Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
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Gregorio v. CA
0 The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint for violation
of B.P. 22 against petitioner Gregorio and one Vito Belarmino, as
proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently
funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances bought by
Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her.
The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by
the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime
(PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),
while she was visiting her husband and their 2 daughters at their city
residence. Gregorio was brought to the PARAC-DILG Office where she
was subjected to fingerprinting and mug shots, and was detained.
She was released in the afternoon of the same day when her husband
posted a bond for her temporary liberty.
Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorios complaint
is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for
malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and
Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating
an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and
groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her.[27] As previously
mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the
fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her
action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion
that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on
account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
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1. RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Right to Privacy is protected in the bill of rights, however, the bill of rights
are a person’s rights vs. the State, one cannot use the bill of rights in filing
a case for a private person. If one is filing a case for a private person, then,
Article 26 should be invoked.
0 Right to privacy must be reconciled with the right to free speech,
religion, expression etc. because, you have rights but also other
people have rights also, just because somebody said something
may disturbed you, that does not automatically mean that you
already have a right of action against him.
DE VERA-YALUNG | 1
NOTE: There are instances where the school might be called upon to
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, exercise its power over its student for acts committed outside the school
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever premises and beyond school hours in the following:
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or 5888In cases of violation of school policies or regulations occurring
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined in connection with school sponsored activity off campus; or
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the 5889In cases where the misconduct of the student involves his
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing status as a student or affects the good name and reputation of
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. the school.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be RIGHT TO INFORMATION
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or Article III, Constitution
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
0 Basis of Liability for Damages be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
Violation of the constitutional right to privacy that causes damage to law.
another makes the actor liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code. The
claim for damages may be anchored on deprivation of due process, There is no intrusion into the right of privacy of another if the information
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure or the sought are matters of public record. This is especially true in case the
privacy of communication and correspondence and other related rights persons who are invoking the right to privacy are public officers and the
specified in Article 32. matter involved is of public concern. Thus, there is no violation of the
right to privacy if a citizen will ask from the Government Service
B. Violation of the Right to Privacy as Independent Tort Insurance System a list of legislators who secured clean loans therefrom.
0 Persons entitle to Relief (Valmonnte v. Belmonte)
GR: The right to privacy can be invoked only by natural persons. Juridical
persons cannot invoke such right because the entire basis of the right to ========================================================
privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party; a Valmonte v. Belmonte
corporation would have no such ground for relief. 23 Petitioner Ricardo Valmonte wrote a letter to Hon. Feliciano
XPN: A corporation is entitled to the constitutional right against Belmonte, GSIS General Manager, requesting that he be furnished with the
unreasonable searches and seizure under Article 32, CC. list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan. Belmonte replied through the Deputy
GR: The right is purely personal in nature, hence: General Counsel of the GSIS whose opinion is that is that a confidential
23 It may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it;
to have been violated; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
24 Can be subject to waiver of the person whose zone of privacy is unless so ordered by the courts.
sought to be intruded into;
25 The right ceases upon the death of the person. 23 WON they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of
XPN: A privilege may be given to the surviving relatives of a deceased their constitutional right to information? YES!
person to protect his memory but the privilege exist for the benefit of the
living, to protect their feelings and to prevent the violation of their own HELD: The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of
rights in the character and memory of the deceased. reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the
opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately
23 Standard Applied: In determining if there was a violation of before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th
the right is that of a person with ordinary sensibilities. It is eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
relative to the customs of time and place and is determined by
the norm of an ordinary person. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the
Four Types of Invasion of Privacy: benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
23 Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s solitude or into his private particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended, provide for
affairs; annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and
23 Protects a person’s sense of locational and psychological other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as
privacy. the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
24 It is not limited to cases where the defendant physically guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is
trespassed into another’s property. It includes cases when the expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
defendant invades one’s privacy by looking from outside compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of
(Example: “peeping-tom”) the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law was the
necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds
GR: There is no invasion of right to privacy when a journalist records administered by the System". Consequently, as respondent himself admits,
photographs or writes about something that occurs in public places. XPN: the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the
When the acts of the journalist should be to such extent that it constitutes legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed
harassment or overzealous shadowing. properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to
23 The freedom of the press has never been construed to accord the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers
newsmen immunity from tort or crimes committed during the were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
course of the newsgathering. appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the
24 There is no intrusion when an employer investigates an first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree
employee or when the school investigates its student. of fidelity and that and its transactions were above board.
25 RA 4200 makes it illegal for any person not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
such communication by means of a tape recorder (Ramirez vs public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information
CA, Sept. 28, 1995) sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
26 Use of a telephone extension for purposes of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization does not violate RA The Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a
4200. government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are
within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
HELD: YES, there is. It does not need further elucidation that the incident
charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of
respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26
underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. Thus, under
this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are
provided for violations of a person's dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind.
It is petitioner's position that the act imputed to him does not constitute
any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and 2219. In this respect, the law is
clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive
but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous
acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's
dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive
language. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury, although incapable of pecuniary computation, may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation as a proximate result of petitioner's abusive, scandalous and
insulting language.
