Brad McAdon

Two Irreconcilable Conceptions of

Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric1

Abstract: This essay examines the inconsistencies in the discussion of

proofs in Rhetoric 1.1 and 1.2. Recent commentators have attempted
to reconcile these inconsistencies by claiming that ethos and pathos
are to be understood as rational, inferential, or cognitive aspects of
Aristotle’s conception of rhetorical proof, thus linking the proofs in
1.2 to those in 1.1. In sharp contrast, I contend that the rift between
the two conceptions of rhetorical proofs is even greater than most
commentators acknowledge. I argue that there are two completely
different conceptions of rhetorical proofs that cannot be reconciled
in these two sections of the Rhetoric, that the inconsistencies are due
to the tumultuous transmission and editorial history of the corpus
Aristotelicum (and not to any of Aristotle’s developmental views on
rhetoric), and that the transmission and editorial history of the text
needs to play a much more important role in our interpretation of
the Rhetoric than it has hitherto.

Stating the problem

ne of the most significant and enduring problems for in-

O terpreters of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the inconsistent dis-
cussion of pisteis in 1.1 and 1.2. In 1.1, we are told that
all the other things besides pisteis—including ethos (implicitly) and
pathos (explicitly)—are outside of the issue itself and, as such, are

1
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments
and especially Harvey Yunis for his frank advice, continued encouragement, and
willingness to read three earlier drafts of this essay.

Rhetorica, Vol. XXII, Issue 4, pp. 307–325, ISSN 0734-8584, electronic ISSN 1533-
8541. ©2004 by The International Society for the History of Rhetoric. All rights
reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article
content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website,
at www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.
307
308 RHETORICA

appendages (prosthekai) and are forcefully denounced and clearly

understood not to be included as artful pisteis.2 In sharp contrast, 1.2
claims that there are three artful pisteis—the traditional ethos, pathos,
and logos. Though pathos was clearly and forcefully censured in 1.1
and ethos was implicitly censured, logos has been understood to mean
the enthymeme of 1.1, but, as I hope to show, there are problems with
this view. Moreover, in 1.1 we are told that the enthymeme is the most
authoritative (kuriotaton, 1355a7) of the pisteis, but in 1.2, we are told
that ethos is, generally speaking, the most authoritative pistis (kuri-
otaten, 1356a13) and that the enthymeme is no longer the substance
or body of proof but, instead, is not even technically considered a
pistis at all and shares a position with example as the means by which
persuasion through the speech itself (the third pistis) is accomplished.
Many attempts have been made to resolve these real or appar-
ent inconsistencies. One of the more recent attempts to resolve the
problems is to understand ethos and pathos as enthymematic or cog-
nitive, and, thus, rational forms of pisteis which then make 1.1 and
1.2 much more reconcilable.3 Rather than directly engaging each of
these views, which would require a substantial work in itself, and
rather than understanding ethos and pathos as enthymematic or cog-
nitive aspects of Aristotle’s Rhetoric that would more closely align 1.2
with 1.1, I will attempt to demonstrate that the rift between the two
opening chapters is deeper and more irreconcilable than has been
acknowledged by most commentators.
I will argue that the references to the pisteis in 1.1 are to be under-
stood in view of discussions of both apodeixis in the Posterior Analytics
and the rhetorical proofs identified in Prior Analytics 2.23–27 and not
in light of the traditional proofs of Rhetoric 1.2— ethos, pathos, and
logos—as most commentators seem to tacitly accept. In the Prior Ana-

2
Aristotelis: Ars Rhetorica, ed. R. Kassel (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1976). All
translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
3
See especially W. A. Grimaldi, “Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhet-
oric,” Hermes (1972): 20–21; G. Kennedy, “Review of Grimaldi, Aristotle: Rhetoric I: A
Commentary,” American Journal of Philology (1982): 131–33. For more recent attempts see
especially J. Wisse, Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1989),
esp. 19–22; W. Fortenbaugh, “Persuasion Through Character and the Composition of
Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 134 (1991): 152–56; A. C. Braet,
“Ethos, Pathos and Logos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Re-Examination,” Argumentation
6 (1992): 307–20; A. Gross and M. Dascal, “The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle’s
Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 34 (2001): 275–91; and J. Walker, “ Pathos and Katharsis
‘Aristotelian’ Rhetoric: Some Implications,” in A. G. Gross and A. E. Walzer eds.,
Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000),
74–92 (p. 75).
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 309

lytics, we are told that “not only are the dialectical and demonstrative
deductions brought about through the [three] figures that have al-
ready been discussed, but rhetorical deductions also and absolutely
any proof (pistis) whatsoever” (68b10–13). The remainder of the Prior
Analytics then attempts to show how different rhetorical proofs can
be reduced to or∼must be understood “through the figures.” More-
over, in the Posterior Analytics, much of the discussion concerning
demonstration (apodeixis), like the discussion of different pisteis in
the Prior Analytics, is strikingly similar to that of Rhetoric 1.1. Thus,
if the pisteis of Rhetoric 1.1 are to be understood in view of the discus-
sion of apodeixis of the Posterior Analytics and as under the umbrella
of the syllogistic of the Prior Analytics, then the rift between 1.1 and
1.2 becomes significantly wider if it can also be shown that the pisteis
of 1.2— ethos, pathos, and logos—are not in any way considered to
be demonstrative or understood to be a part of the syllogistic of the
Prior Analytics in the sense that the pisteis of 1.1 are.
After I establish this parallel between the pisteis in Rhetoric 1.1
and the Prior and Posterior Analytics, I will briefly compare the con-
ception of the traditional three pisteis in 1.2 to my reading of pisteis
in 1.1 and argue that ethos and pathos are not to be understood as
demonstrative as the pisteis in 1.1 are said to be. There also appears
to be a difference between the enthymeme as a kind of apodeixis in
1.1 and the enthymeme and the example as the means by which
persuasion through showing and appearing to show is realized in
1.2. My discussion in this section will also question the view that ei-
ther ethos or pathos is a rational or cognitive aspect of the Aristotelian
conception of rhetoric. Finally, after briefly discussing other passages
in the Rhetoric that are also inconsistent, I close by suggesting that we
must grant far more consideration to the transmission and editorial
history of the text as the most reasonable explanation for the many
and significant inconsistencies in the Rhetoric.

The pisteis in 1.1

Our first reference to pisteis in Rhetoric 1.1—that they are uniquely

within the art and that the enthymeme is the substance of the pisteis
(1354a13–14)—does not provide us with a definition of what pisteis
are. Yet many contemporary commentators have tried to define the
term as it is used here in light of the traditional proofs of 1.2— ethos,
pathos, and logos—so as to maintain a unity or consistency in the
310 RHETORICA

text.4 While pisteis are not yet defined, we are told here that they
are uniquely within the art and that all the other things (aside from
pisteis) are appendages (προσθ¨και) and that the compilers of arts of
arguments say nothing about enthymemes, which are the substance
of proof, but, instead, concern themselves with things that are outside
the matter (1354a13–16).
Contrary to contemporary attempts to define pisteis in 1354a13–
16 in conjunction with the traditional pisteis of 1.2, Rhetoric 1.1 con-
tinues that “the artful method concerns the pisteis and that a pistis
is a kind of demonstration” (âπεÈ δà φανερìν âστιν íτι ™ µàν êντεχνο̋
µèθοδο̋ περÈ τ€̋ πÐστει̋ âστÐν, ™ δà πÐστι̋ ‚πìδειξÐ̋ τι̋, 1355a4–5).
The passage continues that the enthymeme is the rhetorical apodeixis,
the most authoritative of the pisteis, and the rhetorical sullogismos. To
understand how these characteristics of pisteis are irreconcilable with
the pisteis of 1.2, it is necessary to consider what an ‚πìδειξι̋ is within
the Aristotelian conception of συλλογισµì̋.
In the corpus, we are provided with four definitions of what a
συλλογισµì̋ (deduction) is: it is an argument “in which, certain things
having been supposed, something different from the things supposed
results of necessity because these things are so.”5 The term συλλο-
γισµì̋ is not limited to one specific kind of argument or one realm
of discourse, as we are told within the corpus that there are demon-
strative, dialectical, sophistical, and rhetorical deductions. While the
basic idea common to each of these deductions is that the conclu-
sion follows from the premises, there are also important differences
concerning the nature of the premises for each. For example, we are
told that demonstrative premises differ from dialectical premises in
that the demonstrator asserts “one side of a contradiction” while
the dialectician offers premises in the forms of questions (An. Pr.
24a22–24b12, Topics 104a9–15). Because a demonstration is a scien-
tific deduction and because a scientific deduction means “a deduction
by possessing which we understand something,” demonstrative de-
ductions must have premises that are true, primitive, immediate,

4
W. A. Grimaldi, Aristotle: Rhetoric I: A Commentary (New York: Fordham Univer-
sity Press, 1980), 7; Wisse, Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero, cited in n. 3 above,
19–22; G. Kennedy, Aristotle: “On Rhetoric,” A Theory of Civic Discourse (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 30; Braet, “ Ethos, Pathos and Logos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric:
A Re-Examination,” cited in n. 3 above, 307–20.
5
R. Smith, Aristotle: Prior Analytics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 24b18–20,
Smith’s translation. The sullogismos is also defined at Topics 100a25–27, Sophistical
Refutations 165a1–3, and Rhetoric 1356b16–18.
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 311

more familiar, prior to, and explanatory of the conclusion (An. Post.
71b21–23, Top. 100a25–29).
Moreover, demonstrative deductions are concerned with first
principles and idia from specific fields of inquiry (An. Post. 72a7–
8, 76a37). In contrast, the dialectician draws his premises from the
accepted responses and opinions of his opponent, êνδοξα. Dialectical
deductions do not have to meet the stricter requirements of the
demonstrative deduction, and the dialectician, like the rhetorician, is
not limited to specific fields of inquiry, as is the demonstrator, but
can roam from field to field (Topics 100a25–29; An. Post. 81b18–21;
SE 165b2–4). These different uses of the sullogismos exemplify the
claim that while the demonstration is a kind of deduction, not every
deduction is a demonstration (™ µàν γ€ρ ‚πìδειξι̋ συλλογισµì̋ τι̋, å
συλλογισµä̋ δà οÎ π̋ ‚πìδειξι̋, An. Pr. 25b31). So we are still faced
with the problem in the Rhetoric that the pistis is said to be a “kind
of demonstration.”6
Commentators have attempted to severely qualify the meaning
of apodeixis in Rh. 1355a5–8, as, for example, Kennedy’s attempt to
limit it to “probable argument” and Cope’s claim that apodeixis is “to
be understood here, as often elsewhere, as a general term including
proof of every kind.” Thus for Cope the claim that “ pistis is an
apodeixis” is a “misapplication of ‚πìδειξι̋ to rhetorical proof.”7 These
seem to be the prevailing contemporary views of apodeixis in this
passage, but the problem with the views of Cope and Kennedy is
that of the hundreds of uses of apodeixis in the Prior and Posterior
Analytics, Topics, Metaphysics, and Rhetoric, there does not seem to be
a qualified or other sense of apodeixis that is explicitly stated other
than that which is presented as “scientific knowledge” in the Prior and
Posterior Analytics. Perhaps this is why Cope does not provide a single
example from the corpus where apodeixis is used as “a general term
including proof of every kind.” 8 That is, whereas there are several

6
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. H. Treddenick, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1997); Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations, trans. E. S. Forster, (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
7
Grimaldi, “Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric,” cited in n. 3 above,
p. 21; Kennedy, Aristotle: “On Rhetoric,” A Theory of Civic Discourse, cited in n. 4 above,
p. 33, n. 22; E. M. Cope, The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary, (New York: Arno
Press, 1877, reprint 1973), 19.
8
W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1965), 501. It is worth noting here that Ross, commenting upon An. Pr. 70a7–8 (σηµεØον
δà βοÔλεται εÚναι πρìτασι̋ ‚ποδεικτικ˜ £ ‚ναγκαÐα £ êνδοξο̋), claims, echoing Cope,
that ‚ποδεικτικ  “may once in a while be used in a wider sense.” Yet the three passages
312 RHETORICA

passages in the Prior and Posterior Analytics that provide us with

distinctions among different kinds of sullogismoi, there is only one
passage in the corpus that explicitly refers to a kind of demonstration
(and, thus, that there are different kinds of demonstration as there
are different kinds of deductions) and that is our passage here— ™
δà πÐστι̋ ‚πìδειξÐ̋ τι̋. Yet understanding this passage in conjunction
with parallel passages in the Prior and Posterior Analytics suggests
that the concept of demonstration referred to in Rhetoric 1.1 is the
same as that delineated in the Analytics.
For example, surely it is correct to say that if the pistis is a
kind of demonstration then it is also to be understood as a kind
of deduction, for while we can have a deduction which is not a
demonstration, we cannot have a demonstration that is not a deduc-
tion of some kind first. This correlates with the opening lines of the
Prior Analytics where we are told that the work concerns itself with
demonstration and demonstrative science (24a10–11) and the later
claim that not all deductions are demonstrations (25b31). Later, in
2.23, we are told that “not only are the dialectical and demonstrative
deductions brought about through the [three] figures that have al-
ready been discussed, but rhetorical deductions also and absolutely
any proof whatsoever” (πλÀ̋ ™τισοÜν πÐστι̋, 68b10–13). The remain-
der of Prior Analytics then attempts to demonstrate how different
rhetorical pisteis—induction (68b15–37), example (68b38–69a19), re-
duction (69a20–69b1), objection (69b2–70a2), and probabilities and
signs (70a3–70b5)—can be reduced to or understood as demonstra-
tive deductions within the figures. As Smith notes, Prior Analytics
2.23–27 [68b15–70b5]
form a continuous investigation of several argumentative terms: “in-
duction” or “leading up to” (epagoge), “example” (paradeigma), “leading
away” (apagoge), “objection” (enstasis), “likelihood” (eikos), “sign” (se-
meion). Aristotle’s purpose is to bring “absolutely any form of conviction
[pistis] whatever arising from whatever discipline (πλÀ̋ ™τισοÜν πÐστι̋
καÈ ™ καθ' åποιανοÜν µèθοδον) under the umbrella of the deductive the-
ory of An. 1–22. As such, these Chapters form a natural continuation
of An. 1–44. The terms Aristotle discusses were all evidently part of a
technical vocabulary of rhetoric established before he began to write: his

that he offers as examples of this use— Soph. Ref. 167b8, De Gen. et Corr. 333b24, Met.
1025b13—do not support his claim. Grasping at these three passages suggests the
extreme measures that Ross pursued in trying to find passages to support his claim.
Rather, I think that Smith, as cited in n. 5 above, correctly states that “demonstration
does not seem to admit of degrees” (p. 151).
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 313

purpose here is not to define these terms for the uninitiated, but to show
how they may be fitted into the account of deductions in the figures.9

Initially, two points are worth noting. First, neither ethos, pathos,
nor logos are included here as “any proofs whatsoever” or, as Smith
notes, any rhetorical proofs. Second, this passage from the Prior Ana-
lytics corresponds very closely with the claim from the anonymous
Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum that rhetorical proofs from words and ac-
tions and men themselves include probabilities, examples, tekmeria,
enthymemes, maxims, signs, and refutations (Rackham 1428a19–22).
So, in addition to correlating with a possibly contemporary rhetor-
ical text wherein the pisteis are understood to be probabilities, exam-
ples, tekmeria, enthymemes, maxims, signs, and refutations, the Prior
Analytics may also be the closest parallel we have for understand-
ing a pistis as a kind of demonstration in the Aristotelian sense of
apodeixis. For in Prior Analytics 2.27, we are told that a probability
differs from a sign. A probability is a generally accepted premise
(εÊκì̋ âστι πρìτασι̋ êνδοξο̋) such as “People hate those they envy,”
whereas a sign means either a necessary or an accepted demonstra-
tive premise (πρìτασι̋ ‚ποδεικτικ˜ £ ‚ναγκαÐα £ êνδοξο̋, 70a3–8).
That is, a sign, as one of the pisteis of 2.23, can be taken in three ways,
“corresponding to the ways the middle term in the figures is taken”
(70a11). As explained in Book 1 of the Prior Analytics, a figure is a
deduction the premises of which share one common or middle term
and the other two terms are called extremes. These figures can take
three forms. If the middle term (M) is the subject (S) of one premise
and the predicate (P) of the other, the sullogismos is in the first and
most authoritative figure; if the middle term is the predicate of both,
it is in the second figure; and if the middle term is subject of both, it is
the third figure.
In An. Pr. 27, an example of the sign in the first figure (heretofore
unnamed) is that because a woman has milk, she is pregnant. As a
first figure sullogismos, this would be written
M P
All [those] having milk are pregnant.
S M
This woman has milk.
S P
This woman is pregnant.

9
Smith, Aristotle: Prior Analytics, cited in n. 5 above, p. 219.
314 RHETORICA

The sign that the woman is pregnant is that she has milk, and we
are told that, as a demonstrative premise, it cannot be refuted. Next,
examples of signs that conform to the second and third figures are
then considered, and these can be refuted because the conclusion
does not follow from the premises. This distinction between signs
and deductions that are irrefutable seems to correlate with the earlier
claim that “not every deduction is a demonstration” (An. Pr. 25b31),
as the deductive examples in the second and third figure do not
prove the conclusions from the premises and, as a result, are not
demonstrative in the sense that signs in the first figure are said to
be demonstrative.
This first-figure sign is also discussed in the Rhetoric where it is
named a tekmerion. Whereas signs were distinguished in the Prior
Analytics according to how they fit within the figures, in the Rhetoric
we are told that there are necessary and non-necessary signs and
that the tekmerion is the necessary sign. Moreover, it is from these
necessary signs that the sullogismos comes about (‚ναγκαØα µàν οÞν
λèγω âξ Áν γÐνεται συλλογισµì̋, 1357b5–6). It is worth noting that
Grimaldi translates this as “by necessary signs I mean those from
which the strictly demonstrative syllogism comes,” and explains, “I
add the words ‘strictly demonstrative’ because that is the meaning of
συλλογισµì̋ here,” and he cites An. Po. 73a24, “strict demonstration
is the syllogism from necessary premises” which is his translation of âξ
‚ναγκαÐων Šρα συλλογισµì̋ âστιν ™ ‚πìδειξι̋. He continues that the
tekmerion “introduces into rhetoric the character of reasoning found
in the Analytics” and that Aristotle identifies the tekmerion “with the
middle term of the first figure syllogism, the usual figure for the
strictly scientific syllogism.” 10
This corresponds with An. Post. 1.14 where we are told that first
figure is the “most scientific” (âπιστηµονικäν µˆλιστα) of the figures,
that through this figure alone one can “hunt for understanding what
a thing is,” that this figure has “no need of others,” and that “the
first figure is the most important [or authoritative] for understand-
ing” (κυρι¸τατον τοÜ âπÐστασθαι, 79a32), which may also parallel the
enthymeme as the most authoritative of the proofs in Rhetoric 1355a7.
Yet even though Grimaldi recognizes the parallels between the tek-
merion of the Rhetoric and Prior Analytics with the authority granted
the first figure in the Posterior Analytics, he then seems to vacillate
on this similarity by stating that the tekmerion cannot be understood

10
Grimaldi, Aristotle: Rhetoric I: A Commentary, cited in n. 4 above, p. 65. See also
Posterior Analytics 1.6.
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 315

as a “strict apodeictic protasis which leads to complete knowledge”

because the tekmerion only explains the fact and not “the reason for
the fact” (65–6). But even deductions that explain or prove only the
fact are still considered to be “demonstrative” as the discussion of
the two demonstrations concerning the nearness of the planets in An.
Post. 78a35ff. seems to illustrate.11
The passage in the Rhetoric continues—“when they think that it
is not possible to refute that which has been said, then they think that
they are bringing a tekmerion—as proved and completed,” and that
of all the signs, only the tekmerion, if it is true, is irrefutable (Šλυτον,
1357b7–8, 17). This coincides with the Prior Analytics wherein we
are told that a sullogismos in the first figure, if its premises are true,
cannot be refuted (Šλυτον, 70a30), as Smith notes, “because it is a
proof” (227). The parallels between the Rhetoric and the Analytics are
striking.
We are told next in the Rhetoric that the enthymeme is a rhetorical
demonstration (êστι δ' ‚πìδειξι̋ ûητορικ˜ âνθÔµηµα, 1355a6). This is a
curious statement in that it does not say that the rhetorical sullogis-
mos is the enthymeme, but that the “rhetorical demonstration is the
enthymeme.” As noted above, there are important differences be-
tween the apodeixis and the sullogismos, and there are many passages
in the corpus that explain that there are different kinds of sullogis-
moi—dialectical, demonstrative, sophistical, and rhetorical—and in
the definition of a sullogismos in the Rhetoric, we are told that the en-
thymeme is the rhetorical sullogismos (1356b16–18). But, again, we are
never told explicitly that there are different kinds of demonstrations
but rather that a demonstration is a (specific) kind of sullogismos (™
µàν γ€ρ ‚πìδειξι̋ συλλογισµì̋ τι̋, An. Pr. 25b30) in language that is
strikingly similar to the claim here in our passage that the enthymeme
is a kind of sullogismos (τä δ' âνθÔµηµα συλλογισµì̋ τι̋, Rhet. 1355a8).
To add to the confusion, we are then told that the enthymeme
“is, generally speaking, the most authoritative of the proofs” (καÈ êστι
τοÜτο ±̋ ε-ÊπεØν πλÀ̋ κυρι¸τατον τÀν πÐστεων, 1355a8). This claim
seems to contradict the later claim in 1.2 that ethos is “so to speak, the
most authoritative proof” (σχεδäν ±̋ εÊπεØν κυριωτˆτην êχει πÐστιν τä
ªθο̋, 1356a13).
This latter passage is the foundation of Eugene Garver’s argu-
ment that ethos is the most authoritative of the proofs. He states, for
example, that “the enthymeme is the body of rhetoric, and charac-

11
This discussion in 78a35 is not without its difficulties. See Barnes’s commentary
in Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. J. Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 156.
316 RHETORICA

ter is its soul,” and continues that “Aristotle can assert on the one
hand that the enthymeme is the body of proof∼and that ‘we most be-
lieve when we suppose something to have been demonstrated’ (1.1,
1355a5–6), and on the other, that character is the most persuasive
of proofs (1.2, 1356a13).” He further elaborates upon this distinction
between enthymeme and ethos: “On the one hand, he [Aristotle] says
that the enthymeme is the strongest (malista) of rhetorical proofs (1.1,
1355a5) and the body of proof (1354a15). On the other, he tells us,
a page later, that character (ethos) is the most persuasive (kuriotaten)
kind of proof (pistis) (1.2, 1356a13).” What Garver does not tell us,
though, is that the text of Rhetoric 1.1, as I have pointed out above, tells
us that the enthymeme is the “most authoritative” (kuriotaton) of the
proofs (1355a3–7). It is important to note that the text at 1355a7 does
not say that the enthymeme is the “strongest” (malista) of the proofs,
as Garver renders it. Rather, the enthymeme as the rhetorical demon-
stration, is the “most authoritative” or “most effective” (kuriotaton) of
the proofs, and as a demonstration, the rhetorical enthymeme would
be “most convincing” (πιστεÔοµεν µˆλιστα).
There is a glaring inconsistency between these two passages.
Most commentators overlook important conceptual differences be-
tween (1) the enthymeme as the rhetorical demonstration which is
the most authoritative pistis and (2) ethos as the most authoritative
pistis. Garver’s attempt to unite or integrate 1.1 with 1.2 is, in my view,
mistaken, but just one more way that contemporary commentators
have attempted to reconcile the problem of different conceptions of
proofs in 1.1 and 1.2.12

Ethos, pathos, and logos in 1.2

It is possible to try to understand many of the things that were

called pisteis in fourth-century BCE Greek culture—induction, exam-
ple, reduction, objection, and probabilities and signs—“within the
figures.” But ethos, pathos, and logos are not mentioned as “any kind
of proof whatsoever” in the Prior Analytics, and there is nothing in
the preceding or ensuing discussion therein that would cause one
to think that ethos or pathos play any role whatsoever in either the
rhetorical pisteis mentioned in 2.23 or within the broader discussion
of inference in either the Prior or Posterior Analytics.

12
E. Garver, Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994), 150, 151, 173.
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 317

In Rhetoric 1.2, we are told that, in sharp contrast to 1.1, there are
three entechnic pisteis, each of which is furnished through the speech
(or argument) itself (1356a1–4). It is important to note that there is no
indication in the text that either ethos or pathos is to be understood
here as inferential or cognitive in any sense. Rather, we are told
that persuasion is effected through the moral character (ethos) of the
one speaking and that this moral character—not the argumentative
form—is made evident through the speech. That is, the virtues,
practical wisdom, and goodwill of the speaker are made known
because of the way the speaker presents himself during the course of
his presentation. There is nothing here to suggest, as Braet, Gross and
Dascal, and Garver do,13 that ethos must or even could be presented
through enthymemes that are invested with moral qualities. That is
not at all the point. The admonition from the pseudo-Demosthenic
speech Against Callippus to the jury to be weary of ethical appeals
may illustrate what the point really is ([Dem.] 52.1):
There is no situation harder to deal with, men of the jury, than when
a man possessing both reputation and ability to speak is audacious
enough to lie and is well provided with witnesses. For it becomes
necessary for the defendant, no longer to speak merely about the facts of
the case, but about the character of the speaker himself, and to show
that he ought not to be believed on account of his reputation. If you
are to establish the custom that those who are able speakers and who
enjoy a reputation are more to be believed than men of less ability, it
will be against yourselves that you will have established this custom.
(trans. Murray)

What the speaker warns his audience against in this passage is what
is censured in 1.1 as outside the matter and what is advocated as the
most authoritative pistis in Rhetoric 1.2. Any attempt to equate the
conception of ethos in 1.2 with apodeictic or enthymematic argumen-
tation of 1.1 seriously misses the point of what is said in 1.2.
It is the same with pathos. In 1.2, we are told that proof by pathos
is realized when the audience is disposed in a certain way (1356a3).
Moreover, the text states that they are to be induced into emotion
by the speech (εÊ̋ πˆθο̋ Íπä τοÜ λìγου προαχθÀσιν, 1356a14), not
addressed in syllogistic, apodeictic, cognitive, or inferential forms. It
is also important to note that this same word, “induced” (προαχθÀσιν)

13
Braet, “Ethos, Pathos and Logos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Re-Examination”
cited in n. 3 above, pp. 312–13; Gross and Dascal, “The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle’s
Rhetoric,” cited in n. 3 above, p. 281ff; Garver, Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character,
cited in n. 12 above, pp. 179–83.
318 RHETORICA

is used in 1.1 where pathos is explicitly censured—“for it is wrong to

tweak [or warp] the judge while inducing (προˆγοντα̋) him unto
anger, jealousy, or compassion” (1354a25). Again, enthymematic or
cognitive forms are not the point here at all, but, rather, the inducing
of emotions—and the same inducing of emotions that is forcefully
censured in 1.1.
Further, a substantial number of passages in Aristotle explicitly
state that pathos is the antithesis of rationality, though, interestingly
enough, they are never cited by commentators. Of the many pas-
sages that could be cited, consider the following (Nicomachean Ethics
1095a2–11):
This is why a youth is not a suitable student of political science; for
he lacks experience of the actions of life, which are the subject and
premises of our arguments. Moreover, since he tends to follow his
feelings (πˆθεσιν), his study will be futile and useless; for the end [of
political science] is action, not knowledge. It does not matter whether he
is young in years or immature in character, since the deficiency does not
depend on age, but results from following his feelings (κατ€ πˆθο̋) in his
life and in a given pursuit; for an immature person, like an incontinent
person, gets no benefit from his knowledge. But for those who accord
with reason in forming their desires and in their actions, knowledge of
political science will be of great benefit. (trans. Irwin)

This distinction between pathos and rationality is very common in the

Nicomachean Ethics: “Human beings as well as beasts find it painful
to be angered, and pleasant to exact a penalty. But those who fight for
these reasons are not brave, though they are good fighters; for they
fight because of their feelings, not because of the fine nor as reason
prescribes” (EN 1117a6–9; cf. 1145b11–14). We are also warned about
those who are carried away by passion who do not act according
to “right reason” (EN 1150a20–27), told that violent actions are the
result of following passions rather than waiting on reason (1150b19–
28), advised that those who are ruled by passion are unjust (1135b16ff;
cf. 1134a16–21), and informed that those who “live by passion pursue
their own pleasures” and do not even have a clue what is noble or
truly pleasant (1179b4ff). Finally, we are also told that “someone who
lives in accord with his feelings (κατ€ πˆθο̋) would not even listen to
an argument turning him away, or comprehend it [if he did listen];
and in that state how could he be persuaded to change? And, in
general, feelings (τä πˆθο̋) seem to yield to force, not to argument”
(1179b27–29).
Many other passages could be cited that clearly distinguish be-
tween pathos and reason to the detriment of the former, but enough
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 319

have been offered here to make the point. In sharp contrast with
recent commentators on the emotions in Aristotle, there is substan-
tial textual support to suggest that there is a considerable thread
in the corpus that indicates that pathos is to be understood not as
a rational or cognitive aspect of rhetoric and certainly not as en-
thymematic, much less apodeictic, but as one of those qualities that
belong to the incontinent, the young, and the irrational. These unfa-
vorable characteristics of pathos are not only not acknowledged by
recent commentators, but are also consistent with the detrimental
view of the evoking of pathe in 1.1 and the advocating of “leading
unto emotion” in 1.2. Moreover, if the same person who penned these
passages on pathos in the Nicomachean Ethics is also the same person
who advocates persuasion through pathos in the Rhetoric, then we
have another glaring, conceptual inconsistency. It seems difficult to
reconcile the detrimental view of pathos in the Ethics with the view in
the Rhetoric that the ethical rhetor—one who exemplifies φρìνησι̋,
‚ρετ , and εÖνοια—would stoop to appealing to the emotions in order
to persuade.
The final point in considering whether ethos and pathos are to
be understood as rational, cognitive, or enthymematic is the mud-
dled presentation of both in the Rhetoric. While many contemporary
commentators rely upon Rhetoric 2.1, 2.2–11, and 2.12–17 to show
that pathos and ethos are rational or enthymematic, there is hardly a
consensus among scholars that the passages that discuss ethos and
pathos in Book 2 of the Rhetoric follow from the earlier, and very brief,
remarks concerning ethos and pathos as entechnic pisteis in 1.2. Con-
cerning the section on the emotions in 2.2–11, for example, Kennedy
notes that this passage “seems to have originated in some other con-
text and been only partially adapted to the specific needs of a speaker.
With few exceptions (e.g., 2.3.13 and 6.20, 24) the examples given are
not drawn from rhetorical situations: and some (e.g., 2.2.10–11) do
not at all fit a deliberative, judicial, or epideictic audience”; and many
of the passages “seem to be afterthoughts, tacked on to the discus-
sion to adapt them to their present context.” As for the section on
ethos, Kennedy suggests that this was “almost certainly written in
a different—nonrhetorical—context and only added to the Rhetoric
at a later stage, without adequate revision to integrate them into the
objectives of the treatise.”14

14
Kennedy, Aristotle: “On Rhetoric,” A Theory of Civic Discourse,” cited in n. 4 above,
pp. 122, 164.
320 RHETORICA

There has been little discussion in the literature as to whether or

not logos, the third entechnic pistis in 1.2, differs from the enthymeme
of 1.1. It just seems to be tacitly accepted that it does not. Yet two
important differences merit consideration. First, the third entechnic
proof in 1.2 is “in the argument itself, through showing or appearing
to show” (âν αÎτÀú λìγωú δι€ τοÜ δεικνÔναι £ φαÐνεσθαι δεικνÔναι,
1356a2–4). The latter phrase—“through showing or appearing to
show”—is a curious expression and, while the corpus has much to say
about “appearing to prove,” 15 the Sophistical Refutations provides the
closest parallel. Sophistical Refutations concerns itself with arguments
that appear to be refutations but really are not. Therein we are told
that there are those (sophists) who think it more profitable to seem
to reason and refute but who really do not (165a15–32). These who
prefer only apparent reasoning (φαινìµενοι συλλογιστικοÐ) but who
do not really reason are said to be contentious (âριστικοÐ, 165b7–8,
171b7–8) because their apparent reasoning “apparently accords with
the subject matter and so is deceptive and unfair” (171b 21–22). The
sophistical art, therefore, is a “money-making art that relies upon
apparent wisdom (σοφÐα̋ φαινοµèνη̋) and, as such, sophists aim at
apparent proof” (φαινοµèνη̋ ‚ποδεÐξεω̋) (171b28–30).16
This raises the question as to whether the text in the Rhetoric is
advocating that the third traditional entechnic pistis (âν αÎτÀú λìγωú δι€
τοÜ δεικνÔναι £ φαÐνεσθαι δεικνÔναι) relies upon sophistical trickery.
In response, we are also told in Rhetoric 1.4 that rhetoric is, in part,
“like sophistical discourses” (1359b11–12). While Grimaldi rejects
the idea that rhetoric “engages in deception,” the text says that
the third entechnic pistis is realized “through proving or appearing
to prove” (1356a4). The text is not qualified so as to suggest that
the rhetor would only need to understand apparent proving. The
idea that rhetoric does have a detrimentally sophistical element to it
is then cryptically reiterated a few lines later, again without any
qualification—“they are convinced through the arguments when
we show the truth or that which is apparent” (1356a19–20). Thus,
when the text later says that rhetoric “resembles partly dialectic and
partly sophistical arguments” (1359b11–12), it seems to be referring
to this aspect of sophistical argumentation since no other aspect of
sophistical argumentation is mentioned between the two passages.

15
R. Smith, Aristotle: Topics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 47–50. See especially
Topics 100b23–25 and Robin Smith’s discussion of the same.
16
Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, trans. E. S. Forester (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1992).
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 321

Cope, is, therefore, right, in claiming that this “denotes the fallacious
branch of rhetoric.”17
The second point of comparison between the traditional third
pistis and enthymemes as rhetorical apodeixis is that whereas in 1.1
the enthymeme is the substance of proof (σÀµα τ¨̋ πÐστεω̋), in 1.2,
we are told that concerning “proving and apparent proving” there
is both the rhetorical sullogismos (enthymeme) and the rhetorical
epagoge (example) and that “all [speakers] make proofs from proving,
stating either examples or enthymemes and through nothing else
besides these” (πˆντε̋ δà τ€̋ πÐστει̋ ποιοÜνται δι€ τοÜ δεικνÔναι £
παραδεÐγµατα λèγοντε̋ £ âνθυµ µατα, καÈ παρ€ ταÜτα οÎδèν, 1356b5–
7). Two details in this passage merit consideration. First, whereas
the enthymeme, as the rhetorical apodeixis, is the substance of and
the most authoritative pistis in 1.1, in 1.2 it now shares its seemingly
relegated position with the example as the means by which showing
and apparent showing are realized. Thus, enthymeme and example
seem to serve a lesser role than ethos and pathos, both of which, by
contrast, were denounced in 1.1.
Second, in 1.1 we are told that pisteis are made through the com-
mon things (1355a27), and the discussion of “the common things”
(ta koina) in 1.1 closely parallels the conception of ta koina in the
Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics.18 That is, ta koina are commonly
recognized principles that are applicable to any field of inquiry such
as the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, and
the law that when equals are subtracted from equals then that which
remains are equals. But in Rhetoric 1.2, we are told that all the pisteis
are made through the enthymeme and example and through nothing
else at all besides these. There is an enormous conceptual difference
between “proofs said from the common things” and “proofs said
from enthymemes and examples.” As the means by which showing
and appearing to show are effected, the latter formulation is further
complicated by the claim a little further along in 1.2 that “Most of the
enthymemes are from these specifics which are called particular and
peculiar, fewer from the common things” (1358a26–28). This broader

17
Grimaldi, Aristotle: Rhetoric I: A Commentary, cited in n. 4 above, p.91. Concern-
ing φαινìµενον, Cope, The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary, cited in n. 7 above,
maintains that it “denotes the fallacious branch of Rhetoric, ‘the apparent, unreal,
sham’ arguments, exemplified in II.24, and corresponding to the spurious branch of
Dialectics treated in the Sophistical Refutations” (32).
18
For discussion, see B. McAdon, “Probabilities, Signs, Necessary Signs, Idia,
and Topoi: The Confusing Discussion of Materials for Enthymemes in the Rhetoric,”
Philosophy and Rhetoric 36 (2003): 223–48.
322 RHETORICA

discussion of the materials from which enthymemes are composed

is exceptionally inconsistent (and will be discussed in more detail
below).
I have argued for two points: that there are significant conceptual
and theoretical inconsistencies between the traditionally understood
entechnic pisteis of 1.2— ethos, pathos, and logos—and the entechnic
pisteis as apodeictic in 1.1; and that there are considerable problems
with understanding ethos and pathos as inferential, rational, or cogni-
tive aspects of rhetoric. These problems include the fact that neither
ethos nor pathos was understood in any inferential sense in the Prior
Analytics’ list of “any pistis whatsoever” or its broader discussion
of inference; that ethos was understood by Aristotelian contempo-
raries (pseudo-Demosthenes) as no more than the presentation of
character and discouraged; that passages from the corpus indicate
that pathos is the antithesis of rationality and is in no sense consid-
ered to be apodeictic; and that much of the evidence provided to
support the claims that ethos and pathos are rational or inferential
is derived from passages within the Rhetoric that, in their original
form, possibly have nothing at all to do with rhetoric and have been
appended to another text (or other texts) by someone else at a later
time. Finally, we also have the unambiguous assertion in Book 3 that
enthymemes should not be sought when attempting to invoke ethos
or pathos, and that “demonstration has neither ethos nor moral pur-
pose” (οÎ γ€ρ êχει οÖτε ªθο̋ οÖτε προαÐρεσιν ™ ‚πìδειξι̋, 1418a16–17).
This clearly suggests that there is no rational or cognitive aspect of
ethos or pathos. The claim “in the argument itself through showing
and to appear to show” (= traditional logos) also contains glaring
inconsistency and confusion between 1.1 and 1.2. There are two dif-
ferent conceptions of enthymeme: as rhetorical apodeixis and the most
authoritative proof (1.1); and, along with example, as the means of
sophistic demonstration (1.2).
These thematic inconsistencies in conjunction with the docu-
mented turbulent editorial and composition history of the corpus
Aristotelicum lead me to believe that the text, as we have it, is a
compilation of originally separate texts that have been (confusedly)
reworked into what we now have, rather than a text that is unified
(so Grimaldi) or conceptually coherent (Gross and Daschal). In ad-
dition to the inconsistencies in the Rhetoric that I have discussed, I
will briefly mention two more that are closely related to the confusing
and inconsistent discussion of the enthymeme and the materials from
which enthymemes are derived.
In conjunction with the Prior Analytics, we understand the en-
thymeme in syllogistic terms within the figures, as the tekmerion in-
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 323

dicates, especially if enthymemes are somehow derived from tekme-

ria, as both the Prior Analytics (70a11) and the Rhetoric (1357a32–33)
claim. We are also told in the Prior Analytics that if one premise is
stated, then we get only a sign, but if the other is added, then we get
a full-fledged deduction (70a24–25), and the two examples provided
therein clearly indicate this principle (70a25–28). Yet in the Rhetoric
we are told that the enthymeme is deduced from few premises, fewer
than the first sullogismos (τä δ' âνθÔµηµα συλλογισµìν, καÈ âξ æλÐγων
τε καÈ πολλˆκι̋ âλαττìνων £ âξ Áν å πρÀτο̋ συλλογισµì̋, 1357a16–
17) and that it is not necessary to state all the premises since the
audience can supply them. We are also provided with an example of
an enthymeme that, according to the statement in the Prior Analytics,
should be a sign since it omits a premise—“that Dorieus has won a
contest with a crown it is enough to have said that he has won the
Olympic games, and there is no need to add that the Olympic games
have a crown for the prize, for everybody knows that” (1357a17–21).19
Clearly, there are numerous inconsistencies in the Aristotelian texts
concerning the nature of the enthymeme. This confusion is due, I
submit, not to scholars’ inability to understand the enthymeme, but
to their attempts to find a unified meaning of the term from within
the confusion and inconsistency of the text itself.
Closely related to the confusing discussion of the enthymeme in
the Rhetoric are the similarly confusing references to the materials
from which enthymemes are derived. For example, we are told that
enthymemes are distinguished as being derived from either proba-
bilities, signs, or necessary signs, the former two as general pisteis
(âπÈ τä πολÔ) whereas the latter is necessary (‚νˆγκη, 1357a22). We
are then told that enthymemes are drawn from either idia or topoi
in common (οÉ κοιν¨ù, 1358a1–2). In addition to the conceptual differ-
ences between, on the one hand, probabilities, signs, and necessary
signs and, on the other, idia and topoi, there is also a conceptual dif-
ference between idia and topoi, as these terms are distinguished in the
Posterior Analytics. Therein we are told that “Of those things used in
demonstrative sciences, some are peculiar to each science and some
are common” (êστι δ' Áν χρÀνται âν ταØ̋ ‚ποδεικτικαØ̋ âπιστ µαι̋ τ€
µàν Òδια áκˆστη̋ âπιστ µη̋, τ€ δà κοινˆ, 76a37–38). In Rhetoric 1.2 yet
another conception of τ€ κοινˆ is presented in addition to that in both
the Posterior Analytics and Rhetoric 1.1.
For example, we are told in the Posterior Analytics that the com-
mon (principles or things) are foundational principles (or axioms)

19
Kennedy’s translation, Aristotle: On Rhetoric, cited in n. 4 above.
324 RHETORICA

that one must grasp in order to know anything (76b12, 72a17),

whereas in Rhetoric 1.2 we are told that learning these topoi in com-
mon (οÉ κοιν¨ù) will not make anyone the wiser concerning any sub-
ject (κ‚κεØνα µàν οÎ ποι σει περÈ οÎδàν γèνο̋ êµφρονα, 1358a21–2).
Moreover, we are also told that in sharp contrast to the role of the
enthymeme in the rhetorical demonstration of 1.1, the enthymeme
is one of the common proofs (1393a23–24). The conception of en-
thymemes and their relation to common topoi in 2.22–23 is also
muddled. Thus, on the question of the materials from which en-
thymemes are derived, the Rhetoric seems to use ideas from the Prior
Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, and the Topics, but never integrates
those ideas into a consistent conception.
Other features of the Rhetoric that have so far resisted explana-
tion include the relation between the discussion of pathos in 2.2–11
and the discussion of pathos in 1.2, the parallel problem concerning
ethos in 2.12.-18, as well as the relation of book 3 to books 1–2. At-
tributing these well known problems to the turbulent transmission
and editorial history of the corpus Aristotelicum is, as Fortenbaugh
notes, “an old idea.” 20 Yet an understanding of the transmission and
editorial history of the corpus is rarely incorporated into an inter-
pretation of the Rhetoric either in whole or in part. This is not the
case with other Aristotelian texts. Michael Frede, for example, has
recently acknowledged that the Aristotelian Metaphysics “as it has
come down to us clearly is not a treatise written in one piece. It
is a compilation of rather heterogeneous materials.” He continues
that there is now “general agreement on one fact which is of great
importance for the student of Metaphysics Λ. Λ originally seems to

20
Fortenbaugh, “Persuasion Through Character and the Composition of Aristo-
tle’s Rhetoric,” cited in n. 3 above, p. 153. For discussion of the issue see Strabo, Geography,
vol. 6, trans. H. L. Jones, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 13.1.54;
Plutarch, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 4, trans. B. Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1968), Sulla 26; J. Barnes, “Roman Aristotle,” Philosophical Togata II:
Plato and Aristotle at Rome, eds. J. Barnes and M. Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997), 3–69; I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Acta Universi-
tatis Gothoburgensis: Göteborgs Universitfts Arsskrift, LXIII), 412–26 and “Notes on
the History of the Transmission of Aristotle’s Writings,” Goteborgs Hogskolas Arsskrift
56 (1950): 37–70; A. H. Chroust “The Miraculous Disappearance and Recovery of the
Corpus Aristotelicum,” Classica et Mediaevalia 23 (1978): 50–67; H. B. Gottschalk, “Aris-
totelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the Time of Cicero to the End of the
Second Century A.D,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (Berlin: De Gruyter,
1990), 1079–174; Richard Shute, On the History and Process by which the Aristotelian
Writings Arrived at their Present Form (New York: Arno Press, 1888, reprint 1976); F.
Grayeff, “The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle’s Text,” Phronesis 1 (1956): 105–22.
Rhetorical Proofs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 325

have constituted a treatise of its own which only later was inserted
into the Metaphysics.” He continues:
This assumption brings with it a certain approach to the text. If it
originally was an independent treatise, we should approach it as such.
And that is to say that in our interpretation of it we should not feel
constrained by the assumption that the view it presents has to fit in
with the view presented by what precedes and what follows Λ in
the Metaphysics, that the arguments it advances fit in with an overall
argument of the rest of the Metaphysics. For, given that the questions
the Metaphysics raises as a text have not been fully resolved, we do
not even know whether there is such a thing as an overall argument
of the Metaphysics, whether there is an overall view presented by this
writing. We do not even know whether all the parts are informed by
one and the same conception of the metaphysical enterprise. It seems
safe to say that Λ is a metaphysical treatise, but we should not even
presume from the outset that the conception of metaphysics underlying
it is the same as that underlying other parts of the Metaphysics. In this
sense we should approach it as a treatise by itself, try to understand
it on its own terms, without letting our understanding of this text be
prejudged and constrained by what we believe we know about the rest
of the Metaphysics so as to bring Λ in line with the text as a whole.21

Much of what Frede says is directly applicable to the Rhetoric—that

our approach to the text entertains the false assumption that portions
should “fit in with what precedes and follows,” that the argument
within is meant to be coherent, and that there is one conception
of rhetoric therein that is informed by the same unified mind. In
light of the transmission of the corpus and the inconsistencies in the
text that I have attempted to point out, these are surely unfounded
assumptions; yet, they seem to prevail in contemporary approaches
to the text. Only by considering the transmission of the Rhetoric
while attempting to interpret it will it be possible to understand
the differences in the text on their own terms and gain a better
understanding of the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition.

21
M. Frede, “Introduction,” Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristote-
licum, eds. M. Frede and D. Charles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 1, 4–5.