Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
CWP …… Of 2017
State of Purvanchal Pradesh.……….…..…………………………………… (Petitioner)
Versus
Gaurav Mulekhi ………………….…………………………………………. (Respondent)
AND
SLP …… of 2017
State of Purvanchal Pradesh ..…………………………………………………. (Petitioner)
Versus
Koolhaas……….………………………………………………………………. (Respondent)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
A. BOOKS
TABLE OF CASES
27. Tarun Bharat Sangh, Alwar v. Union 1992 Supp (2) SCC 448 5
of India
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1
Article 136(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal fro m any judg ment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or
made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
2
Article 133(2) Notwithstanding anything in article 132, any party appealing to the Supreme Court under clause
(1) may urge as one of the grounds in such appeal that a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
this Constitution has been wrongly decided.
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
1. About Bharat, Bangla and Barma: Bharat is a democratic country having 70 percent of its
population engaged in agriculture relying on traditional methods of irrigation. Bharat shares
borders with Bangla and Barma and all three are active members of United Nations.
2. Drohingyas take refuge in Bharat: Atrocities against the official ethnic group, Drohingyas
continue who have been denied citizenship by the state of Barma since 1982. In 2011, Barma
started persecuting the Drohingyas living in the Drakhine state of Barma. Fearing their lives,
Drohingyas take refuge in the state of Purvanchal Pradesh of the country of Bharat.
3. Samadi Sarovar Project: Tenders were invited for Samadi Sarovar Project (SSP). Koolhaas, a
swiss-based Architectural Company submitted its designs and budget. State approved it seeing
a less budget proposition in comparison to the other tenders. Eyeing the victory in 2017
elections, the state does an over-hasty act and asks its govt. engineers to pace up the work of
the construction of the dam. A tunnel to divert river is built by the government engineers.
4. Hue & cry over construction of dam: NGO ‘LiveWire’ claimed that the Environmental
Impact Assessment has been faulty. However, Bharat Express claimed that public
participation in EIA was affected by the violence spread by the Drohingya militants.
Government passed an order directing construction of dam (G.O. 1183) & another order
directing to send Drohingyas back to the state of Barma (G.O. 1184). Gaurav Mulekhi, an
activist, challenges both orders filing a PIL.
5. Breach in tunnel: On 17th October’17, there is a breach in tunnel costing the lives of 160,000.
High-powered committee stated that material used was of mediocre quality because the
desired material would have taken time to be transported and the construction would have
been delayed. The samples of concrete showed the water to cement ratio was higher than what
it should have been. State filed a civil suit for damages in District Court where it lost. In the
appeal filed for it in the High Court, it again lost & the state was asked to pay damages.
6. Proceedings before Supreme Court of Bharat: The State filed a criminal case u/s 304A, 336,
337 & 338, IPC, 1860 against Koolhaas. The state again lost both in trial court and High
Court. Finally, state files an SLP against the high court order for the state to pay damages &
contends the negligence on the part of Koolhaas. Further, government orders were quashed in
favour of the earlier PIL filed by Gaurav Mulekhi. Appeal is filed by the State challenging the
verdict of high court. Now all the matters have been clubbed and listed before the Supreme
Court of Bharat.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
_______________________________________________
ISSUE-I
_______________________________________________
ISSUE-II
__________________________________________________
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. G.O. 1184 is violating Article 14, Article 21 and Article 51(c) of the Constitution
of India
1. The fundamental rights in the constitution are violated: The right against
deportation, in keeping with the Constitutional Guarantees under Article 14 and
Article21 of the Constitution of India, read with Article 51(c) of the Constitution
of India, which protects against arbitrary deportation of the drohingyas who have
taken refuge in Bharat after escaping from their home country Barma due to
atrocities committed against them and due to threat to their life
2. Inte rnational law is being violated: It is humbly submitted that India ratified the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10th December 1948. UDHR, while
laying down the basic foundation for Human Rights, protects the Refugees by
explicitly recognising the Principle of Non-Refoulement. Article 14 of UDHR.
B. G.O. 1183 is violating Article 14, Article 19, Article 21 and Article 48(A) of the
Constitution of India
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE G.O. 1183 AND G.O. 1184 ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF PURVACHAL PRADESH ARE VALID OR NOT?