We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the
truth about the rumor and why he was not satisfied with the separate
denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to
face, invade the latter's privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the
presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends, accusing him —
a married man — of having an adulterous relationship with Florence.
This definitely caused private respondent much shame and
embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood
without feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and
distrust in his family where before there was none. This is why a few days
after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public
apology and payment of damages, which petitioner ignored.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of
the CA affirming the judgment of the RTC holding Rodrigo Concepcion
liable to the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for F50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, P10,000.00 for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.
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(iv.) NUISANCE Before a private person can abate a public nuisance, he must comply
Under the Civil Code, a nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, with the following requirements:
business, condition of property, or anything else which: That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the
Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or property to abate the nuisance;
Annoys or offends the senses; or That such demand has been rejected;
Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and
Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway executed with the assistance of the local police; and
or street, or any body of water; or That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand
Hinders or impairs the use of property. (Art. 694). pesos.
Code of Sanitation of the PH, it considers the ff nuisance: Private Nuisance – remedies against a private nuisance are a civil action
Public or private premises maintained and used in a manner and abatement, without judicial proceedings. Any person injured by a
injurious to health; private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by destroying
Breeding places and harborages of vermin; the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of
Animals and their carcasses which are injurious to health; the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that
Accumulation of refuse; the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a
Noxious matter or waste water discharged improperly in streets; private person be followed.
Animals stockage maintained in a manner injurious to health;
Excessive noise; and A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a
Illegal shanties in public or private properties. (Section 85, P.D. No. nuisance shall be liable for damages in two cases:
856) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
Nor can it be said that a principal-agent relationship existed between BSP PROOF
and the security guards Penñ a and Gaddi as to make the former liable for In all cases when the registered owner rule is invoked, the person
the latter's complained act. The basis for agency therefore is invoking the rule a particular defendant must prove that the said
representation which element is absent in the instant case. Records show defendant is the registered owner of the vehicle. [Best evidence is the
that BSP merely hired the services of AIB, which, in turn, assigned certificate of registration]
security guards, solely for the protection of its properties and premises.
Nowhere can it be inferred in the Guard Service Contract that AIB was LIABILITY OF TRANSFEREE
appointed as an agent of BSP. Instead, what the parties intended was a If registered owner is made liable despite the transfer of the vehicle, the
pure principal-client relationship whereby for a consideration, AIB transferee is liable to the registered owner for the damages caused to the
rendered its security services to BSP. passenger. He has the right to be reimbursed by the transferee.
======================================================== 3rd party complaint against the transferee may be appropriate in a
case filed by the injured passenger against the registered
(vi.) SPOUSES owner.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
FC: In the absence of a marriage settlement or when the marriage QUASI-DELICT CASES
settlement agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community The rule is usually applied to common carriers but the SC already
property shall govern. extended the rule to quasi-delict cases involving private vehicles.
ACP – Spouses jointly own all properties of the marriage or acquired Registered owner rule had been applied to cases involving
thereafter subject only to few XPNs. enforcement of liability against an ER under Art. 2180 of the
Specie of vicarious liability is imposed under the system of ACP bec. it is NCC even if the ER is not engaged in business.
expressly provided in par. 9 of the Art. 94 of the FC that the ACP shall be
liable for “liabilities incurred by either spouses by reason of a crime or a ======================================================== Del
quasi-delict, in the case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive Carmen vs Bacoy
property of the debtor-spouse. Payments made shall be considered At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud along with
advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon her spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud,
liquidation of the community” were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended. Upon
reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso
passenger jeep that was being driven by Allan Maglasang. The jeep was
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. and used as a
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
DE VERA-YALUNG | 24
public utility vehicle. Because of the unfortunate incident, for Reckless Espinas learned that the owner of the other car, is Filcar. Espinas sent
Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan. several letters to Filcar and to its President and General Manager Carmen
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Flor, demanding payment for the damages sustained by his car. Filcar
Bacoy (Geronimo), an independent civil action for damages based on denied any liability to Espinas and claimed that the incident was not due
culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of
employers, namely, the Spouses del Carmen and the registered owner of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor both said that they always exercised the
the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo. Defendants refused to assume civil due diligence required of a good father of a family in leasing or assigning
liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have their vehicles to third parties.
no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own the
jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan. For his part, Oscar Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in
Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas?
stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers rented house to take
it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject HELD: Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver,
jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with
vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights on. And Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered
implying that the vehicle was illegally taken. owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas car;
and it is on the basis of this fact that we hold Filcar primarily and directly
WON the registered owner Oscar Geronimo is also liable? YES! liable to Espinas for damages. As a general rule, one is only responsible
for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable
HELD: Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code. One exception is an
by a group, the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as he was employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his
entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time Rodrigo faced his employee is under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to expect that the
driver should have also returned the key to the operator together with the Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an
Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do action predicated on an employees act or omission may be instituted
so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the police for against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
reasons unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly, committed by his employee. Although the employer is not the actual
Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil
attest on cross-examination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and
that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo. vigilance over the acts of ones subordinates to prevent damage to another.
