Social Bandits, Modern Capitalism and the

Traditional Peasantry.
A Critique of Hobsbawm.
Pat O'Malley*

Eric Hobsbawm's outline of the concept of social banditry suggest certain

conditions of existence for that mode of primitive rebellion. Primary among
these conditions are the presence of a 'traditional peasant environment and
the absence of 'industrial capitalism'. This paper presents a critique of
Hobsbawm's specifications, and suggest two alternative conditions: the
presence of class conflict which unites direct producers, and the absence of
effective, institutionalised political organisation of producers' interests.
This reformulation is illustrated by reference to the Kelly Outbreak in late
nineteenth century Australia.
The fundamental features of social banditry have been set out in the work of
Eric Hobsbawn [1969a; 1971; 1974]. In summary, he specifies the
phenomenon as consisting
essentially of relatively small groups of men living on the margins of
peasant society, and whose activities are considered criminal by the
prevailing official power-structure and value-system, but not (or not
without strong qualifications) by the peasantry. It is this special relation
between peasant and bandit which makes banditry 'social': the social
bandit is a hero, a champion, a man whose enemies are the same as the
peasants', whose activities correct injustice, control oppression and
exploitation, and perhaps even maintain alive the ideal of emancipation
and independence. [Hobsbawm, 1974:143]
Drawing on various of Hobsbawm's statements, four prime characteristics
of the social bandit may be delineated: (1) the bandit does not leave his
community [1969a: 35]; (2) he reflects the moral values and ideology of that
community [1971: 23; 1969a: 21; 1974: 145]; (3) his predator activities are
consistent with this ideology—his victims are those defined as enemies by the
community [/969a: 35; 1971:21]; (4) he is supported in word and deed by the
community [1969a: 35,1974:143].
These characteristics may be integrated with each other in a comparatively
straightforward fashion. The bandit is not forced to leave his community—or
at least, not its general proximity—because of generalised support at the
grassroots level. This support stems, in the first instance, from the fact that the
* Lecturer, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University.
490 The Journal of Peasant Studies
occasion of his outlawry was an action (or a series of actions) which did not
contravene local values. This very condition implies an ideological conflict
between the local community and some outside group whose values are given
official military of paramilitary support. The bandit does not leave the local
community precisely because it provides him with vital means of support
which would not be available among strangers. In particular, these include a
conspiracy of silence from authorities about his whereabouts, and a network of
informers who supply vital intelligence about the activities of his (official)
enemies. These advantages are forthcoming, in turn, because the bandit is seen
as symbolising or even representing local opposition to the officially imposed
order. Finally, in order to maintain this community support the bandit must
continuously express the basic ideological conflict. His victims must continue
to be the enemies of the local community rather than the oppressed members of
the community itself. While occasional lapses from this pattern appear to be
forgiven, any sustained predation of the 'locals' leads to a rupture of the social
conditions supporting the bandit and he would be forced to surrender or to
become some other variant of outlaw.
Thus far, this schematic characterisation is consistent with Hobsbawm's
accounts. However, he goes on to suggest conditions which he argues are
necessary for the existence of social banditry. These include two of prime
importance:
(i) a social environment constituted by a 'traditional peasantry' [1971: 23;
1969a: 20];
(ii) A 'precapitalist' [1971: 23) or 'preindustrial' [1969a: 37] social environ-
ment. '
While having no quarrel with Hobsbawm's characterisation of social banditry
per se, his account of these conditions of existence of the phenomenon is
inadequate. The first problem is that Hobsbawm fails to specify precisely what
is meant by the 'peasantry' who support social bandits. This is an important
shortcomings given the judgment by Landsberger [1974:6] and others [Ennew et al,
1977] that definition of the term 'peasant' is a 'thorouglily confused issue'. Indeed
this much is admitted by Hobsbawm himself [1973:2-5] when writing on 'Peasants
and Politics'.2 In this latter paper, Hobsbawm allows for a continuum of peasant
types ranging from the 'mid-nineteenth century communal peasantry in central
Russia' to 'the mid-nineteenth century model of French peasantry... who operate
in a framework of bourgeois institutions and law, especially property law, most
likely as individual commodity producers, possibly shading over to com-
mercial farmers' [Hobsbawm 1973: 4]. Such a broad definition of peasantry
clearly permits the penetration of a capitalist productive order. However, even
allowing that we may work with such a loose definition of peasants, given
Hobsbawm's second condition of existence of social banditry specified above,
it would appear that the phenomenon could only occur among 'precapitalist' or
'preindustrial' peasantries. This might be a working point were Hobsbawm to
specify clearly the nature of such a distinction. However, he is remarkably
loath to say once and for all whether it is 'capitalism' [Hobsbaivm 1971: 23],
'industry' [Hobsbawm 1969a: 37] or any more or less corresponding order
A Critique ofHobsbawm 491
[Hobsbawm, 1974: 148n] which spells the limits of the conditions of existence
of social banditry.
Apart from inconsistency or indifference on this matter, Hobwbawm also
confuses the issue by arguing that social banditry is usually prevalent when 'the
traditional peasant society (sic) gives way to the modern economy (sic)' [1974:
149]. We are now confronted with social banditry emerging most prominently at
precisely that moment when—according to his own earlier specifications—it
should be defunct. Hobsbawm's inconsistencies on such key issues allow him
to argue that, on the one hand, social banditry is 'unlikely to be found in the
modern industrial era' [1974: 144], yet also to refer extensively to examples
drawn from Sicily in the 1940s and Reggio Calabria in 1955 [1971:14-28], and
in Sardinia during the last thirty years [7974:150-151].
In order to impose some order on this chaos, two key problems must be
resolved, namely (a) is the peasantry/social banditry nexus necessary, and if so,
why? (b) is the industrialism-capitalism/social banditry incompatibility
necessary, and if so, why? In answering these questions I will use Hobsbawm's
work as a resource for reaching conclusions with which he may or may not
concur.

Bandits and Class Conflict

If we return to the specification of the basic concept of a social bandit, it is seen
that the bandits depend on support from the 'peasantry' which is gained and
maintained through actions which express the latter's views. Since banditry is
maintained through predation, it follows that the objects of predation must be
capable of sustaining the bandit and must be approved as targets within the
'peasant' world. These conditions presume some endemic conflict within the
broader social order—as Hobsbawm [1971: 23] indicates—founded in the
structured inequalities between 'rich and poor', 'rulers and ruled'. In short,
conflict stemming from the indigenous class structure. Together, these
considerations define the principal objects of bandits' predation as members of
the dominant class or their agents in the local community, and thus generate
the class character of social banditry.
This much is quite consistent with Hobsbawm's own case as presented
above, and apparently coincides with one of his most recent comments on the
problem:

It (social banditry) is unlikely to be found within societies organised

primarily around kinship, since in these the horizontal socio-economic
stratification does not yet prevail over the vertical division between kinship
groups, nor are "states" and "governments" in the modern sense found.
In the clan society of the old Scottish highlands the Macgregors may have
specialised in the family occupation of outlawry, but their victims were
not the rich as such but the other clans (including their poor).
[Hobsbawm 1974:148. Emphasis added].
492 The Journal of Peasant Studies
Pritna facie, social banditry presumes as one of its conditions of existence
chronic class struggle which permeates the social and geographical terrain of
the bandit. However, it cannot be assumed that any form of class struggle is
likely to support social banditry. It is in specifying the nature of such class
struggle that the category of 'peasantry' becomes relevant to Hobsbawm.
Clearly, if the bandit is not to be betrayed, the dominated class must be united
and not torn by factional conflict. The concept of a peasantry takes on im-
portance for Hobsbawm at this point, since peasant societies are partly denned
by him in terms of their high degree 'of formal or informal (mostly localised)
collectivity, which . . . tends to inhibit permanent social differentiation within
the peasantry' [1973: 4]. It is from this basis, presumably, that Hobsbawm
builds one of his justifications for specifying a pre-capitalist social environment
for social banditry. He maintains that capitalism brings about 'socio-economic
differentiation of the agrarian (working) population' and this dissipates the
'local collectivity' [1973:4].
These assumptions about class unity, capitalism and the peasantry are highly
questionable. As pointed out by Corrigan [7975:345-6], in his general analysis
of peasant consciousness Hobsbawn tends to adopt a positional view of class
which reduces politics and ideology to something which can be read off from
the position of the producers in relation to the productive system. But while
there may well be a strong historical tendency for there to be an association
between 'traditional peasants' and 'communal unity' this does not allow the
rendering of a traditional peasantry into a necessary condition of such unity. It
is quite conceivable that unity will arise in rural communities of heterogenous
composition where there exists a commonly shared experience of work or
exploitation between the members of several dominated classes. Such condi-
tions, for instance between rural proletarians and members of other dominated
rural classes—including sections of the peasantry, are not as uncommon as
Hobsbawm seems to think [c.f. Mints, 1973, esp. 318-320]. In Corrigan's
words [1975: 346], rather than unity being a matter determined by common
class membership, 'Particular producers in specific situations embody social
relations and think thoughts about their experiences of labouring with others
against enemies natural and human.' On these grounds, we may specify that
(so far) neither the presence of a traditional peasantry nor the absence of
industrial capitalism appear as necessary conditions of existence for social
banditry. Rather what is required is that class struggle be manifested in a
generalised unity of the local (working) population—be they all peasants, or
an admixture of sharecroppers, labourers, small-scale cash croppers or what-
ever.

Bandits and political institutions

If social banditry is to be supported by such a community, it must appear in the
absence of what Hobsbawn [1974:148] terms 'more effective mechanisms for
articulating social protest'. The limitations of social banditry as a form of
peasant movement are seen by Hobsbawn to be twofold. Firstly, it is the
A Critique ofHobsbawm 493
personal emancipation of particular individuals and takes the form of
'spontaneous bands', a characteristic which tends to resist formal structuring
and consequently precludes extensive guerilla or other political operations
[Hobsbawm, 1971: 26]. For this reason, he comments that 'banditry is not so
much a form of peasant movement as a symptom of peasant unrest' [1974:
153]. Thus, support for social banditry wanes markedly with the penetration
of effective modes of political organisation reflecting class interests, such as
peasant leagues, agrarian socialism and agricultural trades unions. The com-
mon characteristic of these is a degree of formal organisation, long-term and
cohesive operation, and articulation with non-local members of the same class
(or coalition of classes) which is nowhere approximated by social banditry.
Wherever such organisation emerges, Hobsbawm demonstrates the demise,
transformation or absorption of existing social bandits [Hobsbawm, 1971:
23-28; 1974: 146-148]. However, while suggesting in his earlier work that
social banditry generally disappears with the rise of such political movements,
in his later work he specifically mentions 'the curious but significant co-
existence of banditry with more ambitious or general movements of social
insurrection' [1974:142], This suggests an important distinction which may be
vital to the conditions of existence of social banditry. On the one hand,
extra-institutional, illegitimate and insurrectionary political movements would
share with social banditry a similar relationship to the constituted order. Such
movements, as Hobsbawm [1974: 146-148] suggests, may utilise the skills,
resources and generally disruptive capacities of social bandits for their own
ends. However, the emergence of institutionalised and legitimated movements
effectively representing direct producers' interests tends to eliminate violent
manifestations of class conflict [Giddens, 1973: 202-7]. Under these circum-
stances support for social banditry would be eroded because such insurrec-
tionary practices will appear as counter-productive and inconsistent with the
legitimate programme of the institutionalised movement.
At this juncture Hobsbawm's decision to specify a 'pre-industrial-capitalist'
environment for banditry is further explained, as he sees a clear connection
between such political organisation and the 'modern economic order' [1974:
144]. His case seems to be that the development of industrial capitalism
generates class-conscious ideologies and political movements which gradually
penetrate the rural interior and effectively rob banditry of its social support.
Such a process would explain the continued existence of social bandits in
certain regions of capitalist states such as Italy (about which I have commented
already)—because 'modes of modern i.e. urban and non-agricultural action,
took time to penetrate the remote hinterland in which most farm labourers
(read "peasants") lived' [Hobsbawm, 1969a: 294].
In support ofHobsbawm, the work of Poulantzas [7973] and Giddens [1973]
suggests that there are theoretical reasons for assuming that the rise of institu-
tionalised movements representing direct producers' interests is predicated on
the emergence of modern capitalism. However, the more specific condition
suggested in this paper is to be preferred to that of 'industrial capitalism'
because not all industrial capitalist societies are democratic, and because there
494 The Journal of Peasant Studies
is uneven diffusions of such movements within capitalist democracies—as
Hobsbawm's comments on Italy make clear.
This being the case, key conditions of existence for social banditry are
neither the specific presence of a 'traditional peasantry', nor the specific
absence of modern capitalims per se, but rather,
(i) the presence of chronic class struggle which is reflected in a unified conflict
consciousness among direct producers; and
(ii) the absence of effective institutionalised political organisation of the
interests of the direct producers which manifests a programme of con-
certed action for the generalised attainment of their commonly sought
ends.
None of this implies a necessity for the absence of industrial capitalism, even
though it may be historically associated quite strongly with the disappearance
of the specified conditions of existence. Nevertheless, Hobsbawm suggests
that a further reason for specifying the absence of industial capitalism is that
certain 'technical and administrative' conditions in the modern industrial era
tend to stifle social banditry. In particular, he specifies the important roles
played by modern transport and by efficient law enforcement agencies.
Improved policing organisation renders the bandit highly vulnerable
[Hobsbawm, 1974: 148], while the fact that bandits depend for their prey on
'slow and cumbrous preindustrial travel' means that the 'construction of good
and fast roads is often enough to diminish banditry notably* [Hobsbawm, 1969:
16]. It is difficult to know how far Hobsbawm's own examples of the per-
sistence of social banditry in modern Italy would refute such ideas. It is also
difficult to know precisely what level of technical and administrative develop-
ment Hobsbawm sees as requisite to the disintegration of social banditry.
However, that social banditry may flourish in the absence of a traditional
peasantry, in a specifically capitalist environment, and where there is a com-
paratively high level of development of police organisation and the penetration
of a relatively modern communication system, is evidenced by the 'Kelly
Outbreak' in late nineteenth century Australia. In order to illustrate this point
and to assess the critique of Hobsbawm presented above, a brief analysis of the
Kelly gang is presented.

Ned Kelly and the land Struggle, 1878-1880

The background to the Kelly Outbreak was a 'class contest for the possession
of lands' [N.S.W., 1883, ii: 239]. Most productive land in the colonies of
Australia was held on lease to the state by large-scale, bourgeois pastoralists, or
'squatters', who also dominated the colonial legislatures [Parnaby, 1967;
Ward, 1966: 62]. Between 1860 and 1880 a series of attempts was made to
redistribute this land into small freehold plots of about three hundred acres
each. However, the measures achieved the reverse of what ostensibly was
intended, for their effect was to convert the leasehold of the squatters into
freehold ownership without greatly diminishing either the size or number of
the pastoral estates [Shann, 1963:214; Roberts, 1968:252].'
A Critique ofHobsbawm 495
Arranged against the squatters in this conflict was an alliance formed between
the rural proletariat—largely consisting of shepherds, sheep-shearers and
labourers—and such small farmers ('selectors') as had obtained land under the
ineffectual reforms. This alliance was so close that the two parties, often
collectively referred to simply as 'selectors', tended to merge together. On the
one hand, the selectors were almost all ex-rural-workers who had recently
gained smallholdings and who, because of the generally marginal nature of
their properties, continued to sell their labour to local squatters [Bate, 1968:
50; Clune, 1955: 86]. On the other hand, many rural workers were the kin,
workmates of close neighbours of selectors, and were themselves awaiting the
opportunity to take up smallholdings of their own [Osborne, 1970: 45; Jones,
1968:184].
The continued failure of land reform into the 1870s intensified conflict, and
as Coghlan [1969, Hi: 357] points out, "war between the squatter and the
selector became very fierce". By and large, the most visible mode taken by this
struggle was the manipulation of the land reform laws, for example, by the use
of 'straw men' to buy up small-holdings which would later be consolidated
under a single owner. Inevitably, the political and financial resources available
to the squatters ensured that they would prove to be the beneficiaries of such
illegal or quasi-legitimate practices. However, not only the land itself, but also
the moveable capital on it—sheep, horses and cattle—were objects and
means of conflict. Squatters impounded smallholders' 'wandering' stock and
charged them a fee, but were often suspected by the selectors of doing so to
harrass them. On the other hand, sheep and cattle 'duffing'—illegal butcher-
ing of large landowners' animals—was a popular and class-legitimated activity
among the poorer selectors and labourers [Bate, 1968:46-7; Walker; 1964:208],
In the late 1870s, Brown [1948:47] observes, duffing grew to adopt the form of
a "large scale war on the wealthy stock owners of the north east (of Victoria)."
But in many respects the most violent aspects of the class struggle in the
hinterland revolved around conflict between the police and the working class.
The squatters, throughtheir general occupancy of magisterial positions, had
exercised very close control over the police force until the introduction of a
centralised police system in 1862, and the squatting bias and judicial oppres-
sions of the magistracy, and of the police who were dancing attendance on the
Justices, gave rise to widespread dissatisfaction [Walker, 1964: 210]. Sub-
sequent reform of police organisation did little to allay workers' and selectors'
hatred and suspicion, and especially in the 'Kelly Country' or north-east
Victoria, police officers were regarded as traitors by the bush workers [Ward,
1966: 154-156]. This feeling was cemented by the fact that a large measure of
contact between police and the rural poor came about through their opposing
roles in the cattle, sheep and horse stealing cases, which had taken on a
more-or-less explicit class dimension. From this environment of virulent class
conflict, characterised by the unity of rural direct producers and the
generalised resort to the individualistic and extra-institutional means of
struggle, emerged the Kelly gang. In what follows I will attempt to establish
the close conformity of this gang to Hobsbawm's concept of'social bandits'.
496 The Journal of Peasant Studies
It will be recalled that it is the special relation between the rural poor and the
outlaw which is the core characteristic of social banditry. The two essential
aspects of this relation are, first, the bandit's predation on the enemies of the
rural poor and his occasional espousal of their cause, and second, the reciprocal
support given to the bandit by the people.
Analysis of the Kelly gang may begin with a look at the nature and sources of
their support. Apart from occasional sustenance, probably the most important
form of assistance rendered to the Kellys was the 'bush telegraph'—a network
of informers who supplied the gang with detailed information about the
movements of the police. The existence and extent of this supporting network
has been remarked upon by a host of commentators,4 and indeed, the gang's
active supporters in north-eastern Victoria probably numbered thousands
\Jones, 1968:179]. The result of this was that the 'telegraph' was so extensive
and effective that Kelly was able to goad pursuing police with minute details of
their daily movements [Brown, 1948:55]. The corollary of the 'bush telegraph'
was a conspiracy of silence which kept the police in ignorance of the gang's
whereabouts. The general lack of information forthcoming to police about the
bushrangers' activities led Kelly's judge, Sir Redmond Barry to lament:
In a new community where society is not bound together as close as it
should be, there is a class which looks upon the perpetrators of these
crimes as heroes . . . It is remarkable that although New South Wales
joined Victoria in offering a large reward for the detention of the gang no
person came forward to assist the police. There seems to have been a spell
cast over the people of the north-eastern district which I can only
attribute to sympathy with crime or dread of the consequences of doing
their duty.
While the bush telegraph and conspiracy of silence were essential to the
bushrangers, of greater importance to this analysis is the identity of the
supporters and the reasons for their support. All commentators agree that
Kelly's sympathisers were the selectors and rural workers.5 Most of those
arrested as accomplices and supporters were from this background [Jones,
1968: 187] and it was the selectors who manned Kelly's bush telegraph \Joy
and Prior, 1971:33,56-58]. Moreover, there is no room for doubt that the land
issue was basic to their involvement. The police officer in command of north-
east Victoria informed the Royal Commission set up to investigate the Kelly
outbreak that the Kelly sympathisers' whole object is to obtain land [Legisla-
tive Assembly of Victoria, 1881-4: Appendix / ] . Jones' [1968:178] corroborating
research indicates that 'the Kellys wanted ground' and that even after Kelly's
execution sympathisers were organising for another outbreak of armed
violence. They were eventually placated only by the promise of land being
made available for selection on an even-handed basis.
The close relationship between the class struggle and Kelly's bushranging is
also indicated by a review of the most active opponents of the outlaws. In
country areas, apart from the activities of the police, the main outcry against
the bushrangers came from the squatters and from those in the professions
A Critique ofHobsbawtn 497
(lawyers, school teachers, etc.), and it was these parties who under police
supervision organised into vigilante groups in order to track down the Kelly
gang [Brown, 1948: 84]. In so doing they emphasised the presence of class
allegiances throughout the whole Kelly outbreak, a theme taken up in the bush
ballads of the rural proletariat. Virtually without exception these portray Kelly
as the champion of the poor or as an heroic fighter against the squatters and
police, while the squatters—together with citizen volunteers and vigilantes—
were protrayed as villains [Stewart andKeesing, 1955:4-6]. This popular vision
of Ned Kelly as a 'Robin Hood' figure is of considerable importance to his
identification as a social bandit. In Hobsbawm's typification, it was seen that
one of the main generators of social support from among the rural people is the
bandit's Robin Hood' pattern of predation, coupled with his espousal of the
case for the poor. The outlaw activites of the Kelly gang were restricted to four
principal types of crime, none of which contravened the ideology of the rural
poor. The first was the working-class-legitimated activity of 'cattle duffing',
which (in accordance with Hobsbawm's specification of the social bandit's
career) was Kelly's initial step toward outlawry [Bate, 1968: 60]. The second,
and most momentous, was open confrontation with the police, which ranged
from public humiliation of individual officers to the murder of three policemen
in 1878. Even in the face of newspaper accusations of cowardice in the latter
incident, Kelly retained the local support which enabled him to elude capture
for a further two years. While there is no evidence about working-class
reactions to this murder (apart from the bush ballads, which fully exonerate
Kelly) it seems reasonable to suppose that the lack of overt negative reaction
and the continued support followed from workers' hatred of the police.
But the two principal predatory activities of the Kelly gang were bank
robbery and the holding-up of squatters' homesteads. Both of these practices
preyed upon the enemies of the rural poor: the squatters who were the
'land-grabbers' and cattle impounders, and the banks who held the mortgages
of the struggling selectors. Furthermore, there is evidence that Kelly
distributed the proceeds of such raids among the local smallholders and
labourers [Osborne, 1970: 65-95]. Indeed, the Kelly gang carried through this
'Robin Hood' policy as part of a more or less class-conscious campaign against
the squatters, banks and police. Ned Kelly used every opportunity both to
publicise his working-class allegiances and to support the issues with which he
aligned himself. For example, after the Euroa bank robbery, he held up a large
sheep station at FaithfulPs Creek, assembled a considerable number of locals
together to address them, and argued that "I never molested workmen or
farmers, except when they come between me and the police. I have never taken
from a poor man when I could help it in my life but I'll rob the banks, and if I
get my hands on any mortgages, I'll burn them the same as those I got this
afternoon". [Quoted in Brown, 1948: 96].h His renowned 'Glenrowan' and
'Jerilderie' letters reflect a similar linking of this actions to the cause of the
poor. In both letters he rails against the persecution of selectors by squatters,
and in the 'Glenrowan' letter specifically links his banditry to the cause of the
local selectors and labourers.7
498 The Journal of Peasant Studies
In summary, the members of the Kelly gang conformed to, and fostered, the
'Robin Hood' style, preying on the enemies of the poor and espousing the
cause of the disinherited. In turn, the gang members received invaluable
support from the poor, in whose eyes they appeared as heroes in a struggle
against a common class-enemy. In these respects, Ned Kelly appears as the
archetypical social bandit. But there exists in his milieu neither the 'pre-
capitalist' nor the 'traditional peasant' environments specified by Hobsbawm
as conditions of existence necessary for social banditry. While it could be
claimed that some selectors may have constituted as 'peasantry' under
Hobsbawm's vague definition of that term, their engagement in capitalist
agriculture, their alliance with the rural working class, and the means whereby
they had gained possession of land, scarcely allow them to be classified as a
'traditional peasantry'. Moreover, far from being economically backward, late
nineteenth century Australia was an advanced capitalist region—albeit that it
occupied a colonial status. In the period between 1870 and 1880 per capita real
product and consumption were higher than in Britain, and were possibly the
highest in the world, while the rate of economic growth was equal to that of the
United States \Jackson, 1977: 11-16]. Universal male suffrage had been
granted in the 1850s, and by 1878 urban trade unionism was extensive and
becoming increasingly militant [Shann, 1963:296-299]. All the signs point to a
situation which contradicts Hobsbawm's argument about peasants, capitalism
and banditry, yet conforms to the conditions of existence of banditry outlined in
this paper, namely
(i) the presence of chronic class struggle which is reflected in a unified conflict
consciousness among direct producers;
(ii) the absence of institutional political organisation of the interests of the
direct producers which manifests a programmme of effective action for the
generalised attainment of their commonly sought ends.
It now remains to consider the role of Hobsbawm's 'technical and administra-
tive' conditions of industrial society in rendering social banditry inviable. Two
principal points are pressed by Hobsbawm in this respect. The first concerns
the predatory dependence on "slow and cumbrous" preindustrial travel which
he ascribes to social bandits [Hobsbawm, 1969: 16]. The difficulty with this
point derives from the fact that the Kellys never practised highway robbery
[Clune, 1955: 230]. Rather, their targets were the banks—which are still
vulnerable to armed robbery—and the pastoralists homesteads and live-
stock—the latter of which are still being subjected to theft. Consequently
there seems little reason to suppose that changes in transportation have in any
way rendered inviable the forms of predation resorted to by the Kelly gang. It
may be true that highwaymen disappear with the arrival of modern roads and
railways (railways, incidentally, penetrated 'Kelly country' in 1872), but it is
not true that all social bandits are highwaymen, and it cannot therefore follow
that social banditry disappears with such developments.
Hobsbawm's second point concerns a claim that developing police tech-
nology and organisation deal a lethal blow to banditry. This argument is
difficult to assess, particularly because Hobsbawm fails to specify what degee
A Critique ofHobsbawm 499
or type of development he envisages. It was certainly the case that Kelly faced a
police force which had been extensively reorganised in the 1860s precisely
because of its ineffectiveness in dealing with an earlier outbreak of bush-
ranging. While this remodelled force had considerable impact on bushrangers
between 1862 and 1865 [Walker, 1964: 219-215] it was unable to capture the
Kellys for over two years, despite the arming of all officers, the assignment of
police to all country banks and the reinforcement of north-eastern Victoria by a
military contingent of fifty men [Brown, 1948: 105-6]. Whether or not the
survival of the Kellys refutes Hobsbawm's rather vague ideas, the instance
suggests that the effectiveness of any social control agency will be very severly
impaired by the non-co-operation of the local populace. (It may be worth
noting that Ned Kelly was eventually captured only when betrayed by a town
schoolteacher). Hobsbawm's [1974: 150-151] own references to banditry in
modern Sardinia point to a similar argument. Since, ultimately, the Italian
police would have access to all modern enforcement organisation and tech-
nology, either these are ineffective in eradicating banditry, or the police are not
able or do not choose to use them. In other words, it would appear that social or
political factors intervene in such a manner as to render problematic the effect of
'technical and administrative' conditions in eliminating social banditry. If this is so,
then no assumption may be made about the absence of industrialisation or of
industrial capitalism as a necessary condition of existence for social banditry.
Indeed, it may be possible to turn with some confidence to modern, urban,
capitalist and industrial environments for instances of social banditry!

NOTES
1. It should be stressed that Hobsbawm discusses a range of conditions of existence for social
banditry. These two are selected because they appear to be particularly questionable and
because most other conditions mentioned appear to play a somewhat subsidiary role. Thus,
for example, I leave in abeyance detailed consideration of Hobsbawm's observation that
banditry emerges "during and after periods of abnormal hardship" [1971:24]. Insofar as such
periods constitute (almost by definition) material conditions likely to generate social unrest, I
see no immediate difficulties sufficient to warrant an extensive critique.
2. In that paper, Hobsbawm allows himself to 'assume that most of us, most of the time know
what the term "peasant" refers to' [1973:3]. Yet he admits on the same page that 'beyond a
certain point in the socio-economic differentiation of the agrarian population the term
"peasantry" is no longer applicable. That point itself is often difficult to establish'.
3. For the most complete analysis of this conflict see Coghlan [1969, Volume 2]. An insightful
Leninist interpretation of the earlier stages of land reform is to be found in Baker [1967].
4. These include Joy and Prior [1971: 33, 56-58], Brown [1948: 64-65], Jones [1968: 175: 184]
and Osborne [1970: 8,45].
5. For example, Clune [1955: 86], Ward [1966: 146-7], Coghlan [1969, ii, 960], Brown [1948:
64-5].
6. Kelly is referring in this passage to mortgages of selectors' properties. That afternoon he had
stolen a number of these from the bank at Euroa.
500 The Journal of Peasant Studies
7. The letters are reproduced in tow in Joy and Prior [1971: 188-208], Kelly's diatribe against
the practices of squatters is worth reproducing here, as it indicates how far he identifies the
local squatters (Whitty and Burns) as the common enemies of himself and the poor: 'I heard
again I was blamed for stealing a mob of calves from Whitty and Farrell which I knew
nothing about. I began to think they wanted me to give them something to talk about.
Therefore I started wholesale and retail horse and cattle dealing. Whitty and Burns not being
satisfied with all the picked land on the Boggy Creek and King River and the run of their
stock on certificate ground free and no one interfering with them, paid heavy rent to the
banks for all the open ground so as a poor man could keep no stock, and impounded every
beast they could get, even off Government roads.
If a poor man happened to leave his horse or a bit of a poddy calf outside his paddock they
would be impounded. I have known over 60 head of horses impounded in one day by Whitty
and Burns all belonging to poor farmers so they would have to leave their ploughing or
harvest or other employment to go to Oxley. When they would get there perhaps they would
not have money enough to release them and have to give a bill of sale or borrow money which
is no easy matter.'

REFERENCES
Baker, D . , 1967, 'The origins of Robertson's land acts'. Historical Studies. (Australian and New
Zealand) 8: 166-182.
Bate, W., 1968, 'Kelly and his times'. In C. Cave (ed.) Ned Kelly, Man Myth. Sydney: Cassell
Australia, pp. 40-62.
Brown, M., 1984, Australian Son. The Story of Ned Kelly. Melbourne: Georgian House.
Clune, F . , 1955, The Kelly Hunters. London: Angus and Robertson.
Coghlan, T. A., 1969, Labour and Industry in Australia. Melbourne: MacMillan (4 volumes).
Corrigan, P., 1975, 'On the politics of production: a comment on "Peasants and Politics" by Eric
Hobsbawm'. The Journal of Peasant Studies. 2: 341-349.
Ennew, J., P. Hirst and K. Tribe, 1977,' "Peasantry" as an Economic Category'. The Journal of
Peasant Studies. 4: 295-322.
Giddens, Anthony, 1973, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. London: Hutchinson.
Hobsbawm, E. J., 1969a, Bandits. London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson.
Hobsbawm, E. and G, Rude, 1969b, Captain Swing. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Hobsbawm, E. J., 1971, Primitive Rebels. Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th
and 20th Centuries. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Hobsbawm, E. J., 1973, 'Peasants and Polities'. The Journal of Peasant Studies. 1: 3-22.
Hobsbawm, E. J., 1914, 'Social Banditry'. In H. W. Landsberger (ed.) Rural Protest. Peasant Move-
ments and Social Change. London: MacMillan. pp. 142-157.
Jackson, R. V., 1977, Australian Economic Development in the Nineteenth Century. Canberra:
Australian National University Press.
Joy, W. and T. Prior, 1971, The Bushrangers. Sydney: Shakespeare Head Press.
Jones, I., 1968, 'A new view of Ned Kelly'. In C. Cave (ed.) Ned Kelly, Man and Myth. Syndey:
Cassell Australia pp. 154-189.
A Critique ofHobsbawm 501
Landsberger, H. A., 1974, 'Peasant unrest: themes and variations'. In H. A. Landsberger (ed.)
Rural protest: peasant movements and social change. London: MacMillan pp. 1-54.
Legislative Assembly of Victoria, 1881-4, Parliamentary Papers: Reports of the Royal Commis-
sion into the Kelly outbreak 1881-3. (Melbourne: Government Printers).
Mintz, S., 1973, 'The rural proletariat and the problems of rural proletarian consciousness'. The
Journal of Peasant Studies. 1: 291-325.
New South Wales, (N.S.W.), 1883, Votes and proceedings of the Legistlative Assembly. Sydney:
Government Printer. Volume 11.
Parnaby, J. E., 1967, 'The composition of the Victorian Parliament 1854-1881'. In M. Beever and
F. B. Smith (eds.) Historical Studies. Australian and New Zealand: Selected Articles. Series II,
Melbourne University Press, pp. 75-92.
Poulantzas, N . , 1973, Political Power and Social Classes. London: NLB.
Roberts, Sir Stephen, 1968, History of Australian Land Settlement. 1788-1920. Sydney: MacMillan
of Australia.
Shann, E., 1963, An Economic History of Australia. Melbourne: Georgian House.
Stewart, D . and N. Keesing (eds.), 7955, Australian Bush Ballads. Sydney: Longmans.
Walker, R. B., 1964, 'Bushranging in fact and legend'. Historical Studies. 42: 206-231.
Ward, R., 1966, The Australian Legend. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.