A. G.O. 1184 is violating Article 14, Article 21 and Article 51(c) of the Constitution
of India
[A.1] The fundamental rights in the constitution are violated
1. It is humbly submitted that the right against deportation, in keeping with the
Constitutional Guarantees under Article 14 and Article21 of the Constitution of India,
read with Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India, which protects against arbitrary
deportation of the drohingyas who have taken refuge in Bharat after escaping from
their home country Barma due to atrocities committed against them and due to threat
to their life 3 .
2. It is humbly submitted that the Constitutional Provisions of Article 14, Article 21 and
Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India provides equal rights and liberty to any
person whether he is a citizen or alien 4 . In the case of NHRC v. State of Arunachal
Pradesh5 , the court held that:
Our Constitution confers certain rights on every human being and certain
other rights on citizens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law
and equal protection of the laws. So also, no person can be deprived of his
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.
Thus, the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human
being, be he a citizen or otherwise
3. Further, In the case of Ktaer Abbas Habib Al Qutaifi v. Union of India 6 , the Gujarat
High Court held that:
This principle prevents expulsion of a refugee where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Its application
3
Facts on record, para 2.
4
The State Trading Corporation v. The Co mmercial Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 1811.
5
AIR 1996 SC 1234.
6
1999 CriLJ 919.
7
UN High Co mmissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the Ext raterritorial Applicat ion of
Non-Refoulement Ob ligations under the 1951 Convention relat ing to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, 26 January 2007.
8
UN General Assembly, Protocol Relat ing to the Status of Refugees , 31 January 1967, United Nat ions, Treaty
Series, vol. 606, p. 267.
9
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.
10
UNGA Rosultion no. A/RES/ 51/ 75 dated 12 February, 1997.
11
United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946.
7. It is humbly submitted that India ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
on 10th December 1948 13 . UDHR, while laying down the basic foundation for Human
Rights, protects the Refugees by explicitly recognising the Principle of Non-
Refoulement. Article 14 of UDHR states that Article 14 “Everyone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution”. India ratified
International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights 14 (ICCPR) in 1979. the ICCPR
also encompass the obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a
person from their territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there
is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by Articles 6 [Right to
life] and 7 [Right to be free from torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment] of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to
be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed 15 .
8. Furthermore, India became a signatory to the International Conventio n on Protection
of All Persons against Enforced Disappearances 16 in 2007. The Convention seeks to
protect people extreme seriousness of enforced disappearance and protects the right of
any person, to not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. Article 16 of the
Convention explicitly lays down the Principle of Non-Refoulement which is as
hereunder:
i. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler"), surrender or extradite a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to
enforced disappearance.
12
UN High Co mmissioner fo r Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of
Non-Refoulement Ob ligations under the 1951 Convention relat ing to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, 26 January 2007.
13
217 A (III).
14
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171.
15
UN High Co mmissioner fo r Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of
Non-Refoule ment Ob ligations under the 1951 Convention relat ing to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, 26 January 2007.
16
UN General Assembly, International Convention on Protection of All Persons against Enforced
Disappearances, 20 December, 2006.
ii. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations, including, where applicable, the existence in the State
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations
of human rights or of serious violations of international humanitarian
law.
9. It is humbly submitted that India became a signatory to the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 17 in 1997.
Convention puts an obligation on States to take all necessary measures to prevent acts
of torture. This includes legislative, administrative and judicial measures, as well as
any other measures that may be appropriate. States are also obliged to prevent other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 3 of the Convention
explicitly recognises the Principle of Non-Refoulement.
[A.3] Article 14, Article 21 and Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India are violate d
10. It is humbly submitted that in a recent judgement the Delhi High Court, In Dongh
Lian Kham v. Union of India18 ,stated:
The principle of “non-refoulement”, which prohibits expulsion of a
refugee, who apprehends threat in his native country on account of his
race, religion and political opinion, is required to be taken as part of the
guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as “non-
refoulement” affects/protects the life and liberty of a human being,
irrespective of his nationality.
11. Since the petitioners apprehend danger to their lives on return to their country 19 , it
would only be in keeping with the golden traditions of this country in respecting
international comity and according good treatment to refugees.
12. Furthermore, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) and Anr. v. UOI and Ors 20 , the
Supreme Court has categorically stated:
Constitutional provisions must be read and interpreted in a manner which
would enhance their conformity with the global human rights regime.
India is a responsible member of the international community and the
17
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85.
18
226(2016) DLT 208.
19
Facts on record, Para. 2.
20
WP (C ) No. 494/2012.
15. The Court has strengthened Article 21 21 in two ways (i) laws affecting personal
liberty have to pass the tests of Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution 22 and (ii)
the Court recognized several unarticulated liberties that are implied by Article 21. The
environmental issues must and should receive the highest attention from this court. 23
Every person enjoys the right to a wholesome environment, which is a facet of the
right to life guaranteed under Article 21. 24 It is basic right of all to live in a healthy
21
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21.
22
Maneka Gandhi v. Un ion of India, AIR 1978 SC 597.
23
Tarun Bharat Sangh, Alwar v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 448.
24
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420; M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1992 (3) SCC 256;
Virendar Gaur v. State of Haryana, 1995 (2) SCC 577.
18. It is humbly submitted that the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 is a parent
legislation enacted by the Parliament for protection and improvement of environment.
25
The World Co mmission on Environ ment and Development, 43 (1987).
26
Facts on record, para 5.
27
Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645.
28
M.C. Mehta v. State of Orissa, AIR 1992 Ori 225.
29
T. N. Godavarman Thiru mulvad v. Union of India & Others, (2006) 1 SCC 1.
30
Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1987 SC 1109.
31
State of Kerala v. N. M . Tho mas, AIR 1976 SC 490.
32
So m Pra kash Rekh i v. Union of India, A IR 1981 SC 212.
33
Virendra Gaur v. State of Harayana, 1995 (2) SCC 571.
34
Bangalore Med ical Trust v. B. S. Muddappa, AIR 1991 SC 1902.
35
N. D. Jayal v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 86.
36
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Un ion of India, 1996 (5) SCC 281.
37
Facts on record, para 2.
38
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India,1996 (5) SCC 281.
39
Vellore Cit izen’s Welfare Foru m v. Un ion of India, AIR 1996 SC 2715.
40
Id., S. Jagannath v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 811; A. P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M. V. Nayadu,
AIR 1999 SC 812.
41
T. N. Godavarman Thiru mulakpad v. Un ion of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267.
42
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Wood Products, AIR 1996 SC 149.
43
National Forest Policy, 1988.
44
T. N. Godavarman Thiru mulpad v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 4256.
45
M.C. Mehata v. Kamal nath (1997) 1 SCC 388.
46
Sushila Saw M ills v. State of Orissa, (1995) SCC 615.
47
Facts on record, Para 5.
48
Council of Eu ropean Co mmittee, 1996 report.
49
Thammanna vs K. Veera Reddy, 1981 AIR 116.
50
Facts on record, para 6.
51
Vedanta Alumina Ltd. vs Prafulla Samantra & Ors, LPA 277/2009 DHC.
52
Appeal No. 9 of 2011. Judg ment of NGT (Southern Zone, Chennai) on December 13, 2013.
53
Appeal No. 3/ 2011 (T) (NEAA No. 26 of 2009). Judgment of Principal Bench of the Nat ional Green Tribunal
on April 20, 2012.
54
M.C. Mehta v. U.O.I , AIR 1988SC 382.
55
Facts on record, para 5.
56
Facts on record, para 6.
57
V. Srinivasan v. UOI, Appeal No. 18 of 2011 (T), Judgment of Principal Bench of the National Green
Tribunal on February 24, 2012.
58
2013 AIR SCW 3231.
approval could be challenged. The grounds for judicial review were illegality,
irrationality and procedural impropriety. Thus the granting of environmental approval
by the competent authority outside the powers given to the authority by law, would be
grounds for illegality. If the decision were to suffer from Wednesbury
unreasonableness 59 , the Court could interfere on grounds of irrationality. Last, an
approval can be challenged on the grounds that it has been granted in breach of proper
procedure 60 . Nevertheless the Court has not restrained itself, in cases where it found
that the SEAC had recommended approvals without any application of mind 61 .
28. It is humbly submitted that in Gram Panchayat Navlakh Umbre v. Union of India and
Ors 62 , the Court held that:
decision making process of those authorities besides being transparent
must result in a reasoned conclusion which is reflective of a due
application of mind to the diverse concerns arising from a project such as
the present. The mere fact that a body is comprised of experts is not
sufficient a safeguard to ensure that the conclusion of its deliberations is
just and proper.
Therefore, the Environment Impact Assessment Report is faulty.
ON BEHALF OF KOOLHAAS
29. It is humbly submitted that in order to impose criminal liability under sections 304A,
336, 337 and 338, IPC, 1860, it is necessary that the death must have been the direct
result of a rash and negligent act of the accused and that the act must be proximate
and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. 63 It must be the
59
The Wednesbury principle means that only an administrative decision that is unreasonable to an extreme
degree can be brought under the legitimate scope of judicial review. The princip le is generally considered as a
reason for courts not to interfere in ad ministrative body decisions. Non-applicability of the principle would
imply that courts will be less hesitant in interfering in such decisions.
60
The procedural breach has to be of a mandatory requirement in the procedure.
61
This phrase is frequently used in law to refer to the failu re of administrative authority to actively consider all
aspects and issues while arriv ing at a particular decision.
62
Public Interest Litigation No. 115 of 2010. Judg ment of Bo mbay High Court on June 28, 2012.
63
Sukaroo Kaviraj, (1887) 14 Cal. 566.
causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been causa sine qua non.64 Culpable
rashness is acting with consciousness that the mischievous and the illegal
consequence may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief
that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent their happe ning. 65 Culpable
negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect
will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the
caution required by him, and that if he had he would have had the consc iousness. The
imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection. 66
30. Negligence in common parlance means and implies failure to exercise due care
expected from a reasonable prudent person. 67 It is humbly submitted that in the case
of K. Veeraraghavan v. The Secretary to Government, 68 the principle of law on
supervision being the ‘due care’ has been reiterated. It has been stated that
supervision will fall under the ambit of ‘due care’ only if it comes within the area of
competence. It is humbly contended that in the present case, due care was being given
through the supervision being provided by the experts of the Koolhaas. 69 For
negligence to apply, it must also be proved that the event causing the accident must
have been in the control of Koolhaas. The area of competence was merely to the
extent that the construction was being done in accordance with the design of the dam
provided or not. The way the tunnel was being constructed was still in the hands of
government.
31. It is humbly submitted that there have been no faults in the design. It is for the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt which it has
failed to do so. 70
[A.2] Rashness and negligence on the part of the State
32. Rash or negligent act is an act done not intentionally or designedly. 71 A rash act is
primarily an over- hasty act, and is thus opposed to a deliberate act, but it also includes
an act which, though it may be said to be deliberate act, is yet done without due
64
Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap, 5 Bo m. L.R. 679.
65
In re Nidamarti Nagabhushnam, (1872) 7 M.H.C.R. 119.
66
Bhalchandra, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1319.
67
K. Veeraraghavan v. The Secretary to Govern ment, (2014) 5 M LJ 479.
68
Ibid.
69
Facts on record, Para 4.
70
P. Rajappan v. State of Kerala, 1986 Cri. L.J. 511.
71
Istlingappa v. Emperor, 17 I.C. (Bo m) 542.
34. It is humbly submitted that the construction of the dam was started only after the
government engineers of Purvanchal Pradesh had selected and approved of the design
and the budget for it. 76 The term ‘breach’ corroborates to a ‘gap’ or a ‘crack’ in the
tunnel. 77 The breach in the tunnel constitutes a deficiency in the way of working of
the government engineers and material used which was of mediocre quality wherein
the government has flawed.
35. It is to be further noted that the government had employed ‘engineers’ and not
‘workers’. A reasonable and prudent engineer knows the correct ratio of cement and
water whereas, as per the high-powered committee, the very ratio between the two
was wrong. This corroborates to the fact that the diligence which had to be applied by
the government engineers was not applied and the state has failed on its part.
72
Nga Myat Thin v. Emperor, (1898) P.J.L.B. 426.
73
Facts on record, Para. 4.
74
Blyth v. Birminghan Water Worka Co., 11Ex. 784.
75
Facts on record, Para. 13.
76
Facts on record, Para. 3.
77
breach | Definit ion of breach in Eng lish by Oxford Dict ionaries, accessible at
<https://en.oxforddict ionaries.co m/definit ion/breach> accessed on 09 October, 2017.
36. As laid down in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher,78 if the damage had been caused by
the plaintiff’s own default, he cannot complain for the damage so caused. It is humbly
submitted that in the present case, the rule of strict liability does not arise on the
architectural company, Koolhaas, because the State of Purvanchal Pradesh has itself
failed in their way of construction as it was the government engineers who were
constructing the tunnel.
37. Furthermore, as per the high-powered committee, it was found that the material used
was of mediocre quality, available near the site whereas the desired material would
have taken time to be transported and the construction would have delayed. 79 It is the
state of Purvanchal Pradesh who had pressurized their own engineers to hurry and
pace up the work for their own motive of seeking victory in the 2017 elections, as a
result of which Koolhaas were not given time to procure material as prescribed in the
budget. Infact, due to the constant pressures from the government, it had to procure
the resources available near the construction site. 80 It is therefore submitted that the
State is itself at default and cannot impose strict liability on Koolhaas. Hence, the
company, Koolhaas is not liable to pay damages arising out of the disaster.
[B.2] State has caused loss of life, violated Article 21 and environmental safeguards
38. It is humbly submitted that it was the government of Purvanchal Pradesh which has
showed negligence. Article 21 81 envisages a right to life and personal liberty of a
person. The word “life” under Article 21 means a quality of life which guarantees the
fundamental right of every individual to live in the safe and sound premises. 82
39. It is humbly submitted that the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 is a parent
legislation enacted by the Parliament for protection and improvement of environment.
The power conferred under an environmental statute may be exercised only to
advance environmental protection and not for a purpose that would defeat the object
of the law. A power conferred by the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 having
78
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
79
Facts on record, Para. 12.
80
Facts on record, Para. 4.
81
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21.
82
Shantisar Bu ilders v. Narayanan Khimalal Totamen, AIR 1990 SC 630; Charan Lal Sahu v. Un ion of India,
AIR 1990 SC 1480.
regard to its object cannot be treated as power simpliciter, but is a power coupled with
a duty and therefore it is a duty of the State to make sure that the conditions or
directions under the Act are fulfilled. Enforcement agencies are under an obligation to
strictly enforce environmental laws.
40. In the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India and Anr.,83
the Hon’ble Court held that it is on the state to perform statutory duties under the
Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986. Failure to perform duties, also undermines the
right to life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
41. The same principle had been reiterated in the case of Association of Victims of
Uphaar Tragedy v. Union of India. 84 The court held that Article 21 imposes
affirmative duty on the State to protect the lives of individuals. By failing to protect
life and provide safe premises, the State was liable to pay compensation to the victims
for its violation of their Article 21 right.
42. The callous disregard to the statutory and moral obligations and to the fundamental
and indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21, 85 levies the obligations on the
State of paying the public in failing to provide safe premises, free from hazards that
could reasonably be foreseen. 86
43. In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Anr., 87 a three-Judge Bench,
while dealing with the public projects and policies, has opined that the court does not
become the approving authority of such policies. Thereafter, the Bench observed:
Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and
consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not
merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a
responsible Government.
44. In the case Mr. Gatakala Venkateswarlu vs Union of India (Uoi) And Anr., 88 the court
held that:
In a welfare society, construction of dam or bundh for the sake of
community is essential function; and use of land or accumulation of water
for the benefit of society cannot be non-natural user. But that cannot
83
A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1446.
84
(2003) 2 ACC 114.
85
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21.
86
Association of Victims of Uphaar tragedy v. Un ion of India and Ors., (2003) 2 A CC 114.
87
(2000) 10 SCC 664.
88
128 (2006) DLT 1.
absolve the State from its duty of being responsible to its citizens for such
violations as are actionable and result in damage, loss or injury.... Once the
occasion for loss or damage is failure of duty, general or specific, the
cause of action under tort arises. It may be due to negligence, nuisance,
trespass, inevitable mistake etc. It may be even otherwise. In a developed
or developing society the concept of duty keeps on changing where a
manufacturer was held responsible for injury to a consumer. They may
individually or even collectively give rise to tortious liability.
45. Since nearly 1,60,000 people have died and many have suffered loss on facts found
due to both at the stage of construction and failure to take steps even at the last
moment, state is liable to pay damages.
PRAYER
G.O. 1183 AND G.O. 1184 ARE ULTRA VIRES AND THEREFORE, DECLARE
THEM AS INVALID.
KOOLHAAS IS NOT LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE.
THE STATE HAS TO PAY DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE DISASTER.
MISCELLANEOUS
AND ANY OTHER RELIEF THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED
TO GRANT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
-Sd