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may
claim that his jeep was stolen, this circumstance by itself will not prove invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a
that it really was stolen. family to prevent damage. As its core defense, Filcar contends that Article
2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code is inapplicable
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion because it presupposes the existence of an employer-employee
that Oscar Jr. gave his implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is relationship. According to Filcar, it cannot be held liable under the subject
in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid proof that he ensured that the provisions because the driver of its vehicle at the time of the accident,
parking area is well secured and that he had expressly imposed Floresca, is not its employee but that of its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor.
restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his We cannot agree. It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps,
driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the
endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned, employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the
Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article
matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given 2180, of the Civil Code.
the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation, including the
discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it. The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner
so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor
persons for the deaths or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Thus,
of whether the employee drove the registered owners vehicle in whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the
connection with his employment. The main aim of motor vehicle registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability
registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered the vehicle in the streets and highways.
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public ========================================================
highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles
without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant (viii.) RENT-A-CAR BUSINESS
means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so LEASED VEHICLES
inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle The registered owner rule applies even if the registered owner leased the
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of vehicle to another who is the actual operator. – Registered owner is
persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways. directly liable.
To be free from liability, the lessor-owner should register the lease
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle contract w/ the LTO. The lease should be annotated in the cert.
was stolenwhich are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar of registration in order that there will be notice to 3 rd parties
Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use. that the lessee and not the registered owner who is in
possession and operating the vehicle.
Filcar Transport Services vs Espinas
Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street ========================================================
in Manila. Upon reaching the intersection of Leon Guinto and President FGU Insurance Corp vs CA
Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the signal light turned This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April 1987,
green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the 2 vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, figured in a traffic accident. The
middle of the intersection when another car, traversing President Quirino car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven
Street and going to Roxas Boulevard, suddenly hit and bumped his car. As at the outer lane of the highway by Benjamin Jacildone, while the other
a result of the impact, Espinas car turned clockwise. The other car car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent FILCAR and driven by
escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of
plate number. After verifying with the Land Transportation Office,
DE VERA-YALUNG | 25
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized
owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of
Soriano. At that time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the
Philippine driver's license. Petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and
of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized
of subrogation it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the
respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation as insurer of FILCAR for event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors
quasi-delict. peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they
WON the registered owner FILCAR is liable for damages suffered by third use.
persons although the vehicle is leased to another? NO! As admitted by appellant Aonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a
distance of about 10 meters before the accident. Corrolarily, therefore, he
HELD: The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a could have avoided the accident had he stopped alongside with an earlier
presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made jeep which was already at a full stop giving way to appellee. But according
responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care to eyewitness Sorsano, he saw appellant Aonuevo umaarangkada and hit
and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing the leg of Villagracia. This earlier jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia
damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is to proceed but Aonuevo at an unexpected motion came out hitting
hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned Villagracia. Aonuevo admitted that he did not blow his horn when he
therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR crossed Boni Avenue. By Aonuevos own admission, he had seen
being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car Villagracia at a good distance of 10 meters. Had he been decelerating, as
leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample
them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Aonuevo
be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any possibility
an employer of the latter. that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to the cause of the
accident. A motorist has been held liable for injury to or death of a
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as to
which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable cause a collision. Neither does Aonuevo attempt before this Court to
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to
of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative
motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established
provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of negligence appreciable against Villagracia.
master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. As between Anñ onuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged
Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on Aonuevo as solely responsible for the accident. The petition does not
the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine
can neither prosper. Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracias bicycle
Corporation is rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that had been equipped with safety equipment. Aonuevo himself admitted
case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by having seen Villagracia from 10 meters away, thus he could no longer
petitioner corporation caused injuries to several persons and damage to claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety
property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation horns. The fact that Aonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn
raised the defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracias bicycle had been
over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and, that the driver was not equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had
its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it was
found that the true nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more incumbent on Aonuevo to have established that Villagracias failure to
than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself of the burdens have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The fact
and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld this finding and affirmed that Aonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider
the declaration of joint and several liability of the corporation with its such causal connection as not proven.
driver. ========================================================
========================================================
(x.) STATE
(ix.) ART. 2185 NCC STATE LIABILITY
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a Constitution: State cannot be sued without its consent. Consent of the
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the State to be sued can be manifested through a special law or general law
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) allowing the State to be sued.
WON the criminal liability of the accused was extinguished by reason of Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
his death while judgment of conviction is pending appeal? YES! can validly file, sinmultaneously and independently, a separate civil action
for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case? YES!
HELD: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As HELD: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." Corollarily, the claim for civil criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of
the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits
b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) . . .;e) Quasi-delicts. Where the civil for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil
liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum
and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
explained above. omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private- accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, his employer or guardians.
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action.
this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
hereby dismissed without qualification. counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
======================================================== separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in
since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION filed.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS – include actions for damages for Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
violation of civil and political rights, defamation, fraud, physical injuries Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can
and neglect of public officers. avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
Civil action which the Civil Code provisions allow to be filed disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
(particularly Article 33) is ex-delicto, that is, civil liability while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to
arising from delict. deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS DE VERA-YALUNG | 32
the law. Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
RE: Suspension of the Separate Civil Action independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action also be adjudicated.
was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless
his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal
penal statute.
action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule
applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto.
