GENERAL PROVISIONS

Antonio Carpio vs Executive Secretary

Political Law – Control Power – Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

In 1990, RA 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES” was passed. Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the
constitutionality of the said law for he figured that it only interferes with the control power of the president. He
advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission by limiting its power “to
administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both
the NPC and the PNP were placed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of
control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same
time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is
merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the
citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under
the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
Manalo vs Sistoza
Appointments
Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued by former Pres.
Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief
Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions.
Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III,
authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for
prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments.
HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine whether a
statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts
will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.

Ishmael Himagan vs People of the Philippines & Judge Hilario Mapayo

“Equal Protection” – Suspension of PNP Members Charged with Grave Felonies

Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin
Machitar Jr and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA
6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where
the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring
that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would
be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives
no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense
where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension
cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the
trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The
two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the
time from within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally
or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed
to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for
over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be
lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase “be terminated
within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused
will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case
within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases
where the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the
dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.

AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

Gonzales vs COMELEC

Constitutional Law – Political Question vs Justiciable Question

One of the issues raised in this case was the validity of the submission of certain proposed constitutional
amendments at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Petitioners argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposal to the people who would be more interested in
the issues involved in the election. It was contended that such issue cannot be properly raised before the courts
because it is a political one.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision to indicate that
the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment
to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. The SC also noted that if what is placed in question or
if the crux of the problem is the validity of an act then the same would be or the issue would be considered as a
justiciable question NOT a political one.
Defensor Santiago vs COMELEC
Political Law – Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term
Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative” The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of the said petition in
papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among others that the People’s Initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power
(particularly the President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of people’s initiative.

ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it constitute a
revision.

HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because,
in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ., it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one,
it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing
equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective
officials are based on the philosophy of governance, “to open up the political arena to as many as there are
Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and
decision-making for the common good”; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision
of the 1987 Constitution.

Lambino & Aumentado vs COMELEC

Amendment vs Revision

Lambino was able to gather the signatures of 6,327,952 individuals for an initiative petition to amend the 1987
Constitution. That said number of votes comprises at least 12 per centum of all registered voters with each
legislative district at least represented by at least 3 per centum of its registered voters. This has been verified by
local COMELEC registrars as well. The proposed amendment to the constitution seeks to modify Secs 1-7 of Art
VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions”. These proposed changes will
shift the president bicameral-presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The
COMELEC, on 31 Aug 2006, denied the petition of the Lambino group due to the lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution – this is in pursuant to the ruling in Santiago vs
COMELEC. Lambino et al contended that the decision in the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties
within that case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who
can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal.
The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that
the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures – that the
petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The proponents
failed to prove that all the signatories to the proposed amendments were able to read and understand what the
petition contains. Petitioners merely handed out the sheet where people can sign but they did not attach thereto the
full text of the proposed amendments.
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a mere amendment. This is also in
violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed amendment should only contain one issue. The proposed
amendment/s by petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be parliament to
enact more rules.
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be decided upon other facts. The rule is,
the Court avoids questions of constitutionality so long as there are other means to resolve an issue at bar.

***NOTE: On November 20, 2006 in a petition for reconsideration submitted by the Lambino Group 10 (ten)
Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735 is adequate.
HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various opinions already given when the
Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the
Constitution thru a people’s initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
****RA 6735: An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor