1.

6
CASE
CRAZY EDDIE, INC.

In 1969, Eddie Antar, a twenty-one-year-old h igh school dropout from Brooklyn,

opened a consumer electronics store with 150 square feet of floor space in New
York C ity,l Despite this modest beginning, Anlar would eventually dominate the
reteli] consumer electronics market in the New York City metropolitan area. By
1987, Antar's Hrm. Crazy Eddie, Inc., had forty-three retail outlets, sales exceed­
ing S350 million, and outstanding stock with a collective market value of S600
million . Antar personally realized more than $70 million from the sale of Crazy
Eddit' s tock during his tenure as the chief executive of the company.
A classic rags-to-riches story became a spectacular bUSiness failure in the late
1980s when C razy Eddie collapsed following allegations of extensive financial
wrongdoing involving Antar and his associates. Shortly aher a hostile takeover of
the company in November 1987, the firm's new ow ners discovered that Crazy
Eddie's inventory was overstated by more than $6S million. This huge inventory
shortage had been concea led from the p ublic in registration s tatements filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Subsequent investigations by
regulatory autho rities w ould demonstrate that Crazy Eddie's profits had been in­
tentionally overstated by Eddie Antar with the help of several subordinates.2

1. This case wu CQ-au tnored by Carol Knapp, assistant professor at the University of Central
Oklahoma.
2. The facts of this case were drawn from numerous ar ti cles publi5hed oyer a period of Sf;yetal
years and several SEC enforcement releases. ~ New York Timl!S and The Wall Slrtel!oUrnJl/, in
particut ~ r, closely followed the colorful saga of Crazy Eddie and its founder. Eddie Antar. One
of the more compn!henslve \nyestigiiltive reports regarding the his tory of CrAZy Eddie, [nc., is
the following artid~ G. Bl.'lsky and P. Furman, "Calculated Madness: The Rise and Fa.1l of
e rny Eddie Anlar,H Crlli,.'s New York Business,S June 1989, 21-33. This article p rovided much
of the background information regarding Eddie Anta r that was includoo in this case.
'. ­
71
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72 SECTION ONE COMPREHENSIVE CASES

EDDIE ANTAR: THE MAN BEHIND THE LEGEND

Eddie Antar was born into a large, closely knit Syrian family in 1947. After drop·
ping out of high school at the age of sixteen, Eddie began peddling television sets
in his Brooklyn neighborhood. Within a few years, Antar and one of his cousins
scraped together enough cash to open an electronics store near Coney Island. It
was at this tiny store that Antar acquired the nickname "Crazy Eddie." Whenever
a customer would attempt to leave the store empty·handed, Eddie would block
the store's exit, sometimes locking the door until the individual agreed to buy
something-anything. To entice a reluctant customer to make a purchase, Antar
wouJd first determine which product the customer was considering and then
would lower the price until the customer finally capitulated.
Antar became well known in his neighborhood not only for his unusual sales
tactics but also his unc'o nventional, if not asocial, behavior. A bodybuilder and fit­
ness fanatic, he typically came to work in his exercise togs, accompanied by a
menacing German shepherd.. His quick temper caused repeated problems with
vendo rs, competitors, and subordinates. Antar 's most distinctive trait was his in­
ability to trust anyone outside of his large extended family. In later years, when
he needed someone to serve in an executive capacitY in his company, Antar nearly
always tapped a family member, although the individual seldom had the appro­
priate training or experience for the position. Eventually, Antar's father, sister,
two brothers, uncle, brother-in-law, and several cousins would assume leadership
positions with Crazy Eddie, while more than one dozen other relatives would
hold minor positions with the firm .

CRAZY EDDIE'S FORMULA FOR SUCCESS

In the early 19805, sales in the consumer electronics industry exploded, doubling
in the four-year period from 1981 to 1984 alone. As the public's demand for elec­
tronic products grew at an ever-increasing pace, Antar converted. his Crazy Eddie
stores into consumer electronics supermarkets. Antar stocked the shelves of
Crazy Eddie's retail outlets with every eledronic gadget he could find and with
as many different brands of those products as possible. By 1987, the company had
seven product lines. Following are those product lines and the percentage of sales
they accoWlted for in the company's 1987 income statement.

Televisions 53%
Audio and audio systems 15%
Portable and personal electronics 10%
Car stereos 5%
Accessoties and tapes 4%
Computers and games 3%
MisceUaneous Items---lncludlng microwaves.
air conditioners, and small appliances 10%
Total 100%

Antar encouraged his salespeople to supplement each store's profits by pres­

suring customers to buy extended product warranties. Many, if not most, of the
repair costS that Crazy Eddie paid under these warranties were recovered by the
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CASE 1.1 CKAZY ECOI[;.IHC. 73

company from manufacturers that had is~'Ued factory warcanties on the products.
As a re!>ult, the company realized a 100 percent profit margin on much of its war­
ranty revenue.
As his finn grew rapidly during the late 19705 and early 1980s,Anta r began ex­
tracting large price concessions from his suppliers. His ability to purchase elec­
tronic products in large quantities and at cut-rate prices enabled him to become a
"transhippcr," or secondary supplier, of these goods to smaller consumer elec­
tronics retailers in the New York Oly area. Although m anufacturers frowned on
this p ractice and often threatened to stop selling to him, Anta r continually in­
creased the scale of his transhipping operation.
The most important ingredient in Antar's marketing s trategy was large-scale
advertising. Antar created. an advertising "'umbrella" over his company's prine..
pal retail market that included the densely populated area within a l~mile ra·
dius of New York City. Antar blanketed this region with raucous, sometimes
annoying. but always memorable radio and television commercials. In 1972,
Antar hired a local radio personality and parHime actor known as Doctor Jerry
to serve as Crazy Eddie's advertising spokesman. Over the fifteen years that the
bug~yed. Doctor Jerry hawked products for Crazy Eddie, he became more reeog·
nizabJe, according to one survey, than Ed Koch, the longtime mayor of New York
City. Doctor Jerry's series of ear·piercmg television corn.mercials that featured him
screaming "Crazy Eddie-His prices are insane!" brought the company national
notoriety when they were parodied. by Dan Akroyd on Saturday Night Uve.
The focal theme of Crazy Eddie's advertising campaigns was the discounting
policy of the company. The company promised to refund the difference between
the selling price of a product and any lower price for that same item that a cus­
tomer found within thirty days of the purchase date. Despite the advertisin g bar·
rage that was intended to convince the p ublic that Crazy Eddie was a
deep-discoun ter, the company's prices on most products were in line with those
of its major competitors. Customers who w ere attracted to Crazy Eddie outlets by
Hadvertised specials" were often diveJ"ted by the company's sales staff to a higher
quality and higher profit margin p roduct.

CRAZY EDDIE GOES PUBUC

in 1983, Antar decided to sell stock in Crazy Eddie to raise capital to fi nance his
aggressive expansion program. Crazy Eddie's initial public offering was delayed
[or more than one yea r when the underwriting firm Antar retained to market the
stock discovered that the company's financial records were in disarray. Among
other problems uncovered by the underwriter were extensive related. party trans­
actions, interest-free loans to employees, and speculative investments unrelated
to the company's principal line of business. The underwriting firm was also dis­
turbed to find that nearly all of the finn's key executives were members of the
Antar family. Certain of these individuals, including Eddie's wife and mother,
were being paid salaries approaching $100,000 for little or no work.
To prepare for the initial public offering, the underwriter encouraged Antar,
Crazy Eddie's chairman of the board and president, to clean up the company's ac·
counting records and financial affairs. The underwriter also urged Antar to hire a
chief financial officer who had experience with a public company and who was
 •

74 SECTlON ONE COMPREHENSIVE CASES

not a member o f the Anlar family. The underwriter was concerned that investors
would question the competence of the Crazy Eddie's executives who were related
to Anlar. Despite the underwriter's concern, Anlar hired one of his cousins, Sam
E. Anlar- who became known wifuin the company as "Sam the CPA" to distin­
guish him from Eddie's father of the same name-to serve as Crazy Eddie's chief
financial officer.
The sale of C razy Eddie's s tock to the public was a tremendous success.
Because the initial public offering was oversubscribed, the cbmpany's under­
writer obtained. permission from the SEC to sell 200,000 more shares than origi­
nally planned. Following the public offering, Antar worked hard to convince the
investment community, particularly financial analysts, that his firm was finan ­
cially strong and well managed. At every opportunlty, Antar painted a picture of
continued growth and increased market share for Crazy Eddie.
One tactic Antar ~ to convince financial analysts that the company had a
rosy future was to invite them to a store and demonstrate in person his uncanny
ability to "close" sales. Such tactics worked to perfection as analysts from the
most prominent investment firms wrote glowing reports regarding Crazy Eddie's
management team and the company's bright prospects for the future. One ana­
lyst wrote, "Crazy Eddie is a disciplined, competently organized firm with a s0­
phisticated management and a well-trained, dedicated staff."3 Another analyst
wrote that Antar was a "brilliant merchant surrounded by a deeply dedicated or­
ganization eager to create an important retail business."4 Because of such reports
and continued strong operating results, as reflected by the company's financial
statements for 1984-1987 that are presented in Exhibits 1 and 2, the price of Crazy
Eddie's stock skyrocketed. Many investors who purchased the company's stock
in the initial public offering realized a 1,000 percent increase in the value of their
investments .

CRAZY EDDIE GOES ••• BUST

Despite Crazy Eddie's impressive operating results during the mid -1980s and the
company's stock being one of the hottest investments on Wall Street, all was not
well within the firm. By 1986, the company was in deep trouble. By the latter part
of that year, the boom days h ad ended fo r the consumer electronics industry.
Although sa les of consumer electronics were still increasing. the rate of growth
had tapered off considerably compared to the dramatic growth rates realized by
the industry during the early 1980s. AdditionaUy, the consumer electronics in­
dustry had become saturated with retailers, particularly in major metropolitan
areas such as New York City, the horne base of Crazy Eddie. Increased competi­
tion meant smaller profit margins for Crazy Eddie and diminished Antar's abil­
ity to extract sweetheart deals from his suppliers,
Besides the problems posed by the increaSingly competitive consumer elec­
tronics industry, Crazy Eddie was facing a corporate meltdown by the late 19005.

3. J. E. Tannenbaum, "How Mounting Woes at Crazy Eddie Sank A Tumaround Effort," Tht
Wall Slrttl ]Ol/nllll, 10 July 1989, Al,A4.
4. C. Belsky and P. Furman, ~Ca !cu!a ted Madness: 1he Rise and Fall of Crilzy Eddie Antar:
Crain's New York BusilltsS, 5 June 1989. 26.
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CASE U CRAZY EDDIE, INC. 75

EXHIBIT 1
1984-1987 Balance
Sheets of Cmzy Eddie

7,701 .

debentures
Unearned r(l\lenue~
_ 60,975
. ~,337 l,e29
, -
635,

Stockholders' equity ,
. t4"t:'"
:,.
Common stock . •.. f',-,.....' 313•
~
280 , 13<\'
AdditiOnal pald­ ln ; ~ ~7,678 17,668 · " 2,~98
Retained 3S,269 24,673 ,1 1,42Q'
I ~~60 42.621 ,
, .23,86.1
Total .
$~ :~ $1 26,950

The tripling of the company's annual sales volume between 1984 and 1987 and
the more complex responsibilities associated with managing a public company
imposed a huge administrative burden o n Crazy Eddie's executives. Compli­
cating matters was the disintegration of Antsr's inner circle of relatives, who had
served as his principal advisers during the first fifteen years of his company's
existence. Antar forced many of his relatives to leave the firm after they sided
with his former wife in a hitter and highly publicized divorce. Even as Crazy
Eddie's internal affairs spiraled into chaos and the fi rm lurched toward fin ancial
di saster, the company's stock was still being touted by Wall Street as a "can't
miss" investment. .
In late 1986, Eddie Antar resigned as company presi dent. althougl-\ he relained
the title of chairman of the board. A few weeks later. he simply dropped ou t of
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76 SECTION ONE COMPREHENSIVe CASES

\;
EXHIBIT 2
1984-1987 Income
!
Statements 01
1
Crazy Eddie

\
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sight. By that point, Antar had already realized more than $50 million from the
sale of Crazy Eddie stock. In the absence of Antar, Crazy Eddie's finandal condi­
\
tion worsened rapidly. Poor operating results reported in eady 1987 for the fourth (,
quarter of that fiscal year sent the company's stock price into a tailspin from
which it never recovered. In November 1987, a takeover group headed by two
prominent financiers gained control of the company. A companywide physical in­
ventory taken by the new owners disdosed a $65 million shortage of inventory,
an amount that easily negated the total profits reported by Crazy Eddie since it
went public in 1984. That inventory shortage would eventually plunge Crazy
Eddje into bankruptcy and send regulatory authorities in pursuit of Eddie Antar
for an explanation.

C HARGES OF ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITI ES !

Extensive investigations of Crazy Eddie's financial records by the new owners I
and regulatory authorities resulted in numerous fra ud charges being leveled I
against Eddie Antar and his former associates. The SEC alleged that after Crazy
Eddie went public in 1984, Antar became preoccupied with the price of his com~
pany's stock. Antar realized that Crazy Eddie had to keep posting impressive 0p­
I I

erating results to maintain the upward trend in the stock's price. An SEC

investigation revealed that within the first six months after the company went

public, Antar ordered a subordinate to overstate inventory by $2 million, result~

ing in the firm 's gross profit being overstated by the same amount. The following

yea r Antar ordered year-end inventory to be overstated by $9 million and ac­

counts payable to be understated by $3 million. Court records document that .

Crazy Eddie employees overstated year-end inventory by preparing inv~ntory

count sheets for items that did not exist. To overstate accounts payable,' bogus '

debi t memos were prepared and entered in the company's accounting records.

CAse 1.6 CRAZY EDDIE, INC. 77

As the economic fortunes of Crazy Eddie began to decline in the late 1980s,
Antar became more desperate in his efforts to enhance the company's reported
revenues and profits. He ordered company employees to include in inventory
consigned merchandise and goods that were being returned. to suppliers. Another
fraudulent lactic Antar used to overstate inventory involved transrupping trans­
actions, the large volume transactions between Crazy Eddie and many o f its
smaller competitors.
Antar was aware that a key statistic financial analysts foll ow for retailers is the
annual percen tage change in "same store" sales. Any decline in this percentage is
seen as a negative signal of a retailer's future prospects. As the consumer elec­
tronics industry be<:ame increasingly crowded, the revenues of Crazy Eddie', in­
dividual stores began to fall, although the finn's total revenues continued to
climb due to new stores being opened each year, To remedy the drop in same
store saJes, Antar instructed his employees to record selected transhipping trans-­
actions as retail sales of individual stores. For instance, suppose that Crazy Eddie
sold 100 microwaves costing $180 each to another retailer at a per unit price of
$200. The $20,000 in sales would be recorded as retail sales with a normal gross
profit margin of 30 to 50 percent-meaning that inventory would not be credited
for the total number of microwaves actually sold. This practice killed two birds
with ·the proverbial stone. Same store sales were inflated for selected operating
units, and inventory was overstated with a corresponding increase in gross profit
from sales.

WHERE WERE THE AUDITORS?

When the scale of the Crazy Eddie fraud was revealed to the public, the ques tion
on the minds o f many investors, creditors, and other interested parties was,
"Where were the auditors?" when all this chicanery was occurring. Four different
acrounting firms audited Crazy Eddie's financial statements over its turbulent
history. Antar dismissed Crazy Eddie's firs t accounting firm, a local firm, before
he took the company public. The underwriting fi rm that managed Crazy Eddie's
initial public offering urged Antar to retain a more prestigious accounting firm to
increase the public's confidence in the company's financial statements. As a re­
suit, Antar retained Main Hwdman to serve as Crazy Eddie's audit firm. Main
Hurdman had a nationwide acrounting practice with several prominent clients
in the consumer electronics industry. In the mid-1980s, Peat Marwick became
Crazy Eddie's audit finn when it merged with Main H urdman. Following the
corporate takeover of Crazy Eddie in 1987, Peat Marwick was replaced by Touche
Ross.
Much of the criticism stemming from the Crazy Eddie scandal focused on
Main Hurdman and its successor, Peat Marwick,. Published reports suggest that
the audit fees charged Crazy Eddie b y Main Hurdman were unreasonably low. In
one year, the accounting firm reportedly charged Crazy Eddie only $85,000 for a
full-scope independent audit-an audit o f a firm that had several hundred mil­
lion dollars of revenues. A leading critic of major accounting firms alleged that
Main Hu rdman had " lowballed" to obtain the Crazy Eddie audit, realizmg that
it could make up for any lost audit revenue by seUing the company consulting
services.
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78 SECllON ONE COMPREHENSIVE CASES

In one year, Main Hurdman charged only $85,000 10 do a complete audit 01 Crazy
Eddie-a business wjth hWldreds of millions of dolJars in reported revenues, dozens of
retail slores, and two large warehouses. At the very same time that Main H urd man was
charging the bargain basement price of $85,000 for supposedly conducting an audit, its
consulting division was charging Crazy Edd ie millions of d ollars to computerize CrilZY
Eddie's inventory system.s

nus same individual questioned Main Huroman's ability to objectively audit

an inven tory system that it had effectively developed. Main Hurdman's indepen­
dence was also questioned because many of Crazy Eddie's accoun tants were for­
mer members of that accounting firm. Critics charge that a company that hires
one or more of its former auditors can more easily conceal fr audulent activities
during the course of subsequent audits. That is, a former aud itor may help his or
her new employer undermine subsequent audits. Crazy Edd ie's hiring of several
of its former auditors was not unusual; auditors often accept positions with for­
mer clients when they leave public accounting. Many accounting £inns actually
arrange such "placements," ~ practice that has been widely challenged.
You would think that if an auditor wanted to leave a public accounting finn, heor she
would be discouraged from going to work for clients they had audited. Instead,just the
opposite is true with big accounting fums encouraging their personnel to work for
clients in the apparent belief that it helps cement the accountant-client relatioriship.6
Most of the criticism directed at Crazy Eddie's auditors stemmed from their
failure to uncover the huge overstatement of the company's inventory and the re­
lated understatement of accounts payable. Third parties who filed suit against the
auditors charged them with "aiding and abetting" the fraud by failing to thor­
oughly investigate numerous suspicious circumstan ces they discovered. Of par­
ticular concern were several reported instances in w h ich the aud itors requested
client documents, only to be told that those documents had been lost or inadver­
tently d estroyed.
In Peat Marwick and Main Hurd man's defense, Antar and h is associates en­
gaged in a large-scale plan to deceive the aud itors. For example, after d iscovering
which inventory sites the auditors wou ld be visi.ting at year-end, Antar would
ship sufficient inventory to those stores or warehouses to conceal any shortages.
Likew ise, Crazy Eddie personnel systematically destroyed incriminating docu­
ments to conceal inventory sho rtages from the auditors. Antar also ordered his
employees to stop using the sophisticated, computer-based. inventory system de­
Signed by Main Hurdman. Instead, the acco unting personnel were required to re­
turn to an archaic manual inventory system previously used by the company. The
absence of a computer-based invento ry system made it much more difficult for
the auditors to determine exactly how much inventory the fi rm had at any point
in time.
A particularly disturbing aspect of the Crazy Eddie scandal was the involve­
ment of several key accounting employees in the various fraudulent schemes.
Among the parties who were charged w ith participating in the fraud or being
aware of it were the director of the internal aud it staff, the acting controller, and

5. M.I. Weiss, NAuditQrs: fk> Watchdog&, Not JUSI ~an Coun le rs,~ ACCOII" , jng TodIlY, 15
November 1993, 41.
6. Ibid. , 42.
 •

CA S E U CRAZY EOO4E , INC .

the director of accounts payable. Past experience h as proven tha t a fraud involv­
ing the collusion of numerous client executives,'particularly key accounting per­
sonnel. is cxtn~ m el y difficult for aud itors to uncover.

E PILOGUE
In June 1989, Crazy Eddie filed a Ch apter 11 bankru ptcy petition after losing its
line of credit. La ler that same year, the company closed its remaining stores and
liquidated its assets because it could not obtain credit from its vendors.
Meanwhile, Ed die Antar was named as a defendant in several lawsuits, including
a large civil suit filed by the SEC and a criminal indicbnent filed by a U.s. district
attorney. In January 1990, a federal judge ordered Antar to repatriate 552 million
that h e had transferred to foreign bank. accou nts in 1987. The following month,
fed eral marshals began searching lqr Antar after he failed to appear in federal
cowt fot a hearing in which he was to account for the funds transferred to over­
seas bank accOlU\ts. After surrendering to federal marshals, Antar was found in
contempt and released on his own recognizance. FollOwing this court appear­
ance, Antar became a fu gitive. For the next two years, Antar eluded federal au­
thorities despite reported sightings of him in Brooklyn. South America, and
Jerusalem. .
On June 25, 1992, Eddie Antar was arrested by Israeli police. At the time, Antar
was living in a sma U town outside Tel Aviv and posing as an Israeli citizen, David
Jacob Levi Coh en . On December 31, 1992, Antar's atto rney announced that an ex­
tradition agreement had been reached with the U.S. Justice Department and
Israeli authorities. After being extradited , Antar w as convicted in July ]993 on
seventeen coun ts of fi nancial fra ud including racketeerin g, conspiracy, an d mail
fraud . In May 1994, Antar was sentenced to twelve and one-h alf years in fede ral
p rison "nd ordered to pay restitution o f $121 million to former stockholders and
cred itors.
A federal ap peals court overtu rned the seventeen-count fraud conv iction of
Eddie Antar in April 1995. The appeals court ruled that the judge who presid ed
over Antar's trial had been biased aga inst him . The appeals cou rt ordered that a
n ew trial be held fo r Antar und er a di fferen t judge. In May 1996, Antar' s attor­
neys and federal prosecutors arranged a plea bargain agreement to settle the
charges outstanding against him. Under the terms of this agreement, Antar
p leaded guilty to one federal charge o f racketeering and publicly admitted, for
the first time, that he had d efrauded investors b y manipulating his company's ac­
counting records. Following his admission of guilt, one of the p rosecuting attor·
n eys conunented that "Crazy Eddie wasn't crazy, h e was crooked:'" Several of
Antar ' s fonner associates have also been convicted o r have pleaded gu ilty to
fraud charges, including C razy Edd ie's fo rmer chief financial officer, Sam E.
Antar.
A federal judge sentenced Eddie Antar to seven years in federal prison in early
1997. An lar, who had remained in prison since being extradited to the U.S. in

7. FA. McMorris, "Clny Eddie 1nc.'s Antill Adm its G uUt in Rl!cketeering COnSplr~,'" Tht

Wall Slrttl/oufMI, 9 May 1996, 87.

80 SECTION ONE COMPREHENSIVE CASES

1993, received credit fo r the time he had already spent in p rison. As a result, he
was required. to selve only two years of the seven-year prison sentence.
To date, more than $60 million has been recovered from Aniar, including funds
discovered in bank accounts in Israel, Great Britain, Switzerland, and
Leichtenstein. Federal authorities believe they may be able to recover additional
hmds that are still·concealed in secret bank accounts around the w orld. These au­
thorities estimate that Antar may hav~ as milch as $10rniUion hidden away in for­
eign bank accounts.8
In March 1993, a $42 million settlement was announced for dozens of lawsuits
filed against Crazy Eddie. Although the contributions of the various defendants
to the settlement pool were not disclosed, among those defendants were Peat
Marwick and the local accoWlting finn used by Crazy Eddie before tbe company
went public.

QUESTIONS
1. Compute key ratios and other fmandal meas ures for Crazy Eddie during the
period 1984-1987. Identify and briefly explain the red flags in Crazy Eddie's fi­
nancial statements that suggested the firm posed a higher-than-normallevel of
audit risk.
2. Identify specific audit procedures that might have led to the detection of the
following accounting irregularities p erpetrated by Crazy Eddie p ersonnel: (a) the
falsification of inventory count sheets, (b) the bogus debit memos for accounts
payable, (c) the recording of transhipping transactions as retail sales, and (d) the
inclusion of consigned merchandise in year-end inventory.
3. The retail consumer electronics industry was undergoing rapid and dramatic
changes during the 1980s. Discuss how chan ges in an audit client's ind us try
should affect audit p lanning d ecisions. Relate th is d iscussion to C razy Eddie.
4. Explain what is implied by the term lowballiMg in an audit context. How can
this practice potentially affect the quality of independent audit services?
5. Assume that you were a member of the Crazy Eddie audit team in 1986. You
were assigned to test the client' s year-end inventory cutoff procedures. You se­
lected thirty invoices entered in the accounting records near year-end; fifteen in
the few days p rior to the client's fiscal year-end and fifteen in the first few days
of the new year. Assume that client personnel were unable to locate ten of these
invoices. What course of action would have been appropriate at this point and
why?
6. Should companies be allowed. to hire individuals who formerly served as their
independent auditors? Discuss the pros and cons of such a policy.

8. M. Siconolfi, ~ It's Crazy Eddie. So the Idea May Be A Uttle Insane, ~ ~ W~II Siru l IOllr1l~l,
13 June 1996, Al, AlO .
..