Provides for an independent civil action for damages for violation of
The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32,
civil and political rights.
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently
regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
RATIONALE: It is for the effective maintenance of democracy
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
How Committed
continues this procedure, to wit:
Involves intentional acts, the tort of violation of civil and
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action
political rights can also be committed through negligence.
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot
Rule is that good faith on the part of the defendant does
be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
not necessarily excuse such violation.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
NOTE: It is not necessary that there should be malice of bad faith. To
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may
make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which
be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last
is the effective protection of individual rights.
until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
c. Persons Liable
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the
Directed against public officers or employees
criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
The coverage was expanded to cover even private individuals – who
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
obstructs, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or impair
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
the rights and liberties of another.
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
Direct and Indirect Participation
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions
A person may be held liable whether his participation is direct or
shall be tried and decided jointly. indirect
========================================================
Superior officers of the law enforcers who conducted the raid
The person who actually conducted illegal search and seizure.
i. ART. 32 CIVIL CODE/SEARCHES AND SEIZURES NOTE: Not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
NCC constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other Penal Statute.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
State Immunity
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages: A public officer who is the defendant in a case for damages under
Freedom of religion; Article 32 cannot escape liability under the doctrine of state
Freedom of speech; immunity.
Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; The doctrine of state immunity applies only if the acts involved are
Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; acts done by officers in the performance of official duties
Freedom of suffrage; within the ambit of their powers. Obviously, officers do not act
The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; within the ambit of their powers if they would violate the
The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public constitutional rights of other persons.
use;
The right to the equal protection of the laws; Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against Does not destroy every person’s right and cause of action for
unreasonable searches and seizures; damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
Consti rights.
The privacy of communication and correspondence;
The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
not contrary to law; release from his detention as a speedy means for obtaining his
The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government liberty.
for redress of grievances;
The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; ========================================================
The right of the accused against excessive bail; Aberca v. Ver
The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a conduct pre-emptive strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest,
Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of threats and
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1)
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because
confessing becomes a State witness;
the writ of habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune
Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless
the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no cause of
not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which
Freedom of access to the courts. prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for being filed
DE VERA-YALUNG | 42
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS
At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular Interest on the total monetary award at the rate of 12% per annum from
accident along the National Highway in Barangay Apopong, General the finality of this decision until the award is fully satisfied.
Santos City, which resulted in the death of Armando Mumar (Mumar),
husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar (respondent). Subsequently, People v. Tibon
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason of Accused-appellant and his common-law wife Gina Sumingit lived together
Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide. as husband and wife since 1994. They had two children, Kenken and
RTC: judgment is rendered against defendant Paulita Sierra, her co- Reguel. Gina went to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper, leaving
defendant and to pay: 1. P65,000.00 for burial damages; accused-appellant with custody of their two children. After some time,
P300,000.00 for loss of income; 3. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and 4. accused-appellant heard from his sister who was also working in Hong
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. Kong that Gina was having an affair with another man. After the
The RTC said that Nelfa testified that her husband was earning about revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two
P6,000.00 a month without presenting any documentary evidence to children. On the night of December 12, 1998, accused-appellants mother
prove her claim, but nonetheless awarded her P300,000.00 for damages and his siblings, went to accused-appellants room. They saw accused-
due to loss of income. appellant with KenKen and Reguel. The two children appeared lifeless
CA: 1. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; 2. Indemnity for loss and bore wounds on their bodies. Accused defense was insanity and also
of earning capacity in the amount of P1,224,000.00; 3. Temperate argues that the reduction of civil indemnity from PhP 75,000 to PhP
damages amounting to P25,000.00 in lieu of the award for burial 50,000 is recommended, since the crimes were not attended by any
expenses; 4. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. 5. The total aggravating circumstances.
amount of damages shall bear an interest of 12% per annum from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. WON the reduction of civil indemnity is proper? NO!
The CA adopted the factual findings of the RTC. It also ruled that the RTC
erred in awarding burial expenses and actual damages for loss of earning HELD: The commission of parricide is punished more severely than
capacity despite lack of proof. Based on the wifes claim that the victim homicide since human beings are expected to love and support those who
earned not less than P6,000.00 a month and his age at the time of death, are closest to them. The extreme response of killing someone of ones own
based on his birth certificate (29), the CA applied the formula: flesh and blood is indeed unnatural and tragic. Tibon must thus be
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim handed down the harshest penalty for his crimes against his innocent
at time of death) x [Gross Annual Income less the children.
Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses (50% of gross Penalty Imposed
income)] In view of RA 9346, the appellate court correctly modified the sentence of
Tibon to reclusion perpetua.
WON the CA erred in awarding to herein respondent loss of earning Pecuniary Liability
capacity despite complete absence of documentary evidence that the When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
deceased Mumar was self-employed and earning less than the minimum awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
wage under current labor laws in force at the time of his death actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; and (5) temperate damages.
