall not grant
any third party any privilege or concession to operate a bus/jeepney terminal” (Sec. 4(c))
○ Ordinance No. 1778: Prohibiting all buses and jeepneys from entering the city and directing them to proceed
to the common terminal for pick-up and drop-off of passengers
■ Declaring inoperable all terminals in Lucena City
■ Stipulating that no other terminals shall be situated inside/within Lucena City
■ Establishing LGCT as permanent common terminal, which was given exclusive franchise
■ Directing all other buses/jeepneys must avail of the facilities of LGCT
● JAC Liner assailed the following Ordinances for being unconstitutional
○ RTC declared Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, Sec. 4(c) illegal, Ordinance No. 1778 as void, directing Mayor
and SP of Lucena to cease and desist from implementing Ordinance No. 1778
● RTC denied LGCT’s MR, CA dismissed petition and denied LGCT’s subsequent MR as well

Petitioner’s Contentions (LGCT):

● Ordinances enacted pursuant to SP’s power to “regulate traffic and prohibit encroachments and obstacles on public
roads”
● Since RTC failed to serve copy of assailed orders to Office of the SolGen, it never acquired jurisdiction over the case
● Other solutions for the traffic problem have been tried but proven to be ineffective -- Reasonableness is different from
effectiveness; it is reasonableness, not effectiveness of an ordinance which bears upon its constitutionality
● Previous Ordinance issued (directing bus owners and operators to put up terminals outside Lucena City) only resulted
in relocation of terminals to other well-populated barangays, giving rise to traffic congestion in those areas -- SP could
have defined, in a more precise manner the area of relocation to avoid such

Respondent’s Contentions (JAC Liner):

● Invalid exercise of police power, undue taking of private property, violation of constitutional prohibition against
monopolies
● Objective of Ordinances was to benefit private interest of petitioner by coercing all bus operators to patronize its
terminal -- Court cannot rule on this because examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited

ISSUE/S:
● W/N RTC has jurisdiction over the case -- YES
● W/N City of Lucena, through Ordinances, properly exercised its police power -- NO

HOLDING:
● Petition DISMISSED.

RATIO:
Re: Jurisdiction of RTC
● Nowhere is it stated in the Rules that failure to notify SolGen about the action is a jurisdictional defect
○ It merely states that courts have “discretion” to notify SolGen in matters involving the VALIDITY of an
Ordinance
○ SolGen shall be notified (by the party assailing Ordinance) and entitled to be heard, in cases assailing the
CONSTITUTIONALITY of an Ordinance
● JAC Liner actually served a copy of its petition upon Office of SolGen two days after it was field and SolGen
has issued a Certification to that effect, there was compliance with rules

Proper Exercise of Police Power:

1. Interests of public require interference
2. Means employed are reasonably necessary for attainment of objective, and not unduly oppressive
 ● Ordinances were enacted to relieve traffic congestion, thus involving public interest warranting the
interference of the State (First requisite complied with)
● Ordinances are characterized by overbreadth, they go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem
○ Compulsory use of LGCT would subject users to fees and charges, which is unduly oppressive
○ Declaring inoperable all terminals, that no other terminals shall be situated inside/within Lucena City
is also unduly oppressive
○ Scope of proscription against maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be
able to provide facilities better than LGCT are barred from operation
● SP identified the cause of traffic congestion to be indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers on the streets,
however bus terminals do not impede or help impede flow of traffic
○ If terminals lack adequate space such that drivers are compelled to load and unload on the streets, reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, and regulation come in the form of denial of
permit to operate for failure to meet specifications
● Absent any showing that terminals are encroaching on public roads, terminals are not obstacles nor are they
public nuisances. Even assuming they are nuisances, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se.
○ Operation is a legitimate business, which cannot be injurious to the rights of property, health, or
comfort to community
Nuisance per se - affects immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity (may seek abatement without judicial proceedings, under general welfare clause)
Nuisance per accidens - nuisance only because of the location or other circumstances of the individual case

CITY OF MANILA, et al v. JUDGE LAGUIO, et al

G.R. No. 118127 || April 12, 2005 || TINGA, J.
(sauna, massage parlors, night clubs)
FACTS
● This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the RTC of Manila, which rendered
Ordinance No. 7783 of the City of Manila void and unconstitutional.
● Antecedents:
○ Private Respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.
■ It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
○ 28 June 1993 — MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a WPI and/or TRO with the
lower court against herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza,
and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council)
■ MTDC prayed that the Ordinance prohibiting the establishment or operation of business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita–Malate Area
○ 25 November 1994 — Judge Laguio rendered a decision:
■ Enjoining the petitioners from implementing the Ordinance
■ Declaring the Ordinance null and void
■ Making permanent the WPI
○ Hence, this petition
● Petitioners’ contentions:
○ The Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No.
409, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
○ Judge Laguio rendered a decision curtailing the power of the City Government of Manila to enforce such
ordinance
● Private respondents’ contentions:
○ The Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels
and inns such as MTDC’s Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for “amusement” or
“entertainment” and they were not “services or facilities for entertainment,” nor did they use women as “tools
for entertainment,” and neither did they “disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants” or “adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”
○ The Ordinance is ultra vires and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It further argued that
the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power
○ The Ordinance is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its
lawful business
 ○ The Ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause
○ The Ordinance confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the
Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions

ISSUE/S
● W/N the RTC erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional — NO

HOLDING
● Petition DENIED. RTC Decision AFFIRMED.

RATIO
● The test of a valid ordinance is well-established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements
(CUP-PUG)
○ Must not Contravene the Constitution or any statute
○ Must not be Unfair or oppressive
○ Must not be Partial or discriminatory
○ Must not Prohibit but may regulate trade
○ Must not be Unreasonable
○ Must be General and consistent with public policy
● The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council
acting as agent of Congress.
○ Local government units as agencies of the State are endowed with police power in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
○ The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional
limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good.
○ In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
● The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.
○ Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically, as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of
the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.
○ Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
○ Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his
life, liberty and property.
○ To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
○ It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work.
○ A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
● The object of the Ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community.
○ Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.
● The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have
no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
○ Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution,
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
○ That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal
prostitution is of no moment.
 ○ We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most
innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of
the Ordinance.
○ Besides, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
● It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental
interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s fundamental right to liberty and property.
○ Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives
and still retain their dignity as free persons.
○ The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice.
○ Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law.
○ Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.

WHITE LIGHT CORP., et al v. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 122846 || January 20, 2009 || TINGA, J.
(wash up rates)
FACTS
● On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”.
o The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates
for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
● The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development
Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business
interests as operators.
● The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
● RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution.”
o Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to
needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises.
● Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay.
● When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and
other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
o Also, they contended that under ART III, Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact
all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
● Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and
freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
● CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.
● Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

ISSUE/S
● W/N Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power – NO

HOLDING
● Petition GRANTED. CA Decision REVERSED, RTC Decision REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RATIO
● Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
● The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.
○ Common thread among the decisions and the case at bar:
 ■ All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit
activity in transient lodging establishments.
■ At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the
lives of its citizens
● The test of a valid ordinance is well-established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements
(CUP-PUG)
○ Must not Contravene the Constitution or any statute
○ Must not be Unfair or oppressive
○ Must not be Partial or discriminatory
○ Must not Prohibit but may regulate trade
○ Must not be Unreasonable
○ Must be General and consistent with public policy
● The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as
conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the general
welfare clause.
● Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people.
● The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike.
○ These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State.
○ Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement.
○ Those means must align with the Constitution.
● SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect
only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated
to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.

BAYAN KMP. v. ERMITA

G.R. No. 169838 || April 25, 2006 || AZCUNA, J.
(Substantive due process: no permit, no rally)
FACTS:
● Consolidated petitions of three groups assailing the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 (Public Assembly
Act) and the implementation of such, particularly Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) Policy
○ Bayan KMP: rights as organizations/individuals violated when rally was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing BP 880
○ Del Prado: injured/arrested when a peaceful mass action was preempted and violently dispersed by the
police, march to Malacanang was violently dispersed
○ Kilusang Mayo Uno: rights as organizations/individuals, right to peaceful assembly, affected by BP 880,
rally to be conducted at Mendiola was blocked by police and forcibly dispersed, and arrested
B.P. 880:
● Requires written permit to organize public assembly in a public place, unless it be held in a freedom park
established by law/ordinance, or held in public place (with consent of owner), or campus of gov’t
owned/operated educational institution
● Application for written permit subject to approval of mayor, to be filed at least 5 working days before
scheduled public assembly
● Mayor must cause publication immediately at conspicuous place, and must act on application within 2
working days from application, action to be served on applicant within 24 hours
● In case of denial, applicant may contest such in court, decisions may be appealed after 48 from receipt-- all
cases to be decided within 24 hours
● Public assembly held without a permit deemed to be a violation and subject to imprisonment of 1-6 months
Calibrated Preemptive Response Policy (CPR):
● Highest degree of restraint that the military, police, and other peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal of the same

Petitioners’ Contentions (Bayan, et. al):

● BP 880 violates Constitution and ICCPR and other human rights treaties PH is a signatory
 ○ Requires permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of presence/absence of clear and present
danger, also curtails the venue-- repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
○ Not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government
○ The words “lawful cause” “opinion” suggest exposition of some cause not espoused by the gov’t
○ Curtailment of right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition
for the valid exercise of that right
○ Provisions are not mere regulations but prohibitions
○ Causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble
○ Law delegates powers to the Mayor without clear standards (clear and present danger, and grave danger)
standards in the laws are inconsistent
○ CPR is void for altering the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in BP 880, and is preemptive, gov’t
takes action before rallyist can perform their act

Respondent’s Contention (Exec. Sec. Ermita):

● Petitioners have no standing because they have not presented evidence that they had been “injured/arrested/detained”
because of CPR/BP 880
● BP 880 is:
○ Content neutral (has no reference to content of regulated speech)
○ Narrowly tailored (gov’t interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive)
○ Leaves open alternative channels for communication of the information
● Nothing in BP 880 authorizes denial of a permit on the basis of a rally’s program content
● Local chief executive has the authority to exercise police power to meet “demands of common good”
● CPR is simply responsible and judicious use of means to protect public interest and restore public order, does not
replace the rule of maximum tolerance of BP 880

ISSUE/S:
● W/N B.P. 880 and RA 7160 are void for overbreadth or vagueness -- NO
● W/N CPR is void for vagueness -- YES

HOLDING:
● Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. CPR VOID. BP 880 CONSTITUTIONAL. Secretary of Interior and Local Gov’ts
DIRECTED to ensure immediate compliance w/ Sec. 15 of BP 880 after 30 days from finality of Decision

RATIO:
● Right to freedom of speech and right of people to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances
guaranteed to petitioners by Art. 3, Sec. 4 of the Constitution
○ Exercise of such rights is not absolute, may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community/society
● BP 880 not vague or overbroad it regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to
the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger which Congress has the right to prevent.
○ No prior restraint, since content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation
● B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place, and
manner of the assemblies (BP 880 basically codify the ruling in the Reyes case, which set standards for
application of a permit to rally, and state that such is indispensable)
○ It refers to ALL kinds of public assemblies that would use public places
○ The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based, assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection
○ Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally
● Permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order/safety/convenience/morals
or health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under UDHR and ICCPR

Re: Freedom Parks

● Sec. 15 of BP 880 provides for creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed to petition and peacefully
assemble
● Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s system of regulation of the
people’s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble, the Court ruled that after 30 days from this Decision, no
prior permit is required for the exercise of such right until that city or municipality has complied with Sec. 15
(to designate at least one freedom park in their jurisdiction)
○ Without such alternative forum, to deny the permit is in effect denying the right itself
 ● If no parks are identified in city/municipality concerned, ALL public parks shall be deemed freedom parks, no
prior permit required to hold an assembly there

Re: CPR
● SolGen conceded that use of term “CPR” should be discontinued because it does not mean anything other than
maximum tolerance policy set forth in B.P. 880
● “When I stated that CPR is being enforced in lieu of maximum tolerance, I simply wanted to send a message that we
would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would henceforth follow it to the letter”
● CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means
something else
Maximum Tolerance - highest degree of restraint that the military/police and other peacekeeping authorities
shall observe during a public assembly or dispersal of the same

Re: If mayors do not act on permit

● Rallyists who can show the police an application filed on a given date, after 2 days from date, can rally in
accordance with application without the permit itself, grant of permit being presumed under the law
○ Burden of authorities to show there has been a denial of application, before rally may be peacefully dispersed

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, et al v. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL of NEDA, et al

G.R. Nos. 167798 & 167930 || April 19, 2016 || CARPIO, J.
(uniform ID system)
FACTS
● These are two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, assailing the constitutionality of EO
420, which is also known as “Requiring All Government Agencies and Government-owned and Controlled
Corporations to Streamline and Harmonize their Identification (ID) Systems, and Authorizing for such Purpose the
Director-general, National Economic and Development Authority to Implement the Same, and for Other Purposes”
(13 April 2005)
○ Under this EO, the Pres. directs all gov’t agencies and GOCCs to adopt a uniform data collection and format
for their existing ID systems
● Petitioners’ contentions (G.R. No. 167798):
○ EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch
of the gov’t
○ EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy
● Petitioners’ contentions (G.R. No. 167930):
○ EO 420 is contrary to law
■ Completely disregards and violates the decision of the SC in Ople v. Torres
■ Violates RA 8282 (Social Security Act of 1997)
○ Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420
■ The implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
○ EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy
■ It allows access to personal confidential data without the owner’s consent
■ EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its
provisions
■ There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420
○ Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the EO was issued without public
hearing.
○ EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discriminatory
treatment of and penalizes those without IDs
● Respondents’ contentions:
○ Petitioners have no legal standing to file the suit
○ The petitions do not present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination

ISSUE/S
● W/N EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the Pres. — NO
● W/N EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy — NO

HOLDING
● Petitions DISMISSED. EO 420 declared VALID.

RATIO
● Unified ID collection system, in general
○ Sec 2 of EO 420: “Coverage. — All government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order.”
■ EO 420 applies only to gov’t entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing
laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420.
○ Sec 1 of EO 420 directs these gov’t entities to “adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system.” Thus, all gov’t
entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs.
■ The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency
and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by gov’t entities.
○ Sec 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14
specific items.
■ These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by gov’t
entities, and even by the private sector
■ EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the
government entities. Gov’t entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes,
other than the 14 specific data.
○ Benefits of unified ID system:
■ Savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies
■ Compatibility in systems as to hardware and software
■ Ease of verification and thus increased reliability of data
■ User-friendliness of a single ID format for all gov’t entities
○ 2 ways the unified ID system can be achieved:
■ The heads of these existing gov’t entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their
systems uniform
■ If the gov’t entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their
regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform
ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater
efficiency, and optimum compatibility
■ This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative
power
■ The Pres. may, by EO or AO direct the gov’t entities under the Exec. dept. to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and format
■ ART VII, Sec 17 of the 1987 Consti: “The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
■ Under this constitutional power of control, the Pres. can direct all gov’t entities, in the
exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and
ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the
public
■ The Pres,’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation
● RE: Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
○ The Consti also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
■ There are several laws mandating gov’t entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general,
improve public services. The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is
designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services.
■ Thus, in issuing EO 420, the Pres. is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed.
○ EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped
legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Exec. power — the Pres.’s constitutional
power of control over the Exec. dept. EO 420 is also compliance by the Pres. of the constitutional duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
● RE: Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy
○ All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in
the performance of their governmental functions.
■ There have been no complaints from citizens that these ID cards violate their right to privacy.
■ Neither have there been complaints of abuse by government entities in the collection and recording
of personal identification data.
○ In fact, petitioners in the present cases did not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO
420 violated their right to privacy.
 ■ Thus, they had even less basis for complaining against a unified ID system under the executive
order in question.
■ The data collected and stored under EO 420 were to be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID
card itself would show only 8 of these.
○ The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.
■ With the exception of the eight specific data to be shown on an ID card, the personal data to be
collected and recorded under EO 420 shall be treated as “strictly confidential” under Section 6(d) of
the executive order. These data are to be considered not only strictly confidential, but also personal
matters.
■ As such, they shall be exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information, under
Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution on matters of public concern.
■ Being matters that are private and not of public concern, the data treated as “strictly confidential”
under EO 420 cannot be released to the public or the press.
○ Ople v. Torres was not the proper authority on which to base the argument that EO 420 would violate the
right to privacy.
■ In that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled
solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation.
○ EO 420 applies only to government entities that, pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws,
already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards.
■ It does not grant these entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws.

MIRASOL v. DPWH
G.R. No. 158793 || June 6, 2006 || CARPIO, J.
(Substantive due process: motorcycle prohibition)
FACTS:
● Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the tollway
on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of
motorcycles using the highways.
● Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the
tollways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

Petitioners’ Contentions:
● Respondents did not appeal from RTC’s Order, such became a “final judgment” (No, preliminary injunction does not
serve as final determination of the issues, merely serving to preserve the status quo until the court could properly hear
the case)
● DPWH is only allowed to redesign tollways, but not determine “who or what can be qualified as tollway users”
● DPWH failed to prove “scientific” data on the danger of having motorcycles on highways, exercise of police power is
baseless and unwarranted
● AO 1 introduces an unreasonable classification by singling out motorcycles, violating their right to travel

ISSUE/S:
● W/N RTC Decision is already barred by res judicata -- NO
● W/N Department Orders of DPWH and TRB Contravene RA 2000 -- YES
● W/N AO 1 is unconstitutional -- NO

HOLDING:
● Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Department Orders of DPWH and Revised Rules Regulations VOID. AO 1 is
VALID.

RATIO:
● Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being
required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility.

Re: Right to travel

● Refers to the right to move from one place to another; petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point
A to Point B along the tollway, what is being regulated is the mode by which they wish to travel
● AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles,
pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. There exists
real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways.
 ○ A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply
because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.

Re: Department Orders of DPWH and TRB

● DPWH derived its power to issue Orders from Dept. of Public Works and Communication