HELD: Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual The Solicitor General recommended the reduction of civil indemnity from
damages, which as a rule must be duly provenby documentary evidence, PhP75,000 to PhP50,000. However, recent jurisprudence pegs civil
not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow. indemnity in the amount of PhP75,000, which is automatically granted to
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the formers death, without
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of murder,
deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under homicide, parricide and rape. People v. Regalariohas explained that the
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty
deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
minimum wage under current labor laws. According to Art. 2199 of the Civil Code, one is entitled to adequate
Based solely on Nelfas testimony, the CA determined that the deceased compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by him that is duly proved. This
falls within one of these exceptions. Nelfa testified that her husband was compensation is termed actual damages. The party seeking actual
in the business of contracting and manufacturing grills, fences and gates, damages must produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable,
and his earnings exceed P6,000.00 per month prior to his death. She such as receipts, to justify an award therefor. We note that the trial court
presented no documentary proof of her claims. failed to award actual damages in spite of the presentation of receipts
It was error for the CA to have awarded damages for loss of earning showing wake and funeral expenses (Exhibits R, R-1, R-2, R-4, and R-5)
capacity based on Nelfas testimony alone. amounting to PhP173,000. We therefore grant said amount.
First, while it is conceded that the deceased was self-employed, the Court Moral damages are also in order. Even in the absence of any allegation
cannot accept that in his line of work there was no documentary proof and proof of the heirs emotional suffering, it has been recognized that the
available to prove his income from such occupation. There would have loss of a loved one to a violent death brings emotional pain and anguish,
been receipts, job orders, or some form of written contract or agreement more so in this case where two young children were brutally killed while
between the deceased and his clients when he is contracted for a job. their mother was away. The award of PhP75,000.00 is proper pursuant to
Second, and more importantly, decedent was not earning less than the established jurisprudence holding that where the imposable penalty is
minimum wage at the time of his death. death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346, the award
Respondent testified that her husband was earning not less than of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
P6,000.00 per month. On the other hand, the highest minimum wage rate
at the time of the accident, based on Wage Order No. RTWPB-XI-07, was Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court should have made
P148.00. At that rate, the monthly minimum wage would be P3,256.00, accused-appellant account for PhP30,000 as exemplary damages on
clearly an amount less than what respondent testified to as her husbands account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and
monthly earnings. The deceased would not fall within the recognized proved, in the crime of parricide.
exceptions. There is therefore no basis for the CAs RULING: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
computation for Mumars supposed net earning capacity and the of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406 convicting accused-appellant
subsequent award of damages due to loss of earning capacity. Honorio Tibon y Deiso of parricide is AFFIRMED with the
RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT IN PART the petition. MODIFICATION that accused-appellant should pay the heir of the
We AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals victims:
dated 31 July 2009 and Resolution dated 27 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. Civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 for each victim;
00023-MIN. We ORDER petitioner to pay respondent the following: Actual damages of PhP 173,000;
Civil indemnity of P50,000.00; Moral damages of PhP 75,000 for each victim; and
Temperate damages of P25,000.00, in lieu of the award for burial Exemplary damages of PhP 30,000 for each victim.
expenses;
Moral damages of P50,000.00; and
HELD: At most, we perceive a mix-up in the reservation process of WON THE RTC ERRED IN AWARDING NOMINAL DAMAGES IN THE
petitioners. This demonstrates a mere negligence on the part of AMOUNT OF P150,000.00?
petitioners, but not willful intention to deprive respondents of their
membership benefits. It does not constitute default that would call for HELD: Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has
rescission of the sale of FRCCI shares by petitioners to respondents. For been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating
the negligence of petitioners as regards respondents reservation for April or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any
1, 1999, respondents are at least entitled to nominal damages in loss suffered by him.12 Its award is thus not for the purpose of
accordance with Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code. indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a
Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been right.13 Indeed, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in
violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or fact. When granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of
recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss a wrong inflicted but simply a recognition of the existence of a technical
suffered by him. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification injury.14 A violation of the plaintiff’s right, even if only technical, is
for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. Indeed, sufficient to support an award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as
nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. When there is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of
granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong nominal damages is proper.
inflicted but simply a recognition of the existence of a technical injury. A Applying such principles to the instant case, we have on record the fact
violation of the plaintiff's right, even if only technical, is sufficient to that petitioners have an unpaid balance on the purchase price of lots sold
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS to them by respondents. Their refusal to pay the remaining balance of the
DE VERA-YALUNG | 49
purchase price despite repeated demands, even after they had sold the Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to
properties to third parties, undoubtedly constitutes a violation of be paid in case of breach thereof. (Article 2226, Civil Code).
respondents’ right to the said amount under their agreements. The facts GR: The court cannot change the amount of liquidated damages agreed
show that the right of the vendor to receive the unpaid balance to the lots upon by the parties.
sold was violated by petitioners, and this entitles respondents at the very XPN: Article 2227 provides that liquidated damages, whether intended as
least to nominal damages. an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
Deed of Absolute Sale – fully paid iniquitous or unconscionable.
Contract to Sell – must be proved Article 2228 provides that when the breach of the contract
committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the
Agabon v. NLRC parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. Whether intended as an indemnity or penalty shall be equitably reduced
It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
board and cornice installers, however, they were dismissed for Normally intended for breach of obligation, some in certain contracts you
abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal have liquidated damage and penalty, in penalty, normally provided
dismissal and payment of money claims. The Labor Arbiter rendered a for something other what the other than what
decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent the liquidated damages covers.
to pay the monetary claims. Accordingly, the CA, after a careful review of ========================================================
the facts, ruled that petitioners dismissal was for a just cause. They had Radiowealth Finance Co vs Del Rosario
abandoned their employment and were already working for another Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally
employer. executed in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for
₱138,948. It is agreed that if default be made in the payment of any of the
WON PET was validly dismissed? YES! But w/o due process installments or late payment charges thereon as and when the same
becomes due and payable the total principal sum then remaining unpaid,
HELD: The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to
together with the agreed late payment charges thereon, shall at once
dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the
become due and payable without need of notice or demand and, in
dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an
addition, a further sum of ten per cent (10%) of said amount which
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated
in no case shall be less than (P500.00), as and for liquidated
Due Process Rule. This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not
damages.”
for any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law. Payment of
Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite
backwages and other benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only if
repeated demands, they failed to pay their obligations under their
the employee was unjustly dismissed. Promissory Note. Petitioner filed a Complaint for the collection of a sum
In cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin of money before the RTC of Manila, Petitioner, in its Complaint, prayed for
requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to follow Wenphil by "14% interest per annum from May 6, 1993 until fully paid."
holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on Whether the prayed interest per annum should be granted – NO! HELD: It
the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed should be stressed that respondents do not contest the amount of the
in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by principal obligation. While the specific date on which each installment
dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well. would be due was left blank, the Note clearly provided that each
installment should be payable each month. Their liability as expressly
It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a stated in the Promissory Note and found by the CA is "₱13[8],948.00
grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due which is payable in twelve (12) installments at ₱11,579.00 a month for
twelve (12) consecutive months." In addition, the
process were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid
Note also provided that the debtors would be liable for attorney’s fees
dismissal.
equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due in case a legal action was
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of instituted and 10 percent of the same amount as liquidated damages.
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for
or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for being unconscionable. Such damages should also be deemed
the violation of his statutory rights. The sanction should be in the nature included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Since the Note already
of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5 percent monthly to be added to
taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation each unpaid installment until fully paid. Payment of interest was not
of the employer. Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in expressly stipulated in the Note. Thus, it should be deemed included in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by such penalty.
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose Convincingly, petitioner has established not only a cause of action against
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As enunciated the respondents, but also a due and demandable obligation. The
by this Court in Viernes v. National Labor Relations Commissions, an obligation of the respondents had matured and they clearly defaulted
when their checks bounced. Per the acceleration clause, the whole debt
employer is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an
became due one month (April 2, 1991) after the date of the Note because
employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the
the check representing their first installment bounced.
employer fails to comply with the requirements of due process. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is
The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the MODIFIED in that the remand is SET ASIDE and respondents are ordered
private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of TO PAY ₱138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per month beginning
nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of the amount due as
discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. attorney’s fees. No costs.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem
it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would Continental Cement Corporation vs Asea Brown Boveri Inc
serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due Petitioner Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a corporation engaged
process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or in the business of producing cement, obtained the services of respondents
recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. (ABB) and BBC Brown Boveri, Corp. to repair its
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. 160 KW Kiln DC Drive Motor (Kiln Drive Motor).
======================================================== Due to the repeated failure of respondents to repair the Kiln Drive Motor,
petitioner filed with RTC of QC a Complaint for sum of money and
damages against respondent corporations
(vi.) LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Respondents, however, claimed that under Clause 7 of the General
Conditions, attached to the letter of offer issued by respondent ABB to
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS DE VERA-YALUNG | 50
petitioner, the liability of respondent ABB "does not extend to Exemplary damages are required by public policy to suppress wanton
consequential damages either direct or indirect." Petitioner reiterates that acts. When there is gross carelessness or negligence amounting to wanton
the General Conditions cannot exculpate respondents because petitioner misconduct.
never agreed to be bound by it nor did petitioner receive a copy of it. Imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
Respondents insist that petitioner is bound by the General Conditions. By to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
issuing Purchase Order Nos. 17136-37, petitioner in effect The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
accepted the General Conditions appended to respondent ABB’s letter of species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him
offer. Respondents also deny liability for damages claiming that they for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in
performed their obligation in good faith. However, it was proven that good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar
respondent ABB not only incurred delay in performing its obligation but conduct in the future.
likewise failed to repair the Kiln Drive Motor; thus, prompting petitioner
to sue for damages. REQUISITES:
Whether the Purchase Order Nos. 17136-37 will bind the petitioner and They may be imposed by way of example in addition to
hence will exculpate the respondent from payment for damages– NO! compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to
HELD: Respondents failed to show that petitioner was duly furnished them has been established;
with a copy of said General Conditions. Hence, it is not binding on They cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their de-termination
petitioner. Having breached the contract it entered with petitioner, depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
respondent ABB is liable for damages pursuant to Articles 1167, 1170, may be awarded to the claimant;
and 2201 of the Civil Code,. Based on the foregoing, a repairman who fails The act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton,
to perform his obligation is liable to pay for the cost of the execution of
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
the obligation plus damages. Though entitled, petitioner in this case is not
========================================================
claiming reimbursement for the repair allegedly done by Newton
Contractor, but is instead asking for damages for the delay caused by Cathay Pacific Airways ;td vs Vasquez
respondent ABB. Cathay is a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting
As per Purchase Order Nos. 17136-37, petitioner is entitled to penalties passengers and goods by air. As part of its marketing strategy, Cathay
in the amount of ₱987.25 per day from the time of delay, August 30, 1990, accords its frequent flyers membership in its Marco Polo Club. The
up to the time the Kiln Drive Motor was finally returned to petitioner. members enjoy several privileges, such as priority for upgrading of
Records show that although the testing of Kiln Drive Motor was done on booking without any extra charge whenever an opportunity arises. Thus,
March 13, 1991, the said motor was actually delivered to petitioner as a frequent flyer booked in the Business Class has priority for upgrading to
early as January 7, 1991. The installation and testing was done only on First Class if the Business Class Section is fully booked. Respondents-
March 13, 1991 upon the request of petitioner because the Kiln was spouses Dr. Daniel Earnshaw Vazquez and Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez
under repair at the time the motor was delivered; hence, the load testing are frequent flyers of Cathay and are Gold Card members of its Marco Polo
had to be postponed. Club. On 24 September 1996, the Vazquezes, together with their maid and
Under Article 1226 of the Civil Code, the penalty clause takes the place of two friends, went to Hongkong for pleasure and business. For their return
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non- flight to Manila they were booked on Cathay’s Flight CX-905. Vazquezes
compliance with the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the and their companions checked in at Cathay’s check-in counter and were
contrary. In this case, since there is no stipulation to the contrary, the given their respective boarding passes, to wit, Business Class boarding
penalty in the amount of ₱987.25 per day of delay covers all other passes for the Vazquezes and their two friends, and Economy Class for
damages (i.e. production loss, labor cost, and rental of the crane) claimed their maid. A ground attendant by the name of Ms. Chiu saw a message
by petitioner. that there was a "seat change" from Business Class to First Class for the
In sum, we find petitioner entitled to penalties in the amount of ₱987.25 Vazquezes. approached and told the Vazquezes’ accommodations were
per day from August 30, 1990 up to January 7, 1991 (131 days) or a total upgraded to First Class. Dr. Vazquez refused the upgrade, reasoning that it
amount of ₱129,329.75 for the delay caused by respondent ABB. would not look nice for them as hosts to travel in First Class and their
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. guests, in the Business Class; and moreover, they were going to discuss
business matters during the flight. Ms. Chiu told them that if they would
(vii.) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES not avail themselves of the privilege, they would not be allowed to take
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil the flight. Eventually, after talking to his two friends, Dr. Vazquez gave in.
liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or He and Mrs. Vazquez then proceeded to the First Class Cabin.
more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct Upon their return to Manila, the Vazquezes, in a letter addressed to
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party. Cathay’s Country Manager, demanded that they be indemnified in the
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the amount of P1million for the "humiliation and embarrassment" caused by
defendant acted with gross negligence.
its employees. They also demanded "a written apology. After Cathay’s
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
failure to give them any feedback within its self-imposed deadline, the
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Vazquezes instituted before the RTC of Makati City an action for damages
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; against Cathay, praying for the payment to each of them the amounts of
the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. P250,000 as temperate damages; P500,000 as moral damages; P500,000
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be as exemplary or corrective damages; and P250,000 as attorney’s fees.
proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or Whether (1) by upgrading the seat accommodation of the Vazquezes from
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of Business Class to First Class Cathay breached its contract of carriage with
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated the Vazquezes; (2) the upgrading was tainted with fraud or bad faith; and
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in (3) the Vazquezes are entitled to damages. – YES, NO, YES [NOMINAL
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, NOT EXEMPLARY]
before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addi- HELD: Just like other privileges, such priority could be waived. The
tion to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be Vazquezes should have been consulted first whether they wanted to avail
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the themselves of the privilege or would consent to a change of seat
stipulation for liquidated damages.
accommodation before their seat assignments were given to other
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in
passengers. Normally, one would appreciate and accept an upgrading, for
advance shall be null and void.’
it would mean a better accommodation. But, whatever their reason was
and however odd it might be, the Vazquezes had every right to decline the
PUNITIVE or VINDICATIVE DAMAGES
upgrade and insist on the Business Class accommodation they had
booked for and which was designated in their boarding passes. They
clearly waived their priority or preference when they asked that other
TORTS & DAMAGES – ATTY. BELTRAN-ANGELES | FINALS DE VERA-YALUNG | 51
passengers be given the upgrade. It should not have been imposed on was fit to work on the day of his scheduled departure, yet he was not
them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Cathay allowed to leave allegedly for medical reasons. Further, the Court agrees
breached its contract of carriage with the Vazquezes. with the CA that petitioner BMC is liable to respondent for exemplary
We find no persuasive proof of fraud or bad faith in this case. The damages, which are imposed by way of example or correction for the
Vazquezes were not induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious public good in view of petitioner’s act of preventing respondent from
words or deceitful machination or through willful concealment of being deployed on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on
material facts. Upon boarding, Ms. Chiu told the Vazquezes that their the date of his departure, despite evidence to the contrary. Such act, if
accommodations were upgraded to First Class in view of their being Gold tolerated, would prejudice the employment opportunities of our seafarers
Card members of Cathay’s Marco Polo Club. She was honest in telling who are qualified to be deployed, but prevented to do so by a manning
them that their seats were already given to other passengers and the agency for unjustified reasons. Exemplary damages are imposed not to
Business Class Section was fully booked. Ms. Chiu might have failed to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent
consider the remedy of offering the First Class seats to other passengers. against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. In
But, we find no bad faith in her failure to do so, even if that amounted to this case, petitioner should be held liable to respondent for exemplary
an exercise of poor judgment. Neither was the transfer of the Vazquezes damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
effected for some evil or devious purpose. ========================================================
In this case, we have ruled that the breach of contract of carriage, which
consisted in the involuntary upgrading of the Vazquezes’ seat (viii.) ATTORNEY’S FEES
accommodation, was not attended by fraud or bad faith. The CA’s award of Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of
moral damages has, therefore, no leg to stand on. It is a requisite in the litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender must be When exemplary damages are awarded;
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
manner. Such requisite is absent in this case. Moreover, to be entitled litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
thereto the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, or In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
compensatory damages. Since the Vazquezes are not entitled to any of
plaintiff;
these damages, the award for exemplary damages has no legal basis. And
Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
where the awards for moral and exemplary damages are eliminated, so satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
must the award for attorney’s fees In actions for legal support;
The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathay’s In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
breach of contract is an award for nominal damages under Article 2221 of skilled workers;
the Civil Code. Nonetheless, considering that the breach was intended to In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s
give more benefit and advantage to the Vazquezes by upgrading their liability laws;
Business Class accommodation to First Class because of their valued In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
status as Marco Polo members, we reduce the award for nominal damages When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
to P5,000. In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
Bright Maritime Corporation vs Fantonial In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal,
payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract
and for the award of moral, exemplary, and actual damages as well as The amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded is left to the discretion of the
attorney’s fees before the Regional Arbitration of the NLRC in Cebu. courts. Necessarily, the award must be reasonable under the
Petitioners assert that respondent’s failure to join the vessel on January circumstances.
17, 2000 should not be attributed to it for it was a direct consequence of The amount agreed upon by the plaintiff and his counsel does not control
the delay in the release of the medical report. Respondent was not yet the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded. In the same vein,
declared fit to work at the time when he was supposed to be deployed on the plaintiff’s counsel does not have a right to enforce the award of
January 17, 2000, as instructed by petitioners’ principal. Respondent’s attorney’s fees because, as stated earlier, the same is due to the plaintiff
fitness to work is a condition sine qua non for purposes of deploying an and not to his counsel.
overseas contract worker. Since respondent failed to qualify on the date
designated by the principal for his deployment, petitioners had to find a KINDS:
qualified replacement considering the nature of the shipping business ORDINARY – attorney’s fees given to the counsel. (Legal
where delay in the departure of the vessel is synonymous to
Ethics)
demurrage/damages on the part of the principal and on the vessel’s
charterer. Without a clean bill of health, the contract of employment EXTRAORDINARY – not really given to the counsel, rather it is meant
cannot be considered to have been perfected as it is wanting of an to indemnify the party, for whatever cost he paid his lawyer. It
important requisite. is possible that the party had to pay 5000.00, the award of
Whether petitioners’ reason for preventing respondent from leaving attorney’s fees was 10,000.00, the award will not be given
Manila and joining the vessel M/V AUK in Germany on January 17, 2000 is wholly to the counsel.
valid. – NO!
HELD: Respondent’s Medical Certificate dated January 17, 2000, stamped ========================================================
with the words "FIT TO WORK," proves that respondent was medically fit Kaisahan at Kapatiiran ng mga Manggawa vs Manila Water Co Inc
to leave Manila on January 17, 2000 to join the vessel M/V AUK in The Union is the duly-recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
Germany. The Affidavit of physician that respondent was declared fit to employees of the respondent Manila Water Company, Inc. (Company)
work only on January 21, 2000 cannot overcome the evidence in the while Borela is the Union President. The Metropolitan Waterworks and
Medical Certificate dated January 17, 2000, which already stated that Sewerage System (MWSS) entered into a Concession Agreement
respondent had "Class-B Non-Infectious Hepatitis-B," and that he was fit (Agreement) with the Company to privatize the operations of the MWSS.
Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement provides that the Concessionaire shall
to work. Petitioners’ act of preventing respondent from leaving and
grant [its] employees benefits no less favorable than those granted to
complying with his contract of employment constitutes breach of contract
MWSS employees at the time of [their] separation from MWSS. Among the
for which petitioner BMC is liable for actual damages to respondent for benefits enjoyed by the employees of the MWSS were the amelioration
the loss of one-year salary as provided in the contract. The monthly salary allowance (AA) and the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) granted in August
stipulated in the contract is US$670, inclusive of allowance. 1979, pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 97 issued by the Office of
The Court upholds the award of moral damages in the amount of the President.
₱30,000.00, as the CA correctly found petitioners’ act was tainted with The payment of the AA and the COLA was discontinued pursuant to
bad faith, considering that respondent’s Medical Certificate stated that he Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization